OLAGUER vs PURUGGANAN

FACTS: Alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 share of stocks (worth 600k), employed as EVP
Businessday Corporation, President of Businessday Info System and Svces & Businessday
Marketing Corp. Active in the political opposition against Marcos together with resps Raul Locsin
and Enrique Joaquin. Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifea had an unwritten agreement that, in
the event that Eduardo was arrested, they would support the Eduardos family by the continued
payment of his salary. Executed a Special Power of Attorney on 5/26/79 appointing Locsin,
Joaquin and Hofilea for the purpose of selling or transferring petitioners shares of stock with
Business day. During trial, Eduardo testified that he agreed to execute the SPA in order to cancel
his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the purpose of concealing that he was a
stockholder of Businessday, in the event of a military crackdown against the opposition. Parties
acknowledged the SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate
Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon City. By the time he
was released from prison 6 years later, he was no longer a shareholder in the said bank.
According to the respondents, they were just doing what was accorded in the SPA, given that the
price of theirs plummeted below market value because of the stigma brought about by Olaguer
being a very prominent oppositionist.
ISSUE: Whether absence as mentioned in SPA should be understood as that of NCC 381.
RULING: NO. If it were, then the very existence of that SPA would be rendered nugatory. Olaguer
has to be a minor or insane for that SPA to have function. An SPA has to be construed strictly but
its provision has to be construed as to its existence, i.e. understood in a way that will give more
power/ function to that SPA. Since the said SPA executed by Olaguer gave powers to the
respondents to actually dispose of his share, he cannot therefore assail such now. And even if the
said contract is assailable, it was already ratified by the reception of the amount 600,000 by
Olaguers wife and in-laws from 1980-1982.
Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009
FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any
money. In March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May
1972, they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed without any word
from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a
document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985.
Virgilios application for naturalization in US was denied because petitioners marriage with Sofio
was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofios death is necessary because Civil
Code governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is
only needed. Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and
valid.
LEONOR VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR NO. 112597 APRIL 2 1996
FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower
court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids.
While her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This
prompted her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed
a divorce case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence
of valid marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held in favour of the private respondent.
Subsequently the Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage
certificate in the Philippines. The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioners appeal.
The Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same.
She filed this petition with the Supreme Court to assail the validity of CAs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?
HELD:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondents contention is untenable. The Court
explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in
the marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their
children shall be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that A
void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all
1.
MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES
CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS
VILLENA BORBON
G.R. No. 130277.
May 9, 2002
Puno, J
Nature:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct
some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian. The birth certificate shows,
among others, that the child's full name is Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on
May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate
also indicates that the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City .
Facts:
On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the birth certificate of her son,
Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date
of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant's name should be "Ma.
Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner
alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's
father, Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should
follow the mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and
Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.
On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing. On June 26, 1997, the trial court
issued another order setting the date for the presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997.
RTC Ruling:
On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It ruled:
It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS AND
INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc., may be the subject
of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New Civil Code), authorizing changes or

corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE
PERSONS INVOLVED.
Issue:
Whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be
corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or
adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
[10] This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia[11] where we held that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to make the
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:
The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once
in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
the duty of the court to--(1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
likewise entitled to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely
clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage
between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles
Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in accordance with
our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are
complied with.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August 25, 1997 of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set aside. The case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings.
G.R. NO. 138496 February 23, 2004
CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
FACTS: HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN CO, was born May 19,
1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND
LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN are CHINESE CITIZENS. CO BOON PENG filed an application for his
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special Committee on Naturalization under
LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270. His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine
citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and consequently took an
oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under Rules of Court for correction
of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on the ff. grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant;
**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of pari material rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on account of the naturalization of
their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of
their father, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff.
material allegations in their petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.
REPUBLIC vs MERCADERA
637 SCRA 654, G.R. No. 186027

December 8, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September 28, 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn
Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorneyin-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth - fromMarilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction
unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."
MERCADERA: filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live
Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108
RTC: issued an order, Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance
OSG: entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing.

