ZAPANTA VS.

POSADAS
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lNTERNAL REVENUE; INHERITANCE TAX

UPON
DONATIONS.The
principal
characteristics of a donation mortis causa, which
distinguish it essentially from a donation inter
vivos, are that in the former it is the donor's
death that determines the acquisition of, or the
right to, the property, and that it is revocable at
the will of the donor. In the donations in
question, their effect, that is, the acquisition of,
or the right to, the property, was produced while
the donor was still alive, for, according to their
expressed terms they were to have this effect
upon acceptance, and this took place during the
donor's lifetime.
2.ID.; ID.Neither can these donations be
considered as an advance on inheritance or
legacy, according to the terms of section 1536 of
the Administrative Code, because they are
neither an inheritance nor a legacy. And it cannot
be said that the plaintiffs received such advance
on inheritance or legacy, since they were not
heirs or legatees of their predecessor in interest
upon his death (sec. 1540 of the Administrative
Code). Neither can it be said that they obtained
this inheritance or legacy by virtue of a
document which does not contain the requisites
of a will (sec. 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure).

BONSATO VS. CA
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VDA DE ROCES VS. POSADAS

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INHERITANCE TAX; GlFTS 'INTER VlVOS";

SECTION 1540, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE.
The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the
Revised Administrative Code are, obviously,
those donations inter vivos that take effect
immediately or during the lifetime of the donor,
but are made in consideration of his death. Gifts
inter vivos, the transmission of which is not
made in consideration of the donor's death,
should not be understood as included within the
said legal provision for the reason that it would
be equivalent to levying a direct tax on property
and not on the transmission thereof, which act is
not within the scope of the provisions contained
in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code referring expressly
to tax on inheritances, legacies and other
acquisitions mortis causa.

INTERPRETATION.Such interpretation of
the law is not in conflict with the rule laid down
in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas
(54 Phil., 289), wherein it was said that the
expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos,
because the law considers them as advances in
anticipation of inheritance in the sense that they
are gifts inter vivos made in consideration of
death. In that case, it was not held that that kind
of gifts consisted in those made completely
independent of death or without regard to it.

REQUISITES OF A DISPOSITION "MORTIS

CAUSA".A disposition post mortem should
reveal the following characteristics: (1) the
transferor retains the ownership (full or naked)
and control the property while alive; (2) the
transfer is revocable, before his death, by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; and (3) the transfer
should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.
3.ID.; DONATIONS "INTER Vivos".If the
donor conveys the ownership and only reserves
for himself during his lifetime the owner's share
of the fruits or procedure, and the deed expressly
declares the act to be "irrevocable", it is not a
donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter
vivos.
DONATIONS "MORTIS CAUSA"; CASES
THEREON.In the cases held by the Supreme
Court to be transfers mortis causa and declared
invalid for not having been executed with the
formalities of testaments, the circumstances
clearly indicated the transferor's intention to
defer the passing of title until after his death.
5.DONATIONS "INTER Vivos"; REQUISITES.
The solemnities required for a donation inter
vivos are those prescribed by article 633 of the
Civil Code of 1889

PUIG VS. PENAFLORIDA

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Donations; Inter vivos and mortis causa;

Distinguished.The Spanish Civil Code of
1889 (Art. 620) as well as the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Art. 728), admit only gratuitous
transfers of title or real rights to property either
by way of donation inter vivos or else by way of
last will and testament, executed with the

