In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.

EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the
said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for
the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the
action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and
letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors
to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties
were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter
was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the
propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2
Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this
Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these
words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be

known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court
Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual
dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme
Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP
By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are
made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the
license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment
of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause

appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations
of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and
legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of
the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia
vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted
power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from
some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them
seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section
1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of
freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the welldefined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar

(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent

acknowledges from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it
explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...
(Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the ByLaws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the

respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION

FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP
dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 19772005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part
of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked
in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that
he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in
the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment3 stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues
to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues
on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the
IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no
rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that
what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his
intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated,
thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an
inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this
Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is
the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of

annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection
clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP
annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds
that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that nonpractice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the
inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment
of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was
in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment
of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar8 - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is

attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would
not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose
such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the
type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider
at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is
DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days

from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and
values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
On April 8, 1999, Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia filed before this Court a
Letter-Complaint[1] against Atty. Rolando S. Bala. According to complainants, he
failed to render a legal service contracted -- the preparation of a petition for review that
he was to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in connection with DARAB Case No.
5532. Moreover, he supposedly refused to return the P9,200 legal fees they had paid him
for the purpose. Finally, he allegedly hurled invectives at them when they asked him for
a copy of the petition that he claimed to have filed.
This Court required respondent to comment on the Complaint.[2] He failed to
comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard.[3]

In its

Resolution, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.[4]
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In her September 23, 2004 Report,[5] Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita

J. Herbosa found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Despite due notice, he neither submitted a position paper nor appeared at any of
the hearings[6] called by the Commission. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of
complainants evidence.
According to the findings of Commissioner Herbosa, complainants engaged the
services of respondent (sometime in May 1998)[7] to appeal to the CA the adverse
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations Adjudication Board (DARAB).[8]
Instead, he erroneously filed a Notice of Appeal[9] with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, appeals from the decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the
CA through a verified petition for review.[10]

Because of respondents error, the

prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.
Commissioner Herbosa gave no credence, however, to the allegation of
complainants that respondent had deceived them by resorting to a wrong remedy. While
opining that he might not have been in bad faith in filing a notice of appeal instead of a
petition for review, the commissioner in her Report nonetheless held that his failure to use
the proper legal remedy constituted lack of professional competency that warranted an
appropriate sanction.[11]
The Report also concluded that respondent should be sanctioned for his
unjustified refusal and failure to return the money paid by his clients.[12]

Their

payment totaled P9,200, broken down as follows: P5,000 to write the appeal; P700 to
mail it; and an additional P3,500 for writing the pleading on short notice. He, however,
failed to return the money despite his promise -- and his obligation under the
circumstances -- to do so.[13]
Finally, Commissioner Herbosa held that respondent should be sanctioned further

for uttering unsavory words against complainants during one instance when they had
called on him to ask for a copy of the supposed appeal. Hence, she recommended that,
aside from a fine of P5,000 and the return to complainants of the amount of P9,200,
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months should be imposed upon
him.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 12 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No.
XVI-2005-74,[14] which adopted with modification the Report and Recommendation of
the investigating commissioner. It recommended that respondent should be reprimanded
and suspended from the practice of law for six months; and that he should return, within
thirty days from his receipt of the Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest
from the filing of the present Complaint with this Court.[15]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it.[16]
Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[17] They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[18]

Negligence for
Wrong Remedy
The Code of Professional Responsibility[19] mandates lawyers to serve their
clients with competence and diligence.[20] Rule 18.02 states that a lawyer shall not
handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Specifically, Rule 18.03 provides
that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.[21] A client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense authorized by law, and is
expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.[22]
Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not familiarize
himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case. Worse, he repeatedly
assured them that the supposed petition had already been filed.[23]
Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume that
there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that he was
therefore negligent.
Conduct Unbecoming

Having become aware of the wrong remedy he had erroneously taken, respondent
purposely evaded complainants, refused to update them on the appeal, and misled them as
to his whereabouts.[24] Moreover, on June 17, 1998, he uttered invectives at them
when they visited him for an update on the case.[25]
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall

keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the clients request for information. Accordingly, complainants had the right to
be updated on the developments and status of the case for which they had engaged the
services of respondent.[26] But he apparently denied them that right.
Furthermore, for using unsavory words against complainants, he should also be
sanctioned. Lawyers may be disciplined -- whether in their professional or in their
private capacity -- for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.[27] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer
to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times.
In addition, the Court notes the nonparticipation of respondent even in the present
proceedings. He ignored the directive for him to file his comment,[28] just as he had
disregarded the IBP hearing commissioners orders[29] for the conduct of hearings,
submission of documentary evidence and position paper. Never did he acknowledge or
offer any excuse for his noncompliance.
Clearly, his conduct manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities. Despite the
fact that his profession and honor are at stake, he did not even bother to speak a word in
his defense. Apparently, he has no wish to preserve the dignity and honor expected of
lawyers and the legal profession. His demeanor is clearly demeaning.
The Need to Reimburse
the Money Paid

Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money paid
by complainants. First, his legal services were virtually nullified by his recourse to the
wrong remedy. Complainants would not have lost their right to appeal had he acted

competently.
Second, the legal fees were not commensurate to the services rendered.
Complainants engaged his legal services to appeal the DARAB Decision, but all he did
was to file a Notice of Appeal.[30]
Additionally, he had already promised them a refund of the money paid, yet he
failed to do so.
The Court may ascertain how much attorneys fees are reasonable under the
circumstances.[31] In the present case, the request of complainants for a full refund of
the attorneys fees they had paid effectively challenged the contract; it was as though the
parties had no express stipulation as to those fees. [32] Quantum meruit therefore
applies.
Quantum meruit -- meaning as much as he deserves -- is used as basis for
determining a lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract.[33] Lawyers must
be able to show that they are entitled to reasonable compensation for their efforts in
pursuing their clients case, taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.[34]

Based on the circumstances of the present case, the legal services

actually rendered by respondent were too insignificant for remuneration because of the
uselessness of the remedy he took.
This Court has imposed the penalty of suspension for six months for a lawyers
negligence in failing to perfect an appeal.[35]

Considering the similarity of the

circumstances with those prevailing in this case, we find the imposition of the same
penalty reasonable.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of negligence and conduct
unbecoming a lawyer; he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six

months, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED to pay
Spouses Eduardo and Teresita Garcia the amount of P9,200 -- with legal interest from
April 8, 1999 -- within 30 days from his receipt of this Decision. He is further WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar offenses will be dealt with more severely.
In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975
FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar
Confidant during the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar
Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his confidential letter that the result of
the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was raised
before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court
called the 5 bar examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn
statements on the matter. It appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by
Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar
examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades
obtained in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have
extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in one subject he can bring it to
the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith of trust and
confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the
candidate and reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation
also revealed that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the
Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar
examination.
ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and recorrect the examination result of a bar candidate.
RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to
convince each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help
him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is
limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are corrected by the
examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All
requests for re-evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate
themselves. With the facts fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the
exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and
confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from
the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the
criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam while under oath
constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners acted in good faith and
thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A.

DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.
Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in
his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused
the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's
name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the
first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein,
which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of
3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in
April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A.
from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months
before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted
to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination
must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but
due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses
must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo
A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So
ordered.

A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989

JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,

vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint
dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney
Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his
(complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further
alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with
respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since
then has been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer"
dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged
that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted
marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as complainant's motherin-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother as
to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings
and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former."
(Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer"
and made a number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last
May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had
refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living
although she had no means of livelihood; and
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of
complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the
amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General

for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a
number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings
complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following
terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo,
Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena
Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household appliances which she
could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985,
Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU Hospital, respondent
paid for her expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an
incident between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8,
Sept. 20, 1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and
complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 810, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and complainant were
brought to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with
the CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo,
pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following
manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with
complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment, physical
injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No. 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then;

c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as assistance in her
medical expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the
hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto.
Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St.,
Quezon City; that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel
was between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went
there only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984).
(Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas,
Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they (complainant and
Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences being one house away
from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice, because of her
differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St.,
Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his
mother's house.

9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in

CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 3739).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not
been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General
found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's suspicion
and/or jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a
friend and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving
complainant and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the
FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport
himself by avoiding any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by
complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which
behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The
Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be suspended from
the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to
show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was
otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon
respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to
comply with the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members
of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct

unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that
continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future

A.C. No. 3149 August 17, 1994

CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander H. Lim, seeking
the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of P92,100.00 from a certain
Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of
assignment, assigning to Yap pension checks which she regularly receives from the
United States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned deed of
assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the loan is fully paid.
Complainant likewise executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get,
demand, collect and receive her pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City.
The above documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent Alexander
H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of the aforementioned
special power of attorney, complainant informed the Tagbilaran City post office that she
was revoking the special power of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a
complaint for injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander H.
Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and Erico B. Aumentado
appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on
23 January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks from the
Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus motion to cite complainant
in contempt of court for attempting to circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing
her address to Mandaue City. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order dated
21 May 1985 expanding the scope of the preliminary injunction to prevent all post offices
in the Philippines from releasing pension checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the latter to withdraw
the pension checks. This motion does not bear the signatures of complainant's counsel of
record but only the signatures of both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney
Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise agreement again
without the participation of the former's counsel. In the compromise agreement, it was
stated that complainant Cerina B. Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00.
It was likewise stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would be
paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an interest of 40% per annum
discounted every six (6) months. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial

court on 15 August 1985.