RTC: reset the hearing

Mercadera: moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte, being no opposition. Without
any objection from the City Prosecutor.
RTC: designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera. Granted
Mercaderas petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct
her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera
OSG: timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision.
It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under
Rule 108.
CA: was not persuaded, affirmed the questioned RTC Order.
ISSUE: whether petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC falls under Rule 103 or 108
HELD: RULE 108.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.16 This rule provides the procedure for an independent
special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others,
that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community.17 In petitions for
change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and
called in the community in which he lives and is best known."18 When granted, a persons
identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him."19 Judicial
permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by
virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition.
When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As
notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Essentially, a change of name does not define or
effect a change of ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It
does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.21 However, "there could be instances where
the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but
because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public
mind."22 Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its
grant
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.24 Entries in the civil register
refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"25 also as
enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.26Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the
ambit of the rule.
The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a
correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove
the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."36 From the allegations in her petition,
Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered
given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up
to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to
simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy

allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law
provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.
Meralco Securities v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
G.R. No. L-46245 May 31, 1982
Aquino, J.:
Facts: Petitioner questions the decision of the respondent which held that petitioners pipeline is
subject to realty tax. Pursuant to a concession, petitioner installed a pipeline system from Manila
to Batangas. Meanwhile, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property.
So, petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Laguna. The
board upheld the assessments and the decision became final and executory after the lapse of
fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision by the appellant. Meralco
Securities contends that the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals and no judicial review of the Board's decision is provided
for in the Real Property Tax Code. Hence, the petitioners recourse to file a petition for certiorari.
Held: It was held that certiorari was properly availed of in this case. It is a writ issued by a
superior court to an inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to be elevated for review and correction in
matters of law.
The rule is that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial power there is an
underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by the statute. The purpose of judicial review
is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of
parties affected by its decisions. The review is a part of the system of checks and balances which
is a limitation on the separation of powers and which forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
Judicial review of the decision of an official or administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial
functions is proper in cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave abuse of discretion, fraud or
collusion or in case the administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious.
Case Digest: Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas and La Flor de la Isabela, Inc. vs. Hon.
Virgilio A. Sevandal, et al.
Petitioners Claims:
Petitioners claimed in its Letter-Complaint to the SEC that Tabaqueria, owned by its former
General Manager, Gabriel Ripoll, cannot be allowed to continue said name because it will confuse
and deceive the public into believing that Tabaqueria is operated and managed by, and part of
Tabacalera. Compania General, being a Spain-based company, operated under La Flor de la
Isabela in the Philippines. Petitioners filed with the DOJ and the DTI a Complaint for Infringement
and Unfair Competition. Petitioners alleged that Tabaqueria deliberately sought to adopt the
Tabacalera trademarks to confuse the public that the Tabaqueria cigars are the same or are
somehow connected with the Tabacalera products. As such, the Petitioners filed for a Motion to
grant Cease and Desist Order in order to enjoin Tabaqueria from further producing cigars.
Respondents Claims:
Ripoll, now the Directing Manager of Tabaqueria, alleged that there is insufficient evidence to
issue a Cease and Desist Order against him on the ground of unfair competition and infringement
of trademark. Moreover, they moved to dismiss the case on the ground of forum shopping.
Further, the Office of Legal Affairs of the DTI ruled that there was no similarity in the general
appearance of the products of the parties and consumers would not be misled. DTI further found
that the competing products, in their totality, are easily distinguishable through their brand and
logos. TABACALERA is the brand of the Tabacalera products, while FLOR DE MANILA is the
brand of the Petitioners. In fact, per Certification of BIR in 1994, Flor de Manila is the brand

registered by the latter with said bureau. As per inspection, none of their boxes even show the
word TABAQUERIA.
Issue:
Whether or not there is substantial similarity between the two parties as to amount to unfair
competition and trademark infringement, and are therefore entitled to a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals and the DTI. Injunctive relief
may only be issued when the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; when the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The Court found that there is
no urgent and paramount necessity for the writ. The Petitioners has not shown, at least
tentatively, that there exists a fraudulent and malicious entry into the market and as a result
thereby, their sales dropped by 25%.
BENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS OF ZAMBALES, PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF ZAMBALES, PROVINCE OF
ZAMBALES, and MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MARCELINO, respondents.
[January 29, 1993, G.R. No. 106041]
Facts:
On 1985, Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the said properties in issue as taxable
improvements. The assessment was appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the
Province of Zambales. However, the appeal was dismissed mainly on the ground of the
petitioner's failure to pay the realty taxes that fell due during the pendency of the appeal.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, one of the
herein respondents. In its decision dated March 22, 1990, the Board reversed the dismissal of the
appeal but, agreed that the tailings dam and the lands submerged thereunder shall be subject to
realty tax.
For purposes of taxation the dam is considered as real property as it comes within the
object mentioned in Article 415 of the New Civil Code, It is a construction adhered to the soil
which cannot be separated or detached without breaking the material or causing destruction on
the land upon which it is attached. The immovable nature of the dam as an improvement which
determines its character as real property, hence taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property
Tax Code.
Issues:
Whether or not the tailings dam is subject to realty tax?
Whether or not it be considered as immovable property?
HELD:
Yes, it is subject to realty tax and it is considered an immovable property.
The petitioner does not dispute that the tailings dam may be considered realty within the
meaning of Article 415. It insists, however, that the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a
separate and independent property because it does not constitute an "assessable improvement"
on the mine although a considerable sum may have been spent in constructing and maintaining
it.
The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of "real property" and simply says
that the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other

