Professional Documents
Culture Documents
salvadoran revolution:
the erp in northern morazdn
was [sic] the coercive pressures created by the blows and counterblows of
two military forces, a dilemma Nebajenos typically describe as being en-
tre dosfuegos (between two fires).... Hence, just because an insurgency
grows rapidly does not mean that it represents popular aspirations and has
broad popular support" (1992:20, c.f, p. 91, emphasis in the original).
I am supportive of Stoll's effort to counteract analyses that paint the
world in black and white terms
which hold Latin American gov- resumen
ernments able to do no right and Este articulo ofrece una explicacion
revolutionaries no wrong. If, in matizada de la politico interna de relaciones
fact, this necessary corrective guerrilleras. Utiliza los conceptos de
lay at the heart of his argument, hegemonia, campos de poder y habitui
I would have little objection. para analizar las dindmicas de estrategias
However, by parceling out re- guerrilleras y esfuerzos para implementaias en
sponsibility for the death toll el EJerdtoRevolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) en
equally between revolutionaries la parte norte de Morazan, El Salvador. El
who struggled to alter a highly autor sostiene que las estrategias
guerrilleras los involucraron en un
exploitative economic system
proceso doble de construccion de
and a military that killed thou- hegemonia hegemonia sobre civiles y
sands of uninvolved civilians in hegemonia sobre sus propios combatientes.
order to defend it, Stoll produces Este proceso doble hubiera sido critico si las
a work of historical revisionism guerrillas del ERP pensaban competir en el
which in the end serves to dis- campo de poder dominado por los militarej
credit all armed movements for Salvadorenos, apoyados por los EEUU.
social change. For a logical,
though unstated, implication of his argument is that an\ mass movement
She also noted that "In this organizational process we attempt not only
to integrate the advanced masses but to attract the backward masses and
We not only had to announce hope but sow it. The situation
was really difficult because the population was internally
divided. This called for work of greater depth. In this con-
text we began to develop a pastoral team with the goal of
evangelizing and promoting a clearer and more Christian
consciousness among the population. The goals were clear:
the creation of community and the organization through col-
In the early 1980s the ERP Command allowed former catechists who
worked in combat or support structures to return to full-time pastoral work
under Miguel Ventura and Rogelio Ponceele. The priests through their ser-
mons and periodic visits to communities and the catechists through Cel-
ebrations of the Word, Bible study and ministrations boosted the morale of
civilians, encouraged them to organize, celebrated their projects and politi-
cal victories over the army, and comforted them in their sufferings (CEBES
n.d.; Lopez Vigil 1987).23
Democratic process (nomination of officers, voice or hand voting) were
undermined by a hierarchical structure of control centered in ERP political
activists and their superiors (political commissions and zone commanders
who worked out of guerrilla headquarters). For strategic military reasons
the ERP simply could not allow truly autonomous sources of civilian power.
The election of a person uncommitted to the revolutionary process, a per-
son who sowed dissent among the civilian population or one lacking the
mental and physical fortitude to withstand pressure from the FAES could
have had disastrous consequences for civilians and compas alike.24 Given
the situation it was all but inevitable that independent civilian organization
would be severely limited by the exigencies of the conflict. In 1991, seven
years after the model was first put into practice, an internal ERP document
stated that "[i]n the controlled zone there exists but a single political ten-
dency: the revolutionary party. The civilian population is the party's social
base and the social organizations or guilds (gremios) are mediums of power
with the functions of the state" (FMLN Pleno de Comite Regional
NorOriental 1991).
Notwithstanding the limits on democracy, doble cara was a strategic
success in northern Morazan and in other areas of eastern El Salvador
(e.g., southern Usulutan, northern San Miguel) in which the ERP was ac-
tive. From 1984 when political activists and collaborating civilians promoted
the first local councils, the number of groups and level of coordination among
them increased steadily. In 1988, the process culminated in the creation of
the Patronato de Desarrollo de las Comunidades de Morazan y San
Miguel (Community Development Council of Morazan and San Miguel or
PADECOMSM), composed of fifty-five local councils coordinated from
offices in Perqufn, Morazan (PADECOMSM 1988).25
The financial assistance and political backing obtained by councils from
reprise
David Stoll described Guatemalan civilians as caught up in a vicious
struggle "between two armies," innocent victims of military repression
brought on by a largely unsolicited guerrilla presence. I have argued that,
beginning in the mid-1980s in northern Morazan, FMLN guerrillas and the
Salvadoran military did, indeed, struggle to obtain the collaboration of the
civilian population. But I have also emphasized that that struggle unfolded
on afield of power not of the guerrillas' choosing. Absent the denial of
democracy and the suppression of organized mass movements for social
change in El Salvador- and the history of such suppression and denial is a
notes
acknowledgements. My thanks to John Holloway, Sergio Tischler. Julie Cottle, Stephen
Streeter and Nancy Churchill, as well as to John Hammond, Mark Edelman and Lynn Stephen,
referees for JLAA. for helpful critique and suggestions for improvement. Adam Flint hosted a
short visit to El Salvador in June 1998 during which I was able to gather materials that strength-
ened several sections. This paper is based out on fieldwork carried out over twenty months
between June 1991 and January 1996. Financial support was provided by the University of
Connecticut Research Foundation (1992, 1994) and a Fulbright-Hays grant (1994-95); it was
written in Puebla, Mexico at the Benemdrita Universidad Aut6noma de Puebla where I was
supported by the Consejo Nacional de Ciencias y Tecnologia (CONACYT) during 1997-98.
Thanks also to Roxanna Duntley, Phyllis Robinson. Shelli McMillan. Samuel Vidal Guzman and
Jacinto Marquez for their work on the project.
1
The FMLN formed in October 1980 as a coalition of five political-military organiza-
tions; apart from the ERP they were the Fuerzas Populares de Liberation (FPL), the Resistencia
Nacional (RN), the Partido Comunista Salvadorena (PCS) and the Partido Revolucionario de
Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).
references cited
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Anonymous
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Binford, Leigh
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1997 El Mozote: vidas y memorias. San Salvador: UCA Editores.
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Entrevista ineditada con Mauricio Chevez y Henrietta Shannon, San Salva-
dor.
n.d. Fabio's Story: Peasant Intellectuals and the Limits of Testimonio. Manuscrito
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Bourdieu, Pierre
1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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1990a The Logic of Practice. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
1990b In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Palo Alto, CA:
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Browning, David
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