On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for disbarment,
based on the following allegations:
7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking assistance, advise and
signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy thereof was furnished to either of them
or at least to complainant herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the
same;
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement;
(b) she would only be incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry about the documents
foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to save her
time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud,
deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent
complainant and connived in her defeat; . . . 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant,
Atty. Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that the other
counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate in the case and it was upon
the request of complainant and another debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he
(respondent) made the compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her lawyers but was
informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her lawyers.
Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her lawyers with copies of the
compromise agreement and a motion to withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by
Yap.
At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise agreement are indeed
grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap, respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1) year from 4
October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note signed by her with respect to
any interest to be paid. The only additional amount which Yap could collect based on the
promissory note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was hired by
him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August 1985,
complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from 92,100.00) after the lapse
of only ten (10) months. This translates to an interest in excess of seventy-five percent
(75%) per annum. In addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00
debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an interest of forty
percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required to see
that the terms of the compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of the compromise
agreement, it is of record that complainant was represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys.
Inting and Aumentado. Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing
her lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and earlier quoted in

this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing counsel of the
compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent informed the trial
court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her counsel,
respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the situation, and the result was the
execution of the compromise agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and
patently disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel; much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise
the matter with him, but should deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the
lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to the law.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by respondent Atty.
Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of the proper sanction from this
Court. Such acts constituting malpractice and grave misconduct cannot be left
unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they
likewise prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record as attorney and
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

DALLONG-GALISINAO V ATTY CASTRO

TINGA, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of
Court. Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner
befitting their noble profession.
Complainant Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On 8 May 2003, she filed with
the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
Complaint-Affidavit[1] with supporting documents[2] against respondent Atty. Virgil
R. Castro for Unprofessional Conduct, specifically violation of Canon 7, Rule 7.03,
Canon 8 and Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3] The charge in the
complaint is summed up as follows:
Responent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-Nueva
Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainants office to inquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, entitled Sps. Crispino Castillano v.
Sps. Federico S. Castillano and Felicidad Aberin, had already been remanded to the court
of origin, MCTC Dupax del Norte, Alfonso Castaned, Nueva Vizcaya. It must be noted
that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil Case No. 784.
Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be
presented to serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this
respondent retorted scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the
Court of Appeals? You mean to say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified
true copy? Surprised at this outburst, complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you
could show us the copy sent to the party you claim to be representing. Respondent then
replied, Then you should have notified me of the said requirement. That was two weeks
ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but you never bothered to notify
me. Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the said requirement.
Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify
you that you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent

angrily declared in Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay?
(You mean to say you dont care anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and
left the office, banging the door on his way out to show his anger. The banging of the
door was so loud it was heard by the people at the adjacent RTC, Branch 30 where a
hearing was taking place.[4]
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his
finger at complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo
nga ibales kaniak ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against
my client, dont turn your ire on me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words
but still managed to reply, I dont even know your client, Sir. Respondent left the
office and as he passed by complainants window, he again shouted, Ukinnam nga
babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!)[5]
Complainant suffered acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her
office of which she was, and still is, the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her
credibility had been tarnished and diminished, eliciting doubt on her ability to command
full respect from her staff.[6]
The Complaint-Affidavit, filed three days after the incident, was supported by an
Affidavit[7] signed by employees of RTC-Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya who witnessed the
incident. The Affidavit narrated the same incident as witnessed by the said employees. A
Motion to File Additional Affidavit/Documentary Evidence was filed by complainant on
25 September 2003.[8]
On 26 May 2003, the CBD-IBP issued an Order[9] requiring respondent to submit
his answer to the complaint. Respondent submitted his Compliance[10] dated 18 June
2003. Respondent explained that he was counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 847,
entitled Sps. Federico Castillano, et al. v. Sps. Crispin Castillano, et al., filed with the
RTC of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30. He learned of the finality of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 64962 with respect to Civil Case No. 847 before the lower
court. Prior to the incident, he went to the office of the complainant to request for the
transmittal of the records of the case to the MCTC and the complainant reassured him of
the same.
Respondent admits having inquired about the status of the transmittal of the
records on 5 May 2003. However, he has no explanation as to what transpired on that day.
Instead, he narrates that on 25 May 2003, twelve days after the incident, the records had
not yet been transmitted, and he subsequently learned that these records were returned to
the court of origin.

The hearing for the administrative complaint before the CBD was set on 25
September 2003 by the Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. However, on
said date, only complainant appeared. The latter also moved that the case be submitted for
resolution.[11] Respondent later on filed a Manifestation stating that the reason for his
non-appearance was because he was still recuperating from physical injuries and that he
was not mentally fit to prepare the required pleadings as his vehicle was rained with
bullets on 19 August 2003. He also expressed his public apology to the complainant in
the sameManifestation.[12]
Complainant filed a Manifestation expressing her desire not to appear on the next
hearing date in view of respondents public apology, adding that respondent personally
and humbly asked for forgiveness which she accepted.[13]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded
and warned that any other complaint for breach of his professional duties shall be dealt
with more severely.[14] The IBP submitted to this Court a Notice of Resolution
adopting and approving the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[15]
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of
Civil Case No. 784. Had he been counsel of record, it would have been easy for him to
present the required certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He need
not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the decision since the Court of
Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate original or certified
true copy of its decision.
His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record and
there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them, respondent had no
right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 8.02A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the
right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil
Case No. 784, respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel
of record of that case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith.
Moreover, in the course of his questionable activities relating to Civil Case No.

784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer of the court. He raised his voice at the
clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of invectives. Not only was it illmannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to a woman and in front
of her subordinates.
As held in Alcantara v. Atty. Pefianco,[16] respondent ought to have realized that
this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it.[17] These acts violate Rule 7.03, Canon 8 and
Rule 8.01, to wit:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law, now shall he, whether in public or
private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that
lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow
lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must
act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct themselves
without reproach at all times.[18]
As correctly evaluated by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not
categorically deny the charges in the complaint. Instead, he gave a lengthy narration of
the prefatory facts of the case as well as of the incident on 5 May 2003.
Complainant also alleged in her Complaint-Affidavit that respondents
uncharacteristic behavior was not an isolated incident. He has supposedly done the same
to Attys. Abraham Johnny G. Asuncion and Temmy Lambino, the latter having filed a
case against respondent pending before this Court.[19] We, however, cannot
acknowledge such allegation absent any evidence showing the veracity of such claim. No
affidavits to that effect were submitted by either Atty. Asuncion or Atty. Lambino.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that
respondent had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This
is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are
accountable for the consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent

afterwards. The fact remains that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot
be taken back. Hence, he should bear the consequences of his actions.
The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their
brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or
contrivance. It is born of sharp contexts and thrives despite conflicting interest. It
emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skills in the honorable performance
of professional duty.[20]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby FINED in the amount of
TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that any similar infraction with
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant
for appropriate annotation in the record of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA Substituted by MARIO VICTORIA, petitioner, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUANITA T. GUERRERO, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna; HON.
FLORENCIO P. BUESER, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court,
Calauan, Laguna; EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF Regional Trial Court,
Calamba, Laguna and/or his Deputies; SPOUSES LUIS GIBE and
ZENAIDA GIBE and All Persons Acting on their Behalf, respondents.
DECISION
Through his appeal by certiorari,[1] petitioner Mario Victoria seeks to set aside the

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 25, 2000 and July 12, 2000,
which (1) dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari[2] and (2) denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On October 27, 1993, respondent spouses Luis and Zenaida Gibe filed a Complaint
for Ejectment and Damages with a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction [3] against
Isidra Vda. de Victoria (the mother of herein petitioner Mario Victoria), Eusebio Arida,
Juan Becina and Guillermo Becina with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauan,
Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No. 261 (the Ejectment Case). In their Complaint, the
Gibe spouses alleged, among other things, the following:
1. In 1992 they acquired a parcel of land (the property) from the heirs of the late Judge
Gregorio Lantin, designated as Lot 1-B-153-A with an area of approximately 27,064
square meters (sq. m.).
2. The property was originally part of Lot 1-B-153 with an area of approximately 34,829
sq. m., which was subdivided into seven parcels in 1989 among Judge Lantin and four of
his tenants as follows:
Felix Victoria, now deceased, was the husband of Isidra Victoria. All the defendants in
the Ejectment Case, as former tenants, were given home lots, while Lot 1-B-153-A which
was allotted to Gregorio Lantin was sold to the spouses Gibe.
3. In the course of fencing Lot 1-B-153-A, it was discovered that the Victoria house was
standing on the northwestern portion of the property; that Mrs. Victoria was harvesting
and picking fruits from the citrus trees planted in that area without the knowledge and
permission of the Gibe spouses; and that Eusebio Arida, Juan Becina and Guillermo
Becina were also surreptitiously planting palay on the northwestern portion.
4. The fencing was discontinued after the children of Mrs. Victoria threatened to shoot at
the workers of the Gibe spouses with an armalite rifle, leaving approximately 8,000 sq.
m. of the northwestern portion of Lot 1-B-153-A open and unfenced.
In her Answer (With Motion to Dismiss),[4] Mrs. Victoria denied having entered
Judge Lantins lot alleged to have been purchased by the spouses Gibe, claiming that her
farmhouse was constructed on the very lot awarded to her family by the DAR. Moving
thus for the dismissal of the Ejectment Case for lack of cause of action, she interposed a
counterclaim praying that, as a tenant of Judge Lantin, she be maintained in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of her lot or, in the alternative, awarded disturbance
compensation; and, in either event, reimbursed for the expenses she incurred as a result of
the Ejectment Case.
At the Preliminary Conference of the Ejectment Case, the parties mutually agreed to
a relocation survey of the property to be conducted by a geodetic engineer.
After the court-appointed geodetic engineer had submitted the results of the
relocation survey, Mrs. Victoria and her co-defendants in the Ejectment Case filed a
Manifestation with Motion[5] requesting the trial court to allow them to engage the
services of an independent surveyor, at their expense, to conduct another survey.
Although the motion was granted, no resulting survey plan was, however, submitted by
them.

By Decision of May 21, 1998, the MTC, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-spouses
Gibe, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing, this Court on the basis of the evidences [sic],
the [sic] mutually submitted before it by both the plaintiffs and the defendants, this Court
has to rule as follows:
1. That since it clearly appeared that the plaintiffs are the real owners of the real property
with an area of 27,064 square meters, including the real property with an area of 5,825
square meters which is in possession of all the defendants, they have the absolute right to
obtain the proper possession thereof and to eject all of them thru legal means;
2. That in as much as all the defendants are at present and also the real owners of the real
properties and also in the possession thereof as evidence[d] by their respective
emancipation patents, each of them is hereby ordered by this Court to properly and
absolutely abandoned [sic] the portions of the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-140417 and immediately delivered its possession to the
plaintiffs;
3. That considering the possession of the defendant Isidra Vda. de Victoria of the real
properties with a total area of 1,508 square meters which she did not own, [she] is
ordered by this Court to pay and remit to the above plaintiffs the sum of P45,000.00 as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the portion above mentioned as it
belong[s] to the plaintiffs and the defendant Becina together with two other defendants
Juan and Arida are in possession of the real property owned by the plaintiffs with an area
of 4,327 square meters, they are hereby ordered [to] jointly pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P50,000.00 jointly as reasonable compensation.
4. That all the defendants are hereby ordered to pay the counsel for the plaintiffs the sum
of P20,000.00 jointly as attorneys fees;
5. That in view of failure of the plaintiffs to prove their entitlement to preliminary
mandatory injunction and to the set the same for hearing as required by law, the same is
hereby denied.
6. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[6] (Underscoring supplied)
On May 22, the spouses Gibe, without notice to the defendants in the Ejectment
Case, filed a Motion for Immediate Execution and Demolition [7] praying that a writ of
execution be issued to enforce and satisfy the judgment, for the ejectment and demolition
of the house of the Defendants.
Eight days after promulgation and receipt of the MTC decision or on May 29, 1998,
the defendants in the Ejectment Case filed a Notice of Appeal[8] without, however, filing a
supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of the decision and depositing monthly
rentals.
By Order of June 1, 1998,[9] the MTC granted the Motion for Immediate Execution
and Demolition and accordingly issued a Writ of Execution.[10]
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order [TRO] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction) [11] was filed on July 13,
1998 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2625-98-C (the Petition for Certiorari).

