Rabor v.

CSC
Facts:
Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao
City. He entered the government service as a Utility Worker on 10 April 1978 at
the age of 55 years. Sometime in May1991, an official in the Office of the Mayor
of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering
that he had already more than 68 years old. Rabor responded by showing a GSIS
certificate with a notation to the effect that his service is extended for him to
complete the 15-years requirement for retirement. The Davao City Government
wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI,
Davao City informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice as to what
action should be taken on Rabors case. Director Caward replied by saying that
Rabors continued employment is contrary to Office of the President M.C. No. 65
hence, it is non-extendible. Mayor Duterte furnished Rabor a copy of Cawads
letter and ordered him not to work anymore. Rabor asked Director Cawad for
extension of his job until he completed the 15-yearrequirement but was denied.
Rabor then asked OP for an extension. His request was referred by OP to CSC
and thereafter CSC denied Rabors request. Rabor asked for reconsidered of CSC
ruling citing Cena case but was denied. Rabor reiterated his request to Mayor
Duterte but was rebuffed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON Rabor request for extension should be granted inview of Cena case
Held: No. Cena doctrine overturned. In Cena v. CSC, the Court reached its
conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section
11(b) of P.D. No. 1146. While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified
terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which prescribe
limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who
has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.
These are CSC Circular No. 27, s. 1990 and OPM.C. No. 65. The Court resolved
the challenges posed by the above two(2)administrative regulations by, firstly,

considering as invalid Civil Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by

interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65 as
inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena. Nevertheless, the Court now ruled
that the SC in Cena made a narrow interpretation. It is incorrect to decide the issue
on the basis only of PD 1146.Reading the pertinent provisions the Admin Code
particularly the provisions governing the CSC, it is clear that both the Admin
Code and PD 1146 are the governing laws relating to retirement of government
officials and employees. It was on the basis of the above quoted provisions of the
1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated its
Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the
central personnel agency of the government empowered to promulgate policies,
standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel
administration in the government." It was also discharging its function
of "administering the retirement program for government officials and
employees" and of "evaluating qualifications for retirement." It is also incorrect to
say that limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has
reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not
germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The
physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human
beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be
expected from individualpersons.CSC Memo No. 27 is not invalid for having
gone beyond the parameters set by PD 1146. In fact what the legislature intends is
that the CSC should fill in the details in the implementation of PD 1146.Civil
Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing
leadership and assistance in the development and retention of qualified and
efficient work force in the Civil Service and with the enforcement of the
constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to the retirement and the regulation
for the effective implementation of the retirement of government officials and
employee.

TANCINCO V. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

369 SCRA 221 DE LEON, JR.
FACTS
1. SPO1 Eddie Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security Protection
Group of the Philippine National Police.
2. On July 17, 1995, while he was repairing a service vehicle in front of
his house, he was shot dead by 5 unidentified armed men.
3. At the time of his death, he was assigned as part of the close-in
security detail of then VP Joseph Estrada. He was off-duty at the time
since the Vice President was in the US for medical treatment.
4. When his widow filed a claim with GSIS, the same was denied on the
ground that there was no proof that Tancincos death was work-related.
5. The denial was affirmed by the ECC.
ISSUE Whether or not the death of SPO1 Tancinco is compensable.
HELD NO. The pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims
for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place
where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his official functions (c) that if the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer. The aforesaid requirements have not been met. Anent the first,
as part of the former VPs security detail, the decedent was required to
guard the person of the former; hence his presence was officially
required wherever the Vice-President would go. At the time of his death,
SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty since the Vice-President was out of the
country. As to the second requirement, it was not sufficiently established
that SPO1 Tancinco died while performing his official functions. The
24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers serves more

as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope

of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all
situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour
duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those
which, although not an official duty, are nonetheless basically police
service in character. In the present case, the decedent was repairing a
service vehicle when he was killed. It cannot be said that the deceased
was discharging official functions, if anything, repairing a service
vehicle is only incidental to his job. Neither was the last requirement
satisfied. As the fatal incident occurred when SPO1 Tancinco was at
home, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show that her husband was
discharging a task pursuant to an order issued by his superiors. This was
not done.