Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 1 of 28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

couJi ILED

DISTRICT OF CONNECTIClDm MAR I W; A 8: 23

COMPLAINT

I i.'-;. OISTRICT COW:

. i II E,)

T, C ;.

KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO
Plaintiff
CASE NO.

v.
MARK T. GOULD,
individually and in his official capacity as
Justice of the Superior Court of Fairfield County and
Justice of the Superior Court of New Haven County

MARCH 13, 2013

Defendant
A. PARTIES

1. Plaintiff Kathryn M. Sorrentino is a citizen of Connecticut who presently resides

at 212 Curtis Terrace, Fairfield, Connecticut 06825
2. Defendant Mark T.Gould trial court judge is a citizen of Connecticut who is
presently presiding at New Haven District Superior Court in Connecticut
at 235 Church Street, New Haven, Connecticut 06510.
B. JURISDICTION
Plaintiff claims federal jurisdiction pursuant to Article III Sec. 2 which extends
the jurisdiction to cases arising under the U.S. Consitution.
Plaintiff brings this suit pursuant to Title 42 U.S. Code Sec. 1983 for violations
of certain protections guaranteed to her by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the federal Constituion, by the defendant under color of law in
his capacity as a judge in the Superior Court of Fairfield County.

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 2 of 28

C. NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff asserts that the following facts are documented court records at the
Bridgeport Superior Court in the case of Saverio A. Sorrentino v. Kathryn M.
Sorrentino, Docket No. FBT-FA-06-4015691-S in which the trial court judge,
Mark T. Gould, presided over a a series of hearings from October 15, 2009 to
May 20, 2010, in which he violated Kathryn M. Sorrentino's Constiutional Rights
and incarcerated her.
D. CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM I: THE TRIAL COURT MARK T. GOULD ERREDNIOLATED
KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WHEN HE FAILED: A) TO ADVISE KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO OF HER
RIGHT TO APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND B) FAILED TO APPOINT
COUNSEL IN A CONTEMPT HEARING IN WHICH SHE FACED POTENTIAL
INCARCERATION, AND IN DOING SO VIOLATED HER CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
Plain Error Doctrine.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino relies on the facts as presented above and
supported by the transcript of the October 15, 2009, hearing and the December
15, 2009 hearing to support her assertion that Mark T. Gould's failure to timely
appoint counsel presents extraordinary circumstance as reasoned in State v.
Go/ding, supra 213 Conn. 239, " ... In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved
for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious
that it affects the fairness and integrity of public confidence in the judicial
proceedings."

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 3 of 28

Kathryn M. Sorrentino was denied her Constitutional right to due process

when Mark T. Gould failed to advise Kathryn M. Sorrentino of her right to
appointment of counsel and failed to appoint counsel at the commencement of
the hearing/trial on the motion for contempt. Therefore the first issue of this case
presents the straightforward and relatively simple rule that a defendant can be
put to trial only after the application of his or her due process right to counsel,
and that when the trial court fails to provide said right, all subsequent
ruling/orders are not upheld. Constitutional right to due process guarantees every
accused individual has a right to effective assistance of counsel.
"The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United Sates
Constitution guarantees the right to appointed counsel to any indigent civil
contemnor who might be incarcerated," Ridgeway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413
(5 th Gir. 1983)
1. Kathryn M. Sorrentino's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Counsel
Attaches in her Hearing/Trial on Plaintiff's Motion for Contempt.
"It is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the
special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases,
which triggers the right to appointed counsel." Lassitel}' v. Dept. of Social
ServicesorDurham County, 452 U.S 18(1981). It would be absurd to
distinguish criminal from civil incarceration; from the perspective of the person
incarcerated, the jail is just as bleak no matter what the label used. In addition,
the line between criminal and civil contempt is a fine one, and is rarely as clear
as the state would have us believe.
The right to counsel, as an aspect of due process, turns not on whether a
proceeding may be characterized as "criminal" or "civil", but on whether the
proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty." Ridgeway v. Baker, 720 F.2d
1409, 1413 (.1h Cir. 1983).
"U.S. Supreme Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment grants as
indigent defendant the right to state-appointed counsel in a criminal case."
GIdeon v. Wainwdght, 372 U.S 335 (1963). And the U.S. Supreme Court has
held this same rule applies to criminal contempt proceedings (other than
summary proceedings. " United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S 688 (1993).

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 4 of 28

Although the Sixth Amendment (A 1) does not govern civil cases, both the Fifth
Amendment (A 1) and the Sixth Amendment (A 1) are incorporated into and
thereby enforced by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court have looked to the analysis of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments by the Courts, to establish the process for
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to civil cases, including civil contempt
cases.
The U. S. Supreme Court in Turner v.

131 US 2507(2011) fully

analyzed the application of the constitutional amendments regarding due process

with the State of South Carolina's tradition/law that does not provide counsel for
defendants in a hearing/trial for civil contempt. In the United States Supreme
Court's decision, the trial court's ruling was overturned but not based on South
Carolina's failure to proved counsel. It was overturned because in Turner v.

Rogers, the trial court failed to provide, at a hearing/trial for contempt,

constitutional due process right in accordance to/enforced by state statutory
law/"safeguards" requiring the very literatim of a finding that the contempt
was willful. The United States Supreme Court thus identifying exception to right

to counsel that exists but only if trial court adheres to the statutory structure of a
contempt hearing/trial which mandates that any finding of contempt must be
supported by the fact that the contempt was willful. Allowing no legal support for
judicial "presumption: or "appearance", nor any judicial "discretion" based on
capability. Simply put, the defendant must be shown/proved by the
plaintiff/evidence submitted, to have the ability to comply with an order. Thus