The Petition assailed the MTC Decision, its Order of June 1, 1998, and the Writ of
Execution, contending that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the Ejectment Case and
committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case in favor of the spouses Gibe and
in issuing the said Order and Writ of Execution pending appeal.[12]
Mrs. Victoria, it turned out, had passed away shortly before the MTC promulgated its
May 21, 1998 Decision. Her son, petitioner Mario Victoria, thus substituted for her.[13]
Branch 37 of the RTC Calauan, to which the Petition for Certiorari was raffled,
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[14]
In the meantime, the appeal filed by the defendants in the Ejectment Case before the
RTC of Calauan, Laguna was dismissed by Branch 92 thereof by Order of October 7,
1998[15] for failure to file their appeal memorandum.[16]
By its Decision dated August 13, 1999,[17] the RTC dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari in light of the following ratiocination:
The petitioner contends that the lower court has no jurisdiction to try the case and to issue
the questioned decision because the subject parcels of land have been subjected and
covered by P.D. 27 known as Operation Land Transfer and any dispute involving said
lands must be referred to the Honorable Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for proper disposition.
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. The complaint
filed by the private respondents was for Ejectment and Damages With a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Ejectment proceedings are within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
xxx
The Answer and the Position Paper of the petitioner Victoria in the case below show that
she claimed ownership over the portion of the lot, by virtue of the Operation Land
Transfer, which the private respondents Gibe alleged to have been occupied by the farm
house of the petitioner. Petitioner Victoria did not question the jurisdiction of the Court
but prayed for the dismissal of the case below for lack of cause of action. So much so,
that when the respondent Court took into consideration the issue of ownership over the
portion of the property allegedly transgressed, it did so only to determine who is better
entitled to possession over said portion. And when it ordered the resurvey of the property
to determine its actual boundaries and the admission of the Engineers report to aid it in
the issuance of the questioned decision. It did not determine the question of ownership,
i.e. as to who the real owner is which the petitioner may do so in a separate complaint
before the proper forum.
xxx
The Decision of the Court below is therefore not an error of jurisdiction but an error of
judgment which is not reviewable by certiorari proceedings. In other words, certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment
as its function is to keep and inferior court within its jurisdiction.
Having found [the MTC] to have jurisdiction to issue the decision dated May 28, 1998,
the respondent judge likewise has jurisdiction to direct the execution of the same pending
appeal pursuant to Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[18]
(Underscoring supplied)

Herein petitioner, Mario Victoria, received a copy of the foregoing Decision of the
RTC on September 18, 1999 and filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the same on
September 28, 1999.[19] In due course, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration by Order dated December 7, 1999.[20]
On March 28, 2000, petitioner instituted another special civil action for certiorari,
this time with the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning both the August 13, 1999 Decision
of the RTC and the May 21, 1998 Decision of the MTC with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[21] This case was docketed as C.A. G.R. S.P.
No. 47964 (the CA Certiorari Petition).
By Resolution of May 25, 2000, [22] the CA dismissed the CA Certiorari Petition in
this wise:
The petition is flawed for the following reasons viz:
1. The correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a petition for
certiorari is an ordinary appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and section 5, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals;
2. The instant petition is filed out of time. The assailed RTC decision was received on
September 18, 1999 while the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on September 28,
1999. (Rollo P. 152). Thus a period of nine (9) days had elapsed. The Order dated
December 7, 1999 was received by petitioner on January 29, 2000 while the instant
petition was filed only on March 28, 2000. Thus a period of fifty eight (58) days had
passed. Hence, petitioner had consumed a period of 67 days, well beyond the 60-day
period allowed by the rules as amended by Supreme Court En Banc resolution dated July
21, 1998.[23] Plainly, the petition was filed out of time.
3. The statement of material dates as to timeliness of the filing of the petition is
incomplete as it failed to state when the motion for reconsideration was filed in violation
of Section 3, Rule 46.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[25] having been denied by the CA by
Resolution of July 12, 2000[26] for being filed 2 days beyond the reglementary period, he
filed the petition at bar after he was granted, on his motion, an extension of thirty days to
file the petition, conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion for extension.[27]
Petitioner anchored his petition on the following grounds:
I.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN [sic] EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION BY NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON GROUND OF
TECHNICALITY INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE CASE ON THE MERITS.

II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALAMBA,

LAGUNA, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF OR IN [sic] EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY RULING THAT
THIS CASE FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, AND THAT THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO WAS

NOT AN ERROR [OF] JURISDICTION BUT AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT

WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE IN CERTIORARI [P]ROCEEDINGS.[28]
The appeal must be denied.
As earlier noted, this Court granted petitioner an extended period to file the petition,
conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion
for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended.[29] Where a motion for extension of time is filed beyond the period for appeal,
the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the
judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.[30]
In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period
to appeal had in fact expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of petitioners motion
for extension of time on April 10, 2001. The Registry Return Receipt[31] of the Resolution
of the CA dismissing the CA Certiorari Petition shows that the same was received by
counsel for petitioners agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, petitioner had only until June 20,
2000 within which to file an appeal or a motion for new trial or reconsideration.[32]
Clearly, the Court of Appeals committed no error when it denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration for having been filed two days after the expiration of the
reglementary period on June 22, 2000.
Similarly, the instant petition for review must likewise be denied for having been
filed on May 12, 2001, almost 11 months after the expiration of the period to appeal on
June 20, 2000.[33]
In fact, a closer inspection of the records indicates that this case should have been
terminated as early as January 4, 2000 with the lapse of the period within which
petitioner could have appealed from the RTC Decision.
By his own account, petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the RTC
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on September 18, 1999 and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the same on September 28, 1999. As correctly pointed out by the CA,
by that time a period of 9 days had already elapsed. [34] Thus, upon receipt of the notice of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration, which was admitted to be on December 29,
1999,[35]petitioner only had 6 days or until January 4, 2000[36] within which to file a notice
of appeal.
However, petitioner failed to do so, and he instead, on March 28, 2000, filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. As the Court of Appeals
again correctly pointed out, [t]he correct remedy from a decision of a Regional Trial
Court in a petition for certiorari is an ordinary appeal pursuant to Section 1, Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure xxx. It is well settled that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional.[37] Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the
latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence.[38]
To be sure, petitioner has regularly invoked, before this Court and the lower courts,
the policy in favor of a liberal interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.

Apropos on this point are this Courts observations in Duremdes v. Duremdes:[39]

Although it has been said time and again that litigation is not a game of technicalities,
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that
issues may be properly presented and justly resolved, this does not mean that
procedural rules may altogether be disregarded. Rules of procedure must be
faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his
failure to abide by the rules.[40] (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original; citations
omitted)
In the case at bar, petitioner has not provided any cogent explanation that would
absolve him of the consequences of his repeated failure to abide by the rules.
Moreover, petitioners principal substantive argument that the Ejectment Case
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB and not of the MTC is without merit.
The MTC does not automatically lose its exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases by the mere allegation of a tenancy relationship. As thoroughly
discussed in Rivera v. Santiago,[41] the party alleging tenancy must prove the existence of
all the essential requisites of tenancy in order to oust the MTC of its jurisdiction over the
case:
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. That is basic.
Unquestionably, petitioner lodged an action for ejectment before the MTC. Under BP
129, the allegations in the complaint conferred initiatory jurisdiction on that first level
court.
xxx
However, when tenancy is averred as a defense and is shown prima facie to be the real
issue, the MTC must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under RA 6657, it is the
DAR that has authority to hear and decide when tenancy is legitimately involved.
In the instant case, respondents averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense
in their Answer with Counterclaim. Under the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure], the MTC was supposed to conduct a preliminary conference to determine if
such relationship was indeed the real issue. We emphasize that the MTC did not
automatically lose its jurisdiction simply because respondents raised tenancy as a
defense. It continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine
whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits.
xxx
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands
devoted to agriculture. To determine whether the CA was correct in its reversal of the
trial court, it is necessary to keep in mind the essential requisites of tenancy which are
as follows:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
(2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land;
(3) There is mutual consent to the tenancy between the parties;
(4) The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;

(5) There is personal cultivation by the tenant or agricultural lessee; and

(6) There is a sharing of harvests between the parties.
All these elements must concur. It is not enough that they are alleged; to divest the
MTC of jurisdiction, they must all be shown to be present. x x x[42] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
In Duremdes v. Duremdes,[43] where a similar argument was raised under factual
circumstances analogous to the case at bar, this Court held:
First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over
a dispute it is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1) [T]hat the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that
the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to
bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part
of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Second. The trial court found that no such tenancy agreement existed between the
respondent and Herminio Tara, and that such allegation was a mere ploy to prevent the
respondent from exercising dominion and ownership over the subject property. This was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no cogent reason to reverse such finding.
Third. The petitioner is barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction. The petitioner
actively participated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a counterclaim and
asking for affirmative relief in his answer. He failed, however, to question the
courts jurisdiction over the suit. After relying on the jurisdiction of the regular
courts, he cannot be permitted to turn around and question it. It is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction.[44] (Emphasis
supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted)
In the present case, neither petitioner nor his predecessor-in-interest submitted
evidence to substantiate the existence of the essential requisites of tenancy. Thus, there is
no basis at all to support petitioners claim that the MTC was without jurisdiction to
render the questioned Decision.
What is more, as in Duremdes and unlike in Rivera, petitioners predecessor-ininterest never questioned the jurisdiction of the MTC. Instead, she based her prayer for
the dismissal of the Ejectment Case on respondents alleged lack of cause of action; with
a counterclaim praying that she be maintained in the peaceful possession and cultivation
of the subject property or, in the alternative, awarded disturbance compensation; and, in
either event, reimbursed for the expenses she incurred. Considering that petitioners
predecessor-in-interest actively participated in the proceedings before the MTC and
invoked its jurisdiction to secure an affirmative relief, petitioner cannot now turn around
and question that courts jurisdiction.
Finally, this Court notes with consternation petitioners attempts, with the aid of his
counsel, Atty. Abdul A. Basar, to deliberately mislead this Court as to the material dates
and status of the decision appealed from, thereby impeding if not frustrating the ends of