improvements affixed or attached to real property." In the absence of such a definition, applying
Article 415 of the Civil Code, which states that the following are considered immovables: Section
No. 1 Lands, buildings and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil; Section no. 3 Everything
attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
Even without the tailings dam, the petitioner's mining operation can still be carried out
because the primary function of the dam is merely to receive and retain the wastes and water
coming from the mine. There is no allegation that the water coming from the dam is the sole
source of water for the mining operation so as to make the dam an integral part of the mine. In
fact, as a result of the construction of the dam, the petitioner can now impound and recycle
water without having to spend for the building of a water reservoir.
And as the petitioner itself points out, even if the petitioner's mine is shut down or ceases
operation, the dam may still be used for irrigation of the surrounding areas.
From the definitions and the cases cited in relation to this case, it would appear that
whether a structure constitutes an improvement so as to partake of the status of realty would
depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its construction and use, The expression
"permanent" as applied to an improvement does not imply that the improvement must be used
perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is devoted has been
accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as the land to
which it is annexed is still used for the said purpose.
The Court is convinced that the subject dam falls within the definition of an "improvement"
because it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's
mine. Moreover, the immovable nature of the dam defines its character as real property under
Article 415 of the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax
Code.
Hence, petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Serg's v. PCI Leasing
Sergs Products, Inc. vs. PCI Leasing G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of
replevin.
Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would
return for other machineries.
Petitioner (Sergs Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of the
writ of replevin.
PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and
therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin.
Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415
of the Civil Code.
Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court,
Citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and
that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization.

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of
the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property.
Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for the
recovery of personal property only.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by
petitioners in the factory built on their own land.They were essential and principal elements of
their chocolate-making industry.Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property
on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and
principal elements in the industry.
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise.Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides The PROPERTY is, and shall at all
times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof
may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or
permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to
what is permanent.
The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin
Tsai vs. Court of Appeals
Ruby Tsai vs. Court of Appeals, Ever Textile Mills, Inc. and Mamerto Villaluz
G.R. No. 120109, October 2, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
Doctrine: Nothing detracts the parties from treating it [the property that is immovable by nature
as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.
Facts: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a
P3,000,000.00 loan from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan,
EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its
factory stands and the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the
mortgage contract. PBCom granted a second loan of P3,356,000.00 to EVERTEX. The loan was
secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto
which were similar to those listed in Annex A of the first mortgage deed.
After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased
various machines and equipments. Then, due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency
proceedings. The CFI issued an order declaring the corporation insolvent. All its assets were
taken into the custody of the Insolvency Court. In the meantime, upon EVERTEXs failure to meet
its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against
EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom
emerged as the highest. On December 23, 1982, another public auction was held and again,
PBCom was the highest bidder. PBCom then leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby
L. Tsai for P50,000.00 a month and subsequently sold the factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai
for P9,000,000.00, including the contested machineries.
On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and
damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure
of subject mortgage was in violation of the Insolvency Law. Further, EVERTEX averred that

PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties, which were not
included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage nor in the Chattel Mortgage and neither were those
properties included in the Notice of Sheriffs. The disputed properties, which were valued at
P4,000,000.00, are: 14 Interlock Circular Knitting Machines, 1 Jet Drying Equipment, 1 Dryer
Equipment, 1 Raisin Equipment and 1 Heatset Equipment.
The trial court rendered in favor of EVERTEX. PBCom and Tsai appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed RTCs decision. Their Motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus, PBCom
and Tsai filed their separate petitions for review with this Court.
Issue: Whether the nature of the disputed machineries make them immovable under Article 415
(3) and (5) of the Civil Code.
Held: No. Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were
heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them
ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion,
however, does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We
have to look at the parties intent.
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract
of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In the
case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.
The pertinent portion of respondent appellate courts ruling is quoted below:
It should be noted that the printed form used by appellant bank was mainly for real estate
mortgages. But reflective of the true intention of appellant PBCOM and appellee EVERTEX was
the typing in capital letters, immediately following the printed caption of mortgage, of the phrase
real and chattel. So also, the machineries and equipment in the printed form of the bank had
to be inserted in the blank space of the printed contract and connected with the word building
by typewritten slash marks. Now, then, if the machineries in question were contemplated to be
included in the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel
mortgage specifically mentioning as part III of Schedule A a listing of the machineries covered
thereby. It would have sufficed to list them as immovables in the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage of
the land and building involved.
Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing
detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of
estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be considered
a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an
obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the parties herein: (1) executed a contract styled as Real Estate Mortgage
and Chattel Mortgage, instead of just Real Estate Mortgage if indeed their intention is to treat
all properties included therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT. These facts, taken together, evince the conclusion that
the parties intention is to treat these units of machinery as chattels. A fortiori, the contested
after-acquired properties, which are of the same description as the units enumerated under the
title LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT, must also be treated as chattels. And, since the
disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been involved in the 1975 or
1979 chattel mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part of the Sheriff to include subject
machineries with the properties enumerated in said chattel mortgages.
Rep vs. Ching
GR# 186166/ Oct. 20, 2010
634 SCRA 415
FACTS:
On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Antonio Ching,
filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of land with improvements,
before the RTC. The subject lot is a consolidation of three (3) contiguous lots situated in Banza,
Butuan City, Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229 square meters. Respondent alleged that
on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from the late former governor and
Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered Lands.

Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause why his
application for registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state the current
assessed value of the subject land and his non-compliance with the last paragraph of Section 17
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8
The OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte filed an Opposition to the
application for registration of title as well as the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondents application for registration.
The RTC was not convinced that respondents Deed of Sale sufficiently established that he was
the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion for reconsideration with attached
additional tax declarations. The RTC denied. Respondent appealed the RTC ruling before the CA.
CA reversed the RTCs earlier resolution and granted respondents application for registration of
title.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by OSG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent application for registration of title be granted.
HELD:
The Court finds that the respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to show
that the land has been classified as alienable and disposable, therefore the application for
registration should be denied.
Likewise, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that there was
no substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to
incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration does not measure up to the time
requirement.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D.
1073 must sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 58
Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that the land belongs
to the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is doctrinal that, under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the State and the latter is the foundation of
any asserted right to ownership in land. Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,
irrefutable evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has
been declassified and now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
Villarico v. Sarmiento
Facts:
Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by
a strip of land belonging to the government.
Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the said government land and
a part thereof was occupied by Andoks Litson Corp.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico acquired a portion of the
same area owned by the government.
o He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents (Vivencio) on the government land
closed his right of way to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his lot.
Issue:
Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.