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 5 of 28

having found that the structure of South Carolina's statutory law regarding
contempt hearings provided the equivalent of due process provisions of the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments the U.S. Supreme Court did not address the
constitutionality of the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his right to
the appointment of counsel and its failure to appoint counsel, but rather found
that the trial court failed to uphold the South Carolina law/statutes regarding
contempt hearings/trials.
In the case, Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, Saverio A. Sorrentino failed to
submit any evidence that Kathryn M. Sorrentino had the funds by which she
could pay the arrearage and future monthly mortgage. Therefore, as the record
shows, nowhere do the facts support a finding of contempt for the Kathryn M.
Sorrentino's failure to pay the arrearage/monthly mortgage, and therefore, with or
without the Trial court's statement of decision or articulation thereupon, nothing
on the record supports the Trial Court's (Gould, J.) finding that Kathryn M.
Sorrentino was in willful contempt of court on Saverio A. Sorrentino's motion for
contempt for failure to pay arrearage/mortgage.
"Due process of law requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised
of the charges against him, have reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of
defense or explanation, have the right to be represented by counsel, and have a
chance to testify and call other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense
or explanation ... because the inability of [a party] to obey an order of the trial
court was excusable." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Berglass v. Berglass,
71 Conn. App. 771. 777, 804 A2d 889 (2002).

Emerick v. Emerick 28 Conn. App. 794 (1992) provides much analysis on

the expansion of the right to counsel in the matter of individuals accused of civil
contempt.

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 6 of 28

"The right to counsel is merely a logical extension of the right to counsel

in criminal cases in which an accused is incarcerated." "The court's recognition of
a due process right to counsel in civil contempt cases in which the contemnor
might be imprisoned reflects a judgment that "it is the defendant's interest in
personal freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments'
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to counsel. .. " Mastin v.
Fel/erhoff, supra; Ridgeway v. Baker, supra; "Thus cases discussing the nature
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases are instructive
regarding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in civil cases
in which a litigant might be incarcerated" "The trial court has an obligation to
inform the potential contemnor of his right to appointed counsel to ensure that
any waiver of the right to counsel is intelligent and competent. In re Jessen, 738
F. Sup. 960,963 (WO.N.C. 1990); see Johnson v. Zerbst 304 US
58
S CI.
82 LEd. 1461 (1938); "The constitutional right to an accused to be
represented by counsel invoke, of itself, the protection of a trial court, on which
the accused ... whose life or liberty is at stake ... is without counsel. This protecting
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of
determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver of the accused.
While an accuse may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver
should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and
appropriate for that determination to appear on the record, " Jonson v. Zerbst
supra.
In Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, as in Emerick, the trial court Mark T. Gould did not
advise Kathryn M. Sorrentinio of either her right to be represented by counselor
her right to appointed counsel in the event that she was indigent, and in
Sorrentino, like wise, Judge Mark T. Gould failed to state on the record that he
had eliminated incarceration as a possible penalty in the event that Kathryn M.
Sorrentino was adjudicated in contempt. Thus Mark T. Gould's failure to advise
of right to counsel and then upon finding of indigence to appoint counsel for
Kathryn M. Sorrentino ran afoul of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, as well as, CT. Practice Book Sec. 25-63.
2. Kathryn M.Sorrentino's Right to Counsel Attached at the Commencement of
the HearinglTrial on Saverio A. Sorrentino's Motion for Contempt.

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 7 of 28

Kathryn M. Sorrentino appeared before Mark T. Gould on December 15,

2009 for a hearing on Save rio Sorrentino's motion for contempt (filed September
18,2009, see entry 196.88). Upon being duly sworn in, the two issues of the
motion for contempt were presented Kathryn M. Sorrentino for her testimony a)
the listing of the Curtis Terrace property by Kathryn M. Sorrentino, for which Mark

T. Gould found her not in contempt at the time of the hearing and, b) the payment
of the Curtis Terrace mortgage by Kathryn M. Sorrentino, pursuant to the parties'
settlement agreemenUdivorce decree. The record clearly shows and it is
undisputed that Mark T. Gould did not advise the Kathryn M. Sorrentino of any
right to appointment of counsel, nor was counsel appointed to here at this time.
The United States Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
has determined right to counsel, "Attaches upon commencement of adversarial
judicial proceedings against the defendant. Whether by way of formal charges,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment."

In Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.28 (1978) the U.S. Supreme Court determined
(although in Bretz analyzing the attachment of double jeopardy) Fourteenth
Amendment protections include right to counsel and therefore Bretz is properly
used by the Defendant to support her argument that right to counsel attaches at
the start of a hearing/trial, and not as in the Defendant's case at the tail end of
what turned into a trial spread out over the course of six months. The Crist Court
determined, "The federal rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is
empaneJled and sworn, a rule that reflects and protects the defendant's interest
in retaining a chosen jury, is an integral part of the 5th Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 8 of 28

Amendment. Hence, a Montana statute providing that jeopardy does not attach
until the first witness is sworn cannot constitutionally be applied in a jury triaL"
Here, the Crist Court although addressing the issue of attachment of right to
Fourteenth Amendment/double jeopardy by ruling that attachment of right
precedes the swearing in of witness, allows reasoning of due process violation to
support Defendant's argument that defendant's right to counsel attached [at
least] upon her being sworn in .

3. The Reviewing Court Need Not Determine Whether the Error Was Harmless.
In Emedck, "Where a trial court has failed to inform a defendant of his
constitutional right to appointed counsel, WE WILL NOT ATIEMPT TO
DISCERN WHETHER THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS. SUCH FAILURE IS
REVERSIBLE ERROR. See Johnson v. Zerbst, supra,' In Re Jessen, supra,'
GIdeon v. Waindght, supra (no harmless error analysis where a criminal
defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel). The failure to
advise the defendant properly is fatal not only to the finding of contempt,
but also to the orders related thereto: the order for the payment of counsel
fees arising out of the finding of contempt, the finding that an arrearage
existed and the order to pay the arrearage."
Emenckcontinues, "Finally, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty by
refusing to appoint counsel for the indigent petitioner is high. The courts have
long recognized the importance of a lawyer in protecting the right to liberty. See
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US. supra; the presence of counsel goes to the very
integrity of the fact-finding process. As the Supreme Court has noted:
"Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law ... he lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceeding against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U S 45, 69, 53 SeT. 55, 64,
77 L.Ed 158 (1932).
CLAIM 2: THE TRIAL COURT MARK T. GOULD RULED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION/ERREDNIOLATED THE KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 9 of 28