justice.
In his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari,
petitioner declared under oath that: (1) he had filed a timely Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Resolution dismissing his petition forcertiorari, and (2) the
notice of the denial by the CA of his Motion for Reconsideration was received by
petitioner only [on] March 28, 2001, thus making it appear that he had until April 12,
2001 within which to perfect his appeal.
Significantly, petitioner did not disclose, either in his motion for extension of time or
in his subsequent petition, the date on which he received the Resolution of the CA
denying his petition for certiorari, thereby concealing the actual period for appeal from
the Court processor.
As already noted, petitioners motion for reconsideration failed to suspend the
running of the reglementary period since it was filed two days too late. Worse, the
Registry Return Receipt[45] of the CA Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration shows that it was received by counsel for petitioners agent on September
20, 2000, and not March 28, 2001 as claimed by petitioner. In fact, by Resolution dated
May 7, 2001,[46] the CA had ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in this case,
which was later withdrawn by Resolution of October 23, 2001 [47] following receipt by it
of the instant Petition on May 15, 2001.
It cannot be overemphasized that parties and their counsel are duty-bound to
observe honesty and truthfulness in all their pleadings, motions and statements
before the courts. Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, A
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court; while Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of
the same provide:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Petitioner and his counsel, Atty. Abdul A. Basar, are thus hereby directed TO SHOW
CAUSE, within 10 days from receipt of a copy of this Decision, why they should not be
held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner MARIO VICTORIA and his counsel, Atty. ABDUL A. BASAR, are
hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of
this Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt
with for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] assailing the Decision[2] of 27 April 2000
and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451.
The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision [3] of18 September 1998 and the Resolution of
24 December 1998 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No. RAB VII05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied Bank) illegally dismissed
Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay,
backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and other amounts totaling P1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
For a background of this case, we quote in part from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking
Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant
manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a Notice of Personnel Action which
provides as one of the conditions of employment the provision on petitioners right to
transfer employees:
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to
transfer or assign you to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and
in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted service to the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches as
follows:
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner
listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned
outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu for seven years already. Private
respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19
April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would
result if he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter
for constructive dismissal.
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86) that he was to

report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May 1994. Private respondent refused.
In a letter dated 13 June 1994, petitioner warned and required of private respondent as
follows:
There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers mentioned, only
you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of working away from your family
as if the other officers concerned do not suffer the same predicament. To exempt you
from the officer transfer would result in favoritism in your favor and discrimination as
against the other officers concerned.
In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the public, and in
accordance with the Banks order of priority of rotating its accountants places of
assignments, you are well aware that Roberto Isla, AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for
more than ten (10) years, was, on February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City Branch
and then to Cagayan de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your objection on the
ground of your length of service is without merit.
xxx
As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and
reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized under Article XII of the
Banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure [which] provides:
XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by management. The
employee shall be required to comply with the order of transfer and reassignment, if the
penalty is not termination of employment.
In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days from receipt
hereof why no disciplinary action should be meted against you for your having refused
to follow instructions concerning the foregoing transfer and reassignment. xxx[4]
On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that (w)hether the banks penalty for my refusal
be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the more establish and fortify my complaint
now pending at NLRC, RAB 7.[5] In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with
discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr. Olveda is managements
discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise
of its exercise of management prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is
to accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with
management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer of Melinda T. Co, a new officer
who had experienced being assigned outside ofCebu for more than a year only to
Tabunok Branch? If the purpose is for check and balance, is management implying that
Melinda Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a seasoned
and experienced accountant or any of the Metro Cebu accountants for that matter? Isnt
this act of management an obvious display of favoritism? xxx[6]
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office communication[7] (Memo)
dated 8 September 1994 from Allied Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C.
Pe. The Memo informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services effective
1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal were: (1) Galanidas continued

refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to
report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave. The
salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and reassignment to
Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any justifiable reason and constituted
violations of Article XII of the Banks EDPP xxx
In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the Bank has terminated your
services effective September 1, 1994 and considered whatever benefit, if any, that you
are entitled as forfeited in accordance with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the
Banks EDPP which provides as follows:
04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the
confirmation of the President or his authorized representative as officer/employee who is
terminated for cause shall not be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his
employment with the Bank or to termination pay.
It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without prejudice to
whatever legal remedies which the Bank may have already undertaken and/or will
undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)[8]
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank had abused its
management prerogative in ordering the transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches. In ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to
insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision in Dosch v. NLRC,[9]
thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is recognized as an
employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management (Abbott Laboratories vs.
NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain limitations. Thus, in
Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296 (1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is an employers
exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such right is not absolute. The right
of an employer to freely select or discharge his employee is limited by the paramount
police power xxx for the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual
but impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act
oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee
cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being away from the family.[10]
(Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was inconvenient and prejudicial

because Galanida would have to incur additional expenses for board, lodging and travel.
On the other hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any business
urgency that would justify the transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim that Allied Bank gave Ms.
Co special treatment. The Labor Arbiter stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms.
Cos name from the list of accountants transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks
letter dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied Banks Vice President
for Operations Accounting, testified that the bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok,
Cebu branch within the first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back wages because he was not
entirely free from blame. Since another bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor
Arbiter granted Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive portion
of the Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December 1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent
Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the aggregate total amount of Three
Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos (P324,000.00) representing the following awards:
a)
Separation pay for P272,000.00;
b)
Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 P16,000.00;
d)
Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank terminated Galanida without
just cause. The NLRC agreed that the transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified,
considering the family considerations mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC characterized
the transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches were smaller than
the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an
assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch. The
NLRC found unlawful discrimination since Allied Bank did not transfer several junior
accountants in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though she had worked for the bank for less than
two years.
The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for lack of due process. The
NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that
Allied Bank failed to send a termination notice, as required by law for a valid
termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would issue a notice of
termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in bad faith, tantamount
to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal undermined Galanidas right to security of
tenure and equal protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated its

Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which states:

In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer advantageous to
both parties to order reinstatement of the complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis,
We deny the claim for 1994 quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as
counsels for complainant-appellee are from the City Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December
23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award of separation pay and granting in
addition thereto backwages, moral and exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant,
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein complainantappellee, POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:
a)
P336,000.00, representing separation pay
b)
P833,600.00, representing backwages
c)
P 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994 13th month pay
d)
P 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident Fund Contribution
e)
P 50,000.00 representing moral damages
f)
P 20,000.00 representing exemplary damages
===========
P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other respondents are dropped for
lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess of their corporate powers.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in its
Resolution of 24 December 1998.[13]
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review questioning the Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14] the Court of Appeals held that Galanidas refusal to
comply with the transfer orders did not warrant his dismissal. The appellate court ruled
that the transfer from a regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was
effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank did not afford
Galanida procedural due process because there was no hearing and no notice of
termination. The Memo merely stated that the bank would issue a notice of termination
but there was no such notice.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its Decision of 27 April
2000, thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision
of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. [15]
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied in its

Resolution of 8 August 2000.[16]

On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts decision and resolution
to the Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation
or execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution; (2) declare Galanidas
termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution; (4) make permanent the restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order
Galanida to pay the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.
The Issues
Allied Bank raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED THERE IS LEGAL BASIS
IN PETITIONERS EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY
RULES CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL.
3.

WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THERE IS LEGAL

BASIS TO HOLD THAT ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE PROCESS.

4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY MONETARY
AWARD.[17]
In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Allied Bank contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey
the transfer orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is a just
cause for termination under the Labor Code.
On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the transfer order. The
memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court, prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano,
again misquoted the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:
xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983) quoted as follows:
xxx
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination where employee
cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family.[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.

Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme Court

The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the assailed Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The
Court held in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of disobedience and
insubordination which respondent Commission sustained. The only piece of evidence on
which Northwest bases the charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated
August 28, 1975 to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers
memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to Director of
International Sales but at the same time regretted that at this time for personal reasons
and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept the transfer from the Philippines and
thereafter expressed his preference to remain in his position, saying: I would, therefore,
prefer to remain in my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services
in that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines. From this evidence, We
cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less imply insubordination on the
part of petitioner.[19]
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination
where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away from the family
does not appear anywhere in the Doschdecision. Galanidas counsel lifted the erroneous
phrase from one of the italicized lines in the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated (SCRA).
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court decisions or
resolutions is not the work of the Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The
syllabus is simply the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the decision.
The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of lawyers in reading the reports. A
syllabus is not a part of the courts decision. [20] A counsel should not cite a syllabus in
place of the carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty. Durano began by quoting from
Dosch, but substituted a portion of the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus,
which they even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from the SCRA
syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We admonish them for what is at the
least patent carelessness, if not an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts
taking cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
text of a decision or authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings
and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.[21]
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals, particularly when they affirm the findings of the NLRC or the lower courts.

