De La Salle University

Election Law Course Outline

Dr. Antonio La Vina

I.

Landmark/Controversial Decisions

Constitutionality of Ipso Facto Resignation Provisions

Quinto v. Comelec, Res., GR No. 189698, February 22, 2010; motions for reconsideration of its December 1,
2009 decision

Party List not only for the Marginalized

AtongPaglaum et al vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Pre-Mature Campaigning
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. 181613 11 September 2009
Penera v. Comelec Motion for Reconsideration, 599 SCRA 609 25 November 2009

Jalosjos vs. Comelec (GR 205033, 2013)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/june2013/205033.pdf

Reyes vs. Comelec (GR 207264, 2013)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2013/june2013/207264.pdf

Supreme Courts decisions against Comelec limiting airtime of political ads, money ban and extended
liquor ban in the 2013 May midterm elections

Limiting airtime limits

http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections-2013/26369-sc-comelec-s-airtime-limit
-

Money ban

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/307670/news/nation/sc-stops-comelec-from-implementing-moneyban
Extended liquor ban
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/uploads/Elections/2013natloc/res/mr130322.pdf
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/405133/liquor-ban-backed-to-2-days-comelec
II.

Citizen participation and electoral rights.

The Right to Vote

Betito vs. Benipayo G.R. No. 147179, March 26,2001 355 SCRA 313
Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649,
US vsSancuya 13 Phil Reports 729

Postponement of election

Sec. 5, OEC (Omnibus Election Code)

Dimaporo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 81151, Jan. 7, 1988,
Basher vs. COMELEC, 330 SCRA 736

Failure of election

III.

Sec. 6 OEC
Basher vs. Comelec 330 SCRA 736
Hassan vs. Comelec, 264 SCRA 125
Sangcad S. Bao (BAO) v. COMELEC, GR no. 149666, December 19, 2003.
Election of Public Officials

Election of President and Vice-President

Secs. 13-20 OEC

Election of Members of Congress

Art. XVIII, secs. 1 and 2 1987 Constitution

Election of Local Officials

Sec. 1, Art. XVIII 1987 Constitution

Sec. 8, Art. X 1987 Constitution

Election of Barangay Officials

Laws postponing barangay elections

(Ever changing schedule of Barangay elections)

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IV.

Republic Act No. 6653

Republic Act 6679
Republic Act No. 8524
Republic Act No. 9164
Republic Act No. 9340

The Comelec
Composition
-

Article IX-C 1987 Constitution

En Banc and Division Cases

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC 212 SCRA 307

ZaratevsCOMELEC, 318 SCRA 608
Ramirez vs. COMELEC,270 SCRA 590
Faelnar vs. COMELEC,331 SCRA 429

Powers and Functions

Gallardo vs. Tabamo,218 SCRA 253

353
Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. COMELEC,289 SCRA 33
Montejo vs. COMELEC,242 SCRA 415
Sandoval vs. Comelec, G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000, 323 SCRA 403

V.

Judicial Review of Decisions

Aratuc vs. Comelec 88 SCRA 251

Filipina Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

Ambil v. Comelec G.R. No. 143398 , October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358

VI.

Voters Qualification and Registration

RA 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996)

Romualdez vs. RTC 226 SCRA 406

Kabataan Party-List vs. Comelec G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009,

BaytanvsComelec GR. No. 153945,396 SCRA 703, 716

VII.

Political Parties and Party List System

VIII.

RA No. 7941 (Party List System Act)

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 1136781, October 6, 2000,
Ang BagongBayani OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698
PGBI vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 190529, 619 SCRA 585
OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698
BANAT vs. Comelec586 SCRA 211.
AtongPaglaum et al. vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013
Liberal Party vs. Comelec, 620 SCRA 393

Candidates and certificates of candidacy

Qualifications

Secs. 63- 78 OEC

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245
Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400
Disqualifications

Sec. 12, 68, OEC

Sec. 40 Local Government Code
Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481
Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

Term Limits

Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013

Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
Certificate of Candidacy

Sec. 7, RA 7166
Secs. 73-78 OEC
Gador vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 431
Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266

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IX.

disqualification of candidates; grounds, procedure and effects of

X.

campaign; election propaganda; contributions and expenditures

XI.

Sec. 13, RA 6646 The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987

Secs. 164-180 OEC
Sec. 26 of RA 7166

casting of votes and Absentee Voting

XIII.

Secs. 79-112
Adiong vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272
National Press Club vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
Pilar V. COMELEC245 SCRA 759
Peralta vs. COMELEC 82 SCRA 30
Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. 181613 11 September 2009,
Penera v. Comelec Motion for Reconsideration 25 November 2009, 599 SCRA 609

election; board of election inspectors (bei); watchers

XII.

Secs. 68,69, 78 OEC

Secs. 5, 7RA 6646 The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
Toraynovs.COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574
Villaber vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126

Sec. 200,BP881
Sec. 195-196, BP881
RA 9189 The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
RA. 8436 Amended by 9369, An act authorizing the Commission on Elections to use an
Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in subsequent
National And Local Electoral Exercises.
Macalintal vs. Comelec,405 SCRA 614
Libananvs HRET,283 SCRA 520

canvassing and proclamation

Secs. 20. 21, 23, 28 RA 6646 The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987

Secs. 222-240 OEC

Casimiro vs. COMELEC 171 SCRA 468, 1989

Quilala vs. COMELEC 188 SCRA 502, 1990

Caruncho vs. COMELEC,315 SCRA 693

XIV.

pre-proclamation controversy

Sec. 241-248 OEC

Sec. 245 repealed by sec. 39 RA 7166 An act providing for synchronized national and local
elections and for electoral reforms

Secs. 15, 16, 17 etc. RA 7166

Laudenio vs. COMELEC 276 SCRA 705

Allarde vs. COMELEC,159 SCRA 623
Dipatuan vs. COMELEC,185 SCRA 86
XV.

election contests

XVI.

Sec. 17 Art. VI 1987 Constitution

The 2010 rules of the presidential electoral tribunal
The 2011 rules of the house of representatives electoral tribunal
Sec. 254 OEC Procedure in election contests
Rule 20, Part V, Comelec Rules of Procedure
Rule 28, Part V, Comelec Rules of Procedure
Rule 35 Part VI, Comelec Rules of Procedure
Commission on Elections
Regional Officials
Provincial Officials
City Officials ( Sec 2(2). Art IX-C, PC; Sec 249 BP 881)
Regional Trial Court
Municipal Officials ( Sec 2(2), Art IX-C, PC; Sec 251, BP 881, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court
Barangay Officials [ Sec 2(2), Art IX-C, PC; Sec 252 BP 881;]
Sangguniang Kabataan ( Sec 1, RA 7166)
De Castro vs. COMELEC 267 SCRA 806
Poe, Jr. vs. Arroyo, PET case no. 0002, March 29, 2005,
Tecson vs. COMELEC424 SCRA 277

election offenses

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Secs 261-269 OEC

Sec. 27 RA 6646
SungavsCOMELEC 288 SCRA 76
De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760

I. Landmark/Controversial Decisions
1. Quinto v. Comelec, Res., GR No. 189698, February 22, 2010;
motions for reconsideration of its December 1, 2009 decision
Author: Ralph Agbisit
Topic: Constitutionality of Ipso Facto Resignation Provisions
Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution
No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
Sec. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy a.) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b.) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
The second proviso in the third paragraph of Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369, which is the basis of Resolution No. 8678,
provide:
Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day
of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Petitioners Eleazar Quinto and Gerino Tolentino, who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend
to run in the coming elections filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of Sec.
4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions.
In its December 2009 ruling, the Supreme Court held that the assailed provision of R.A. 9369 and Sec. 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 are unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
Issue: Whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph of Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369 and Sec. 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional?
Held: No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
1.) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2.) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3.) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4.) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed 2009 decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third, and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.
In the instant case, there is a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded
from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end
of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

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2. AtongPaglaum et al vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Author: Ralph Agbisit
Facts:
On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the
Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces
of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi,
Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board
of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region
had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged
irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates to the
Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan candidates and one Konsensiya ng Bayan candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering
the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates
interposed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec can issue a resolution amending the resolution of the board of canvassers and order the
same board to execute the same resolution
Held: Yes. Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have
direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code
provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is that the
authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate
jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election
Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted
provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation
here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is
supposed to do or ought to have done. The Supreme Court cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended
its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly
and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis--vis the
preservation of the purity of elections and electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.
3. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. 181613 11 September 2009
Author: Angelo Lopez
Facts:
Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of
the campaign period. Andanar claimed that a day before the start of the authorized campaign period, Penera and her
partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting people
to vote for them on the day of the elections. Penera, although admitting on the motorcade, said that the motorcade
was part of the dispersal of their supporters and their transportation back to their respective barangays. Comelec
ruled against Penera and disqualified the latter. Commissioner Sarmiento of Comelec, however dissented in this
majority decision and believed that Andanar was unable to adduce substantial evidence that would support the claim
of violation of election laws. Sarmiento accepted Peneras explanation that the motorcade conductrd after the filing
of their COCs was merely part of the dispersal of the spontaneous gathering of their supporters. The dissenting
opinion also argues thatSection 80 of the Omnibus election Code cannot be applied to the present case since, as the
Court held in Lanot vs. Comelec, and in view of the third paragraph of Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended the election campaign or partisan activity, which constitute the prohibited premature campaigning, should
be designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates. Under present election laws,
while a person may have filed his/her COC within the prescribed period for doing so, said person shall not be
considered a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Thus, prior to the start of the campaign period, there
can be no election campaign or partisan political activity designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate to public office because there is no candidate to speak of.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Penera has engaged in an election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign
period.
2. Whether or not Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code is applicable in this case despite Section 15 of R.A.
8436, as amended.
Held:
1. Yes, In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanars evidence, but also those of
Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on 29 March 2007, participated in a
motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw
candies to the onlookers. More importantly, the conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan
political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding
political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate[.] A motorcade is a procession or
parade of automobiles or other motor vehicles.[31] The conduct thereof during election periods by the candidates

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and their supporters is a fact that need not be belabored due to its widespread and pervasive practice. The obvious
purpose of the conduct of motorcades is to introduce the candidates and the positions, to which they seek to be
elected, to the voting public; or to make them more visible so as to facilitate the recognition and recollection of their
names in the minds of the voters come election time. Unmistakably, motorcades are undertaken for no other
purpose than to promote the election of a particular candidate or candidates.As we previously noted, Penera and her
witnesses admitted that the vehicles, consisting of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles, were festooned with multicolored balloons; the motorcade went around three barangays in Sta. Monica; and Penera and her partymates waved
their hands and threw sweet candies to the crowd. With vehicles, balloons, and even candies on hand, Penera can
hardly persuade us that the motorcade was spontaneous and unplanned. For violating Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code, proscribing election campaign or partisan political activity outside the campaign period, Penera must
be disqualified from holding the office of Mayor of Sta. Monica.
2. Yes, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code remains relevant and applicable despite Section 15 of Republic Act
No. 8436, as amended. First, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly
provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or
association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign
period. Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a candidate. For this
reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that [w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits is an election
campaign or partisan political activity by a candidate outside of the campaign period, is clearly erroneous.a
person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a candidate in the
coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and
reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy. When the campaign period starts
and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her
acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a
candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.As previously
established, a person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the
campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as
election campaign or partisan political activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at
the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at
the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous
advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.

4. Penera v. Comelec Motion for Reconsideration, 599 SCRA 609 25 November 2009
Author: Angelo Lopez
Facts:
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the
COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision
disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the
Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera. (This is a Motion for reconsideration of the case above, all facts and rulings are
material in this case)
Issue: Whether or not the assailed Decision (on the previous case above) is contrary to the clear intent and letter of
the law
Held:
Yes, The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of
candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. The essential elements for violation of Section 80
of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the
act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside
the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is
one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the
election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their
certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the
start of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to such
last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the day
immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section 80
covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period. Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on the
last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such last day, which is before the start of the campaign period
and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running
for elective public office usually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.When
Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing that
Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA
8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate."Congress wanted
to insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy under the early deadline required by the automated election
system would be disqualified or penalized for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign
period.The Decision cannot reverse Lanot without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot would

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mean repealing this second sentence. The assailed Decision, thus is self-contradictory. When the applicable
provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not consider Penera a
candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely
no room for any other interpretation.
In laymans language, this (resolution and what the legislature intends) means that a candidate is liable for an
election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before.
5. Jalosjos vs. Comelec (GR 205033, 2013)
AUTHOR: Anna Beatrice Tarrosa
FACTS:
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was
eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to
the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he
renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act
(R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived.
He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain,
opposed the said act. Election Registration Board approved it and included Jalosjos name in the COMELEC voters
list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos name from the official voters list. MTC
denied Erasmos petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTCs.
On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of ZamboangaSibugay
Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos COC on
the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the
requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC
ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement. Jalosjos won the elections
ISSUE(S):won Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement
HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His
domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in ZamboangaSibugay, it is evident
that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration.
RATIO: By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile
there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
6. Reyes vs. Comelec (GR 207264, 2013)
AUTHOR: Anna Beatrice S. Tarrosa
NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which
stated that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
FACTS:
For allegedly making material misrepresentations in her COC, the Comelec first division cancelled petitioners COC
in its resolution dated March 27 2013 and affirmed by the Comelec en banc on 14 May 2013.
Four days later or on 18 May, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May2013 elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from
the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution.
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr.,Speaker of the House of
Representatives. But petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
With the proclamation and taking of oath, petitioner posits that the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when
she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE(S):Which between Comelec and HRET has jurisdiction over the instant case.

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HELD: The COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case.

RATIO: Contrary to petitioners claim, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the1987 Constitution. From previous analogous cases, it is
clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not
yet assumed office.
MOR-October 22, 2013In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner asked the Honorable Court to affirm the
jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications averring that she is a duly
proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions
regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.
She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken,
with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
Limiting airtime limits

BAGUIO CITY, Philippines - The Supreme Court stopped the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on Tuesday, April 16, from
implementing its airtime limits on political ads.
Voting 9-6, the SC issued a status quo ante order that stopped the implementation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 and its
amendment, Resolution No. 9631.
The order comes barely a month before the May 13 elections, during the home stretch of which, senatorial candidates scramble
for paid airtime to maximize their name recall.
The Comelec under chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr has set the following airtime cap for political ads, being faithful to the intent of
the Fair Elections Act:

For all national candidates, an aggregate of 120 minutes in all TV networks and 180 minutes in all radio stations.

