FORUM SHOPPING

Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration. (Cruz v. Caraos, G.R. No. 138208, April 23, 2007, 521
SCRA 510, 520-521, citing Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial
Buildings, Inc., 426 Phil. 111, 125 (2002). The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first
and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. (Ayala Land, Inc. v.
Valisno, 381 Phil. 518, 528 (2000) cited in PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. JOSEPH JOJO V.
GREY, G.R. No. 180109, July 26, 2010, NACHURA, J.)
Put differently, forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.
Ultimately, what is truly important in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is
the vexation caused the courts and party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issue Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity
of parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the other (MALABANAN vs. RURAL BANK OF
CABUYAO, INC. G.R. No. 163495, May 8, 2009, Second Division, Tinga, J.).
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DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
To exemplify, in agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB). (SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO vs. ANITA R. FLORES, G.R.
No. 167891, January 15, 2010, NACHURA, J.).

PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY

OF COURTS
The Regional Trial Courts, Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari; the rule on hierarchy of courts determines the
venue of recourses to these courts. In original petitions for certiorari, the Supreme Court will not
directly entertain this special civil action unless the redress desired cannot be obtained elsewhere
based on exceptional and compelling circumstances justifying immediate resort to the Supreme
Court(Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007, 528 SCRA 378, 384-385; De los Reyes v.
People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 294, 297; and Santos v. Cruz, G.R. Nos.
170096 and 170097, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 66, 75 cited in CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) vs. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC) and
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010, BRION, J.).
Parenthetically, a direct resort to the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari is incorrect
for it violates the hierarchy of courts (Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534
SCRA 338, 346). In other words, a regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in the RTC
and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals (Chavez v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 164527, 15 August 2007, 530 SCRA 235, 285 citing People v. Cuaresma, G.R.
No. 133250, 9 July 2002, 384 SCRA 152).
This rule, however, may be relaxed when pure questions of law are
raised.A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain
state of facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need
of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances (Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R.
No. 149285, 30 August 2006, 500 SCRA 186, 194 citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,

G.R. No. 140946, 13 September 2004, 438 SCRA 224 cited in MIAQUE vs. PATAG, G.R. Nos.
170609-13, January 30, 2009, First Division, Corona, J.).

THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO

PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING
PLEADING, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN ALL COURTS NOW BELONG SOLELY
TO THE SUPREME COURT
In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System from Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, the Court ruled that
the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it
from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds, cannot operate to exempt it from
the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this
power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.

In said

case, the Court ruled that

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal
fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts
independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court
to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two
basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the
identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by
the Constitution and public policy. Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the
Courts financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal

independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to governmentowned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and
the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Courts
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence (emphasis supplied). In Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Fees. (GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F.
CABALLERO, G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010, PERALTA, J.).

RES JUDICATA
The guiding principle of the doctrine of res judicata was formulated by Vice Chancellor
Wigram in an English case circa1843, thus:
xxx that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by,
a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward
their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open
the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part
of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from
negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res
judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points which the court was actually required
by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly
belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might
have brought forward at the time. (Henderson v. Henderson, 3 Hare 100, pp. 114-115).
The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action
estoppel and issue estoppel. The purpose of the doctrine is two-fold to prevent unnecessary
proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the courts time which could be used by
others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the extent of the
claims being made arising out of the same single incident. (S. Sime, A Practical Approach To Civil
Procedure, (1994 Ed.), Blackstone Press Ltd., London, p. 391).
Under the doctrine of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. (Dela Cruz v. Joaquin,
G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576).
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter,

and identity of cause of action. (Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA
500).
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 101115, August 22, 2002, 387 SCRA 549 cited in CATALINA BALAISMABANAG, assisted by her husband, ELEUTERIO MABANAG, vs. THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA
ALCARAZ, G.R. No. 153142 : March 29, 2010, BERSAMIN, J.).

CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE FILING OF A

MOTION FOR TIME IS CONSIDERED A
SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while
jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons
upon them in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority(Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R.
No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 186).
A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court
based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court(United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26,
2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470).
In Go vs. Cordero, however, the Supreme Court clarified that although the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of personal
jurisdiction, it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate
responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did
not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of
summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the
summons by publication issued by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive
pleading. Consequently,Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and
also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his
motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts

jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court (See
Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) v. Quilala, G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA
433, 437-438 cited in ALLAN C. GO, vs. MORTIMER F. CORDERO, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010,
VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty(Moncupa v. Enrile, 225 Phil. 191, 197 (1986). Rule 102
of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The
Rule provides:
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ of habeas corpusmay be granted by
the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or
any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member thereof, or
before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may
also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time, and
returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule
be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment(emphasis supplied).
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if

the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the
instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application (Go, Sr. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, 4 September 2009, 598 SCRA 266, 301).
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over
the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking
such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrainedvia some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. (In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, G.R. No. 158802, 17
November 2004, 442 SCRA 706, 719).
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.(Veluz v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 169482, 29 January 2008, 543 SCRA 63, 67-68).
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The
writ of habeas corpuswas devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpusis to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. (Ibid).
Finally, in passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry
into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is
thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged.
Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. (Ibid).
In fine, while habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a
mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition

should be dismissed. (NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, G.R.
No. 182497, June 29, 2010, PEREZ, J.).
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AUGUST 12, 2011 3:55 PM

ERRORS OF JUDGMENT BEYOND THE

PROVINCE OF A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI
When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of
the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper
subjects of a special civil action for certiorari(Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 608 (2003). If
every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of a
special civil action for certiorari, then trial would never end and the dockets of appellate courts
would be clogged beyond measure.
For this reason, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 787 (2003).Thus, if the petitioners filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari, instead of appeal via a petition for review, the petition should be
dismissed. (ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC. vs. CIUDAD DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010, PERALTA, J.).
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AUGUST 8, 2011 4:43 AM

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: THE ORDER OF

PREFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF
AN ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE
DOES NOT RULE OUT THE
APPOINTMENT OF COADMINISTRATORS
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of
an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests
to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects
for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select (emphasis supplied).
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant
facts and circumstances of each case (See Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167979, March 16,
2006, 484 SCRA 699; Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 413;
Capistrano v. Nadurata, 46 Phil. 726 (1922).
Relative thereto, jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus:
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the appointment by
the trial court of a co-administration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who
was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate.
In the same vein, the Supreme Court declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v.
Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA
334, 360 that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in

the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates.
Applying the aforementioned pronouncements, the Supreme Court in the settlement of
the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntaystated that the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate. It explained that the subject estate in the case
calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and
Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, the Supreme Court was impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate. (IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, G.R. No. 183053, June 16,
2010, NACHURA, J.)
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AUGUST 4, 2011 5:49 AM

CHANGE OF THEORY ON APPEAL

NOT ALLOWED
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change the theory on appeal.(Lianga Lumber Co.
v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., No. L-38685, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 197).
In other words, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention
of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could
have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. (China Airlines
Ltd. v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. 45985 & 46036, May 18, 1990, 185 SCRA 449).
Accordingly, to permit the petitioners in a case to change their theory on appeal would
thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the basic rules of fair play, justice and due

process (Siredy Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 129039, September 17, 2002, 389 SCRA 34
cited in SPOUSES ERNESTO and VICENTA TOPACIO vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and
MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010, BRION J.).
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AUGUST 1, 2011 8:42 AM

RES JUDICATA: BAR BY

PRIOR JUDGMENT
Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits and
on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a matter
adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment (Dela Cruz v. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July
28, 2005, 464 SCRA 576, 589). The principle bars a subsequent suit involving the same parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. The rationale for the rule is that public policy requires that
controversies must be settled with finality at a given point in time.
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is bar by prior
judgment under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is
conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) thereof.
Res judicata applies in the concept of bar by prior judgment if the following
requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be
on the merits; (3) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and the second action,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action.(Superior Commercial Enterprises, Inc.
v. Kunnan Enterprises Ltd., et al., G.R. 169974, April 20, 2010 cited in SPOUSES ERNESTO and
VICENTA TOPACIO vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS and MORTGAGE BANK, G.R. No. 157644,
November 17, 2010, BRION J.).
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JULY 29, 2011 8:42 AM

