LOLITA ARTEZUELA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

For his failure to meet the exacting standards of professional ethics, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in its Resolution of May 2, 2000 recommended the
suspension from the practice of law of respondent Atty. Ricarte B. Maderazo for the period of six
(6) months, with a stern warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent allegedly represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[1]
By way of a Motion for Reconsideration, [2] respondent now comes before this Court to
challenge the basis of the IBPs resolution, and prays for its reversal.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows: On or about 3:00 in the early morning of
December 24, 1992, Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident at Caduman St., corner H. Abellana St.,
Mandaue City. At the time of the accident, Echavia was driving a Ford Telstar car owned by a
Japanese national named Hirometsi Kiyami, but was registered in the name of his brother-in-law,
Jun Anthony Villapez. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela.[3]
The destruction of the complainants carinderia caused the cessation of the operation of her
small business, resulting to her financial dislocation. She incurred debts from her relatives and due
to financial constraints, stopped sending her two children to college. [4]
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia,
Villapez and one Bernardo Sia.[5] Docketed as Civil Case No. 13666, the case was assigned to
Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. An Amended Complaint was thereafter filed,
impleading Echavia, Kiyami and Villapez, and dropping Sia as a party-defendant. [6] For his services,
complainant paid the respondent the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10, 000.00) as attorneys
fees and Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as filing fee.[7] However, the case was dismissed on
March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of the complainant and her husband. [8]
Because of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, complainant filed a civil case for damages
against the respondent. It was docketed as CEB-18552 and assigned to Branch 57, Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City. The case was dismissed on June 12, 2001. [9]
On November 24, 1994, Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for disbarment
against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and

failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when Civil Case No.
13666 was scheduled for pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, respondent asked for its
postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainants persistent and
repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as
counsel without obtaining complainants consent. [10]
Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While
acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said
document was even printed in respondents office. Complainant further averred that it was
respondent who sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the
dismissal was with her consent.[11]
Respondent denied the complainants allegations and averred that he conscientiously did his
part as the complainants lawyer in Civil Case No. 13666. He withdrew as counsel because the
complainant was uncooperative and refused to confer with him. He also gave several notices to the
complainant and made known his intention before he filed his Manifestation to withdraw as
counsel. Because of the severed relationship, the lower court, after holding a conference, decided to
grant respondents manifestation and advised the complainant to secure the services of a new
lawyer. Complainant, however, refused and instead, sought the dismissal of the case. [12]
Respondent alleged that he sought the postponement of the Pre-Trial Conference scheduled on
August 20, 1993 so that he could file the Amended Complaint. He admitted that Echavias Answer
to the Amended Complaint was printed in his office but denied having prepared the document and
having acted as counsel of Echavia. He claimed that complainant requested him to prepare
Echavias Answer but he declined. Echavia, however, went back to his office and asked
respondents secretary to print the document. Respondent intimated that the complainant and
Echavia have fabricated the accusations against him to compel him to pay the amount
of P500,000.00.[13]
This Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBPVisayas Regional Committee on Bar Discipline formed an Investigating Committee to hear the
disbarment complaint.
On October 6, 1999, Commissioner Gabriel T. Ingles issued a Report finding the respondent
guilty of representing conflicting interests, in violation of Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as, of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. He
recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year.[14]Commissioner Ingles did not rule on the other issues.
As aforesaid, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upheld the
findings of the Committee with modification only as to the penalty.

Seeking reconsideration of the IBPs resolution, respondent contends that the Investigating
Committee did not conduct trial; hence, he was not able to confront and examine the witnesses
against him. He argues that the Investigating Committees finding that he represented Echavia is
contrary to court records and the complainants own testimony in CEB-18552. He also casts doubt
on the credibility of the Investigating Committee to render just and fair recommendations
considering that the Investigating Commissioner and the respondent are counsel-adversaries in
another case, Civil Case No. R-33277. Finally, he questions the imposition of a six-month
suspension, which he claims to be harsh considering that his private practice is his only source of
income.[15]
After carefully examining the records, as well as the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, this Court is inclined to uphold the IBPs resolution.
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when
there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. [16] Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their arguments.[17]
In the case at bar, records show that respondent repeatedly sought the postponement of the
hearings, prompting the Investigating Commissioner to receive complainants evidence ex
parte and to set the case for resolution after the parties have submitted their respective
memorandum. Hence:
The records show that this is already the third postponement filed by respondent namely
December 12, 1996 (sic), January 3, 1996 and April 1, 1996.
The Commission for the last time, will cancel todays hearing and can no longer tolerate any further
postponement. Notify respondent by telegram for the hearing for (sic) April 22, 1996 at 2:00 P.M.
Said hearing is intransferable in character.
In the meantime, complainant affirmed her complaint and likewise her witness, Allan Echavia, also
affirmed the contents of his affidavit and further stated that he had executed the same and
understood the contents thereof.[18]
It is by his own negligence that the respondent was deemed to have waived his right to crossexamine the complainant and her witness. He cannot belatedly ask this Court to grant new trial
after he has squandered his opportunity to exercise his right.
Respondents contention that the finding of the Investigating Committee was contrary to the
records and the complainants own admission in CEB-18552 is without merit. It is true that Atty.