For all local candidates, an aggregate of 60 minutes in all TV networks and 90 minutes in all radio stations.
Broadcast networks GMA-7, TV5, and the Kapisanan ng Brodkaster ng Pilipinas sought a temporary restraining order on the
Comelec rule in February, saying the limit is too "restrictive" and violates the people's right to information. In previous elections,
the Comelec under chair Benjamin Abalos imposed a more liberal interpretation of the law - 120 minutes per TV station, and 180
minutes per radio station.
The Comelec under Abalos previously computed the airtime limit on a per-station basis. This was in 2004, when President Gloria
Arroyo, who appointed him, was running for president. Thisinterpretation of the airtime limits pushed election spending to
stratospheric heights. Reaping the windfall were the media outfits, particularly TV and radio.
In 2010 when the presidential and local polls were conducted, the top two TV giants ABS-CBN and GMA 7 reported record
incomes. ABS-CBN said it earned P420 million from political ads in the first quarter of that year. GMA 7 said it reaped more
than P2 billion in political ads during the course of the 2010 national polls.
Under Brillantes, the Comelec made an aggregate computation to "stick to the spirit" of the Fair Elections Act and set equal
airtime for all candidates. The Comelec adopted the original airtime limits, as applied in the 2001 elections. (Read: Why revert
to old airtime cap for candidates)
The Comelecs new rule caught TV and radio stations by surprise, prompting some of them to go to the High Court, thus the
status quo ante order. The order gives the justices time to hear the arguments of both sides.

Page 8

The nine who concurred were Justices Antonio Carpio, Martin Villarama, Jose Mendoza,Lucas Bersamin, Justices Teresita
Leonardo de Castro, Diosdado Peralta, Marvic Leonen, Presbitero Velasco, and Jose Perez.
Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, Justices Arturo Brion, Bienvenido Reyes, Mariano del Castillo, Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and
Roberto Abad dissented.
Welcomed
Sen Alan Peter Cayetano, the lone senatorial candidate who filed a petition hailed the decision as "a victory for democracy and
for voters in poor rural areas with limited or no access to national television" in a statement.
"Information about candidates should reach every Filipino family, not only those with access to national TV," Cayetano said.
"This decision is a victory for voters, especially the poor in remote rural areas who now have the opportunity to hear more about
the advocacy of various candidates."
GMA-7, one of the petitioners, also welcomed the SC order.
In a statement, Butch Raquel, consultant to the station's chaiman and CEO for corporate communications, said: "We maintain
that the cheapest and most effective way of informing the public about the qualifications of the candidates, and issues involving
them during elections, is through the medium of radio and television."
He cited a newspaper column by former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban that said, a 30-second ad placed on Channel 7s
'Kapuso Mo Jessica Soho' could on the average reach 9,509,573 people.
This calculation is derived from reports of Nielsen Philippines, the TV-radio rating firm used by most advertisers. Using the
usual single ad rate of P419,265, the average cost per person would only be four centavos. Other programs are cheaper but
reach fewer people. - with reports from Purple Romero and Aries Rufo/Rappler.com

Money ban
The Supreme Court stopped the Commission on Elections from implementing a controversial resolution that prevented the
withdrawal and carrying of huge amounts of cash before the elections on Monday.
In a press briefing, Public Information Office Chief Theodore Te said the Supreme Court issued, in a two-page resolution, a status
quo ante order against Comelec Resolution 9688, which disallows cash withdrawals exceeding P100,000 per day and the carrying
of P500,000 cash beginning May 8, Wednesday, until May 13, Monday.
Brillantes: Comelec will not withdraw 'money ban' resolution
Despite the Supreme Court order stopping the implementation of the 'money ban,' Elections chief Sixto Brillantes Jr. said the poll
body will not be withdrawing the resolution preventing the withdrawal and carrying of huge amounts of cash before Election
Day.
At the same time, Brillantes said that while they will abide with the high court's order, the poll body will be filing a comment to
impress upon the SC that coming up with the controversial resolution was not an abrupt move.
Brillantes

said

the

Comelec

en

banc

studied

the

money

ban

for

two

months.

At a press briefing earlier in the day, SC Public Information Office chief Theodore Te said the high court issued a status quo ante
order against Comelec Resolution 9688, which disallows cash withdrawals exceeding P100,000 per day and the carrying of
P500,000
cash
beginning
May
8,
Wednesday,
until
May
13,
Monday.
But Brillantes said that upon receiving the SQA, he consulted with the commissioners and they agreed not to withdraw the
resolution, like what they did on the expanded liquor ban when the high court also stopped them from implementing it.
Gusto lang namin sabihin na pinag-aralan namin to. Gusto rin naming sagutin nang konti yung sinasabi ng BSP na merong
secrecy involved at independent daw sila. Gusto din namin ma-clear whether the concurrence of the President is also necessary
because our position is hindi kailangan ng concurrence ng President, Brillantes told reporters.
[Read more.]
The high tribunal also ordered the Comelec to comment, within 10 days from notice, on the petition filed by the Bankers
Association of the Philippines on Thursday that sought to stop the ban.
The SQA order was issued "[g]iven by authority of Chief Justice [Maria Lourdes Sereno] upon written recommendation of
member
in
charge,"
read
the
resolution.
The SC order essentially kills the Comelec's initiative against vote-buying, since there is virtually no time left for Comelec to
justify it before the court in the face of stiff opposition. The Bangko Sentral has already stated that it will not enforce the
Comelec
order.
BAP petition
In its petition, the BAP said the Comelec acted outside its jurisdiction when it issued the controversial ban.
"The powers conferred to Comelec under the Constitution... do not include the power to impose limitations on the withdrawal of
cash, encashment of checks, conversion of monetary instruments into cash, and the possession or transport of cash," the petition
read.
The petitioners added that the ban violated the due process clause of the Constitution. "The means it employs are not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of its purpose and are unduly oppressive upon individuals."

Page 9

The petitioners also said the money ban violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution because it prohibits banks from
complying with their contractual obligations to their depositors.
It also allegedly violates the presumption of innocence because it presumes that anybody seen giving or offering to another
person cash in excess of P500,000 has committed vote-buying and can be arrested.
The petition also said the ban "invalidly amended Republic Act No. 9160" or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which the
petitioners argued was beyond the scope of Comelec's powers.
The petitioners also said that the ban would require banks and other persons to look into bank deposit accounts, which allegedly
violates the laws on secrecy of bank deposits.
"The petitioners are placed in a situation where they are 'damned if they do, damned if they don't.' If they follow the Money Ban
Resolution, they will be swamped with all kinds of suits by their depositors for preventing them from withdrawing their hardearned money," read the petition.
"If they don't comply with the Money Ban Resolution, they will similarly be at risk of civil and criminal prosecution for
supposedly violating election laws, especially for the crime of 'vote-buying' which the Money Ban Resolution purports to
proscribe," it added.
This developed despite Comelec chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr.'s statement earlier in the day that a supplemental resolution is
already being circulated among the poll commissioners that would relax the controversial policy.
Under the amended resolution, discretion will be left to bank tellers and officials whether to allow cash withdrawals of P100,000
and above.
Largest bankers' group welcomes SC decision
Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) president Lorenzo Tan welcomed the development, standing firm that any policy
move in the future must take into account views of all stakeholders.
"We welcome the order of the Supreme Court in protecting the rights of our depositors to their funds," Tan, who is also president
of Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., said in a text message sent to GMA News Online.
He said the BAP intends to "help in ensuring free and honest elections," but noted that whatever "policy we come up with must
consider the impact of banking business and the rights of our customers."
"The banking industry needs time to prepare for whatever measures Comelec and BSP imposes on the industry," Tan noted.
SC

TROs

This was not the first time in recent weeks that the Supreme Court had either reversed or stopped several Comelec rulings.
The high court last Wednesday stopped the Comelec from implementing an extended liquor ban before the elections .
The SC also had earlier issued TROs against Comelec rulings that placed a cap on the TV and radio airtime of political
advertisements and that ordered the tearing down of several allegedly partisan campaign posters.
The SC also favored party-list groups that contested their disqualification by the Comelec, remanding their cases back to the poll
body for further hearings. With a report from Siegfrid O. Alegado/KG/HS, GMA News

Extended liquor ban

MANILA, Philippines After being issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the Supreme Court (SC), the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) withdrew its five-day liquor ban Thursday.

We promulgated Resolution No. 9691 reverting to the 2-day liquor ban. As it now stands, liquor ban will be from May 12 to
May 13, 2013, Comelec chairman SixtoBrillantes Jr. said in his official twitter account @ChairBrillantes Thursday.

We will accept the fact that the liquor ban will only be two days, he said in a separate earlier interview when asked about the
SCs TRO Wednesday night.

The liquor ban was extended to five days from the original two days after Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
chairman Francis Tolentino wrote a letter to Comelec requesting to lengthen the bans duration last January.

They originally asked for two months [but] we lowered it to five days, Brillantes said.

Page 10

The SC still didnt want it, so we go back to the two days, he said.

According to Section 2 of Comelec Resolution 9582, the liquor ban shall be in force and effect on the day before the election
(May 12) and on election day (May 13).

Section 1 states: It shall be unlawful for any person, including owners and managers of hotels and establishments to sell, furnish,
offer, buy, serve, or take intoxicating liquor anywhere in the Philippines.

Comelecs Minute Resolution 13-0322 that was issued on the basis of Tolentinos letter extended the ban to five days.
Acting on the foregoing request of MMDA chairman Francis Tolentino, the commission resolves to extend the period of the
liquor ban from two days to five days effective May 9 to May 13, it said.

On Wednesday, May 8, a day before the extended ban was supposed to take effect, the SC issued a TRO against the extended
liquor ban.

We will file a manifestation withdrawing our [minute] resolution, Brillantes said.

Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/405133/liquor-ban-backed-to-2-days-comelec#ixzz3IFeFUPwX

II. Citizen participation and electoral rights.

The Right to Vote
7. Betito vs. Benipayo G.R. No. 147179, March 26,2001 355 SCRA 313

Facts:
Herein petitioners, representing the youth sector, seek to direct the COMELEC to conduct a special registration
before the May 15, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21.

Page 11

Petitioners claim that around 4 million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by
the respondent COMELEC under R.A. No. 8189.
Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion, together with Commissioner Borra, attended the public hearing called by
the Senate Committee headed by Sen. Roco. Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted a Memorandum
regarding the Report on the Request for a 2-day additional registration of New Voters Only. The additional 2-day
registration was later approved.
The group of the regional heads and representatives however opposed the additional special registration days
arguing that Sec. 8 of RA 8189 expressly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting
120 days before a regular election. The Commissioner then issued a resolution denying the request for the 2-day
registration.
This prompted the petitioners to file before the SC an instant petition for Certiorari and Mandamus which seeks to
set aside and nullify COMELECs Resolution. Herein petitioner Betito (UP Student) filed a petition for mandamus
praying for another special registration day.
Issue: WON respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC Resolution.

o
o

Ruling: NO
The right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of
the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law.
A citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by the
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the Voters Registration Act of 1996.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
Contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a
mere statutory requirement.
The State, in the exercise of police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for
honest, orderly and peaceful election.
Section 8, of the R.A. 8189: System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The Personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office hours. No
registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution
and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election.
Respondent COMELEC did not commit an abuse of discretion, much less be adjudged to have committed the same
in some patent, whimsical and arbitrary manner, in issuing Resolution No. 3584 which, in respondents own terms,
resolved to deny the request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17 and 18,
2001.
The COMELEC, in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter --Section 8 of RA 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,
respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election,inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters;
evidently, respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely
falls within the proper sphere of its constitutionally-mandated powers.
8. Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 162759
August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 649

o
o

Facts:
Herein petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 which accords
to such applicants the right of suffrage. Long before the May 2004 elections, petitioners sought registration and
certification as overseas absentee voter only to be advised by the Phil. Embassy in the U.S. that according to a
COMELEC letter, they are not yet eligible to vote in the said elections due to the lack of the 1-year residence
requirement prescribed by the Constitution
The same letter however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters
registration.
Due the COMELECs refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis
et.al. filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus. The COMELEC in turn, filed a Comment praying for
the denial of the petition. As such, the petitioners were not able to register and vote in the said elections.
Issue: whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Ruling: YES
As this case concerns the right of suffrage, the pertinent portions of the Constitution are as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in thePhilippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. X xx.
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

Page 12

The aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On
the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that
a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote.
Section 5 of RA 9189 (OAVL) lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However,
Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an
exception and qualifies the disqualification rule.Soon after RA 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, the Congress
enacted RA 9225 providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only
if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws.
On the 1 year residence period: There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring"duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of
overseas absentee voting.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the
passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru
the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
9. US vs Sancuya
13 Phil Reports 729
Facts: Defendants, inspectors of election, refused to permit Rufino Isturis to register as an elector. Isturis claimed
the right by virtue of his ownership of real property worth P500, as prescribed in subsection (b), section 13, of Act
No. 1582.
Issue: Whether or not the inspectors of election can refuse registration of an unqualified voter.
Held: When an elector claims the right to vote by virtue of the above provision of law the inspectors are authorized
to exercise a quasi-judicial power in deciding the question involved, and unless they knowingly, willfully, and
maliciously refuse to register a qualified voter they are not criminally liable.
Evidence insufficient to sustain conviction. Judgment reversed and defendants acquitted.

Postponement of election
10. Dimaporo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 81151, Jan. 7, 1988, ZESYL AVIGAIL FRANCISCO

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

TOPIC: Postponement of election

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and Private Respondent Vicente Belmonte were both candidates for Representative
of 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte during the May 2007 elections, composed of seven (7) towns and
one (1) city.
May 22, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) completed the canvass of the Certificates of
Canvass (COCs) for the City of Iligan and four (4) of the municipalities and upon adjournment PBOC issued a
certification showing Belmonte in the lead and Petitioner in 3rd place
May 19, 2007, ballot boxes containing COCs were allegedly forcibly opened, padlocks destroyed and envelopes
containing COCs and Statement of Votes opened and violated, as discovered by PBOC the following day.
Commissioner-in-Charge of CARAGA Region, Nicodemo Ferrer- ordered that canvassing go tampered ballot
boxes be suspended until after NBI submits its findings.
NBI submitted its report, and Atty. Dennis L. Ausan, Regional Director, Region X issued a Memorandum to
COMELEC En Banc recommending that PBOC reconvene to retrieve the the 3 envelopes containing COCs from the
3 municipalities.
COMELEC issued a resolution directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to immediately reconvene solely for
the purpose of retrieving the three envelopes supposedly containing the COCs from the municipalities of
Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo and to open the same in the presence of all watchers, counsels, and
representatives of all contending parties and the accredited Citizens Arm of the Commission and right there and
then to direct the representatives of the dominant majority and minority parties to present their respective copies of
the COCs for comparison with the COCs intended for the COMELEC and with the COCs inside the envelope just
opened.
That when discrepancies show signs of tampering and falsifying, PBOC is to immediately turnover to the NBI
the copies of the COCs of said three (3) municipalities intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for
purposes of comparison with those retrieved from the questioned ballot boxes.
Commissioner Ferrer- constituted a special provincial board of canvassers
But no canvassing took place on May 30, 2007 in view of the human barricade of some 100 persons who
effectively blocked the entrance to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan building.
Ferrer issued another Memorandum constituting another SPBOC and ordered them to refrain from proclaiming
any candidate until ordered by the Commission
the canvassing still did not take place due to the human barricade which blocked the entrance to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan building had now swelled into a horde of some 300 persons.