AMENDED JUDGMENT AND

SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT:
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In
an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and
legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the
original decision.
On the other hand, following the Supreme Courts differentiation of a supplemental
pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that asupplemental decision does not take
the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster
or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does
not replace that which it supplements (ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO
CORPORATION and FLORANTE DY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, G.R.
No. 167237, April 23, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.).
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JULY 26, 2011 2:21 AM

AS A RULE, A PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI IS NOT AVAILABLE AFTER
THE LAPSE OF THE PERIOD TO FILE AN
APPEAL. EXCEPTIONS:
While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are
exceptions.
Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b)
when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d)
when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. (Martillano v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 195, 201; Sps. Go v. Tong, 462 Phil.
256, 266 (2003); Uy Chua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 17, 30 (2000) cited in ASSOCIATED
ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION and FLORANTE DY, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. CRISPIN C. LARON, G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.).

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NOTWITHSTANDING THE LAPSE OF THE PERIOD TO FILE AN APPEAL
JULY 25, 2011 3:19 AM

Judgment on the pleadings

Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved (Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court).
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed (Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC,
Br. 25, Iloilo City, 368 Phil. 653 (1999). A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as
pleaded (Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 733 (2000), and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying
annexes (DORIS U. SUNBANUN vs AURORA B. GO, G.R. No. 163280, February 2,
2010, CARPIO, J.).
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JULY 25, 2011 2:03 AM

Judgment on the Pleadings

Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved (Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court).
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
party if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed (Sps. Hontiveros v. RTC,
Br. 25, Iloilo City, 368 Phil. 653 (1999). A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as

pleaded (Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 733 (2000), and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying
annexes (DORIS U. SUNBANUN vs AURORA B. GO, G.R. No. 163280, February 2,
2010, CARPIO, J.).
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JULY 21, 2011 2:09 AM

EVIDENCE: PARENTAL AND FILIAL

PRIVILEGE RULE (JUSTICE
ROBERTO ABAD)
Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence No person may be compelled
to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
The afore-quoted rule is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of
the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil
Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or
administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.
In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial
privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The Supreme Court
declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides: The direct line is
either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who
descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he
descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma
Lee. (EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010, ABAD,
J.).
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PRIVILEGE RULE (JUSTICE ROBERTO ABAD)

JULY 19, 2011 12:11 PM

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CERTIORARI

REMEDIES UNDER RULE 45 AND RULE
65 OF THE RULES OF COURT
In Mercado v. Court of Appeals,484 Phil. 438 (2004), the Supreme Court had again
stressed the difference of the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
x x x [T]he proper remedy of the party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical with a petition for review under Rule 65.
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us (SC) by filing
a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. On the other hand, a special civil action underRule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45.
Relative thereto, One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. (VMC Rural Electric Service Cooperative,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153144, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 336, 352).
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc. vs. Ciudad Homeowners Association, Inc., the
Supreme Court stated that a perusal of the records will show that petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the January 4, 2005 CA Decision, which was, however, denied by the CA via a
Resolution dated March 18, 2005. As manifested by petitioners, they received a copy of the March
18, 2005 CA Resolution on March 28, 2005. Thus, from March 28, 2005, petitioners had 15 days,or
until April 12, 2005, to appeal the CA Resolution under Rule 45. Clearly, petitioners had an available
appeal under Rule 45 which, under the circumstances, was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
However, petitioners instead chose to file a special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, on April
18, 2005, which was 6 days after the reglementary period under Rule 45 had expired. xxxx
Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed
outright. Pertinent, therefore, to a resolution of the case at bar is a determination of whether or not
an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy was still available to petitioners, the absence of
which would warrant petitioners decision to seek refuge under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. xxxxxSince petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari, instead of appeal via
a petition for review, the petition should be dismissed. (ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC. vs. CIUDAD

DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010,
PERALTA, J.).
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REMEDIES PROVIDED UNDER RULE 45 AND RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT
JULY 18, 2011 11:31 AM