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN HE FAILED/REFUSED

TO RULE ON THE KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S STATED OBJECTION TO
HEARING ON CONTEMPT MOTION FOR HER FAILURE TO PAY
MORTGAGE AND ARREARAGE AND IN DOING SO OVERRULED THE
KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S OBJECTION TO HEARING ON ISSUE OF
MORTGAGE AND ARREARAGE PAYMENTS.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
Plain Error Doctrine.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino claims plain error doctrine in that Mark T. Gould is
without jurisdiction to refuse to rule on a motion presented. Defendant relies on
CT.G.S.
Sec. 4b-81 (a), where cited in Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285 (1980), it was
reasoned,
" ... the statute that enables the trial court to transfer property in a marital
dissolution action, the court does not retain continuing jurisdiction over any
portion of the judgment that constitutes an assignment of property."
1. Kathryn M. Sorrentinoi Statement Advising Mark T. Gould that the Issue of Her
Payment of the Mortgage for the Marital Property has Been Heard and Ruled
Upon Before by a Court of Competent Jurjsdiction was a Legally Sufficient
Objection to Hearing on Said Issue and Constitutes Preservation of a Claim of
Error and is Therefore Subject to Review by Appeal.
In Lamar Rowe v. Supedor Court; Judicial District ofNew Haven:
"The plaintiff-appellant was found guilty on two counts of contempt of
court. In his writ of error, the plaintiff contended that the second finding of
contempt violated the common law, as well as his constitutional rights to due
process and to protection against
double jeopardy. Before the Trial Court rendered its second finding of contempt,
the attorney for the plaintiff stated the following objection: "I understand that the
likelihood is that the court will find us in contempt, but I think that. .. this question
basically, it's essentially the same fact scenario and it is just rewording the
question, and under the circumstances I would ask the court not to impose a
sentence that is consecutive because its all one set of circumstances that's being
questioned about. .. " The appeal court reasoned, "Although the objection was not
stated artfully ... the plaintiff did assert the narrowest theory of the claim that he
raises in his writ of error-namely that he could not be punished for multiple

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 10 of 28

contempt's ... " Because the trial court appeared to have understood and rejected
this argument, the appeal court found that the plaintiff had preserved the issue of
double jeopardy."
Kathryn M. Sorrentino declared to Mark T. Gould that the issue of the
payment of the mortgage had been heard and ruled upon before by the Trial
Court (Pinkus, J.) and that the Trial Court (Pinkus, J.) had found that Kathryn M.
Sorrentino as not in contempt of court (Transcript: March 26, 2009, pg.16, lines
3, 4, & 5). The Trial Court (Gould, J.) responded by stating, "All right. I
understand what your claims are." (Transcript: December 15, 2009, pg. 22, lines
9 -15). This on top of what transpired at the hearing on October 15, 2009,
wherein Judge Gould referred the issues of the motion for contempt back to
Judge Pinkus, is evidence, on the record, that Judge Gould understood that
issue of the mortgage payments had been heard and ruled upon. Here, like in
Rowe though presented not artfully, Kathryn M. Sorrentino did assert her
objection to the issue of the payment of the mortgage on the grounds that she
had already been found to have not been in contempt for the same charge.
2. Trial Court Mark T. Gould's Failure/Refusal to Rule on Kathryn M. Sorrentino's
Objection to Contempt Hearing on Issue of her payment of Mortgage Was
Denial.
In Ahneman v. Ahneman, 243 Conn. 471 Conn. Supreme Court (1998)
"The trial court's decision not to consider the defendant's motions was the
functional equivalent of a denial of those motions. Like a formal denial, the effect
of the court's decision refusing to consider the defendant's motions during
pendency of the appeal was to foreclose the possibility of relief from the court on
those issues, unless and until the resolution of the appeal required further
proceedings. Indeed, the refusal to consider a motion is more deserving of
appeal review than a formal denial, because the defendant not only has been
denied relief; she has been denied the opportunity even to persuade the trial
court that she is entitled to that relief ... "

10

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 11 of 28

" ... We next consider whether the trial court had the discretion to refuse to
consider the defendant's post judgment motions concerning financial issues. We
consider this issue because it is inextricably linked to the nature of our remand.
Normally, when we conclude that the Appellate Court has improperly failed to
reach an issue concerning a decision by the trial court, we remand the case to
that court for consideration of the merits of that issue. Under our supervisory
powers over proceedings on appeal, however, this court also has the authority to
address the subject of the trial court's decision." See Practice book Sec. 4183;
Matza v. Matza, 226 Conn. 166 (1993).
"... In the present case, our review of the propriety of the trial court's
decision is warranted because a remand to the Appellate Court for review in the
normal fashion would engender significant confusion. On the one hand, we have
characterized the decision of the trial court as the functional equivalent of a
formal denial of the motions at issue here, which suggests that, on remand, the
Appellate Court should perform its function in accordance with its normal scope
of review, see e.g., Crowley v. Crowley 46 Conn. App.
90, 699 A2d 1029
(1997). ("Orders [of trial court in domestic relations cases] will not be reversed
unless its finding have no reasonable basis in fact or it has abused its discretion,
or unless, in the exercise of such discretion, it applies the wrong standard of
law.") "On the other hand, however, because the trial court has not rendered any
factual or legal basis conclusions regarding the defendant's motions, the
Appellate Court cannot perform a review. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion,
we will review the propriety of the trial courts decision ourselves. In addition
invoking our supervisory powers to reach the merits of their claim concerning the
decision of the trial court in this present case "will avoid the necessity of
inordinate further delay. " O'Bymachow v. O'Bymachow, 10 Conn. App
521 A2d 599. "
The CT. Supreme Court having considered the issue decided: "Turning to
the merits, we agree with the defendant's assertion that the trial court's decision
to refuse to consider her motions on financial issues was improper. The simple
reason for that conclusion is that the trial court lacked the authority to refuse to
consider the defendant's motions."
CLAIM 3: TRIAL COURT JUDGE MARK T. GOULD ERRED/RULED WITHOUT
JURISDICTIONNIOLATED KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT HELD JURISDICTION OVER RULED ON
AN ISSUE THAT WAS ALREADY HEARD AND RULED UPON BY A COURT
OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Plain Error Doctrine.

