1.

Naguiat v. NLRC (1997) / Panganiban

Facts
CFTI [Sergio as President; Antolin as VP] held a concessionaires contract with AAFES for the operation of taxi
services in Clark Air Base. Respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxi drivers. However, AAFES was
dissolved as a result of the US military bases phase-out. During the negotiations between AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association and CFTI re: separation benefits, it was agreed that separated drivers will be given P500/year of service.
Other drivers accepted the amount, but respondents refused to accept it.
The respondents, through NOWM, filed a complaint against S. Naguiat (NE), AAFES, and AAFES TDA. They
alleged that they were hired by CFTI and then assigned to NE which managed, controlled, and supervised their
employment. They averred that they were entitled to separation pay based on their earnings of $15 for working 16
days/month. CFTIs defense that the cessation of business was due to financial losses and lost business opportunity.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering CFTI to pay respondents P1,200/year of service for
humanitarian consideration. NLRC affirmed LAs decision with modification by granting separation pay $120/year of
service, and held that Naguiat Enterprises, S. Naguiat, and A. Naguiat are jointly and severally liable with CFTI.
NLRC issued a second resolution denying the MfR of the petitioners.
Issues and Holding
1.
Amount of separation pay
A.
Labor Arbiter correctly found that CFTI stopped the taxi business because of the phase-out of the
US military bases, and NOT due to great financial loss as the business was earning profitably at the time
of closure.
B.
LC 283: separation pay = 1 month pay or at least 1/2 month pay/year of service, whichever is
higher
C.
NLRC did not commit GAD in ruling that respondents were entitled to separation pay of $120 (half
of $240 monthly pay) per year of service
2.
Liability of NE, CFTI and officers
3.
NE not liable
A.
LA found that respondents were employees of CFTI as they received salary from said office, etc.
(upheld by SC)
B.
S. Naguiat was presumed to be managing and controlling taxi business on behalf of NE; S.
Naguiat, in supervising taxi drivers, was carrying out his responsibilities as CFTI
C.
NE is a separate corporation completely (trading business); it is neither respondents indirect
employer nor labor-only contractor
D.
Constitution of CFTI-AAFES TDA provided that members are CFTI employees and that for collective
bargaining purposes, the definite employer is CFTI
4.
CFTI president solidarily liable [S. Naguiat]
A.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC family-owned corporation filed application for clearance
to cease operations. Backwages were computed; however, none of the motions for execution could be
implemented for failure to find leviable assets. LA granted unions prayer that officers and agents be
personally held liable for payment of backwages. NLRC however said that officers of a corporation are
not personally liable for official acts unless they exceeded scope of authority. SC however reversed
NLRC and upheld LA, saying that if the policy of the law were otherwise, the employer can have ways
for evading payment of backwages.
B.
Employer any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (LC 212c)
C.
Applying the ruling on A.C. Ransom, S. Naguiat falls within the meaning of employer who may
be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to the dismissed employees
D.
Both CFTI and NE were close family corporations (Corp. Code Sec. 100, par. 5) [To the extent that
the stockholders are actively engaged in the management or operation of the business
[] Said stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained
reasonably adequate liability insurance]
E.
cf. MAM Realty Development v. NLRC: director / officer may still be held solidarily liable with a
corporation by a specific provision of law
i.
WON there was corporate tort. YES
ii.
TORT violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law; breach of
legal duty
F.
S. Naguiat is solidarily liable for corporate tort because he actively engaged in CFTIs
management or operation
5.
CFTI VP not personally liable [A. Naguiat]
A.
Was not shown that he acted in the capacity of a GM
B.
No evidence on the extent of his participation in the management, operation of business
6.
NOWMs personality to represent respondents
A.
Petitioners held in estoppel for not raising issue before LA or NLRC
7.
No denial of due process since the Naguiats availed of the chance to present positions before LA

2.

Baksh vs CA
Baksh v. CA
February 19, 1993

FACTS: Baksh, an Iranian, courted Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married.
When Baksh visited her home, Gonzales parents allowed them to sleep together. Baksh then forced her to live with
him. He beat her. Gonzales later found out that Baksh was already married. Gonzales sued for damages.