Aviola was Echavias counsel-of-record in Civil Case No. 13666 as evidenced by the certification
from the clerk of court,[19] and as admitted by the complainant in CEB-18552, viz:
ATTY. MADERAZO: (To witness- ON CROSS)
Q:

Madam witness, you mentioned that the defendant in this case was the counsel of Allan Echavia as early as
August 20, 1993, wherein you learned for the first time of this fact when you say he is counsel of Allan
Echavia. (sic) You mean he is the counsel of record of Allan Echavia in the Civil Case before Judge Dacudao? Is
that what you mean?

A:

What I learned was that Atty. Alviola was the counsel of Allan Echavia in the case before Judge Dacudao but I
heard Atty. Maderazo telling Allan Echavia not to admit that Atty. Maderazo is appearing for me because he will
be the one to coordinate with Allans case.

Q:

So it is clear that the defendant in this case is not the counsel of record of Allan Echavia. It was Atty. Alviola
stated by you now?

A:

Atty. Maderazo was not Allan Echavias counsel but it was Atty. Alviola who was the counsel of record of Allan
Echavia.[20]

Nevertheless, the issue in this case is not whether the respondent also acted as the counsel-ofrecord of Echavia. Rather, it is whether or not he had a direct hand in the preparation of Echavias
Answer to the Amended Complaint.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also
be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel
of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting interests of
record--- although these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It
is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other
party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require that he
also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit
and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances of his
relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which might
influence the client in the selection of the counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that
which duty to another client requires him to oppose. (emphasis supplied)

An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the
attorney-client relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from
representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of
his present or former client. Indeed, good faith and honest intention on the part of the erring lawyer
does not make this rule inoperative. [21] The lawyer is an officer of the court and his actions are
governed by the uncompromising rules of professional ethics. Thus:
The relations of attorney and client is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Ceasars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [22]
The professional obligation of the lawyer to give his undivided attention and zeal for his
clients cause is likewise demanded in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Inherently
disadvantageous to his clients cause, representation by the lawyer of conflicting interests requires
disclosure of all facts and consent of all the parties involved. Thus:
CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.
xxx
Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
While the Resolution of the IBP is purely recommendatory, we find no reason to reverse the
same. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence
is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken
judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. [23]
A perusal of Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint shows that it indeed conflicts with
the complainants claims. It reads:
1. The allegations (sic) in Paragraph One (1) of the Complaint is admitted in so far as it pertains to
the personal circumstance and residence of the answering defendant. The rest of the allegations in
Paragraph One (1), and all the allegations in Paragraph Two (2) , THREE (3), FOUR (4), FIVE (5),
SIX (6), ELEVEN (11), TWELVE (12), and FOURTEEN (14), of the Complaint are DENIED for
lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. [24]

By way of prayer, Echavia states:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered dismissing
plaintiffs complaint.[25]
Anent the authorship by the respondent of the document quoted above, the Investigating
Committee found the testimonies of the complainant and Echavia credible as opposed to
respondents bare denial. As pointed out by Echavia, he was approached by Atty. Maderazo,
introduced himself as his lawyer and after some sessions in the latters office, asked him to return
and sign a document which he later identified as the Answer to the Amended Complaint.
The Investigating Committee found respondents defense weak. Respondent did not bother to
present his secretary as witness, nor obtain her affidavit to prove his allegations. Instead, he offered
a convenient excuse--- that he cannot anymore locate his secretary.
Respondent argued that it was the complainant who asked him to prepare Echavias Answer to
the Amended Complaint, after reaching an agreement whereby Echavia would testify in favor of
the complainant. After he declined the request, he claimed that it was the complainant who
prepared the document and asked his secretary to print the same. But as shown, Echavias Answer
to the Amended Complaint was in no way favorable to the complainant.
With the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13666, Echavia is practically off the hook. We cannot find
any reason why Echavia would commit perjury and entangle himself, once again, with the law. He
does not stand to profit at all by accusing the respondent falsely.
Furthermore, considering complainants stature and lack of legal education, we can not see how
she could have prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint and device a legal maneuver
as complicated as the present case.
Respondents attack on the credibility of Investigating Commissioner Ingles to render an
impartial decision, having been an adversary in Civil Case No. R-33277, does not convince us to
grant new trial. This is the first time that respondent questions the membership of Commissioner
Ingles in the Investigating Committee. If respondent really believed in good faith that
Commissioner Ingles would be biased and prejudiced, he should have asked for the latters
inhibition at the first instance. Moreover, we could not find any hint of irregularity, bias or
prejudice in the conduct of the investigation that would lead us to set it aside.
Finally, we remind the respondent that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such, must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance
with the lawyers public responsibilities. [26] The suspension of the respondents privilege to practice
law may result to financial woes. But as the guardian of the legal profession, we are constrained to

balance this concern with the injury he caused to the very same profession he vowed to uphold with
honesty and fairness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160445