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A

CONDIDITION SINE QUA NON FOR THE
FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.(Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, G.R. No. 169241,
May, 2 2006, 488 SCRA 574, 580). Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. (Estate of Salvador Serra Serra v. Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez, 466 SCRA 120, 127
(2005); National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 58, 64 (2001).
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where
the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity
for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised
is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.(BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG vs. SUBIC BAY
DISTRIBUTION, INC., G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010, PERALTA, J.).
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CONDIDITION SINE QUA NON FOR THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

JULY 16, 2011 5:52 AM

JURISDICTION OF THE FIRST LEVEL

COURTS OUTSIDE METRO MANILA;
EXCEPTION TO THE PROSCRIPTION
AGAINST AN AMENDMENT TO CONFER
JURSIDICTION TO THE COURT
Section 19(8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, also known as The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980. as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, or otherwise known as An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7691 further provides:
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts
mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by
this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years
thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos
(P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
Relative thereto, the Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 which was issued declaring
the first adjustment on the jurisdictional amount of first level courts or the MTCs outside of Metro
Manila from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took effect on March 20, 1999.
On the other hand, the second adjustment from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 became
effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No. 65-2004 issued by the Office of
the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004.

In Irene Sante vs. Hon. Claravall, the Supreme Court stated that since at the time of
the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has already been
adjusted to P300,000.00, there is no doubt that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over
the case since the total amount of damages being claimed by the petitioner in the case
was P420,000.00.
Moreover, in the said case the Supreme Court found no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment
of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for
certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.
The High Court declared that while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an
amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the
court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186, 196), the
RTC in the case clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court. Ergo, the amendment of the complaint was in order. (IRENE
SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No.
173915, February 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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AMENDMENT TO CONFER JURSIDICTION TO THE COURT
JULY 14, 2011 7:32 AM

THE FILING OF A MOTION TO DISMISS IS

NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OR
INVOCATION OF THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT
A special appearance before the courtchallenging its jurisdiction over the person through
a motion to dismiss even if the movant invokes other groundsis not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a

voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court (La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78).
In other words, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared
voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance means is that the voluntary
appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have
waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of
summons. (Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009).
In Edna Lhuillier vs. British Airways, the Supreme Court clarified that the special
appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and other pleadings before
the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the said trial court.
The High Court disagreed with the contention of the petitioner and ruled that there was no voluntary
appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel or a waiver of respondents objection
to jurisdiction over its person.
Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum necessitate juris
dicendi jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public good, on account of the necessity of
dispensing justice. (50 C.J.S. 1089). (EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, G.R. No.
171092, March 15, 2010, DEL CASTILLO, J.).
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NOT AUTOMATICALLY CONSIDERED VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE OR INVOCATION OF THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
JULY 13, 2011 8:02 AM

JURISDICTION OVER CASES WHERE

THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IS THE MAIN
CAUSE OF ACTION
In Irene Sante and Reynaldo Sante vs. Hon. Edilberto Claraval, the Supreme
Court clarified that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint since
the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of
action (Nocum v. Tan, G.R. No. 145022, September 23, 2005, 470 SCRA 639, 644-645). Since it is
clear, based on the allegations of the complaint therein that respondents main action is for damages,
the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees

and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.
No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court (Administrative Circular No. 09-94).
This is the tenor of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Mendoza v. Soriano, (G.R. No.
164012, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 260, 266-267), where it held that in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In the said case, the respondents claim
of P929,000.06 in damages and P25,000 attorneys fees plus P500 per court appearance was held to
represent the monetary equivalent for compensation of the alleged injury. The Court therein held
that the total amount of monetary claims including the claims for damages was the basis to
determine the jurisdictional amount. x x x x x
Similarly, in Iniego v. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 394,
4020, the Supreme Court held that the amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction
of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action. x x
xx
Considering therefore that the total amount of damages being claimed by respondent
herein (moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00;P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P50,000.00 attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit) for the
alleged shame and injury suffered by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at a police
station in Pangasinan was P420,000.00, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan (IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).
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JULY 11, 2011 11:21 AM

JURISDICTION: ACTIONS WHICH ARE

INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION
FALL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.
Relative thereto, the statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as a suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, it belongs to the RTC. (Dacasin
vs. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 05, 2010, CARPIO, J.).
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REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
JULY 11, 2011 2:32 AM