ISSUE: WON Baksh was liable for damages. YES

HELD: If a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a ploy to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21. This is not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation that followed.
It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. In this case, Gonzales was a victim of moral seduction.

On Art. 21: designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statue of torts.
CLASS

NOTES

Judicial notice that the cherished possession of every single Filipina is her virginity
If the man never intended to marry the woman BUT STILL promised to marry her, it would be equivalent to
inducement and he would be liable under A21

3.

PNB vs CA

Lessons Applicable: Liability for Torts (Corporate Law)

FACTS:

PNB executed its bond w/ Rita Gueco Tapnio as principal, in favor of the PNB to guarantee the payment of
Tapnio's account with PNB.

Indemnity Agreement w/ 12% int. and 15% atty. fees

Sept 18 1957: PNB sent a letter of demand for Tapnio to pay the reduced amount of 2,379.91

PNB demanded both oral and written but to no avail

Tapnio mortgaged to the bank her lease agreement w/ Jacobo Tuazon for her unused export sugar quota at
P2.80 per picular or a total of P2,800 which was more than the value of the bond

PNB insisted on raising it to P3.00 per picular so Tuazon rejected the offer

ISSUE: W/N PNB should be liable for tort

HELD: YES. affirmed.

While Tapnio had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota

was mortgaged to the bank, it certainly CANNOT escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the
interest of Tapnio and Tuazon, that the degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota
Art. 21 of the Civil Code: any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is

contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
4.

Andamo vs CA

ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of La Salette, Inc)

191 SCRA 195
FERNAN; November 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., a religious corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,
officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of
the Revised Penal Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against respondent corporation. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections
on the land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after
judgment in the related Criminal Case. And later on dismissed the Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The decision was based on
Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
- On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court .
ISSUE

the trial court. A motion for

WON a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within
its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal case
HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of
the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than
this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
Reasoning
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the
plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
by the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence
which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
- In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held
that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of
the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
- While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners
have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures
cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
- Article 2176 1of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence.
- Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or

1 Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.

acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally),
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 2 of the Civil Code. According to the Report of the
Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient
origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an
acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which
case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
5. Barredo vs Garcia
BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942
FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo
- May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia,
16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road and at a high speed
> no proof he exercised diligence of a good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing (selection and
supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding
> CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising
from wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law
- Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against
Fontanilla TF he too cannot be held responsible
ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against Barredo making him primarily liable and directly
responsible under A1903CC as employer of Fontanilla
HELD

2 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia. One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only
subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The
other action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla,
Barredo is held primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of a good father of the family. The
parents simply took the action under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from the employer bec he
has more money to give than Fontanilla who is yet to serve his sentence.
Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include
any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws, infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere preponderance of evidence
- Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly arises presumption of negligence of master or employer
in selection, in supervision or both
2) presumption is juris tantum not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of diligence of a good
father of the family
- basis of civil law liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater familias
- motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
6. Elcano vs Hill
ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977
FACTS
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito
Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it.
ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability was not reversed
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact that at
the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was
already legally married

HELD
1. NO
-The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault or negligence as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject
of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or
negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
"ART 277. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising front negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and
'culpa extra-contractual' or 'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that me preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of
liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility arising
from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and
3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, its "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.

2. YES (but)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch
as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that
pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute . Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person.
It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
- Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents
with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children
in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.
- On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may
not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action.
7. Cinco vs Canonoy
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979
FACTS
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito.
- Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the
final determination of the criminal suit.
- The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioners MFR having been denied, he
elevated the matter on Certiorari to the CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiffs claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the
collision.
- Damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision

- There was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents.
Respondents Comments:
- They observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.
ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action
HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as
specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code.
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases prvided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code
f the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of
the Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property on the other. The word
damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with respect to
harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal
but also to property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.
8.