requisite legal formalities. In the first case, the

act is immediately operative, even if the actual
execution may be deferred until the death of the
donor; in the second, nothing is conveyed to the
grantee and nothing is acquired by the latter,
until the death of the grantor-testator, the
disposition being until then ambulatory and not
Same; Same; Conveyance or alienation
revocable at the discretion of donor.In
dispositions mortis causa conveyance or
alienation is revocable ad nutum, i.e., at the
discretion of the grantor or so-called "donor"
simply because the latter has changed his mind
Same; Same; Specification of whereby be
revoked.The specification in the deed of
donation of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation
is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis
causa
Same; Same; Designation of the donation as
mortis causa not controlling criterion.The
designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the
donation is "to take effect at the death of the
donor" are not controlling; such statements are
to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor (Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, supra; Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, supra).
Same; Same; Rules governing conveyance for
enerous consideration.A conveyance for
onerous consideration is governed by the rules
of contracts and not by those of donation or
testament
Same; Same; Nature of donation in case of
doubt.In case of doubt, the conveyance should
be deemed donation inter vivos rather than
mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to
the ownership of the property subject of the
deed.
Same; Same; Compliance or binding effect of
donation cannot be left to the sole will of
grantor.Defendant-appellant's argument that
the stipulated power of the grantor to encumber
or alienate the property to persons, other than
the donee, at any time before the grantor dies,
should be viewed as a mere resolutory condition
that does not contradict but confirms the
immediate effectivity of the donation is not
legally tenable, since it ignores the circumstance
that the co-called "resolutory condition" is one
purely dependent upon the exclusive will of the

grantor, and is proof that the deed, as executed,

is not obligatory at all (Civ. Code of 1889, Art.
1115; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1182).
Confirming the rule, both the old and the new
Civil Codes prescribe that the effectivity,
compliance, or binding effect of contracts cannot
be left to the sole will of one of the parties (Art.
1256, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 1308, Civil Code
of the Philippines).

BALAQUI VS. DANGSON

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DONATIONS; DONATIONS "INTER VlVOS"

AND DONATIONS "MORTIS CAUSA;"
DISTINCTION BETWEEN."A donation
mortis causa differs from a donation inter vivos
in that it is made, as its name implies, in
consideration of death or mortal peril, without
the donor's intention to lose the thing or its free
disposal in case of survival, as in testamentary
dispositions, and that such is the definition
contained in the laws of the Instituta and the
Digesto, and in law 11, title 4, Partida 5, cited in
the first assignment of error, as well as in article
620 of the Civil Code, in providing that the gifts
to be governed by the rules of testamentary
succession are those taking effect upon the
donor's death; and that donations inter vivos are
those made without such consideration, but out
of the donor's pure generosity and the recipient's
deserts, although the subject matter is not
delivered at once, or the delivery is to be made
post mortem, which is a simple matter of form
and does not change the nature of the act, and
such gifts are irrevocable, especially if without a
price and onerous in character." (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of January 28, 1898.)
ID. ; ID. ; ID.As the donor guaranteed the
right which she conferred on the donee by virtue
of the deed of gift, wherein, by way of
recompense for the latter's good services, she
donates to her the two parcels of land with their
improvements, said gift is inter vivos and
irrevocable,
and
not
mortis
causa,
notwithstanding the fact that the donor stated in
said deed that she did not transfer the ownership
of the two parcels of land donated, save upon
her death, for such a statement can mean nothing
else than that she only reserved to herself the
possession and usufruct of said property, and
because the donor could not very well guaranty

the aforesaid right after her death. [Balaqui vs.

Dongso, 53 Phil. 673(1929)]

mandatory.Section 119, paragraph (b)(1) and

(c) of the Tax Code does not confer on the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or on the
courts any power and discretion not to impose
the 1% interest monthly and the 5% surcharge
for delay in payment of the gift tax already
assessed.

PIROVANO VS. CIR

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Taxation; Gift tax; Donation out of gratitude for

past services taxable.A donation made by a
corporation to the heirs of a deceased officer out
of gratitude for his past services is subject to the
donees gift tax.
Same; Same; Same; No deduction for value of
past services.A donation made out of gratitude
for past services is not subject to deduction for
the value of said services which do not
constitute a recoverable debt.
Same; Same; Same; Gratitude not consideration
under tax code.Gratitude has no economic
value and is not consideration in the sense that
the word is used under Section 311 of the Tax
Code.
Same; Same; Collection of interest and
surcharge for delay in payment of tax

TANG HO VS. BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

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DONATIONS; DONATION OF CONJUGAL

PROPERTY BY THE HUSBAND; RULE
UNDER CIVIL CODE OF 1889.Under the
Civil Code of 1889, a donation by the husband,
alone does not become in law a donation by both
spouses merely because it involves property of
the conjugal partnership.
4.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; DONATION TAXABLE
AGAINST HUSBAND EXCLUSIVELY.A
donation of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership, made during its existence by the
husband alone in favor of the common children,
is taxable to him exclusively as sole donor.