February 16, 2006

JOSE TEOFILO T. MERCADO and MA. AGNES R. MERCADO, Petitioners,

vs.
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
The dignity of the Court can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith that a magistrate is the epitome of honor amongst
men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. 1
Incidental to the present petition for review on certiorari is the contempt proceedings against petitioner Jose Teofilo
T. Mercado arising from his letter dated October 18, 2004, insinuating that: (1) the ponente succumbed to the
"tremendous pressure" of Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in denying his petition; (2) the Security Bank
Corporation, respondent, financed the ponentes travel to the United States; and (3) the ponente gave respondent a
"go signal" to sell his property.
The facts are as follows:
On December 12, 2003, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Ma. Agnes R. Mercado, petitioners, filed with this Court a
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals (a) Decision2 dated May 27, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No.
71570 dismissing their petition for annulment of judgment; and (b) its Resolution 3 dated October 23, 2003 denying
their motion for reconsideration.
On January 12, 2004, we denied the petition because of petitioners failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Appellate Court.4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the Court of Appeals, in dismissing their petition for
annulment of judgment, merely relied on technical rules of procedure, thereby sacrificing the greater interest of
justice and equity; and that their former counsels gross negligence constitutes extrinsic fraud, a ground for annulling
the trial courts judgment.
On March 24, 2004, we issued a Resolution granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and reinstating their
petition. We likewise required Security Bank Corporation, respondent, to comment on the petition.
In its comment, respondent averred that the issues raised in the present petition are mere rehash of the issues
petitioners raised before the Appellate Court. As to the alleged negligence of their counsel, respondent pointed out
that the same cannot be considered an extrinsic fraud since through the same counsel, they actively pursued and
recovered moral damages and attorneys fees. Furthermore, assuming that petitioners counsel refused to file a
motion for reconsideration with the trial court, still, they had the option to terminate his services and hire another;
and that they should not have waited for four (4) years before filing the petition for annulment of judgment.
On June 7, 2004, we issued a Resolution denying the petition on the ground that petitioners indeed failed to show
that a reversible error had been committed by the Appellate Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but we dismissed the same in our Resolution dated September 15,
2004, thus:
We find no compelling reason to grant petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that before a petition for annulment of judgment can prosper, petitioners
must first file an appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief as required by the Revised Rules of Court.
Having failed to do so, they cannot avail of an action for annulment of judgment, otherwise, they would benefit from
their inaction or negligence.
It bears emphasis at this point that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal.
Petitioners contention that their failure to appeal from the trial courts Decision was due to the negligence of their
former counsel lacks merit. Records show that they participated actively, through their counsel, in the proceedings
before the trial court. As party litigants, they were expected to be vigilant of their interests and, therefore, should
monitor the progress of the case. Thus, they should have constantly communicated with their counsel to be advised
of the status of their case. This way, they would not have lost their opportunity to appeal.
Granting that petitioners petition for annulment of judgment is in order, still the same is dismissible. For the remedy
of annulment of judgment to prosper, either one of the following grounds must be present: (1) extrinsic fraud or (2)
lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Petitioner argues that their counsels negligence constitutes extrinsic
fraud. We are not convinced. Extrinsic fraud can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is
prevented from presenting his case to the court. This situation is not present in this case.
We reiterate that in G.R. No. 151816, we ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in
dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the trial courts order of execution of its Decision
in favor of respondent bank.
In fine, this Resolution should now write finis to the instant case. 5
Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration but was denied for being prohibited.
On October 18, 2004, petitioner Mercado wrote Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stating that:
On March 24, 2004, the Third Division, in its Resolution, granted our Motion for Reconsideration and even gave due
course and reinstated our petition.
But when I received the Resolution dated June 7, 2004 denying my Petition for Review on July 12, 2004, I
immediately called my counsel, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, on the phone. I asked him why on earth the ponente denied
again my petition on the same ground for failure of petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed
by the appellate court? My counsel said, the ponente informed him that she has to deny our petition on the same
ground because of the tremendous pressure from the Chief Justice to favor Security Bank Corporation (SBC). By
the way, my counsel and the ponente are very close and long time friends to each other. When I heard the bad
news, I was so shocked in disbelief. It is true, what you did is unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious. It is also very
suspicious that after a few days after my conversation with Atty. Villanueva, he and his family left for London, leaving
my case to the care of one of his Associates. Later on, the ponente herself left for the U.S.A. to visit her children. Is
this a coincidence? As the saying goes, when there is smoke, there is fire. Another coincidence, before the receipt
of the Resolution dated June 7, 2004, denying our petition on the basis of SBCs unsubstantiated Comment, SBC
sold our property to M. Miranda Development Corporation and succeeded in getting a permit to demolish the four
(4) building erected in our property from the Forbes Park Association, even if the case is still pending and we have
not even filed our Motion for Reconsideration with the Supreme Court, not to mention the Lis Pendens annotated on
the title of the property in the name of SBC. The person who bought our property from SBC for P120,000,000.00 is
known to my nephew and us. While the buyer is drinking with my nephew and others, not knowing that one of them
is my nephew, he bragged to them that he just bought the property of the Mercados in Forbes Park. The buyer said
I paid already the property because SBC told me that they already have the go-signal from the ponente to sell the