Dulay vs CA

Facts: An altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang sa
Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, in which Torzuela, a security guard in
the said carnival shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Torzuelas security agency.
Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, widow of the deceased Atty. Dulay filed
an action for damages against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD security agency, which were
impleaded as alternative defendants being the employer/s of Torzuela.
Petitioner Dulay alleged in her complaint that the incident resulting in the death of Atty. Dulay was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants, Torzuelas wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Torzuelas act of shooting was beyond the scope of his
duties and that the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), and therefore, the civil liability is governed by the Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damages based on negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, could not lie, since the civil liability under Art. 2176 applies only to
quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of the RPC. The RTC upheld the arguments of SAFEGUARD. Thus in their appeal,
the Dulays allege that: without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of lawx x xRespondent judge also declared that the complaint was one for
damages founded on crimes punishable under Art.100 &103, RPC as
distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence, the
appeal before the Supreme Court.
distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence, the
appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON, Article 2176 covers only acts of negligence

HELD: No. Contrary to the theory of SAFEGUARD, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176
of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence.
Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also
those which are voluntary and intentional. fault or negligence, under the
article covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
9.

Garcia vs Florido

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing
petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, "without
prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the Chief
of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent,
Ricardo Vayson, for a roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a
conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City.
- At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway at kilometer 21 in
Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25)
with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant,
Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C.
Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents,
owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer
for preliminary attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et. al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had
no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages,
respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan,
Zamboanga del Norte, in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of the aforesaid
criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil
action is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise until after
final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New
Civil Code, is not applicable because Art 33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to
the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and dismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground that since no express
reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of the criminal case would have to be determined
only after the termination of the criminal case
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is not based on quasi-delict since the allegations of the
complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or

regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and
severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained independently from a criminal action. By instituting
a civil action based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to abandon his/her right to press recovery
for damages in the criminal case.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated
either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover
them in the present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be
involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of
a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but
also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal
case has disappeared.
- As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless
of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to . . . Articles 32, 33 and
34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted . . .
and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law,
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under
quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2
of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the
institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case,
petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to
file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil
Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar
him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict.
Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;

d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of
private respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
Reasoning
- The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove
the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and
character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of
the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal
Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence
in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit
when such reservation shall be made.
SEPARATE OPINION
BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from
the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above
civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a
reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the
Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and
is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it
cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the
Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no
showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case
No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to
the bigger one.
10. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
Facts: Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite
scattered in the premises behind its power plant. Fifteen year old
David Taylor is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two years before the incident David spent four months at sea, as a
cabin boy on an interisland transports. Later he took up work in his
father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It appears that he was a boy of more than
average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and
physically than most boys his age.
David, along with Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without permission. While playing,
the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some pieces and
brought them home. In the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl , The two boys made a series of experiments with
the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket

and obtained no result. Next, they tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the caps
with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance
they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed causing injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action
was brought by the plaintiff, through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by plaintiff.
Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of the defendant of leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury. When
the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages for
the injury.
The immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiffs injury, was his own act in putting a match to the
contents of the cap. True, David Taylor may not have known
and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the
contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his
act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger
to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understand the necessity for the exercise of
that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and
immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true
that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and
principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
NOTE for undergraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the original.
11.Tayag vs. Alcantara
98 SCRA 723 (July 23, 1980)
Facts: The Heirs of Tayag filed a complaint for damages against Phil Rabbit Bus lines alleging among others that
Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along McArthur highway on
his way home. He was hit by the bus driven by Villa which caused his death.
Philippine Rabbit filed motion to suspend trial on the ground that criminal case against Villa was still pending. When
Villa was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt,
Philippine Rabbit filed a motion to dismiss the civil case. The heirs opposed alleging that their cause of action is not
based on crime but on quasi-delict. The Judge indeed dismissed the
case, hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Villa in the criminal case will result to the dismissal of the civil case based on
quasi-delict.
Held: No. The acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on
quasi-delict. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides:
When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony,
such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony
in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from
other sources, like quasi delict. In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners'
cause of action was based upon a quasi-delict, to wit:
That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan
in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable and
proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to persons
and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules
and regulation.
That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr.
and damage to his property would not have occurred.
The essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or
negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage
caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or
commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
12. Cruz vs CA
CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997
NATURE

Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.

FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to March 22, 1991,
Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation on March
23, 1991.
- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on the next day at
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very
dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic,
Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.
- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her office and
the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr.
Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About
one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and
the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside
the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and
the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply
with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was
attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the
driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon
as it arrived.
- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her
transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San
Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the
intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives
then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo reoperated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome
Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived,
Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal
wall, the patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.
ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide
HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that
act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the
advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its
realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct
falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that
in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at
bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof
exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such
breach and the resulting death of his patient.
13. YHT Realty Corp vs CA

FACTS: Respondent McLoughlin would always stay at Tropicana Hotel every time he
is here in the Philippines and would rent a safety deposit box. The safety deposit
box could only be opened through the use of 2 keys, one of which is given to the
registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of
the hotel. McLoughlin allegedly placed the following in his safety deposit box 2
envelopes containing US Dollars, one envelope containing Australian Dollars,
Letters, credit cards, bankbooks and a checkbook. On 12 December 1987, before
leaving for a brief trip, McLoughlin took some items from the safety box which
includes the ff: envelope containing Five Thousand US Dollars (US$5,000.00), the
other envelope containing Ten Thousand Australian Dollars (AUS$10,000.00), his
passports and his credit cards. The other items were left in the deposit box. Upon
arrival, he found out that a few dollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was
likewise missing. Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that
Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went
up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she
had stolen McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the
assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole
the key assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep. McLoughlin insisted that
it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez
refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety
deposit box entitled Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box
ISSUE: WON the "Undertaking for the Use of Safety Deposit Box" admittedly
executed by private respondent is null and void.
HELD: YES. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of
public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. The
hotel business like the common carriers business is imbued with public interest.
Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel
guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the
essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be
negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that
ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers on guests for their
signature. In an early case (De Los Santos v. Tan Khey), CA ruled that to hold
hotelkeepers or innkeeper liable for the effects of their guests, it is not necessary
that they be actually delivered tothe innkeepers or their employees. It is enough
that such effects are within the hotel or inn. With greater reason should the liability
of the hotelkeeper be enforced when the missing items are taken without the
guests knowledge and consent from a safety deposit box provided by the hotel
itself, as in this case. Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly
contravene Article 2003, CC for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability
arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any
cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against
Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not

negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. The New Civil Code is
explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to,
the personal property of the guests even if caused by servants or employees of the
keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any
force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may spare the hotel-keeper
from liability. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the act of the thief or
robber was done with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to qualify the
same as force majeure.
14.

Facts: Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanaoc, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega jr., Celestino, Kamlon and 14
Ricardo Does was charged of Grave Coercion. On Feb 1964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte, The petitioners willfully and
feloniously prevented Antonio Vergara and his family from
closing their stall at the Public Market. Petitioners forcibly opened the door of the stall and brutally demolished the stall
using axes then carrying away the goods and merchandise. Such
acts of the petitioners where said to be pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted to 30K for actual damages and
20K for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company also took
advantage of their public position, being the Mayor of the said municipality and the others being policemen. The CFI finds
them guilty. The CA acquitted the accused but ordered them to
pay jointly and severally 9,600 as actual damages.
Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid notwithstanding the acquittal of the accused.
Held: Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged. No separate civil action is
necessary considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal
proceeding. To require a separate civil action would only clod the court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to
be established.
15. People vs. Ligon
152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987)
Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused,
Rogelio Ligon. While waiting for the traffic light to change,
Fernando called a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction was occurring, the traffic
light changed to green, and the car suddenly moved forward.
While the car was moving, Rosales was clinging to the window but lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. The
bystanders rushed Rosales to PGH where he was treated for multiple
physical injuries until his death.
Since Ligon did not stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and sought the assistance of two police officers in an
owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was able
to overtake the car and blocked it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers drew their guns and told them
to alight from the car. They were brought to the police station.
Ligon was then charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. A charge of robbery with homicide was likewise charged
to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an allegation
that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box of the victim. Ligon however was never apprehended after the police released
him, so only Gabat was convicted by the RTC. An appeal was
then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he is free from civil liability, since only
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. In the instant case, a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabats willful act of calling the
victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes
set the chain of events which led to the death of the victim. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the
driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed;
(2) failed to help the victim while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to
the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the drivers act of
speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.
16. Philippine Rabbit

