Prof. V. A.

Avena

A2010
Evidence

Hearsay
PEOPLE v. CUSI
G.R. No. L-20986
DIZON; August 14, 1965
(ricky)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari praying that the ruling of Judge Cusi be declared
erroneous and to order him to allow witness Sgt. Lucio Bao to answer the
question in full
FACTS
- Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo
Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide
in the CFI of Davao, to which they pleaded not guilty.
- During the trial, and while Sgt. Lucio Bao, of the Police Force of Digos,
Davao, was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial
confession made to him by Arcadio Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from
admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed
that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the
name of each and everyone of them.
- The prosecutor asked the witness to mention in court the names of
Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao,
Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness
would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. Judge
Vucente Cusi resolved the objection by directing the witness to answer the
question but without mentioning the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer
the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the
objection. The prosecutor's MFR of this ruling was denied.
ISSUE
WON Judge Cusi erred in resolving the objection.
HELD
YES.
Ratio There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may
not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Reasoning The purpose of the prosecutor is nothing more than to establish
the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bao the names of
those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without
claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bao
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so
named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, the question

propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been
allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer
shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named
really and actually conspired with Puesca and took part in the commission of
the offense.
Disposition The writ is granted.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
356 SCRA 108
PUNO; March 2, 2001
(joey)
NATURE
Consolidated cases: GR No. 146710-15- Petition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction, GR No. 146738 - Quo Warranto
FACTS
- This case concerns Eraps fall from power. You know the story
- January 18, 2001 start of EDSA II
- January 20, 2001 [midnight] first round of negotiations for the peaceful
and orderly transfer of power between Estradas and Arroyos camps; [noon]
Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the Philippines; [2:30
p.m] Estrada and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace and issued a
press statement saying that he has strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President but he was
nevertheless leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation.
- Still on January 20, Estrada signed a letter with the following tenor: By
virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am
hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers
and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the VicePresident shall be the Acting President. Copies of this were received by
former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. and by Senate President Pimentel
at 9 p.m.
- January 22 - Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency; SC issued Resolution in A.M No. 01-1-05-SC, wherein the court
resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the 12 members of
the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer
the oath of office to Arroyo as President
- Arroyo was recognized by more than a hundred foreign diplomats and by
the House of Representatives (through Resolution No. 175) as the new
President. She appointed cabinet members, ambassadors and special
envoys, signed bills into laws, and nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr.
as VP. Surveys to the public also showed high rate of acceptance.
- February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.

- Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. A
special panel of investigators was created to investigate the charges against
the petitioner.
- Petitioner filed these petitions, the first one seeking to enjoin the
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted, and the second praying for
judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of
the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of
his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be
holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WON the cases at bar involve a political question
2. WON Estrada resigned as President
3. WON petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
4. WON petitioner enjoys immunity from suit
5. WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal
for non justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The
doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of political cases.
Reasoning
- Tanada v. Cuenco: Political questions refer to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
- The 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.

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- Reliance on of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino is

erroneous. There is a clear legal distinction between EDSA I and EDSA II.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I
is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted
from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial
review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions.
2. YES
Ratio To be considered as a resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. As long as
the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Reasoning
- The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article
VII of the Constitution as petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he
suffers from a permanent disability.
- Petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacaang. Consequently, whether or not he resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20,
2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (totality
test)
- Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Exec. Sec. Angara
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was used as an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner.
- Among others, it stated that that on January 20, the petitioner decided to call
for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate.
The SC considered this as an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up
the presidency even at that time. The diary also stated that Estrada
expressed no objections to the plans for a graceful and dignified exit. To the
SC, this was proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he
had to resign.
- SC also noted that the first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power was limited to 3 points, which did not include the resignation of
petitioner because at this time, this was not a disputed point.
- Angaras diary quotes Estrada saying, Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na
masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. To
the SC, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The
intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
- During this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period.

- The resignation of the petitioner was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang.

In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace,
the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that
he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called
on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation
and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.
- It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a
temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern and cites the letter
transmitted to the Senate President and House Speaker as support.
However, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner.
Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the
result of his repudiation by the people.
- Petitioner also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies
on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which states that no public officer shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the RPC on bribery.
- The intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective
shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case
against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or
prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person
can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his
constitutional right. A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants
to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public
official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such
resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him.
- Also, when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, there were cases filed
against him before the Ombudsman but they were not technically pending as
the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. The Ombudsman
refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation for the reason that as
the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Section 12 of RA
No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked.

- Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative

investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning.
However, the exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.
Even assuming that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be
considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process
already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the
opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked
out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of
Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in
effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
3. NO
Ratio Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner
provided for in section 11 of Article VII
Reasoning
- The Congress has through various acts confirmed GMAs presidency. They
passed the following resolutions: House Resolution No. 176 (Resolution
Expressing The Support Of The House Of Representatives To The
Assumption Into Office By Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo As
President Of The Republic Of The Philippines, Extending Its Congratulations
And Expressing Its Support For Her Administration As A Partner In The
Attainment Of The Nations Goals Under The Constitution); House Resolution
No. 178 (Resolution Confirming President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos
Nomination Of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. As Vice President Of The
Republic Of The Philippines); Senate Resolution No. 82(Resolution
Confirming President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos Nomination Of Sen. Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr. As Vice President Of The Republic Of The Philippines);
Senate Resolution No. 83 (Resolution Recognizing That The Impeachment
Court Is Functus Officio); Senate Resolution No. 84 (Certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up
such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular
election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.). Both houses of Congress also
started sending bills to be signed into law by Arroyo as President.
- Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of
inability.
- The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat.
- Even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is
merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. NO
Ratio Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.

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Moreover, unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing
as any other trespasser; he is not immune from suit for criminal acts.
Reasoning
- Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from
all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
- The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case
law. In Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco it was held: the [Governor-General] is
liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority
that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or
not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from
personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but
also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and
judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided
the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably
qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the
lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ
over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as Governor-General but
as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of
his act.
- Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make
it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already
be filed against him.
- The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be
covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
5. NO
Ratio To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might
be, by the barrage of publicity. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden. (Martelino v Alejandro)
Reasoning
- 2 principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with
the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high
profile cases. (1) British- presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury;
courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair
trial suffers a threat. (2) American- skeptical about the potential effect of
pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial; employ different

strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable

harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
- Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair
trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavelto-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We
have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of
parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
- There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer
more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to
show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
- The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent
Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the
respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted
news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at
him by the mobs." News reports have also been quoted to establish that the
respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner
and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be
influenced by this bias of their superior.
- Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial.
The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the
subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the
Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith
and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor
can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the
prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they
are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can not be
compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be compelled to
prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal.
Dispositive Petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are
DISMISSED
SEPARATE OPINION
Vitug [concur]
- Resignation is an act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
renounces his office indefinitely. In order to constitute a complete and
operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear

intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by an act of

relinquishment. Resignation implies, of the intention to surrender, renounce,
relinquish the office.
- Mr. Estrada imports that he did not resign from the presidency because the
word "resignation" has not once been embodied in his letters or said in his
statements. However, the contemporary acts of Estrada during those four
critical days of January are evident of his intention to relinquish his office.
Scarcity of words may not easily cloak reality and hide true intentions.
- Abandonment of office is a species of resignation, and it connotes the giving
up of the office although not attending by the formalities normally observed in
resignation. Abandonment may be effected by a positive act or can be the
result of an omission, whether deliberate or not.
- Mr. Joseph Estrada invokes "temporary incapacity" under Section 11, Article
VII of the Constitution. This assertion is difficult to sustain since the temporary
incapacity contemplated clearly envisions those that are personal, either by
physical or mental in nature, 7 and innate to the individual.
- Neither can it be implied that the takeover has installed a revolutionary
government. A revolutionary government is one which has taken the seat of
power by force or in defiance of the legal processes. Within the political
context, a revolution is a complete overthrow of the established government.
In its delimited concept, it is characterized often, albeit not always, by
violence as a means and specificable range of goals as ends. In contrast,
EDSA 2 did not envision radical changes. The government structure has
remained intact. Succession to the presidency has been by the duly-elected
Vice-president of the Republic. The military and the police, down the line,
have felt to be so acting in obedience to their mandate as the protector of the
people.
Mendoza [concur]
- The legitimacy of a revolutionary government cannot be the subject of
judicial review. In contrast, these cases do not involve the legitimacy of a
government. They only involve the legitimacy of the presidency of Arroyo.
- The events that led to the departure of petitioner Joseph E. Estrada from
office are well known and need not be recounted in great detail. Justice
Mendoza quoted excerpts from the Far Eastern Economic Review and Time
Magazine as quoted in the submitted Memorandum.
- The permanent disability referred to in the Constitution can be physical,
mental or moral, rendering the President unable to exercise the powers and
functions of his office. As his close adviser wrote in his diary of the final hours
of petitioner's presidency: The President says: "Pagod na pagod na ako.
Ayoko na-masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy,
intriga. Angara himself shared this view of petitioner's inability. He wrote in
his diary: "Let us be realistic," I counter. "The President does not have the
capability to organize a counter-attack. He does not have the AFP or the
Philippine National Police on his side. He is not only in a corner; he is also
down.
- This is the clearest proof that petitioner was totally and permanently
disabled at least as of 11 P.M. of Friday, January 19, 2001. Hence the
negotiations for the transfer of power to the respondent Vice-President Gloria

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Macapagal-Arroyo. It belies petitioner's claim that he was not permanently

disabled but only temporarily unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office and therefore can only be temporarily replaced by respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo under Art. VII, Sec. 11.
- From this judgment that petitioner became permanently disabled because
he had lost the public's trust.
- The only question left for resolution is whether there was massive prejudicial
publicity attending the investigation by the Ombudsman of the criminal
charges against petitioner. The test in this jurisdiction is whether there has
been "actual, not merely possible, prejudice"19 caused to petitioner as a
result of publicity. There has been no proof of this, and so I think this claim
should simply be dismissed.
Motion for reconsideration
PUNO; April 3, 2001
ISSUES
1. WON prejudicial publicity has affected petitioners right to fair trial
2. WON petitioner resigned or should be considered resigned
3. WON the Angara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following
rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions and
res inter alios acta, and WON reliance on newspaper acounts is violative of
the hearsay rule
4. WON Congress post facto can decide petitioners inability to govern
considering Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution
5. WON petitioner must be first convicted in the impeachment proceedings
before he can be criminally prosecuted.
6. WON there was double jeopardy
7. WON petitioner was immune from suit
8. WON the SC Justices who went to EDSA should inhibit themselves from
the proceedings
HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner assails the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the
events and occurrences to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our
Decision, we used the totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner
has resigned. We referred to and analyzed events that were prior,
contemporaneous and posterior to the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as
president. All these events are facts which are well-established and cannot
be refuted. All these prior events are facts which are within judicial notice by
this Court. There was no need to cite their news accounts. The reference by
the Court to certain newspapers reporting them as they happened does not
make them inadmissible evidence for being hearsay. The news account only
buttressed these facts as facts. Even then, petitioner has not singled out any
of these facts as false.
- We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. It is not unusual for courts to distill a persons subjective intent
from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts ascertain intent in criminal

cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and testaments, in commercial
cases involving contracts and in other similar cases.
- Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Under the
res ipsa loquitur rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury,
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is not
a rule of substantive law but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation
does not exempt the plaintiff with the requirement of proof to prove
negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine,
creating an inference or presumption of negligence and to thereby place on
the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof.
- It is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule usually applied
only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in the whole
world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of
prejudicial publicity.
- Petitioner keeps on pounding on the adverse publicity against him but fails
to prove how the impartiality of the panel of investigators from the Office of
the Ombudsman has been infected by it. This fact must be established by
clear and convincing evidence and cannot be left to loose surmises and
conjectures.
- We cannot replace this test of actual prejudice with the rule of res ipsa
loquitur. The latter rule assumes that an injury (i.e., prejudicial publicity) has
been suffered and then shifts the burden to the panel of investigators to prove
that the impartiality of its members has been affected by said publicity. Such
a rule will overturn our case law that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
- Petitioner suggests that the Court should order a 2-month cooling off period
to allow passions to subside and hopefully the alleged prejudicial publicity
against him would die down. There is no assurance that the so called 2month cooling off period will achieve its purpose. Petitioner cannot avoid the
kleiglight of publicity. What is important for the petitioner is that his
constitutional rights are not violated in the process of investigation.
2. YES
Ratio In determining whether a given resignation is voluntarily tendered, the
element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the resignation is submitted
under duress brought on by government action. The three-part test for such
duress has been stated as involving the following elements: (1) whether one
side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2) whether circumstances
permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such circumstances were the
result of coercive acts of the opposite side.
- A resignation may be found involuntary if on the totality of the circumstances
it appears that the employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively
deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be considered,
under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to
resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he
or she was given; (3) whether the employee was given a reasonable time in
which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the

effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the circumstances

test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must be gauged
by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely subjective
evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only option to be
resignation - for example, because of concerns about his or her reputation - is
irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is between comparably
unpleasant alternatives - for example, resignation or facing disciplinary
charges - does not of itself establish that a resignation was induced by duress
or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is so even where the only
alternative to resignation is facing possible termination for cause, unless the
employer actually lacked good cause to believe that grounds for termination
existed.
- A resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing
proceedings for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without
procedural view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for
deliberation of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer
charged with misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate
authority has already determined that the officers alternative is termination,
where such authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers
employment under the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to
threaten to do what one has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any
measure authorized by law and the circumstances of the case.
Reasoning
- Petitioners issuance of the press release and his abandonment of
Malacaang Palace confirmed his resignation. These are overt acts which
leave no doubt to the Court that the petitioner has resigned.
- Petitioner had several options available to him other than resignation-- the
holding of snap elections, written declaration of temporary inability, etc.
Immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked Secretary Angara: "Ed,
aalis na ba ako?" which implies that he still had a choice of whether or not to
leave.
- To be sure, pressure was exerted for the petitioner to resign. But it is
difficult to believe that the pressure completely vitiated the voluntariness of
the petitioners resignation. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled
through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential
residence, no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to
justify the conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.
3. NO
- The Angara diary is not an out of court statement but is actually part of the
pleadings. It was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.
Furthermore, the three parts of the Diary published in the PDI were attached
as Annexes A-C of the Memorandum of private respondents Romeo T.
Capulong, et al. The second and third parts of the Diary were earlier also
attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of same respondents.
Petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both
the second and third parts of the diary. It was also extensively used by
Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner
had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed
to do so.

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Evidence

- Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called
hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom
it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay
evidence: (1) absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor
evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not at all hearsay evidence, however,
is inadmissible as evidence.
- Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by
courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. The decided
historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative statements
from the definition of hearsay, and to develop more class exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
- A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they
do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this
class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him." It has
long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay.
- Wigmore: The partys declaration has generally the probative value of any
other persons asssertion, and it has a special value when offered against the
party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys statement
with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like a
witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, admissions pass
the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial assertions
be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to cross-examine
because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does not need to cross
examine himself. The Hearsay Rule is satisfied since the party now as
opponent has the full opportunity to put himself on the stand and explain his
former assertion.
- Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party himself rests
not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the
trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A
party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself
or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an
oath. A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.
- The Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party.
- Even if the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, it is binding on him
under the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys
reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by
the other person.
- Petitioner further contends that the use of the Angara diary against him
violated the rule on res inter alios acta (see Section 28 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court) However, the rule has several exceptions. One of them is

provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner

or agent.
- Executive Secretary Angara was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was
authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before
he abandoned Malacaang Palace. The Diary shows that petitioner was
always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations.
Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days
before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Consequently,
petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara.
- Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent are binding on the
principal. The reason behind this is "What is done, by agent, is done by the
principal through him, as through a mere instrument.
- Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently
relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently
of whether they are true or not. They belong to two classes: (1) those
statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which
are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class includes
the following:
a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and
the like;
c. Statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the
state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad
faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.
- Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro, which frowned on
reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. However, in the Muro case,
Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a
newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to
be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. In
the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the
admissibility of the Angara Diary when he filed his pleadings. He was
therefore not denied due process. Petitioner had "been given an opportunity
to inspect" the Angara Diary but did not object to its admissibility.
On the Rule on Proof of Private Writings
- Sec. 20 Rule 132 provides that before any private writing offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b)
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
- A proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary
evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be
reasonably established as a pre-requisite to its admission. However, a party
who does not deny the genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object
that it was not properly identified before it was admitted in evidence.
On the Best Evidence Rule

- It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the
Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6,
2001. In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule.
- Wigmore: Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial
courts discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be
served by requiring production.
- Francisco: an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is
sought to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into
application; and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted,
the rule of exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and
timely objection had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of
objecting to the admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say
here that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever
it appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before
the secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be
sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts
consideration. Secondary evidence of the content of the writing will be
received in evidence if no objection is made to its reception.
4. YES
- Petitioner argues that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when
there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the
President. It is also urged that the presidents judgment that he is unable to
govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the
House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this
Court cannot review.
- Petitioner himself made the submission that "Congress has the ultimate
authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11
of Article VII." If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress
exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress
itself.
- Petitioner now argues that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is
a judicial question. Petitioners change of theory, ill disguised as it is, does
not at all impress. The cases at bar do not present the general issue of
whether the respondent Arroyo is the de jure or a de facto President. Specific
issues were raised to the Court for resolution and we ruled on an issue by
issue basis. Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization
that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question.
- Petitioner asserts that these acts of Congress of passing Resolutions should
not be accorded any legal significance because: (1) they are post facto and
(2) a declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied. There is nothing
in section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution which states that the declaration
by Congress of the Presidents inability must always be a priori or before the
Vice-President assumes the presidency. Special consideration should be
given to the fact that the events which led to the resignation of the petitioner
happened at express speed and culminated on a Saturday. Congress was
then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori on
petitioners letter claiming inability to govern.

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Evidence

- Petitioner cannot strictly maintain that the President of the Senate, the
Honorable Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and the then Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Honorable Arnulfo P. Fuentebella, recognized
respondent Arroyo as the "constitutional successor to the presidency" post
facto. Before the oath-taking, Senate President Pimentel, Jr. and Speaker
Fuentebella had prepared a Joint Statement which states their recognition of
Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the Presidency. This a priori
recognition by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives was followed post facto by various resolutions of the Senate
and the House, in effect, confirming this recognition. These acts of
Congress, a priori and post facto, cannot be dismissed as merely implied
recognitions of respondent Arroyo, as the President of the Republic.
- The Constitution clearly sets out the structure on how vacancies and
election contest in the office of the President shall be decided. Thus, section
7 of Article VII covers the instance when (a) the President-elect fails to
qualify, (b) if a President shall not have been chosen and (c) if at the
beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or
shall have become permanently disabled. Section 8 of Article VII covers the
situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation
of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the
President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution
specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the
contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that
the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of
resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction
to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII
gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself
submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court.
5. NO.
- A plain reading of the section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution will not
yield petitioners conclusion. The provision conveys two uncomplicated
ideas: first, it tells us that judgment in impeachment cases has a limited
reach. . .i.e., it cannot extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, and
second, it tells us the consequence of the limited reach of a judgment in
impeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that the party convicted
shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according
to law. No amount of manipulation will justify petitioners non sequitur
submission that the provision requires that his conviction in the impeachment
proceedings is a condition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and
punishment for the offenses he is now facing before the Ombudsman.
6. NO.
Ratio Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.

Reasoning
- Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walk out from
the impeachment proceedings "should be considered failure to prosecute on
the part of the public and private prosecutors, and the termination of the case
by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal." He explains "failure to prosecute" as
the "failure of the prosecution to prove the case, hence dismissal on such
grounds is a dismissal on the merits." He then concludes that "dismissal of a
case for failure to prosecute amounts to an acquittal for purposes of applying
the rule against double jeopardy."
- Assuming that the first four requisites of double jeopardy were complied
with, petitioner failed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor
was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent.
Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be predicated on prior conviction
for he was not convicted by the impeachment court.
- At best, his claim of previous acquittal may be scrutinized in light of a
violation of his right to speedy trial, which amounts to a failure to prosecute.
As Bernas points out, a failure to prosecute, which is what happens when the
accused is not given a speedy trial, means failure of the prosecution to prove
the case. Hence, dismissal on such grounds is a dismissal on the merits.
However, petitioner was not able to prove that his case was dragged to an
unreasonable length of time.
- Nor can the claim of double jeopardy be grounded on the dismissal or
termination of the case without the express consent of the accused. The
impeachment proceeding was closed only after the petitioner had resigned
from the presidency, thereby rendering the impeachment court functus officio.
By resigning from the presidency, petitioner more than consented to the
termination of the impeachmment case against him, for he brought about the
termination of the impeachment proceedings. We have consistently ruled
that when the dismissal or termination of the case is made at the instance of
the accused, there is no double jeopardy.
7.. NO
- Petitioner avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit
during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish
between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer
may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be
shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the
immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not
his term.
8. NO.
- There is no ground to inhibit the12 members of the Court who merely
accepted the invitation of the Arroyo to attend her oath taking. As mere
spectators of a historic event, said members of the Court did not prejudge the
legal basis of the claim of Arroyo to the presidency at the time she took her
oath.

- It is clear from A.M. No. 01-1-05 SC, that the Court did not treat the letter of
respondent Arroyo to be administered the oath by Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,
as a case but as an administrative matter. If it were considered as a case,
then petitioner has reason to fear that the Court has predetermined the
legitimacy of the claim of respondent Arroyo to the presidency. To dispel the
erroneous notion, the Court precisely treated the letter as an administrative
matter and emphasized that it was "without prejudice to the disposition of any
justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."
- In further clarification, the Court on February 20, 2001 issued another
resolution to inform the parties and the public that it "did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant
and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the
alleged resolution."
- To disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of
them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction
as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by
the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects
the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification,
if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Justices.
Dispositive MR denied for lack of merit
CORNEJO, SR. V SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. L-58831
FERNAN; July 31, 1987
(mini)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review Sandiganbayan decision
FACTS
- Cornejo seeks a review on certiorari of a decision in a Criminal case
wherein the Sandiganbayan found him guilty for the crime of Estafa
- facts of the criminal case:
Accused represented himself to be connected with the City
Engineer, to the complainant, Beth Chua. He said that he was empowered to
inspect private buildings and that the Metro Manila Commission requires that
the floor area of all houses be measured, a service which usually costs
P3/square meter, but for which he would only charge P0.50/square meter if
he were to be hired. Although Beth Chua initially was doubtful about the
personaility of the accused Engineer, she eventually believed him and hired
him for the premises she had been renting.
Beth Chua saw the accused Engineer go into the house of her
neighbor, Mrs. Bernal, and found out he was there for the same purpose.