property. Few days thereafter, all the improvements in our property were totally demolished by a construction
company owned by my provincemate in Pampanga by the name of Mr. Bana, whom I personally met at the site
while the demolition was being carried out.
Have you no conscience at all? Are you not bothered of the final judgment after life? Is this the legacy you want to
impart to your children and all the Filipino people? What you did to my family and I is unforgivable not only to God
and to humanity. You have deprived us of our precious possession without due process. This is also the abode of
my wife, my children, their respective spouses, and my 10 grandchildren, not to mention the several household
members and their families.
I would like to believe that the Supreme Court is the last bulwark of true justice. If you, the Chief Justice, himself, are
the first person to make a mockery of our laws, no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country
because they said, there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. This is in the highest degree of
injustice. You have deprived us of our basic fundamental rights in the protection of our property without due process.
There is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in particular. Do you think I will bring my case to the Supreme
Court by mere question of facts? From our petition for Annulment of Judgment filed before the Court of Appeals and
now the Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, my wife and I as petitioners-movants have clearly
invoked LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court to adjudicate respondent SBCs counterclaim for
the payment of the loan. As I understand, when the ground invoked as basis for Annulment of Judgment is LACK
OF JURISDICTION, the Petition may be filed at any time before it is barred by estoppel or laches, neither of which
is obtaining in our case. Even in laymans legal point of view, this Petition of ours clearly and undoubtedly raises a
question of law.
Please I beg of you, have a last hard look on our Petition and the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration and let us
focus and not evade on the real issue on LACK OF JURISDICTION on the part of the trial court and not
concentrate on negligence of counsel and other trivial reasons, etc. Or better yet, please refrain from influencing the
members of the Third Division. Let them deliberate regularly on our case or inhibit themselves on the case. Please
let the Institution serve justice, and not individual pecuniary interests. SBCs counsels are experts in fabrication of
facts and in misleading the courts. I have a feeling that they might as well have led you to believe something, which
is not true. Please dont be an instrument of their wicked schemes, lest the Supreme Court itself becomes their
means to perpetrate injustice. This is the only Bank which is not interested in amicable settlement in spite of my
several sincere offers of amicable settlement since the case was filed in 1995 up to 2003, and these are all in writing
and duly received by SBC. Unfortunately, all my offers were rejected by them.
I wrote you this letter as a last resort because my family and I looked up at you before as the most honest and
upright Chief Justice. As we would like to know if you really had intervened and put pressure, as the Ponente said to
Atty. Villanueva, (my counsel) to favor SBC because if you did, then we rest our case. Please enlighten us before
we seek another forum to seek redress the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment we suffered.
If we are wrong about you, and I hope we really are wrong, please accept our appeal for forgiveness and apologies.
GOD is my witness, that what I have told you is the truth.
Mr. Chief Justice, the Filipino people know how religious you are. Please do what a religious man ought to do in
serving justice. Please live up to our, as well as HIS expectations. (Emphasis supplied)
On November 2, 2004, Chief Justice Davide required Mercados lawyer, Atty. Jose P. Villanueva, to comment on the
letter and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 6
On November 17, 2004, the Courts Third Division ordered Mercado to personally appear on November 22, 2004
and show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. 7

On the scheduled date, Mercado, together with Atty. Pablo G. Macapagal, his new counsel, appeared before the
Third Division and swore to the truth of the letter he wrote.8 He manifested that he only stated therein what Atty.
Villanueva told him that his petition was denied for the second time "because of the tremendous pressure from the
Chief Justice." He further manifested that during the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he (Atty. Villanueva) pointed
to Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, bragging that she is "a very very good, close and long time friend of
his."9 However, while stating this, Mercado referred to Justice Conchita Carpio Morales as Justice Gutierrez. 10
Forthwith, the Third Division issued in open court a Resolution11 directing Atty. Macapagal to submit a written
explanation why Mercado should not be held in contempt of Court.
For his part, Atty. Villanueva submitted a comment,12 strongly denying Mercados allegations in his letter. He denied
having told petitioners that their petition had to be denied again "because there was a tremendous pressure from the
Chief Justice in favor of Security Bank Corporation." He also stressed that there was no correlation between the
ponentes trip to the United States and his trip to London. He explained that he and his family went to London to
attend the graduation of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva. To substantiate this, he submitted a
photocopy of "London School of Economics (LSE) and Political Science Presentation Ceremonies" where the name
of his daughter, Cherriemaya Veloso Villanueva, is listed as one of the successful graduates. He likewise submitted
a photocopy of his passport indicating his departure for London on July 14, 2004 and his arrival in the Philippines on
July 27, 2004. In addition, he said he never met anyone from respondent bank, including its lawyers, and that there
is no truth to Mercados statement regarding his nephews alleged encounter with the new owners of the subject
property.
On December 13, 2004, Mercado submitted his explanation13 why he should not be punished for contempt of court.
He claimed that the contemptuous statements in his letter merely reiterate the tenor of Atty. Villanuevas statements.
He offered an apology, explaining that he wrote the letter while he was "under the impulse of personal stress" as he
was losing his residential house.
On January 26, 2005, the Third Division ordered both Mercado and Atty. Villanueva to appear on February 21, 2005
to elucidate their respective positions.
Mercado testified that it was Atty. Villanueva who informed him that the ponente is Justice Gutierrez. Atty. Villanueva
even bragged that she is his "very, very close friend."
For his part, Atty. Villanueva testified that it was Mercado who informed him that Justice Gutierrez is the ponente. He
also confirmed that she attended the wake of his mother. But he denied Mercados claim that he pointed to Justice
Gutierrez and said that she is his close friend.14
Thereafter, the Third Division designated Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao as Commissioner to receive
evidence on the factual issues involved in the contempt incident. 15
On May 18, 2005, Justice Dacudao submitted his Investigation, Report and Recommendation. He found Mercado
"guilty of improper conduct tending to bring the authority and the administration of justice by the Court into
disrespect when he openly belittled, degraded, and embarrassed the Highest Court of the land, particularly the Chief
Justice x x x." However, he held that "there was no showing that he acted with malice and/or in bad faith or that he
was properly motivated." Thus, he recommended that Mercado be fined in the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).
We cannot sustain Justice Dacudaos finding that Mercado did not act with malice or bad faith in imputing those
derogatory and disrespectful remarks against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.