However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when the
findings are grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
has gone beyond the issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised on
a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and (8)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.[22] After a scrutiny of the records,
we find that some of these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of the
employers prerogatives.[23] The employer exercises the prerogative to transfer an
employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the employees salary,
benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of
showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the displaced
employee.[25]
The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities
from one branch to another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a
hundred branches throughout the country.[26] Allied Bank does this primarily for internal
control. It also enables bank employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual
promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Other Financial Intermediaries,[27] requires the rotation of these personnel. The Manual
directs that the duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records
should be rotated and that such rotation should be irregular, unannounced and long
enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations.[28]
Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of periodically transferring
personnel to different branches. As the Court of Appeals found, assignment to the
different branches of Allied Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment. Galanida
consented to this condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action.[29]
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied Bank discriminated against
Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13
June 1994[30] showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various
branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not
single out Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for
assignment outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The
person first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than
ten years, had already transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none
of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or corroborated his allegations of
widespread discrimination and favoritism.
As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June 1994 itself showed that her

assignment to Cebu was not in any way related to Galanidas transfer. Ms. Co was
supposed to replace a certain Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has
the prerogative, based on its assessment of the employees qualifications and competence,
to rotate them in the various areas of its business operations to ascertain where they will
function with maximum benefit to the company.[31]
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a demotion. Galanida did not
present evidence showing that the transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other
privileges. Instead, Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured Galanida that he would
not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and that the transfer would involve the same
rank, duties and obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in the affidavit he
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainants salary,
benefits and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch officers is premised on
the role/functions that they will assume in the management and operations of the branch,
as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for the proper
discharge of the functions of the accounting section of the branch, review of
documentation/proper accounting and control of transaction. As such, the accounting
functions in the branch can be assumed by any of the following officers with the rank of:
Senior Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another branch/office
is lateral in nature and carries with it the same position/rank, salary, benefits and other
privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the officer to assume the functions relative to
his job and NOT the position/rank of the officer to be replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was guilty of unfair labor
practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization [32] and are limited to
the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the
present case. There is no evidence that Galanida took part in forming a union, or even
that a union existed in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly refuse the transfer orders on
the ground of parental obligations, additional expenses, and the anguish he would suffer
if assigned away from his family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case of Homeowners Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. v. NLRC,[33] we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for an illicit or
underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an employees right to self-organization, to rid
himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an employee for union activities cannot
be upheld is self-evident and cannot be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where
no such illicit, improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the
objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal inconvenience or

hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and Telephone Corp. v.
Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana, was a cashier at the Baguio City
Branch of PT&T who was directed to transfer to the companys branch office at Laoag
City. In refusing the transfer, the employee averred that she had established Baguio City
as her permanent residence and that such transfer will involve additional expenses on her
part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be a big sacrifice for her as she
will be kept away from her family which might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling
for the employer, the Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the
country as valid as long as there is no bad faith on the part of the employer. We held
then:
Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee opposes his
employers decision to transfer him to another work place, there being no bad faith or
underhanded motives on the part of either party, it is the employees wishes that should
be made to prevail.
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC.[34] Dosch,
however, is not applicable to the present case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer
consequential to a promotion. We upheld the refusal because no law compels an
employee to accept a promotion, and because the position Dosch was supposed to be
promoted to did not even exist at that time. [35] This left as the only basis for the charge of
insubordination a letter from Dosch in which the Court found not even the slightest hint
of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36]
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post, as in the Dosch case,
cannot be likened to a transfer from one city to another within the country,[37] which is the
situation in the present case. The distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or from Cebu
City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the distance from Baguio City to Laoag City or
from Baguio City to Manila, which the Court considered a reasonable distance in PT&T
v. Laplana.[38]
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful disobedience of a lawful
order of an employer.[39] Employees may object to, negotiate and seek redress against
employers for rules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and
unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by competent authority, the
employees ignore or disobey them at their peril. [40] For Galanidas continued refusal to
obey Allied Banks transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just
cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code. [41] Galanida is thus not
entitled to reinstatement or to separation pay.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Omnibus Rules), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the

Labor Code:
(i)

A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds

of termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.

(ii)

A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the

assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against him.

(iii)

A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that

upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.

The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994. The
first notice required Galanida to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him for his refusal to comply with the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard.[42] An actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange
of several letters, in which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutors Office,
assisted him, gave Galanida an opportunity to respond to the charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8 September 1994 sent to Galanida
constitutes the written notice of termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding
that it did not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on dismissals,
quoted in the Memo, that, Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation
Committee subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized
representative.[43]The appellate court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any
notice of termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading Transfer and
Reassignment, was not the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it unequivocally informed
Galanida of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. The statement, please be informed
that the Bank has terminated your serviceseffective September 1, 1994 and considered
whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as forfeited xxx [44] is plainly worded
and needs no interpretation. The Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation
Committee that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo referred to
Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer first to the Bacolod City branch and
then to the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his continued refusal to
report for work despite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave. [45] The
Memo also refuted Galanidas charges of discrimination and demotion, and concluded
that he had violated Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment, did not preclude it
from being a notice of termination. The Court has held that the nature of an instrument is
characterized not by the title given to it but by its body and contents. [46] Moreover, it
appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination. We quote
from the Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee, as follows:

The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:

1.
On March 13, 1994[47] Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the Region VII
Arbitration Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A copy of the Complaint is
attached to the Petition as Annex H;
xxx
5.
On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of
Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex N;
6.
Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental Complaint wherein
he alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached
to the Petition as Annex O; xxx [48] (Emphasis supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to the Memo as a Letter
of Termination. Further, Galanida amended his complaint for constructive dismissal [49]
to one for illegal dismissal[50] after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had
understood the Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated his services.
The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal rules which required the banks
President or his authorized representative to confirm the notice of termination. The
banks Vice-President for Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the
movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can certainly represent the bank president in
cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain errors. Although the
Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated Galanidas services as of 1 September 1994, the
Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received a copy
of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his
dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination must be served on the
employee.[51] Allied Bank could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he
had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks decision to dismiss him.
Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the
Memo. For this reason, Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1
September 1994 to 4 October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of P10,000 in nominal damages
proper. Courts award nominal damages to recognize or vindicate the right of a person
that another has violated.[52] The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of Allied
Banks decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank should have exercised more care in issuing
the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18 September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case
No. V-000180-98 is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1)

The awards of separation pay, moral damages and exemplary damages are
hereby deleted for lack of basis;

2)

Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the period from 1 September
1994 to 4 October 1994; and

3)

Awarding nominal damages to private respondent for P10,000.

This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this Decision, of the backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits, due to Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual
from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Durano are
ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
future.
SO ORDERED.

SAMAR MINING CO., INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO P. ARNADO,

POMPEYO V. TAN and RUFINO ABUYEN, Respondents-Appellees.
Benedicto G. Arcinas for Petitioner-Appellant.
Villavieja & Zapanta for Respondents-Appellees.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, dismissing this case, with
costs against the petitioner, and lifting the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued.
Acting upon a claim for compensation, under Act No. 3428, filed by Rufino Abuyen, on
June 18, 1956, for a disease allegedly contracted in the course of his employment, as
foreman of the Samar Mining Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the petitioner and
docketed as WCC Case No. R-VI-217, decision was rendered, on October 14, 1958, by
Pompeyo V. Tan an officer of Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor
sentencing petitioner herein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To provide continued medical treatment and hospitalization to the claimant in
accordance with Section 13 of the Act until his tuberculosis is cured or arrested;
"2. To pay to the claimant a lump sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE (P2,523.00) PESOS and a weekly compensation of P17.40 from date
hereof until he is cured or his pulmonary tuberculosis is arrested as certified by a
competent physician but the total compensation should not exceed P4,000.00; Payment to
be made, thru the Regional Office No. VI of the Department of Labor;
"3. To pay to the workmen compensation fund the amount of P26.00 as administrative
costs pursuant to Section 55 of Act 3428, as amended."cralaw virtua1aw library

A reconsideration of said decision having been denied, on March 24, 1960, petitioner
commenced Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, for a writ of
certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, against Francisco P. Arnado, as
Regional Administrator of said office, Pompeyo V. Tan, as the writer of said decision, and
claimant Abuyen, upon the ground that Tan had acted without jurisdiction in hearing said
claim and rendering decision thereon, and that Arnado had committed a grave abuse of
discretion in sustaining and upholding said acts of Tan. Sustaining respondents objection,
upon the ground of wrong venue, the case was, however, dismissed by said court, the
decision of which was, on June 30, 1961, affirmed by Us.
On July 21, 1961, petitioner commenced, against the same respondents in said Case No.
42836, the present action, for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the filing of the case, said court issued a
restraining order, which was, later, followed by a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the
filing and approval of the requisite bond. After appropriate proceedings, said court
subsequently rendered the decision mentioned in the opening paragraph hereof,
dismissing the petition, upon the ground that respondent Tan had authority to hear and
pass upon the aforementioned claim of Abuyen, and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued meanwhile. Hence, this appeal by petitioner herein, who insists: 1) that,
being merely a labor attorney, respondent Tan had no authority to make the award
complained of; 2) that as Regional Administrator, respondent Arnado could not delegate
said authority to respondent Tan; and 3) that no such delegation of authority to him has
been made.
It is not disputed that respondent Tan is a labor attorney, assigned to Regional Office No.
VI of the Department of Labor, and that, as such, he has no authority to hear claims for
compensation under Act No. 3428 and to render decisions thereon. Based, however, upon
Plan No. 20-A, submitted to the President of the Philippines by the Government Survey
and Reorganization Commission, and Executive Order No. 218, dated December 10,
1956, particularly section 32 thereof, 1 as well as on Rule 21, section 1, of the Rules of
Procedure promulgated by the Workmens Compensation Commission 2 pursuant to
section 12, of Article III of said Plan No. 20-A, and section 45 of Act No. 3428, as
amended by Republic Act No. 772, 3 we have held, as early as August 21, 1961
". . . that a regional office of the Department of Labor has original jurisdiction to hear and
determine claims for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act. If a claim is
controverted, it shall be heard and decided only by a regularly appointed hearing officer
or any other employee duly designated by the Regional Administrator to act as hearing
officer. But when the claim is uncontroverted and there is no necessity of requiring the
claimant to present further evidence, the Regional Administrator may enter an award or
deny the claim. Furthermore, an employer is duty bound to controvert a claim within 14
days from the date of the accident or illness of the laborer or within 10 days after he or
his representative first acquired knowledge of the said accident or sickness. Failure to do
so within the period provided will result in the renunciation of his right to controvert the
claim. But an employer may reinstate his right to controvert the claim by filing a petition

under oath specifying the reasons for his failure to do so." 4

We have repeatedly reiterated this view, 5 which is now well settled. In the case at bar,
respondents-appellees contend and have introduced evidence to the effect that Regional
Administrator Arnado had by virtue of an office order, dated November 29, 1957, and
marked as Exhibit 1 designated respondent Tan who is a duly qualified Member of
the Philippine Bar "as Hearing Officer in the case of Rufino Abuyen v. Samar Mining
Co., WCC Case No. 44238 (R-VI- 217)." As a consequence, the only issue for
determination is whether or not there has been such designation in his favor.
Petitioner assails the evidence thereon upon the theory: 1) that the lower court erred in
reopening the case, after its submission for decision, for the reception of said evidence;
and 2) that the same is insufficient to establish the designation aforementioned.
As regards the first alleged error, it appears that petitioners had asked the lower court to
render judgment on the pleadings; that, thereafter, both parties submitted their respective
memoranda; that, in order to bolster up their contention, respondents attached to their
Memorandum, as Annex I, the alleged designation of respondent Tan by Regional
Administrator Arnado; that petitioner, however, objected to the consideration of said
Annex I; that, accordingly, the lower court deemed it best to reopen the case for the
introduction of additional evidence and the determination of the admissibility in evidence
of said Annex I; and that the same was identified, marked and admitted as Exhibit I at the
rehearing.
In this connection, it should be noted that trial courts have discretionary power to reopen
a case either before or after rendition of judgment, for the introduction of additional
evidence, so as to dispel doubts on material points. Such power is controlled by no other
rule than that of the paramount interest of justice, and its exercise will not be reviewed on
appeal in the absence of clear abuse thereof. 6 No such abuse has been committed in the
case at bar. On the contrary, the exercise of said power by his Honor, the trial Judge,
served to promote the interest of justice, by clarifying the question whether or not
respondent Tan had been given the aforementioned designation.
As a matter of fact, said Exhibit 1 merely confirmed the allegation in respondents answer
to the effect that respondent Tan had acted "not as Labor Attorney but as Hearing Officer
designate pursuant to the authority granted him by the previous Regional Labor
Administrator to try and hear the merits of the compensation case . . . WCC Case No. RVI-217, Rufino Abuyen v. Samar Mining Co., Inc." Moreover, pursuant to the very cases
cited by petitioner, 7 the truth of this allegation had been deemed impliedly admitted by
the petitioner, when it submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings. 8
Independently of the foregoing, the second alleged error is obviously devoid of merit, the
signature of Regional Administrator Arnado on said Exhibit 1 having been identified by
one of his subordinates, who, as such, was familiar therewith.
One other point must be stressed. The illness on which Abuyens claim is based took