11

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 12 of 28

Kathryn M. Sorrentino relies on the plain error doctrine. Kathryn M.

Sorrentino relies on the facts as presented above and supported by the transcript
of the October 15, 2009, hearing and the December 15, 2009 hearing to support
her assertion that Mark T. Gould's refusal to hear and thereby over-ruling her
objection constitutes a violation of her due process rights thereby presenting
extraordinary circumstance as reasoned in State v. Golding, supra 213 Conn.
239, " ... In addition, the plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary
situations where the existence of the error is so obvious that it affects the
fairness and integrity of public confidence in the judicial proceedings."
Additionally, in Golding, " ... under second prong of the analysis we must
determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be
fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust.. .only if both prongs of the analysis are
satisfied can the appealing party obtain relief."
1. Kathryn M. Sorrentino is Entitled to Claim the Fourteenth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino appeared before the Trial Court Judge Mark T.
Gould on October 15, 2009 in a hearing on Saverio A. Sorrentino's motion for
contempt (filed September 18, 2009). Judge Gould heard the issue of the listing
of the property at 212 Curtis Terrace and upon attempting to consider the issue
of the claim that Kathryn M. Sorrentino failed to pay the mortgage for same, she
stated (Transcript: 11/15/2009, P9. 5, lines 20-27, and P9. 6, lines 1-5) that the
issue regarding the payment of the mortgage had already been heard by Judge
Pinkus and he had ruled that she was not in contempt. Judge Gould referred
Saverio A. Sorrentino's motion for contempt back to Judge Pinkus. A hearing

12

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 13 of 28

ensued on November 12, 2009, attended Saverio A. Sorrentino where the sole
issue presented was the listing of the property at 212 Curtis Terrace. Kathryn M.
Sorrentino was not present and because the motion was not in the file, Judge
Pinkus refused to hear the motion. Scheduled for December 15, 2009, for a
hearing on Save rio A. Sorrentino's motion for contempt (filed September 18,
2009).
Upon being duly sworn in, the two issues of the motion for contempt were
presented to Kathryn M. Sorrentino for her testimony a) the listing of the property
by Kathryn M. Sorrentino, for which the Trial Court Judge Mark T. Gould found
Kathryn M. Sorrentino not in contempt and, b) the payment of the Curtis Terrace
mortgage by Kathryn M. Sorrentino, pursuant to the parties' settlement
agreement/divorce decree (DS-131 and 143. Kathryn M. Sorrentino on the record
(Transcript 12/15/2009, pg. 22, lines 9-15) advised the Court that the issues of
Saverio A. Sorrentino's motion for contempt were already heard AND RULED
ON by the Court (Pinkus, J.) Transcript March 26, 2009, P9.1, lines 3,4&5}.
Kathryn M. Sorrentio's argument is well proved in the reasoning and decisions of
the United States Supreme Court.
In Smalis v. Pennsyvania, 47 U.S. 140 (1986) the Court reasoned:
" ... Whether the trail is to a jury or, to the bench, subjecting the defendant to post
acquittal fact finding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates Double
jeopardy Clause." "The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense ... through out most of
our history, this clause was binding only against the Federal Government. In
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), the Court rejected an argument that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all the provisions of the first eight
Amendments as limitation on the States and enunciated the due process theory
under which most of those Amendments do now apply to the States. Some
guarantees in the Bill of Rights, Justice Cardozo wrote, were so fundamental

13

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 14 of 28

they are "of the very essence of the scheme of ordered liberty" and neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. But the double jeopardy clause,
like many other procedural rights of defendants, was not so fundamental; it could
be absent and fair trials could still be had. Of course, a defendant's due process
rights, absent double jeopardy consideration per se, might be violated if the State
"created a hardship so acute and shocking as to be unendurable," but that was
not the case in Palko. In Benton v. Maryland 395 US. 784, 794-95 (1969),
however, the Court concluded "that the double jeopardy prohibition ... represents
a fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage ... once it is decided that a
particular Bill of Right guarantee is "fundamental to the American scheme of
justice," '" "the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and
the Federal Governments." Therefore, the double jeopardy limitation now applies
to both federal and state governments and state rules on double jeopardy, with
regard to such matters as when jeopardy attaches, must be considered in the
light of federal standards.
"In doctrine of Benton v. Maryland, 395 US. 784, puts the issues in the
present case in a perspective quite different from that which the issues were
perceived in Hoag v. New Jersey, Supra. The question is no longer whether
collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is part of the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy, and if collateral estoppel
is embodied in that guarantee, then it's applicability in a particular case is no long
a matter to be left for a state court determination within the broad [397 U.S.436,
443] bounds of "fundamental fairness, 'but a matter of constitutional fact we must
decide through an examination of the entire record. Cf. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 US. 254, 285, 728-729d; Nemotko v. Maryland, 340 US 268, 271,
327; "Collateral estoppel is an awkward phrase, but it stands for an extremely
important principle in our adversary system of justice. It means simply that when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment,
that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.
'Although first developed in civil litigation, collateral estoppel has been an
established rule of federal criminal aw at least since this Court's decision more
than 50 years ago in United States II: Oppenhiemer, 242 U W 85 As Mr. Justice
Holmes put the matter in that case. "It cannot e that the safeguards of the
person, so often and so rightly mentioned with solemn reverence, are less than
those that protect from liability in debt. '242 US, at 87, 37 S, Ct. at 69.7. As a
rule of federal law, therefore, '(I) t is much too late to suggest that this principle is
not fully applicable to a former judgment in a criminal case, either because of
lack of 'mutuality' or because the judgment may reflect only a belief that the
Government had not met the higher burden of proof exacted in such cases for
the Government's evidence as a whole although not necessarily as to every link
in the chain.' United States II: Kramer, 289 F. 2d 909, 913. The ultimate question
to be determined, then, in the light of Benton II: Maty/and, supra, is whether this
established rule of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else