Ratio:
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state
or property of public dominion.
o It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined to privileged individuals but is open
to the indefinite public. Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built is for the use
of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion.
o Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be:
Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts
Acquired by prescription against the state
Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution
Be burdened by any voluntary easement
It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the petitioner and
petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and he cannot claim any right of possession over it.
Abrogar v. People
Facts:
Abrogar here is being accused with theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The
information alleged that he effectively stole the business from PLDT while using its facilities.
o He filed a motion to quash the information since according to him it does not contain material
allegations charging the petitioner with theft of personal property since long distance calls and
the business of providing telecommunication are not personal properties under theft.
Issue:
Whether or not "stealing the business from PLDT while using its facilities" constitutes taking
of personal property within the meaning of Art. 308 of the RPC.
Ratio:
PERSONAL PROPERTY is defined as anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in
the chapter in real property in the
Civil Code. This court has consistently ruled in the past that any personal property, tangible or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft.
o Any property which is not included in the enumeration in the chapter on real property and
capable of appropriation can be the subject of theft under the RPC.
TO appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing and it may be committed
through the use of the offender's own hands, as well as any mechanical device such as access
device.
o Accused here was charged with using ISR or the unauthorized routing and completing of
international long distance calls using lines to make the calls.
o This is punishable as subtraction under a Revised Ordinance of Manila.
The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal
property which can be the object of theft under the RPC.
o It is not included as real property in the Civil Code but in previous cases, it has been held as
personal property.
Petitioners acts constitutes theft of respondent's business and service by means of unlawful
use of the latter's facilities.
o Hence, the amendment information describes the offense inaccurately by making it seem that
what he took were the long distance calls rather than the business.
o It cannot be said that PLDT is the owner of the "calls" because they merely encode the voices
and decode them.
o It is the use of the communication facilities without the consent that constitutes the crime of
theft.
DELA ROSA vs. ROLDAN
G.R. No. 133882
September 5, 2006
501 SCRA 34
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Facts:
The case originated from a claim of ownership over a parcel of land which was decided in favor of
defendant. However, plaintiff therein, despite the order of the court, continues to refuse to
vacate the land thereby prompting defendant to file with the MTC a complaint for recovery of
ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. The MTC rendered judgment
therein in favor of defendant on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the issue
between the parties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the
possession of the property by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but by virtue of a claim of
ownership; in fact, defendants never recognized the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents
Held:
Yes. The action of respondents against petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and as
such, the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the
nature of an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of
the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any
and all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the
action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant.
Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot
be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the
nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by
defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
was the law in effect when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that
"Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; provided that,
when, in such cases, defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues of possession."
Urieta vda. de Aguilar vs. Alfaro
Facts:
On August 3, 1995, petitioner, Asuncion Urieta, filed for a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Damages before the RTC of San Jose Mindoro. She alleged that on May 16, 1977, her
husband Ignacio Aguilar was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-9354 over a 606 sq meter
parcel of land in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. In 1968, Ignacio allowed
petitioners sister, Anastacia Urieta, mother of respondent Erlinda Alfaro to construct a house in
the southern part of the land and to temporarily stay therein.
In 1994, Ignacio died and his heirs decided to partition the lot. Petitioner asked respondents, who
took possession of the land after Anastacia died, to vacate the property but they did not heed
her demand.
Respondents asserted that on April 17, 1973, Ignacio and petitioner sold to their mother
Anastacia, the southern portion of the land as evidenced by the Kasulatan sa Bilihan which bears
the signatures of petitioner and her husband. However, petitioner denied having signed the
Kasulatan and averred that her signature in the Kasulatan is a forgery.
On September 21, 1998, the RTC ordered the respondents to vacate the subject premises and
denied their counterclaim for reconveyance. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts
decision. CA upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan since it is a notarized document and
disputably presumed to be authentic and duly executed.

Issue: Whether respondents Kasulatan ng Bilihan confer a better right to posses than petitioners
Torrens title.
Held: No.
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership to the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the
entire property. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan to
support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents proof of ownership has in its favor a
juris tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail over
petitioners Torrens title.

Question: Can a valid Transfer Certificate Title be issued on the basis of a forged Deed of
Absolute Sale?
Held: No. xxx with the presentation of the forged deed, even if accompanied by the owners
duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal v. Court of Appeals

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a judgment of the CA
Facts:
The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC)
to pay the Municipality of Pililla (municipality) business taxes and other fees. The judgment was
affirmed by the SC and became final and executor. The case was remanded to the RTC for
execution.
In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the
municipality for the examination of PPCs gross sales for the purpose of computing its business
taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received
from it P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by the release and quit claim
documents executed by the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiolas
motionfor examination and execution of judgment.
Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total liability amounted
to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted that the mayor
cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had registered two liens for
alleged consultancy services and attorneys fees amounting to more than P12M. The RTC,
however, denied his MR.
A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for
appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to represent
the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of the law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the municipality thru the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA.

Issue: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, has authority can file an action in court for and in
behalf of the municipality of Pililla
Held: No. Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file an action in court in behalf and in the name of
the Municipality of Pililla.
Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in lawsuits.
Sec. 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the provincial fiscal shall represent
the province or any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court except (a) in cases
whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the SC or (b) in cases where the municipality or
municipal district is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some municipality or
municipal district in the same province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified, a special
attorney may be employed by the municipal council.
Hence, only the provincial fiscal or municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in
their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipalitys authority to employ a private
lawyer is limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For
this exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified must appear on record.
The fiscals refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the
services of private counsel.
Unlike a practicing lawyer who has a right to refuse employment, fiscal cannot refuse to perform
his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office.
Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the
Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has
declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.
The legality of a private counsels representation can be questioned at any stage of the
proceedings.
Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)
Posted on October 4, 2012
G.R. No. 127820
292 SCRA 676
July 20, 1998
Facts:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Paraaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation, over two parcels
of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of
the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project.
Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously
made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the
latter did not accept. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property
upon its deposit with the clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair market value.
Private Respondent filed an answer alleging that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of
action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA
7160; and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On
private respondents motion, its answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. The trial court
dismissed the complaint
Issue:
Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolution by its law-making body.

