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and GreekAesthetics
Collingwood
STANLEY H. ROSEN
G. COLLINGWOOD,
Oxford, 1938. Reissued as Galaxypaperback, g9l. All quotationsare from the i9gS
edition, hereaftef abbreviatedas P.A.
2 P.A., pp. 273,
152.
I3S
views. It therefore follows that there must be, according to Collingwood's line of thought, a contradictionin Greek aesthetics, one part of
which is wrong, and has generatedthe false views which, in the course
of time, have been turned back onto the part that is right by those corrupted by the erroneous part. Complicated as this sounds, it is very
much like his procedure, if not his explicit formulation.If Collingwood
is right, then everyone, the Greeks as well as ourselves, is at least halfwrong; andin Collingwood'shands,the halfhasa distressingtendencyof
becoming the whole.
Before turning to the details of the argument, it may be well to
present certain technical terms used by Collingwood throughout, sometimes with dire consequences. The first involves a distinction between
imitative and representationalart: "A work of art is imitative in virtue
of its relation to another work of art which affordsit a model of artistic
excellence; it is representativein virtue of its relation to something in
'nature', that is, somethingnot a work of art." I The second involves a
triple distinction of false kinds of art: (a) the theory that art is a craft,
like cobbling or carpentry: "the power to produce a preconceived
result by meansof consciouslycontrolledanddirected action; 2 (b) the
the theory that art is magic: "Amagicalart is an art which is representative and therefore evocativeof emotion, and evokes of set purposesome
emotions rather than others in order to dischargethem into the affairs
of practical life;
"3
Ibid., P. 78.
s Ibid., P. I9.
6 Ibid., P.
s.
136
manwith a t6Xv-for adulter). I Or it can refer to a way in which something is acquired, "withoutany definite sense of art or craft."z Furthermore, just as in Englishthere is a differencebetween a craftlike cobbling
andanart or knacklike fishing(asusedwith regardto amateurfishermen),
and just as there is a difference between arts like fishing and arts like
flute-playing,so too do these differences exist in Greek. What unites
these various-instancesin Englishis that all are manifestationsof "technique," an abstractterm which refers to a skilled nmanner
of doing, but
to no specific manner: the manner varies from case to case. The same is
true in Greek. To have a 'xv-1 is to be able to do something 'exvy.x7,
like cobbling, carpentryetc,, are not the only kinds of skilful
and tCXvmL
activity. Collingwood translates xcxvn, then, in an erroneously rigid
manner; perhaps he has been misled by the word "technical," which he
does not want to be associated with art proper, and which is nowadays
usually applied to activities even more complex than cobbling. But there
is, so to speak, a non-technical use of the term. The matter is made clear
by thinking of the colloquial English uses of the word "technique." Just
as Lysias speaks of a r'xv- in adultery, so do we say of a man that his
"technique" in love is excellent. And just as we could not equate a
love "technique" with a cobbler's "technique" without misunderstanding or blurring the meaning of this abstract term, so too would it be an
error to equate the reXvyq
of a poet with that of a cobbler, if we meant
to say thereby that the poet exhibits the same manner of skilful acting
as does a cobbler. But this is what Collingwood would make of the
Greek view, and he is wrong in so "describing" it. Poets and cobblers
both practice teXvat but their techniques are radically different.
What is the case, however, is that Plato and Aristotle describe the
poet as a ,uLd'-n)q or imitator, just as the craftsman (in Collingwood's
sense of the term) is said to be an imitator. Poetry and craftsmanship are
both techniques which share the characteristic of imitating, but it hardly
follows from this that the 'rexv- of the poet is equivalent to the rexv- of
the craftsman. A large share of Collingwood's objections to the view of
re'Xv are based upon this misunderstanding. The term 'rxvnotvLtx)LX
has a whole spectrum of specific meanings, and if Collingwood wishes to
exclude art from all of these meanings, then he must deny that there is
any skill involved in practicing "art proper." That he is very nearly
involved in this absurdity, I hope to show in a subsequent study of his
description of the "facts" of art.
I Lysias,llEPI TOT EPATOSOENOTE (DONOT, 16-17.
2 Liddell & Scott, UnabridgedGreek-EnglishLexicon,
gth Edition.