14

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 15 of 28

that
US
446] constitutional guarantee may embrace. North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U S 711, 71 2076, it surely protects a man who had been
acquittal from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." Green v. United States,
355 US
190, 225.0
Kathryn M. Sorrentino's Double jeopardy Clause claim is further supported
in People v. Arnold 174 Mis c.2d

18 NY 52d 753 (1997), where in pertinent

part it states, "Double Jeopardy in civil proceeding does not apply unless
contempt which carries possibility of penalty that includes probation and
incarceration-this includes Family Court. Possibility of probation and
incarceration means jeopardy attaches."

CLAIM 4: TRIAL COURT JUDGE MARK T. GOULD ERRED/ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO IN CONTEMPT
FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE ARREARAGE AND MONTHLY PAYMENTS OF
THE MORTGAGE OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As cited in Behms v. Behms, 80 Conn. App.
289, 835 A2d 68 (2003).
"A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to
determine whether the court abused its discretion in failing to find that the actions
or inactions of the [party] were in contempt of a court order. To constitute
contempt, a party's conduct must be willfuL .. Noncompliance alone will not
support a judgment of contempt." (Internal quotation marks omitted).
1. Finding of Contempt Must be Willful:
On record with the Court are Kathryn M. Sorrentino's affidavits wherein
Kathryn M. Sorrentino lists her income. Kathryn M. Sorrentino's income is solely
derived from payments made to her by Save rio A. Sorrentino from court ordered
child support and alimony. On record with the Court are the modifications by
Judge Pinkus (Transcript: January 24, 2008, pg. 17, 18, 19) reducing the amount
from $1,000.00 to $405.00 with Saverio A. Sorrentino ordered to pay the

15

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 16 of 28

mortgage, and_again (Transcript 2/23/2009), changing the amount to $473.00, in

unallocated alimony to be received by Kathryn M. Sorrentino from Saverio A.
Sorrentino. It is therefore undisputed that Kathryn M. Sorrentino was not
receiving $1,000.00 per week but less than $473.00 weekly which is why Saverio
A. Sorrentino had contempt citations from Child Support Enforcement for failure
to pay child support and alimony (See: entries 145, 168 & 198) and Kathryn M.
Sorrentino was not receiving $1,000.00 per week by which she would be required
per the parties settlement agreement to pay the mortgage for the marital
property.
At no time did Saverio A. Sorrentino claim or produce evidence that the
Kathryn M. Sorrentino had additional funds from which she would be able to pay
the purported $45,000.00-$48,000.00 arrearage or the purported $2,900 .00
monthly mortgage payments. Therefore, there was no evidence before the Trial
Court Judge Mark T. Gould upon which he could have found Kathryn M.
Sorrentino had the funds to comply with the order to pay arrearage/monthly
mortgage payments.
Connecticut case law, and the CT. Practice Book adheres to established law that
a finding of contempt must prove with evidence on the record that the contempt
was wi"ful.
"It is elementary law of a finding of contempt that "a parties conduct MUST BE
WILLFUL". Ford v. Ford 52 Conn. App. 522, 529, 727, A. 2d 254 (1999). "Noncompliance ALONE wi" not support a judgment of contempt" /ss/er v. /ss/er 50
Conn. Ap. 58, 64, 716 A. 2d 938 (1988). Failure to comply with court order must
be wi"ful." Connolly v. Connolly, 191 Conn. 468. 483, 464 A.2d 837 (1983) a
charge of non-compliance must be supported by fact. Finding of contempt is a
question of fact: State v. Jackson, 147 Conn. 167, 170, 158A.2d166(1960);

16

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 17 of 28

"IMPLICATION AND CONJECTURE barred when considering contempt appeal."

Id 460.
JJ

Kathryn M. Sorrentino's failure to pay mortgage as per settlement

agreement/divorce decree is due to Save rio A. Sorrentino's breach of settlement
agreement/divorce decree regarding monies that were to be paid to Kathryn M.
Sorrentino. Saverio A. Sorrentino has, via court order, modified amount of money
paid to Kathryn M. Sorrentino does not remove her dependency on sum total of
settlement agreement/divorce decree, but rather it shows that Saverio A.
Sorrentino is responsible for Kathryn M. Sorrentino's inability to pay mortgage,
and that through no fault of her own has been unable to adhere to settlement
agreement/divorce decree and that Kathryn M. Sorrentino's failure to adhere to
settlement agreement/divorce decree IS NOT WILLFUL.
" ... the contemnor, through no fault of his own, was unable to obey the court's
order."

Tobey v. Tobey 165 Conn. 742, 746,

A. 2d 21 (1974)

The Trial Court (Pinkus J.) found as much at the contempt hearing stating
(to the
Plaintiff), " ... 1don't have the tools to fix your problems. I don't have the tools, [to]
have you go back to what you may heave been, earned at one time, get the
houses valued at what they were at one time, and sold. I don't have the ability to
L can't find that
do that." ... "For the record your motion for contempt is
there is any willful violation of a court order." (Transcript: 3/2/2009, P9. 15, lines
5-10 and P9, 1, lines 3-5) See: Schedule 8 (t) ,
CLAIM 5: THE TRIAL COURT MARK T. GOULD ERREDNIOLATED
KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT HELD JURISDICTION ON AN ISSUE INVOLVING A MARITAL
ASSET ALREADY DISPOSED OF AT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE
MARRIAGE AND WHEN HE ORDERED KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO TO
TRANSFER (QUITCLAIM) PROPERTY TO SAVERIO A. SORRENTINO
PREVIOUSLY DISPOSED IN THE DIVORCE DECREE.