Held:
Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by
its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the
former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner
involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in
effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the
latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) and MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs.
APOLONIO GOPUCO, JR.,
Facts:
Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995 square
meters located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City
Sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation informed the owners of the various lots
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including the herein respondent, that the government was
acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their
properties on the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would
no longer be used by the airport. Others, including Gopuco, refused to do so.
Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu for
the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties
CFI ruled in favor of the expropriation proceeding and such became final and executor.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport commenced operations, the Lahug Airport
was ordered closed by then President Corazon C. Aquino
On 16 March 1990, Gopuco wrote8 the Bureau of Air Transportation, through the manager of the
Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously received
by him as payment for the expropriation. This letter was ignored.9
Respondents argument: Gopuco maintained that by virtue of the closure of the Lahug Airport,
the original purpose for which the property was expropriated had ceased or otherwise been
abandoned, and title to the property had therefore reverted to him.
Trial court dismissed respondents petition. However, CA overturned the decision and ordered the
herein petitioners to reconvey Lot No. 72 to Gopuco upon payment of the reasonable price as
determined by it, and deleted the award to the petitioners of exemplary damages, litigation
expenses and costs
Hence this petition
Issue:
WON a private land, which was previously expropriated for a particular public use, be a subject to
a cause of action for recovery of property of the former owner upon the abandonment of such
particular public use.
Ruling:
The answer to that question (issue) depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator
When real property has been acquired for public use unconditionally, either by eminent domain
or by purchase, the abandonment or non-use of the real property, does not ipso facto give to the
previous owner of said property any right to recover the same (Fery vs. Municipality of
Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28).
Further, When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and
the public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner (Fort Wayne vs.
Lake Shore, etc. Ry. Co., 132 Ind., 558; 18 L.R.A., 367.)
Since Gopuco was not a party to the compromise agreements (that former land owners would be
able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the airport), he cannot

legally invoke the same. Also, neither has Gopuco, in the present case, adduced any evidence at
all concerning a right of repurchase in his favor.
Petition granted.
Masikip v. City of Pasig
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by
statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig
sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and recreational activities
of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged
purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The
Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was
genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and
inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to
the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional
limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value

of the property based on the current tax declaration; and

(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based
on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest
Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The
records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the
basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
Francia v. Meycauayan, G.R. No. 170432, March 24, 2008
Facts
The Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for expropriation against the Francia
family in the RTC. The municipality planned to expropriate the property of the Francias, which
located at the junction of the North Expressway main road artery and the MacArthur Highway, to
establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility vehicles with a weighing scale
for heavy trucks. The RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose, and ordered the
municipality to deposit with the Court 15% of the fair market value of the property sought to be
expropriated, to be based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated. The
RTC also ruled that the municipality may take immediate possession of the property pursuant to
the Courts writ of possession only after depositing said amount. The Francias filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, contending that the trial court erred in issuing its order without
conducted a hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose. The CA ruled that the
hearing was not necessary because once the expropriator deposited the required amount with
the Court, the issuance of writ of possession became ministerial.
Issue
Whether a hearing is necessary to determine the public purpose of the expropriation prior the
issuance of a writ of possession No
Held
Under Section 19 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code, the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market
value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated.
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the
proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value
based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public
purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.
ORTEGA vs. CEBU City
G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009
CASE:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco
and Arminda Ortega (Spouses Ortega) and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petition
FACTS:
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in
Hipodromo, Cebu City. ne-half of the above described land is occupied by squatters. On
September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed an ejectment case against the squatters before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of [the
spouses Ortega]. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of