Bad faith imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. 16 It contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior
purposes.17 Malice is of the same genre. It connotes a sinister motive.
Mercados addressing such letter to Chief Justice Davide is a perfect illustration of bad faith and malice tending
directly to degrade the administration of justice. It transgresses the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticisms bringing into disrepute, not only the authority and integrity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, but
also of the entire Judiciary. While feigning to be searching for truth on whether Chief Justice Davide indeed exerted
"tremendous pressure" to the ponente, he repeatedly humiliated him and the Judiciary in the most loutish and
insolent manner. He accused him of doing an "unthinkable, ungodly, and malicious" act and of depriving his
(Mercados) family of their "basic fundamental rights in the protection of (their) property without due process." He
concluded that what Chief Justice Davide did to his family "is unforgivable not only to God and to humanity." In an
insulting and insolent tenor, he stated that "if the Chief Justice, himself, is the first person to make a mockery of our
laws," then there is "no wonder why foreign investors do not want to invest in our country."
Furthermore, he alleged that an irregularity or bribery attended the denial of his petition for review. He insinuated
that the travels of Atty. Villanueva and the ponente abroad were financed by respondent bank, stating that "when
there is smoke, there is fire." He also recklessly accused the ponente of giving respondent bank a "go-signal" to sell
his property. In this backdrop, he asked Chief Justice Davide to "refrain from influencing the members of the Third
Division;" "let them deliberate regularly on the case or inhibit themselves on the case;" and "let the Institution serve
justice, and not individual pecuniary interests."
Finally, he condemned the entire Judiciary by saying "there is no justice in our courts, the Supreme Court in
particular." And with impudence, he threatened Chief Justice Davide to enlighten him before he "seeks another
forum to seek redress for the injustices, sleepless nights, humiliation and embarrassment" his family suffered.
Without doubt, Mercados letter is marked with malice, bad faith, and gross disrespect. He committed a remarkable
feat of character assassination and honor vilification. Contrary to his claim that he is just verifying the truth of Atty.
Villanuevas statements, the words in his letter are more accusatory than inquisitorial. What is disconcerting is that
his accusations have no basis in fact and in law. Obviously, they caused intense pain and humiliation on the part of
Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
The Resolution of the Third Division of this Court dated September 15, 2004 denying Mercados motion for
reconsideration is well explained. A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for annulment of judgment
cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a motion for
new trial or a petition for relief before an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the
party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must be based
either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. 18 Having failed to avail of the remedies
and there being a clear showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed. Only a
disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition unacceptable.
Mercado bewails the denial by the Third Division of his petition through a mere Minute Resolution and
afterreinstating the petition. Apparently, he finds the Courts manner of denial and change of heart unusual and
casts sinister undertone to them.
In In Re Laureta,19 we ruled that the Court is not "duty-bound" to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given depending on its
evaluation of a case. In the same case, we held that "the recall of a due course Order after a review of the records
of the case is a common occurrence in the Court." Like the respondents in the said case, Mercado should not think
that it is only his petition which has been subjected to such recall.