I 37
392 d s ff.
2 See 394
d 7 ff.
138
(Pau-X'
139
hopelessly confused when we further observe that at 607 b 2-6 (interestingly separated by Collingwood as two passages rather than given as one),
the whole passage is extremely relevant. In it, Socrates states that we
were right to expel poetry (unqualified) from the city, such being her
nature ('rota'rrvJ oi'aov) - i.e. that she is mimetic. It is not nmimetic
poetry in opposition to some other poetr), which is being expelled, but
rather poetry which is being expelled because it is mimetic. This is
clear from Socrates' allusion to the long-standing quarrel between philosophy and poetry. As the whole argumnentshows, the quarrel is over the
claim to knowledge. And poetry, since it merely imitates, does not, according to Socrates, knou about the things which it imitates. Poetry's
nature is mimetic; as such, it makes a false claim to knowledge, and so,
as partisans of philosophy, we nmustexpel it from the city. This issue
will shortly be raised again.
Meanwhile, let us notice one last passage which Collingwood translates within the laws of grammar, but in such a way as is not only not
required by the sense of the words, but which is incompatible with
Socrates' argument. At 607 c 5, Socrates says that "pleasure-producing
poetry and inmitation"will be accepted once miore if it has arguments to
defend itself from the charges brought against it. Collingwood translates:
"poetry for pleasure's sake, i.e. representation." The Greek reads:
xxat
7rp68 '8OVv ltTjLX
Now, xcd can mean id est, but its
LL[)at.
usual meaning in such a context is "and"; there would be no reason to
think of id est here, given the whole context, unless we were trying to
read Collingwood's interpretation into the text. But this interpretation
has now been disproved, with respect to Book X.
It should now be evident why I was worrying the meaning of ,uuvcaL4 in
the passage summarized from Book Ill. If we may take the argument just
preceding as established, then, as I pointed out, we must either face a
contradiction in the Republic, or resolve it, either very subtly or very
simply. I have suggested a simple solution, and must let the matter
stand there. I turn now to a second point at which Collingwood is
apparently justified in part of his interpretation. At 607 a ff., Socrates
seems to contradict the whole surrounding argument by saying that
some forms of poetry will be allowed to remain in the city. The Greek
sentence reads:
xP... eL8eVOL 8' &rr oaov [.ovov [IJvou4 Ozozi xac "yxcop 'rozc
MyOoZ 7M0CWX rXpOC&CxTr&Ov
rCI 7ro'?LV.
i.e., "one must know that of poetrv only such hymns to the gods and
I40
encomia to the good may be admitted to the city." What this means is
that poetry as an independent endeavor has been banished from the city;
certain poems which are consistent with the moral and political character
of the city - in other words, which can serve as propaganda - will be
retained. There is no real contradiction here, although I grant that the
language is confusing because Socrates has not bothered to invent a new
term for propaganda-art, which is certainly quite different from the art
which has been expelled. But let us recall the passage in the Laws, wherein the Athenian stranger says that the laws of the city will be its lyric
poetry. I It is in this sense that the present passage must be understood.
The nature of poetry, as practiced by unregulated poets, which caused
it to be banished from the cit), is perfectly useful when it is employed
as a tool of the city. Most important, however, is the fact that, by retaining some poems within the city, it is not thereby argued that these
poems are no longer mimetic. At the very least, Collingwood would
have to admit that, if he is right about Book III, then he is wrong about
Book X, since the poems retained, as encomia to the good and hymns to
the gods, obviously satisfy the criterion of good imitative narrative laid
down in Book III.
