PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. CA and TITO B.

DATO
July 14, 1995; KAPUNAN,
J.
FACTS:
In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then
Gov. of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by
then Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr.Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was
appointed to, thus, he could not be legally extended a permanentappointment. He was
extended a temporary appointment, which was renewed annually.
January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter'srepresentation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was
notfavorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did
not possess the necessary civil service eligibilityfor the office he was appointed to. His
appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.
March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges
were filed against him and a prison guard forallegedly conniving and/or consenting to
evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of
the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil ServiceCommission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing
him that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary
topermanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard.
The change of status was to be maderetroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of
said examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant
Provincial Warden and deleted privaterespondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla
.Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he
requested the Gov. for reinstatement and backwages.His request was not heeded. Dato
filed an action before the RTC.
RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of backwages of Dato equivalent to five years.
Province of Camarines Sur appealed the decisionto the CA.CA: Affirmed RTCs decision.
Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time
he was suspended on March 16,1976.
Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the
employment status of private respondent fromtemporary to permanent, which the CSC
approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private
respondent'sexamination for supervising security guard, private respondent's
appointment in effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequentqualification for civil
service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.
SC Held:
Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not
entitled to his claim for backwagesfor the entire period of his suspension.

Ratio:
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had
not yet qualified in an appropriateexamination for the aforementioned position. Such lack
of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without afixed and
definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power.
The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment
as his having passed the supervisingsecurity guard examination, did not ipso facto
convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a
newappointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary
appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority
The letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear
arrogation of power properly belonging to theappointing authority. CSC has the power to
approve or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to
makethe appointment itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the
employment status of an employee. CSC should have endedits participation in the
appointment of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary
status of the latterwho lacked the proper civil service eligibility. When it issued the
foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it stepped on the toesof the appointing
authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.

Sec. Ricardo T.Gloria

[D.E.C.S.], et al.,
petitioners vs Judge Salvador P.
De Guzman, Jr., et al.,respondents
.G.R. No. 116183 October 6, 1995
FACTS:
Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics
(PAFCA) by virtue oftemporary appointments because at the time of their appointment,
they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities orotherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions. One of them was RosarioCerillo who
was appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However she was relieved from the
position by reason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as
"Coordinator for Extension Services". Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was
dissolved and replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State College of Aeronautics)Aggrieved,
private respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement for reinstatement
before the RTC of Pasay Petitioners filed an answer upon the ground that mandamus will
not lie to compel reinstatement because there appointment prayed for is discretionary
on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees). Respondent Judge de Guzman
rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for extension
services. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the
position of"Coordinator for Extension Services"?
RULING:
The judgment of respondent Judge de Guzman which orders the reinstatement of Ms.
Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently
improper because it finds no support as to facts and the law. The fact is that private

respondent's assignment to the said position was a mere designation. Not being a
permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case
for reinstatement.The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil
Service Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to
compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole
factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing authority are:
performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust
of the appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature,
is primarily confidential. Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary
on the part of the appointing power hence it cannot be the subject of an application for a
writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is
essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment
cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the
appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the
private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a
discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. To the question as to the
legality of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only answer is there was
no termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a
superior officer. There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, PSCA Chairman
of the Board of Trustees Col. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their
respective contracts, Petitioners appointment or employment simply expired either by its
very own terms, or because it may not exceed one year, but most importantly because
the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA.

PLM VS IAC
FACTS: Dr. Esteban has the background of a competent person able to handle a high
post. He used to teach in the Philippine College of Commerce when he was invited by Dr.
Blanco to teach in PLM. Blanco was then the president of PLM. He later assigned Esteban
as the VP for Academic Affairs. His appointment is however merely ad interim.
Thereafter, he received notifications of renewal of his term every time his term would
lapse. Until in 1975 when he asked Blanco to appoint him as the permanent VP. Blanco
however refused to appoint him and he assigned Esteban to a lower post instead. Blanco
also said that the Board of Regents was not able to approve his appointment as VP for it
was withdrawn. Esteban file with the CSC and the CSC ruled in favor of him. PLM
appealed to the trial court and the court affirmed the CSC. PLM again appealed to the IAC
and the IAC ruled in favor of Esteban again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estebans appointment became permanent.
HELD: Esteban had been extended several ad-interim appointments which PLM
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature. An officer ad interim is
one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.
But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Estebans appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the
appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said
appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the PLM in the meantime,
while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the University Charter with the
power of appointment, is unable to act.
Later, in its Resolution 485, the PLM Board of Regents verified Estebans appointment
without condition nor limitation as to tenure. As of that moment, it became a regular and

permanent appointment. Note further that . . . an ad interim appointment is one made

in pursuance of par (4), sec 10, Article 7, of the [1973] Constitution, which provides that
the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad
interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional
period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an acting
appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is
issued.