place in 1956. Yet, through the present case, and Civil Case No. 42836 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the litigation, for the
compensation involved therein, for twelve (12) years. What is more, petitioners
contention was based upon a theory that had been rejected by this Court as early as
August, 1961. Then again, the compensability of Abuyens disability had never been
questioned by petitioner herein. Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case, like the
previous one, has been merely to delay, a policy "often resorted to" in the language of
Mr. Justice Reyes (J.B.L.) "as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party"
in this case a tuberculosis patient "and of compelling it to submit out of sheer
exhaustion." 9 Thus, the conduct of petitioners counsel is hardly compatible with the
duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the
same.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with trebel costs, jointly
and severally, against the petitioner and its counsel, Attorney Benedicto G. Arcinas, and
let certified copy of this decision be attached to the personal record of the latter, as a
Member of the Bar. It is so ordered.

ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.
J. C. Knudson, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken
from a Roman Catholic Church located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value
of the church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of
December, 1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing the evidence, the court
below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 per
cent from the date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two items,
one of which, P741, was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the other,
P840, the rental value of the premises during the occupations by defendants. From this
judgment the defendants appealed to this court.
It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901, members of the
municipal board of the municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed to the
plaintiff in this case, who was the priest in charge of the church, its appurtenances and
contents, the following letter:
PLACER, 11th December, 1901.
R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.

ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing you that in the
municipality of which we have charged we have received an order from the provincial
fiscal, dated the 5th instant, which says: "The cemeteries, convents, and the other
buildings erected on land belonging to the town at the expense of the town and preserved
by it belong to the town, and for this reason the municipality is under the obligation of
administering them and of collecting the revenues therefrom, and for this reason we
notify you that from this date all of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned
into the treasury of the municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them.
In the same way we notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is now in the church,
as it is an image donated to the people by its owner, by virtue of said order is also the
property of said people, and therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof
must be also turned into the municipal treasury for the proper preservation of the church
and for other necessary purposes. We hope that you will view in the proper light and that
you will deliver to the bearer of this letter the key of the alms box of the said image in
order that we may comply with our obligation in conformity with the dispositions of said
order.
We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.
(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.
TOMAS VILLAMOR.
ANDRES CALINAUAN.
BERNARDINO TANDOY.
EUSEBIO LIRIO.
ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.
MAXIMO DELOLA.
SEGUNDO BECERRO.
ONOFRE ELIMANCE.
On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as
priest of the church and the person in charge thereof, protested against the occupation
thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no consideration, and he was
summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and contents.
The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the
real party in interest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds
voluntarily contributed by the people of that municipality, and that the articles within the
church had been purchased with funds raised in like manner, and that, therefore, the
municipality was the owner thereof.
The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances, including the
convent and cemetery, was before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in an
action entitled "The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church against the municipality of
Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were presented on the part of the defendants in that
case as are presented by the defendants in this. The question there litigated was the claim
upon the part of the municipality of ownership of said church and its appurtenances on
the ground that according to Spanish law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not
the owner of such property, having only the use thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and
religious purposes, and that the true owner thereof was the municipality or the State by
reason of the contributions by them, or by the people, of the land and of the funds with

which the buildings were constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case that the
claim of the defendants was not well founded and that the property belonged to the
Roman Catholic Church. The same question was discussed and decided in the case of
Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of The Municipality of Ponce vs.
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz.,
1213).
We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case and we
have no doubt that the property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the defendants,
the property of the Roman Catholic Church, and that the seizure of the same and
occupation of the church and its appurtenances by the defendants were wrongful and
illegal. We are also convinced, from such examination, that the conclusions of the court
below as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church
for the time of its illegal occupation by the defendants were correct and proper. While
some objection was made on appeal by counsel for the defendants that the value of the
articles taken and of the rent of the church and its appurtenances had not been proved by
competent evidence, no objection to the introduction of the evidence of value was made
at the trial and we can not consider that question raised for the first time here.
We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants on
this appeal. We find none of them well founded. The only one which deserves especial
attention at our hands is the one wherein the defendants assert that the court below erred
in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name of the plaintiff instead of
in the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located, or in the
name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.
It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is
the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action.
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:
SEC. 110. Amendments in general. The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on
such terms, if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding
and at any stage of the action, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court,
by adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by
correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or
description in any other respect so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily
be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, and
inexpensive manner. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other
pleading to be made after the time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same.
Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion
filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. No judgment shall be
reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced the real
rights of the excepting party.
We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart from that
power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and
decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only

are we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that weshould do so. Such an
amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. The plaintiff
asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is
engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese
not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do for the bishop what
the bishop might do for himself. His own personality is not involved. His own rights are
not presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare
of the great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly
swallowed up in that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of
the diocese, or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as party
plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, of one party for
another, but is simply to make the form express the substance. The substance is there. It
appears all through the proceedings. No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interest
are at stake. The form of its expression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not
substantial but formal. Defect in mere form can not possibly so long as the substantial is
clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used to express substance and make it clearly
appear. It is the means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still
the substance shows plainly through no, harm can come by making the form accurately
expressive of the substance.
No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by
reason of this error send this back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the
retrial the same complaint, the same answer, the same defense, the same interests, the
same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiff would constitute the
only difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in
a name to justify such action.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole
purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the
administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that
thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one
and become the other, the administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than
to cure it, does not appeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the
plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities
in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending
party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure,
asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a
rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts.
There should be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to
challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of form when his substantial
rights have not been prejudiced thereby.

In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought. (McKeighan
vs. Hopkins, 19 Neb., 33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577;
Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308; George vs. Reed, 101 Mass., 378; Bowden vs.
Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70 Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal
vs. State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo vs.
Costelo vs. Crowell, 134 Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no.
17528; Miller vs. Pollock, 99 Pa. St., 202; Wilsonvs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554;
Wood vs. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521; Insurance Co, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs.
Doyle, 128 Mich., 696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R. Co. vs. Gibson, 4
Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)
It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and decision
in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the
complaint be considered as though originally filed by the Catholic Church, the answer
thereto made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the said
institution which Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff,
and that said decision of the court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding
as to the costs.

ROSALINA BIASCAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCIAL F. LOPEZ, respondent.

RE S O LUTI ON
QUISUMBING, J.:
This administrative case stems from a verified complaint [1] for disbarment, filed on
October 4, 1996, by complainant Rosalina Biascan against respondent Atty. Marcial F.
Lopez for alleged fraud or misrepresentation, breach of his duty as an officer of the court,
and betrayal of his oath as a lawyer amounting to gross misconduct, which renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.
Subject of the complaint is a 600-square meter lot located between Constancia and
Miguelin Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Said property was originally covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34127 in the name of Florencio Biascan. The latter died
intestate, leaving behind two parcels namely: the lot in Sampaloc, Manila, and another
parcel in Novaliches, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 87068.
In her complaint, Rosalina Biascan avers that she is the court-appointed
administratrix of the estate of her deceased father, Florencio Biascan. That estate is the
subject of Special Proceedings No. 98037 entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased Timotea Zulueta and Florencio Biascan, pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Pursuant to her appointment, she filed her Inventory
and Appraisal[2] Report sometime in November 1975.

In August 1977, respondent entered his appearance in the intestate proceedings as

counsel for an oppositor, Maria Manuel Biascan (now deceased).[3]
In an Order[4] dated April 2, 1981, the RTC declared complainant and her brother,
German Biascan, heirs of the late Florencio. Maria Manuel Biascan then filed a Motion
for Reconsideration[5] on June 6, 1981, but the trial court denied said motion on April 30,
1985.[6] Meanwhile, in complete disregard of the intestate proceedings and without
knowledge and approval of the lower court or complainant and her brother, Maria Manuel
Biascan executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication [7] on June 20, 1983 where she falsely
represented herself as the sole heir of the late Florencio Biascan. On July 12, 1983, she
then presented the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication to the Register of Deeds of Manila, as a
result of which TCT No. 34127 was cancelled and TCT No. 155384 issued in her name.
Complainant further averred that on July 24, 1990, without the approval of the
intestate court and taking advantage of the aforementioned fraud, respondent Lopez
registered with the Register of Deeds a Deed of Assignment, [8] dated December 22, 1977,
which Maria Manuel Biascan had executed in his favor. In that deed, Maria Manuel
Biascan ceded to respondent 210 square meters of the 600-square meter land now
covered by TCT No. 155384. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No.
193790 covering the ceded 210 square meters in respondents name.[9]
On June 15, 1992, respondent sold the 210-square meter lot covered by TCT No.
193790 to the Spouses Danilo and Corazon Arganoza in whose favor TCT No. 208601
was issued.[10]
According to complainant, all the foregoing transfers occurred while Special
Proceedings No. 98037 was still pending, but she discovered the transfers only in
February 1993 after inquiries on her behalf were made with the Registries of Deeds of
Manila and Caloocan. [11] Suits for the recovery of the properties are pending with the
Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Caloocan.[12]
In his Comment/Answer[13] filed on November 17, 1998, respondent Lopez denies
committing any fraud, misconduct, or breach of duty to the court, and asserts he acted in
good faith. According to him, what complainant Rosalina Biascan reported in her
Inventory and Appraisal report was a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 24127 and not
the Sampaloc property covered by TCT No. 34127. Also, his acquisition of subject
property and the resulting issuance of TCT No. 193790 in his name was valid because the
land was payment for his legal services under a valid contingent fee contract.
Respondent claims that Maria Manuel Biascan offered to pay him 35% of the area of
TCT No. 155384 for his legal services. Since there was no notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. 155384, he accepted the offer and the Deed of Assignment was executed between
them.[14]
Respondent further asserts that complainant is guilty of laches, as she failed to act
swiftly to protect her alleged interest over the subject property. He points out that from
June 2, 1975, the date complainant filed the petition for settlement and administration of
the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan, up to May 28, 1983 or for approximately eight
(8) years, complainant failed to assert her rights as owner of the property by either
registering a claim to the subject property or filing a case for recovery thereof.