17

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 18 of 28

STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Plain Error Doctrine.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino relies on the plain error doctrine. Asserting that Mark T.
Gould erred/violated her due process rights when he held jurisdiction on a marital
asset that was disposed at the time of the parties divorce. For that issue Kathryn
M. Sorrentino believes review is plenary and must be decided by the application
of correcUlegallaws governing the issue.
"Appellate review under the clearly erroneous standard is a two-prong
inquiry. "[W] e first determine whether there is evidence to support the finding. If
not, the finding is clearly erroneous. Even if there is evidence to support it,
however, a finding is clearly erroneous if in view of the evidence and pleadings in
the whole record {this court} is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. "Buddenhagen v.
10 Conn. 41 (1987),
quoling Doyle v. Kulesza, 197, Conn. 101 (1985)."
"The courts judgment in an action for dissolution of a marriage is final and
binding upon the parties, where no appeal is taken there from, unless and to the
extent that the statutes, in common law or rules of court permit the setting aside
or modification of the judgment." Bunche v. Bunche, 180 Conn. 285.
On May 27,2007, the Kathryn M. Sorrentino and Saverio A. Sorrentino
signed a settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree on
November 29, 2007. Stipulated therein the disposition of the marital property.
The Trial Court, Judge Gould, at a hearing on April 7, 2010, ordered Kathryn M.
Sorrentino to quitclaim her portion of property to Saverio A. Sorrentino, property
that had already been disposed of in a settlement agreemenUdivorce decree.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino claims that in so ordering, Mark T. Gould violated her due
process rights which resulted in Kathryn M. Sorrentino's incarceration (May 10,
2010) for refusing to sign quitclaim and loss of property rights protected by
Fourteenth Amendment.

18

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 19 of 28

1. Trial Court Judge Mark T. Gould had no Jurisdiction Over the Issue of the
Marital Assets (Property Divisiont
"The agreement was ordered incorporated ... into the dissolution decree. A
judgment rendered in accordance with such a stipulation of the parties is to be
regarded and construed as a contract." (Internal quotation marks omitted) .
Issler v. IssIe!; 250 Conn. 22fi 234-34 737 A.2d 383 (1999). See also Miha/yak
v. Mtha/yak, supra 30 Conn. App., 522 (Judgment that incorporates
separation agreement to be regarded as contract and construed pursuant
to contract law)."[I] nterpretation of an agreement is a search for the intent of
the parties." Lavigne v. Lavigne, supra, 427-29. "A judgment rendered in
accordance with the stipulation of the parties is to be construed and regarded as
a binding contract. Caracansi v. Caracansi. 4 Conn. App. 645. 650. 496 A. 2d
225. celt denied. i97 Conn. 805. 499 A. 2d 56 (1985). "Construction of such
agreement is an issue of fact to be resolved by the trial court as the trier of fact,
and subject to our review under the clearly erroneous standard. See Lavigne v
Lavigne. 3 Conn. App. 423 (1985)"
It is not disputed that the parties settlement agreement was incorporated into the
dissolution judgment.
Therefore, as In Pasquariello v. Pasquariello. 168 Conn. 579. 584. 362.
A2d 835 (1975). "The ultimate issue for this court is whether the trial court, could
have concluded as it did." "Accordingly, [o]ur resolution of the [Plaintiff's] claim is

gUided by the gO-neral principles governing the construction of

contracts" A contraot must be construed to effectuate the Intent
of the parties. which is determined from the language used interpreted in the
light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the
transaction." (Internal quotation markes omitted). Issler v. Issler, supra. 250
Conn. 235
In Passamano v. Passamano, 228 Conn. 85 CT Supreme Coun (1993)
"Under CT. General Statues Sec. 4b-81 (a), the statute that enables the trial
court to transfer property in a marital dissolution action, the court does not retain
continuing jurisdiction over any portion of the judgment that constitutes an
assignment of property, Bunch v.

180 Conn. 284

429 A 2d 874

(1980). Therefore, a property division order generally cannot be modified by the

trial court after the dissolution decree is entered, subject only to being opened

19

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 20 of 28

within four months from the date the judgment is rendered under General Statues
Sc. 52-212a. The trial court does retain continuing jurisdiction to modify or
terminate alimony and child support orders, unless the orders are based on a
stipulated agreement that expressly bars future modification. General Statues
Sec. 46b-86; Bernard v. Bernard, 214 Conn. 99(1990).
"Although the court has jurisdiction to assign property in connection with
46b-81, that assignment is not modifiable. See Taylor II. Taylor, 57 Conn. App.
528, 533, 752 A. 2d1113 (2000). Moreover, "property distributions .. .cannot be
modified to alleviate hardships that may result from enforcement of the original
dissolution decree in the face of changes in the situation of either party." (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons, 244 Conn.158, 183-84, 708 A.
2d 949 (1998).
"Because the original decree required the plaintiff to pay the defendant for her
interest in the property prior to July 23, 1998, and he has not made a single
payment "noncompliance on the part of the parties made strict adherence to the
terms of the [decree] impossible." Niles v. Ni/es, 9 Conn. App. 240, 245-4, 518
A. 2d 932 (1986)"
It's undisputed that the issue of the Parties marital property was disposed
at the time of the dissolution of the marriage (See: settlement agreement,
paragraph 2 (a, b, c, and d) Therefore the Trial Court Judge Mark T. Gould had
no jurisdiction to essentially order a modification of said agreement. For that
reason Mark T. Gould's order should be reversed.

CLAIM 6: THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE MARK T. GOULD ERRED/ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF
CIRCUMSTANCE WHEN ISSUING AN ORDER TO MODIFY THE PARTIES
SETTELEMENT AGREEMENT/DIVORCE DECREE.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Kathryn M. Sorrentino believes review is plenary and must be decided by
the application of correct/legal laws governing the issue.