the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and executory, and a writ of execution was
issued on February 1, 1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519,
giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of
[the spouses Ortegas] land (which is occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that
purpose. The amount will be charged against Continuing Appropriation, repurchase of lots for
various projects. The value of the land was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in
Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City]
filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu
City] against [the spouses Ortega].
On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that [Cebu City] has the lawful right to
take the property subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the
complaint upon payment of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners (one of whom was the City
Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21, 1999, fixing the value of
the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) per square meter
and ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation for the
expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B.
The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory because of [Cebu Citys] failure to perfect
an appeal on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to enforce the
courts judgment. Upon motion of [the Spouses Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order dated March
11, 2002 for execution or garnishment.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal
of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the
Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing
program. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was
likewise denied.
By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003 Sheriff Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a
Notice of Garnishment to Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch Cebu City,
garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank deposit therein.
Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the CA]. Cebu City] filed before the
[RTC] a Motion to Dissolve, Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that Account No.
101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519 is not actually an existing bank account and
that the garnishment of [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine Postal Bank was illegal,
because government funds and properties may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of public policy. The [RTC] issued an
Order dated March 8, 2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was
also denied. The Spouses Ortega] filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New Manager of
Philippine Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount, which was granted by the
[RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.
ISSUE:

WON the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.

RULING:
It is well settle in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation is a
judicial prerogative.

The determination of just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial

function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may
not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statue, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed compensation.
G.R. No. 152423
December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL & VICTORIA SORDEVILLA vs. MARIA COPRADA
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: Petitioners, spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla filed an ejectment
case against respondent Maria V. Coprada before the MCTC when the latter refused to vacate a
parcel of land, with an area of 253 square meters and covered by a TCT claimed by the
petitioners who are registered owner, upon demand. Respondent occupied said lot and
constructed their residential house, under the condition that they will vacate the premises should
petitioners need to use the same. Furthermore, respondent and her family have been occupying
the subject premises free of rent, including payment of realty taxes.
Respondent admitted that petitioners are the registered owners of the subject land. However,
she averred that in 1945, Emiliana Coprada, Victoria Sordevilla's mother and original owner who
gave permission to her late husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot as their permanent
abode, because of her love and affection for her nephew, and also, due to the fact that the lot is
virtually a wasteland. When Emiliana died, the ownership of the property was inherited by
petitioner Victoria. Respondent alleged that Victoria sold to her for P2,000.00 in installment and
which was fully paid in 1962. Due to their close relationship, the agreement was never reduced
to writing and since then she has been the one paying the realty taxes due on the property. After
the sale, respondent built on the lot a semi-concrete structure. Respondent stated that
petitioners' claim is barred by laches. Even granting, without admitting, that respondent's claim
of ownership is improper, respondent argued that she is a builder in good faith, because she was
able to build the structure on the subject lot with the prior permission of the owner.
MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that laches had already set in which
prevented petitioners from questioning the validity of the purported sale between Victoria and
Maria. RTC reversed MCTCs judgment ruling that respondent's occupation of the subject property
was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission, hence, respondent is bound by an implied
promise that she will vacate the property upon demand and her possession became unlawful
after the petitioners demanded her to vacate the property.
Upon review, the CA reversed the Decision of the RTC and affirmed in toto the Decision of the
MCTC.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject property.
HELD: An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or
depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-93542,
registered in the name of the petitioners. As against the respondent's unproven claim that she
acquired a portion of the property from the petitioners by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title
of petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title

serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a
Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, citing the case of Co v. Militar, the Court held that:
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the whole world
unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing
statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation
of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property, which is one of
the attributes of ownership. x x x
Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' right to eject any person illegally occupying their
property is not barred by laches. In Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu Labrador Uson, as
Attorney-in-Fact v. Spouses Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Spouse Rogelio Pobre and
Melinda Fogata Pobre, the Court held that:
x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of
Appeals, we held, thus:
As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that
they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of
that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.
Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is by mere tolerance or permission of the
petitioners, without any contract between them, respondent is bound by an implied promise that
she will vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the
proper remedy against her.
Since respondent's occupation of the subject property was by mere tolerance, she has no right to
retain its possession under Article 448 of the Civil Code. She is aware that her tolerated
possession may be terminated any time and she cannot be considered as builder in good faith. It
is well settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code, which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is
made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he
is the owner thereof. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its
owners are not possessors in good faith. At the time respondent built the improvements on the
premises in 1945, she knew that her possession was by mere permission and tolerance of the
petitioners; hence, she cannot be said to be a person who builds on land with the belief that she
is the owner thereof.