Finally, respondent prayed for the suspension of the instant administrative case on
the ground that the recovery suits pending before the RTCs of Manila and Caloocan raise
issues that must first be resolved before the instant complaint can proceed; otherwise,
there might be conflicting findings between said lower courts and this Court.
In our Resolution[15] of March 1, 1999, we referred the instant complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002394, the full text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering that it has been established that respondent committed acts of
misconduct which have caused damage and prejudice to complainant and her brother,
respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[16]
This Resolution is now before this Court for confirmation.
At the outset, we note that there appears to be some confusion between the parties on
whether the original TCT covering the property in question was TCT No. 24127 or TCT
No. 34127. Resort to the records show, however, that both parties are in fact referring to
the lot located between Constancia and Miguelin Streets in Sampaloc, Manila.
On the issue of respondents liability, this Court agrees with the findings of the IBP
Board of Governors.
It is clear from the records that when respondent entered his appearance in Special
Proceedings No. 98037 as counsel for Maria Manuel Biascan in August 1977,
complainant had already filed her Inventory and Appraisal Report dated November 22,
1975, which listed the realty covered by TCT No. 34127, as one of the properties forming
part of the Estate of Florencio Biascan. As counsel for an oppositor, respondent must
have gone over the records of Special Proceedings No. 98037, which included the
aforesaid Inventory and Appraisal Report. Also, the Deed of Assignment itself stated that
TCT No. 34127 was registered in Florencio Biascans name and was the subject of
Special Proceedings No. 98037. Clearly therefore, when Maria Manuel Biascan executed
the Deed of Assignment in December 22, 1977 to cover respondents contingent fees,
respondent had actual knowledge that the lot subject of said deed formed part of the
estate of Florencio Biascan. Notwithstanding this and the fact that Special Proceedings
No. 98037 was still pending,[17] respondent registered the Deed of Assignment in his favor
on July 24, 1990 and caused the transfer of title over the part of the land Maria Manuel
Biascan assigned to him. In so doing, the respondent transgressed Article 1491 [18] of the
Civil Code expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring property or rights that may be
the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
Respondents assertion that the assignment was made pursuant to a contingent fee
contract will not exonerate him. True, a contract for a contingent fee is generally not
covered by Article 1491 and is valid because the transfer or assignment of the property in

litigation takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment.[19] However, as
aforesaid respondent caused the transfer of the subject property in his name during the
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037. Thus, the prohibition in Article 1491
clearly applies.[20] Respondent is, therefore, liable for malpractice.[21]
As a member of the bar, respondent is strictly mandated to comply with the
Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, [22] both of which
require him to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of duly constituted authorities.
The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a reprehensible act, which the
Court will not countenance.[23]
Likewise, respondent defied the tenor and intent of the trial courts Order of April 2,
1981 when on July 24, 1990, he proceeded to register the Deed of Assignment and caused
the issuance of a new TCT in his name. Note that respondent proceeded with such
registration of property included in the Estate of Florencio Biascan, despite the fact that
the trial court had ruled that aside from Maria Manuel Biascan, complainant and her
brother were legal heirs of Florencio Biascan. That the Order dated April 2, 1981 was the
subject of an appeal and had not become final at the time he acquired title to the property
does not change the fact that there is such an Order. As a lawyer and an officer of the
court, respondent should have respected said Order[24] and refrained from doing any act,
which would have rendered such Order ineffectual. It bears repeating that a lawyer
should uphold the dignity and authority of the court.[25] His actions violate Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that requires every member of the bar to promote
respect for law and legal processes.[26]
Finally, respondents contention that the result of the recovery suits should be
awaited before any action is taken on the instant Complaint fails to persuade us. What is
addressed in this case is whether respondent knowingly acquired an interest over property
subject of Special Proceedings No. 98037 to the damage and prejudice of the persons
lawfully entitled to said property as legal heirs and in violation of respondents oath as a
lawyer and his duty as an officer of the court. The question of whether complainant
herein is entitled to recovery is not in issue. Thus, the outcome of the recovery suits has
no bearing in the instant case.
On the matter of the imposable penalty, however, this Court is unable to agree with
the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, it being too harsh and not in accord
with jurisprudence. In Valencia v. Cabanting,[27] Bautista v. Gonzales,[28] and Ordonio v.
Eduarte[29] all involving violations of Article 1491 of the Civil Code, this Court imposed
the penalty of suspension of six (6) months on the respondents therein. Considering the
nature of the acts of professional misconduct respondent committed, and the facts and
circumstances of this case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARCIAL F. LOPEZ is declared LIABLE for
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT as a lawyer. He is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS, effective upon receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN
WARNING that any future misconduct on respondents part will be dealt with more
severely. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated soonest to all courts, tribunals, and
quasi-judicial agencies of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in

the personal record of respondent, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.

Torres v javier
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By complaint[1] dated November 26, 2002, Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs.
Natividad Celestino (complainants) charge Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier (respondent) for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyers
oath.
The charges stemmed from the statements/remarks made by respondent in the
pleadings he filed in a petition for audit of all funds of the University of the East Faculty
Association (UEFA), as counsel for the therein petitioners UEFA then Treasurer
Rosamarie Laman, and his wife-former UEFA President Eleonor Javier, before the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
against herein complainants, docketed as NCR-OD-0105-004-LRD (audit case), [2] and
from the pleadings filed by respondent in another labor case as counsel for the one
hundred seventy six (176) faculty members of the University of the East complainants
against herein complainant Atty. Ireneo L. Torres, et al., [3] docketed as NCR-0D-02010005-LRD (attorneys fees case).[4]
The complaint sets forth three (3) causes of action against respondent.
The first cause of action is based on respondents Urgent Motion to Expedite with
Manifestation and Reiteration of Position (Motion to Expedite) filed in the audit case
which complainants allege contained statements which are absolutely false,
unsubstantiated, and with malicious imputation of crimes of robbery, theft of UEFFAs
funds, destruction or concealment of UEFAs documents and some other acts tending to
cause dishonor, discredit or contempt upon their persons.[5] Portions of the questioned
motion read:
Undersigned attorney would like to manifest just so it can not be said

later on that he kept mum on the matter that when individual

respondents-appellants realized that an audit of Union funds was looming,
it appears that they decided to destroy or conceal documents as
demonstrated by an Incident Report Re Robbery dated May 6, 2002 (a
copy just recently secured by the undersigned), attached hereto as Annex
A, where the police investigator stated that no forcible entry was noted
by him but that air condition on the respective rooms were (sic) slightly
move (sic) to mislead that suspect as the same as their point of entry.[]
The police officers stated that no cash of (sic) money were stolen but
instead claimed that still undetermined documents/important papers were
stolen by the suspects.
This brings to mind the United States case against Andersen
officials who shredded documents related to the Enron scandal when they
thought nobody was looking. As in the Andersen/Enron case, the
individual respondents-appellants in the instant case knew that the law was
going to come knocking at their door, asking a lot [of] questions about
financial matters.
From the undersigneds standpoint, the alleged robbery of still
undetermined documents/papers was an inside job as investigation has
shown that there is no evidence of forced entry. Besides, it would be a
cinch to establish a motive by individual respondents-appellants Torres and
Celestino to destroy documents related to the audit ordered by Regional
Director Alex E. Maraan. In any event, the undersigned thinks that the
legal process should go on. Lumang gimmick na yang robbery ng mga
evidensya. They may try to cover up the looting of union funds, but there
is such a thing as secondary evidence, not to mention the power of this
Honorable Office to issue subpoenas even to the unions depositary banks.
[6]
(Underscoring supplied
Complainants aver that respondent violated the attorneys oath that he obey the
laws and do no falsehood, the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule
10.01 thereof, and Rule 138, specifically paragraph 20 (f) of the Rules of Court for
directly pointing to them as the persons who intentionally committed the robbery at the
UEFA office, and for citing the Andersen/Enron case which is irrelevant, impertinent, and
immaterial to the subject of quasi-judicial inquiry.[7]
As second cause of action, complainants allege that in the attorneys fees case,
respondent, in his Reply to Respondents (Torres and Marquez) Answer/Comment filed
before the DOLE, used language that was clearly abusive, offensive, and improper,[8]
inconsistent with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.[9]
As third/last cause of action, complainants quote respondents statement in the
aforesaid Reply, to wit:
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyers to hear notaries public asking their

sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial office and sign
for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits, administer oaths
and certify documents.
x x x,[10]
and allege that the statement is demeaning to the integrity of the legal profession,
uncalled for and deserve[s] censure, [as] the same might shrink the degree of confidence
and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession
and the solemnity of a notarial document.[11]
By his Comment, respondent candidly professes that he was angry [12] while he was
preparing his Motion to Expedite in the audit case, it having come to his knowledge that
the UEFA office had been burglarized and complainant Atty. Torres had been spreading
reports and rumors implicating his clients including his wife to the burglary. [13]
Respondent stresses that he felt that it was his duty to inform the BLR of the loss
of the vital documents so that the resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration
filed by complainants would be expedited;[14] and that the information regarding the
burglary and his use of the Andersen/Enron case as a figure of speech were relevant in
drawing a link between the burglary and the audit the burglary having rendered the
complete implementation of the audit unattainable.[15]
With respect to the attorneys fees case, respondent claims that Atty. Torres did not
in his Answer confront the issues thereof but instead mock[ed] his wife and fabricat[ed]
and distort[ed] realities[16]by including malicious, libelous and impertinent statements and
accusations against his wife which exasperated him. [17] A portion of Atty. Torres Answer
in the attorneys fees case reads:
x x x in her incumbency as President of the UEFA for 12 years (1987-1999)
she got only about P2.00/hr CBA increase which took effect only [in] 1994,
with no other substantial improvements of the teachers benefits, and yet
she spent for more than half a million negotiation expenses from the
UEFAs funds. Her 1994-1999 CBA was only a carbon copy of her old
1989-1994 CBA with no substantial improvements, with uncertain amount
of her expenses, because she removed/concealed all the financial records of
the UEFA during her term. . . I and the other lawyers/teachers denounced
her unlawful deduction of 10% attorneys fees from the small backwages
received by the teachers on April 28, 1993 although there was actually no
lawyer who worked for itand there was no Board nor General
Membership Assembly Resolutions passedthe assembly [Nov. 24, 2001]
was apparently irked to Mrs. Eleanor Javier when she was booed while
talking on the floor, like a confused gabble (sic)[18]
Not wanting to allow his wife to be maligned by Atty. Torres, respondent admits
having responded with a counter-attack in his Reply to Respondents (Torres and