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Evidence

Mrs. Bernal had apparently had similar doubts as to the identity of the
accused Engineer, so both she and Chua went to the Barangay Captain, who
went with them to Pasay City Hall. There, City Engineer Jesus Reyna told
them that the accused Engineer was not authorized to conduct inspection
and investigation of privately owned buildings. This fact was later confirmed
by a certification issued to that effect by said City Engineer.
Accused Engineer was eventually cought by the cops in some
entrapment plan.
- Cornejo objects to the admissibility of the certification issued by City
Engineer Jesus Reyna to the effect that Cornejo was not authorized to
inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings
ISSUE
1. WON the certification issued by City Engineer Jesus Reyna is covered by
the hearsay rule
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Where the statement or writings attributed to a person who is not on
the witness stand are being offered to prove that such statements were
actually made or such writings were executed, such evidence is not covered
by the hearsay rule.
Reasoning The certification was not presented as independent evidence to
prove the want of authority of petitioner to inspect and investigate privatelyowned buildings, but merely as part of the testimony of the complainant that
such certification was issued in her presence and the declaration of Assistant
City Engineer Ceasar Contreras that the signature appearing thereon was
that of Engineer Reyna.
Besides, the finding ot the trial court that petitioner had no
authority to conduct inspections and investigations was reached, not solely
on the basis of the certification, but principally from a consideration and study
of the law which first allowed the city governments to create the position of
City Public Works Supervisor, in relation to the law which placed the city
public works supervisors under the supervision of the city engineers.
Disposition instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

COMILANG V BURCENA
GR 146853
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; Feb13, 2006
(bauza)
FACTS
- Francisco and Mariano Burcena (respondents), together w/ their mother,
Dominga Reclusado Vda. de Burcena (Dominga), filed a complaint for
annulment of document w/ damages against Salvador Comilang (petitioner).

- The complaint alleges that: respondents are the owners of a 918-sqm parcel
of land located in Manueva, Santa, Ilocos Sur and the house with a floor area
of 32 sqm built thereon; respondents acquired the subject property through
their earnings while working abroad; the subject property was declared for
taxation purposes in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; petitioner
caused the execution of a Deed of Donation over said property by taking
advantage of Dominga's blindness, old age and physical infirmity; the said
Deed of Donation is null and void because: (a) Dominga had no right to
donate the same since she is not its owner, (b) Dominga did not give her
consent and was misled to the execution of such document, (c) granting
Dominga had authority to donate, the donation is void because the property
donated is the only property declared in her name and therefore she could
not have reserved for herself in full ownership sufficient property to support
herself; petitioner is in possession of the subject property, depriving
respondents of its ownership and enjoyment of its fruits.
- In his Answer, petitioner contends that: the Deed of Donation was freely and
voluntarily executed by Dominga in consideration of her love and affection for
him; the subject property was acquired by Dominga together w/ her 2 sisters,
Aniceta and Juana Reclusado, long before respondents went to Hawaii;
Dominga erected a house on the land long before the outbreak of World War
II; Dominga financed out of her own money the construction of the house and
subsequent improvements thereof, she being a merchant when she could still
travel to Cagayan Valley; granting that respondents had been sending money
to Dominga, said money already belonged to her; if Dominga used said
money for improving the house, respondents have no right over the house.
- During the pendency of the case and before she could take the witness
stand, Dominga died. Following pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.
Witnesses for the plaintiffs were respondents and their aunt, Margarita
Burcena (Margarita); while petitioner testified on his own behalf.
- RTC held that the donation is void because Dominga could not have validly
disposed of the subject property since it was bought with the money sent by
respondents while working abroad, although declared for taxation purposes in
Dominga's name. (petitioner found in good faith -only has to turnover
property)
- Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. The CA found no cogent
reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC, as well as the latter's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses. The CA held that the case involves
an implied trust known as purchase price resulting trust under Article 1448,
CC where property sold is granted to one party but the price is paid for by
another; that the evidence presented by the respondents convincingly show
that the subject property was bought with money belonging to respondents
but declared in Dominga's name as administrator thereof; and that Dominga's
act of donating the property to petitioner was beyond her authority and
capacity, done without the consent of the real owners, herein respondents.
Thus, the CA sustained the conclusion of the RTC that the donation is void.
- Petitioner's MFR was denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON CA erred in discussing an issue not brought before it (implied trust)

2. WON Margarita's statement on the witness stand (that Dominga told her
that the respondents sent her money to buy the subject property) should not
have been given weight or credence by the RTC and the CA because it is
hearsay and has no probative value.
HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings
even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in these instances: (a)
grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or
clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters not assigned as errors
on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of
justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters not specifically
assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to
raise or which the lower court ignored; (e) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters not assigned
as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent. (See R51, sec 8, ROC)
In this case, since the petitioner directly brought in issue on appeal in his
Appellants Brief the declaration of the RTC that Dominga could not have
validly disposed of the subject property because respondents are the real
owners of the subject property since it was bought with money sent by them,
it was well-within the CAs authority to review and evaluate the propriety of
such ruling. In holding that an implied trust exists between respondents and
Dominga in relation to the subject property and therefore Dominga had no
right to donate the same to petitioner, the CA merely clarified the RTC's
findings.
The trust created under the 1st sentence of Art 1448, CC is sometimes
referred to as a purchase money resulting trust, the elements of which are:
(a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent,
constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be
furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust. Respondents have
shown that the two elements are present in the instant case. Dominga was
merely a trustee of the respondents in relation to the subject property.
Therefore, Dominga could not have validly donated the subject property to
petitioner, as expressly provided in Article 736, CC (guardians and trustees
cannot donate the property entrusted to them.)
2. NO.
Ratio While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement
made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted
in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of
placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the
statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth
or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the
hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of
fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary,

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Evidence

for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially

relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
Reasoning What was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was
actually admitted in evidence, was the fact that the statement was made by
Dominga to Margarita, not necessarily that the matters stated by her were
true. The statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds
used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is
admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the
tenor thereof.
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC
decision. In fact, her testimony is not indispensable. It merely serves to
corroborate the testimonies of the respondents on the source of the funds
used in purchasing the subject property. The testimonies of all three
witnesses for the plaintiffs were found to be convincing and credible by the
RTC. This Court will not alter the findings of the RTC on the credibility of
witnesses, principally because trial courts have vastly superior advantages in
ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they have the opportunity
to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
Dying Declaration
PEOPLE V. MOLAS
G.R. Nos. 97437-39
GRIO-AQUINO, February 5, 1993
(cha)
NATURE
Appeal
FACTS
-Josue Molas (accused-appellant) and Dulcesima Resonable (Dulcesima,
victim) were sweethearts and were engaged to be married. Dulcesima was
the daughter of Bernardo and Soledad Resonable, and the sister of Nicolas
and Abelardo Resonable
-on Feb 2, 1983, at about 6:00 pm after farm work, Bernardo arrived at their
house and found 8-y.o. Abelardo at the doorway of their house bathed in his
own blood. Bernardo carried Abelardo into their house. Abelardo informed his
father that Josue Molas was the person who not only inflicted his injuries but
also stabbed Dulcesima and Soledad. Bernardo then looked for Dulcesima,
who he found dead in a dried carabao mud pool 3-arms length from the
house, and Soledad, who he found near the bench by the door of the house.
Bernardo ran to the barangay captain and sought help from authorities.
Abelardo was brought to the Provincial hospital but died the next day.
-dawn of Feb 3, Josue Molas, with blood-stained clothes, surrendered to
Patrolman Geronimo Vallega, together with the hunting knife I used in killing

the mother, the daughter and the boy. Patrolman Vallega then lodged Molas
in jail. Molas was transferred to Valencia Police Station later.
-next morning, after being informed of his Constitutional rights, refused to
give any statement to the police. Eventually, Molas freely and voluntarily
related the whole story, as taken down by Patrolman Fetalvero. The
following are contained in Molas sworn statement: In our arrival to their
house at sitio Inas, Barangay Dobdob, from Kabangogan, * this Soledad
Resonable lighted a gas lamp in their store and said, "maayo kay naabot na
ta walay makaboot nako ug patyon nako ang akong anak." [It's good that you
have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter] at the same time
went near Dulcesima, her daughter and grabbed her hair and boxed her to
the different parts of her body. Because of faith and sympathy, I stopped
Solidad by holding her hands to prevent her boxing Dulcesima, but on my
intervention, Soledad boxed me hitting my head and arms. Due to blocks I
made she was tired and again went back to Dulcesima and again boxed her
to the different parts of her body. Because I was hurt on the part of Dulcisima,
my wife-to-be and no other means to prevent Solidad, I was able to grab the
weapon on my waist and stabbed Solidad hitting her first on the breast, then
on the back after which I saw Abelardo, Dulcisima's younger brother at my
back holding and boxing my buttock. I stabbed him on the breast and
followed again at the back causing him to fall down on the ground, leaving
therein the weapon I used causing incised wound on my right little finger and
ran away but Dulcisima stopped me by holding my left hand and said,
"puslang nabuhat sa akong ginikanan, patya lamang ko ug layhan ka mag
onong ta sa kamatayon." [How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so
we'll all die together]. Hearing such words, I responded, "papatay ka diay
kanako," [You'll kill me after all?] I went back where Abelardo was and pulled
the penetrated weapon and stabbed Dulcisima who at that time was following
me hitting her breast and caused her life to end. When I saw Solidad her
mother walking towards the seat of their store and sat down, I followed her
and slashed her neck and stabbed her stomach and immediately ran home.
The said confession was signed before Judge Tayrosa of the MTC fo
Valencia after it was translated to Cebuano. Molas did not object to any of the
contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly.
-3 separate information for murder were filed against Molas, to which he
pleaded not guilty.
-for the defense, only Molas was presented. In essence, he testified that at
about 6 pm on Feb 2, he saw his fianc lifeless beside the dried mud pool 3
fathoms away from the store/house. He hugged Dulcesima but she was dead
so he ran to the store. There, he saw Soledad wounded in the neck and
bathed with blood. He also saw Abelardo under a table with a hunting knife in
his back which he pulled from Abelardo. He shouted for help then suddenly a
voice from behind the store said Dont shout, Bay, if you dont want to die! 3
unidentified men started chasing him afterwards. During the said flight he
stumbled, causing the injury in his hands. He informed his mother regarding
what happened, and with his blood-stained clothes, he proceeded to the
police station. While he was being investigated, Patrolman Vallaga arrived
and informed Patrolman Renzal that Abelardo tagged him as the killer. He
also alleged, though unsubstantiated, that Patrolman Quitoy manhandled

him. He denied knowing the contents of the affidavit because it was written in
English and was not translated to him.
-RTC: GUILTY
ISSUES
1. WON the court erred in giving credence to Abelardos dying declaration
2. WON his extrajudicial admission was validly admitted by the court
HELD
1. NO. Correct in giving credence to it as a dying declaration.
Ratio. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (1) concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) that at the time it was
made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; (c) that
he was a competent witness; and (d) that his declaration is offered in
evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling,
69 SCRA 427).
Reasoning. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his
injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was given to his father, while
he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and
spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was
indubitably a dying declaration. All of the circumstances required were
present when Abelardo made his dying declaration.
2. YES
Ratio. While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made
without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as
evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused
established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA
462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA
249).
Reasoning. The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito
Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16, 1984, quoted the
admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on
the witness stand, found him credible.
- the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the
accused. Even if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough
evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of
Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of
the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and
the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and
Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving
beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima
and Soledad Resonable.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment convicting Josue Molas
for the murders of Dulcesima Resonable, Soledad Resonable and Abelardo
Resonable and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for

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each of said murders is AFFIRMED, with modification of the death indemnity

which is hereby increased to P50,000.00 for each case. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS GUMIMBA
517 SCRA 25
TINGA; February 27, 2007
(athe)
NATURE
APPEAL from the decision of the CA
FACTS
- Gumimba and co-accused Abapo were charged with the crime of rape with
homicide of an eight-year old child.
- Both entered a plea of not guilty on arraignment. The prosecution
presented two witnesses: Magallano and Arenas. They testified that
Gumimba went to Magallanos home and confessed to him that he alone and
by himself raped and killed his niece in Ozamis City. He even repeated his
narration and confessed to the baranggay captain that he had raped and
killed the victim.
- Gumimba later on changed his plea of not guilty to GUILTY.
- Both were found guilty of the crime. However, on appeal the appellant
raises the issue that the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant on the
basis of his improvident plea of guilty and his alleged confessions to
Magallano and Aranas, the latter being hearsay.
ISSUE
WON the testimonies of Magallano and Aranas are inadmissible in evidence
for being hearsay
HELD
NO. The testimonies are independently relevant statements which are not
barred by the hearsay rule.
Ratio Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact
that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity is
immaterial. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
DISPOSITION
Decision of the RTC and CA affirmed.

PEOPLE V MARAMARA
G.R. No. 110994
PARDO; October 22, 1999

(rean)
NATURE
Appeal from RTC Decision
FACTS
- Cresencio Maramara was convicted of murder for killing Miguelito Donato.
He now appeals to SC.
- Prosec Version: At a benefit dance held in the yard of accused Maramaras
house in the evening of Nov. 18, 1991 and at about 12 mn, while Ricardo
Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena, Dante Arce, a friend of accused,
approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest. Rowena ran away while
Ricardo scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about
2 meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Accused
took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito, hitting the
latter on the left breast. Ricardo tried to help his fallen brother but somebody
struck Ricardos head with an iron bar which knocked him out for about 3
minutes. When Ricardo regained consciousness, he hurried home and
informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito.
- Miguelitos father, Regarder, immediately went to the crime scene and
rushed Miguelito to the Hospital where the latter died. Before Miguelito
expired, Regarder asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was
accused.
- Defense Version: At about 11p,pm., brothers Ricardo and Miguelito arrived
at the benefit dance and approached the dancing pair of Rowena and Dante.
Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on Dante. Maramara, rushed to the
scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accuseds hands at his back and then
Miguelito repeatedly stabbed him on different parts of his body. Accused
regained consciousness at the hospital where Dr. Gil Georga treated him for
a few days. There was no way accused couldve resisted Miguelitos attack,
much less was he capable of inflicting injury on Miguelito, since the stronger
Ricardo was holding accuseds hands and was dragging him away while
Miguelito kept lunging a 6-inch bladed weapon at him. Dr. Georga,
accuseds attending doctor, never asked the details of the stabbing incident
nor the identity of assailant.

- Guided by these long standing doctrinal pronouncements, we find no reason

to disturb the trial courts assessment of (1) Ricardos eyewitness account of
how accused shot Miguelito and (2) Regarders recollection of his son
Miguelitos dying declaration, as truthful testimonies coming from credible
witnesses. The fact of relationship of prosecution witnesses Ricardo and
Regarder Donato to the victim Miguelito does not necessarily place them in
bad light. Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of bias or
ulterior motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the
testimony of a witness.
- Where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the
presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.
2 YES
- For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must
concur: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact;
(2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is
competent to testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry.
- The degree and seriousness of the wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito
and the fact that his death supervened shortly thereafter may be considered
as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him with the full
realization that he was in a dying condition. The victim Miguelitos dying
declaration having satisfied all these requisites, it must be considered as an
evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of death, all thoughts
of fabrication are stilled. A victims utterance after sustaining a mortal wound
may be considered pure emanations of the incident.
Note: The Court found that the appreciation of treachery by RTC to qualify the
offense to murder is reversed.
Disposition: RTC Decision MODIFIED. Accused guilty of HOMICIDE and
NOT MURDER.

ISSUES
1 WON testimonies of prosecution witnesses are credible
2 WON Regarder Donatos testimony regarding Miguelitos identification of
the accused as his assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is
worthy of credence
HELD
1 YES
- The issue of credibility requires a determination that is concededly best left
to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to observe
that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on
the stand. In the absence of any showing that the trial courts calibration of
credibility is flawed, SC is bound by its assessment.

PEOPLE V. MOLO
G.R. No. L-44680
Per Curiam; 11 January 1979
(ice)
Nature
Automatic Review
Facts
Molo was accused of Murder. He allegedly attacked and assaulter Gapisa in
Romblon with a bolo.
-Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to
sleep. The couple lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and

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dilapidated buri walling surrounded by fruit bearing banana plants. Simeona,

who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an indistinct sound of murmur and
gnashing of teeth. She saw accused Dominador Molo by peeping in a hole.
She immediately lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk
nearby. She tried to awaken her husband, but the latter did not respond. The
accused had already climbed up the house which was only a flight of two
steps. The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the
house. He inquired from Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that
he was asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping near the door, he immediately
grabbed his left wrist and started hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely
awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with his right hand reached for his
bolo which was atop the table nearby; but he was not able to retaliate in as
much as Dominador Molo was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her
own life, Simeona rushed out of the house through the door of the unfinished
kitchen to summon help from her son, Alejandro Gapisa, who was at Roman
Mangaring's house some 100 meters away. Trembling, she told him that his
father was boloed by Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was
known in their locality.
Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the house of
Venancio, followed by Simeona. Upon arrival. they saw Venancio bleeding
profusely and in weakened condition. He was sitting in the floor of the
kitchen, defecating in his pants. When Alejandro took him in his arms,
Venancio told him that he was boloed by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was
present also inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and elicited the
answer, "Boslo". Venancio was then rushed to the hospital and arrived there
at about 1:50 a.m. He expired a few minutes after.
-Testimonies were presented from (1) the victim's wife, Simeona Gapisa, an
eye witness to the alleged murder; (2) Alejandro Gapisa, a son of the victim
who went to the rescue of his father after he was stabbed by accusedappellant and was able to talk with him before he succumbed to several bolo
wounds; (3) Roman Mangaring, a neighbor of Alejandro; and (4) Dr. Victorio
Benedicto, who performed the autopsy and accomplished the Autopsy
Report. PC soldiers and policemen were dispatched to the house of
Dominador Molo some one and a half (1-1/2) kilometers away from the scene
of the killing Dominador Molo was placed under arrest and brought by the
arresting officers to the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks.
Trial Court relying on the testimony of Simeona Gapisa who was an eye-and
ear-witness to the incident and the corroborating testimonies of Alejandro
Gapisa and Roman Mangaring, who testified on the ante-mortem statements
of the victim identifying accused as the assailant; discounting the defense of
alibi put forth by the accused and his wife; appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
recidivism and reiteration alleged in the Information, and a mitigating
circumstance, voluntary surrender, sentenced the accused.
Issues
(The court tried to answer each allegations of Molo)
WON there is no proof of motive on appellant's part.

Motive need not be shown where there is positive Identification. Even in the
absence of proof of motive, the conviction of accused- appellant can stand
inasmuch as he had been positively Identified by Simeona Gapisa and by the
deceased himself through his dying declaration. Motive need not be shown
when there is positive Identification. (People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383;
People vs. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172).
WON Molos Identity as assailant was not established beyond reasonable
doubt.
The alleged inconsistent statement given to the police was neither offered as
evidence nor shown to witness in order to enable her to explain the
discrepancies if any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to impeach Simeona's
testimony on the basis of alleged inconsistent statements which she allegedly
made before the police. Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies
inconsequential. Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of
material consequence as to affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused
do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. The discordance in their
testimonies on collateral matters heightens their credibility and shows that
their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. Far from being evidence of
falsehood, they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith.
On the alleged inconsistent averments regarding the presence of light. A
review of the transcript of the testimony shows that the foregoing is an
inaccurate representation of Simeona's testimony. For she clarified that her
husband was already boloed before the light was snuffed out.
With regard to alleged incredible assertions, i.e. that it was very unusual that
she remained silent while witnessing the attack on her husband. The
transcripts showan answer to the misgivings by showing that she was scared
of being boloed as well which the court finds reasonable.
With regard to the assertion that Simeona only pointed to the accused as the
killer because he was a hated criminal in the locality
No. There was certainty in the identification of Molo.
WON Simeona's account is contrary to physical facts (i.e how Molo stabbed
her husband)
No it is not. To simply thrust a bolo at a lying person is not as forceful as to
hack him with it. The first is an awkward if not difficult movement, but the
second is natural and can be done with facility.
WON Simeona could have been able to recognize Molo (given that he was at
the foot of the stairs and there is a banana plant obstructing the moonlight)
Yes. Simeona testified that the banana plants did not obstruct the light cast
by the moon and the defense did not disprove this fact. Indeed, Simeona had
no difficulty in recognizing the accused, considering that their house was only
elevated by two steps and at the time she saw him through the dilapidated
burl wall he was already at the foot of the stairs.

WON the dying declarations should not be accorded credence because the
victim could not have recognized his assailant, since as testified by Simeona
he was asleep when attacked
No, it was only at the initial stage of the attack when the victim was asleep,
because he was awakened by the first blows and stood up to defend himself.
The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo as his assailant to
Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his neighbor are dying declarations.
Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all, Venancio must
have realized the seriousness of his condition and it can therefore be inferred
that he made the incrimination under the conciousness of impending death,
which, in fact, supervened barely 4-1/2 hours after he was boloed.
Disposition
Affirmed
PEOPLE V BAUTISTA
GR No. 117685
KAPUNAN; June 21, 1999
(monch)
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting Bautisa
FACTS
- Leticia Bandarlipe was sitting on a sled near a kamias tree by her house,
waiting for her husband Cipriano to arrive. She heard a gunshot and the
ensuing shout of her husband that he was shot. She approached him and
saw Bautista pointing a firearm at her husband. Leticia then asked her
husband who shot him and the latter identified the appellant, Poldo Bautista.
Cipriano was rushed to the hospital by Leticias sister-in-law, Barangay
Captain Felipe M. Solis, Jose C. Gagaza, Jr., Barangay Tanod De Leon.
There, he expired.
- Gagaza and Solis proceeded to police station to report the incident.
Gagazas report was entered into the police blotter. It was alleged therein that
Cipriano told Gagaza that he was shot by one Domy Ferreamil. Feriamil is a
business partner of Bautista in a tobacco plantation which the former
operated.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the dying declaration should be admitted.
2. WON the Bautista is guilty
HELD
1. NO
Ratio A dying declaration, also known as an ante mortem statement or a
statement in articulo mortis, is admissible under the following requisites: (1)
that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the
declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death;

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(3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify
to; and (4) that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarant's
death is the subject of the inquiry
Reasoning The TC correctly rejected the ante mortem statement since
Gagaza, who heard the statement, was not presented to testify. The entry in
the police blotter is not enough.
2. No.
Reasoning In her direct testimony, Leticia claimed that the victim identified
his killer. In her cross examination,, she claimed that she ws not able to talk
to him anymore. This testimony has left the Court baffled as to whether or not
the victim indeed identified appellant as his assailant. Likewise, the Court
cannot see its way clear why Leticia should still ask her husband who shot
him when she allegedly saw appellant still pointing the gun at him
- It is also worthy to note that whereas Leticia initially denied having talked to
the local officials who accompanied her to the hospital she subsequently
admitted that Barangay Captain Solis, et al. went to her house the day after
the incident and talked to her about filing a case in connection with her
husband's murder, which she refused to do.
- If it is true that Leticia Bandarlipe actually saw her husband being shot by
appellant, or that her dying husband told her that it was appellant who shot
him, why did she not report what she saw and heard to the two barangay
tanods, Gagaza and de Leon, who responded to her shouts for help; and,
why was she reluctant to file a complaint against the gunman whom she
allegedly saw shoot her husband. Her acts are contrary to the natural
tendency of a witness closely related to the victim, to report a crime and
describe the malefactor at the earliest possible opportunity.
- As to prosecution witness Peralta, he merely learned of the shooting of
Cipriano from the people who rushed to the scene of the crime. He did not in
fact witness the shooting, but merely presumed it was appellant who shot the
victim because he saw appellant carrying a gun near the vicinity of the crime
scene
- Given the alleged knowledge of Gagaza of certain vital facts surrounding
the crime, it is highly surprising why the prosecution did not call him to testify
if only to clarify why on the day the crime was committed, he caused the entry
in the police blotter naming Feriamil as the main suspect in the murde
- In the case at bar, there are pieces of evidence on record which, if properly
considered, would certainly raise questions consistent with the proposition
that the prosecution might have accused the wrong person, foremost of which
is Barangay Captain Solis' testimony that Feriamil was the original suspect in
the murder, and Leticia Bandarlipe's admission that Solis and Gagaza went to
her house the day after her husband's murder to solicit her cooperation in the
prosecution of Feriamil.
Disposition Decision reversed

PEOPLE V BASAY
G.R. No. 86941
DAVIDE, JR.; March 3, 1993

(anton)
NATURE
Automatic appeal to the SC for penalty of life imprisonment (case: life
imprisonment not provided in the RPC. It is not the same as reclusion
perpetua)
FACTS
- Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple Murder with
Arson in a criminal complaint filed on March 24, 1986 with the MCTC of
Pamplona in Negros Oriental for allegedly killing the spouses Zosimo and
Beatrice Toting and their six-year old daughter, Bombie, and for burning the
said spouses' house to conceal the crime, resulting in the death of another
daughter, Manolita.
- April 15, 1986: the accused filed a Waiver of Preliminary Investigation,
prompting the MCTC to forward the records to the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal.
- August 14, 1986: the Integrated National Police (INP) Station Commander
of Pamplona amended the complaint by including the name of another victim,
Manolo Toting, who suffered second and third degree burns because of the
burning of the house.
- December 11, 1986: the Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental an Information for Multiple
Murder and Frustrated Murder with Arson against the accused.
- After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their arraignment on 23
February 1987, trial on the merits ensued.
- December 15, 1988: the RTC promulgated its Decision acquitting accused
Basay but convicting Ramirez.
- The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is based is
summarized in the RTCs decision, and contains the following:
Zosimo Toting, Sr. Beatrice Toting, Manolita Toting and Manolo Toting
were found near the vicinity of the burned house. About 40 meters away,
the investigating officers found six year old Bombie Toting suffering
from serious hack wounds (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18). The young
girl said that she had been in this condition for one and a half days
already.
Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at
7:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed her
parents and burned their house (TSN, January 20, 1988, p. 18, Records,
p. 9). Bombie died on March 7, 1986.
Investigating Officers went to the appellants house, and when the latter
saw them, he tried to run away.
- Appellant was brought into the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, the
MCTC judge of Pamplona on March 14, 1986. He was accompanied by Mr.
Elpedio Catacutan who acted as appellant's counsel. They brought with
them an affidavit previously typed by a police investigating officer. The Judge
then made the court interpreter translate the allegations of the sworn
statement into the local dialect for appellant. Thereafter, in the presence of

the Judge, appellant and Mr. Catacutan signed the affidavit. Appellant and
counsel also signed the vernacular translation of Exhibit F.
- Queried on the joint waiver, Ramirez said he could not have read it because
hes illiterate. When the waiver was read to him, he did not understand it
because it was read in English. He reached only Grade II and knows only
how to write his name.
- The Exhibit "F" referred to is the Sworn Statement (in English) of accused
Jaime Ramirez taken in the Pamplona police station on March 7, 1986 and
subscribed and sworn to only on March 14, 1986 before Judge Teopisto L.
Calumpang of the MCTC of Pamplona. The trial court described this
document as the Extra-Judicial Confession of Ramirez.
- The Joint Waiver mentioned in the testimony of Jaime Ramirez is in the
Cebuano dialect and was signed by accused Basay and Ramirez on March 7,
1986. Both accused state therein that for their safety and security, they
voluntarily decided to be detained and that they killed the spouses Zosimo
Toting and Betty Toting and thereafter burned the spouses' house; that the
fire resulted in the death of one and the hospitalization of two Toting children.
- The trial court disregarded this Joint Waiver insofar as it tended to
incriminate the accused "because when they signed said Joint Waiver, they
were not represented by counsel. HOWEVER, it admitted in evidence the
so-called extra-judicial confession of Jaime Ramirez, and considered as flight
(which is indicative of guilt) when Ramirez ran away. It further ruled that the
latter signed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and in the presence of
Elpedio Catacutan.
- On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of
Bombie Toting as a dying declaration but merely as part of the res
gestae because the prosecution failed to prove of the requisites for the
admissibility of a dying declaration: that (1) the statement was given
under consciousness of an impending death; and (2) that Bombie
Toting is a competent witness.
Appellants Claim
- The so-called extra-judicial confession Exhibit "F" was executed in blatant
disregard of his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent during
custodial investigation. It is therefore inadmissible in evidence;
- Bombi Totings statement is "very doubtful and . . . no reasonable mind
would conclude that she was candidly truthful.
Prosecution
- The appellant executed the extra-judicial confession voluntarily and without
duress;
- Bombies statement must be considered a dying declaration.
ISSUE(S)
1.
WON the extra-judicial confession signed by Ramirez is admissible.
(NO)
2.
WON Bombie Totings statement should be considered a dying
declaration, and therefore admissible. (NO)
3.
WON flight by Ramirez is indicative of guilt. (NO)

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HELD
1.
NO
Ratio Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be
admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights.
Reasoning
Article III, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
- The purported extra-judicial confession belonging to appellant Jaime
Ramirez and obtained during custodial interrogation was taken in blatant
disregard of his right to counsel, to remain silent and to be informed of such
rights, guaranteed by Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 (and 1987)
Constitution.
- No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it is in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by
anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
- Elpedio Catacutan was not yet a lawyer, only a barrister. Even if he were
called on as counsel, he was not present during the custodial investigation.
Securing counsel to help the accused when the latter subscribed under oath
to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late and had no palliative effect;
it did not cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial investigation
when the extra-judicial statement was being taken.
2.
NO
Ratio The trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness.
Her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement made it
impossible for her to have communicated effectively.
Reasoning
- Bombie suffered the following injuries:
Infected hack wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid
abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and through,
with necrotic transected muscle.
- She was taken from the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or 2 days after
the commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on March 7, 1986. Dr.
Edgar Cantalao (doctor who attended to Bombie before she died) testified
that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not talk. It was this inability to
talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of the latter's
supposed statement.
RTC:

. . . Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth,

however, the Court must be cautious in appreciating said testimony where
the person had a serious wound and had not eaten for one day and one
night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to
who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother,
Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and Jaime
Ramirez who killed her parents and her brother and sisters and burned
their house. XXX
Had the statement of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to
the barangay captain or to any reputable member of the community
where the incident happened, the Court will have to put weight and
consider her statement as a dying declaration. Our experience has
shown that persons in authority are prone to fabricate or
misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose.
- Lastly, as a result of the foregoing observations, the trial court completely
disregarded Bombie Toting's so-called statement as against Teodoro Basay.
Therefore it should also not held against Jaime Ramirez.
3.
NO
Ratio While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first saw the
armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them.
Reasoning
- This act should not be considered as the flight which is indicative of guilt.
The appellant had not left his house or barangay since 4 March 1986, the day
the crime was committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had
the intention to flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner
and should not have remained in his house.
- If indeed his running away could be construed as flight, it could only be
considered as circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be
insufficient for a conviction. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
in order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a conviction, there must be,
inter alia, more than one (1) circumstance. No other circumstance was
established in this case.
DISPOSITION
Decision of the RTC is reversed, and Jaime Ramirez is acquitted.
MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006
(marge)
NATURE
Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with
modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision
finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and
the CA resolution denying MR.

FACTS
[Yeah, I know this digest is very long. Sorry, but I assure you the case is even
longer. The portions of the Courts ruling relevant to the topic in the outline
have been italicized for easier reference. ^_^]
Version of the Prosecution
-Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their
neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio
returned to the bench in front of the Santos store and sat on it together with
his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a
gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire
coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping
his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio
shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was
shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting
incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not
see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on
Artemio.
-Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her
house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground.
Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and
aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their
house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk
more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered
Ernitas call for help and approached them.
-When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was
illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an
unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he
was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the
space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block
his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants
growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view.
-At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her
baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to
put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a
gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She
immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused
wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of
the back portion of Litos house. From there, the accused crossed the street
and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which
looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some
companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried
leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time
because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the
two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their
house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so
because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for
help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or
any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help.

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-While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be
touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police
arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of
the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and
informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2
Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral
vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2
Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he
then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos.
-Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the
shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and
informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited
accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him
his M-14 rifle. Accused did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and
went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole
night of Nov 4, 1998. Accused did not also give any statement to anybody
about the incident. The following day, accused was transferred by the police
to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
-Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, after learning about the
incident and seeing his brother sprawled lifeless on the ground went around
the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped
through the hole of the said door, she saw accused reclining on a bench
about 2 meters away from the door. He was wearing a brown shirt, black
jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but
he had no socks on his feet. Seeing that the accused was tapping the floor
with his right foot, Alicia confronted him, asking Nong Listing I know that you
can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he
done wrong to you? Accused did not answer her.
-Nov 5, 1998: Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City
Health Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver. His
Necropsy Report No. 76 summarized his findings to the effect that the cause
of death was a gunshot wound entering at the anterior right side of the chest,
perforating the body of the sternum, the heart and the upper lobe of the left
lung, and forming an irregular exit at the posterior chest wall left side. During
the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that the trajectory of the bullet indicates that
his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired.
Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the assailant must have
been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun
at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio
indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and
lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food
particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot.
Version of the Defense:
-Nov 4, 1998, abt 8:30 pm: Marturillas was roused from his sleep by his wife
since two brgy kagawads wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen
from bed, he was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his
house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople,
had just been shot. At once, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the
members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be

escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs
were contacted, they then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what
assistance they could render.
-While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from
where the deceased lay sprawled, Marturillas and his team was met by Ernita
Pantinople who was very mad and belligerent, immediately accusing him of
having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy.
Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. Not being
able to talk sense with Ernita, he and his companions backed off to avoid a
heated confrontation. They decided to go back to his house. -Upon reaching
his house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan
Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio
frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of
nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for
police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later,
PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house,
informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio
Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said
police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him
his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition
which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is
reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45
pm, Nov 4, 1998.
-Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released
Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for
gunpowder nitrates.
-On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita
Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the
City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder.
[see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then
2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding
sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not
Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint.
-Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople
was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee
from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka
tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards
the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of
the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities
since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After
the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas
and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the
crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the
Marturillas group return to where they came from.
-Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to
the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a
very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with
him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could

clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and
other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house
of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house
of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified
that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of
the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding
policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen,
volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that
it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that
immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the
children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen
arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo
ang akong bana?
Ruling of RTC and CA:
-The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He
was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene
immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the
victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the
latters complicity in the crime.
-No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their
positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
-Both courts also rejected Marturillas defenses of denial and alibi, saying
these were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or
relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate,
alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses found to be more credible.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the prosecutions evidence is credible.
2. WON the evidence is sufficient to convict him of homicide.
HELD
1. YES. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great weight and a
high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA. Although there are recognized exceptions to the
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts,
petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any.
Re: Positive Identification
-Ernitas testimony that she saw Marturillas at the crime scene is credible
because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her
house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with the accused, who is her neighbor,
and a long-time brgy capt of the locality when the incident took place. Ernita
was also able to see his face while he was running away from the crime
scene. The identification of a person can be established through familiarity
with ones physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one
another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable
distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural

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communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be
expected to know each others distinct and particular features and
characteristics.
-Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two
fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. In corroboration, Lito
testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright. The trees and
plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place where Artemio was
shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the
prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of the place
where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing
in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot
where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree,
some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the place where
Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which
could not have posed an obstacle to Ernitas view of the crime scene from the
kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an elevated
position.
-Given the proper conditions, the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a
flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow
the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming
from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the
place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as
the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when
conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity
of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her
identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled
by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner.
Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony
-Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as
her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did
not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping
that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was
surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte
affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by
administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what
affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential
to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They
referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio
as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the
person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a
gunshot.
Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime
-It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the
cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered
the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of
attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the

assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.

His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added
credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had
an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had
seen petitioner shoot the victim.
Re: Dying Declaration
-Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
-Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of
death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons
aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in
their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying
declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of
ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not
infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the
dying declaration of the deceased victim.
-To be admissible, a dying declaration must
1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death;
2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death;
3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence;
4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the
subject of inquiry; and
5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that
person been called upon to testify.
-The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the
inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding
circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that
would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending
death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that
realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death
occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a
dying condition.
-As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it
was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by
his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and
telling piece of evidence.
Re: Res Gestae
-The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of
both are present.
-Rule 130.42: Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while
a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence

as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal

act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae.
-Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is
whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental
balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
-A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and
3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
-All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting,
was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration
without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also,
the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters
statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae.
-Aside from the victims statement, that of Ernita -- Kapitan, ngano nimo
gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the
same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the
shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner;
and it related to the circumstances of the shooting.
2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient
to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the
victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order
as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning
evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads
to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC
considered the ff:
a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming
from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while
shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain.
b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance,
Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket
and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a
firearm.
c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was
established as part of the res gestae.
d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the
incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go

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immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really
innocent, he should not have simply left.
e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The
victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was
trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This
showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim.
-These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was
petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the
accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the
reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim.
-To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof
that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are
circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would
lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the
conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not
necessarily weaker.
Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti
- The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the
gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the
crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a
witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not
of the courts to dictate.
-A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not
fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as
when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in
perspiration.
-The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the
fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of
the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of
eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to
the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with
the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes.
Re: Alibi
-As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to
prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the
locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any
event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and
positive identification made by Ernita.
Disposition Petition is denied. Assailed Decision and Resolution are affirmed
with modifications. [SC reviewed amount of damages, since an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. SC awarded
P50k as indemnity ex delicto, P25k for temperate damages, P50k for moral
damages, P312k for loss of earning capacity, P20k for attorneys fees, plus
costs.]

Declaration Against Interest

PEOPLE V TOLEDO
August 6, 1928; MALCOLM, J.
(lora)
NATURE
Appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the CFI of Mindoro,
finding him guilty of the crime of homicide.
FACTS
- Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the
occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan,
Province of Mindoro.
- One morning, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed,
and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for
Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly.
- Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to
a neighboring house. From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the
municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal
president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought.
About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in
the fight.
- The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined.
The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the
quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution,
there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno
Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo.
Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave.
- On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in
another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and
that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or
master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the
accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The
defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which
was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in not admitting the affidavit of Sisenando
Holgado
HELD
- The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points of
view among the members participating, all leading to the same result of
acquittal.
- Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor: Disregarded and refrained from all
discussion relative to the admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves

exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that
Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In
reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her
relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to
exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the
defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its case.
- Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real: Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relation with the
other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. Exhibit 1 was made
by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and
without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of
Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and
not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between
the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly tends to negative
the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and
circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of
premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The
modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous
declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same
fact cannot be procured.
- Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand: the court erred in not admitting
Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. Had Exhibit 1 been
received, it is believed that its influence would have been felt by the trial
court. Without Exhibit 1, the appellate court is bound by the appreciation of
the evidence made in the trial court, and could, with little propriety, set aside
the findings made by a learned trial judge. The case calls for an examination
of the right of the courts to receive in evidence documents of the character of
Exhibit 1.
- Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said
on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the
principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns
the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception,
under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to
their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be
that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to
show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account
of the hearsay doctrine.
- Professor Wigmore attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which
the arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is
inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating the principle and
is unjustified on grounds of policy.
- Donnelly vs. United States: The rues of evidence in the main are based on
experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history than some
parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the
admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of
the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case
of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much
against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to
convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man; and

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when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which

seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if
proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the
arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr.
Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length.
- In the Philippine jurisdiction, the Court have never felt bound to follow blindly
the principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles
discloses anomalies.
- A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court
of Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes
when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime,
under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by
offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other
committed the crime. Again admissions are receivable against either a
pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. We fail to
see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the
one instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance.
Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he
had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet
the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.
- A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not
here controlling. Most of them do not concern the confessions of declarants
shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for
denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the
crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath.
Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath.
They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. When Sisenando
Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the
end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected
to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers
named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio
Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president.
Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of
innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with
the other proven facts.
- Professor Wigmore: PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact
against Penal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third Person.
It is today commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many
judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be either a
pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in
authority there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of
the execution at large. The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in
two separate rivulets of rulings, starting independently as a matter of practice,
but afterwards united as parts of a general principle. . . .
- These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning
of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to be
perceived and argued for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all such
statements, in that they concerned matters prejudicial to the declarant's self-

interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be
treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
- This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty about
its scope; but it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it was
sometimes put in the broad form that any statement by a person "having no
interest to deceive" would be admissible. This broad form never came to
prevail. But acceptance was gained, after two decades, for the principle that
all declarations of facts against interest (by deceased persons) were to be
received. What is to be noted, then, is that from 1800 to about 1830 this was
fully understood as the broad scope of the principle. It was thus stated
without other qualifications; and frequent passages show the development of
the principle to this point.
- But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, not strongly argued and not
considered by the judges in the light of the precedents, a backward step was
taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the
statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and to
confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary
interest. Thenceforward this rule was accepted in England; although it was
plainly a novelty at the time of its inception; for in several rulings up to that
time such statement had been received.
- The same attitude has been taken by most American courts, excluding
confessions of a crime, or other statements of facts against penal interest,
made by third persons; although there is not wanting authority in favor of
admitting such statements.
- PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. It is plain enough that this
limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, is inconsistent with the broad
language originally employed in stating the reason and principle of the
present exception (ante, pars. 1457, 1476) as well as with the settled
principle upon which confessions are received (ante, par. 1475).
- But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only
plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is
the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral.
This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been drawn to oppose any
reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This
would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is
notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being
deceived by their lies. The truth is that any rule which hampers an honest
man in exonerating himself is a bad rule, even if it also hampers a villain in
falsely passing for an innocent.
- The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking
to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a
criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a
person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite
unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and
wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent.
- The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and
universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the
rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise unavailable
as a witness, and therefore the declaration would have been inadmissible in

any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456). Secondly, in some of the
rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the independent doctrine (ante, pars.
139-141) was applicable that, in order to prove the accused's noncommission of the offense by showing commission by another person, not
merely one casual piece of evidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting
on several concurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most of
the early rulings had in view, not the present exception to the hearsay rule,
but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of
one who is not a co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.
- It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous
doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself
even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession,
made on the very gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice.
Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation the course of
proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if that trial had
occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful
if we, following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the
French court never for a moment hesitated to admit, the authenticated
confession of the escaped Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author
of the treason there charged. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476,
1477.)
- Editor of L. R. A. in his note in volume 37: The purpose of all evidence is to
get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and
unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose.
In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the
inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such
evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his
extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the declarant is
dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not
inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not
rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable,
something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that
the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because
no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
- Again, if, seems indisputable, the desire to close the door to falsehood
which cannot be detected dictates the exclusion of such testimony, the
question as to the effect to be given to such a confession is solely one of
weight and credibility. . . .
- Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical
procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would
say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a
crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was
other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused
man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate
a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced in the law
display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow precedent
to overcome truth?

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Disposition Judgment appealed reversed and defendant acquitted and an

order will immediately issue directing his release.
FUENTES JR. VS CA
G.R. No. 111692
Bellosillo; February 9, 1996
(mel)
NATURE
Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder.
FACTS
At four o'clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together with
Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit dance
at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner called Malaspina
and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, "Before, I saw
you with a long hair but now you have a short hair." 2 Suddenly petitioner
stabbed Malaspina in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the
ground and his companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled. Before the
victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he muttered that
Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him. The victim, as per report of the Rural
Health Physician, died out of the stab wound (at the left lumbar region).
Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina; that when the victim was killed he was
conversing with him; that he was compelled to run away when he heard that
somebody with a bolo and spear would "kill all those from San Isidro"
because "Jonie," the killer, was from that place; that since he was also from
San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother's house where he met "Jonie;" that
"Jonie" admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because after a
boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him; that as
there were many persons milling around the house "Jonie" jumped out and
escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o'clock in the
morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.
The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, found petitioner
guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
*In this case, Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession of Zoilo
Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal interest and therefore an
exception to the hearsay rule. The so-called confession of Zoilo was allegedly
given to Felicisimo Fuentes, the uncle of petitioner and Zoilo, who in turn
relayed the matter to P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde, Jr. Felicisimo testified that on
24 June 1989 while he was at Barangay San Isidro, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr.,
confessed that he killed Malaspina in "retaliation;" that he even showed him
the knife he used and asked his help in finding a lawyer, in securing bail and,
if possible, in working out a settlement with the relatives of the deceased. The

following day however he learned that the self-confessed killer was gone and
that petitioner had been arrested for a crime he did not commit.
For his part, Station Commander P/Sgt. Conde, Jr., testified that after the
criminal information for murder was filed on 26 July 1989, petitioner met
Felicisimo who informed him of the disclosure by Zoilo. Conde then advised
Felicisimo that if it was true that it was Zoilo who fatally stabbed Malaspina
Felicisimo must persuade Zoilo to surrender. Conde then personally went to
Barangay San Isidro to investigate. There he was told by the townsfolk that
Zoilo had already fled.
ISSUE
WON the admission against penal interest allegedly made by Zoilo Fuentes
can be accepted in this case
HELD
NO
RATIO
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to
declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons." The
admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and
trustworthiness.
There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration
against interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the
declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the
circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
REASONING
For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in
certain cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case
(SUPRA) cannot be applied in the instant case which is remarkably different.
Consider this factual scenario: the alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a
cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their
common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of
a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking feature that militates
against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate.
The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of
such a statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the
sense of justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of
Zoilo and on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further
that Zoilo was subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his
admission of guilt readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely
nothing, that can bind Zoilo legally to that statement.

But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against
penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is
not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally
incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously
contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him
ipso facto unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to
produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the prosecution
and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous statements
of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that Zoilo admitted having
killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious
effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is
always for the admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of
guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to abuse, as when the
extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing the
probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to
lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable
to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as
explained in Toledo
The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay
rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best
method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of the
fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that
the doors be closed to such evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from finding petitioner ALEJANDRO FUENTES JR.
guilty of MURDER and directing him to indemnify the heirs of Julieto
Malaspina in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED

PEOPLE V THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN & PETER DOE

(June 19, 97) Romero
[maem]
Facts accdg to TC: Around 11:30am of August 1991 Rasaca and Openda, Jr.
are drinking. The two invited Bernal who was passing by. After a few minutes
Bernal leaves, saying he has to fetch his son. After Bernal left, two men (the
Does) arrived, approached Openda, Jr. asking him if he was Payat. When
Openda, Jr. said yes, one of the two men suddenly pulled out a handgun
while the other handcuffed Openda, Jr. who was told not to run because
theyre policemen and he had a score to settle with them. With that they
hastily took him away.
The prosecution established through Enriquez testimony (which includes
Openda, Jr.s declaration against his own interest) that Bernal kidnapped
Openda, Jr. because the latter had an illicit affair with Bernals wife Naty.

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The defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher who was arrested
by the police, and thus not kidnapped.
TC: Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping Openda, Jr.
Bernal: TC committed error in giving weight to prosecutions witnesses
testimony.

That at the time he made said declaration, the declarant was aware that the
same was contrary to his interest;
[Openda, Jr. advised Naty not to do it {giving him money for motel} again
because she was a married woman.]
That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to
be true.
[No sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.]

SC: No error. TC affirmed.

Bernal conspired with the two Does. Proof of conspiracy is frequently made
by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The circumstances here
sufficiently indicate Bernals participation.
Circumstance A Testimony of Sagario, Bernals childhood friend and
neighbor:
He saw Bernal at the billiard hall at 11am with two companions.
He overheard Bernal dispatch one of his companions to Tarsings Store to
check if a certain person is still there, which person turned out to be Openda,
Jr.
Upon confirmation of Openda, Jr.s presence, the three men left the billiard
hall.
Minutes later, a handcuffed Openda, Jr. passed by the billiard hall with
Bernals companions.
Circumstance B Testimony of Racasa, Bernals neighbor and compadre,
who narrated the facts as found by the TC.
Circumstance C Testimony of Enriquez, a tailor and Openda, Jr.s friend:
That sometime in January 1991 Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and
Bernals wife Naty were having an affair.
SC: Natys infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of
the perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from
which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor,
motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.
Openda. Jr.s revelation to Enriquez is admissible in evidence as a
declaration against interest which has the following requisites:
That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
[Here, Openda, Jr. had been missing since his abduction, thus he is deemed
unable to testify.]
That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
[With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that interest has been expanded to include all
kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal here,
the affair with Naty was a crime.]

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but must be credible in itself.

PAREL V PRUDENCIO
G.R. 146556
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; April 19, 2006
(aida)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- February 27, 1992 Prudencio filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and damages against Parel. Prudencio alleged that he owned a two-storey
residential house in Baguio City, the construction of which was funded by his
own money and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048. The
construction began in 1972 and was completed after three years.
- In 1973, when the second storey of the house was undergoing construction,
Prudencio allowed Parels parents (the late Florentino and Susana) to move
in so that the couple could supervise the construction of the house and to
safeguard the materials. When the second storey was completed, he allowed
the Parels and their children to temporarily live in the house out of sheer
magnanimity because Florentino was his brother-in-law.
- November 1985 Prudencio wrote Florentino, asking the latter to vacate
the house as the former was due for retirement. This request was acceded to
by Florentino and Susana when they migrated to the US in 1986.
- Without Prudencios knowledge, Parel and family unlawfully entered the
house and took possession of the ground floor. They refused to leave
despite Prudencios demands which prompted the respondent to institute an
action for recovery. Prudencio also asked for a monthly rental of P3,000 from
April 1988 until Parel vacates the house.
- In his counterclaim, Parel alleges that his parents are the co-owners of the
said house. He claim that he occupied the ground floor of the house with his
father Florentinos knowledge.
- The RTC found that the house was co-owned by Florentino and Prudencio
thus the latter cannot evict Parel. The RTC found that:
- Florentino was an allocatee of the land on which the subject
house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government
employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave

them the chance to construct their own house on said

reservation.
- Prudencio failed to show proof of any contract, written or oral,
express or implied, that Florentino and his family stayed on the
house not as co-owners but as mere lessees, nor any other proof
that would clearly establish his sole ownership of the house.
- Prudencio and Florentino agreed to contribute their money to
complete the house. Since the land on which said house was
erected has been allocated to Florentino, the parties had the
understanding that once the house was completed, Florentino
could keep the ground floor while Prudencio could have the
second floor.
- The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as
the several documents showing the City Assessors assessment
of the property all in Prudencios name since tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of ownership.
- Upon appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA found
as meritorious Prudencios contention that since petitioner failed to formally
offer in evidence any documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute the
evidence offered by respondent.
- It ruled that the trial courts statement that Parels occupancy of
the house is due to a special power of attorney executed by his
parents most specially the deceased Florentino Parel who is in
fact a co-owner of said building" is wanting of any concrete
evidence on record.
- The said power of attorney was never offered, hence, could not
be referred to as evidence to support Parels claim.
- Except for the bare testimonies of Candelario Regua, the
carpenter-foreman, that it was Florentino who constructed the
house and Corazon Garcia, the former barangay captain, who
testified that the lot was allocated to Florentino, there was no
supporting document which would sufficiently establish factual
bases for the TCs conclusion; and that the rule on offer of
evidence is mandatory.
- An affidavit dated September 24, 1973 was issued by
Florentino. The said affidavit stated that Prudencio, not
Florentino, was the owner of the house. The CA found the
affidavit to be conclusive proof of Prudencios sole ownership of
the house since it was a declaration made by Florentino against
his interest.
- The CA also found the tax declarations and official receipts
representing payments of real estate taxes of the questioned
property covering the period 1974 to 1992 sufficient to establish
Prudencios case which constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property.
ISSUES
WON Parel was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his father
was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house

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HELD
YES
Reasoning
- The building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in
the name of respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioners
cross-examination that the existing structure of the two-storey house was in
accordance with said building plan.
- Court reasoning relevant to declaration against interest
- The rule on declaration against interest is in Rule 130, Sec. 38.
- The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral
interest.
- In said affidavit, Florentino categorically declared that while he
is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of
the same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon
City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his childrens interests as his heirs. A
declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
- Notably, during Florentinos lifetime, from 1973 (the year he
executed said affidavit) until 1989 (the year of his death), there is
no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a
criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by
respondent against him and his son.
- While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The house which Parel claims to be co-owned by
Florentino had been consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name
of Prudencio, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances abovementioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole
owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.
- Court reasoning as to offer of evidence
- The rule on offer of evidence is in Rule 132, Sec. 34.
- The records show that although Parels counsel asked that he
be allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he,
however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did not consider the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
- A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to
rest his findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already
been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
- Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were

not formally offered, the same were marked during the

presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be
taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
- The reliance in Bravo v. Borja is misplaced. In Bravo, the Court
allowed evidence on minority by admitting the certified true copy
of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was
not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the
birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to
prove petitioners minority which was never challenged by the
prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case.
The rule referred to in the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133
of the RoC and not Section 34 of Rule 132.
- The testimonies of Parel and his witnesses failed to show that the subject
house is co-owned by Florentino and respondent.
Disposition Judgment affirmed.

PHILIPPINE FREE PRESS, INC v CA (LIWAYWAY PUBLISHING, INC)

G.R. No. 132864
GARCIA; Oct 24, 2005
(kooky)
NATURE:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 ROC
FACTS:
- PFPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the publication of Philippine Free
Press Magazine, a widely circulated political magazine. It enjoyed
considerable prestige and a high profit margin prior to the declaration of
Martial Law. Its main office was in Pasong Tamo, Makati.
- During the 1965 elections, PFPI supported Diosdado Macapagal against
Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the election of Marcos and prior to Martial law, PFPI
printed numerous articles highly critical of the Marcos administration,
exposing the corruption and abuses of the regime. PFPI likewise ran a series
of articles exposing the plan of the Marcoses to impose a dictatorship in the
guise of Martial Law.
- In the evening of Sept 20, 1972, soldiers surrounded the Free Press
Building, forced out its employees at gunpoint and padlocked the said
establishment. The soldier in charge informed Teodoro Locsin, Jr., son of
Teodoro Locsin, Sr., President of PFPI, that Martial Law had been declared
and that they were to take over the building and to close the printing press.
- On Sept 21, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was arrested, brought to Camp Crame, and
subsequently transferred to Fort Bonifacio.
- In Dec, 1972, Locsin, Sr. was informed that no charges were to be filed
against him and that he was to be provisionally released subject to the
following conditions: (1) he remained (sic) under city arrest; xxx (5) he was
not to publish the Philippine Free Press nor was he to do, say or write
anything critical of the Marcos administration.

- Consequently, publication of the Philippine Free Press ceased. The building

remained padlocked and under heavy military guard. This led to the financial
ruin of PFPI. Its situation was further aggravated when its employees
demanded the payment of separation pay. Its minority stockholders also
made demands that Locsin, Sr. buy out their shares.
- On separate occasions in 1973, Locsin, Sr. was approached by Atty. Crispin
Baizas with offers from Pres Marcos for the acquisition of PFPI. Locsin, Sr.
refused. A few months later, Sec Guillermo De Vega, reiterated Marcoss offer
to purchase the name and the assets of PFPI.
- mid-1973, Brig. Gen. Hans Menzi, former aide-de-camp of Pres Marcos,
contacted Locsin, Sr. concerning the sale of PFPI. A meeting was held inside
the PFPI Building, wherein Menzi reiterated Marcoss offer to purchase both
the name and assets of PFPI, adding that Marcos cannot be denied. Locsin,
Sr. refused but Menzi insisted that he had no choice but to sell. Locsin, Sr.
then made a counteroffer that he will sell the land, building and all the
machineries and equipment but he will be allowed to keep the name of PFPI.
Menzi thereafter informed Locsin, Sr. that Pres Marcos was amenable to his
counteroffer, and is offering P5.75M on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
- Aug 22, 1973, Menzi tendered to Locsin, Sr. a check for P1M, downpayment
for the sale. Locsin, Sr. accepted the check, subject to the condition that he
will refund the same in case the sale will not push through. On Aug 23, 1973,
the Board of Directors of PFPI held a meeting and reluctantly passed a
resolution authorizing Locsin, Sr. to sell the assets of its to Menzi minus the
name Philippine Free Press.
- On Oct 23, 1973, the parties met and executed two notarized Deeds of Sale
covering the land, building and the machineries of the PFPI. Menzi paid the
P4.75M balance.
- Locsin, Sr. thereafter used the proceeds of the sale to pay the separation
pay of PFPIs employees, buy out the shares of the minority stockholders as
well as to settle all its obligations.
- On Feb 26, 1987, PFPI filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale against
Liwayway and PCGG before RTC on the grounds of vitiated consent and
gross inadequacy of purchase price. On motion of PCGG, complaint was
dismissed on Oct 22, 1987.
- On Oct 31, 1995, TC dismissed PFPIs complaint and granted Liwayways
counterclaim of attorneys fees.
- CA affirmed w/ modification, deleting award of attorneys fees.
ISSUES:
WON the lower court erred in dismissing PFPIs complaint
a. WON PFPIs cause of action has already prescribed
b. WON PFPI was able to establish the force, intimidation, duress and undue
influence which vitiated its consent
c. WON the purchase price was grossly inadequate such as to show vitiation
of consent
d. WON PFPIs use of the proceeds of the sale constitute an implied
ratification

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HELD
NO
a. On Prescription: YES, the action has prescribed.
- CA ruled the 4-year prescriptive period started to run when the deeds were
executed (Oct 1973). PFPI contends, however, that it should start on Feb 25,
1986 (People Power), on the theory that martial law has the effects of force
majeure, which works to suspend the running of the prescriptive period.
- SC: Martial Law did not suspend the running of the period. PFPI has failed
to convincingly prove that it was so circumstanced that it was well-nigh
impossible for it to successfully institute an action during the martial law
years.
b. On vitiation of consent: NO, PCPI has not established it.
- PFPI ascribes the following errors to CA:
1. in considering as hearsay the testimonial evidence that may prove
the element of "threat" against petitioner or Locsin, Sr., and the
dictatorial regime's use of Liwayway as a corporate vehicle for forcibly
acquiring petitioners properties;
2. in concluding that the acts of then President Marcos during the martial law
years did not have a consent-vitiating effect on PFPI 3. in resolving the case
on the basis of mere surmises and speculations.
- The evidence referred to as hearsay pertains mainly to the testimonies of
Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr., which, in gist, established the following facts: 1)
the widely circulated Free Press magazine, which, prior to the declaration of
Martial Law, took the strongest critical stand against the Marcos
administration, was closed down on the eve of such declaration, which
closure eventually drove petitioner to financial ruin; 2) upon Marcos orders,
Locsin, Sr. was arrested and detained for over 2 months without charges and,
together with his family, was threatened with execution; 3) Locsin, Sr. was
provisionally released on the condition that he refrains from reopening Free
Press and writing anything critical of the Marcos administration; and 4)
Locsin, Sr. and his family remained fearful of reprisals from Marcos until the
1986 EDSA Revolution.
- Per the Locsins, it was amidst these circumstances that PFPIs property
was sold to Liwayway, represented by Menzi, who, before the sale, allegedly
applied the squeeze on Locsin, Sr. thru the Marcos cannot be denied and
[you] have no choice but to sell lines.
- CA, in rejecting PFPIs posture of vitiation of consent, observed: xxx the
testimonies of Locsin, Sr. and Locsin, Jr. regarding Menzis alleged implied
threat that Marcos cannot be denied and that Liwayway was to be the
corporate vehicle for Marcoss takeover of the Free Press is hearsay as
Menzi already passed away and is no longer in a position to defend himself
It is clear from the provisions of Sec 36, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence that any evidence, . . . is hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of
some other person not on the witness stand. Consequently, hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule

- SC: Evidence of statement made or a testimony is hearsay if offered against

a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay
evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it is
presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the
persons to whom the statements or writings are attributed.
- Sec 38, Rule 130 ROC, an exception to the hearsay rule, reads: Declaration
against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to
testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence
against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.
- In assessing the probative value of Menzis supposed declaration against
interest, i.e., that he was acting for Pres Marcos when he purportedly coerced
Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, it cannot be given evidentiary
weight as PFPI wants. The Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested
witnesses. They are likely to gain the most from the annulment of the subject
contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be
viewed with utmost caution. They should not be laid lightly at the door of men
whose lips had been sealed by death. Francisco explains why:
It has been said that of all evidence, the narration of a witness of his
conversation with a dead person is esteemed in justice the weakest. One
reason for its unreliability is that the alleged declarant can not recall to the
witness the circumstances under which his statement were made. The
temptation and opportunity for fraud in such cases also operate against the
testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least where
proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe foundation
for judicial action except in so far as such evidence is borne out by what is
natural and probable under the circumstances taken in connection with actual
known facts. And a court should be very slow to act upon the statement of
one of the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other party;
such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to satisfy the court of the
truth of the story which is to benefit materially the person telling it.
- PFPI insists that the testimonies of the Locsins are not hearsay because
hearsay evidence has been defined as the evidence not of what the witness
knows himself but of what he has heard from others. xxx Thus, the mere fact
that the other parties to the conversations testified to by the witness are
already deceased does [not] render such testimony inadmissible for being
hearsay. Xxx Teodoro Locsin, Sr. and Teodoro Locsin, Jr. were in fact
testifying to matters of their own personal knowledge because they were
either parties to the said conversation or were present at the time the said
statements were made.
- Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial evidence, one-half
purporting to quote the words of a live witness and the other half purporting to
quote what the live witness heard from one already dead, the other pertaining
to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in character.
- The all too familiar rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his own knowledge. PFPI witnesses cannot testify
respecting what Pres Marcos said Menzi about the acquisition of PFPI, if any

there be, precisely because none of said witnesses ever had an opportunity
to hear what the two talked about.
- Neither may PFPI circumvent the hearsay rule by invoking the exception
under the declaration-against-interest rule. In context, the only declaration
supposedly made by Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as adverse to
his interest could be that he was acting in behalf of Marcos in offering to
acquire the physical assets of petitioner. Far from making a statement
contrary to his own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the
declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for the President of the
Republic can hardly be considered as a declaration against interest.
- As regards the second error imputed by PFPI to the CA, SC held this is a
rehash of PFPIs bid to impute on Liwayway acts of force and intimidation that
were made to bear on PFPI or Mr. Locsin, Sr. during the early years of martial
law.
- As regards the third error, SC held that PFPI is oblivious that it itself can
only offer, as counterpoint, also mere surmises and speculations.
- To further illustrate that PFPI was not able to establish vititation of consent:
Locsin, Sr refused to sell PFPI a number of times, even if the threat of arrest
hung over his head, rejecting the offers of Baizas and De Vega. He even
testified that the initial offer of Menzi was rejected even though it was
supposedly accompanied by the threat that Marcos cannot be denied.
Locsin, Sr. was, moreover, even able to secure a compromise that only the
assets of the Free Press will be sold. It is thus quite possible that PFPIs
financial condition, albeit caused by the declaration of Martial Law, was a
major factor in influencing Locsin, Sr. to accept Menzis offer.
c. On the gross inadequacy of the price: NO
- gross inadequacy of the purchase price does not, as a matter of civil law,
per se affect a contract of sale. (Art 1470 CC)
- Following this provision, it behooves petitioner to first prove a defect in the
consent, failing which its case for annulment contract of sale on ground
gross inadequacy of price must fall.
d. On use of the proceeds constituting implied ratification: YES
- The ruling of the CA on the matter is well-taken: It need not be
overemphasized that by using the proceeds in this manner, Free Press only
too clearly confirmed the voluntaries of its consent and ratified the sale.
Needless to state, such ratification cleanses the assailed contract from any
alleged defects from the moment it was constituted.
Disposition Petition denied

Pedigree
MENDOZA VS CA
201 SCRA 675
CRUZ; September 24, 1991
(eva)
NATURE

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Certiorari
FACTS
- The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying
day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory
recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court.
- The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981. Teopista Toring Tufiacao,
herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza,
married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza
recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according
her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
- Casimiro, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs
allegations and set up a counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.
- Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because
Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at his house. When she
married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged
him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but
gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro
allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave
her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. Casimiro
opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank.
- Lolito corroborated his mother and said he considered Casimiro his
grandfather because Teopista said so.
- Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, namely, Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin
of Casimiro. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later,
Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted
in Brigida becoming pregnant and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed
him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave
him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.
Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his
father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so
informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid
him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00
to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give
certain properties to Teopista.
- Casimiro himself did not testify because of his advanced age, but Vicente
Toring took the stand to resist Teopista's claim. The last statement was
shared by the other defense witness, Julieta Ouano, Casimiro's niece, who
also affirmed that Vicente Toring used to work as a cook in Casimiro's boat.
She flatly declared she had never met Teopista but she knew her husband,
who was a mechanic. 6
- the trial court judge rejected plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous
possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of
the latter or of his family.

- On appeal, however, the respondent court reversed.

- Casimiro died on May 1986. Counsel, now acting for Vicente Toring, then
asked this Court to substitute the latter for the deceased Casimiro Mendoza
in the present petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec vice and nunc pro
tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's illegitimate son is
allowed.
2. WON Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an
illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza.
3. WON Teopista has nevertheless established the status of an illegitimate
child of Casimiro by another method.
HELD
1. In Masecampo vs. Masecampo, it was held that The subsequent death of
the father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one who
pretended to be his natural son. It may survive against the executor,
administrator, or any other legal representative of the testate or intestate
succession. We hereby allow the substitution of Casimiro Mendoza pro haec
vice and nunc pro tunc by Vicente Toring, who appears to be the former's
illegitimate son. This disposes of the private respondent's contention that the
lawyer-client relationship terminated with Casimiro's death and that Vicente
has no personality now to substitute him.
2. NO
Ratio To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall
continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while
it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated
the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and
without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is
illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has
not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate
child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code.
Reasoning The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant
although they were both residents of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is not
unusual for a father to take his illegitimate child into his house to live with him
and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is childless, as in this case.
Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not
decisive of one's status. The regularity of defendant's act of giving money to
the plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been
sufficiently established.
3. YES

Ratio What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into
account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,"
according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may
consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
- The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff
himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the
daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light
of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 39 Act or declarations about pedigree. The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
- To set the record straight, it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this
question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was
that he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and
Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's
illegitimate daughter.
- Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to
the hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and
because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of such proof than
from its admission. Nevertheless, precisely because of its nature as hearsay
evidence, there are certain safeguards against its abuse.
- Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following
requisites that have to be complied with before the act or declaration
regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is
in question must be shown by evidence other than such declaration.
- All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who
made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of
Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the
time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista
and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the
complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the
complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her
and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro

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has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of

the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which
Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
- If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private
respondent and her witnesses (the truck, house, joint account) we can
reasonably conclude that Teopista was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro
Mendoza.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered
DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuacao to be the illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.

FRANCISCO L. JISON, vs. CA and MONINA JISON

G.R. No. 124853
1998 J. DAVIDE, JR.
(SJ)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
In her complaint filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At
the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated
Esperanza F. Amolar (who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6
August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his
acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave
her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's
degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central
Bank examiner. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her,
MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
In his answer, FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual
relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period specified in the complaint
as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of
her whereabouts since then; further, he never recognized MONINA,
expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special
defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of
action against him and that her action was barred by estoppel, laches and/or
prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of
damages due to the malicious filing of the complaint.

At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses,

namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin,
Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo
Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar. These witnesses explained
individual circumstances, which induced them to believe that MONINA was
Franciscos daughter.
On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time,
she was 40 years old and a Central Bank Examiner. She affirmed that as
evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar and
baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in
Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar (who passed away on
20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO. MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she
stayed as a boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4),
her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other school expenses.
She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw
FRANCISCO give money to her mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado
directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools, but
FRANCISCO continuously answered for her schooling. For her college
education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped
due to an accident which required a week's hospitalization. Although
FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother
shouldered most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San
Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for MONINA's tuition
fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like
were shouldered by FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA
would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her to
canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two
semesters at University of San Agustin, as evidenced by her transcript of
records she transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos
house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA enrolled at Western
Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in
Commerce in April 1967. During her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio
and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the
CPA board exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University
as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO was likewise
listed as Guardian
In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge
Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48. As
additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro
Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.

did he know of her whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had

sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about MONINAs
birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in
person or otherwise, and asserted that he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid
for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would
pay for these fees despite absence of instructions or approval from
FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it
Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco,
that MONINA was his daughter.
The trial court ruled against Monina but the Court of Appeals reversed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Moninas filiation was sufficiently
established.
HELD
NO.
RATIO
Under Article 1751 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as
MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence
as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms
of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established, thus:
ART. 172.
following:
(1)

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1)
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2)

FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October,

1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would sleep with the other
female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and
daughter slept in a room on the second floor. At that time, his household staff
was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male workers. After
Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

NOTE THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FAMILY CODE

HERE. THE COURT SAID THAT IT MAY BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED
SINCE IT WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES AS THEY
ARE BOTH ALIVE AND HENCE, IN THE POSITION TO DEFEND
THEMSELVES ADEQUATELY.

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This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the
Civil Code.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second
paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has none of the
evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof is
required. Specifically, to prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to
consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously.
By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not
require any particular length of time.
The foregoing STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH ONES
FILIATION IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT AN ORDER FOR
RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT MAY CREATE AN UNWHOLESOME
ATMOSPHERE OR MAY BE AN IRRITANT IN THE FAMILY OR LIVES OF
THE PARTIES, SO THAT IT MUST BE ISSUED ONLY IF PATERNITY OR
FILIATION IS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules
on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in civil cases, i.e., preponderance
of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply
put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and
upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in
the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case
in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to
controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in
favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendants. The concept of preponderance of evidence refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
REASONING (FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO)
With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant
controversy.
FRANCISCOs arguments that he could not have had sex with MONINAs
mother deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed that

unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity

for such indulgence, this does not favor FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of
rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the
participants in the sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue
of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds to the
victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers
protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs mother could no longer testify
as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long
before the institution of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean
that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth
and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is whether
MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.
The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by
about the end of 1945. We agree with MONINA that this was broad enough
to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946
could still be attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and
MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her mother
was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as
determined by the date of her birth, sexual contact between FRANCISCO
and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the
overwhelming evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered
MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has been
enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs
illegitimate daughter.
SOLINAP V LOCSIN
G.R. No. 146737
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ: December 10, 2001
(da)
FACTS:
-Eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. died intestate on
December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed a "Petition for
Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the
Intestate Estate of the deceased. He allegedthat he is an acknowledged
natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal
heir of the decedent.
-January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin,
Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the
deceased, filed an opposition to respondent's petition for letters of
administration. They averred that respondent is not a child or an
acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime,
never affixed "Sr." in his name.
-January 5, 1993 , another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop
(sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased),
Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that

respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of

limitations.
-The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased)
also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier
oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition dated
January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin),
likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent
and the deceased.
-To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of
his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of birth
records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D"
contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and
that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his
signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity
of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was machine
copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the bound volume of 1957
records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
is included. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing
Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that
he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the
deceased.
-Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is
spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",
indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan
C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was
born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957,
however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on
a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario
dearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as
witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the
signatures of Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of
Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are
forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document
surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
ISSUE:
WON Juan E. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is qualified to be granted
letters of administration (Which of the two documents is genuine)
HELD:
Juan E. Locsin, Jr is not an interested person within the meaning of Section
2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of

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administration since he failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C.
Locsin, Sr.. (Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious)
Reasoning:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the persons
preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
XXX
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for letters
of administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x"
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not survived by a spouse.
In his petition for issuance of letters of administration, respondent alleged that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an
interested person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has
respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the
deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is
treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action
for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the child's acknowledgment." (Emphasis ours)

Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased,

presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial of the deceased.
Exhibit D spurious:
-Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil Register), the
records of births from all cities and municipalities in the Philippines are
officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar General in Metro
Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records of births cover several
decades and come from all parts of the country, to merely access them in the
Civil Registry General requires expertise. To locate one single birth record
from the mass, a regular employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is
highly unlikely that any of these employees in Metro Manila would have
reason to falsify a particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil
Registry of Iloilo City. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by
interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of
Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court
should have been presented by respondent.
-Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a
December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in
1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x
during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the
former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the
1958 Revised Form."
-Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar
General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956.
We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956
forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form
to be used in 1957 is unlikely.
-The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo
is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the
other entries.
-The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a
carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because
the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates
are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D"
does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion,
race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry
of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there
is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the
date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
-There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital document,
Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8"
for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more
faith and credence by the courts below.
-The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send
copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry
to the Civil Registrar General.A copy of the document sent by the Local Civil
Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be identical in form and in

substance with the copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case, Exhibit
"8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit
"D" as appearing in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such
circumstance should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a
spurious document.
Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by his mother.
In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. Locsin listed as
respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo Escamilla were married
in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not appear.
-In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the
father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate,
or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the
statement of any information or circumstances by which he could
be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no
authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child
upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth
of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the
latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child."
(Emphasis ours)
-The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in
Fernandez vs. Court of Appeal where this Court said that "a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not
competent evidence of paternity."
-A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the
Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and
filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. 18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be
sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic
copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies
between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry.
What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.
-Respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we recklessly set a
very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent
claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with
others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.

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TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

GR 161434
VITUG; March 3, 2004
(maia)
NATURE
This is a consolidation of 3 petitions, all assailing the citizenship of Fernando
Poe, Jr. (FPJ). The two petitions (Tecson v COMELEC and Velez v Poe, Jr.)
were dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction (the petitions were filed in the
SC, without going through the COMELEC). Thus, only one petition was
considered by SC (Fornier v COMELEC). Such petition was filed under Rule
64 of ROC (Review of Decision of COMELEC)
FACTS
- Quick Facts: FPJ was allegedly disqualified from being a candidate for
President because he was not a natural-born citizen. Allegedly, he was born
to an American mother and a Spanish father. Alternatively, even granting that
the father was Filipino, FPJ could not have inherited the Philippine citizenship
because he was illegitimate (father had a prior subsisting marriage, thus
marriage to mother was bigamous; or even granting there was no prior
marriage, FPJ was born one year prior to the marriage of his parents, thus
still illegit).
Long Facts:
On Dec.31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for President under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP). In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen. His real name was
stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in Manila on August
20, 1939.
- Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny
due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming
to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother Bessie
Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a Spanish
national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Even if Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ because FPJ was illegitimate (illegitimate children follow the citizenship
of the mother) since Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to Paulita Gomez
before marrying Bessie Kelley according to an uncertified copy of a
supposed certification of the marriage in July 5, 1936. Further, even if no
such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe married Bessey Kelley only a year
after the birth of FPJ. The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the
date of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan was 25,
unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22, unmarried and American.
- FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou. No
birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon his death in

September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified him as a Filipino residing in San

Carlos, Pangasinan. Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was
born on May 17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father
was an Espaol and mother a mestiza Espaol.
Procedure
- In the hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the following:
-Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
-Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting that
she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his
relationship with Kelley (in Spanish) and its English translation
-Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe
-Certification from the director of the Records Management and Archives
Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the Phils before 1907
-Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives
stating that there was no available information regarding the birth of Allan
F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:
- Certification that there was no available information regarding the birth of
Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National Archives
that there was no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe
and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in the
name of Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
-Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos, Pangasinan
stating that the records of the birth of the said office from 1900 to May
1946 were destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the Fornier petition for lack of
merit. Fornier filed MFR (denied)
ISSUE/S
1. WON FPJ can be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground
that he materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
natural-born Filipino
HELD
1. NO
Ratio While the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Phils., the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy.
Reasoning Quick version: In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter
of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,

depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would

have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Phils. was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse
Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ
has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
- thus, following jus sanguinis, FPJ was Filipino
- Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,
must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
*For discussion on Pedigree, see long version, its really obiter lang.
Long version:
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he
materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a
natural-born Filipino?
Obiter:
Concept of citizenship (baka lang magtanong si maam about this)
- earliest understanding was given by Aristotle who described a citizen as a
man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office
and the state would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a
self-sufficient existence. Citizenship was deemed to deal with rights and
entitlements on the one hand and with concomitant obligations on the other.
- concept of citizenship underwent changes in the 18th to 20th centuries:
18th century: limited to civil citizenship, established rights necessary for
individual freedom [i.e. Rights to property, personal liberty and justice];
19th century: concept expanded to include political citizenship, encompassing
right to participate in exercise of political power;
20th century: developed to social citizenship, emphasized right of citizen to
economic well-being and social security).
Now, it seems that movement is towards internationalization of citizenship
Concept of Citizenship in the Phils from the Spanish times to the present
- Spanish period: no such term as Philippine citizens, only Spanish
subjects. In church records, natives were identified as indios. Although
there were a lot of Spanish laws on citizenship, not all these were extended

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to the Phils. It was only in the Civil Code of Spain (which became effective in
the Phils 1889) where a categorical enumeration of Spanish citizens were
made, viz:
a. Persons born in Spanish territory
b. Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were born outside
Spain
c. Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers
d. Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political status of the
native inhabitants would be determined by the US Congress. Spanish
subjects and natives who choose to remain in the territory may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making a declaration of their decision
within a year from the date of the ratification of the treaty. If no such
declaration is made, their allegiance shall be held renounced and they would
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside. Upon
ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the Phils ceased to be
Spanish subjects. They did not become American citizens either but were
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Phils entitled to
protection of the US.
- in the Philippine Bill of 1902, it was provided that all inhabitants of the Phil.
Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects in the 11 th
day of April, 1899, and then resided in said islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Phil
Islands (this is what they call the Filipinization en masse)
-under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of Phils was deemed to be a
citizen as of 11 April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on said date, (2)
residing in the Phils on said date, and (3) since that date, not a ctizen of
some other country.
- 1935 Constitution provided jus sanguinis (blood relationship) as basis for
citizenship, as indicated in Sec. 1, Art. 3 (defining citizens):
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Phils
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Phils and upon reaching the
age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935 Constitution,
which, when taken together with the existing civil law provisions would
provide that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and
acquire that of their foreign husbands. This was deemed discriminatory in
that it incapacitated the Filipino woman from transmitting her citizenship to
her legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to
still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. 3,
1973 Constitution state that the ff are citizens of the Phils:

- Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Phils
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
1935 Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female citizen of the
Phils who marries an alien retainers her Philippine citizenship unless by
her act or omission she is deemed to have renounced her citizenship
under the law.
- 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by the
questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution and outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1
that the following are Filipino citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Phils at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Phils
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The Case of FPJ
- The Constitution requires that the President of the Phils should be a naturalborn citizen of the Phils (Art. 7, Sec. 2). [Natural born citizen citizens of the
Phils from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship (Art. 4 sec.2)]
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino because his father Lorenzo was also Filipino.
The ff can be drawn with some degree of certainty from the evidence:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie Kelley.
- FPJ was born to them on August 20, 1939 (governed by 1935 consti).
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on September
16, 1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.
- At the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old, a Filipino, and resident of Pangasinan.
- The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy. The three
documents (birth certificate of FPJ, marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan
and the death certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the
originals. As public documents, the 3 documents are prima facie proof of their
contents as stated in the ROC (130, Section 44) that the entries in official
records made by a public officer in the performance of his duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in 1870, when
Phils was still a Spanish colony (since he died at 84 in 1954) and that his
place of residence at the time of death was the same as his residence before
death in the absence of evidence that would attest otherwise. In that case,
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the
Philippine Bill effected in 1902. This citizenship would then extend to his son
Allan F. Poe, FPJs father.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation under Civil Law

- For proof of filiation (relationship or civil status of a child to either parent) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of father to child), the mandatory rules of
civil law would not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration by Ruby
Kelley Mangahas, FPJs maternal aunt and sister of his mother Bessie,
proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship
with FPJ (living with Bessie and the children in one house as one family)
would be accepted.
- Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg. Acknowledgement in
the birth certificate by signing name of father). Absence of this renders the
birth certificate useless as being an authoritative document or recognition
- In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F. Poe in the birth
certificate of FPJ. Thus, the only other proof of voluntary recognition
remained to be some other public document
- 1950 Civil Code 3 types of acknowledgement of illegitimate children which
had to be done during the lifetime of the presumed parent:
(a) Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will or a statement before
the court in authentic writing)
(b) Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized as natural)
(c) Compulsory (demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized the rules as stated in Articles 172, 173 and
175 and the rules have retroactive effect (Article 255). These provisions are
there to govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if
any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual
would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State.
While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code,
such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain
of civil law(that branch of law which is concerned with the organization of the
family and regulation of property).
The relevance of citizenship is
exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, which provides that laws relating to
family rights and duties, or status, condition, and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the phils, even though living abroad. Thus, the
need to reiterate the consti provisions on citizenship
The ONLY item relevant to pedigree:
- The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship
status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up
with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The CC and FC provisions on
proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive
effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about
pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the CC or FC
provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court: Act or Declaration about
pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage,
may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and

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the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts
of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
- For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at
issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in
question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred,
and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.
- Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister
of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be
accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal
relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children
(including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -"I, Ruby Kelley
Mangahas, do hereby declare that:

3.
Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald
Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Phils. as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or
`FPJ.

9.
Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with
our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.),
Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months
between 1943-1944.

18.
I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my
nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the
legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
- Conclusion (digesters take): the affidavit of Ruby Mangahas was sufficient
to establish that there was recognition of the child FPJ, thus he may take the
citizenship of his father.
DNA Testing
- DNA testing to prove paternity could also be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity
Re: contention that being illegitimate prevents a child from inheriting the
citizenship of the father
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous marriage
between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason that Allan allegedly had
a prior existing marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the
veracity of this marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the fathers
citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and violates the equal
protection clause.

Citing Bernas: What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective

public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of
political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither
justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated.
- when jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child to inherit the mothers
citizenship, it to ensure a Filipino nationality for the child in line with the
assumption that the mother would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born during that time
period and it states that Filipino citizens include those whose fathers are
citizens of the Phils., which Allan Poe was
DISPOSITION
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs citizenship but the
evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC
DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC for dismissing the original petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
GRAVADOR V MAMIGO
G.R. No. L-24989
CASTRO; July 21, 1967
(owen)
FACTS
- The controversy arose because of conflicting records of Gravadors date
of birth which is the basis of computation of retirement annuities and the
number of years of service of a retiree.
- Pedro Gravador, principal of Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Negros
Oriental, was advised by Superintendent of Schools Salazar of his separation
from the service because he had reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 as according to (1) pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools and
(2) his Insular Teacher's Cards and Employee's Record Card, which has just
been found in connection with the verification of his service that he was born
on November 26, 1897 (TF he is 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old) unless
he can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that he
was below 65 year old. Mamigo was designated teacher-in-charge of the
said elementary school.
- Gravador wrote the Director of Public Schools and the Division
Superintendent of Schools protesting his forced retirement because the date
of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to his
letter was (1) the affidavit of Bandoquillo and Sienes, both of Amlan, Negros
Oriental, that they knew him to be born on December 11, 1901, in Amlan,

formerly known as New Ayuquitan, Negros Oriental because they were the
neighbors of Gravadors parents and they were present when Gravador was
born and that they were also invited in Gravadors baptismal party; (2) postwar records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an
Employee's Record Card and an Employee's Record of Qualifications which
state that Gravadors birth date is December 11, 1901.
- problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records
of the church where Gravador was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that
the municipal civil register contains no record of the Gravadors birth.
- Gravador filed a suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages in CFI
Negros Oriental as he asked the court to adjudge him entitled to the office of
principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment of not
only his back salaries but also damages in the total amount of P52,400.
- TC: (1) concluded that the post-war records were intended to replace the
pre-war records and therefore the correct date of birth is December 11, 1901;
(2) took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in CFI
Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the Gravadors brother where
it was stated that he was one of the co-owners of a piece of land and at the
time he was 23 years old. TC granted his petition
- Respondents Claim: (1) TC erred in placing full reliance on the post-war
records because these records were made only because it was thought that
the pre-war records had been lost or destroyed, but as some pre-war records
had since been located, the date contained in the pre-war records should be
regarded as controlling; and (2) the finding of the Superintendent of Schools
that Gravador was born on November 26, 1897 is an administrative finding
that should not be disturbed by the court.
ISSUE
WON TC erred in giving full reliance on post war records and verified answer
by Gravadors brother in a cadastral proceeding (PEDIGREE)
HELD
NO
- The findings of fact of administrative officials are binding on the courts if
supported by substantial evidence is a settled rule of administrative law. But
where there is substantial evidence supporting the finding of the
Superintendent of Schools is precisely the issue in this case.
- Cogent Reasons why TC did not err in its findings
(1) although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his
birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and
relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
Even in his application for back pay which he filed with the Department of
Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on October 7,
1948, Gravador stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He
repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked GSIS
and the CSC to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
(2) the import of the declaration of Gravadors brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that Gravador

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was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a
deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree
within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of
Gravador only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante
litem motam of a deceased relative.
(3) Gravador has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and
who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. Gravador could not
have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as the pre-war records
indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
Disposition Judgment Affirmed

Common Reputation
IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE
A.M. No. 533
FERNANDEZ; September 12, 1974
(glaisa)
FACTS
- A decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding that by
preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father,
Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly
being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently
respondent Florencio Mallare was declared excluded from the practice of law;
his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this
Court, the lawyer's diploma previously issued to him.
- Respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new
trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction
of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence
proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an entry in the registry of baptism
of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to
show that Estaben Mallare (respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana
Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known
Esteban Mallare and his mother during their lifetime.
- Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29,
1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon three
basic arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the
natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino citizen; (b) Esteben
Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen
Philippine citizenship; and (c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban
Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE
WON Esteban Mallare (respondents father) is a Filipino as respondent
claims.

HELD
- YES. Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and therefore with qualification
and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.
- In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino
was denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of his
father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can
not be considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she was "an inhabitant
of the Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine"; that the landing
certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's
mother, Te Na, as "wife of Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex
parte determination of the evidence presented by therein applicant and
consequently carries little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her said
husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20,
1939, to the effect that he had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino
mother was not only self-serving, but also it can not be considered a reaffirmation of the alleged election of citizenship since no previous election of
such citizenship has been proved to exist.
- With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the
authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of
respondent's citizenship has been duly filled.
- The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the
person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were
one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously
resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of
wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and
illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.
- Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or
race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive.
Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may
proceed from persons who are not members of the family - the reason
for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of
the existence of marital relations.
- The public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural child,
testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the
former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly
improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother,
instead of adopting that of his father. And it would be straining the imagination
to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to
suit some ulterior motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants
of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.
- The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana
Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as
being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were
not only based on the reputation in the community regarding her race or raceancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual
basis.

- And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an
alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.
Dispositive Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the
original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court
dated April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this
case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Res Gestae
PEOPLE V DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 139150
KAPUNAN; July 20, 2001
(giulia)
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decisionof the CA.
FACTS
-RTC of QC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
-Initially, the Information filed against petitioner charged him with homicide.
Subsequently, the Information was amended charging petitioner with murder.
At his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.
-Fr. Garabato, the deceased, hired Abundo Tad-y and Mario Mascardo in the
construction of his house. On June 16, 1993, the two workers were unloading
construction materials from a Ford Fiera owned and driven by Fr. Garabato.
-The vehicle was parked in front of the house of the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo
De La Cruz where another vehicle was also parked behind it.
-The petitioner got upset with the deceased because he could not get his jeep
out. Fr. Garabato moved the vehicle. At that moment, the two workers were
standing behind the Ford Fiera, and they heard successive shots of gunfire.
They instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the gunshots; such
that they saw smoke coming from the side of petitioner's jeep and saw
petitioner seated in the driver's seat still holding his gun pointing towards the
Ford Fiera.
-Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabato's position, reloaded his gun with another magazine and shot Fr. Garabato anew. Petitioner
immediately left the scene on board his jeep.
-Out of fear of their lives, the two workers ran to the house being constructed.
About half an hour later, Mario Mascardo went back to the locus criminis and
there he saw the helpless body of Fr. Garabato surrounded by several
curious spectators and police officers.
-Fr. Garabato's body was rushed to Quezon City General Hospital where he
was pronounced DOA. The medico-legal concluded that Fr. Garabato died of
"(h)emorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds of the body". The
victim sustained six (6) gunshot wounds spread over his head and body. Four
(4) of these wounds were diagnosed to be fatal.
-On June 19, 1993, petitioner gave himself up to Superintendent Efren
Santos, Chief of Police of Sangandaan Police Station and other police

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officers in the presence of a tabloid reporter and with the assistance of his
counsel, Atty. Constante A. Ancheta.
-At the Police Station, prosecution witnesses, Abundio Tad-y Benito and
Mario Mascardo positively identified petitioner Pablo De La Cruz as the
person who shot Fr. Garabato.
-For his part, petitioner interposed the twin defense of denial and alibi. The
trial court summed up his version of the case as follows:
Accused firmly disclaims knowledge or participation in the aforesaid shooting
incident. He denies having known or seen Fr. Garabato on June 16, 1993. He
claims that at the time and date Fr. Garabato was shot, he was in Gagalangin
Health Center in Tondo, Manila; that he and his two children, Carmela and
Pamela, went to fetch his wife, Cornelia, who was employed therein as a
midwife. From there, they would proceed to Baclaran Church to hear mass.
This point was corroborated by defense witnesses, Cornelia de la Cruz
(Pablo's wife) and Romeo Mabahagi (a janitor/utility man at Gagalangin
Health Center).
The Accused's defense is further corroborated by the testimony of witness,
Ricardo Cuadra, who categorically stated that he witnessed the shooting
incident, and that he actually saw the face of the assailant, and he was
certain that the assailant was NOT Pablo de la Cruz.
-TC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of homicide, not murder as
was charged in the Amended Information. It ruled that the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia was not sufficiently established by the prosecution
and appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
-On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner for homicide but
modified the penalty as it held that the trial court erred in appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
ISSUE
WON the petitioner was guilty
HELD
In this case, the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the two
prosecution witnesses. These two witnesses were with the victim at the time
that he was shot and they positively identified petitioner as the perpetrator of
the crime. Their testimonies were corroborated by the testimony of another
prosecution witness, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, the police officer who
investigated the incident.
-Contrary to petitioners contention, the fact that Mascardo and Tad-y Benito
worked for the victim does not in any way render their testimonies
incredulous. Petitioner has not ascribed any ill motive on their part to
wrongfully accuse him of the crime. In the absence thereof, their respective
testimonies are not affected by their relationship to the victim.
-Considering the positive identification of petitioner as the assailant of the
victim by eyewitnesses to the crime, both the TC and CA gave scant
consideration to petitioner's defense of denial and alibi. Denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and selfserving evidence which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

-Moreover, for alibi to prosper, petitioner must prove not only (1) that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but (2) it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was so far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
-To the mind of the Court, the distance between Sangandaan, Quezon City
and Tondo, Manila does not preclude the possibility that petitioner could have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at or about the
time of its commission.
-Alibi is a defense invariably viewed by the Court as weak. It is treated with
disfavor simply because it is easily fabricated on the part of the accused, his
friends, relatives and supporters. Petitioner's defense of alibi is thus
unavailing especially in light of the clear and positive identification of him as
the assailant by two credible eyewitnesses who had no motive to lie.
The testimony of prosecution were alleged to be fraught with inconsistent and
incredulous statements. The prosecution allegedly tried to portray the victim
as a "pacifist" and that he was "meek as a lamb" when in fact he was a
Lieutenant Colonel assigned to the headquarters of the Armed Forces. The
victim was not allegedly constructing his own residence in the area, as
claimed by the prosecution, but was just renovating a house. The
eyewitnesses allegedly claimed to have heard ten (10) gunshots but only six
(6) gunshots were established. Petitioner denies owning a .45 caliber pistol
and faults the prosecution for not presenting the same as evidence. He also
claims that it would be inconceivable for him to kill the victim in the presence
of his two (2) children, as narrated by the prosecution.
These alleged inconsistent and incredulous statements pertain merely to
minor details and do not detract from the crux of the testimonies of Mascardo
and Tad-y Benito that they witnessed the killing of the victim by petitioner.
Even if the trial court found certain imputations made by the prosecution
witnesses "exaggerated," still, these do not per se render the entire testimony
unworthy of credence. "Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" is not a strict legal
maxim in our jurisprudence. It is neither a test of credibility nor a positive rule
of universal application. Therefore, it should not be applied to portions of the
testimony corroborated by other pieces of evidence.
-With respect to the non-presentation of the .45 caliber pistol, the
presentation of the weapon is not a prerequisite for conviction.
On Res Gestae
-Petitioner further puts in issue the admission by the trial court of the
statement made by the bystanders imputing the crime to petitioner as res
gestae. SP03 Jesus Patriarca, a prosecution witness, testified that when he
conducted the investigation immediately after the incident occurred, he
questioned those people at the scene of the crime if they know who shot the
victim. The response he got was: "yun hong pulis na nakatira sa tapat"
referring to petitioner. The trial court admitted this statement as part of res
gestae. According to the TC:
[A]lthough the people who gave this information were not
presented on the witness stand, this Court still resolved to admit
and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the spectators
competent as "PART OF RES GESTAE". Records of this case

reveal that the incident was reported to SPO3 Patriarca at around

2:45 in the afternoon of June 16, 1993, while the latter was on
duty, and immediately, they rushed to the scene of the crime to
investigate. It was at that instance that he gathered the aforesaid
information.
"RES GESTAE" refers to those exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, the victim(s) or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that
the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a
false statement. As borne by evidence on record, all the elements
of res gestae are sufficiently established, insofar as the
aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned:
a) the principal act (res gestae) the killing of Fr.
Garabato in broad daylight is a startling occurrence;
b) the statements were made before the declarants
had time to contrive or devise that is, within several
minutes after the victim was shot; and
c) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending
circumstances the identity of the assailant is a
material and vital information that concerns the
aforementioned startling occurrence. 22
-Even if the declaration was not to be considered as res gestae, the
testimonies of Mascardo and Tad-y Benito positively identifying petitioner is
sufficient to establish the latter's guilt.
-CA correctly held that petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. When petitioner went to the
Sangandaan Police Station, he did so purportedly to clear his name. It was
not his intention to submit himself to the authorities and assume responsibility
for the death of the victim. To be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance,
the voluntary surrender must be spontaneous.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE vs. CARIQUEZ
GR 129304
DAVIDE, JR.; Sep 27, 1999
(athe)
NATURE: Appeal
FACTS
AVA (mother of Ethel) and LEEZEL (live-in partner of Ava; not the father of
Ethel) were initially charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10,

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Article VI of R.A. NO. 7610.3 (Otherwise known as "Special Protection of

Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.") but later
on the information was amended to charge them with the crime of parricide
when the victim, ETHEL died. Ethel was beaten and mauled in the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which directly
caused her death.
Among the witnesses presented by the prosecution were Lilia Gojul (Avas
sister), Michelle Torente (neighbor), Theresa Castillo (neighbor).
Lilia Gojul used to live with her sister but was forced to leave as Avas
household was not at all peaceful. One day Lilia visited Ava and her niece
but she was shocked to see Ethel's appearance; her hair was shaven, her
face was full of contusions, her neck had faded cigarette burns while her
arms and legs had traces of pinching and maltreatment. She also had marks
of "black-eye" on both eyes. Lilia also noticed Ethel's knees with contusions
due to prolonged kneeling. When Lilia asked the little girl to identify who
inflicted the injuries on her body, Ethel tearfully pointed to Ava and Leezel .
Lilia confronted Ava about her and Leezel's treatment of Ethel
The second witness, Michelle Torrente, testified that she was aghast to see
Ethel shaven, with bruises all over her body and wounds in her arms and
legs. Ethel also had cigarette burns, and when Michelle asked what
happened, Ethel replied: "pinaso po ako." When Michelle further asked who
burned her and caused her bruises, Ethel said, "Papa ko po," referring to
Leezel Franco.
The little girl's shaven head and bruises were also noticed by Theresa
Castillo, an occupant of unit 115, adjacent to Ava's residence. When she
asked Ethel's "yaya" why this was done to the little girl, the "yaya" answered,
"parusa".
AVA and LEEZEL were the witnesses presented by the defense.
Ava offered two versions. She testified in open court that Ethels death was
due to an accident. Ethel fell from the stairs. The second was narrated in her
affidavit and reply-affidavit where she pointed Leezel as the culprit.
Leezel, on the other hand, claimed that he had no idea as to what
happened to Ethel; all that he saw was the child lying on the floor, and then
he helped Ava bring the child to the hospital. He further claimed that the
testimony of Lilia is not true.
The trial court found Ava and Leezel guilty of parricide and homicide
respectively.
They both appealed. Their contention, among others, was the
prosecutions witnesses are purely hearsay and that they were convicted on
the basis of circumstantial evidence.
ISSUES
1. WON the declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they
observed from Ethel were hearsay, therefore inadmissible
2. WON the TC erred in convicting Ava and Leezel based on circumstantial
evidence
HELD

1. NO. They saw her and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of
torture. While the answer of ETHEL as to who inflicted the injuries may have
been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL could not be confronted on that, yet it
was part of the res gestae and, therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule
pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.2
Ratio There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting
part of the res gestae. (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
Reasoning In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted
on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them spontaneously pointed to AVA
and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the
injuries and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has
been no uniformity as to the interval of time that should separate the
occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations. What is
necessary is that the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27
May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL.
2. NO.
Ratio Circumstancial evidence is sufficient to convict provided the following
requisites are present, namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived from are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.17 [Section 5, Rule 133, Rules of Court.] The
circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain of events so as to
lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the guilt of the
accused.
Reasoning In the Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
enumerates seven (7) circumstantial evidence which the trial court took in to
account and relied upon as bases for its finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were
criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL (testimony of Lilia, Michelle,
Theresa, Dr Bienvenida, etc.)
DISPOSITION : Decision of RTC finding Ava and Leezel guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Parricide and Homicide
respectively is AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 132635 & 14387275
2

SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequently thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae.

MENDOZA; February 21, 2001

(jojo)
NATURE
An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles City, convicting
Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against his
granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy
Ocampo
FACTS
- Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness upon the person of
AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ;
and rape
of MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him, whereupon the cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
The evidence for the prosecution:
- In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused), then 13 years of
age, slept in a room she shared with Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and
her two half-brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found the
accused beside her on the floor, her mother having left for the market. He
kissed her on the mouth and the breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled
down her shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts. Afterward, he
inserted his middle finger into Mary Joys vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain
and tried to resist by kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger
although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not before warning her to
keep quiet and not to tell anyone what he had done to her.
- 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was watching television alone
in the living room, Velasquez approached her and, though she tried to evade
him, he succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her shorts and
underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and started kissing her. Then he
inserted his middle finger into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse
with her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested Mary Joy,
sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and at other times licking her
vagina.
- Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named Aira, 2 years old. On
April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the
room crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did something to her,
which she demonstrated by opening her right leg and moving one of her right
fingers toward her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter and
thought that her father was just joking with the latter. However, Aira started to
cry. In the days that followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her
vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why her vagina hurt, Aira
said it was because of the things her grandfather had been doing to her
vagina, showing her mother what had been done to her.On April 28, 1997,
Regail noticed pus coming out of Airas vagina. She also noticed that her
daughter was running a fever, and that her vagina was red and swollen. She
took Aira to Dr. Lydia Buyboy, who told her that her daughter had lacerations
in her vaginal area and that she had probably been fingered. However, the

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doctor declined to give a medical certificate as she did not want to get
involved in any case.
- Mary Grace Ocampo( stepdaughter of accused), Angelinas daughter,
married Ranold, accuseds son by first wife Caridad and Regails brother.
Mary Grace testified that she had been molested by her stepfather when she
was 9 years old. She recalled when, as a new couple, Angelina and accused
spent the night at an aunts house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Mary Grace
was with them. According to Mary Grace, accused went to her side, raised
her clothes, and fondled her breasts. His hands went lower. She was unable
to resist accuseds advances because of his strength and threats. To prevent
a recurrence of the event, Mary Grace moved out of their house and went to
live with her aunt in Angeles City. Kimberly was around Airas age, and Regail
remembered hearing that pus had also come out of the childs vagina. When
she told her about Dr. Buyboys findings, Mary Grace lost no time and took
Kimberly to Dr. Buyboy, who made the same findings.
- Angelina and Loida went to the police station to make a report and brought
the children to the Ospital ng Angeles for physical examination. They went
back to the Mabalacat Police Station and gave their statements. They went to
the NBI for another physical examination.
The evidence for the defense:
- Accused denied the allegations against him. He said there were always
several people in their house at any time, and so it was impossible for him to
have an opportunity to molest any of the complainants. He believed that Mary
Joy had accused him because he always noticed whenever she came home
late and scolded her. As for Mary Graces complaint, he claimed he was in
fact the one who caught Kimberly playing with her organ and that he reported
this to Kimberlys parents. He believes that Regail filed the complaint against
him because he had scolded her and punished her when she went out on a
date with a married man, and again when she went out with her cousin after
she had married Meryll Robertson. As to Roan, he claimed he never
molested her. Of his granddaughter Aira, accused-appellant said that she was
a liar and a naughty child.
- On April 30, 1997, during Loida Kellows despedida, he was drinking with
his friends when he developed a headache and decided to sleep. At around
10PM, he was awakened by his son Renel who gave him glass of bitter
liquid to drink. The drink contained sleeping pills. After taking one sip, he set
it aside. When he woke up the next morning, he looked for his family, but
they were not around. He got home at 8PM, but there was still no sign of
them.
- The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his watch and ring and
bought a ticket on the Super Ferry 10. At 9PM, he sailed for Cebu and
stayed with his eldest son, Rolando Velasquez. Three weeks later, he learned
of the cases filed against him from the newspapers and television. However,
because he had no job and no money, he was unable to return to Pampanga
to clear his name. He was found in Cebu and arrested in July.
- The accused presented several witnesses to testify that he is a man of
good repute, and to corroborate his story.
TC RULING:

The accused was convicted of (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against

his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy
Ocampo
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in denying the accused of his right to
preliminary investigation.
2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Regail Velasquez
3. WON the trial court erred in giving credibility to Mary Joy Ocampos
testimony
HELD
1. NO.
It is an established jurisprudence that the issue of lack of or a defective
preliminary investigation should be raised before or during trial and such
statutory right to a preliminary investigation is deemed waived when
appellant, as in this case, failed to claim it before plea. Moreover, in
appellants arguments, it is unclear whether this alleged motion for
preliminary investigation which was denied by the trial court was anchored on
the lack of it or merely a defect thereon or a mere motion for reinvestigation.
When it does not appear from the record that a preliminary investigation was
not granted the accused, it must be presumed that the proceedings in the trial
court were in accordance with law. So that where no objection has been
made at the trial, appellant must be taken to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit thereof. Failing
to raise the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during the trial, appellant
is now estopped to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any rate,
absence of preliminary investigation merely affects the regularity of the
proceedings but does not affect the trial courts jurisdiction or impair the
validity of the information.
2. NO.
The trial court based its conviction of accused-appellant for acts of
lasciviousness against Aira Velasquez on the testimony of Regail Velasquez,
Airas mother, who testified on what her daughter had told her. Aira herself
was not presented in court, being a mere child of two and a half years old.
(pls see orig copy re testimony)
- As the SolGen contends, Airas acts and statements constitute exceptions
to the hearsay rule because they were part of the res gestae. The inculpatory
and spontaneous statements were: (1) Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu.
(Tatang (accused-appellant) has been doing something to me.) (2) I-tatang
kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya. (Because Tatang has
been doing something to my private part, that is why it hurts.) (3) She
showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing with pus,
and then she gestured, by slightly opening or raising her right foot and using
her right finger, to show what accused-appellant had done to it.
- We hold that Airas statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it
was made immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered
shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to
contrive the same. Regails account of Airas words and, more importantly,

Airas gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct from

hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they
had been thus uttered.
- Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless
of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact.
- Accused also questions the fact that when Aira was examined on May 9,
1997, Dr. Aguda discovered an old healed laceration, which usually indicates
that the injury was inflicted more than one month prior to the examination,
whereas the date of the alleged molestation was on April 16, 1997, one week
short of a month. This discrepancy was already explained by Dr. Aguda to the
satisfaction of the trial court. According to the doctor, the medical
classifications and periods were based on adult cases, whereas Aira was a
little child with a very small hymen, and the laceration was very superficial.
Understandably, then, the results varied slightly.
The Court is not unaware of the caution to be observed when
circumstantial evidence is to be considered as inculpatory indicia in a criminal
prosecution. That is why it has spent an unusual amount of time and effort to
reflect upon all the circumstances which the lower court accepted as an
unbroken chain of events, reinforced by corroboration and yielding a
conclusion of guilt, all consonant with the requisites therefor.But, in this case,
the chain of facts cannot but produce an inference consistent with guilt and
not with innocence. It is highly unlikely that a child of Airas age would be
able to concoct such a depraved tale and compliment it with such disturbing
gestures with only the fantastic intention of implicating her grandfather.
- To sum up, the following circumstances establish accuseds guilt:
Regails account of her daughters words and actions, her personal
knowledge of the pus discharged from her daughters vagina and the
NBI medico-legal report confirming it, and accuseds bare denials,
compounded with his unexplained flight to Cebu, bringing little more
with him than the clothes on his back. Taken together, these are
sufficient to convince us of the truth of the allegations against accused.
- The rule is settled that we give due deference to the observations of trial
courts on questions of credibility of witnesses since they have a better
opportunity for observation than appellate courts. For this reason, the trial
courts evaluation of testimonial evidence is accorded great respect. Aira is a
two-year old child. The penalty imposable for acts of lasciviousness against
children under 12 years of age should be that provided by R.A. 7610, which is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Accused-appellant is Airas
grandfather. His relationship to his victim aggravates the crime, and, as
provided by R.A. 7610, Section 31, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent, guardian,
stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity. Hence, the maximum period of reclusion temporal medium should be
imposed. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

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minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be reclusion temporal

minimum.
3. YES
- The accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the
rape victim, if such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. We adhere to this
principle in the case at bar. Accused questions the credibility of Mary Joy
Ocampo because of a three-year delay in reporting the alleged rape.
- Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not necessarily an indication that
the charge is fabricated.[69] In these cases, the delay was caused by fear. It
is apparent from the testimony of witnesses, both of the prosecution and of
the defense, that accused-appellant was a man to be feared. He brooked no
disobedience even from his own brothers and sisters and was so feared that,
even when his life and his freedom were gravely threatened, nobody, not
even his own brother, was willing to wake him and confront him with the
accusations. His wife, his children, and close relatives fled their home and
lived in a hotel for four days to escape his ire. Physically, he was intimidating.
He is a black belter in karate and, according to his own sisters testimony, he
could hurt a person merely by holding his hand. In fact, accused threatened
Mary Joy with harm if she told anyone what accused-appellant had done to
her.[70] It is, therefore, easy to see why Mary Joy kept her silence.
- Mary Joys alleged inconsistent testimonies as to whether or not she knew
Jesus Tootsie Mendoza or Robertson is inconsequential. At any rate,
Mary Joy clarified these points. Also, Mary Joys alleged inconsistent
testimony as to whether her mother was in the market or asleep in the house
when she was raped is readily explicable or reconcilable. Mary Joy testified
that the first time Lamberto inserted his finger on her sexual organ, her
mother was in the market and when appellant finally succeeded in inserting
his sexual organ into Mary Joys, nobody was at home except her other
brothers who were asleep. Evidently, in both instances, Mary Joys mother
was not in the house.
- Inconsistencies on minor or inconsequential matters do not impair the
essential integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole, nor detract from
the witnesses testimony. On the contrary, they strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they erase the
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. A rape victim cannot be expected to keep
an accurate account of her traumatic experience. Discrepancies could be
caused by the natural fickleness of human memory.
- Mary Joys testimony is corroborated by medical findings of hymenal
lacerations, which the trial court found meritorious. On the other hand,
accused merely makes a bare denial of the charges against him.
Accused said that there was always a large number of people in their house,
such that he would have had no opportunity to commit the crimes charged
against him. Rape has been known to be committed in places ordinarily
considered as unlikely. The scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily
isolated or secluded. It can be committed in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside an
occupied house, and even in a room where other members of the family are
sleeping. Among couples with big families who live in cramped quarters, the

presence of other members of the family is not necessarily a deterrent to the

commission of this crime. In this case, it is not impossible for the rape to have
taken place inside a small room with five occupants therein, including
accused-appellant and Mary Joy.
DISPOSITION: Decision of RTC of Angeles finding Velasquez guilty of acts
of lasciviousness and of rape is affirmed.

ABALLE v PEOPLE
FERNAN; March 15, 1990
G.R. No. 64086
(jojo)
NATURE
- Direct appeal from the decision of the CFI of Davao City, finding petitioner
Peter Paul Aballe guilty of homicide.
FACTS
- At around 7PM of Nov.7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao City, Quirino
Banguis, a 42-year old driver, attended a birthday party at the residence of
his neighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his wife and other children,
leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house. Upon their
return at around 8:30 that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying
prostrate, bathed in her own blood with multiple wounds on different parts of
her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing.
- The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie sustained a total of 32 stab
wounds. Cause of death was attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiple
stab wounds.
- At daybreak of the following day, Nov. 8, acting on information furnished by
the victim's father, a police team headed by Sgt Marante sought the accused
for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal
bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt.
Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally
admitted that he killed Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought
him to the Toril police station for interrogation.
- While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout
(he finished second year high school) and next door neighbor of the victim,
brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at the "bangera"
where he had concealed the death weapon which was a 4-inch kitchen knife.
Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped T-shirt
which he claimed he wore during the commission of the crime. Aballe also
made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie while
under the influence of liquor and marijuana. ( Pls. see original copy re sworn
affidavit) Thereafter, an information was filed against Aballe, charging him
with homicide penalized under Article 249 of the RPC. At his arraignment on
Apr. 13, 1981, he pleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicial
confession on the ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the
absence of counsel. Notwithstanding the repudiation of his earlier
confession, Aballe was convicted of the crime of homicide.

ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in giving full weight to Aballes extrajudicial
confession taken during custodial investigation and in imposing a penalty
which was not in accordance with law.
2. WON the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable
doubt
HELD
1. YES
- Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by the lower
court for having been obtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights.
Throughout the custodial interrogation, the
accused's parents and relatives were almost always around but at no stage
of the entire proceedings was it shown that the youthful offender was ever
represented by counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement
was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de
parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel
as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the lower court.
- Equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife recovered from Aballe after his
capture and after the police had started to question him. Together with the
extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally
infirmed interrogation and must consequently be disallowed. The
bloodstained T-shirt, however, is admissible, being in the nature of an
evidence in plain view which an arresting officer may take and introduce in
evidence.
- The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the
crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the
cause. . ."
2. YES
It is well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicial
confession, the accused, upon being picked up in the morning of Nov. 8,
1980 as he was coming out of the communal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt
covered with bloodstains which he tried to cover with his hands, suddenly
broke down and knelt before Sgt. Marante and confessed that he killed
Jennie Banguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral confession is
competent evidence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing.
( Pls see orig copy re testimony)
- The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the
offenses charged may be given in evidence against him. The rule is that any
person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in
such case it must be given in its substance.
- Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is
not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning,

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but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having
slain the victim.
- Inappropriateness of penalty discussed

PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS

G.R. No. L-44690
AQUINO, March 28, 1980
(cha)
NATURE
Automatic review of CFI judgment convicting Tampus of murder, sentencing
him to death; co-accused Avila was also sentenced to death in another case
but did not appeal in this case because his sentence was already under
review

public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court may motu proprio exclude
the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to
decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant,
exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the
attorneys for the prosecution and defense. (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of
Court. See 21 Am Jur 2d 305, sec. 270).
Reasoning. The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and
hearing, and not the trial court's session hall at Makati, Rizal, because this
Court in its resolution of July 20, 1976 in L-38141, where Rodolfo Avila was
one of the accused-appellants, refused, for security reasons, to allow him to
be brought to Makati So, this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in
the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the
national penitentiary in Muntinlupa. No showing that the public was actually
excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was
prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national penitentiary.

FACTS
-Tampus and Avila, members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of their
co-gang member Rosales by stabbing Saminado, a member of the Batang
Mindanao gang which was a hostile group to the Oxo gang. The accused and
the victims were all prisoners in the national penitentiary and are in the
emergency ward.
-How it happened: at around 10 am, Saminado went to the toilet. Tampus and
Avila followed Saminado and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted
him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds while Avila stabbed Saminado 9
times. Afterwards, the two surrendered to a prison guard their knives, saying
"Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." Saminado died 11am upon
arrival in the prison hospital.
-the officer of the day investigated the incident right away. 2 days after the
killing, another prison guard investigated the two and obtained their
extradjudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted
Saminado.
-at the arraignment, they pleaded guilty even after they were told regarding
the gravity of the charge and informed them that the death penalty might be
imposed upon them. When the prosecution presented evidence, the two
accused took the witness stand, affirmed their confessions and testified as to
the manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado. The trial was held
at the state penitentiary.

2. YES
Reasoning. (1) Confession was voluntarily made. The investigator in taking it
endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with section 20 of the
1973 Constitution (refer to the case for the salaysay); (2) Res Gestae: even if
there was an initial investigation before the extrajudicial confession was
obtained (where the right against self-incrimination may not have been told to
the accused), Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming
out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S.
Eustaquio, the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him
that they had committed an act of revenge; (3) they already waived their right
to remain silent and to have the right to counsel when they gave freely on the
spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion; Admission was
confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in
court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction;
***other issues are criminal issues***

ISSUES
1. WON Tampus was denied his right to a public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary
2. WON the extrajudicial admissions of Tampus and Avila were admissible

BARREDO, J., concurring:

HELD
1. NO.
Ratio. For the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison
without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal
of the judgment of conviction. The accused may waive his right to have a

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

- The extra-judicial confession of the accused, having been taken after the
1973 Constitution is manifestly barred from admission under section 20 of the
Bill of Rights (Article IV) thereof.

Disposition. WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment as to Jose Tampus is

modified. He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The lower court's judgment
as to his civil liability is affirmed. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. (lacked 10
votes required)
Separate Opinions

I concur, but I believe it is best that the court should inform the accused of his
right to remain silent and not wait for the lawyer to make the objection.

-grave doubts as to the alleged waiver by the accused of his constitutional

right to counsel and to remain silent given in the middle of his "voluntary"
extrajudicial confession during his custodial interrogation by the prison
investigator
-it was the trial courts duty to apprise and admonish the accused of his consti
right to remain silent and against self-incrimination. Any confession or
incriminatory statement obtained in violation thereof is expressly declared
"inadmissible in evidence."

PEOPLE V REYES
G.R. No. L-1846-48
BENGZON; January 18, 1948
(aida)
NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Pampanga
FACTS
- Vicente Gatchalian, Severino Austria, Pedro Reyes, Eusebio Perez,
Gervasio Due and Marcelo Due were charged in two separate cases with the
deaths of Benjamin Nery and Alfredo Laguitan. In another case, they were
accused of causing physical injuries to Francisco Orsino.
- April 19, 1946, Good Friday in Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga While the
pabasa was being performed, the appellants, assisted by Marcelo Due,
Gervasio Due and one Peping and carrying pistols, approached Nery,
Laguitan and Orsino who were members of the military police.
- The three MPs were sitting on one corner, watching the proceedings. At
gunpoint, the three MPs were driven to the road and when they were about
ten meters away from where the pabasa was being done, they were shot
from behind. Nery and Laguitan were killed instantly while Orsino fractured a
leg which took 6 months to heal.
- The motive for the killing was the conflict between the MPs and the Huks,
the attackers being Huk members.
- Six people testified for the prosecution, including Reyes.
- Eusebio Perez said he was attending the pabasa and when he heard
gunshots, he grabbed his wife and ran. The next day he saw three of the
assailants including Maximo Austria and they said they were going into hiding
because they had taken part in the shooting the night before. Perez did not
mention Gatchalian.
- Lt. Martinez testified that in the investigation conducted by Quintans,
Gatchalian stated that each of them approached an MP and fired at them and
that he was sure they would die.
- Witnesses for the defense gave their own testimonies.
- Segundo Guevara saw Gatchalian during the pabasa and when gunshots
were heard, he saw Gatchalian run carrying his child and then the latter lay in
a pile of palay. Gatchalian remained in Guevaras house the whole night.
This was corroborated by a testimony by Evaristo Paras.

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- The fiscal filed a motion for the dismissal of the case against Eusebio Perez
for insufficiency of evidence. This was granted. He also asked that the
accused Pedro Reyes be discharged so that the latter may be used as
prosecution witness. This was also granted.
- The CFI judge found the accused Maximino Austria alias Severino Australia
alias Big Boy and Vicente Gatchalian alias Magallanes guilty of the offenses
set forth in the different informations. They were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and indemnity for the deaths of Nery and Laguitan.
- Reyes did become a state witness but he did not confirm every statement
he had previously made at the fiscal's investigation. He testified that before
the crime was committed, Gervacio had asked him to talk to the MPs but he
refused. Later on, he heard gunshots and when he ran to the ricefield, he
saw and heard Gervacio saying that the MP he shot would surely die and
Gatchalian assuring him that the MO would indeed die.
- Orsino narrated a similar incident but could not identify the assailants except
Austria. Lts. Martinez and Quintans declared under oath that Gatchalian
admitted to them during the investigation that he had shot one of the MPs.
Gatchalian even demonstrated how he shot the victim whih was captured in a
photograph.
- Lt. Quintans also testified that Austria had voluntarily signed the confession.
- Gatchalian denies that he made a confession before Lt. Quintans. He
denied that he had taken part in the killing and that he was merely threatened
to be killed lest he reenact the crime as shown in the photograph. He alleged
that he was maltreated and even showed his supposed injuries in court.
ISSUE
WON the judgment appealed from should be reversed
HELD
NO
Reasoning
- The picture of the reenactment of the crime is convincing enough to show
the guilty participation of the appellants.
- Their defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The Solicitor General's brief
substantially proves conspiracy between them and their other co-accused
who are still at large.
Disposition Judgment affirmed
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- Appellants' guilt not having been proved beyond all reasonable doubt, they
are entitled to acquittal.
- The testimony of Eusebio Perez to the effect that on April 20, 1946,
appellants told him that they wanted to hide because of their participation in
the shooting the previous night, is absolutely incredible. If appellants had
wanted to hide, it is incomprehensible that they should start by admitting to

Eusebio Perez that they took part in the shooting affray and then confiding to
him their intention to hide.
- The testimony of Pedro Reyes cannot be taken seriously, not only because
it comes from a polluted source, but because it is inherently unbelievable that
the authors of the shooting could have been so reckless enough to make
comments on the results of the shooting in the field, near the scene, and at
the hearing distance of Pedro Reyes. According to the latter, everybody,
including the assailants, ran away afield; but it is unbelievable that the
assailants should stop in their flight just to make comments and seemingly
should to afford Pedro Reyes the opportunity to over-hear their conversation.
- The testimonies of Fidel Martinez and Segundino S. Quintans as to the
supposed oral admission of Vicente Gatchalian and the written statement
signed by Severino Austria, are completely valueless because of the
uncontradicted testimonies of the two appellants to the effect that they were
maltreated, tortured and threatened to be killed.
- Orsino testified that the shooting took place in front of the place where the
pabasa was being held in the presence of many people. Not one of those
many had witnessed the shooting was called by the prosecution to testify as
to who did the shooting and how it took place, with the single exception of
Orsino.

PEOPLE V TULAGAN
G.R. No. L-68620
NARVASA; July 22, 1986
(rach)
FACTS
- May 19, 1979: at about 11pm, Marlon Catungal, 19, died a violent death,
succumbing to "Shock, due to severe hemorrhage, secondary to stab wound,
anterior chest."
- No one saw precisely how, where and when that single stab wound was
inflicted, or by whom, but there seems to be no question (both prosecution
and defense agreeing on this point) that the deceased was killed while
attempting to flee from at least 2 men, identified as Freddie Eding Tulagan
and Valentin "Satsoy" de Guzman. The chase began at or near the public hall
of Bgy. Don Pedro, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, where a dance was being held on
the occasion of the barrio fiesta, and ended, tragically for Catungal, at the
porch (azotea) of the house of a certain Cesar Evangelista, some 300m
away. The deceased appeared to have been carried, after he had been fatally
stabbed, from the house of Evangelista to the shoulder of the provincial road
about 10m away, where his corpse was later found by police investigators
and barangay officials.
- The only person with any claim to some sort of direct observation of the
pursuit and its sanguinary ending is Bonifacio Ulanday, who gave a sworn
statement before the provincial Fiscal at Dagupan City on June 6, 1979 and
later testified before the TC. His version is as follows:
1. The chase began at the dance hall, at about 10pm, after Catungal was
accosted by Satsoy and 3 other persons.

2. Catungal ran away when he saw Satsoy receive a "balisong" about a

foot long from one of his companions.
3. Satsoy chased Catungal. His 3 other companions also chased Catungal.
4. Ulanday followed in such a way as to avoid being noticed by the
pursuers, staying about 15m behind them.
5. Ulanday only lost sight of the 4 persons running after Catungal when
said Catungal entered a certain yard; he did not witness how the 4
allegedly overtook Catunga;.he did not see any person who stabbed or
killed Catungal.
6. Ulanday only saw 4 persons who lifted Catungal and placed him in front
of a big house, at w/c time Catungal was motionless and blood was oozing
from the body of Catungal ; Ulanday also said in his statement before the
Provincial Fiscal:
While I was running towards the North (following the pursuers) I saw
Satsoy and his companions carrying the cadaver of Catungal from the
azotea of a house located around 10m away from the road to Bayambang.
They placed the cadaver of Catungal on the left side of the road from
Malasiqui.
- On the basis of this sworn statement, and those of Bgy Capt. Jose B.
Macaraeg and his daughter, Natalia Macaraeg, an information was filed with
the Circuit Criminal Court at Dagupan City charging Freddie Tulagan alias
"Eding," Valentin de Guzman alias "Satsoy," Romie Mendoza and Ramon
Mendoza with the crime of murder.
- As may at once be perceived, there is no direct evidence to establish that
Satsoy stabbed Marlon Catungal while the latter was being held "helpless
and defenseless" by the 3 other accused. Neither before the Investigating
Fiscals nor before the TC was any proof adduced directly and positively
demonstrating precisely how and by whom the single fatal wound was
inflicted.
- Of the 4 thus charged, only Mendoza was arrested. Arraigned, he pleaded
not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty of murder with the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
- Case now before SC on automatic review. The decision under review lays
stress on Natalia Macaraegs testimony of a statement by de Guzman
deemed to be part of the res gestae or an "oral confession.": Natalia asked
de Guzman, Tulagan and Mendoza what they did to her neighbor, accused
de Guzman, while standing side by side with Tulagan and Mendoza told
her that they killed Marlon Catungal, her neighbor, an employee of PNR.
ISSUE/S
1. WON said statement constitutes res gestae
2. WON TCs other conclusions were correct
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Not every statement made on the occasion of a startling occurrence is
admissible as part of the res gestae; only such are admissible as appear to
have been involuntarily and spontaneously wrung from an observer by the
shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as has aptly been said, it is

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the event speaking through the witness, not the witness speaking of the
event. The startling occurrence must produce so powerful an effect or
influence on the observer as to extract from his lips some description of the
event practically without being conscious of his utterance.
Reasoning Actually, it was Vicente de Guzman who supposedly volunteered
information, without initially having to be asked by Natalia.
- TC opined that the statement made by Satsoy is admissible against
accused Romeo Mendoza as part of the res gestae. R130, sec 36 provides
that statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. Besides, the statement of de Guzman partakes of an oral confession
or part of the res gestae. The testimony of Natalia Macaraeg on this point is
competent evidence.
THIS IS ERROR.
- There is no evidence whatsoever that the statement attributed to de
Guzman was made by him "immediately subsequent" to the startling
occurrence which the TC had in mind: the slaying of Catungal. On the
contrary, if account be taken of the claim of another prosecution witness,
Ulanday, that he had followed the 4 persons pursuing the deceased for
almost 1 hour, it would most certainly have taken de Guzman and his
companions that length of time to return from the crime scene to where the
chase had started, or to Natalia's store. Natalia herself testified that the 3
accused returned to her store at about 10:30pm or after more or less 1
hours.
- There is no indication in the record that de Guzman was so affected when
he made the statement in question under the circumstances related by
Natalia Macaraeg. Indeed, it may reasonably be inferred from Natalia's
testimony that he was in nowise agitated, stunned or shocked but was, on the
contrary, calm, imposed, in full possession of his faculties and fully aware of
what he was doing and saying. His statement regarding the killing of Marlon
Catungal is not admissible as part of the res gestae, contrary to the view of
the court a quo.
- Considered as an "oral confession," de Guzman's statement is, of course,
admissible against him, but its use against others for any purpose is
proscribed by the well known rule res inter alios acta.
2. NO
Reasoning TC also said that: Aside from the evidence that accused Romeo
Mendoza, Freddie Tulagan and Valentin de Guzman chased Marlon Catungal
at May 19, 1979 at around 9pm, it was shown that upon the return of the
three accused to the store at about 10:30pm, Natalia noticed blood stains on
their hands and bodies. These circumstances and pieces of evidence have
not been denied by accused Romie Mendoza. These constitute conclusive
and decisive evidence of the guilt of accused Romeo Mendoza as one of the
authors of the death of Marion Catungal.
- This is completely contrary to the record. It is belied by the very decision
itself, which in a later part states that Romie Mendoza DENIED that he
appeared at Natalias store with Tulagan and de Guzman; and that he took

part in the pursuit of the deceased. His counsel presented 2 witnesses who
substantiated his denial.
- TC also considers as an indication of guilt" the fact that Mendoza was
arrested only 2yrs. after issuance of the warrant.
- SC said that this signifies nothing insofar as the guilt of person arrested and
his denial of complicity in the crime charged are concerned. Such
circumstance can just as plausibly suggest that the officers charged with
serving the warrant exhibited less than a desirable diligence and concern in
the performance of that duty as that the accused person sought to hide
himself and evade arrest.
- Certain relevant and significant considerations prevent this Court from
giving faith and credit to the evidence given by Natalia Macaraeg (failed to
mention de Guzmans we killed him statement on either of her 2 sworn
statements); and the same is true with respect to Bonifacio Ulanday (who
claims to be a friend yet after seeing lifeless body did nothing and saw no
cause to inform Catungal's family about the death of their son or to report that
matter to Macaraeg. He kept silent about what he knew until he chanced to
meet Catungal's father in Dagupan City 2 weeks after the event). The Court
cannot bring itself to accept the testimonial declarations of these two
witnesses, which form the pillars of the prosecution's case, and this,
particularly in view of the firm denials of the accused and the exculpatory
testimony of Victoriano Deldio and Andres Nevado, as to whom no clear
motive or reason to subvert the truth to favor said accused has been shown.
- Given the fact that the victim's last moments are veiled in obscurity insofar
as what evidence has been offered is concerned, there being no direct
evidence of how the killing was done, no evidence of whether or not
authorities the pursuers took part in the final assault or of what role each
played therein, and no evidence of which of them inflicted the single fatal stab
wound, and what the others were doing while the deceased was being
stabbed, said conclusion, lacking any kind of support in the record, is nothing
but pure and simple speculation.
Disposition The guilt of the accused Romeo ("Romie") Mendoza not having
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the decision under review is reversed
and said accused is acquitted.

AIR FRANCE vs. CARRASCOSO

18 SCRA 155
SANCHEZ; Sep 28, 1966
(athe)
NATURE: Review on certiorari
FACTS
Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 'first class' round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in 'first

class', but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to
vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager
alleged, had a 'better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class'
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued; plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat in the plane.
After transferring to the tourist class seat, one flight attendant approached
him and requested from him his ticket and said that she will note of his
transfer. He refused because for him it is tantamount to accepting his
transfer. Later, he went to the pantry that was next to him and the purser was
there. He told him that he recorded the incident in his notebook. He read it
and translated to him because it was recorded in French. "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene." Carrascoso, during trial, included this incident
in his testimony.
ISSUES
1. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class seat he claims
2. WON the CA erred in finding that the purser madean entry in his
notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene" is
predicated upon evidence which is incompetent, therefore not admissible
(because the defendant was saying that the best evidence in this case is
the entry and not the testimony)
HELD
1. YES. The testimony of the defendants witnesses that the issuance of first
class ticket was no guarantee that the passenger would have a first class
ride, but such would depend upon the availability of first class seat cannot
hold water. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, in this case,
the first class tickets of the plaintiff without any reservation whatever and
even marked with OK, meaning confirmed.
2. NO. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best
evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue
happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued
to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out
of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the
declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook
was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its
trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
Moreover, if it were really true that no such entry was made, the deposition of
the purser could have cleared up the matter.
DISPOSITION: Decision of CA affirmed.

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BORROMEO V CA
G.R. No. L-31342
BARREDO; April 7, 1976
(apple)
NATURE
Cross-petitions for the review of the per curiam resolution of the CA
FACTS
-The main controversy here centers on the true nature of the three
documents, Exhibits A, B and C, which on their faces are unquestionably
deeds of absolute sale of the real properties therein described executed by
the deceased Simeon Rallos on various dates in favor of Emmanuel Aznar, in
Exhibits A and C, and his sister, Alma Aznar, in Exhibit B.
-In his complaint in the court below, Juan T. Borromeo, as administrator of the
estate of Simeon Rallos, alleged that these documents were in fact equitable
mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by Matias Aznar, deceased
father of Emmanuel and Alma
-The trial court dismissed the said complaint and on appeal, said dismissal
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original decision
-Crispina Rallos Alcantara, who claimed to have been present when the
transactions took place, testified to the effect that her deceased father merely
borrowed money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and
P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to the latter the
properties described in Exhibits A, B and C. She testified that the transactions
were disguised as absolute sales and Rallos was assured by Matias Aznar
that he could exercise the right to repurchase the lots and would deliver to
him the corresponding options in writing.
-According to Borromeo (appellant), Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5, which,
according to Crispina Rallos Alcantara, were her notations allegedly
representing the deductions made by Matias Aznar for advance interest,
attorney's fees and miscellanous expenses are corroborative of her testimony
that the transactions in controversy were really loans with mortgages.
-The CA, in its original decision, found the testimony of Crispina Rallos
Alcantara unreliable and insufficient to justify the reformation of the
instruments in question. The CA stated: While it is true that relationship does
not disqualify a witness, it calls for a close scrutiny of his testimony. As
correctly observed by the trial court, her testimony cannot be considered as
absolutely unbiased or impartial, as she was naturally interested in an
outcome of the case favorable to the plaintiff. The fact remains that Exhibits
A, B and C were signed by Rallos himself as a party thereto. His successorsin-interest cannot now be heard to complain that the parties to said exhibits
intended the same to be loans with mortgages contrary to what are clearly
expressed therein.
-The CA likewise found Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3, and C-5 weak and
unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted. They are clearly selfserving, as they were admittedly prepared by the declarant herself, who was

a daughter of the deceased Rallos and who cannot, therefore, be said to be

disinterested witness.
-However, in its per curiam resolution, this rather strong position taken by the
appellate court was completely reversed by itself as follows: While it is true
that in our decision rendered in this case, we held that the notations or
memoranda of Crispina Rallos Alcantara marked as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B3 and
C5 were self-serving and unsatisfactory as evidence of the facts asserted, the
same, however, may be considered as constituting part of the res gestae, and
as such, are admissible in evidence to show the nature of the contracts in
question and the relation of the parties involved. Statements, acts or conduct
accompanying or so nearly connected with the main action as to form a part
of it, and which illustrate, elucidate or qualify the act, are admissible as part of
the res gestae. Accordingly, the attendant circumstances and the statements
then made are admissible as part of the res gestae to show the execution of
a contract, and, relevant matters said and done which are parts of the res
gestae of the negotiation and execution of a contract are admissible to show
the existence and nature of the contract and the relation of the parties.
Matters attendant upon a sale or conveyance may also be admissible as part
of the res gestae.
-Thus the CA reversed first its rulings on the admissibility of the
relevant evidence by admitting those it had rejected in its original
decision and then premised the reversal of its conclusions therein on
these newly admitted evidence. Indeed, it appears that had that court found
no reason to admit and take into account said evidence, it would not have
reversed its previous finding that the subject deeds are absolute sales.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals committed a legal error in admitting the evidence
it had originally held to be incompetent
HELD
Yes.
-We cannot see how the disputed notes and memoranda can be considered
in any sense as part of the res gestae as this matter is known in the law of
evidence. It must be borne in mind, in this connection, that Crispina was not a
party to the transaction in question. Only Simeon Rallos, on the one hand,
and Matias Aznar, if she is to be believed, or Emmanuel and Alma Aznar, as
the documents show, on the other, were the parties thereto.
-The record does not reveal why Crispina was with her father at the time,
hence, there can be no basis for holding that she actually took part in the
transaction. That she allegedly took notes thereof while there present made
her at best only a witness not a party. It cannot be said, therefore, that her
taking down of her alleged notes, absent any showing that she was
requested or directed by the parties to do so or that the parties, more
particularly the Aznars, who are being sought to be bound by them, knew
what she was doing, constitute part of the transaction, the res gestae itself.
-If such alleged taking of notes by Crispina has to be given any legal
significance at all, the most that it can be is that it is one circumstance

relevant to the main fact in dispute. In other words it could at the most be only
circumstantial evidence.
-The trouble however is that the admission of said notes and memoranda
suffers from a fatal defect. No witness other than Crispina has testified as to
the veracity of her testimony relative to her alleged notes and memoranda.
Not even her husband who, according to her, was present on one of the
occasions in issue, was called to testify. It cannot be denied that Crispina is
interested in the outcome of this case. In the words of the Court of Appeals
itself in its original decision, "her testimony cannot be considered as
absolutely unbiased or impartial", hence, "unreliable and insufficient to justify
the reformation of the instruments in question."
-Such being the case, how can the notes and memoranda in dispute add any
weight to her testimony, when she herself created them? Surely, they cannot
have anymore credibility than her own declarations given under oath in open
court.
-The extensive and repeated arguments of the parties relative to the issue of
whether or not self-serving statements may be admitted in evidence as parts
of the res gestae are very interesting and illuminating, but they are rather off
tangent. The notes supposedly prepared by witness Alcantara during the
transaction between her father and the Aznars do not partake at all of the
nature of hearsay evidence. If anything, they constitute memoranda
contemplated in Section 10 or Rule 1323 which provides:
-As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown beforehand
that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case
here.
-It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written
statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because
he support his open-court declaration with written statements of the same
facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the
proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down. What is more,
even where this requirement has been satisfied, the express injunction of the
rule itself is that such evidence must be received with caution, if only because
it is not very difficult to conceive and fabricate evidence of this nature. This is
doubly true when the witness stands to gain materially or otherwise from the
admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina Alcantara.
Disposition
Petition dismissed. The per curiam resolution of the CA appealed is hereby
reversed and the original decision of that court is affirmed.
3

SEC. 10. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he
knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced
and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it,
and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing, though he retain no
recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing correctly stated the transaction
when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

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DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES V RADIO

MINDANAO NETWORK,INC
G.R. No. 147039
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; January 27, 2006
(owen)
NATURE
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 RoC seeking the review of the CA
Decision affirming RTC Makati Decision reducing interest rate to 6% per
annum
FACTS
- Radio Mindanao Network, Inc. (RADIO), who owns several broadcasting
stations all over the country, filed a civil case against DBP Pool of Accredited
Insurance Companies (DBP) and Provident Insurance Corporation
(PROVIDENT) for recovery of insurance benefits. PROVIDENT covered
RADIOs transmitter equipment and generating set for P13,550,000.00 under
a Fire Insurance Policy, while DBP covered RADIOs transmitter, furniture,
fixture and other transmitter facilities for P5,883,650.00 under a Fire
Insurance Policy.
- July 27, 1988 evening, RADIOs station in Bacolod City was razed by fire
causing damage in the amount of P1,044,040.00. RADIO sought recovery
under the two insurance policies but the claims were denied on the ground
that the cause of loss was an excepted risk excluded under condition no. 6
(c) and (d)
6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or
through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following
consequences, namely:
(c) War, invasion, act of foreign enemy, hostilities, or warlike operations
(whether war be declared or not), civil war.
(d) Mutiny, riot, military or popular rising, insurrection, rebellion, revolution,
military or usurped power.
The insurance companies denied the claims by maintaining that the evidence
showed that the fire was caused by members of CPP/NPA. Hence, the civil
case.
- RTC Makati: in favor of RADIO. PROVIDENT to pay P450,000.00 plus
12% legal interest from March 2, 1990 the date of the filing of the Complaint.
DBP to pay P602,600.00 plus 12% legal interest from March 2, 1990.
- CA: affirmed the decision, with the modification that the applicable interest
rate reduced to 6% per annum. MFR denied.
- DBP assails: factual finding of both RTC and CA that its evidence failed to
support its allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, (members
of the CPP/NPA)
RTC
+ testimony of witnesses Lt. Col. Torres and SPO3 Rochar, who were
admittedly not present when the fire occurred, was limited to the fact that an
investigation was conducted and in the course of the investigation they were

informed by bystanders that heavily armed men entered the transmitter

house, poured gasoline in it and then lit it. After that, they went out shouting
Mabuhay ang NPA.
+ persons whom they investigated and actually saw the burning of the station
were not presented as witnesses
+ documentary evidence, which includes a letter released by the NPA merely
mentions some dissatisfaction with the activities of some people in the media
in Bacolod, do not satisfactorily prove that the author of the burning were
members of the NPA..
CA
+ police blotter of the burning of DYHB
+ certification of the Negros Occidental Integrated National Police, Bacolod
City regarding the incident
+ letter of alleged NPA members Magsilang claiming responsibility for the
burning of DYHB
+ fire investigation report dated July 29, 1988
+ testimonies of Lt. Col. Torres and SFO III Rochas
ISSUES
1. WON police blotter of the burning of DYHB, the certification issued by the
Integrated National Police of Bacolod City and the fire investigation report
prepared by SFO III Rochas is deemed sufficient (Entry in Official Records)
2. WON the testimony of Lt. Col. Torres is admissible
3. WON the letter of Magsilang, who claims to be a member of NPA-NIROC,
being an admission of person which is not a party to the present action, is
admissible (Admission & Confessions)
4. WON the excepted risk was not proven by DBP
5. WON the reports of witnesses Lt. Col Torres and SFO II Rochar that the
bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of
the CPP/NPA is an exception to the hearsay rule as part of res gestae
(Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence)
HELD
1. NO
- The documentary evidence may be considered exceptions to the hearsay
rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, none of these documents
categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA.
> police blotter: a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all
believed to be CPP/NPA more or less 20 persons suspected to be
CPP/NPA,
> certification from the Bacolod Police station: some 20 or more armed
men believed to be members of the New Peoples Army NPA,
> fire investigation report: (I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team
that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be
members of the CPP/NPA were the ones responsible
- All these documents show that indeed, the suspected executor of the fire
were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not
sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof.

2. NO
- The only person who seems to be so sure that that the CPP-NPA had a
hand in the burning of DYHB was Lt. Col. Torres. However, though his
testimony is persuasive, it cannot be admit as conclusive proof that the CPPNPA was really involved in the incident considering that he admitted that he
did not personally see the armed men even as he tried to pursue them. Note
that when Lt. Col. Torres was presented as witness, he was presented as an
ordinary witness only and not an expert witness. Hence, his opinion on the
identity or membership of the armed men with the CPP-NPA is not admissible
in evidence.
3. NO
- Under Section 22, Rule 130 RoC. An admission is competent only when the
declarant, or someone identified in legal interest with him, is a party to the
action.
4. YES
- In insurance cases, where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which
insures against other perils or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a
defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not assumed that risk, and
from this it follows that an insurer seeking to defeat a claim because of an
exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that the loss
comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is
made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon
the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is
excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.
- Consequently, it is sufficient for RADIO to prove the fact of damage or loss.
Once RADIO makes out a prima facie case in its favor, the duty or the burden
of evidence shifts to DBP to controvert RADIOS prima facie case. In this
case, since DBP alleged an excepted risk, then the burden of evidence
shifted to DBP to prove such exception. It is only when petitioner has
sufficiently proven that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk
does the burden of evidence shift back to respondent who is then under a
duty of producing evidence to show why such excepted risk does not release
petitioner from any liability
5. NO
- A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, which means those facts which are derived from his perception. A
witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either
because he was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he
has learned. The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the
trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such
evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more
importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the outof-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the
out-of-court statement depends.
- Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or
spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of

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the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The rule in res gestae applies when the
declarant himself did not testify and provided that the testimony of the witness
who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediate attending circumstances.
- It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down,
the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk
to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and
speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting situations where
hysteria is likely to take place. It cannot therefore be ascertained whether
these utterances were the products of truth. That the utterances may be
mere idle talk is not remote. At best, the testimonies of SFO III Rochar and
Lt. Col. Torres that these statements were made may be considered as
independently relevant statements gathered in the course of their
investigation, and are admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact
that they had been thus uttered.
- Admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and
sufficiency. Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
- Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the
members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence,
it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof.
These
declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.