CIVIL PROCEDURE: How to compute time

for filing pleadings in the Court.
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period
of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day(Section 1 of Rule 22 of the
Rules of Court). xxxxx
In Alma Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, the Supreme Court ruled that when petitioner
filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007, the same was well within the
extended period for the filing thereof. This is true because petitioners Fifteen (15) days from April
28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. On the other hand, May 14, 2007, the
following day, was a legal holidaythe holding of the national and local elections. Therefore, the

filing of the petition on May 15, 2007 was done within the reglementary period. (ALMA B. RUSSEL
vs. TEOFISTA EBASAN and AGAPITO AUSTRIA, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010, NACHURA, J.).
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filing pleadings in the Court.
JULY 9, 2011 2:49 AM

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO

SPEEDY TRIAL
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in criminal
cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined
as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure
that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. Intimating
historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, the Supreme Court reiterated the
old legal maxim,justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious
resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, Third
Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him
was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended
over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating
the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy
trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such
right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept. xxxxxxx A balancing test of applying societal interests
and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition
of the case and to a speedy trial, Four (4) factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b)
the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. x x x. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for

such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the
State. xxxx (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312313).
Relative thereto, the Supreme Court has clarified that in determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55) the Court
ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took
into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the
creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction,
and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the
accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 408 Phil. 767 (2001), the complexity of the
issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time
spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations Administrator,(G.R. No.
104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721), the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases
and the conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated
therein.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the
separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was
interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing.
Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing
when the prosecution manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases
No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried
separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except
only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.In fact, petitioners acquiescence is evident
from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the Peoples evidence in
the five BW cases. xxxxx
In the case of Tan vs. People, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and the
petitioners failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell
on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely

objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried
separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection
thereto. For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the
prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637,
April 21, 2009, 3rd Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
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JULY 7, 2011 9:10 PM

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION: A PETITION FOR

DECLARATORY RELIEF DOES NOT
NECESSARILY FALL UNDER THE
JURISDICTION OF THE RTC
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a
regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and
determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties
rights or duties thereunder. Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
Be that as it may, we have to make a distinction between the first and the second
paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder (emphasis ours).
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought
under this Rule (emphasis ours).
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to
(1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil
Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3)
an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to
repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result
in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
Hence, it is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not
categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly
uses the word may that an action for quieting of title may be brought under [the] Rule on
petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief may x x x
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. The use of the word may in a statute
denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an
option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the
assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: (MALANA vs. TAPPA,
G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
Evidently, there is no doubt that even an MTC can take cognizance over declaratory relief
cases as long as the same falls under its jurisdiction. Therefore, it does not follow that a declaratory

relief under the second paragraph of Section 1 Rule 63 of the Rules of Court should be filed before
the Regional Trial Court.
Meanwhile, it has to be emphasized that an action for declaratory relief
presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of
rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an
authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract
for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues
arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of
the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately
available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead
to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action (MALANA vs.
TAPPA, G.R. No. 181303, September 17, 2009, Third Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
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JULY 6, 2011 12:35 PM

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT as a postjudgment remedy after the finality of

a judgment
Annulment of Judgment is a recourse equitable in character and allowed only in
exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Section 2 of the said Rule
provides that the annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, although jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as an additional ground.
A. Fraud