The Third Division initially denied Mercados petition because it is apparent on its face that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment. Considering his motion for
reconsideration alleging that the Appellate Court merely relied on technical rules of procedure and that his former
counsel committed gross negligence, the Third Division took the most prudent course by reinstating the petition.
Now, after considering the petition and the comment thereon, the Third Division was convinced that, indeed, the
Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error. Is this irregular? The answer is a resounding "no." The
reinstatement of a petition does not guarantee that it will be subsequently granted. Otherwise, the filing of comment
and subsequent pleadings would be an exercise in futility.
Now, in a bid to escape liability for contempt, Mercado invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication.
We are not persuaded.
A person charged with contempt of court for his utterances which clearly constitute contempt may not ordinarily
escape liability by merely invoking the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. Liberty of speech must not be
confused with abuse of such liberty. When he attributed those contemptuous remarks to Chief Justice Davide and
the ponente, Mercado abused such liberty. His statements cast aspersions to their reputation and integrity and
create a distrust to the Judiciary.
The fact that Mercados letter was addressed only to the Chief Justice does not rinse it of its contemptuous
character. In In Re Laureta,20 we ruled that letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the
performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
court.
Accordingly, we hold Mercado guilty of indirect contempt of court.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxxxx
d. Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
xxxxxx
As for Atty. Villanueva, while Justice Dacudao did not categorically state that he (Atty. Villanueva) told Mercado that
Chief Justice Davide exerted "tremendous pressure" on the ponente, the reason why the petition was dismissed for
the second time, however, we are inclined to believe that Atty. Villanueva gave such information to Mercado. Not
only that, Atty. Villanueva also revealed the name of the ponente; that he and the ponente have known each other
since 1964; and that the ponente would be at
the wake of his mother, thus:
After a careful and conscientious examination of the evidence adduced in the instant case, the undersigned
investigator is fully convinced that it was only through Atty. Villanueva that petitioner could have learned or known
the name of the ponente in the case.

As between petitioner and Atty. Villanueva, the undersigned investigator in inclined to give more credence to the
testimony of petitioner. Not only was petitioner consistent, firm, and candid and detailed in his testimony, but he was
also able to corroborate his claims, by submitting his diary which contained vital entries and by presenting the
testimony of his nephew. x x x
Moreover, it was admitted by Atty. Villanueva that he and Justice Gutierrez have known each other since 1964 and
that Justice Gutierrez was in the wake of his mother. These admissions tend to strengthen the allegations of
petitioner that Atty. Villanueva was the one who told him the name of the ponente; that Atty. Villanueva told him that
he and the ponente are very close; and that when petitioner attended the wake of Atty. Villanuevas mother, he was
told by Atty. Villanueva that Justice Gutierrez, the ponente, was coming.
Rule 15.06 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not state or imply that
he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." Further, Rule 15.07 provides that "a lawyer
must impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness." Atty. Villanueva took the
forbidden course. In informing Mercado that he was "a very very good, close and long time friend" of the ponente,
Atty. Villanueva impressed upon the former that he can obtain a favorable disposition of his case. However, when
his petition was dismissed twice, Mercados expectation crumbled. This prompted him to hurl unfounded, malicious,
and disrespectful accusations against Chief Justice Davide and the ponente.
We have repeatedly admonished lawyers from making bold assurances to their clients. A lawyer who guarantees the
successful outcome of a litigation will exert heavy pressure and employ any means to win the case at all costs. But
when the case is lost, he will blame the courts, placing them under a cloud of suspicion. As what happened in this
case, Atty. Villanuevas statements led Mercado, not only to suspect but also to believe, that the entire Court,
together with Chief Justice Davide and the ponente, could be pressured or influenced,
Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe and maintain the respect due to courts and the judicial officers. 21 Atty.
Villanuevas conduct, no doubt, degraded the integrity and dignity of Chief Justice Davide and the ponente and this
Court as well.
Thus, we find Atty. Villanueva also guilty of indirect contempt of court.
On the appropriate penalty, the general rule is that courts have inherent power to impose a penalty for contempt
reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense. And that the degree of punishment for contempt is said to
lie within the sound discretion of the court.22 Considering the circumstances obtaining herein, we believe that
Mercado and Atty. Villanueva should be fined P50,000.00 each and warned that a repetition of similar acts will
warrant a more severe penalty.
One last word. The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.23 Thus, we must act to preserve its honor and integrity from assaults of disrespect. One reason
why respect of the public for the Judiciary has diminished is because of unscrupulous lawyers who imply that judges
and justices can be influenced or bribed. Such conduct has no place in the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, Jose Teofilo T. Mercado and Atty. Jose P. Villanueva are declared GUILTY of indirect contempt of
court. They are FINED P50,000.00 each and WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. Villanuevas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

A.C. No. 3695 February 24, 1992

DOMINGO C. GAMALINDA, complainant,
vs.
AYTYS. FERNANDO ALCANTARA and JOSELITO LIM, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N

NARVASA, C.J.:

In his verified letter-complaint dated June 19, 1991, 1 complainant Domingo Gamalinda charges retired Judge Fernando
Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim with grave abuse of their profession ("labis nilang pag-abuso sa kanilang propesyon"),
deception, threats, dishonoring and injuring the reputation of said complainant and bringing about the loss of his land.
The Court finds the charges to be without basis and accordingly dismisses them.
The administrative complaint against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara is a futile attempt to resurrect the charges
filed against him in Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494, which were dismissed by this Court in its resolution of September
8, 1988 for having become moot and academic. Adm. Matter No. MTJ-90-494 was filed only on July 22, 1987, or
five (5) months after the respondent judge's retirement from the service on February 3, 1987. No motion for
reconsideration having been seasonably filed by complainant, that resolution has become final and executory. It
serves as a bar to a relitigation of the same charges against respondent judge. 2 That those charges are now being
brought against respondent judge in his capacity as an attorney does not help the cause of complainant, for the change in
the form of action or remedy pursued does not bar the application of the rule of res judicata. 3
On the other hand, the record establishes that Atty. Lim was merely performing his duty as counsel for the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 3827 when he did what is now complained of. 4
In Civil Case No. 3827 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Branch LXIII, Salud Balot and Felicidad Balot had sued
the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda 5 for reconveyance, with damages, of the eastern half of Lot No. 3217 of the cadastral
survey of Victoria, Tarlac, which was allegedly inadvertently included in the original certificate of title of Apolinario
Gamalinda. In the course of the trial, plaintiffs were able to secure a writ of preliminary injunction against the "defendants,
their agents, representatives or other persons acting in their behalf, ordering them to desist from threshing and carting
away the palay harvest on Lot No. 3217 of the Cadastral Survey of Victoria, . . . until further order of this Court. . . ." 6 This
injunction was made permanent in the decision of the lower court rendered on July 26, 1977 in favor of the plaintiffs.
Pending appeal to the Court of Appeals, complainant herein entered a portion of the area in dispute, in the belief
that the whole of Lot No. 3217 belonged to him by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Quitclaim 7executed in his favor by the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda on May 6, 1985. It must be noted that at that time
title to Lot No. 3217 was still in the name of Apolinario Gamalinda. Thus, when Maximiano Tiburcio, Protacio Cabatino and
Maximo Mateo, tenants of Salud Balot, entered the portion being cultivated by complainant, the latter reported the incident
to the police.
From Salud Balot's viewpoint, it was complainant who intruded into her land. Relying therefore on the injunction
issued by the lower court, she filed through counsel, Atty. Lim, a motion to declare complainant Gamalinda in
contempt of court.
Complainant interposed the defense that the area in dispute in Civil Case No. 3827 was different from the area
occupied by him. To resolve the issue, the lower court with his agreement, ordered a resurvey of Lot No. 3217. The
result of the resurvey showed that contrary to complainant's claim, the lot occupied by him was the very same land
involved in Civil Case No. 3827. Accordingly, the lower court declared complainant in contempt in an order dated
July 24, 1986 which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals in a decision rendered on March 21, 1998. 8
Considering that Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo are tenants of Salud Balot and complainant is the successor-ininterest of the heirs of Apolinario Gamalinda, the defendants in Civil Case No. 3827, it is clearly erroneous for
complainant to claim that neither he nor Tiburcio, Cabatino and Mateo had anything to do with said civil case. Being
privies to the parties, they are necessarily bound by the orders rendered in said case.
On October 12, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming in toto the judgment of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 3827. 9 After the appellate court's decision had become final, Atty. Lim moved for the execution of the
affirmed judgment, 10 and when the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied, filed an "Urgent Motion to Require Domingo
Gamalinda to Surrender TCT 186299 to the Clerk of Court and to Authorize the Latter to Execute Reconveyance of Lot

3217-A in Favor of Plaintiffs." 11 That motion was granted by the lower court, but complainant refused to surrender the
Owner's Copy of TCT No. 186299, prompting Atty. Lim to file the questioned "Motion to Declare Owner's Copy of TCT
186299 Null and Void," 12 which the lower court granted on July 31, 1989.

It is clear from the foregoing that the questioned acts of Atty. Lim were all done in line with his duty to prosecute his
clients' cause in Civil Case No. 3827. The first motion was filed to protect his clients' possessory rights over the
property in dispute while the second motion was made to procure execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 3827.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 13He
shall serve his client with competence and diligence, 14 and his duty of entire devotion to his client's cause not only
requires, but entitles him to employ every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present
every defense provided by law to enable the latter's cause to succeed. 15 An attorney's duty to safeguard the client's
interests commences from his retainer until the effective release from the case 16 or the final disposition of the whole
subject matter of the litigation. 17 During that period, he is expected to take such reasonable steps and such ordinary care
as his client's interests may require.
This is precisely what Atty. Lim was doing when he filed the motions complained of. He should be commended, not
condemned, for diligently and competently performing his duties as an attorney;
With respect to the complainant's contention that the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land relied upon by the lower
and appellate courts in Civil Case No. 3827 is a forged or fake instrument, suffice it to say that this is a matter that
should have been litigated in said case instead of being raised for the first time in these proceedings. In any case,
there being no showing that Atty. Lim was aware of any defect in that deed, the charge of deception against him will
not lie. Absent, too, is any showing that Atty. Lim had anything to do with the preparation of the criminal information,
and for the same reason he cannot be called to account for it.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative charges against retired Judge Fernando Alcantara and Atty. Joselito Lim are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4380 October 13, 1995

NICANOR GONZALES and SALUD B. PANTANOSAS, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN, respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
This resolves the administrative case filed by Nicanor Gonzales and Salud B. Pantanosas against Atty. Miguel
Sabacajan on February 14, 1995, 1 the verified complaint wherefor alleges:
xxx xxx xxx
4. That sometime in October, 1994, complainants were informed by the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City that the complainants' owner's duplicate of title covering their lands, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-91736 and T-91735 were entrusted to the office secretary of the
respondent who in torn entrusted the same to respondent;
5. That respondent admitted and confirmed to the complainants that their titles are in his custody
and has even shown the same (to) the complainant Salud B. Pantanosas but when demanded (sic)
to deliver the said titles to the complainant in a formal demand letter, marked as ANNEX "A,"
respondent refused and continues to refuse without any justification to give their titles (and) when
confronted, respondent challenged the complainants to file any case in any court even in the
Honorable Supreme Court;
6. That respondent's dare or challeng(e) is a manifestation of his arrogance taking undue advantage
of his legal profession over the simplicity, innocence and ignorance of the complainants, one of
whom is his blood relative, his aunt, for which complainants shudder with mental anguish;
7. That due to his challeng(e), the complainants sent a letter to the Honorable Supreme Court for
enlightenment, copy of which is attached as ANNEX "B", for which the Honorable Supreme Court
required 19 legible copies of a verified complaint;
8. That in spite of repeated demands, request(s) and pleas towards (sic) respondent, respondent still
fail(ed) and stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to the rightful owners,
the complainants here(in), which act is tantamount to willful and malicious defiance of legal and
moral obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law
and justice, to the prejudice and damage of the complainants; 2
xxx xxx xxx

On March 22, 1995, the Court required respondent to comment on the foregoing complaint. In his unverified
"Answer" thereto, respondent admitted having met Salud Pantanosas but claims that, to his recollection, "Nicanor
Gonzales/Serdan" has never been to his office. Respondent likewise denied that he challenged anyone to file a
case in any court, much less the Supreme Court. He also claims that he referred complainant Pantanosas to his
client, Mr. Samto M. Uy of Iponan, Cagayan de Oro City, for whom he worked out the segregation of the titles, two of
which are the subject of the instant case. 3
Respondent likewise denies complainants' allegation that he is arrogant, in contrast to the innocence, simplicity and
ignorance of said complainants. He contends that the truth of the matter is that complainants have been charged

with a number of criminal and civil complaints before different courts. He also asserts that he was holding the
certificates of title in behalf of his client, Samto M. Uy. 4
Atty. Sabacajan stresses, by way of defense, that "the instant action was chosen precisely to browbeat him into
delivering the Certificates of Title to them without said certificates passing the hands of Mr. Samto Uy with whom the
complainants have some monetary obligations." 5
In its resolution dated June 26, 1995, 6 for internal administrative purposes the Court referred this case to the Office of
the Bar Confidant for the corresponding evaluation, report and recommendation.
From the foregoing proceedings taken on this matter, the Court finds that respondent admitted having taken
possession of the certificates of title of complainants but refused to surrender the same despite demands made by
the latter. It follows, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to show that he was legally justified in doing so.
Instead, all he did was to inform this Court that "his obligation to deliver the certificates to Mr. Samto Uy excludes
the delivery of said certificates to anyone else." 7
Respondent attached some certifications to his "Answer" to support his contention that complainants are notorious
characters. However, the certifications indicate that most of the cases stated therein, especially those involving
fraud, have been dismissed. With respect to those still pending, there is no indication as to the identity of the party
who instituted the same, aside from the consideration that the remedy thereon is judicial in nature. At any rate, these
aspersions on the character of complainants have no bearing on the misconduct of respondent charged in the
present case.
Respondent likewise submitted xerox copies of certain certificates of title in an effort to explain why he kept the
certificates of title of complainants, that is, supposedly for the purpose of subdividing the property. However, an
examination of the same does not show any connection thereof to respondent's claim. In fact, the two sets of
certificates of title appear to be entirely different from each other.
As a lawyer, respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his
client. The records do not show that he or his client have availed of said remedies, instead of merely resorting to
unexplained, if not curt, refusals to accommodate the requests of complainants. Also, he cannot be unaware of the
imposable sanctions on a counsel who resorts to unlawful means that would cause injustice to the adversaries of his
client.
The Court accordingly finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in
handling the legal affairs of their clients. If complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that
does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title since there is no showing in the records that the
same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any intimation that there is a court
order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title.
Apparently, respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall impress upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.
Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their certificates of titles supposedly to enforce payment of their
alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to impress the latter of his power to do so.
Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Respondent has closely skirted this proscription, if he has not in fact
transgressed the same.

On the foregoing considerations, the Court desires and directs that respondent should forthwith return the
certificates of title of complainants. To ensure the same, he should be placed under suspension until he presents to
the Court proof of receipt by complainants of their respective copies of Certificates of Title Nos. T-91735 and T91736 or a judicial order or document authorizing or justifying the retention of possession thereof by respondent or
his aforenamed client.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Miguel Sabacajan is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to
this Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by
complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the possession by him or his
client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrative
misconduct will be punished more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the personal records of respondent and have copies thereof furnished to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.