MARTURILLAS V PEOPLE
G.R. No. 163217; PANGANIBAN; Apr 18, 2006
(marge)
NATURE
Petition for Review seeking to set aside [1] CA Decision affirming (with
modifications as to the award of damages) the RTC Davao City Decision
finding Celestino Marturillas (former Brgy Capt of Gatungan, Bunawan
District, Davao City) guilty of homicide in Criminal Case No. 42091-98; and
the CA resolution denying MR.
FACTS
[Yeah, I know this digest is very long. Sorry, but I assure you the case is even
longer. The portions of the Courts ruling relevant to the topic in the outline
have been italicized for easier reference. ^_^]
Version of the Prosecution

-Nov 4, 1998, abt 6pm: Cecilia Santos called her husband Lito and their
neighbor and kumpare Artemio Pantinople for supper. After eating, Artemio
returned to the bench in front of the Santos store and sat on it together with
his three children. Lito was still eating supper in their kitchen when he heard a
gunshot. From a distance of about 10meters, he also noticed smoke and fire
coming from the muzzle of a big gun. Moments later, he saw Artemio clasping
his chest and staggering backwards to the direction of Litos kitchen. Artemio
shouted to him, Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan, (Help me, Pre, I was
shot by the captain). Lito did not approach Artemio right after the shooting
incident because Cecilia warned him that he might also be shot. Lito did not
see the person who shot Artemio because his attention was then focused on
Artemio.
-Shortly, Lito saw Ernita Pantinople, the wife of Artemio, coming from her
house towards the direction where Artemio was sprawled on the ground.
Ernita was hysterical, jumping and shouting, Kapitan, bakit mo binaril and
aking asawa. She also repeatedly cried for help. Lito then went out of their
house and approached Artemio who was lying dead near a banana trunk
more than 5meters from his house. Some of their neighbors answered
Ernitas call for help and approached them.
-When the shooting incident happened [abt 7:30pm], Litos house was
illumined by a lamp. Their open-type kitchen (no walls) gave him an
unobstructed view of Artemio who was about 5meters away from where he
was positioned at that time. Although there was a gemilina tree growing in the
space in between his house and the store of Artemio, the same did not block
his view of Artemio. Likewise, the coconut trees and young banana plants
growing at the scene of the crime did not affect his view.
-At the same instance, Ernita was also in their kitchen preparing milk for her
baby who was then lying on the floor of their kitchen. When she was about to
put the bottle into the babys mouth, she suddenly heard the sound of a
gunburst followed by a shout, Help me Pre, I was shot by the captain. She
immediately pushed open the window of their kitchen and saw the accused
wearing a black jacket and camouflage pants running towards the direction of
the back portion of Litos house. From there, the accused crossed the street
and disappeared. Ernita saw the accused carrying a long firearm which
looked like an M-14 rifle and also sensed that accused had some
companions with him because she heard the crackling sound of the dried
leaves around the place. She had a clear view of accused at that time
because their place was well-illumined by the full moon that night and by the
two (2) fluorescent lamps in their store. She immediately went out of their
house and ran towards Artemio who tried to speak to her but could not do so
because his mouth was full of blood. She repeatedly called her neighbors for
help; a few responded to her calls and approached them; no brgy tanod or
any member of the CFO and CAFGU came to help.
-While waiting for the police, Ernita did not allow Artemios body to be
touched by anybody. After more than 2hours, [around 10pm] the police
arrived, together with a photographer named Fe Mendez who took pictures of
the crime scene. Ernita and Lito then approached PO2 Operario and
informed him that accused was the one responsible for the shooting. PO2
Operario stayed at the crime scene for about 1hour and waited for the funeral

vehicle to pick up the body of Artemio. When the funeral hearse arrived, PO2
Operario told the crew to load Artemios body into the vehicle. Thereafter, he
then boarded again their mobile car together with Lito Santos.
-Armed with the information that accused was the one responsible for the
shooting of Artemio, PO2 Operario proceeded to the house of accused and
informed him that he was a suspect in the killing of Artemio. He then invited
accused to go with him to the police station and also to bring along with him
his M-14 rifle. Accused did not say anything. He just got his M-14 rifle and
went with the police to the police station where he was detained the whole
night of Nov 4, 1998. Accused did not also give any statement to anybody
about the incident. The following day, accused was transferred by the police
to Tibungco Police Station where he was detained.
-Alicia Pantinople, the 44-year old sister of Artemio, after learning about the
incident and seeing his brother sprawled lifeless on the ground went around
the Bunawan Police Station and noticed a locked door. When she peeped
through the hole of the said door, she saw accused reclining on a bench
about 2 meters away from the door. He was wearing a brown shirt, black
jacket and a pair of camouflage pants. He was also wearing brown shoes but
he had no socks on his feet. Seeing that the accused was tapping the floor
with his right foot, Alicia confronted him, asking Nong Listing I know that you
can recognize my voice. It is me. Why did you kill my brother? What has he
done wrong to you? Accused did not answer her.
-Nov 5, 1998: Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer of the Davao City
Health Department, conducted an autopsy on Artemios cadaver. His
Necropsy Report No. 76 summarized his findings to the effect that the cause
of death was a gunshot wound entering at the anterior right side of the chest,
perforating the body of the sternum, the heart and the upper lobe of the left
lung, and forming an irregular exit at the posterior chest wall left side. During
the trial, Dr. Ledesma explained that the trajectory of the bullet indicates that
his assailant was in a lower position than Artemio when the gun was fired.
Since the wound was negative of powder burns, the assailant must have
been at a distance of more than twenty-four (24) inches when he fired his gun
at Artemio. He did not also find any bullet slug inside the body of Artemio
indicating that the bullet went through Artemios body. Artemios heart and
lungs were lacerated and his stomach contained partially digested food
particles indicating that he had just eaten his meal when he was shot.
Version of the Defense:
-Nov 4, 1998, abt 8:30 pm: Marturillas was roused from his sleep by his wife
since two brgy kagawads wanted to see him. Dazed after just having risen
from bed, he was rubbing his eyes when he met the two Kagawads inside his
house. He was informed that a resident of his barangay, Artemio Pantinople,
had just been shot. At once, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the
members of the SCAA (Special Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be
escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. As soon as the SCAAs
were contacted, they then proceeded to the crime scene to determine what
assistance they could render.
-While approaching the store owned by the Pantinoples and not very far from
where the deceased lay sprawled, Marturillas and his team was met by Ernita
Pantinople who was very mad and belligerent, immediately accusing him of

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having shot her husband instead of Lito Santos who was his enemy.
Marturillas was taken aback by the instant accusation against him. Not being
able to talk sense with Ernita, he and his companions backed off to avoid a
heated confrontation. They decided to go back to his house. -Upon reaching
his house, he instructed Kagawad Jimmy Balugo to contact the Bunawan
Police Station and inform them what transpired. Not knowing the radio
frequency of the local police, Kagawad Balugo instead radioed officials of
nearby Brgy San Isidro requesting them to contact the Bunawan PNP for
police assistance since someone was shot in their locality. Moments later,
PO2 Mariano Operario and another police officer arrived at Marturillas house,
informing him that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio
Pantinople. Upon their invitation, Marturillas immediately went with the said
police officers for questioning at the Bunawan Police Station, taking with him
his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition
which he turned over for safe keeping with the Bunawan PNP. Such fact is
reflected in Bunawan PNPs police blotter to have occurred at around 10:45
pm, Nov 4, 1998.
-Nov 5, 1998: Marturillas was subjected to paraffin testing by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Davao City. The next day, the PNP Crime Laboratory released
Physical Sciences Report No. C-074-98 finding Marturillas NEGATIVE for
gunpowder nitrates.
-On this same day, PO2 Operario, after preparing all the affidavits of Ernita
Pantinople and her witnesses, prepared and transmitted a Complaint to the
City Prosecution Office recommending that Marturillas be indicted for Murder.
[see case for full text of the affidavits]. On the basis of these affidavits, then
2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Raul B. Bendigo issued a Resolution finding
sufficient evidence to indict Accused for the crime of Homicide and not
Murder as alleged in the Affidavit-Complaint.
-Defense witness Ronito Bedero testified that on the night Artemio Pantinople
was shot, he was at his house and he saw an unidentified armed man flee
from the crime scene who later joined two other armed men near a nangka
tree not far from where deceased was shot. All three later fled on foot towards
the direction of the Purok Center in Brgy Gatungan. He noticed that one of
the three men was armed with a rifle but could not make out their identities
since the area where the three men converged was a very dark place. After
the three men disappeared, he saw from the opposite direction Marturillas
and his team of kagawads and 3 SCAA members going to the scene of the
crime but they did not reach the crime scene. A little later, he saw the
Marturillas group return to where they came from.
-Dominador Lapiz testified that he was one of the first persons who went to
the crime scene where he personally saw the body of deceased lying at a
very dark portion some distance from the victims house and that those with
him at that time even had to light the place with a lamp so that they could
clearly see the deceased. He also testified that there were many coconut and
other trees and bananas in the crime scene. He also testified that the house
of Lito Santos was only about 4meters from the crime scene, while the house
of victim-Artemio Pantinople was about FIFTY (50) meters away. He testified
that there was no lighted fluorescent at the store of deceased at the time of
the shooting. His testimony also revealed that when the responding

policemen arrived, Lito Santos immediately approached the policemen,

volunteered himself as a witness and even declared that he would testify that
it was Marturillas who shot Artemio Pantinople. He further testified that
immediately after he went to the crime scene, the widow of the victim and the
children were merely shouting and crying and it was only after the policemen
arrived that the widow uttered in a loud voice, Kapitan nganong gipatay mo
ang akong bana?
Ruling of RTC and CA:
-The guilt of petitioner had been established beyond reasonable doubt. He
was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene
immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the
victim himself that he had been shot by the captain, clearly established the
latters complicity in the crime.
-No ill motive could be ascribed to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their
positive, credible and unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to
establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
-Both courts also rejected Marturillas defenses of denial and alibi, saying
these were necessarily suspect, especially when established by friends or
relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate,
alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses found to be more credible.
Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the prosecutions evidence is credible.
2. WON the evidence is sufficient to convict him of homicide.
HELD
1. YES. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court accords great weight and a
high degree of respect to factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA. Although there are recognized exceptions to the
conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the trial and the appellate courts,
petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any.
Re: Positive Identification
-Ernitas testimony that she saw Marturillas at the crime scene is credible
because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her
house. Undoubtedly, Ernita is familiar with the accused, who is her neighbor,
and a long-time brgy capt of the locality when the incident took place. Ernita
was also able to see his face while he was running away from the crime
scene. The identification of a person can be established through familiarity
with ones physical features. Once a person has gained familiarity with one
another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable
distance. Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural
communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be
expected to know each others distinct and particular features and
characteristics.
-Ernitas recognition of the assailant was made possible by the lighted two
fluorescent lamps in their store and by the full moon. In corroboration, Lito
testified that the place where the shooting occurred was bright. The trees and

plants growing in between Ernitas house and the place where Artemio was
shot to death did not impede her view of the assailant. To be sure, the
prosecution presented photographs of the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinities. These photographs gave a clear picture of the place
where Artemio was shot. Admittedly, there are some trees and plants growing
in between the place where the house of Ernita was located and the spot
where Artemio was shot. Notably, however, there is only one gemilina tree,
some coconut trees and young banana plants growing in the place where
Artemio was shot. The trees and banana plants have slender trunks which
could not have posed an obstacle to Ernitas view of the crime scene from the
kitchen window of her house especially so that she was in an elevated
position.
-Given the proper conditions, the illumination produced by a kerosene lamp, a
flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow
the identification of persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming
from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were sufficient to illumine the
place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as
the person who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when
conditions of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity
of Ernita with the face of petitioner considerably reduced any error in her
identification of him. Neither was there any indication that Ernita was impelled
by ill motives in positively identifying petitioner.
Re: Inconsistency Between Affidavit and Testimony
-Although Ernita stated in her testimony that she had recognized the victim as
her husband through his voice, it cannot necessarily be inferred that she did
not see him. Although she recognized him as the victim, she was still hoping
that it was not really he. Thus, the statement in her Affidavit that she was
surprised to see that her husband was the victim of the shooting. Ex parte
affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently prepared by
administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of what
affiants have said. Nevertheless, the alleged inconsistency is inconsequential
to the ascertainment of the presence of petitioner at the crime scene. They
referred only to that point wherein Ernita ascertained the identity of Artemio
as the victim. They did not relate to Ernitas identification of petitioner as the
person running away from the crime scene immediately after she heard a
gunshot.
Re: Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime
-It was to be expected that, after seeing the victim stagger and hearing the
cry for help, Santos would shift his attention to the person who had uttered
the plea Help me pre, I was shot by the captain. A shift in his focus of
attention would sufficiently explain why Santos was not able to see the
assailant. Santos never pointed to petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime.
His statements corroborated those of Ernita and therefore simply added
credence to the prosecutions version of the facts. If it were true that he had
an ulterior motive, it would have been very easy for him to say that he had
seen petitioner shoot the victim.
Re: Dying Declaration

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-Rule 130.37: The declaration of a dying person, made under the

consciousness of impending death, may be received in any case wherein his
death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death.
-Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of
death, are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect. Persons
aware of an impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in
their words and extremely scrupulous in their accusations. The dying
declaration is given credence, on the premise that no one who knows of
ones impending death will make a careless and false accusation. Hence, not
infrequently, pronouncements of guilt have been allowed to rest solely on the
dying declaration of the deceased victim.
-To be admissible, a dying declaration must
1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding the declarants death;
2) be made under the consciousness of an impending death;
3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions of improper
influence;
4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the declarant is the
subject of inquiry; and
5) have been made by a declarant competent to testify as a witness, had that
person been called upon to testify.
-The law does not require the declarant to state explicitly a perception of the
inevitability of death. The perception may be established from surrounding
circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that
would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of impending
death. Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that
realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death
occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a
dying condition.
-As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it
was a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning. It [was] complete and [was] not merely fragmentary. Testified to by
his wife and neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and
telling piece of evidence.
Re: Res Gestae
-The fact that the victims statement constituted a dying declaration does not
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of
both are present.
-Rule 130.42: Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while
a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal
act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received
as part of the res gestae.
-Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance

inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is
whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental
balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
-A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur:
1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and
3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.
-All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting,
was a startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the
exciting influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration
without any prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also,
the declaration concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latters
statement was correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae.
-Aside from the victims statement, that of Ernita -- Kapitan, ngano nimo
gipatay ang akong bana? (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?) -may be considered to be in the same category. Her statement was about the
same startling occurrence; it was uttered spontaneously, right after the
shooting, while she had no opportunity to concoct a story against petitioner;
and it related to the circumstances of the shooting.
2. YES. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient
to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the
victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order
as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning
evidence, coupled with the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads
to the logical conclusion that petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. SC
considered the ff:
a. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming
from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while
shouting, Help me pre, I was shot by the captain.
b. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husbands utterance,
Help me pre, I was shot by the captain, then saw petitioner in a black jacket
and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene while carrying a
firearm.
c. Ernitas statement, Captain, why did you shoot my husband? was
established as part of the res gestae.
d. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the
incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility to go
immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting. If he were really
innocent, he should not have simply left.
e. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The
victims wife positively testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was
trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner tried to block. This
showed petitioners antagonism towards the victim.

-These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was

petitioner who shot and killed the victim. Where an eyewitness saw the
accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victims fall, the
reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim.
-To be sure, conviction in a criminal case does not require a degree of proof
that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral
certainty is required or that degree of proof that produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are
circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they are of a nature that would
lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the
conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis--vis direct, evidence is not
necessarily weaker.
Re: Paraffin Test & Corpus Delicti
- The negative paraffin test result and the prosecutions failure to present the
gun used in the shooting is not enough to exculpate the accused from the
crime. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a
witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not
of the courts to dictate.
-A negative paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not
fired a gun. It is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as
when culprits wear gloves, wash their hands afterwards, or are bathed in
perspiration.
-The prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the
fact that a crime had actually been committed. [Corpus delicti] is the fact of
the commission of the crime that may be proved by the testimony of
eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily refer to
the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide with
the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes.
Re: Alibi
-As held by the CA: [Petitioners] alibi is utterly untenable. For alibi to
prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Here, the
locus criminis was only several meters away from [petitioners] home. In any
event, this defense cannot be given credence in the face of the credible and
positive identification made by Ernita.
Disposition Petition is denied. Assailed Decision and Resolution are affirmed
with modifications. [SC reviewed amount of damages, since an appeal in a
criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review. SC awarded
P50k as indemnity ex delicto, P25k for temperate damages, P50k for moral
damages, P312k for loss of earning capacity, P20k for attorneys fees, plus
costs.]

NAPOCOR v. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR. [BANGPAI SHIPPING

COMPANY, & WALLEM SHIPPING, INC.]
G.R. No. 170491
CHICO-NAZARIO; April 4, 2007
(edel)

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Nature: Certiorari under Rule 45

Facts:
-M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by
Bangpai allegedly bumped and damaged NAPOCORs Power Barge 209
which was then moored at the Cebu International Port.
-NAPOCOR then filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against
Bangpai for the alleged damages caused on the power barges.
-NAPOCOR filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading
Wallem as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of
Bangpai.
-Bangpai & Wallem filed their respective Motions to Dismiss which were
denied by J. Codilla.
-NAPOCOR after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal
offer of evidence before the lower court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V"
together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, Bangpai and
Wallem filed their respective objections to said formal offer of evidence.
- J. Codilla denied (through an order) the admission and excluding from the
records NAPOCORs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I",
"J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its submarkings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and
"S" and its sub-markings.
-According to the court a quo: The record shows that the plaintiff has been
given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of
the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff
attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the
photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" xxx
the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section
1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidencexxx However, these
excluded evidence should be attached to the records of this case to enable
the appellate court to pass upon them should an appeal be taken from the
decision on the merits to be rendered upon the termination of the trial of this
case.
- NAPOCORs MR was denied and so the filed a petition for Certiorari via
R64 before the Court of Appeals maintaining that J. Codilla acted with GAD
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admission of its
exhibits and its sub-markings.
- CA dismissed the petition as it appeared that there was no sufficient
showing by NAPOCOR that there was GAD. It appeared that the pieces of
documentary evidence which were denied admission were not properly
identified by any competent witness. Also, they found that the judge acted
within the pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said
documentary evidence for in Sec 3 of Rule 130 of the RoC, when the subject
of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original documents themselves, except in certain cases
specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the
non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of
evidence falls under such exceptions. Lastly, the CA said that the information
(in said exhibits) were not received, retrieved or produced electronically and

that NAPOCOR had not properly authenticated such evidence as electronic

documents.
- Hence, the instant petition wherein NAPOCOR insists that the photocopies
it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic evidence
based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined under
Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to
information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, "electronic document" can also refer to other modes of written
expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included
in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by sight
or other means".
ISSUE: WON the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as
contemplated in RA No. 8792 or the IRR of the Electronic Commerce Act, as
well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence/ WON said electronic documents
qualify under the one of the exceptions of Best Evidence Rule so that those
may be admitted as documentary evidence
HELD: NO/NO.
Reasoning:
-A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by
NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the
signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be
recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a
persons signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced.
- According to the SC, the TC did not commit an error when it denied the
admissibility of the photocopies as documentary evidence as Napocor failed
to establish that its offer falls under the exceptions (as herein enumerated).
Best Evidence Rule under Rule 130 (as discussed by the SC):
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary
evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or
destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and
bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the
proper place or places.
- History of BER: Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern
technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to
guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered

copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the
rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings
occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of
writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as
reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. (Lee v. P of
the Phils)
-DEFINITION: "electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects
the electronic data message or electronic document.
-The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only
in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document
which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the
manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
* NOTE: It was also said that NAPOCOR continued to obdurately disregard
the opportunities given by the TC for it to present the originals of the
photocopies it presented BUT at the SC it prayed that it be allowed to present
the originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same
are lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence.
However, SC denied said prayer.
DISPOSITIVE: Petition DENIED. CA DECISION of 9 November 2005
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

CAPILA v. PEOPLE
GR No. 146161.
July 17, 2006. Sandoval-Gutierrez
(ina)
FACTS
- Lani and Ariel, employees of Pilipinas Bank, went to the Meralco collection
office in JP Rizal, Makati to get the collection totaling around P1.3M. They
packed the money in duffel bags and padlocked them. While waiting for the
armored van, two armed men approached them. The robbers hit Dimas dela

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Prof. V. A. Avena

A2010
Evidence

Cruz, the guard on duty, on the nape and ordered Lani and Ariel to lie facedown. The robbers took the duffel bags and the gun of Dimas.
- Right after the robbery, Dimas told Ariel that one of the robbers is his fellow
guard, Pepito Capila. He then called reported the incident to the police, the
Meralco security division, and the security agency.
- The police arrived at the scene 10 min after the call. When questioned by
SPO4 Maximo, Dimas said that one of the robbers is Pepito Capila, his fellow
sekyu.
- A criminal case for robbery was filed with the RTC against Pepito and
Dimas and 4 others. The prosecution evidence included of the testimony of
SPO4 Maximo and Ariel, but not of Dimas.
- RTC acquitted everyone except Pepito. Pepito appealed to CA on the
ground that the RTC erroneously admitted in evidence Dimas statement that
Pepito is one of the robbers for being hearsay and that he was denied due
process for not being given a chance to cross examine Dimas because
Dimas didnt testify. CA affirmed RTC decision.

right away. When questioned by SPO4 Maximo, Dimas, who was still
shocked, named petitioner herein as one of the robbers. His statements to
Ariel and SPO4 Maximo were made before he had the time and opportunity
to concoct and contrive a false story.); and
(3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances (The statement of dela Cruz refers to
the robbery or incident subject matter of this case.).
2. NO. Even though the declarant is not presented as witness, the statement
is not hearsay since it forms part of the res gestae.

ISSUES
1. WON the statement of Dimas is admissible
2. WON Pepito was denied due process
HELD
1. YES. The statement of Dimas is part of the res gestae.
- Res gestae is a Latin phrase which literally means things done. As an
exception to the hearsay rule, it refers to those exclamations and statements
by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as spontaneous
reactions or utterances inspired by the excitement of the occasion, and there
was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and fabricate a false
statement.
- The reason for the rule is human experience. It has been shown that
under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, the state of
nervous excitement which occurs in a spectator may produce a spontaneous
and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions produced by
the external shock. As the statements or utterances are made under the
immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, such statements or utterances may be taken as expressing the real
belief of the speaker as to the facts he just observed. The spontaneity of the
declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event
speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.
- The requisites for the admission of res gestae in evidence are (with
corresponding compliance in this case):
(1) that the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence (The
principal act, which by any measure is undoubtedly a startling occurrence, is
the robbery);
(2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or
immediately or subsequent thereto (Dimas informed Ariel and SPO4 Maximo

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