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People

GR No. 147703 (2004)

Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to imprisonment.
The court further ruled that in the event of insolvency of accused, Philippine Rabbit, as its employer, shall be liable for the
civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment
against the accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth
mentioning that Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the
judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
HELD: No. The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the
appeal. In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be
said that the employer was deprived of due process.
It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities of their employees in
the event of the latters insolvency. To allow
employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final
judgment rendered by a competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating
the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with respect to the formers civil liability, but also with as to
its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

17.

Air France vs. Carrascoso

G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966

Facts: Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. Air
France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a white man who, the Manager
alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his first class seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendants
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. A
commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a
hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his
seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly gave his
first class seat in the plane.
Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso P25,000.00 by way of
moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome.
The CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoss
plane ticket.
Issue: WON Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of bad faith, entitling him to the
award of damages.
Held: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg. The
said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok.
The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating
circumstances that defendants Manager in Bangkok
went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to
give the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using
the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a white man whom he (defendants manager) wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proved that this white man had any better
right to occupy the first class seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first
class ticket was issued.
The responsibility of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
Thus, Where a steamship company had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of contract and tort, giving a right
of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to
falsely notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection; though the language used
was not insulting and she was not ejected. Although the relation
of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. And
in another case, Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when
the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and
told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would
pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the
conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioners contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscosos action as we have said, is
placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample to power to grant
exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The
only condition is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first
class seat fits into this legal precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.
18. Fores vs. Miranda

105 Phil 266 (March 4, 1959)

Facts: Miranda was riding a jeepney driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descending Sta. Mesa bridge at high speed, the
driver lost control. It swerved and hit the bridge wall,
resulting to injuries to the passengers and Miranda. Miranda broke some bones in his right arm. The driver was charged
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly. Fores, owner of the jeepney, claimed that one day before the accident, she
sold the vehicle to a certain Sackerman. In the meantime,
Miranda prays for moral damages.
Issues:
Whether or not approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without
conveying therewith the authority to operate the
same.
Whether or not an award for damages is proper.
Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding between the parties, approval of the Public
Service Commission is necessary for such sale, as provided for
1.
2.
by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146).
As to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has been held that moral damages are not recoverable
in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of
transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous cases:
a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
quasi delicts causing physical injuries
ART. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under
the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The
same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not
recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or
bad faith. The mere carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier, as in the case at bar.
In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the lawmakers intended in article 2220 to limit recovery of moral
damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. The fact
that negligence may be so gross as to amount to malice, must be shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is not to be
lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was
breached though negligence of the carriers employees. The award for moral damages is eliminated.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.

38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company. Everyday, he comes by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he works and
he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him to
ride the trains free of charge.
One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing
his feet to slip making him fell violently on the

platform. His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries he had received were
very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the
city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated.
He instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages from the defendant
company. His action is founded upon the negligence of
the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing
to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly
entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of
their servant.
2. Whether Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held: (1) No. Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence
of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised
due diligence in the selection and control of the servant. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company
were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in
the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery
is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the
defendant company and the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate,
differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof
of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
(2) No. it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertinent to the question of
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of
the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the
steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the
platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to
alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him
to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the
train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step, which he was required to take, or the character of the platform where
he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.