Fraud is of two categories. It may either be: (a) actual or constructive and (b) extrinsic or
intrinsic.
Actual or positive fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of the
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact. Constructive fraud is construed as such because
of its detrimental effect upon public interest and public or private confidence, even though the act is
not done with an actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other persons.
On the other hand, fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. There isintrinsic fraud
where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where
the act prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured, so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud,
but collateral to the transaction sued upon. xxxxx
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which
is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The fraud or deceit
cannot be of the losing partys own doing, nor must such party contribute to it. The extrinsic fraud
must be employed against it by the adverse party, who, because of some trick, artifice, or device,
naturally prevails in the suit. It affects not the judgment itself but the manner in which the said
judgment is obtained.
Extrinsic fraud is also present where the unsuccessful party has been prevented by his
opponent from exhibiting fully his case by keeping the former away from court or giving him a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, having been kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumed to represent a party and connived at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sold out his clients interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court (CITY
GOVERNMENT OF TAGAYTAY vs. GUERRERO, G.R. Nos. 140743 & 140745, September 17, 2009,
Third Division, Nachura, J.).
Where a fraud is the ground for annulment of judgment, it must be extrinsic or
collateral. There is extrinsic fraud when a party is prevented from fully presenting his case to the
court as when the lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his clients interest (SY BANG vs.
SY, G.R. No. 179955, April 24, 2009, Thied Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
B. Lack of jurisdiction

An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted

indiscriminately by the Court. It is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional
cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a
losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and
executory. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment
of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim (NUDO vs. CAGUIOA, G.R. No.
176906, August 4, 2009, Third Division, Nachura, J.).
When a petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is grounded
on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,the petitioner does not need to allege
that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or petition for relief are no longer available through
no fault of his or her own (GALURA vs. MATH-AGRO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 167230, August 14,
2009, First Division, Carpio, J.).
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JULY 5, 2011 12:53 PM

EVIDENCE: RES INTER ALIOS ACTA

ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET RULE IN
RELATION TO THE RULE ON EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on
the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against
them. The reason for this rule is that:
On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him (HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO
AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third Division, Corona, J.).

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration (emphasis supplied).
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order
that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessarythat (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself(b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged coconspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.
In Harold Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, et. al., aside from the extrajudicial
confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them
(HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, et al. G.R. No. 177727, January 19, 2010, Third
Division, Corona, J.).
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NOCERE NON DEBET RULE IN RELATION TO EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION
JULY 1, 2011 2:08 PM

SPECIAL PROCEDINGS: APPLICATION OF

THE WRITS OF AMPARO AND
HABEAS DATA
The writs of amparo and habeas data cannot be used as tools to stall the
execution of a final and executory decision in a proper dispute pursuant to Section 19 of
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC), which was essentially reproduced in the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).

The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, theRule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect
on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the
Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or
on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated. Thus:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Dataprovides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party (emphasis supplied).
From the above-quoted provisions, it can be gleaned that the coverage of the writs
is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security . And the writs cover not
only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568
SCRA 1, the Supreme Court empathetically stated:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention
or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the

Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property (emphasis supplied).
Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008,
554 SCRA 768:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to
the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations
of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the
petitioners therein branding as acts of terrorism the therein respondents alleged entry into the
disputed land with armed men in tow.The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical
possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life
or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has
been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing
and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.
In Castillo vs. Cruz, the Supreme Court emphasized that respondents petition did not
show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations that petitioners in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there
and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and

forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue
confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the
offenses a day after their arrest.
Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication
for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue
and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be
justified.
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas datawhen it is not even
alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their
person, family, home and correspondence.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full
advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges. It need
not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a
final and executory decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may
be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas
data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal proceedings (CASTILLO vs. CRUZ, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009, En
Banc, Carpio Morales, J.).
In Armando Canlas, et. al., vs. NAPICO Homeowners Association et al., the
High court also reiterated that the writ of amparo will not be issued where the persons right to life,
liberty and security is not threatened. Thus:
Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for
reconsideration for the second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As
such therefore, Petitioners herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in
any way be treated as such motions for reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible
issuance of the writ of amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of the Honorable
Supreme Court in these cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the
powers of the Supreme Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own

previous decision that cannot be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of
merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo. xxxxxx
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this
case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not
included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ
of amparo is made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the
final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security.
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
xxxx No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. xxxxxx
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the
petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
ection 6. Issuance of the Writ. Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or
judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of
court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the
judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to
serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not
be later than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance (emphasis supplied).
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be
issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is
intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his
or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its
part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ. Therefore the Petition should be
dismissed (ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CANLAS, MARRIETA PIA vs. NAPICO
HOMEOWNERS ASSN XIII, INC., et al. G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, En Banc, Reyes, R.T. J.).