APOLONIO TANJANCO v.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS

17 December 1966 | Reyes, J.B.L., J.
SUMMARY: Both of legal age, Tanjanco and Santos engaged in consensual sex, in consideration of the formers
promises of marriage. As a result, Santos conceived a child. She was forced to resign from her job, but when Tanjanco
was informed about her condition, he left her and broke their engagement. She prays to the court to compel Tanjanco to
recognize the unborn child, which CFI and CA dismissed for lack of cause of action. The CA, however, said that it stated a
cause of action for damages under NCC 21. The SC held that mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. In this case, it was not shown that Santos was seduced by Tanjanco to engage in intimate sexual relations. The
fact that they maintained this relationship for one whole year shows voluntariness and mutual passion, which is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Santos, therefore, cannot claim damages under NCC 21.
FACTS:
From December 1957, P Tanjanco courted R Santos, both being of adult age, and expressed his undying love and
affection for her. Sometime in July 1958, in consideration of Tanjancos promise of marriage, Santos consented and
acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge. Subsequent thereto and regularly until December 1959, P succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her, as a result of which, she conceived a child. Due to her pregnant condition, and to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, she had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. where she was
receiving a salary of P230.00/month. Because of this, she was unable to support herself and the baby. When she
informed P about her pregnant condition and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, he stopped and
refrained from seeing her, and since about July 1959, has not visited R Santos and has broken their engagement and
promises. As Santos suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation, she instituted a complaint praying for a decree to compel Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child that she was
bearing.
CFI dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals affirmed that there was no cause
of action shown to compel the recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support. But it held that the complaint did
state a cause of action for damages, premised on NCC Article 21. It directed the court of origin to proceed with the case.
P Tanjanco appealed to the SC, pleading that actions for breach of promise to marry are not permissible in this
jurisdciction.
ISSUE: W/N the breach of promise to marry in this case is an actionable wrong?
HELD:
NO. The cause for damages contemplated in NCC Article 21 refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. Similar jurisprudence rule that the promise or enticement must be the sufficient cause for
the woman yielding into the seduction. Accordingly, it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or
curiosity of the female, and that the other merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. In this
case, Santos maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, with repeated
acts of sexual intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
The dismissal is without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of Tanjanco with Santos, if any.