So far, then, we have discussed Collingwood's analysis of art as XVJ,
and of Plato's theory of the mimetic nature of art. In the arguments to be
considered next, these errors are combined in a way which generates
further misinterpretations, and which culminates in an omission of what
is Plato's major point with respect to art. Collingwood says that Plato
and Aristotle "took it for granted that poetry, the only art which they
discussed in detail, was a craft," that is, a craft like cobbling, carpentering or weaving. "The poet is a kind of skilled producer; he produces
for customers; and the effect of his skill is to bring about in them certain
states of mind, which are conceived in advance as desirable states. The
poet, like any other kind of craftsman, must know what effect he is
aiming at, and must learn by experience and precept, which is only the
imparted experience of others, how to produce it"2. This view of art is
said to be the predominant, if not the only, Greek view: "There are
suggestions in some of them, especially in Plato, of a quite different
view, but this is the one which they have made familiar, and upon which
both the theory and the practice of the arts has for the most part rested
down to the present time."3
I
'4'
09XL Oe
CL 0
p0&
8OO
aLL'Ltr
7tcpL
6v
av
vuLL[LY
,tp4s x&XBo4YN7tOVtpW.
-
,,
OUX
?OLXEV.
- XOCPICgL
av
'o ?'V
`
7r0t4)GE& AJ1-TLXOq rpO4
In the rest of this crucial passage, it is elicited that the imitator, having
elaVatL
`iLov
X6you
nrpL
pretation of exvzY.
Further, the whole issue of art pivots upon the central problem of
knowledge. Plato is not writing (nor Socrates speaking) as an aesthetician, but as a political philosopher. The question here, then, is of the
political function of art, and ultimately, of its epistemological status.
I
602
a 8
if.
142
As the reference, cited above, to the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry makes clear, and as all of Socrates' discussions of art
for making is
support, the artist is subject to the delusion that his r6yyis
a
delusion
and
this
usually
of
knowledge,
equivalent to the possession
shared by the artist's audience. Since, from Socrates' viewpoint, the
artist does not know, and rather tends to corrupt his audience because of
the persuasiveness and pleasantness of art, he must be expelled from the
best city; art will be practiced now by the guardians or priests in accord
with right reason. I Nowhere does Socrates suggest that craftsmen (as
such) should be expelled from the city; it is the poet or artist who must
go, and for the reasons given. The poet's lack of knowledge makes his
t&epv-politically dangerous in a way that the texv- of the craftsman is
not; even should the craftsman, who is also an imitator, be subject
to the delusion that he knowsby imitating, he has not got the power of
persuading his fellow citizens of this error. Who would take seriously
a cobbler's claims that cobbling is really philosophy? But that the poet's
claims are very, very seriously regarded, we need not take Socrates'
word; we have only to consider the role of the artist in contemporary
society.
Thus far I have tried to separate the r?yvy of the craftsman from that of
the artist. But there is a second difficulty here. The view that art is a
Texv1 in any sense is by no means the only, qr even the most exclusively
important, of the views present in Plato's dialogues. Equally, perhaps
even more famous, and in the long run at least as influential, is the view
at all, but rather divine inspiration. This theory
that art is not a -rXywv'
is developed in the Ion. It is related to the preceding theory with respect
to epistemology: once again it will emerge that the artist has no real
knowledge. In interrogating the rhapsode Ion, Socrates proceeds to
develop the argument that, in order to judge speeches about things, we
must first be experts about the things themselves 2 Poets - and rhapsodes - speak of many things, about none of which they are expert.
When we want to know about medicine, we consult a doctor; when we
want to know about war, we consult a general, and so on. But we never
consult the poet about these things, even when he imitates perfectly
war or sickness. And should we wish to know about poetry itself, we
I See Phaedrus 271 C ff. for a description of how to speak and write 'reXvLxtq; one
must know the differentnaturesof the men & the kinds of argumentto which they will
respond, when to speak and when to keep silent, etc. In other words, one must be a
I43
would consult, not a man who is a good reciter of Homer, for instance,
but one who knows about poetry as such, by skill and systematic
xoc ia npv).I When we do interrogate poets on
knowledge (t6Xwvjn
the mattersabout which they write, we find that they do not understand
them (as Socratesrecounts in the Apology).How, then, do poets make
poems.?It cannot, as we havejust seen, be by rxv, for then they would
know the things which they are able to describe. (It is now assumedthat
a reXvLrqhas some knowledge about his production, probablywhat is
called secondaryknowledge in the Republic- not true knowledge, but
better than that of the poet). The answer is this:
Vrowreq yap
ovtrs
OZ 'r TCI)Ve'7CV
xoaL xCtCx6VoL
7COLJTL
7toiV'r
o &yOoO1
LXOuTC0OLQoL
0. &yaOol
TMUOC T&
ax'
evoeoL
JCaurcq.