Marquez) Answer/Comment[19]wherein he stated:

What kind of a lawyer is this Atty. Torres? The undersigned feels that Atty.
Torres just cannot kick the habit of injecting immaterial, irrelevant, and
impertinent matters in his pleadings. More than that, he lies through his
teeth. The undersigned thinks that if he has any common sense at all he
should shut up about his accusation that Prof. Javier spent more than half a
million pesos for negotiation expensesshe obtained only P2-increase in
union members salary, etc. because of the pendency of the damage suit
against him on this score. He easily forgets the sad chapter of his life as a
practitioner when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit (Case
No. NCR-OD-M-9401-004) which he filed to gain pogi points prior to
the UEFA election in 1994.[20]
xxx
To repeat, if respondent Atty. Torres has any common sense at all, he
should stop making irrelevant, libelous and impertinent allegations in his
pleadings. This means changing his standard tactic of skirting the main
issues by injecting a web or a maze of sham, immaterial, impertinent or
scandalous matters.[21] (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent adds that he merely wanted to bring to the BLRs attention that Atty.
Torres had the habit of hurling baseless accusations against his wife to embarrass her,
including one for unjust vexation and another for collection and damages both of which
were dismissed after trial on the merits, thus prompting him to state that these dismissed
cases indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of mental dishonesty.[22]
Respondent further claims that in his Answer in the same attorneys fees case, Atty.
Torres accused his client, Prof. Maguigad, of forging the signature of a notary public and
of deliberately us[ing] a falsified/expired Community Tax Certificate in order to justify
the dismissal of the case against him (Atty. Torres); [23] and that Atty. Torres continued
harassing his clients including his wife by filing baseless complaints for falsification of
public document.[24] Hence, in defense of his clients, the following statements in his
Reply:
Respondent further concluded that lead petitioner Prof. Maguigad
falsified the said petition by causing it to appear that he participated in
the falsification when he did not in truth and in fact participate
thereat . . . obviously oblivious of the obvious that it is highly improbable
for Prof. Maguigad to have forged the signature of the notary public. If he
intended to forge it, what was the big idea of doing so? To save Fifty Pesos
(P50.00) for notarial fee? Needless to say, the allegation that lead (sic)

petitioner Maguigad used a falsified Com. Tax Cert. is patently unfounded

and malicious.
But that is not all. Respondents went further and charged Profs.
Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez and Javier with the same crime of falsification
of public document . . . by causing it to appear that Rogelio Maguigad had
indeed participated in the act of verifying/subscribing and swearing the
subject petition before notary public Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, when in truth
and in fact he did not participate thereat.
To the mind of the undersigned, this is the height of irresponsibility,
coming as it does from a member of the Philippine Bar. There is no
evidence to charge them with falsification of public document, i.e. the
verification appended to the present petition. They did not even sign it.
The crime imputed is clearly bereft of merit. Frankly, the undersigned
thinks that even a dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with
such a very serious charge.
It is not uncommon for us trial lawyer[s] to hear notaries public
asking their sons, wives, girlfriends, nephews, etc. to operate a notarial
office and sign for them. These girlfriends, nephews, etc. take affidavits,
administer oaths, and certify documents.
Believing that the said
veification was signed by an impostor-relative of the notary public [Atty.
Jorge M. Ventayan] through no fault of his client, Prof. Maguigad, the
undersigned sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). On May 2, 2002, an NBI agent called up the undersigned to inform
him that he arrested in the area near UE one Tancredo E. Ventayen whom
he caught in flagrante delicto notarizing an affidavit of loss and feigning to
be Atty. Jorge M. Ventayen, supposedly his uncle.[25]
xxx
Petitioners devoted so much space in their answer/comment vainly
trying to prove that Profs. Maguigad, Mendoza, Espiritu, Ramirez, and
Javier committed the crime of falsification of public document reasoning
out that they made untruthful statements in the narration of facts in the
basic petition.
Respondent Torres is a member of the Philippine Bar. But what law
books is he reading?
He should know or ought to know that the allegations in petitioners
pleading are absolutely privileged because the said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues.[26] (Underscoring supplied)
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
found respondent guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility for using

inappropriate and offensive remarks in his pleadings.

The pertinent portions of the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation read:
Respondent admits that he was angry when he wrote the
Manifestationand alleges that Complainant implicated his wife in a
burglary. Moreover, Respondent alleges that Complainant has been
engaged in intimidating and harassing his wife.
It appears that herein Complainant and herein Respondents wife
have had a series of charges and counter-charges filed against each other.
Both parties being protagonists in the intramurals within the University of
the East Faculty Association (UEFA). Herein Complainant is the President
of the UEFA whereas Respondents wife was the former President of
UEFA. Nevertheless, we shall treat this matter of charges and countercharges filed, which involved the UEFA, as extraneous, peripheral, if not
outright irrelevant to the issue at hand.
xxx
Clearly, [r]espondents primordial reason for the offensive remark
stated in his pleadings was his emotional reaction in view of the fact that
herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This excuse
cannot be sustained. Indeed, the remarks quoted above are offensive and
inappropriate. That the Respondent is representing his wife is not at all an
excuse.[27] (Underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
reprimanded.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by
Resolution[28] of October 7, 2004, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Report of the IBP faulting respondent is well-taken but not its
recommendation to reprimand him.
It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy,
utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,
petitions and motions, are absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant
to the subject inquiry, however false or malicious they may be.[29]
The requirements of materiality and relevancy are imposed so that the protection
given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be
abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified. [30] If the pleader
goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is
libelous, he loses his privilege.[31]

A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can
doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.[32] That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in
every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be
legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may
become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.[33]
The first cause of action of complainants is based on respondents allegation in his
Motion to Expedite that a burglary of the UEFA office took place, and his imputation to
complainants of a plausible motive for carrying out the burglary the concealment and
destruction of vital documents relating to the audit. The imputation may be false but it
could indeed possibly prompt the BLR to speed up the resolution of the audit case. In
that light, this Court finds that the first cause of action may not lie.
As regards the second cause of action, it appears that respondent was irked by Atty.
Torres Answer to the complaint in the attorneys fees case wherein he criticized his
(respondents) wifes performance as past President of UEFA.
This Court does not countenance Atty. Torres incorporating in his Answer in the
attorneys fees case statements such as the assembly . . . was apparently irked by Mrs.
Eleonor Javier when she was booed while talking on the floor like a confused gabble
(sic). But neither does it countenance respondents retaliating statements like what kind
of lawyer is Atty. Torres?, he lies through his teeth, if he has any common sense at all
he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets the sad chapter of his life as a practitioner
when he lost out to Prof. Javier in the petition for audit which he filed to gain pogi
points. Nor respondents emphasis that Atty. Torres is of the habit of hurling baseless
accusations against his wife by stating that the dismissal of the cases against his wife, of
which Atty. Torres was the complainant, indubitably indicate Atty. Torres pattern of
mental dishonesty.
The issue in the attorneys fees case was whether the 10% attorneys fees checked
off from the initial backwages/salaries of UEFA members is legal. Clearly, the abovequoted statements of respondent in the immediately preceding paragraph cannot be said to
be relevant or pertinent to the issue. That Atty. Torres may have conducted himself
improperly is not a justification for respondent to be relieved from observing professional
conduct in his relations with Atty. Torres.
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever may be the ill-feeling existing
between clients should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct toward each
other or toward suitors in the case.[34]

In the attorneys fees case, Atty. Torres was acting as counsel for himself as
respondent and complainant was acting as counsel for his wife as complainant. Although
it is understandable, if not justifiable, that in the defense of ones clients - especially of
ones wife or of ones self, the zeal in so doing may be carried out to the point of undue
skepticism and doubts as to the motives of opposing counsel, the spectacle presented by
two members of the bar engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, and
detract from the dignity of the legal profession.[35]
Moreover, in arguing against the dismissal of the attorneys fees case on the basis
of the alleged forgery of the notary publics signature, respondent did not only endeavor
to point out that Atty. Torres erred in advancing such an argument, but personally
attacked Atty. Torres mental fitness by stating that the undersigned thinks that even a
dim-witted first-year law student would not oblige with such a very serious charge, and
[r]espondent Torres is a member of the bar [b]ut what law books is he reading.
In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language must be
dignified and choice of language is important in the preparation of pleadings. [36] In the
assertion of his clients rights, a lawyer even one gifted with superior intellect is
enjoined to rein up his temper.[37]
As reflected above, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was
actuated by his giving vent to his ill-feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the
mantle of absolute immunity does not extend. Personal colloquies between counsel which
cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should be carefully avoided.[38]
If indeed Atty. Torres filed criminal complaints for falsification of public
documents against respondents clients as a scheme to harass them, they are not without
adequate recourse in law, for if they plead for a righteous cause, the course of justice will
surely tilt in their favor, the courts being ever vigilant in the protection of a partys rights.
[39]

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 8 A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH
COURTESY, FAIRNESSS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS
PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUES,
AND
SHALL
AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

instructs that respondents arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court
and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another.[40] The language vehicle does not run short of expressions
which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive.[41]
As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of
notaries public basis of the last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity
that should characterize the legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document,
respondent, who justifies the same as legitimate defense of his client who was being
accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the relevance of the statement to the
subject matter of the pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.
Respecting the verified complaint Annex EJ-A[42] to the Comment of
respondent filed by his wife, Prof. Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the
same cannot be consolidated with the present administrative case since the parties and
causes of action of such complaint are completely different from those of the present
complaint.
WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings,
respondent Atty. Jose C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One
(1) Month, effective upon receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that any
future infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with more severely.

31 SCRA 562 Legal Ethics A Lawyers Right to Criticize the Courts

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in
said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the
opposing party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing
of said motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of
Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion
for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the
Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as
unconstitutional. He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his
lawyers certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his
profession when members of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to
the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without knowing the
reasons why and that he became one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as administered by the present members of
the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacens petition as the Court
wanted to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not
surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.
He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry
out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful

and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, has the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions
of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should
have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing
party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be
entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his
client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely