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and revealingly and pertinently discussed-see, e.g., the section on illocutionaryforce or the discussionof deixis-there is also muchthatis very difficult
and mysterious, especially in the chapter on the 'Linguistics of Language'
(Montague grammar,for instance, is presented in a page or so), or that is
unmotivated(at least to me); see, e.g., the couple of pages on 'experimentson
pronouninterpretation'.Equallyimportant,I could not see any close connection between most of what is discussed in these chapters and the content of
the central chapters (5 and 7), to be consideredpresently.
Ch. 6 ('Linguistic determinism:The Whorfianhypothesis') is a fascinating
but in the end inconclusive mix of critical analysis of experimentalwork and
suggestions as to conditionsthat need to be met for work really to be relevant
to the issue (which conditionshave hardlyever been met), togetherwith some
very open-ended speculations regarding 'examples of linguistic forms that
(might) embody cultural models'-where, of course, the critical word is
'might'. All this comes with some brilliantif tangentialcommentsusing a 'Goethean hypothesis' to try to account for the sequence of color categories discovered by Berlin & Kay (1969),viz., that this sequence 'correspondsto how
the colors of objects changewhen the intensityof lightfallingon them changes'
(188). Notwithstandingthe rationale provided in the first paragraphof this
chapter, I am still not sure of its role or place in the book, for all its intrinsic
interest.
The last chapter('Action, thoughtand language')asks, again, why linguistic
actions are carried out simultaneouslywith two different forms of thought:
'Why is imagistic thinkingupacked by syntactic thinking?'(251). McN offers
a numberof suggestions or 'reasons', but I think the central claim is that imagistic and syntactic thinkingmust be synthesized so as to make thinkingintersubjectiveand thus to make communicationpossible.
The linguistic act is a synthesis of the analogical(global and imagistic)and
the synthetic (segmented and linear). Ch. 5 asks how this 'synthesis of individually constituted(intrinsic)and socially constituted(purelinguistic)values'
(84) is accomplished.McN assumes that, with regardto 'internalpsychological
computations', productionand understandinginvolve virtuallythe same processes and so can be handledtogether, and that the 'referentialgestures that
spontaneously occur with speech' provide critical informationabout the 'internal structureof linguisticacts'.
As mentioned before, symbols have intrinsic value and linguistic or contrastive value; in addition,they 'are affectedby the contextualwhole' of which
they are part, and, centrallyfor McN, 'symbols have spontaneousgenerativity-the ability to occur without inputs that triggerthem' (84). As he puts it,
'spontaneityof inner speech symbols is the key to generativity,the ability of
surface sentences to occur withoutinputs. Thinkingis not the "input"to some
other process that evokes the inner speech symbol. Rather, the symbols of
inner speech are what, along with imagery, CONSTITUTE thinking'(100). In appropriate environments,the 'symbols of inner speech appear to be self-activating', it is not a matterof responses to inputs. Wordsthat are self-activating
McN calls 'smart' words: 'the hypothesis is that "smart" symbols tend to be
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inner speech symbols' (100). Smart words or symbols have two critical (and
defining)properties:(a) they are 'self-activatingin appropriateenvironments',
which requiresthat they be sensitive to thoughtpatternsnot yet linguistically
coded; and (b) they 'can select other symbols'. Smart symbols therefore are
doubly context-sensitive-sensitive 'to the evolving thought environmentnot
yet coded linguisticallyand to the potentiallinguisticenvironment'(100).
Above I have triedto use McN's own languageas much as possible for two
reasons. First, because I think that these ideas regardingthe spontaneity of
inner speech symbols and self activation and self organizationin speech are
central to his account, and second, because I am not secure enough in my
understandingof what he is getting at to attempt any substantialrephrasing.
Of the two properties characterizing'smart' words, the second-'sensitivity
to linguisticpotentialand ability to select other words'-has been considered
before in the frame notion (and its congeners), as McN notes. But the first'sensitivity to not yet categorizedimagisticthinking'-which is also absolutely
necessary to his account, has not been investigated,at least in any guise that
I know. Indeed, McN himself is hardput to find supportingevidence, and the
three experiments he does cite can hardly bear the interpretiveburden put
upon them. In effect, McN has two difficult, if related, tasks before him. He
needs to spell out much more fully what he means by 'self activatingin appropriate[nonlinguistic]environments',and, given such an elaborate and enriched account,he needs to indicatewhatkindof supportingevidence is already
available and especially what sorts of experimentsmightbe conductedto provide furtherrelevant evidence.
This is essential, because the notion of 'self activating symbols' is central
to the theoretical analysis he offers of the 'various majorphenomenaof psycholinguistics'. It is also important,critically,because he arguesthat the dominant class of models in currentpsycholinguistics,viz., information-processing
models, cannot 'explain or even formulateas a problemspontaneousgenerativity: the ability of linguistic structuresto take shape in speech production
without inputs that trigger them' (133). In McN's words, 'Information-processing [IP] models all PRESUPPOSE input from the outside. This input is not
explained by the model and, apartfrom triggering,it plays no role in the operations of the model (145) ... in all these theories there is necessarily a PRESUPPOSED ultimate input of "informationalor cognitive phenomena," that is
meaning or thought' (146). On McN's account, however, there is no sharp
separationof 'computationaloperationsfrom interpretation'.A smartsymbol
'selects and classifies an environmentof thinkingnot yet linguisticallycoded ... it also takes
in its environment,alteringitself as it altersthe environment... Whereasan IP "input"triggers
an operationbut does not furtherparticipatein it, an "appropriateenvironment"becomes
partof the mentaloperationcarriedout by the symbol.The environmentis the settingin which
the "smart" symbol self activates, but in turnthe environmentis alteredby the symbol and
the symbol is alteredby the environment'(147).
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[Received 12 January1990.]
BACH.State University of
Informallectures on formal semantics.By EMMON
New York Press, 1989. Pp. x, 150. Cloth $29.50, paper $9.95.
Reviewed by M. J. CRESSWELL,
University of Massachusetts and
Victoria University of Wellington