"Allgood epic poets speakall their beautifulpoems, not from craft, but
through their being inspired and possessed, and the same is true for good-
lyric poets."2 The poet must be E`XcppoV (out of his mind) before he can
7roLSLV(poetise).
ad
(O OE64oc4
E'LV O Xeycow).3
The view that poets are divinely inspired, then, denies that art is a
r6xvn, but, like that view, also denies that the poet has knowledge. The
first part of this view (the second is usually forgotten) has had a considerable influence in the history of aesthetics, both in its orthodox and
in its more extravagant interpretations. That Plato does not take it literally is, I think, clear from the bantering tone of the whole dialogue.
(This is of course not to say that it has no significance for Plato.) We
may note one decisive passage. Socrates says to Ion at 53 2 d 6:
. eV 7OtUEaTC
M\X&aoCpo?0
0
Cpaol xac U,7txpLTML xod &v up?L
?'V.CZ O'L
Oere rok7roL .Lcxroc,sy&) 8K oi'rv &;Xo6: wro i ?kyo, otov CLxbo L86Y TV
iVOpCOWOV.
"You rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose work you sing, are wise,
but I speak nothing else than the truth, as is fitting to an ordinary man."
That the poets are not aoyop6requires little argument; in the Socratic
doctrine, not even the philosopher can make this claim. The aocplO of
the poet would, of course, be that of the gods who speak through his
lips. But if the poets speak coypEo,whether it is theirs or not, we ought to
study their divinely inspired poems rather than the mundane treatises of
lI Ibid.,
2
3
532 c 6.
Ibid., S33 e S.
Ibid., S34dff.
144
'45
See for example the distinction with respect to the use of the flute at 3+i a 38.
146
&
7OL7TLX'
OicatLt1LPL4aCL4'
auVOXOV.
"Epic, tragic, comic and dithyrambic poetry, the majority of flute and
lyre music, are all in general mimetic."4 Now even in the face of the
'
POl. 1340 a
a 25
p. go.
22.
2 1340
3 P.A.
4 Poetics, 1447
a 13.
147
fact thatapparentlysome formsof flute and lyre music are not mimetic,
it must be transparently clear that this exception is insufficient
for invalidating the claim that Aristotle considered art "essentially
representative." And there are no exceptions to the view that he
considered poetry as essentially representative. The strongest case that
Collingwood could in reason have made would be this: for Plato, not
all poetry is mimetic; for Aristotle, not all music is mimetic. Were this
the case, it would not transform the Poeticsinto a "Defence ... of
RepresentationalPoetry"I as though Aristotle recognized any poetry
which is not mimetic. As a matter of fact, Aristotle asserts in the first
TXXL
line that he is speakingof poetry as such (7cept -OLYTLXTJ ocu> -r
,tiovdt83v au'rr),2 all of which, to repeat, is mimetic. We have already
discussed the first part of Collingwood's hypothetical case. As for the
second, two lines may be taken. The first, and admittedly less satisfactory, is that the exception noted is too trivial to take seriously. It
would perhapsmake more sense to say that those forms of flute and lyre
music which are not genuinely "artistic"are not mimetic, than to conclude that art is not essentiallyso. But fortunately, this passagedoes not
stand alone in the Aristoteliancorpus; we have just inspected a passage
from the Politics which Collingwood does not seem to have known, in
which music is declared to be manifestlymimetic. Since this passageis
utterly unambiguous,and since Aristotle never amplifieswhat he means
by saying "mostflute and lyre music" in the Poetics, nor gives any examples of music which is not imitative, but only of music which is, I
submit that either the suggestionwhich I have made, or one something
like it - stylistic caution, perhaps- is the correct explanationof the
case. I do not insist upon my suggested reading, but only that Collingwood's interpretationof Aristotle's theory of art is as grossly inaccurate
as his interpretation of Plato. But finally, it should be urged that, as
always, Collingwood is provocative and valuable in his analysis, which
notices what are admittedly ambiguities in Greek aesthetic theory.
1 P. A.
2
Poetics)
p. sp.
I447
a i.
148