Page 13

12.

13.

14.
15.
16.

the new SPBOC convened and opened the ballot boxes for the towns of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod. As
the SPBOC proceeded with the canvass, private respondent Belmonte objected to the inclusion of the COCs of the
concerned municipalities due to manifest errors in COCs, numbers of votes in words and in figures opposite the
names of appellant and appellees Badelles and Dimaporo contain intercalations done through the application of a
white correction fluid (SnoPake), which intercalations are visible to the naked eye, COCs were obviously
manufactured, tampered and falsified, intercalations in the COCs were not made or prepared by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBOC) concerned and SOVs likewise contain intercalations done through SnoPake resulting in an
altered number of votes for appellant and respondents.
SPBOC denied Belmontes objections due to lack of jurisdiction BUT COMELEC granted Belmontespetitionit took cognizance of the petition as one for the correction of manifest errors, hence, within its jurisdiction as per the
last sentence of Section 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166; and directed BOC to reconvene in Manila and issue a
new certificate of canvass of votes excluding the election returns subject of this appeal and substituting the proper
entries as are evident in the authentic copies of the election returns related to the subject COCs and also to proclaim
the winning candidate.
Dimaporo moved for a reconsideration but was denied by COMELEC
Court Resolved to require public respondent Commission on Elections to observe the STATUS QUO
Belmonte- filed his Comment and On that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House
Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
ISSUE: WON there should be postponement of election and proclamation of winning candidate?
HELD: NO, Petition Dismissed
RATIO: COMELEC was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmontes petition to correct manifest errors then
proclaiming him the winner. Election cases are imbued with public interest. They involve not only the adjudication
of the private interest of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the offices within their
gift. It has always been the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily
decided, consistent with the laws desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.
Considering that at the time of proclamation, there had yet been no status quo ante order or temporary restraining
order from the court, such proclamation is valid and, as such, it has vested the HRET with jurisdiction over the case
as Belmonte has, with the taking of his oath, already become one of their own.
Hence, should Dimaporo wish to pursue further her claim to the congressional seat, the filing of an election
protest before the HRET would be the appropriate course of action.

11. Basher vs. COMELEC, 330 SCRA 736 Alvin Rufino

Failure of election
12. Hassan vs. Comelec, 264 SCRA 125 ALVIN RUFINO
13. Sangcad S. Bao (BAO) v. COMELEC, GR no. 149666, December 19, 2003.
AUTHOR: Carl Fredson Au
FACTS:
Sangcad S. Bao sought re-election as mayor of Butig, Lanao del Sur in the 2001 elections and thus filed an a
motion to declare failure of election in COMELEC. Aside from petitioner, the other candidates for mayor were:

Gorigao Langco

Dimnatang L. Pansar

Rasmia U. Salic Romato

The COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on June 28, 2001 and rendered a "short resolution" dismissing
the cases for lack of Merit.
Bao contends that SPA No. 01-336 being a contentious case, the COMELEC acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal
and thus falls under the term court; that the questioned resolution failed to express clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based in contravention of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that contrary to the
findings of the COMELEC, the two (2) conditions which is to declare a failure of election was present in the instant
case; and that the serious and massive election irregularities in thirty out of forty precincts in Butig were more than
sufficient to affect the election results as they disenfranchised more than 70% of the registered voters.
Bao further contends that even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in failure to election ; that
the COMELEC erred in not giving credence to the official Narrative Report of Casidar which contained facts

Page 14

affecting the validity of the elections; and that in failing to conduct summary hearing for the reception of evidence,
the COMELEC violated the Omnibus Election Code and its own rules.

ISSUES: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in not declaring a failure of election?
HELD: NO, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides circumstances for there to be a Failure of
Election was well explained in Typoco v. COMELEC that clearly there are only three instances where a failure of
election may be declared, namely:
1.

the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;

2.

the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes;

3.

after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody
or canvass thereof, such election results in failure to elect on account of force rnajeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.

In all instances there must have been a failure to elect; this is obvious in the first scenario, where the election was
not held and second where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of
election returns which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to
mean that nobody emerged as winner.
In the present case, the allegations-bases of both Bao's petition and Langcos petition-in-intervention before the
COMELEC are mostly grounds for an election contest, not for a declaration of failure of election. While there are
allegations which may be grounds for failure of election, they are supported by mere affidavits and the narrative
report of the election officer. Bao and Langco were not able to present substantial evidence in support of their
allegations; and this should not be blamed on the COMELEC.
General allegations, without sufficient evidentiary support, do not warrant a declaration of a failure of
elections. Election results are the expression of the will of the people whose welfare and interests must immediately
be served by those upon whom the people have placed their trust.

III. Election of Public Officials

Election of President and Vice-President
Secs. 13-20 OEC
Election of Members of Congress
Art. XVIII, secs. 1 and 2 1987 Constitution
Election of Local Officials
Sec. 1, Art. XVIII 1987 Constitution
Sec. 8, Art. X 1987 Constitution
Election of Barangay Officials
Laws postponing barangay elections
(Ever changing schedule of Barangay elections)
-

Republic Act No. 6653

Republic Act 6679
Republic Act No. 8524
Republic Act No. 9164
Republic Act No. 9340

Page 15

IV. The Comelec

Composition
En Banc and Division Cases

14. Sarmiento vs. COMELEC 212 SCRA 307

Author: Carl Au
FACTS:
There were several resolutions decided and issued by the COMELEC En Banc in different cases namely:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

G.R. No. 105628

G.R. No. 105725
G.R. No. 105727
G.R. No. 105730
G.R. No. 105771
G.R. No. 105778
G.R. No. 105797
G.R. No. 105919
G.R. No. 105977
Petitioners want to impugn the challenged resolutions by COMELEC which for them was issued with grave abuse of
discretion wherein the Commission En Banc took cognizance of and decided different appeals without first referring
them to any of its Divisions. This is because Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly
provides:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied).
The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of Article XII provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and
decided by divisions, except contests involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. . . .
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc can circumvent and decide election cases without first letting it go
to its Divisions?
HELD: No, the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of
petitioners in the abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions. Said resolutions
are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside.
It is clear from the above equoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election cases include pre-proclamation
controversies, and all such cases must first be heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The
Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. In the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases and, in compliance
with the above provision of the Constitution, the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority
to hear and decide these Special Cases.
Rule 27, Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by
any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:
Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers.
(a) A party aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had stated orally his intent to appeal said
ruling shall, within five days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board of canvassers, file with
the Commission a verified appeal, furnishing a copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the adverse party.
(b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by the Clerk of Court concerned.
(c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
(d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set the case for hearing.
A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may be filed within five (5) days from
its promulgation. The Clerk of Court of the Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof,
notify the Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the Commission En Banc.

Page 16

Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of
the Commission En Banc within ten (10) days from the certification.
DOCTRINE: Election protest cases including pre-proclamation controversies cannot go directly to COMELEC En
Banc it should follow the proper procedure set forth by law and undergo the Division first. COMELEC En Banc acts
as an appellate body.
SEPERATE OPINIONS:
RUZ, J., concurring: The language of the provision suggests that it is jurisdictional and not merely
directory and therefore requires that all election cases be heard first by the division, whose decision may be
reconsidered only by the Commission en banc. Just like the Supreme Court itself cannot consider in the first instance
cases coming under the exclusive original jurisdiction of a lower court, like a petition for declaratory relief. Even in
the interest of a speedy administration of justice, we can exercise only appellate jurisdiction over such a case under
Article VIII, Section 5(2) of the Constitution. I find the quoted provision ill-considered, to say the least, in view of
the practical difficulties it may spawn. But we are dealing with a mandatory provision of the Constitution which,
unless amended must be observed.
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting: My ultimate submission is that we must read the second
sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution in such a manner as to avoid handcuffing, as it were, the
Comelec and denying it the essential flexibility it badly needs to be able to carry out the basic constitutional mandate
of "expedit[ing] disposition of election [protests and] pre-proclamation controversies."
This teleological or purpose-oriented reading may be achieved by regarding that second sentence as directory and
not mandatory (or jurisdictional) in character. The legal distinction between directory and mandatory provisions is as
applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws. The characterization of a constitutional or statutory provision as
directory rather than mandatory is not determined simply by the particular grammatical terms employed; indeed, the
problem of distinguishing between directory and mandatory language would not arise if the use of "will" or "shall"
instead of "may" were regarded as conclusive. That characterization is most rationally made on the basis of the
major purpose or objective which shines through the constitutional language and which must be given effect.
Alternatively, the second sentence of Article IX(C)(3) of the 1987 Constitution may be read, without departing from
the literal terms used in that provision, as encompassing only election cases properly so called, i.e., election protests,
and not pre-proclamation controversies.
For all the foregoing, I reach the conclusion that the Commission En banc did not act with grave abuse of discretion
nor without or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the alleged pre-proclamation controversies at bar, without first
requiring each and everyone of them to be heard in Division.

15. Zarate vs COMELEC, 318 SCRA 608

FACTS: Julian Lallave, Jr. won the 1996 SK Elections of BrgyIcan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, garnering a total of 46
votes over MarivicZarate who garnered 45 votes. Unsatisfied with the proclamation by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers, Zarate filed an election protest before the Municipal Trial Court stating that three or more votes that
read JL should not have been credited in favor of Lallave. Zarate further stated that the votes bearing JL were
stray votes and that there was no candidate with the name or nickname of JL.The Municipal Trial Court rendered
it decision in favor of petitioner Zarate, declaring 8 of the original 46 votes invalid.
Lallave appealed to the Commission on Elections theorizing that the votes reading JL should be credited in his
favour considering that such initials sufficiently identify him as the candidate and that the votes bearing Julian, Jr
de Real, NotnoLallave, and Nono de Real should have been credited as well being his nickname and
middlename, respectively.
The appeal by Lallave was not referred to a division of the Commission but was, instead, submitted to the
Commission en banc.The COMELEC en banc annulled the decision of the Municipal Trial Court and declared
Lallave as the elected SK chairman.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction?
Held: Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction without first referring the case to any of its division.
The petition for annulling the COMELECs decision was granted and was set aside. The Commission was ordered to
assign the case to a division.
Ratio: The recourse of respondent Lallave transgressed Section 3 Article IX of the Constitution which provides that
...election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall
be decided by the Commission en banc.
16. Ramirez vs. COMELEC,270 SCRA 590

Page 17

FACTS:
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and private respondent Alfredo I. Go were candidates for vice mayor of Giporlos, Eastern
Samar in the election of May 8, 1995. Petitioner was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) on the basis of results showing that he obtained 1,367 votes against private respondents 1,235 votes.
On May 16, 1995, private respondent filed in the COMELEC a petition for the correction of what he claimed was
manifest error in the Statement of Votes (SPC No. 95-198). He alleged that, based on the entries in the Statement of
Votes, he obtained 1,515 votes as against petitioners 1,367 votes but that because of error in addition, he was
credited with 1,235 votes.
In his Answer with Counter-Protest, petitioner Jose C. Ramirez disputed private respondents claim. He said that
instead of the total of the votes for private respondent Alfredo Go, it was actually the entries relating to the number
of votes credited to him in Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7, and 10 which were erroneously reflected in the
Statement of Votes. According to petitioner, the entries in the Statement of Votes actually referred to the number of
votes obtained by RoditoFabillar, a mayoralty candidate, and not to the votes obtained by private respondent.
On August 1, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its first questioned resolution, directing the MBC to reconvene
and recompute the votes in the Statement of Votes and proclaim the winning candidate for vice mayor of Giporlos,
Eastern Samar accordingly.
Petitioner Jose C. Ramirez and public respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers filed separate motions for
clarification. On September 26, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued its second questioned resolution, reiterating
its earlier ruling. It rejected the MBCs recommendation to resort to election returns:
The Municipal Board of Canvassers is reminded that pursuant to Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is the
Statement of Votes, duly prepared, accomplished during the canvass proceedings, and certified true and correct by
said Board which supports and form (sic) the basis of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of winning
candidates. In fact and in deed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers/Movant had submitted to the Commission,
attached to and forming part of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation a Statement of Votes without any notice
of any discrepancy or infirmity therein. To claim now that the proclamation was not based on said Statement of
Votes but on the Certificate of Votes because the entries in the Statement of Votes are erroneous is too late a move,
considering that by the Boards act of submitting said Statement of Votes as attachment to the Certificate of
Proclamation and Canvass, it had rendered regularity and authenticity thereto.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking the annulment of the two resolutions.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction over SPC No. 95-198 because the case was resolved by it
without having been first acted upon by any of its divisions.
HELD: No. Art. IX, 3 of the Constitution provides:
3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in
order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases
shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Comelec en banc. (Emphasis added)
Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC[6] it was said that By now it is settled that election cases which include preproclamation controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission[7] and a petition for
correction of manifest error in the Statement of Votes, like SPC No. 95-198 is a pre-proclamation controversy in
none of the cases[8] cited to support this proposition was the issue the correction of a manifest error in the Statement
of Votes under 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) or 15 of R.A. No. 7166. On the other hand,
Rule 27, 5 of the 1993 Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre-proclamation controversies involving,
inter alia, manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with the COMELEC en
banc, thus
5. Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed Directly With the Commission. (a) The following preproclamation controversies may be filed directly with the Commission:
xxx
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two
or more copies of the election returns of one precinct, or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were tabulated
separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into the certificate
of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such errors could
not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the
winning candidates had already been made.
xxx
(e) The petition shall be heard and decided by the Commission en banc.
xxx
Accordingly in Castromayor v. Commission on Elections,[9] and Mentang v. Commission on Elections,[10] this
Court approved the assumption of jurisdiction by the COMELEC en banc over petitions for correction of manifest

Page 18

error directly filed with it. Our decision today in Torres v.COMELEC[11] again gives imprimatur to the exercise by
the COMELEC en banc of the power to decide petition for correction of manifest error.
In any event, petitioner is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc. Not only did he
participate in the proceedings below but he also sought affirmative relief from the COMELEC en banc by filing a
Counter-Protest in which he asked that entr[ies] in the statement of votes for Precinct Nos. 11, 11-A, 6, 1, 17, 7 and
10, be properly corrected for the petitioner, to reflect the correct mandate of the electorate of Giporlos, Eastern
Samar.[12] It is certainly not right for a party taking part in proceedings and submitting his case for decision to
attack the decision later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the decision turns out to be adverse to him.

