Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA
NACARIO, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws
and applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987
which reversed and set aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines
Sur. 2 The challenged decision adjudged the petitioners liable to the private respondents in the
total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:
In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along
the national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident
with JB Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner
Jose Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle
was damaged. 5 No criminal case arising from the incident was ever instituted. 6
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter
negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company,
Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de
Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on
March 27, 1980 a "Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever
discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted
in her husband's death and the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia
likewise executed an affidavit of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest
in instituting any case, either civil or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on
November 7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur. 8 In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased
son, the petitioners through their representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as
extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the death of their son, for the funeral
expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase price of
which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged
on their promise and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife
of their late son. The Nacario spouses prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered
to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of their son Bienvenido,
P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages. 9
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants
(herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-ininterest of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private
respondents), extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not
discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private
respondents in their own capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of
Alicia; and Alicia could not have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private
respondents) since she was not the one who suffered these damages arising from the death of
their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony
of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the ones who bought the tricycle that was
damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of such fact, and they did establish
such fact in their testimony . . . 11 Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he expenses for the funeral
were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,
therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor. 12
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral
services, P450.00 for cemetery lot, P55.00 for oracion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's
fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision 14 but their motion was denied. 15 Hence, this
petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00
despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's
compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the
accident that occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the
spouse and the one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to
extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive
it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to
their legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos.
1 and 2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral
relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs.
As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the
private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs.
The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of
Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been
estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his
funeral, the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their
deceased son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have
said, had been released by the agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with
Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of
their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in favor of the
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitionerappellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order,
dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case
No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein
plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause
of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of
Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute
the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and
canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife
continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She
prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other
properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese
law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But
before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on
31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on
two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by
her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body of the
order, the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be
resolved on the question of whether or not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the

court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the motion was denied on 15
September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal
issued by the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14
October 1969. The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who
prayed for the affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims,
he did not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal
of said counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the
petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to
be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court
did not act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for
a declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the
proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit
to one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted
that "the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page
22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of
the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable
nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the
counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity
has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action
for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves
property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil
Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses
can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal
separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to
the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the
marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the
spouse takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The
action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8,
1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an
action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a
dissolution of that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence
of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the
action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation beyond all
controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the
parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason
the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a
divorce proceeding, before final decree, abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208;

Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of
Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874;
Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark.
452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie
v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs.
Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are
solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the
marriage bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of
property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no
right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without
prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse,
unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom
said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending
spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share
of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor
of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their
nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after
a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the
action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor
or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but
actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included
in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their
source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that
before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical
and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the
death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise,
that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as
a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in
a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article
83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the
first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally
believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three
persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question
raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter,
her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident
of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two
(2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C.
Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes
administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4;
Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that
she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court
denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow
(surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial
court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the
said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only
inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil

Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant
provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of
a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final
intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the
Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887
of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos.
1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall
inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-inlaw. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No.
3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of
the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the
Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because
of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no
filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had
an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it
may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son
Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not
succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon
the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an
intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with
costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.