20

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 21 of 28

In Borkowski v. Borkowski, 228 Conn. 729, 738,38 A. 2d 100 (1994), "The

CT. Supreme Court explained that the power of the trial court to modify an
existing order does not include the power to retry issues already decided. Thus
the court's inquiry "is necessarily confined to a comparison between the current
conditions and the last court order." The court continued: "Applicable to
dissolution actions .. .is the principle that and adjudication by a court
having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties is final and
conclusive not only as to matters actually determined, but as to matters
which the parties might have litigated as incident thereto and coming
within the legitimate purview of the subject matter of the action". Id.,

39.
1. Modrtication of Settlement Agreement Must be Supported by SUbstantial
Change of Circumstance.
In Grino/d v.
172, Conn. 192 (197) the plaintiff was estopped from
seeking a modification of the parties' settlement agreement, the trial court found
that the plaintiff failed to establish by the evidence a "substantial change in
circumstances. "The short answer to this is that our law permits modification of
support obligations when circumstances of the parties change. Turner v. Turner.
219 Conn. 703 (1991).
CLAIM 7: THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE MARK T. GOULD ERRED/ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND THAT KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO HAD
"APPARENTLY AGREED" TO THE FORMULATED PLAN FOR PURGE
SUBMITTED TO THE COURT.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW:
Kathryn M. Sorrentino believes review is plenary and must be decided by
the application of correct/legal laws governing the issue.
1. Kathryn M. Sorrentino Did Not Agree To The Formulated Plan And
Therefore Mark T. Gould Had No Authority To Order The Plan Into his
Judgment.
The facts of this case clearly show, evidenced above and in transcripts,
that Kathryn M. Sorrentino refused to sign the quitclaim, which was part of the
formulated plan devised submitted for the purge by Saverio A. Sorrentino,
because inter alia, it was a conflict of the parties court ordered settlement
agreement, wherein it was stipulated that marital properties would be sold and all

21

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 22 of 28

debt listed on the parties affidavits would be paid from the proceeds of the sale.
The Mark T. Gould stated in his articulation that there was "apparently an
agreement." Kathryn M. Sorrentino asserts that there is nothing on record to
support that finding.
"An Agreement unwritten means nothing; but rather intentlactions/admittings, of
the parties." Nanni v. Dina Corporation 117 Conn. App. 1 (2009).

Here, the

record (Transcript: May 7, 2010 and April 7, 2010) clearly shows that at no time
did Kathryn M. Sorrentino agree to the formulated plan, expressly, at no time did
Kathryn M. Sorrentino agree to quitclaim her property. As on record, and as
presented above, Mark T. Gould's colloquy with Kathryn M. Sorrentino shows a
clear declaration by Kathryn M. Sorrentino that it was not her plan and that she
did not fully understand it. Additionally, the formulated plan when reduced to
writing as ordered by Judge Gould, was not signed by Kathryn M. Sorrentino, as
asserted by her court appointed attorney and ultimately she was incarcerated for
refusing to sign "the plan," which apparently had been reduced sua sponte by
Judge Gould to a single stipulation/oral order to quitclaim her portion of the
marital property in Newtown to Saverio A. Sorrentino. Here, it could be
reasonably argued that, on top of it all, Kathryn M. Sorrentino refusal to sign
quitclaim was justified under the Transparently Invalid Order exception.
In re: Providence Journal Company, 809 F.2d 63 (1st cir.1986), the court
addressed an order entered by a court clearly without jurisdiction,
" .. . Nonetheless, court orders are not sacrosanct. An order entered by a court
clearly without jurisdiction over the contemnors or the subject matter is not
protected by the collateral bar rule. Were this not the case, a court could wield
power over parties or matters obviously not within its authority-a concept
inconsistent with the notion that the judiciary may exercise only those powers
entrusted by law."

22

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 23 of 28

CLAIM 8: APPEAL: THE TRIAL COURT MARK T. GOULD

VIOLATED KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN HE FAILED/REFUSED TO
HEAR AND RULE UPON THE MOTIONS SHE FILED.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
Plain Error Doctrine
Abuse of Discretion
Mark T.

to hear and rule upon the motions filed by Kathryn

M. Sorrentino and thereby violated her right to a speedy trial as provided for her
in the sixth amendment of the United States Constiution.
The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constituion proveds that "(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy triaL .. " The Clause protects the defendant from delay
between the presentation of the indictment or similar charging intrument and the
beginning of trial.
In Barker v. Wingo (1972), the Supreme Court developed a four-part test
that considers the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and the prejudice to the defendant. A
violation of the Speedy Trial Clause is cause for dismissal with prejudice of a
criminal case.
"The abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court's decision on a motion
for contempt. Sablowsky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn. 713, 721, 784 A.2d 890 (2001) .
The facts of this case, however, present to question of whether a trial court has
the discretion to refuse to consider a party's motion for contempt. We have
already squarely addressed this issue, concluding that, in the absence of "an
extreme, compelling situation, "a trial court that has jurisdiction over an action
lacks authority to refuse to consider a litigant's motions." Ramin v. Ramin, 281
Conn. 324 (2007)

23

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 24 of 28

Connecticut Practice Book Sec. 11-19

February 2010 to September 2010 the trial court judge Mark T. Gould) failed to
hear and rule upon the properly filed and served motions of Kathryn Sorrentino
(with the exception of denying her motions for articulations and stay concerning
her appeal). Most importantly, two Motions (OS-206.80 and OS-227.50) should
have been heard because they directly related to the eight-month, on going
hearing. Motions OS-206.80 and OS-227.50 are Motions For Contempt for
Saverio A. Sorrentino's failure to pay the mortgage on the property located at 27
Plumtrees Road, Newtown, Connecticut. Wherein they: a) counter Save rio A.
Sorrentino's Motion for Contempt alleging Kathryn M. Sorrentino's failure to pay
the mortgage on their property in Fairfield, Connecticut, thus giving credence to
Kathryn M. Sorrentino's claim that Saverio A. Sorrentio's claim is equitably
estopped. This illustrates the legal maxim: IIhe who seeks equity, must do
equity.1I And, b) it would have shown the evidence that proved Kathryn M.
Sorrentino was not responsible for paying the mortgage unless she received
$1,000.00 weekly from the Save rio A. Sorrentino (See transcript dated January
24,2008, pg. 4, lines 10-14) in which he swears under oath: "I had a-the
plaintiff had a $1,000.00 per week obligation, and the defendant was supposed,
out of that, pay the mortgage." The facts and transcripts prove that Judge Gould
had Kathryn M. Sorrentio's Motion (206.80 and later re-filed as 227.50) in front of
him at several hearings and failedl refused to hear and rule upon them.
According to Ramin v. Ramin, 281 Conn. 324 (2007), Mark T. Gould lacked the
authority to do so. And according to the Connecticut Practice Book Sec. 11-19

24

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 25 of 28

(A 12) Judge Mark T. Gould had a time limit for deciding short calendar matters.
He "took papers" for Defendant's Motion for Clarification (214) twice from the
short calendar and did not rule on it. Mark T. Gould left the Bridgeport Court
house in September 2010 without hearing or ruling on Kathryn M. Sorrentino's
motions.
Settled law dictates that Judge Gould lacked the authority to not hear and
rule Kathryn M. Sorrentino's motions (See FBT FA-06-4015691-S docket entry
numbers: 203.89, 206.80, 214, 227.50 and 250).

"Atty. McGuiness: Briefly, it came to my attention through my client that

there were other certain motions down, not that I'm involved in any of this.
The Court: Mm-hmm.
Atty. McGuiness: I was court-appointed specifically for the motion for
contempt.
Atty. McGuiness: But there are other outstanding motions that she has that
she wanted to be heard on. I know the Court doesn't have time today but I
don't know what the Court - the plan was, because she has a number of
motions of contempt that pretty much dovetailThe Court: I understand that. Atty. McGuiness-the motion that the Court's
hearing now.
The Court: ... 1will have a report-back date of next Monday, and at that
time when we have the report-back date we will take care of the other
outstanding motions." (Transcript date: May 10, 2010, pg. 14, lines 1-25).
Mark T. Gould court failed to hear Kathryn M. Sorrentino's motions on the
next Monday as promised and thus violated her right to a speedy trial as
provided for her in the sixth amendment of the federal Constitution (See
Transcript date: May 17, 2010).
CLAIM 9: THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE MARK T. GOULD ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION/ERRED WHEN IT RULED THA T KATHRYN M. SORRENTINO
HAD THE ABILITY TO PAY THE MORTGAGE AND A $50,000.00
ARREARAGE BASED ON HER "GOOD HEALTH, INTELLIGENCE, AND
BACKGROUND IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING."
STANDARD FOR REVIEW

25

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 26 of 28

Plain Error Doctrine

Mark T. Gould failed to find a "substantial change in circumstances" as
required by Connecticut General Statutes 46b-86 et seq.
Kathryn M. Sorrentino asserts that the Trial Court Judge Mark T. Gould
abused its discretion when it determined she had an ability to pay/earning
capacity with which she should have paid the monthly mortgage and a
$50,000.00 arrearage. Mark T. Gould's Response to Order for Articulation filed
10/29/2011, Ordered sua sponte, states his reason for finding Kathryn M.
Sorrentino in contempt for failure to the mortgage and arrearage: The court
" ... found that the defendant, in good health, intelligent and with a background in
education and teaching, had an ability to make payments under a plan as
requested by the plaintiff.. ." The transcripts of December 15, 2010 show that
Saverio A. Sorrentino presented no evidence to Mark T. Gould or otherwise to
support the Court's finding. Kathryn M. Sorrentino's own testimony that was
accepted by Mark T. Gould indicated that she had never been a teacher, nor
does she hold a teaching certificate, nor does she have a background in
education, nor had she worked in 18 years. Mark T. Gould accepted Kathryn M.
Sorrentino's testimony: "I have not ordered a payment schedule for you because
of your testimony and your indication that you have not worked and do not have
a job ... " (Transcript pg. 12, lines 3-5). The Trial Court (Gould, J.) abused its
discretion when it ruled on the Kathryn M. Sorrentino's ability to pay/earning
capacity when the Court has on record multiple financial affidavits of Kathryn M.
Sorrentino filed with both the Superior Court and the Magistrate Court proving

26

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 27 of 28

her to be indigent due to being a displaced homemaker of 18 years and solely

reliant on child support and alimony from Saverio A. Sorrentino.

E. OTHER LAWSUITS
The Plaintiff has no other lawsuits in statae or federal court dealing with
the same facts involved in this action.

F. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Wherefore Plaintiff prays this Court issue equitable relief as follows:
1. Issue injunctive relief commanding Defendant to reverse his Order.
2. Issue declaratory relief as this Court deems appropriate and just.
3. Issue other relief as this Court deems appropriate and just.
4. Award Plaintiff her costs of litigation.

G. JURY DEMAND
The Plaintiff requests a jury trial.
Respectfully submitted,

v,Suf\NVV\J

Kathryn M.Sorrentino, Pro se

212 Curtis Terrace
Fairfield , CT 06825
Tel: 203400-3712
Email: kathrynsoren.O@gmail.com

27

Case 3:13-cv-00346-WWE Document 1 Filed 03/14/13 Page 28 of 28

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that she is the plaintiff
in the above action, that she has read the above complaint and that the
inofmration contained in the complaint is true and correct. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746;
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621.
Executed at 915 Lafayette Boulevard, Bridgeport, Connecticut on March 13,
2013.

Kathryn M. Sorrentino

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was mailed this date
postage prepaid to:

MARK T. GOULD, Judge

235 Church Street
New Haven, CT
203 503-6800

80f\.MMJ

Kathryn M. Sorrentino, Pro se

212 Curtis Terrace
Fairfield, CT 06825
Tel: 203400-3712
E-mail: kathrynsoren.O@gmail.com

28