17. Faelnar vs. COMELEC,331 SCRA 429

TOPIC:COMELEC EN BANC and DIVISION CASES
AUTHOR: Rexcia Baldeo
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Certiorari
FACTS:
1. On April 8, 1997, petitioner Eugenio Faelnar filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Guadalupe, Cebu City in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections.
2. The following day, on April 9, 1997, a basketball tournament, dubbed the "2nd JING-JING FAELNARS CUP,"
opened at the Guadalupe Sports Complex and lasted up to April 30, 1997. This gave rise to a complaint for
electioneering filed against petitioner and Cecilio Gillamac by Antonio Luy.
3. The complaint alleged that the basketball tournament was actually a campaign gimmick staged outside the
campaign period which officially started on May 1, 1997, in violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
4. Luy alleged that: (1) during the tournament, a streamer bearing petitioners name was placed on the facade of the
Guadalupe Sports Complex; (2) petitioners name was repeatedly mentioned over the microphone during the games;
(3) the tournament was widely published in the local newspaper; and (4) a raffle sponsored by Cecilio Gillamac was
held with home appliances given away as prizes.
5. Petitioner denied participation in the tournament and claimed that its major sponsor was Gillamac Marketing, Inc.
He contended that the same was purely a sporting event for the benefit of the youth.
6. The complaint was investigated by the election officer of Cebu City, who later recommended the dismissal of the
charges against petitioner and Gillamac.
7. On the other hand, the Law Department of the COMELEC recommended the filing of a case against petitioner
and Gillamac for violation of 80, in relation to 262, of the Omnibus Election Code, and 50 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2888, in relation to 12 of Republic Act No. 6679.
8. In its Resolution, the COMELEC en banc resolved to dismiss the case.
9. However, on motion of Antonio Luy, the COMELEC reconsidered its action and ordered the filing of the
necessary Informations against petitioner and Gillamac.
10. Accordingly, petitioner and Gillamac were formally charged in the RTC of Cebu City.
11. Petitioner moved to quash the information or, in the alternative, for reinvestigation of the case, contending that
the said Resolution, which dismissed the complaint against him, was immediately executory, it was no longer within
the power of the COMELEC to reconsider. And that Luys MOR was a prohibited pleading under the Commissions
rules of Procedure.
12. Petitioners motion was denied by the trial court. He moved for reconsideration, but his motion was likewise
denied by the court. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the COMELEC dismissing the criminal complaint for violation of the election laws
immediately final and executory.
HELD: No. A Motion for Reconsideration is allowed in election offense cases.
RATIO: Section 1, Rule 13 of Comelecs Rules of Procedure states, the following pleadings are not allowed,(d)
motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in election offense cases; . . .
Under the present rule, therefore, a motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC
en banc is allowed in cases involving election offenses.
Here, there is no question that what is involved is a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in an election offense.
Hence, a motion for reconsideration of such resolution is allowed under the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.
It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the one that determines the existence of probable cause in an election
offense. But it may also be delegated to the State Prosecutor or to the Provincial or City Fiscal but may still be
reviewed by the Comelec.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
A motion for reconsideration of a ruling, resolution or decision of the COMELEC en banc is allowed in cases
involving election offenses.
It was also held that the Comelec en banc is the one that determines the existence of probable cause in an election
offense.

Powers and Functions

18. Gallardo vs. Tabamo,218 SCRA 253 353
TOPIC:COMELEC POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
AUTHOR: Rexcia Baldeo

Page 19

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Certiorari

FACTS:
1. At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner Antonio Gallardo was the
incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized
elections. The other petitioners are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial engineer, provincial budget
officer and government project laborers of Camiguin. On theother hand, the private respondent was the incumbent
Congressman of the lone Congressional district of Camiguin, candidate for the same office in the said synchronized
elections and the Regional Chairman of the LDP in Region X.
2. On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and
restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-dayban on public
works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas PambansaBlg. 881) because although they were initiated few
days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineeringplans,
specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project.
The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29
different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and
the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15)
projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers
and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and
laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.
3. On the same day, respondent Judge Tabamo issued a TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file
theirAnswer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992.
4. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action forcertiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Theycontend that the case principally
involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction isexclusively vested in the
Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE(S):WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the said Special Civil Action case.
HELD: No. The COMELEC has jurisdiction in this case.
RATIO: COMELEC has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The
present Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations. The
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article IX-C thereof reads as follows: Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1)
Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.
Moreover, the Constitution also invests the Commission with the power to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws
is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it
exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the Court agree with
the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the court below involves the prosecution of election
offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically,
what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are
continuing.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: COMELEC has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections as provided by the Constitution.

19. Telecommunication and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines vs. COMELEC,289 SCRA 33
TOPIC: Powers and Functions
AUTHOR: Carlo Guevara
NATURE OF THE CASE:
FACTS:
1.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.
2.
It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to
show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.
3.
Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement
of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
4.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time - The
Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this

Page 20

purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
5.
Petitioner GMA Network contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by
COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time.
6.
GMA Network claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time
in connection with the 1992 presidential elections and 1995 senatorial elections and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year.
7.
They claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this
years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for such.
ISSUE(S): WON Sec. 92, B.P. No. 881 is valid in requiring stations to furnish the COMELEC radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign, at least once but not oftener than every other day.
HELD: Yes, the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the
variety and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. Broadcast media are public trustees
charged with the duty of ensuring that the people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right
of the people is paramount to the autonomy of broadcast media. The use of property bears a social function and is
subject to the state's duty to intervene for the common good.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Airing of COMELEC Time, is a reasonable condition for the grant of petitioner's franchise:
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies
have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. A
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the
constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using
them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better
measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but
even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t
is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., "a license permits broadcasting, but the license has no constitutional right to
be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct
himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves." As radio and television
broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air
time to the COMELEC. "the air lanes themselves 'are not property because they cannot be appropriated for the
benefit of any individual.'"
Giving free air time is a duty:
The duty imposed on the GMA Network, Inc. by its franchise to render "adequate public service time" implements
92 of B.P. Blg. 881. Undoubtedly, its purpose is to enable the government to communicate with the people on
matters of public interest. COMELEC Time should "be considered as part of the public service time said stations are
required to furnish the Government for the dissemination of public information and education under their respective
franchises or permits." B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is the enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner in
accepting a public grant of privilege.
Requirement of COMELEC Time, is a reasonable exercise of the State's power to regulate use of franchises:
The COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. The failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless paid by the
government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art III, 7 of the Constitution provides that "the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized."
The validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety and
vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common
carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the
autonomy of broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the state's

Page 21

duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that
whatever altruistic service they may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
20. Montejo vs. COMELEC,242 SCRA 415
TOPIC: Powers and Functions
AUTHOR: Carlo Guevara
FACTS:
1.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.

2.
Pursuant to Sec. 462 of the Local Government Code, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular
province.
3.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved. As a consequence of the conversion, eight
(8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce
the Third District to five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
4.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities; COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
5.
The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosaand the composition of the
Fifth District were not disturbed.
6.
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC to the
inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts.
7.
He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462
registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District.
8.
Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol representing the Second District opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his
district.
9.
Respondent COMELEC denied the motion ruling that the adjustment involved the least disruption and it
complied with the constitutional requirement for each legislative district.
10.
Petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of representation
ordained in the Constitution. He seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District
of the province.
11.

Intervenor Apostol opposed the petition on two (2) grounds:

(1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and

(2) assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its
own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
ISSUE(S): WON the exercise of the legislative power of redistricting and reapportionment by COMELEC is valid.
HELD: No, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting
which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The said ordinance states:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.
Section 3: Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located

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shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election.
But based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the limit of its power to make
minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to
adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province
was created. . . ."
The meaning of minor adjustments as found in the debates of the Commission stated that the transfer of one
municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one. Minor
adjustments do not allow the change in allocations per district.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to aregular province brought about an imbalance in
the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem of
reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the
Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the second district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third
district of Leyte.

21. Sandoval vs. Comelec, G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000, 323 SCRA 403
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent herein were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas
legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998. After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass,
the district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected congressman. The petitioner took his oath of
office, on the same day, private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which sought the annulment of
petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the
canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass
and proclamation despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was non-inclusion of 19 election returns in
the canvass, which would result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The Comelec en banc issued an
order setting aside the proclamation of petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition for
certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec order.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential, vicepresidential, senatorial ad congressional elections
Held:
While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies, the exception to the
general rule can be found under sec. 15 of RA 7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential,
senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a
vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence
of Sec. 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House for the simple reason that the
correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in
the election.
Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc (rule 27,
sec. 5, 1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must
first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission.
In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law since this involves the exercise of its
quasi-judicial power.

V. Judicial Review of Decisions

22. Aratuc vs. Comelec 88 SCRA 251
Facts:

Page 23

On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the
Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces
of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi,
Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board
of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region
had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon.
Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged
irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight
Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates to the
Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven Kilusan ng Bagong
Lipunan candidates and one Konsensiya ng Bayan candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering
the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates
interposed the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec can issue a resolution amending the resolution of the board of canvassers and order the
same board to execute the same resolution
Held:
Yes. Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct
control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that
it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from
the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section
168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior
body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or
ought to have done. The Supreme Court cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond
that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably
asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis--vis the preservation of the purity of
elections and electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.

23. Filipina Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25
TOPIC: Judicial Review of Decisions
AUTHOR: Maria Theresa Denilla
NATURE OF THE CASE
FACTS:
1.
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent Commissioners of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID CALL No. 127 on September 16, 1969
calling for the submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths with
the following specifications and descriptions, to wit:
11,000 Units VOTING BOOTHS, easy to install and store. Must be of light but strong and durable materials, rust
proof or rust resistant and construction must be sturdy. Each Unit shall consists of two (2) voting booths with overall
measurements of 150 cms. long x 75 cms. wide x 185 cms. high. (Each voting booth or compartment measuring 75
cms. long x 75 cms. wide x 185 cms. high). The top and all sides except the front side, shall be fully covered. The
front side of the unit shall be without cover to serve as its opening (entrance). Each voting compartment shall be
provided with a writing table. Each unit shall be contained in individual wooden box. Bidders are required to submit
finished sample.
2.
Among the seventeen bidders who submitted proposals in response to the said INVITATION were the
herein petitioner, Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) and the private respondent, Acme
Steel Manufacturing Company, (Acme for short).
3.
On October 7, 1969, the respondent COMELEC Bidding Committee Chairman and Members submitted
their Memorandum on the proceedings taken pursuant to the said Invitation to Bid which stated that Acme's bid had
to be rejected because the sample it submitted was "made of black iron sheets, painted, and therefore not rust proof
or rust resistant," and that, "it is also heavy 51 kilos in weight. 4 The Committee instead recommended that
Filipinas be awarded the contract to manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be
made by all members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made." 5
4.
On October 9, 1969, after an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the
COMELEC Commissioners, and after the Commissioners noted that Acme submitted the lowest bid, the
COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the contract (for voting booths) to Acme, subject to the condition, among
others, that "(Acme) improves the sample submitted in such manner as it would be rust proof or rust resistant. ... ." 6

Page 24

5.
On October 11, 1969, the COMELEC issued Purchase Order No. 682 for the manufacture and supply of the
11,000 Units of voting booths in favor of Acme. Acme accepted the terms of the purchase.
6.
On October 16, 1969, Filipinas filed an Injunction suit with the then Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No. 77972, against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners, chairman and
members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent Acme.
7.
Filipinas also applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. After hearing petitioner's said application, the
respondent Judge in an order dated October 20, 1969 denied the writ prayed for.
8.
Thereafter or more specifically on October 29, 1969, the public respondents filed a motion to Dismiss on
the grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the nature of suit, and that the complaint states no cause of
action.
9.
Acting on the motion (to dismiss), the respondent Judge issued the questioned Order dismissing Civil Case
No. 77972. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
10.

Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUES:
[1]. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC
dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid; and
[2]. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and
Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract
HELD: [1]. Yes. Lower court has the jurisdiction over controversies dealing with the COMELEC's award of
contracts, the same being purely administrative and civil in nature,
[2]. No. Filipinas, the losing bidder, has no cause of action under the premises to enjoin the COMELEC from
pursuing its contract with Acme, the winning bidder.
RATIO:
[1] By constitutional mandateThe Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections, including the
determination of the number of location of Polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other
election officials. ... The decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court. (Section 2, Article X, 1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180, approved June 21, 1947, the election law then
enforced) provided that, "(a) any controversy submitted to the Commission on Elections shall be tried, heard and
decided by it within fifteen days counted from the time the corresponding petition giving rise to said controversy is
filed," and that, "any violation of any final and executory decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall"
constitute contempt of court Likewise, the same section provided that, "any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules
of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Similarly, Section 17(5) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), as amended, provides that, "final
awards, judgments, decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections ..." fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court prescribed the
manner of appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court from a final ruling or decision of the Commission on Elections,
among other administrative bodies.
[2] While the law requires the exercise of sound discretion on the part of procurement authorities, and that the
reservation to reject any or all bids may not be used as a shield to a fraudulent award, petitioner has miserably failed
to prove or substantiate the existence of malice or fraud on the part of the public respondents in the challenged
award.
The "Bidders Tender Call No. 127", the form accomplished by the bidder pursuant to Invitation to Bid No. 127, also
categorically provide that the bidder submits his proposals "subject to the conditions stated in the invitation." 13
It is crystal clear from the aforequoted conditions, that subject to the rights of the COMELEC duly reserved in the
said Invitation, award shall be made to the lowest and responsible bidder whose offer will best serve the interest of
the COMELEC; that the COMELEC had reserved the right, among others, to accept such bid, as may in its
discretion, be considered most reasonable and advantageous; and that the invitation was merely a call for proposals.
Consequently, the COMELEC was not under legal obligation to accept any bid since "Advertisements for bidders
are simply invitation to make proposals and the advertiser is not bound to accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless
the contrary appears." 14
Pursuant to COMELEC's Invitation to Bid No. 127, a bidder may have the right to demand damages, or unrealized
or expected profits, only when his bid was accepted by resolution of the COMELEC. Filipinas' bid, although
recommended for award of contract by the bidding committee, was not the winning bid. No resolution to that effect
appeared to have been issued by the COMELEC. Decidedly then, Filipinas has no cause of action.
In issuing the resolution awarding the contract for voting booths in Acme's favor, the Commissioners of the
COMELEC had taken into account that Acme's bid was the lowest; that Acme was a responsible manufacturer; and
that upon an ocular inspection of the samples submitted by the bidders, Acme's sample was favorable chosen subject
to certain conditions cited in the resolution. In fine, the public respondents properly exercised its sound discretion in
making the award.

Page 25

24. Ambil v. Comelec G.R. No. 143398 , October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358
TOPIC: Judicial Review of Decisions
AUTHOR: Thea Denilla
NATURE OF THE CASE: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order
FACTS:
1.
Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position of
Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.
2.
On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected
Governor, Eastern Samar, having obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
3.
On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second highest number of votes, filed
with the Comelec, an election protestchallenging the results in a total of 201 precincts.5 The case was assigned to
the First Division (formerly Second), Commission on Election.
4.
In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from the service. On March 3, 2000,
the President of the Philippines appointed Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the seat vacated by Commissioner
Guiani. Commissioner Javier assumed office on April 4, 2000.
5.
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez received a purported resolution
promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito
dissenting. The result was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a margin of 1,176 votes.
6.
On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, declared that the thirteen-page resolution "is a useless
scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no promulgation of the Resolution in
the instant case.
7.
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the promulgation of the resolution of
the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon, and prohibiting the Comelec, First
Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and directing the Comelec, First Division, to deliberate
anew on the case and to promulgate the resolution reached in the case after such deliberation.
8.
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Comelec from
implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the promulgation of the resolution set on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the
afternoon. At the same time, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from
notice.
9.
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment. Respondent Ramirez admitted that the proposed
resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid after his retirement on February 15, 2000. He submitted that
Comelec, First Division, its membership still constituting a majority, must elevate the protest case to the Comelec en
banc until resolved with finality.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No.
98-29) acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
[2] Whether or not the Guani Resolution is valid
HELD:
[1] No. The COMELEC did not acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
[2] No. Guiani resolution is void.
RATIO:
[1]The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, Eastern Samar.32 It is within the original
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division. Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of
the divisions resolution or final decision. In fact, there was really no resolution or decision to speak of 35because
there was yet no promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Petitioner went directly to the Supreme Court from an order of "promulgation of the Resolution of this case" by the
First Division of the Comelec.
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in
division can not dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the
Division of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such
motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a
motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases
where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the Comelec en banc,
whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before the Supreme Court.
[2] First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly,
one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or decision.Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The
resolution or decision of the Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his retirement from office, but when he vacated
his office without the final decision or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was automatically
invalidated.Before that resolution or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no valid resolution or decision
to speak of.

Page 26

Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First Division, Commission on Elections, denied the release or
promulgation of the Guiani resolution. He disowned the initials on the face of the first page of the resolution
showing its promulgation on February 14, 2000, and said that it was a forgery. There is no record in the Electoral
Contests and Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a "resolution on the main merits
of the case was promulgated."
Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, disclaimed the "alleged thirteen (13) page
resolution" for being "a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties" there being no promulgation
of the resolution in the case.
Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her signature on the Guiani resolution. On the date that it
was purportedly promulgated, which was February 14, 2000, the Division issued an order where Commissioner
Tancangco expressed her reservations and stated that she wished to see both positions, if any, before she made her
final decision.
A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en banc is promulgated on a date previously fixed, of
which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by
telegram
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE: The power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows:
"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."This decision must be a final decision or resolutionof the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is
by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in
Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain andadequate
remedy provided by law.Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.Article IX-C, Section 3, 1987
Constitution provides as follows:
"Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied]
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a division may be raised to the en banc
via a motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust
adequate administrative remedies available before the COMELEC.
In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts intervention is
fatal to ones cause of action."
"This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the
viability of a special civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can convincingly show that
his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1) when the question is purely legal, (2) where
judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the
controverted acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on
the matter, and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

VI. Voters Qualification and Registration

25. Romualdez vs. RTC 226 SCRA 406

Page 27

FACTS:
1. Philip Romualdez - natural born citizen of the Philippines, son of former governor of Leyte, nephew of Imelda
Marcos
2. Philip had a residence constructed in Leyte since he wanted to establish legal residence there.
3. 1986 snap elections he acted as campaign manager of Kilusang Bagong Lipunan in Leyte
4. Feb 21-24, 1986 Romuladez fled and sought "asylum" in US which granted US granted.
5. 1987- Philip attempted to come back and run for congressional seat in Leyte.
6. He received letter from Cobb, District Director of US Immigration & Naturalization Service, informing that he
should depart from US or he will be deported.
7. Romualdez left and arrived without any government document.
8. Upon arrival, he registered himself as voter in Leyte and was allowed.
9. Advinalla (private resp) prayed that he be excluded from list of voters since he didn't have 1-year residence in the
Philippines and 6-month residence in leyte to qualify as voter.
10. Romualdez claims that he is a resident
11. MTC - Romuladez is a resident
RTC- reversed. Romualdez is disqualified.
ISSUE: WON Romualdez is a qualified voter
Held: YES. RTC reversed. MTC reinstated.
RATIO:
In election cases, residence is equivalent to domicile, personal presence in that place with conduct indicative of
intention.
Political situation brought by "People's Power Revolution" truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes.
Their sudden departure can't be described as "voluntary" or "abandonment of residence" to the context that these
terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile by choice"
26. Kabataan Party-List vs. Comelec G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009

FACTS:
1. COMELEC issued Resolution 8514 which set Dec 2 '08- Dec 15 '09 as period of continuing voter registration
using biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except ARMM
2. Raymond Palatino- youth sectoral representative under Kabataan Party list contends that serious questions
involved justify the resort to Court and ; that based on NSO data projected voting population for May 2010 elections
total to 12.5M.
3. Palatino prayed for that the resolution be declared null and void.
ISSUE: WON extension may be granted
HELD: Yes. Petition granted. COMELEC Reso null and void.
RATIO: RA 8189, Sec 8 (System of Continuing Registration of voters) decrees that voters may be allowed to
register daily during regular office hours EXCEPT during the 120 day prohibitive period.
COMELEC's rule making power shiuld be exercised in accord with law. It can only fix periods and dates for preelection IF same cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law.

27. Baytan vs Comelec GR. No. 153945,396 SCRA 703, 716

TOPIC: Voters Qualification and Registration
AUTHOR: Denise Guiao
NATURE OF THE CASE:Petitioner for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction.
1.
2.

FACTS:
On 15 June 1997, ReynatoBaytan, Reynaldo Baytan, and Adrian Baytan (hereafter referred to as petitioners) were
on their way to register for the May 1998 elections.
Allegedly, they met newly elected Barangay Captain Roberto Ignacio (Ignacio for brevity), in Barangay 18, Zone II
of Cavite City. Ignacio led the petitioners to register in Precinct No. 83-A of Barangay 18; Voters Registration
Records evidenced the same.

Page 28

3.

4.

5.
6.
7.

1.

When the petitioners returned home, they wondered why the registrants in the precinct looked unfamiliar. This
prompted them to return to the registration center to study the precinct map of Barangay 18. They then realized that
their residence is situated within the jurisdiction of Barangay 28. They immediately proceeded to Precinct 129-A of
Barangay 28 and registered anew on 22 June 1997, again as evidenced by Voters Registration Records.
On 21 August 1997, the petitioners sent a letter to former COMELEC Assistant Executive Director Jose Pio O.
Jocscon and furnished a copy thereof to COMELEC Registrar Franco Trias. They requested for advice on how to
cancel their previous registration. They also explained the reason and circumstances of their second registration and
expressed their intention to redress the error.
On 16 September 1997, the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded copies of the Voters Registration Records of
the petitioners to the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Juanito V. Ravanzo for evaluation.
On 10 January 1998, Ravanzo recommended filing an information for double registration against petitioners.
On 09 November 2000 the COMELEC affirmed the recommendation of Ravanzo. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but the COMELEC en banc denied the motion.
ISSUE:
Did Reynato, Reynaldo, and Adrian, all with the surname Baytan, violate the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
through double registration?
HELD: YES. There was a violation of the OEC. Article XXII, Sec. 261 (y)(5) of the Election Code provides:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(y) On Registration of Voters:
(5) Any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing
an
application for cancellation of his previous registration.
The petitioners had done precisely what was prohibited by the law and is thus in blatant violation
of such.
RATIO:
First and foremost, it was improper for the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration due to the fact
that the minute resolution of the COMELEC was only issued in the PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE. A
preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a
crime, its function being merely to determine probable cause. There is no question that the petitioners registered
twice on different days and in different precincts without cancelling their previous registration. There is
probable cause and trial should ensue.
The COMELEC noted further that the affidavits submitted by the petitioners contained GLARING
INCONSISTENCIES. Petitioners claimed that Ignacio led them to the wrong precinct to register. However,
Ignacios affidavit stated that while he led them to the voting precinct of Barangay 18, he immediately left the area
not knowing that petitioners registered in the wrong barangay.
ALSO, Aurora Baytan, the mother of the petitioners, had another version. She said that Ignacio came to
their house to inform them about the redefinition of their barangays territorial jurisdiction and then he brought her
sons to Barangay 18 to register.
The COMELEC also pointed out that double registration is malumprohibitum, and thus their intent
should not be considered. Regardless of the letter they sent to COMELEC Assistant Exectuive Director Jose Pio O.
Jocson, they are still guilty of the offense.
Second, the petitioners allege that prescription has already attached. This contention has no merit. The
period of prescription started to run on 16 September 1997, when the Election Officer of Cavite City forwarded
copies of the petitioners Voters Registration Records. The preliminary investigation hearing interrupted this period
on 19 January 1998, and thus the 5-year prescription has not yet attached.
Third, stemming from the first issue, the petitioners say that the COMELEC en banc violated the
Constitution when it took cognizance of the case. Accordingly, Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that election cases must be heard and decided in division, not en banc. This is without merit. Only
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers are within the scope of the said mandate. The COMELEC may exercise its
administrative function (in this case, finding of probable cause) en banc.1
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
There is double registration when any person, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application
for cancellation of his previous registration. It is an offense malumprohibitum and thus intent need not be
considered to found guilty of such offense.

VII. Political Parties and Party List System

28. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 1136781, October 6, 2000

1Canicosa v. Comelec, 282 SCRA 512 (1997)

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TOPIC: Political Parties and Party List Systems

AUTHOR: Denise Guiao
NOTES: This case has already been overturned by a case that will also be discussed later on: Banat v. Comelec.
The 2% threshold for party-list representatives has already been declared unconstitutional.
NATURE OF THE CASE:These are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari with applications for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

1.
2.
3.
4.

FACTS:
ANTECEDENT LAWS:
The 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government the party-list method
of representation. It was granted that any national, regional, sectoral party or organization registered with the
COMELEC may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation,
shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. Apart from the above-stated stipulation, Section 5,
Article VI also provides:
That the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list.
One-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Thus, on 3 March 1995, R.A. No. 7941 was enacted. Through it, the State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives. It mandated at least FOUR
INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS:
The twenty percent allocation The combined number of ALL party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent (20%) of the total membership of the House of Representatives; including those elected under the party-list.
The two percent threshold Only those parties garnering a minimum two percent (2%) of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
The three-seat limit Each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Proportional representation The additional seats, which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
EVENTS THAT TRANSPIRED:
On 11 May 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with national elections. Out
of 123 parties and organizations who participated, only 12 obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes cast for
the party-list system. COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives. (2 seats for the #1 party, a.k.a the
first party.)
Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) was later on held to be entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 2.04 percent of the total votes cast on the special elections held on 4, 18, and 25 July 1998.
(TOTAL: 14 SEATS)
On 6 July 1988, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution. It alleged that the 20% membership of party-list representatives in
the House of Representatives was mandatory.
On 15 October, COMELEC Second Division granted PAG-ASAs petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein
38 respondents, in addition to the 14 already sitting, totaling 52, meeting the 20% requirement.
COMELEC completely ignored the 2% requirement stating that following such will mean the concentration of
representation of part, sectoral, or group interests in the House of Representatives xxx. Such strict application of the
2% threshold does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature to develop and
guarantee a full, free, and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral, or group interests in the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it categorically ignored the two
percent threshold rule and declared 38 parties and organizations entitled to party-list seats in order to fill the 20%
requirement of the Constitution of 52 seats.
HELD:
YES, COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void
the two percent vote requirement imposed by R.A. No. 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its
application, holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory threshold. The proclamations
of the 14 sitting party-list representatives two for APEC and one for each remaining 12 qualified parties are
AFFIRMED.
RATIO:

1.
-

The Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation is not mandatory. It is merely a ceiling imposed by the Constitution.
The simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad powers to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941 to promote proportional representation. It also deemed it

Page 30

2.

necessary to require parties to obtain at least 2% of the total votes to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering
more will get additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
THAT SAID, IT SEEMS THE CONSTITUTION ONLY IMPOSES A
CEILING, AND NOT A MANDATORY NUMBER OF SEATS NEEDED
FILLED.
NOTE: This didnt make any sense to me. But thats the reasoning of the court.
Mandatory 2%, Not mandatory, 20%.

In imposing the 2% threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations, and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. Also, an
important consideration in adopting the party list-system is to promote and encourage a multi-party system of
representation.

3.
-

METHOD of ALLOCATING ADDITIONAL SEATS

Rejected formulae:

o
o

Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment

The Niemeyer Formula
Worked for Germany. Would not work for us.

Accepted Formula:
The Legal and Logical Formula of the Philippines:
FIRST PARTY COMPUTATION:

ADDITIONAL SEATS OF OTHER QUALIFIED PARTIES:

CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
The twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in the total number of seats in the House of
Representatives is merely a ceiling and is not mandatory.
However, the 2% threshold of votes to qualify for a seat is mandatory in order to promote the intent of
legislators to have proportional representation of parties, organizations, and coalitions in Congress.
CONCURRING OPINION by Puno, J.
DISSENTING OPINION by Mendoza, J. Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.
This was just basically a questioning of the how they computed for the allowable seats for each party but he
agreed with the opinion of the others as regards entitlement to seats only of 2% garnerers of votes .

29. Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698

Page 31

Facts:
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties On April 10, 2001,
Akbayan Citizens Action Party seeks the disqualification of certain major political parties in the 2001 party-list
elections arguing that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented andnot the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issue:
1. May political parties participate in the party-list elections
2. is the party-list system exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations
Held:
1st Yes .We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
2nD: Yes
30. PGBI vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 190529, 619 SCRA 585
Facts:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to
get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act.
Issue: Was there legal basis for delisting PGBI?
Held:NO! Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs
delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system.
First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independenceof one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which itordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word.
Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two separate reasons for delisting.Second,
MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 andtherefore, simply cannot
stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list organization in an election as
similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list
organization that does not participate in an electionnecessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes.
To be sure, this is a confused interpretationof the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenariosdifferently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different
and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an
interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of
the law.
31. OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, 359 SCRA 698
TOPIC: Party-List
PONENTE: J. Panganiban
FACTS:
> Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants.
> The ultimate question raised is this: Aside from those already validly proclaimed pursuant to earlier Resolutions
of this Court, are there other party-list candidates that should be proclaimed winners?
>The answer to this question is circumscribed by 8-point guideline given in June 26, 2001 Decision in these
consolidated cases and by 4 unique parameters of the Philippine party-list system:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to
a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.

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 Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.
> On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring Comelec to do the
following:
immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of
the guidelines enunciated in this Decision
>COMELEC complied and submitted Compliance Report. The Court affirmed the report.
> The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list organizations has
reduced the total number of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of this reduction, the two-percent
benchmark required by law has now been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their
proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.
ISSUES:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec, Grego v. Comelec and related cases should be deemed applicable to the determination of
winners in party-list elections
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the
eight-point guideline should be deducted from the total votes cast for the party-list system

HELD:
1. Labo and Grego cases are not applicable.
> Under Section 11(b) of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act):
only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to
have a seat in the House of Representatives.
>The critical question is this does the clause total votes cast for the party-list system include only those ballots
cast for qualified party-list candidates?
>To answer the question, there is a need to review Labo v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec
In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot
be deemed elected to the office.
In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered stray.
It was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception mentioned in Labo v. Comelec is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions:
(1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified
(2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
>HOWEVER, the foregoing pronouncements:
(1) referred to regular elections for local offices and
(2) involved the interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.
> They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed by RA 7941. Section 10 of this
latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition not entitled to be
voted for shall not be counted:
SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote for candidate for
membership of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a
party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally,
That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.
>Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the present
controversy pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results -such that even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their
compliance with other requirements.
2. The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast
for the party-list system
>BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the
holding of the party-list elections will result in the instability of the system. The reason is that qualified party-list
candidates would be encouraged to seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining
the needed percentage of the votes cast.
>Although such scenario may be possible, SC believes that the perceived instability can be alleviated because
(1) unlike in the past elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified and disqualified participants list, which can
be used for future elections
(2) in the light of recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting
new candidates for the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and
manner as to enable it to determine their qualifications long before the elections are held.

>PARTY-LIST WINNERS
The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes cast for
the party-list system.
In the present case, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total number of votes cast
during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in
order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast nationwide.

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1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

There are only 46 qualified party-list participants.

>WINNERS AND NOMINEES
Only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total valid votes cast. Two percent
of this number is 130,464.
Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes may be declared winners.
>IN SUM; (contained in the Epilogue of the Resolution)
To speed up the process of determining the party-list winners in the future, SC deem it wise to summarize the
implementing process followed in this Resolution, as follows:
After the promulgation of June 26, 2001 Decision, the SC directed Comelec to conduct a factual determination as to
which of the various party-list candidates had passed the eight-point guideline instituted in that Decision. Comelec
was able to submit its Final Compliance Report on September 27, 2001.
Of the various parties and organizations which Comelec allowed to participate in the 2001 party-list elections, it
recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four more groups were
added, for a total of 46.
Next, SC determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system. To do so, SC subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the total votes
cast. Those parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this balance were
declared winners.
After identifying the winners, SC determined, by using the formulas mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how many
nominees each winning party was entitled to.
The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed before the end of the year
2002, had Comelec been more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its Compliance
Reports.
In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of whether the votes of disqualified
candidates should be deducted from the total votes cast nationwide.
The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages.Thus, the Court had to devote an
enormous amount of time and effort poring over, understanding, and ruling upon these submissions.
In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon and this Resolution was discussed, finalized and
promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6 above.
IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more expeditiously, now that there are
precedents to guide all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections.
For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of 46 qualified parties.
For another, given the lessons and experiences in these proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully and
more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new candidates.
Such process can even be done in advance under such rules and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law
and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify participants well in advance of the
elections.
The Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous journey they experienced in our
one-of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will
be accorded ever-widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they can help develop -- in peace
and harmony -- a society that is just, humane, progressive and free.

32. BANAT vs. Comelec586 SCRA 211. EL JAEY

PONENTE: J. Carpio
FACTS:

June 27, 2002- BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because the Chairman and the Members of
the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is- would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list
seats.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, assailing the COMELEC Resolution (3 August 2007) wherein it approved the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal
Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.

July 9, 2007- COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated Resolution and proclaimed 13 parties as
winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine
Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of
Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the BANAT, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of
Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of
the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating
Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined

Page 34

pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Hence, this petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution.

ISSUES:
1.
Is the twenty percent (20%) allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2.

Is the three-seat (3-seat) limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 valid?

3.
Is the two percent (2%) threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
4.
Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?
HELD:
1.

The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling

The number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of
the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress.
2.

Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid.

>This is one way to ensure that no party shall dominate the party-list system.
There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a
seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified.
3.

No. Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional.

The two percent (2%) threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of partylist representatives.
SC therefore strikes down the2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
4.

No. The Constitution does not prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.
On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings.
However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

33. Atong Paglaum et al. vs. Comelec, April 2, 2013

TOPIC: Party-List System
AUTHOR: Estomo, Robert
NOTES: Poll body should not be blamed for acting on the ruling in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and Banat
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari and certiorari with prohibition

Page 35

FACTS: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totalling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in
an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May
2013 party-list race.
The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among others,
that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or
groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress. Petitioners argued that the poll
body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some of the petitioners application for accreditation and
cancelling the existing accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due
process in the evaluation proceedings.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo prior to the
disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a
mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
ISSUES: W/N Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the 52 party-list groups?
HELD: Yes, Art 6, Sec5(1) of the Constitution is not to be construed as limiting the party-list system to sectoral
parties only.
RATIO: Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high court stated that it is not
synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The high court stressed that the framers of the 1987
Constitution did not intend to leave out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to
sectoral groups. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system. In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral
parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make
the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to
include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties. The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may
either represent marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined political
constituencies. The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent also applies
only to the sectoral parties or organizations.
The high court ruled that it is enough that a majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations must
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. The same is true for those who lack welldefined political constituencies.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The party-list system is not exclusive for sectoral parties.
34. Liberal Party vs. Comelec, 620 SCRA 393
TOPIC: Political Parties and Party-List System
AUTHOR: Estomo, Robert
NATURE OF THE CASE: Special Civil Action for Certiorari
FACTS:
On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting Aug 17, 2009 as the last day for the
filing of petitions for registration of political parties. Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of petitions
for accreditation on Feb 12, 2010 and required that accreditation applicants be registered political parties,
organizations or coalitions. On Feb 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as
dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition
(NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the
dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections. On Mar 9, 2010, the LP presented Rep.
Lualhati Antonino (a member of the NPCs National Convention) as its witness. Rep. Antonino testified, among
others, that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National Central Committee to enter into a coalition
with the NP, and that neither the National Convention nor the general membership was ever consulted about the
merger with the NP.
On Mar 10, 2010, the NP-NPC presented former Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr. as its witness to refute Rep. Antoninos
testimony. On Mar 15, 2010, the LP and the NP-NPC filed their respective Memoranda. On Apr 12, 2010, the en
banc granted the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present
case. In the same Resolution, the en banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPCs application for accreditation as
dominant minority party. The en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of coalitions. It
opined that the registration of a coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It held that
if the NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an
operative fact. The en banc noted that no representative from either the NP or the NPC ever filed any formal
opposition to the NP-NPC petition for registration and accreditation.
It thus concluded that hardly any controversy existed for it to resolve. At the same time, it disregarded Rep.
Antoninos testimony, since she lost her NPC membership when she admitted support for the candidacy of Sen.
Manuel A. Roxas II the Liberal Party candidate for vice-president a ground provided under the Constitution and
By-Laws of the NPC.

Page 36

ISSUES: W/N the Comelec en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the registration of NP-NPC
coalition beyond the deadline?
HELD: Yes, the NP-NPCs petition for registration as a coalition is time-barred. Thus, the en banc was wrong in
ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition.
RATIO: The COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least suffer
disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected
applications for registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the political party
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc., where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed
out of time, among other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only political party
whose application for registration was denied at the COMELEC level for late filing.
We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul and rightly so because of the denial of their
applications on the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.
Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or
a suspension of the deadline in favor of a party in the course of application), the en banc acted in excess of its
jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had
set; the authority to register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the
mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfied and was not.
Where conditions that authorize the exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal excess of jurisdiction results.
Separately from the above consideration, we view the en bancs position that the deadline for registration is only for
political parties and not for organizations and coalitions to be preposterous, given the importance of the
participation of political parties in the election process and the rigid schedules that have to be observed in order to
implement automated elections as efficiently and as harmoniously as possible. We note that the COMELEC has not
even bothered to explain why it imposed a deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political
organizations and coalitions. In our view, this kind of ruling was patently unreasonable, made as it was without basis
in law, in fact or in reason; and was a grave abuse of discretion that fatally afflicted the assailed COMELEC
Resolution.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The deadline for registration for interested individuals and political parties set forth by
the Comelec is mandatory in nature.

VIII. Candidates and certificates of candidacy

Qualifications
35. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245
AUTHOR: Mowie Angeles
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for CERTIORARI
FACTS:
1. Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed
office in due time.
2.On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on 20 January 1983.
3.Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos.
4.His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad.
5.He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that
should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omhibus
Election Code.
6. The petitioner motioned for a petition for review to the SC
ISSUE: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon
RATIO:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials.
However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the
Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed to have
bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of

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the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November
1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent
loss of such status.
The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the certification
from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos
in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find
it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he
really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done
so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to
take such categorical acts.
The anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility Qualifications for public office are
continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.
Held: The petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he
is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once
this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
36. Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 FERNANDO ANGELES

37. Aquino vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

TOPIC: Candidates and certificates of candidacy; Qualifications
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS:
1. On March 20, 1995, petitioner Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the following information in his
certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.
2. LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art.
VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8,
1995 elections.
3. Aquino filed another certificate of candidacy amending his first certificate. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of
his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13)
days.
4. Second Division of the COMELEC dismissed the disqualification case.
5. On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995
resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
6. Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the
congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto
Syjuco, who obtained (35,910) votes.
7. Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner.
8. ComElec enbanc ordered continuance of canvassing but suspended proclamation.
9. Aquno filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve
Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of
whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
10. ComElec declared Aquino ineligible thus disqualified.

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ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Aquino is eligible to run as Representative for new 2nd Legislative District of Makati City? No.
Whether or not the candidate acquiring 2nd highest number of votes shoul be proclaimed? No.
HELD:
RATIO: To be eligible to run, a candidate "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice.
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the
district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. Residence, for
election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Court held that the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the
previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that
to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the
same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his
parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times
during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up
to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
condominium unit in the area only.
The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated
above, the lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period
required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law
as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs
of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or noneligible person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere
belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Disqualifications
38. Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481
TOPIC: Candidates and Certificates of Candidacy; Disqualification
AUTHOR: Romero
NATURE OF THE CASE: Civil Action for certiorari
FACTS:
1.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court
upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.
2.
Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during
the January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office.
3.
After his term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he
succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City Councilors.
4.

However, his qualification is being questioned.

5.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the
May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term.
6.
On May 13, 1995, petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II, City
of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Bascos disqualification, for the
suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor
of Manilas Second District.

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7.
On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a
copy of the petition. The other members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later.
8.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
9.
Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on
May 17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates
who vied for the seats. [5] Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby BithaoCamarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
10.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty
proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC. He reiterated Bascos disqualification and prayed
anew that candidate Romualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by
filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with Reservation to Submit Answer and/or Motion to Dismiss
Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with Temporary Restraining Order).
ISSUE(S): Is private respondents proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the
disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio?
HELD: No.
RATIO: Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads:
SEC. 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.(i)
The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the
Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any
proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely
affect the results of the election. ->Inapplicable. Why?
Reason of inapplicability: Suspension of proclamation refers on those in relation to contested returns and
NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
Inapplicable. Why?
Reason of inapplicability: The use of the word may indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely
directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.
What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the
Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised
whimsically and capriciously.
The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally
respected and even given finality.
The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so
as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
It is to be noted that Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure [25] states that:
SEC. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is proclamation shall be
suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.
However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent
with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify,
Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to
the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three cases do not
in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.
In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the provisions of
the Omnibus Election Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election returns.
In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of Canvassers violation
of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to
succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty position

Page 40

died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere
second-placer, the mayor.
Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on advanced
copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal basis for
proclamation.
With no precedent clearly in point, petitioners arguments must, therefore, be rejected.

39. Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

Facts:

EduManzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for Vice Mayor of Makati City during
the May 11, 1998 elections.

A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on Manzano contending that Manzano is an
American citizen thus suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.

COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on
May 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec 40 of the Local Goverment Code
from running any elective position.

Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the motion remained pending even after
the election.

The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for disqualification which was opposed by the
private respondent.

On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution reversing the decision of the
COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice
mayor of Makati.

Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers
proclaimed private respondent as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.

Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to
declare private respondent Manzano, disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:
1.

WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in
the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril.

2.

WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?

3.

WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

Reasons:
1.

Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under
40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was Mercado since the he was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings
for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners
motion for intervention was tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari.

2.

NO. Invoking the maxim duralexsedlex, petitioner contends that through Sec. 40(d) of the Local
Government Code (which declares as disqualified from running for elective local position Those with
dual-citizenship), Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing
dual allegiance to hold elective office. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship

Page 41

is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be a

national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an
issue because a person who has this raises a question of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore
posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. Hence, dual citizenship in the aforementioned disqualification
clause must mean dual allegiance. Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
3.

Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for candidacy,
such persons with dual citizenship have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual
citizenship. In private respondents certificate of candidacy, he made these statements under oath on March
27, 1998: I am a Filipino citizenNatural-born. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a
foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance theretoThe filing of such certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual-citizen.

Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED

Term Limits
40.Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013
FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Petitioner AbelardoAbundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose
Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period
of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres
sought the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the
position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor.
In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC,
which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been
the rightful choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the
2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to
have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right
to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or

Page 42

break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

41. Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157

TOPIC: Term Limits
AUTHOR: Michelle Sy
NATURE OF THE CASE: Determination of the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials,
with the exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms.
FACTS:
1.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992.
2.

On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.

3.

On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995.

4.

On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.

5.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative
to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought for the
disqualification of Capco. The petitioner contends that Capco already served as a mayor for three consecutive terms
by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
6.
On April 30, 1998, the second division of COMELEC ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared the
private respondent disqualified. However, the private respondent appealed and the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2,
reversed the decision and declared that Capco is eligible to run for a third term in the May 11, 1998 elections.
7.
Accordingly, the private respondent won the said May 11, 1998 elections and was proclaimed elected by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
8.
The petitioner contends that the service rendered as mayor by the private respondent from September 2,
1989 to June 30, 1992 and the two additional terms should be considered as fulfilling the three consecutive terms
within the contemplation of Article 10, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code. Petitioner also argues that it is irrelevant that the private respondent became mayor by succession because the
purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to
prevent a monopolization of political power.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the
remainder of term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit?
HELD: No, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
RATIO: Article 10, Section 8 of the Constitution contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms
as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such
officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number
of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is
simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the
term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual
has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Certificate of Candidacy
42. Gador vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 431
TOPIC: Certificate of Candidacy
AUTHOR: Michelle Sy
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction

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FACTS:
1.
The petitioner Amado F. Gador, is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamis as
Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election.
2.
He alleges that he filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January
7, 1980 and that he filed such based on a news item in the Bulletin Today, January 6 issue.
3.
The petitioner alleges that he wired the Chairman of the COMELEC on January 8, 1980, informing him of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and at the same time requesting him to release the approval of the said
certificate.
4.
On January 11, 1980, the petitioner caused the Election Registrar to wire the COMELEC Chairman,
reiterating the information that the petitioner had filed a certificate of candidacy and that he was already in the thick
of campaigns and was asking about the status of his candidacy.
5.
However, the request of the respondent COMELEC to the President regarding the extension of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy from January 4 to January 10, 1980 was denied which means that there is a strong
probability that the petitioners name as a candidate for mayor may not be included in the list of candidates.
6.
The petitioner contends that on grounds of fairness, principles of equity and for the best interest of the
people of Ozamis City, judgment should be rendered commanding the respondent, COMELEC, to immediately
include the petitioner in the list of candidates for Mayor.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid?
HELD: No, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void for having been filed beyond January 4, 1980.
RATIO: Section 7, Batasang Pambansa bilang 52, provides that The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in
triplicate not later than January 4, 1980. It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended
the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy.
The court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
43. Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266
FACTS: In the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS filled in separate
candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by
Robert Z. Barbers (Barbers Wing) nominated Grachil G. Canoy, while the other group lead by Francisco T. Matugas
(Matugas Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr.
Miguel H. Mula, a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the Barbers Wing, filed before the COMELEC a
petition for disqualification against Teodoro. On May 8, COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying Teodoro as
candidate because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude
On May 10, herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, an independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy
for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the
LAKAS Matugas Wing as the substitute mayoralty candidate.
Mula filed another disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinica before the COMELEC. He alleged that said
substitution was invalid because Sinaca was not member of the LAKAS party when he was nominated as a
substitute and it lacks approval of Sen. Barbers as a joint signatory of the substitution.
COMELEC Second Division dismissed the disqualification case. COMELEC en banc set aside the resolution of the
Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL asserting that the substitution violated the provisions of Sec. 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code that the substitute must belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate.
Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because he was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination
as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.
ISSUE: WON the substitution of Emmanuel Sinaca was against the provisions of Section 77 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
HELD: No. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person
belonging to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. Petitioner Emmanuel Sinaca,
an independent candidate, had first withdrawn his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member before
he joined the LAKAS party and nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute candidate. He had
filed his certificate of candidacy and his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Gov.
Matugas with his written acceptance of the party's nomination. Therefore, he is a bona fide LAKAS member. There

Page 44

is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must
have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such.

44. Torayno vs.COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574

FACTS: During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy
dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
In 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de
Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed
20 years of residence. The next year, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating
therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was in CDO.
Petitioners filed a petition before COMELEC in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral
candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the
resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor.
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC n which they sought the
annulment of the election of private respondent and the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the
next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city.
COMELEC First Division denied the Petition for Disqualification. OMELEC en banc upheld the findings and
conclusions of the First Division, holding that the records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of
Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly
established by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his
family has been living since then.
ISSUE: W/N respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty
candidate.
HELD: Yes. In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing
in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the
three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the seat of
the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city. These facts
indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to
qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano
in his choice of residence.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted
not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves -their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and all matters vital to their common
welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with their desired constituencies,
and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is
substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications
for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the residence requirement does
not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence requirement.

45. Villaber vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126 Miguel Caponong

XVII. disqualification of candidates; grounds, procedure and effects of

Secs. 68,69, 78 OEC
Secs. 5, 7RA 6646 The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
Toraynovs.COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574
Villaber vs. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126

Page 45

XVIII. campaign; election propaganda; contributions and expenditures

46. Adiong vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272 MIGUEL CAPONONG
47. National Press Club vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1
FACTS:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two
(2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for
provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
Petitioners allege that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates
the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to
censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted
that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election
issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b):
Sec. 11 Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. In addition to the forms
of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas PambansaBlg.
881, it shall be unlawful;
b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station, other mass
media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free
of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes
except to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality who is a candidate for any elective public office shall take a
leave of absence from his work as such during the campaign period.

Abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of mediabased campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the COMELEC
space of the newspapers and on COMELEC time of radio and television broadcasts,
would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information
concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the
right of voters to information and opinion.
The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable,
the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying
the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b)
prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other
political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec").
Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 90. Comelec space. The Commission shall procure space in at least
one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done
in any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be
known as "Comelec Space" wherein candidates can announce their
candidacy. Said space shall beallocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially by the Commission among all candidates within the
area in which the newspaper is circulated.
Sec. 92. Comelec time. The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as "Comelec Time" which shall be allocated
equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of
all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide

Page 46

radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of the campaign.

require the Comelec to procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general

circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television
stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec
space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among
all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and television
station involved.
Both rules are also given a constitutional basis as provided by Article IX(C) (4) of
the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
Sec. 4. The Commission [on Elections] may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or
permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media
of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

The Comelec has thus been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise
or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the
operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of
such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the
ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as
uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in
connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates",
during the period of elections.

ISSUE:
WON THE ASSAILED LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
CONSTITUTE A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION
OR REGULATION OF THE OPERATIONS OF COMMUNICATION AND
INFORMATION ENTERPRISES DURING THE PERIOD OF ELECTION
HELD:

NO, the provisions do not violate petitioners freedom of speech.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By
virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is
limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328
dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of
authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12
January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period.
Section 11 (b) is also limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b)
shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase
and sale disguised as a donation, of print space and air time for "campaign or other
political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the
reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy
events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or
commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are
not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum,
Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other
coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political
office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.
Another limitation on the scope of application, is that Section 11 (b) exempts from
its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air
time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a
fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective
public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television

Page 47

station.
The COMELEC is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "COMELEC time" and
"COMELEC space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that COMELEC will
carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once
again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at
their disposal.
Section 11 (b) does not cut off the flow of media reporting, opinion or commentary
about candidates, their qualifications and platforms and promises. Newspaper,
radio broadcasting and television stations remain quite free to carry out their
regular and normal information and communication operations. Section 11 (b)
does not authorize any intervention and much less control on the part of COMELEC
in respect of the content of the normal operations of media, nor in respect of
the content of political advertisements which the individual candidates are quite
free to present within their respective allocated COMELEC time and COMELEC
space.
Section 11 (b) does, of course, limit the right of free speech and of access to mass
media of the candidates themselves. The limitation, however, bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set out in Article IX(C) (4)
and Article II (26) of the Constitution. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of
print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially
affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Here lies the core
problem of equalization of the situations of the candidates with deep pockets and
the candidates with shallow or empty pockets that Article IX(C) (4) of the
Constitution and Section 11 (b) seek to address. That the statutory mechanism
which Section 11 (b) brings into operation is designed and may be expected to
bring about or promote equal opportunity, and equal time and space, for political
candidates to inform all and sundry about themselves, cannot be gainsaid.
The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated
with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much
to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke
rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to
appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The
right of the general listening and viewing public to be free from such intrusions and
their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to
advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media
enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged"
candidates.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

CRUZ, J., DISSENTING

It is for the purpose of properly informing the electorate of the credentials and platforms
of the candidates that they are allowed to campaign during the election period. Such
campaign includes their personally visiting the voters in house-to-house sorties, calling on
the telephone for their support, sending them letters of appeal, distributing self-serving
leaflets extolling their virtues, giving away buttons and stickers and sample ballots and
other compaign materials, and holding caucuses, rallies, parades, public meetings and
similar gatherings.

It is curious, however, that such allowable campaign activities do not include the use of
the mass media because of the prohibition in Section 11(b) of Rep. Act. No. 6646. The
candidate may employ letters or leaflets or billboards or placards or posters or meetings
to reach the electorate, incurring for this purposes a not inconsiderable amount of his or
his supporters' money. But he may not utilize for the same purpose periodicals, radio,
television or other forms of mass communications, even for free. Employment of these
facilities is allowed only through the respondent Commission on Elections, which is
directed by the Election Code to procure newspaper space and radio and television time to
be distributed among the thousands of candidates vying throughout the land for the
thousands of public offices to be filled in the coming elections.

The lawful objective of Section 11(b) may be readily conceded. The announced purpose of
the law is to prevent disparity between the rich and the poor candidates by denying both
of them access to the mass media and thus preventing the former from enjoying an undue

Page 48

advantage over the latter. There is no question that this is a laudable goal. Equality among
the candidates in this regard should be assiduously pursued by the government if the
aspirant with limited resources is to have any chance at all against an opulent opponent
who will not hesitate to use his wealth to make up for his lack of competence.

The financial disparity among the candidates is a fact of life that cannot be corrected by
legislation except only by the limitation of their respective expenses to a common
maximum. The flaw in the prohibition under challenge is that while the rich candidate is
barred from buying mass media coverage, it nevertheless allows him to spend his funds
on other campaign activities also inaccessible to his straitened rival. Thus, the rich
candidate may hold as many rallies and meetings as he may desire or can afford, using for
the purpose the funds he would have spent for the prohibited mass media time and space.
The number of these rallies and meetings, which also require tremendous expense, cannot
be matched by the poor candidate, but the advantage of the rich candidate in this case is
not similarly prohibited. By the same token, the rich candidates may visit more houses,
send more letters, make more telephone appeals, distribute more campaign materials,
incurring for all these more expenses than the poor candidates can afford. But these
advantages are allowed by the law because they do not involve the use of mass media
space and time.

48. Pilar V. COMELEC245 SCRA 759

JUANITO C. PILAR vs. COMELEC

AUTHOR: Paolo Santillan

[G.R. No. 115245; July 11, 1995]

NOTES:

TOPIC:
NATURE OF THE CASE:
A petition for certiorari
FACTS:

MARCH 22, 1992;petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. MARCH 25,
1992; petitioner withdrew his candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated NOVEMBER 3, 1993 and FEBRUARY 13,
1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated FEBRUARY 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065.
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the
petition in a Resolution dated APRIL 28, 1994
ISSUE:
WON THE DEATH OF MAYOR PONTAL SERVED AS AN ACQUITTAL OF THE
CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST HIM
HELD:

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File
Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within
thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices
of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions

Page 49

and expenditures in connection with the election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures
herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the
winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the
period prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements
or reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as
required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the
discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such
failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by
the Commission against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in
writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the
date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
their obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section,
the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold
public office (Emphasis supplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and

expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348
(Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in
Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to
candidates to file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the
election, the Law Department of the Commission, the regional election
director of the National Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors
and the election registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery or
registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy with
them to comply with their obligation to file their statements of contributions
and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every election registrar
shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the
statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the
winning candidates fails to file the statement required within the period
prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements
or reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as
required herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the

Page 50

discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such
failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by
the Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section,
the administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition,
the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures.
The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed
to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who
withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art.
IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy."
These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matters contained in
the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions.
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign.
The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a
candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such
a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided
that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made
no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION:

MELO, J., DISSENTING

But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still
considered a candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not
bound to render an accounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term
'candidate' is used to designate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at
our election (Santos vs. Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind.,
207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one
who withdraws his certificate of candidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted
for at an election. And considering the shortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to
the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy, petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed
there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacy for purposes to raise funds or to
extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.

Page 51

49. Peralta vs. COMELEC 82 SCRA 30

FACTS: Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. He, along
with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs
26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in
the proper spaces in the ballot the names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a
political party, group or aggravation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the
political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot).
Peralta was vehement in contending that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the
Constitution: Bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. He sought the shelter of its protection for himself
and other independent candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is
not nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal protection question.
The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting provided for in the Code is that an
independent candidate would be discriminated against because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a
political party, a voter would have voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent
candidate does not enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of the
equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able
to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted
individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation.
The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. The choice is his. No
one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion.
Such a system of voting facilitates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It enables the laborer, the farmer, and the
voter of ordinary education to vote with greater facility for all the official candidates of the party of his choice. It
thus broadens the ways and means by which the sovereign will can be expressed.
Certainly, before filing his certificate of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to
candidates of a political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In other words, the choice
is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and considered the
relative advantages and disadvantages of either alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his
voluntary action or decision, he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of
discrimination.
Nor could it be true, as petitioners contend, that a system which allows straight ticket voting encourages laziness and
political irresponsibility. While there may be those who may be moved to vote straight party by reason of lack of
interest, nevertheless, there are still those sufficiently interested to cast an intelligent vote.

XIX. election; board of election inspectors (bei); watchers

Sec. 13, RA 6646 The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
Secs. 164-180 OEC
Sec. 26 of RA 7166
XX.

casting of votes and Absentee Voting

50. Macalintal vs. Comelec,405 SCRA 614

FACTS: A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,
seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a
taxpayer and as lawyer. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates
funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the
year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Petitioner raises
three principal questions for contention:

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That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to
the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;

That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice- President, violates the
constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President
and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and That Section 25 of the same law,
allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to
exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1
of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1. No, Sec 5(d) is valid. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission
on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the
Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the
ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said
discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines,
and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when
Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further
weakening petitioners claim on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it
necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vicepresidency, granting
merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the
winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President. Congress could not have allowed the
COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for
the said positions.
3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional. The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is
intended to play a distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions. The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC
which is an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions,
orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative
power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is
unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.
51. Libanan vs HRET,283 SCRA 520
TOPIC: Casting of Votes and Absentee Voting
AUTHOR: KAYELYN LAT
NATURE OF THE CASE: Special civil action for certiorari
FACTS:
1.
Petitioner MarcelinoLibanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone
congressional seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections.
2.
After the canvass of the returns was made, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar
proclaimed Ramirez to have been duly elected representative of the District (41, 523 votes); compared to petitioner
(40,869)
3.
Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before HRET:
The elections were marred by massive irregularities instigated by respondent Ramirez in the 23
municipalities (lone district of Eastern Samar)
Contested 79 precincts in 5 municipalities; that the election returns and/or ballots in certain precincts were
tampered with, substituted, or systematically marked in favor of Ramirez
HRET should issue an order annulling the election and proclamation of Ramirez

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4.
Respondent Ramirez denied the charges: prayed for the dismissal of protest and confirmation of his
election
5.
-

February 20, 1996: Revision of ballotsin the protested precincts was commenced
6 of the contested precincts were found to have been merged into 3 precincts
Thus, only 76 ballot boxes were opened for revision

6.
HRET designated a Hearing Commissioner and a Deputy Hearing Commissioner for the reception of
evidence; Respective memoranda of Libanan and Ramirez were filed.
7.
HRET explained:
No spurious ballot was found
For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must not have any of the ff. authenticating marks:
(a) the COMELEC watermark; (b) the signatures or initial of BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; (c) red and
blue fibers
All the ballots had COMELEC watermarks
Ruled in favor of respondent Ramirez
8.
Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of HRETs decision:
absence of BEI Chairmans signature at the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were
not those issued to the voters during the elections (311 ballots)
the law would require the signature before issuing it to the voter
9.
HRET credited petitioner Libanan with 30 votes because of the error in the computation of the base figure
and rejected 12 ballots for Ramirez; Ramirez remained to be the winner with a lead of 99 votes
10.

Thus, the present recourse.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the ballots rendered the
ballots spurious
HELD: NO; Ballots not spurious; Respondent still remained to be the winner
RATIO:
As to the jurisdiction:

The constitution mandates that HRET and the SET shall each, respectively, be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.

GENERAL RULE: As long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the
power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x xx excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.

EXCEPTION: The Court may do so, however, but only in the exercise of this Courts so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon the determination that the Tribunals decision was rendered without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by
the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.
Are the ballots spurious?

Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166 (Signature of Chairman at the back of Every Ballot)

There is NOTHING in the law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authenticated shall thereby be
deemed spurious. The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure.

During the deliberation of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, held on August 8, 1991, the
members agreed to delete the phrase Any ballot which is not so authenticated shall be deemed spurious.

A ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks: (a)
COMELEC watermark; (b) signature or initials, or thumbprint of Chairman of BEI; (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red and blue fibers in
the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject
to rejection.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:A ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks: (a) COMELEC watermark; (b) signature or initials, or thumbprint of Chairman of BEI; (c) in
those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of
red and blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered
spurious and subject to rejection.

52. Casimiro vs. COMELEC 171 SCRA 468, 1989

TOPIC: Canvassing and Proclamation

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AUTHOR: KAYELYN LAT

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari and mandamus
FACTS:
1.
In the local elections of 1988, Gabriel Casimiro was the UNIDO candidate for Mayor of Municipality of
Las Pinas, Metro Manila; AlfredoJuntilla and RosalinoRiguera were also candidates for the same position of Mayor,
with Riguera having been ultimately proclaimed Mayor.
2.
Remigio Ramos and Eduardo Castillo were both candidates for Vice Mayor; while Reynaldo Salvador was
a candidate for Councilor, all in the same municipality
3.

During the canvassing of votes, cases were filed before COMELEC (Juntilla, et al vs. Riguera, et al)

To suspend canvass of election returns/transfer of venue for the canvass of election returns to COMELEC
Main Office in Intramuros, Manila and/or suspend the proclamation of any winning candidate, or to declare nullity
of Proclamation, if any
To enjoin Board of Canvassers from Canvassing of Votes of Las Pinas and/or Tabulation Unofficial
Election Returns
4.
COMELEC rendered a decision: Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Pinas, Metro Manila, is hereby
ordered to reconvene, complete the canvass if not yet completed, and proclaim the winning candidates, if warranted
5.

Respondent Riguera and other winning candidates for local officials were proclaimed

6.
COMELEC en banc denied a motion for reconsideration; disposed of a Motion for Clarification and/or
Partial Reconsideration filed by Casimiro
7.
Petitioners Casimiro and UNIDO party availed of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against
COMELEC, the Las Pinas Board of Canvassers, and Riguera as the principal respondents
8.
In the meantime, an electoral protest was filed by Reynaldo Salvador (candidate for councilor) before RTC
of Makati; Judge Ranada scheduled the verification of tally sheets and opening of 7 ballot boxes; boxes were
transferred from COMELEC Main Office to RTC, Makati
Petitioners prayed for a Restraining Order enjoining Judge from enforcing said order
9.
Rustico Antonio and 9 other defeated UNIDO candidates for Councilors filed another Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus against COMELEC, Las Pinas BOC and proclaimed councilors seeking nullification of the same
ISSUE(S):
(1)
Whether or not the canvass proceedings in the COMELEC Central Office were illegal for having been
made without prior notice to petitioners as to the date and time of canvassing
(2)
Whether or not the proclamation of Riguera despite the pendency of motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners before COMELEC was hasty and in contravention of election laws and rules, hence a nullity
HELD: (1) NOT ILLEGAL; (2) NO, proclamation is proper
RATIO:
(1)
Canvassing

The transfer of the canvassing from Las Pinas to COMELEC Main Office in Manila was represented by a
letter from the Municipal Board of Canvassers granting their request. The letter having clearly referred also to
transfer of the venue of the canvass, petitioners cannot justifiably claim that notice was lacking, or that said notice
was meant only for the transfer of election returns. If petitioners representatives were absent during the canvassing
it was because they had opted to leave the proceedings for reasons of their own. No grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to COMELEC, therefore, in upholding the validity of the canvassing at its Main Office.

Under Sec 244 of Omnibus Election Code, the proceedings of the Board having been contested, petitioners
should have appealed the matter within 5 days from the time the contested ruling or proceeding was held. As found
by COMELEC, however, said appeal was not made within the reglementary period.
(2)
Proclamation

Candidate RosalinoRiguera was proclaimed soon after the promulgation of the Decision of the COMELEC
Second Division of March 25, 1988. It cannot be denied, however, that the Board of Canvassers has the legal
obligation, after canvass of the returns, to proclaim the elected candidates. The duty of the Board to so proclaim is
ministerial after the mechanical or mathematical act of counting the votes cast has been accomplished.

Neither should it be lost sight of that the Board proclaimed winner pursuant to the COMELEC decision
dated March 25, 1988 ordering the board to reconvene, complete the canvass if not yet completed, and proclaim the
winning candidates.

The proclamation therefore, was in compliance with that directive.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was dated March 29, 1988 while the proclamation was
made right after the promulgation of the COMELEC Second Divisions Decision on March 25, 1988. Hence,
petitioners allegation that the proclamation was improper because it was made during the pendency of a Motion for
Reconsideration suffers from inaccuracy.

XIII.canvassing and proclamation

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53. Quilala vs. COMELEC 188 SCRA 502, 1990

FACTS: Petitioner Cirilo M. Quilala was KBL candidate for Mayor in the Municipality of Currimao, Ilocos Norte
while private respondent Wilbur Go was the official administration candidate for the same
position in Jan. 18, 1988 elections.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers completed its canvass in the afternoon of Jan. 19, and immediately thereafter
proclaimed the winning candidate in the person of Wilbur C. Go. On Jan. 21, 1988, petitioner filed a petition with
the COMELEC principally anchored on allegation that petitioner was not represented in the canvassing of election
returns.
Respondent COMELEC issued its decision dismissing the petition and confirming the validity of the proceeding of
the Board of Canvassers. Petitioner filed a case for annulment of the proclamation on the ground that he was not
represented when the canvass of the election returns was resumed, as he was not notified of the time and place of the
resetting of the canvassing.
ISSUE: WON the canvassing and proclamation are valid.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: Petitioner may not claim ignorance of the aforesaid provisions as these are matters directly affecting his
political fortune. Consequently, with or without notice, it was the duty of the petitioner and all candidates for that
matter to assign their watchers or representatives in the counting of votes and canvassing of election returns in order
to insure the sanctity and purity of the ballots.
54. Caruncho vs. COMELEC,315 SCRA 693
FACTS: Petitioner Emiliano R. Caruncho III was the candidate of the Liberal Party for the congressional seat in the
lone district of Pasig City at the May 11, 1998 synchronized elections. The other candidates were: Arnulfo G.
Acedera, Jr. (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP); Marcelino P. Arias (Nacionalista Party); Roberto C. Bassig (Independent);
Esmeraldo T. Batacan (PDR-LM Coalition); Henry P. Lanot (LAMMP); Francisco C. Rivera, Jr. (PRP/PDR);
Elpidio G. Tuason (Independent), and Raoul V. Victorino (Liberal Party/LAMMP).
At exactly 6:00 oclock in the evening of May 14, 1998, General Acedera and his supporters stormed the Caruncho
Stadium in San Nicolas, Pasig City, where the canvassing of election returns was
being conducted. They allegedly forced themselves into the canvassing area, breaking a glass door in the process. As
pandemonium broke loose, the police fired warning shots causing
those present in the canvassing venue, including the members of the Board and canvassing units, to scamper for
safety. The canvassing personnel exited through the backdoors bringing with them the
Election Returns they were canvassing and tallying as well as the Statement of Votes that they were accomplishing.
They entrusted these documents to the City Treasurers Office and the Pasig Employment Service Office (PESO).
Election documents and paraphernalia were scattered all over the place when the intruders left.
The following day, the sub-canvassing units recovered the twentytwo (22) Election Returns and the Statement of
Votes from the Treasurers Office and the PESO. However, page 2 of each of the
22 election returns, which contained the names of candidates for congressmen, had been detached and could not be
found.
The Board, satisfied that it had finished canvassing the 1,491 election returns from as many clustered precincts,
proclaimed Henry P. Lanot as the winner in the congressional race for the lone district
of Pasig. The votes obtained by the leading three candidates were: Henry P. Lanot 60,914 votes; Emiliano R.
Boy Caruncho III 42,942 votes, and Arnulfo Acedera 36,139 votes. The winner,
Lanot, led his closest rival, Caruncho, by 17,971 votes. Petitioner Caruncho filed a Motion to Nullify Proclamation
on the Basis of Incomplete Returns with the COMELEC. He alleged that the Board had proceeded with the
proclamation of Henry Lanot as the winning congressional candidate even though one hundred fortyseven (147)
election returns involving about 30,000 votes, were still not canvassed.
He prayed that the COMELEC en banc declare the proclamation null and void and that the Board of Canvassers be
directed to convene and reopen the ballot boxes to recount the votes of the candidates for the House of
Representatives and thereupon proclaim the winner. The Board of Canvassers asserted that there were only twentytwo (22) election returns, not 147 as claimed by Caruncho, that were missing but these were eventually recovered.
COMELEC declared that the proclamation of the winning congressional candidate of Pasig City as NULL AND
VOID. However, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution dated October 1, 1998 reconsidering the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and dismissing petitioners amended motion (petition) to nullify the
proclamation on the basis of incomplete returns for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the proclamation without taking into
account the 22 election returns.
HELD: No.
RATIO: Granting that the proclamation was made without taking into account the twenty-two (22) election returns,
still, the COMELEC did not abuse its discretion. The election returns represented only 4,400 votes. That number
cannot affect the result of the election because Henry Lanots lead over his closest rival, herein petitioner, was
17,971 votes. As the second paragraph of Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code aforequoted states, the Board
of Canvassers could have totally disregarded the twenty-two (22) election returns and legally proclaimed Lanot as

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the winner in the election in Pasig City for Member of the House of Representatives. SEC. 233. When the election
returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of the election returns is missing, the board of canvassers
shall, by messenger or otherwise, obtain such missing election returns from the board of election inspectors
concerned, or if said returns have been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the
Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns
issued by the Commission, and forthwith direct its representative to investigate the case and immediately report the
matter to the Commission. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent
proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all returns are considered and
none is omitted. However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of
the election. It bears stressing that in the case at bar, the COMELEC has categorically found that the election returns
which were not counted by respondent canvassers represented only 4,400 votes. To be sure, this number will not
affect the result of the election considering that Lanots lead over petitioner was already 17,971 votes.

XIV. pre-proclamation controversy

55. Laudenio vs. COMELEC 276 SCRA 705
56. Allarde vs. COMELEC,159 SCRA 623
57. Dipatuan vs. COMELEC,185 SCRA 86

XV. election contests

58. De Castro vs. COMELEC 267 SCRA 806

59. Poe, Jr. vs. Arroyo, PET case no. 0002, March 29, 2005
60. Tecson vs. COMELEC424 SCRA 277

XVI. election offenses

61. Sunga vs COMELEC 288 SCRA 76
SUNGA v. COMELEC- CHEYENNE YU
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of
Iguig, Province of Cagayan, in the May 1995 elections. Private respondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent
mayor, was a candidate for re-election in the same municipality. Sunga filed with the COMELEC a complaint on
April 22, 1995. The case came to the attention of this Commission on April 26, 1995 in a form of letter from
petitioner accusing respondent of utilizing government properties in his campaign and praying for the latter's
immediate disqualification. Another letter dated was addressed to the COMELEC Regional Director of Region II
(without paying the docket fee), reiterating petitioner's prayer while alleging that respondent and his men committed
acts of terrorism and violated the gun ban. Finally, on May 11, 1995, an Amended Petition was filed with the Clerk
of Court of the Commission containing substantially the same allegations as the previous letters but supported by
affidavits and other documentary evidence. Trinidad, on the other hand, opted not to submit any evidence at all.
Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garnered the highest number of votes, while Sunga
trailed second. On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of the proclamation of Trinidad.
However, notwithstanding the motion, Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga to file another
motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation. Both motions were not acted upon bythe COMELEC 2nd
Division and thereafter dismissed the case.
ISSUES:
1. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the disqualification case; and
2. WON Sunga should be proclaimed as the Mayor.
HELD:
1. Yes.
2. No.
RATIO: 1. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the disqualification case. The Amended
Petition retroacted to such earlier dates of the letter of complaint, an amendment which merely supplements and

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amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is
not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. Before final
judgment: If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may,
during the pendency thereof, order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
guilt is strong. (Sec. 6, RA 6646) A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was
unable, for any reason caused upon it, tod etermine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics so that
the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election.
This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law. The purpose
of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute
him for violation of election laws. The fact that a candidate has been proclaimed and had assumed the position to
which he was elected does not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and
eventually decide the disqualification. The COMELEC should not dismiss the case simply because the respondent
has been proclaimed.(Also, the fact that no docket fee was initially paid is not fatal. The Procedural defect as cured
by the subsequent payment of the docket fee.)
2. Sunga should not be proclaimed as the Mayor notwithstanding the fact that the disqualification case may proceed.
The wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then
as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes to be
declared elected. If the winner is ineligible, the candidate who got the highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed
elected as he did not get the majority or plurality of the votes (Note that Trinidad was not yet declared disqualified
before election). As provided in Sec. 44, RA No. 7160 and echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of theLocal Government Code of 1991, the language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal,
accordingly, in the event that Trinidad is adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be created for failure
of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as
provided by law.
62. De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760
FACTS: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista Party
for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a complaint charging
petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of the 1978 Election Code. Asst.
Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an
investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of
Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist. The following information, was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the prosecution
maintained the Tanodbayans exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to try and decide the
charges against petitioner.
ISSUE: WON the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute, and try election
offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the
frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every
qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed
by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan,
We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to
investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as
contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

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