Expanding the City by Giving It Up

Ex Ante Assessment of Reform in Public Administration

Geert Vissers and Frans-Bauke Vandermeer

Department of Public Administration
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Introduction

In research on public administration, ‘vertical’ views tend to make way for more ‘horizontal’
views, in which policy is taken as a polycentric process (De Bruijn en Ten Heuvelhof, 1993).
This changeover is sometimes ascribed to changes in the practice of public administration: "In
the case of Wieringermeer impoldering the Dutch government was able to carry on quite
autonomously. Now that impoldering and land use of Southern Flevoland are at issue, the
government finds itself in a multi-actor constellation. The planning of military practice
grounds, enlarging or reducing the Oostvaardersplassen, these topics call for negotiation and
adjustment, rather than for orders being given." (Becker, 1987:126)
And indeed, many novel elements can be discerned in the practice of public administration:
new policy actors, new policy themes and topics, new policy instruments. Still, applying
current theoretical and methodological notions in the analysis of some past policy process will
probably give rise to findings that are unlike conclusions about this process arrived at in
analyses at that time. According to present research standards, it does not suffice to observe
that in the case of Wieringermeer impoldering the government functioned as a "most
powerful actor" (ibid.); further questions have to be answered, e.g. concerning the features of
the policy network in which government was able, apparently, to hold that position. In short,
changes in thinking about public administration cannot be ascribed completely to changes in
the practice of public administration; at least in part they result from developments that are
more or less separate from changes in actual administrative practice, like the evolution of
theory within scientific communities.

Despite the wide recognition it has already gained, the idea that policy and public
administration can be viewed as a horizontal and polycentric process (if not a series of
interlocked processes) has only a short history. As yet, there has not been much time to derive
and test implications for policy development and steering. Moreover, work in this field
pertains largely to ‘network management’ and related approaches mainly focusing on
relational aspects of administrative processes. Presumably, this emphasis relates to the
interaction (and inter-actor) level that is now regarded most suitable for adequate description
of policy processes. Not individual actors, the problems they face, or the policies they pursue,
but the relational patterns to which they belong are the core of analysis. Prescriptions are
made about how policy actors should interact, rather than how they should act. To the extent
that this account is valid, the findings that current research in public administration has to

-1-
offer will not meet the needs of many policy actors. Paragraph 1 presents the argument in
greater detail.
In this paper we do not seek some kind of compromise between adequate description of
policy interaction and workable guidelines for action. Rather, we will contend that social
simulation, used as an instrument for ex ante assessment of processes in public administration,
may offer guidance - relevant, comprehensible, and doable - for actors involved in policy
development and implementation, without trivializing or distorting the theoretical picture of
policy as a horizontal, polycentric process involving various different (groups of) actors.
Paragraph 2 presents the method of social simulation, and in particular the prospects of this
method for ex ante assessment of reform in public administration. To illustrate this claim, the
social simulation of a new town province will be described. Paragraph 3 lists some major
problems in the region of Rotterdam that are to be solved by large-scale reform of
administrative arrangements. Paragraph 4 gives an overview of ‘Polis’, the social simulation
designed to make an assessment in advance of outcomes of these new arrangements,
especially with regard to intermunicipal cooperation. In paragraph 5, we present some results
of the simulation, then arguing that social simulation contributes to learning effects that may
well enhance the quality of public administration.

1. Arguments in favour of ex ante assessment of policy processes

Postwar developments in thinking about policy and public administration have often been
described as a change from rationality-based prescription towards recognition of cognitive
limits and social restrictions. Important elements in this development are the predictability of
policy processes and the role ascribed to government.
According to present views, policy processes evolve far less orderly than they were formerly
believed to. The idea that between policy and its outcomes a direct, causal relationship exists
has been abandoned, and given way to more balanced, less straightforward views on policy
impacts (‘performance’ rather than ‘conformance’). Effectiveness is no longer equated with
goal attainment (Bressers, 1983; Delange, 1995), direct connections between policy measure
and outcomes are questioned (Mastop en Faludi, 1993; De Bruijn en Ten Heuvelhof, 1993),
neglect of unintended policy effects is becoming inadmissible (Engbersen en Van der Veen,
1992), the meaning of ‘plan’ has ceased to be unambiguous (Mastop en Faludi, 1993), it is
acknowledged that policy goals may change, and that policy may be goal seeking or goal
setting rather than goal attaining (Herweijer, 1987). Furthermore, there is increasing
recognition that behavioral change involves complex social and psychological processes, a
recognition that has, of course, implications for selecting policy instruments (Hupe, 1987,
Vandermeer et al., 1992).
It is not only on the basis of such considerations regarding content that the orderly evolving
of policy processes can be questioned. Recognition of relational or structural factors (which
1
are, by the way, closely related with content ) may also put the idea of ‘orderly policy
process’ in perspective:

-2-
 2
government itself is no longer seen as a single, ‘monolithic’ actor
government distinguishes itself, in functions fulfilled and behaviours exposed, less
clearly from ‘ordinary’ actors’ than it was assumed to do in former accounts of public
administration (especially now that the limitations of legislation - the policy instrument
monopolized by government - are becoming visible)
governmental actors find themselves, together with other actors, in polycentric
networks, in which no single actor (nor a coalition) is able to control fully the course of
processes or the outcomes of these processes

The view of policy that underlies this concise picture can, slightly exaggerating, be called a
new paradigm: a paradigm of policy researchers. Within this paradigm much work remains to
be done, e.g. concerning network management, the design of new policy instruments
(whether or not inspired by contingency theory), or the relationship between policy and
learning processes. Apart from that, it is possible to withdraw from the paradigm, if only
temporarily, in an attempt to judge its accomplishments. We will thus make two remarks on
the paradigm.

Firstly, given the available evidence concerning the dynamic nature of policy, it seems possible
and necessary that policy processes be studied on the basis of research conceptions that do
not hamper a researcher’s understanding of the dynamics present in the process. To explicate,
we are not saying that conventional research conceptions prevent policy dynamics from being
disclosed. Quite the reverse, we acknowledge that existing evidence on policy dynamics has
been gathered with conventional means. However, these means do impose some restrictions
on adequate description of process. Arriving at the conclusion that processes in public
administration are often highly dynamic is a first, delineating and explaining the kinds of
dynamics involved in these processes a further step. We suggest, for example, to treat the
notion of ‘relative stability’ (of policy networks) as a possible outcome of research, rather
3
than as a research premise . More generally speaking, conceptions that suit the study of
process may be particularly useful with respect to:

perceptions and repertoires of actors involved (Vandermeer et al. 1992)

network connections and network boundaries (O’Toole and Hanf, 1990; De la Bruhèze
1992)
connections between policy networks, and especially the consequences of examining
policy domains separately

Secondly, the question can be asked whether and how policy actors (whose task it is to
prepare, design, select, implement, and/or monitor policy measures) will benefit from findings
arrived at within the above paradigm. Here, it is hardly possible to specify in advance what
4
these policy actors ‘really’ need . Such a specification would be incompatible with the idea
that actor perceptions and repertoires are often highly dynamic; moreover, it would pass over
cognitive differences between policy actors. This caveat taken in mind, it seems a tenable

-3-
statement that actors involved in public administration will find little solace in the idea that
policy processes take place in polycentric networks in which policy actors, like many others,
have to struggle to reach their objectives. Nor will the observation be very useful to them, we
suppose, that their perceptions and objectives are likely to change during the process. The
same may go for the observation that actors addressed by some policy measure not only have
to respond to this particular measure, but to various other incentives as well (Maarse en
Moen 1991; Vandermeer 1995).
Such findings, it must be recalled, stem from research aimed at acquiring knowledge about
ways in which policy processes actually evolve, which is a legitimate research orientation. But
equally legitimate is to proceed on this by asking the question whether the knowledge gained
is, or can be made, relevant for concrete policy actors to guide their behaviours. We discuss
some possible reactions.

One type of reaction is that policy actors draw the conclusion from the above insights that
they should not try to realize their plans and objectives in a direct way. This conclusion may
incite ‘strategic indicative policy’ (Mastop en Faludi 1993; Delange 1995), decentralization
and/or deregulation efforts, or network management (Koppenjan et al., 1993). Here, Hupe’s
judgement may apply that the postmodern instruments for governmental steering can be
considered a mixed blessing: "Against the view of government as Great Guardian the
autonomy of subjects is acknowledged. The price to be paid for this: public responsibilities
become less recognizable, rights and obligations of citizens are blurred. A weakness of
postmodern governmental steering is that it allows the logic of social intercourse to become
all-dominating. While this logic may broaden the scope of action of many citizens
(individualization), it has also the potential of paralyzing government itself. Whatever the
benefits in terms of goal realization to be gained from steering instruments like incentives and
learning, at least potentially, seems to be lost with regard to policy norms and objectives"
(Hupe 1990:232). Consistent with this view is Herweijer’s remark that legislation is becoming
more and more aimed at procedures, and less at reaching a social standard; changes in the
structure and the organization of elements of (the administration of) society are intended, not
societal effects (Albers et al., 1994).
We agree that a balance must be found between direct steering and steering at a distance, and
also that it is wise to reconsider this balance every now and then (see also Kreukels’
(1987:267) propositions). When the balance swings to distanced, indirect, network-like forms
of steering, however, not only Hupe’s objection comes to apply. The problem of reaching a
social standard, in Herweijer’s words, is not solved but postponed whereas a new problem is
created, that is the problem of how network management or steering should be done.

Quite another reaction is that of policy actors who find themselves facing a degree of
complexity they cannot handle and decide that there is no option but to demarcate their own
tasks and competences rigorously, thereby ignoring connections with other policy areas and
issues as much as possible. Such a reaction may be found for instance with actors who view
themselves as ‘not higher-grade enough’ to make an attempt to reshape the policy network,
and/or actors who have a clear solution in mind for some policy question, a solution they

-4-
don’t want to be diluted (which is how they look at it) in a communication trajectory.
Reactions of this type do occur. Not just a few public servants, presumably, tend to see
segregation of policy domains as a necessary evil that makes policy processes surveyable and
manageable. A drawback of this view is, of course, that a unicentric conception of policy is
fallen back on, with all the disadvantages now known to belong to it.

Still another reaction is that policy actors maintain their ideas about desired contents or
direction of policy, yet taking current insights about policy processes into consideration. For
example, actors may revise their assumptions about the relationship between means and ends
(Bougon et al., 1977; Gründwald-Schindl en Kraan-Jetten 1987), or they may anticipate the
perceptions of other actors present in the network, more frequently and more deliberately
than they were used to. This type of reaction, however sensible, has limitations that follow
from the fact that patterns of social interaction change over time, involve a variety of
changing perceptions, and consequently encompass multiple and equivocal rather than
singular and straight causal relations (Vissers, 1994). Some major limitations are:

since relationships within the network may alter, since network boundaries may change,
since new actors may appear while others disappear, and since perceptions are not
stable, it is very difficult to form a reliable image of a future situation to be used as a
basis for anticipation
not just one particular policy actor may anticipate, other actors may too, which means
that an actor has to anticipate no only other actors’ perceptions, but their anticipations
as well. This may lead to a disorderly, sometimes perplexing chain of anticipations of
anticipations and so forth
how actors should anticipate is a question that remains to be addressed by the above
researchers’ paradigm

These limitations do not take away that it makes sense to form as accurate as possible a
picture of future developments. To be sure, saying that no actor in a policy network has full
control does not imply that it is indifferent which course of action is decided upon (Vissers,
1994). This can be formulated positively: any policy measure, any strategy, any style of action
will have its influence on the course of processes in a policy network, even though these
processes are not fully determined by it.
In short, the assumption that policy processes take place in a polycentric policy network
leaves reason and room enough to adopt a well-considered line of action. Therefore, there is
ample reason to create a picture of, and derive expectations about future processes and about
factors that may contribute significantly to these processes. These processes, it can be added,
will remain equivocal. Because different actors are involved, different and sometimes very
unlike perceptions of a policy process may coexist. Accounts of future developments in which
the multiplicity of actor perspectives and perceptions is ignored (or even reduced to
unequivocality by means of averaging, use of probability theory, etc.) pass over a principal
source of policy dynamics. What is needed, next to further theoretical notions concerning

-5-
policy processes, are research instruments which allow future policy processes to be
examined and analyzed as the ongoing interplay of many actors with heterogeneous
backgrounds, social environments, interests - hence with diverging perceptions. Our claim is
that social simulation can be such an instrument.

2 Social simulation as an instrument for ex ante assessment

It is not a new idea that policy processes may benefit from early research. Becker (1987)
mentions analysis of economic consequences, environmental impact statements, technology
assessment, social impact assessment, examples which show that in various policy domains a
need is felt for timely information about possible consequences of intended behaviours. The
question is which sources of information can be used for research preceding the actual
beginning of a policy program. To be sure, ex ante assessment can be based on various
sources of information, but not on data derived from an ongoing policy process, since that has
5
not yet started.

One option is to rely on known situations to estimate or predict future developments:

previous experiences in the same policy domain, in adjoining policy domains, or in the same
policy domain but in a different context (e.g. abroad). In such cases, though, it is uncertain if
the degree of correspondence with the future policy process does allow a trustworthy account
to be made. This applies in particular to the case of rather innovative policy designs (Vissers
et al., 1995). This is not to say that reasoning by analogy is pointless; it does have heuristic
value.
Further types of future-oriented research have been developed (see Van Doorn en Van
Vught, 1978), often based on quantitative data and formal models, or relying on expert
knowledge and judgement. For ex ante assessment of policy processes however, especially in
view of the picture of policy processes sketched above, formal approaches have
disadvantages (whether the model used is deterministic or stochastic). One point is "to what
extent impact analyses should not only take objective impacts (money, goods, etcetera) into
account, but also subjective (feelings etcetera)" (Becker 1987:120-21). Taken seriously, this
point raises the question of how to incorporate ‘subjective impacts’ in a formal, quantitative
model.
Geurts (1981:47) uses the concept of ‘system’ to articulate another weakness of formal
models. The state of knowledge about the functioning of social systems, he insists, does not
yet allow decision rules to be derived with respect to system-internal reactions to changes in
the not-so-near future, changes moreover that may be without precedent. And what is more,
a method that requires all future decisions to be laid down beforehand in routines does not
really allow us to take account of the quality of social systems to learn and adapt (ibid.).
Thus, Becker draws attention to subjective factors that may play a part in future processes
while Geurts stresses that a method to be used should not preclude unexpected events, e.g.
unforeseen effects. Concerning the assessment of future processes in policy networks, still
another weakness of formal models can be brought up: that it is hardly possible to include in

-6-
such models the multiplicity of perceptions and opinions that we have argued to be a major
factor as regards the course of future policy processes.
This weakness also applies to expert-based types of forecasting, especially in versions aiming
at unequivocal conclusions based on consensus, majority, calculation of some measure of
central tendency, and so forth, as is the case in many forms of Delphi research (Van Doorn en
Van Vught 1978:107v). Here, two points deserve special consideration: (1) it is highly
contestable to found a prediction on the average of various, sometimes incompatible views;
(2) even in the case that experts reach agreement, the fact remains that in policy processes
‘non-experts’ are involved who ‘use’ their own perceptions and opinions to react to orders,
measures, or other incentives, and thus may set off processes not foreseen by anyone.

These remarks are not meant to disqualify whatever method in general. Rather, they are made
to show that ex ante assessment of policy processes requires a research instrument to be
essentially open, in the sense that it allows a multiplicity of actors, of perceptions, of relations
between actors, and that it allows all these elements to change in the course of process
without imposing limitations on the degree of heterogeneity to persist or develop. While
many prominent forecasting methods do not meet these requirements in a satisfactory way,
social simulation does.

Simulation means imitation or representation. In a social simulation, conditions in a reference

situation (Vandermeer, 1983:76) are represented in such a way that the acting by participants
in the simulation allows conclusions to be drawn about the acting of those who participate in
the reference situation. In the words of Boskma (1986): "The method of social simulation
does not mean a simulation of social processes; it means real social interaction under
simulated conditions."
In a simulation, like in other experimental settings, conditions are controlled. Participants find
themselves in a situation that can be changed, if so desired. The main difference between
simulation and other experimental methods is that in a simulation these conditions can be
changed by participants themselves, with the exception of a few boundary conditions that are
operative throughout the simulation; examples are time elapsing, macro-economic figures (if
present), and some communication rules. Next to boundary conditions, there are initial
conditions: tasks, positions, organizational arrangements, a state of affairs to put are given at
the beginning of a simulation. These initially given circumstances put the simulation into
operation, but they may change during the simulation as a result of participants’ (inter)actions
(Vandermeer 1983:78). It is because of the presence of initial conditions that social simulation
can be used to study social processes in controlled circumstances. We explicate briefly.
Participants, to be able to make real social processes develop, must be enabled to shape and
reshape the situation in which they find themselves. In a setting that remains unaltered under
participants’ actions and interactions, steps in an interaction process cannot occur. Such a
fixed setting can be used to observe the reactions by participants (individually or collectively)
to a given situation. But since it more or less predetermines the range of possible reactions, it
is unlikely that in a fixed setting a pattern of processes may develop that can be viewed as a
valid representation of the pattern of ‘real life’ processes to be explored.

-7-
As we said above, circumstances in a social simulation may change in due course as a result
of participants’ action and interactions. Thus, the method meets a necessary condition for ex
ante assessment of policy and administrative processes. These processes can be shown, they
can be analyzed, while no attempt has to be made to reduce or ignore heterogeneity. An
environment is offered in which actors holding various positions - and having, if only for that
reason, different repertoires and perceptions (Zajonc en Wolfe, 1966; Vissers en Vandermeer,
6
1991) - will react to some policy actor’s plans and measures . These reactions may give rise
to adjustments, not only in terms of content (policy plans) but also in terms of social structure
(relational patterns). In this way, policy as well as positions, perceptions, and repertoires of
actors will change, simultaneously. (Changes may, but are not necessarily drastic.) Later,
changed frames of perception will be used to react to changed policy plans or measures. We
prefer not to speak of clearly distinguishable ‘stages’ in this regard, especially not because
actors may differ considerably in ease and pace of changing their perceptions.

Having discussed the rationale of social simulation, now we will make some remarks about
the method’s application. First of all it must be noted that social simulation alone will not
solve policy problems. A setting is offered that can be used to gain experience and to acquire
knowledge that may contribute to enhancing the quality of policy and administrative
processes:

processes and results to be brought about by already made policy plans can be
predicted: to what extent will desired effects (or a desired situation) be achieved; to
what extent will unintended effects arise (whether or not undesirable); how solid is the
plan (for instance, does it work well only in specific circumstances)
it is possible to experiment with alternative plans or measures, with new
implementation strategies to a given plan, or with different ways of designing policy
(e.g. a plan can be designed so that it takes a wide range of problem definitions into
account, or so that actors in a policy network are strongly committed, or ‘only’ to
create or reshape a policy network)
the ways in which various actors judge (the quality of) policy can be studied, not only
initially, in relation to some announced plan, but also judgements as they are after a
period of time
different types of learning are feasible (De Caluwé et al, 1995), in addition to the
explicit testing and experimentation indicated above: enhancing directly involved
actors’ understanding of factors that codetermine the course of policy processes,
clarification of the implicit theories (Brief and Downey, 1983) used by them, providing
practical experience with future situations. Furthermore, simulation may serve as an
instrument for collective learning (which includes, among other things, learning by
experience about relational aspects of policy processes)

These possible yields of simulation will not, as a rule, be accomplished all at once. If a

-8-
simulation model (comprising boundary and initial conditions) is designed to serve a fairly
specific purpose, as is often the case, one kind of ‘product’ may be aimed for at the cost of
other options. Implied in this remark is that a simulation model is not a one-to-one
representation of some reference system, but a selection of (abstracted) elements taken from a
reference system in order to re-present it (Peters et al. 1995). This selection is always theory-
laden: "one postulates that certain aspects of the system are relevant to the problem at hand
and that certain aspects are not" (Raser, 1969:7). But also, this selection has to be based on
empirical knowledge of the reference system that will be represented in the model. Thus,
some kind of field research has to precede the designing of a simulation model. This
methodological requirement agrees with our theoretical account of policy and administrative
processes: examine the actors involved in the field under study, learn about their perceptions
and their relationships (especially in view of the policy plan to be investigated in the project)
but be aware that these perceptions and relationships are tied to current circumstances, and
acknowledge that they may change over time as a result of changing circumstances (changed
that may in part be produced by the policy plan being studied). Then introduce in a
simulation: actors, perceptions and relationships found, together with a draft of the intended
policy plan (all these elements in simplified and more or less abstracted form), and observe
processes, perceptions, relationships, outcomes of the plan, and possibly adjustments of the
plan to come about. Conduct several identical replications of the simulation, if possible, in
order to distinguish ‘regular’ from accidental developments (Vandermeer, 1983:85).

3. On creating a town province in the region of Rotterdam

In theory, the qualities of social simulation as an instrument for ex ante assessment are clear.
But are they in practice? We designed a simulation to investigate patterns of intermunicipal
cooperation that are likely to emerge in the future ‘town province’ of Rotterdam. In this
paragraph we will sketch the plan for large-scale administrative reform in the region of
Rotterdam, the problems that were supposed to be solved by this plan, and the possible lack
of cooperation between municipalities it might lead to. In the next paragraph, the simulation
we designed will be described.

The plan to create a ‘town province’ in the Rotterdam area should solve two problems
currently perceived by many officials in the present city of Rotterdam. One is that Rotterdam
is too small; the other that it is too large.
Rotterdam has a vital economic function for the whole country. Yet there are important
policy domains where the city of Rotterdam has to rely on neighbouring towns’ willingness to
cooperate; this applies in particular to public management of harbour and docklands and to
public housing. Dependence of this kind may impede ‘forceful and integrated administration’,
which is widely viewed a necessity in view of Rotterdam’s ‘mainport function’. It is felt that
national and regional economic interests are too large to allow potential hindrance and delay
to persist. However, incorporation of surrounding municipalities, the easiest and most
apparent solution at first sight, is not feasible. The municipalities involved will, most likely,

-9-
fiercely resist such a measure and what is more, incorporation would produce far too large a
town to fit in the administrative landscape in the Netherlands.
The second administrative problem of present Rotterdam is the absence of legal status of the
existing district administrations, and in particular their lack of democratic legitimacy. In the
mid 1980s, an attempt was made to reduce the distance between city council and citizens by
installing district administrations that took over several municipal tasks. A legal basis for this
installing was and is still lacking, since central government is totally unwilling to accept a
further administrative layer.

A ‘town province’ was supposed to solve both problems, that is the plan to create a new
province enclosing the city of Rotterdam and 17 surrounding municipalities, at the same time
splitting up the present city of Rotterdam into 10 autonomous towns. Creating a number of
new towns in the area of the present city of Rotterdam would solve the problem of district
administrations’ lack of legal status, and it would prevent the new province from being
dominated by a single, comparatively large municipality - a situation already experienced in
the context of Openbaar Lichaam Rijnmond (Rijnmond Public Corporation), an earlier
attempt to achieve a regional administrative level in the region of Rotterdam.
To ensure ‘forceful and integrated administration’ at the regional level, the plan transferred
quite some powers of municipal authorities to provincial authorities, in particular those
concerning public management of the harbour and its surroundings (including, of course,
possible extensions) and the city centre of present Rotterdam.

The above outline of the plan is written in the past tense. By now, it is inconceivable that the
plan will be implemented in its original form. Recently, in a referendum held at June 7, the
plan was voted down: 86% of the voters were against it. The referendum was attended by
42% of the electorate, while the city council had decided to accept its outcome if it was to be
attended by at least 36% of the electorate.

Thus, a somewhat concentric process of decision-making has suddenly come to a standstill, at

least for the moment. It was a concentric process in the sense that a select group of actors
produced plans and proposals that were presented successively to various relevant groups and
public agencies. There are many of such groups.
About 1,2 people live in the area which encloses 18 municipalities, presently. The area is part
of the province of South-Holland (that will be halved, once the plan is carried out). Involved
are the district administrations which are to become real, autonomous municipalities (in some
cases after being consolidated). Also involved is the Ministry of Home Affairs, which will
have to deal with a new province to which, moreover, standard legislation does not fully
apply: that is to say, a special law was made to give the future ‘strong’ province a firm legal
basis. This Lex Specialis, as it is commonly referred to, sets aside parts of standard legislation
concerning provinces and municipalities.

The Lex Specialis does reflect the chosen trajectory of decision making. The plan to create a
strong town province and to split up the city of Rotterdam originates from Rotterdam

- 10 -
political and administrative authorities and from officials of OOR, the consultative body
representing all municipalities in the region. These ‘parties’ are still discernable in the Lex
Specialis, which attempts to give very detailed treatment to the allocation of competences to
provincial and municipal authorities. Rotterdam is pursuing a powerful regional or provincial
administration (‘expanding the city by giving it up’), whereas the other towns involved seek
to secure municipal autonomy under such a ‘strong’ provincial regime. In most, if not all,
documents concerning the creation of a town province, a phrase returns that suggests these
opposite interests to be very carefully considered and balanced: ‘local what can be done
locally, regional what must be done regionally’ (‘lokaal wat lokaal kan, regionaal wat
regionaal moet’ (e.g. Voorontwerp Wet Bijzondere Bepalingen Provincie Rotterdam (1993).
It seems as if the ‘core actors’ have adopted a course of decision making in which parties
assumed to have formal ‘bar power’ (Baakman, see Maarse 1991, note 9) are being
committed to the plan, possibly believing that splitting up the city of Rotterdam, as a local
issue, is not to become a major obstacle, especially not since present district administrations
(and their officials) will be upgraded. Now if it happens that no town province will be created
at all, ironically this will be the result of very local considerations in Rotterdam. (Official
conclusions still have to be drawn from the referendum outcome; first reactions from MP’s
suggest that the process towards a town province will be continued, though without radically
splitting up Rotterdam.)

The referendum outcome can be viewed as an unforeseen disruption of the transformation

process even before it actually started. The consequence may be that already in this early
phase a major revision of the plan will have to be made. The least to be said is that the
episode illustrates the importance of paying due attention to implementation and
transformation processes.

While until recently Rotterdam authorities were quite sure that a ‘town province’ would be
accomplished, they were somewhat worried about possible repercussions. Is some
‘Rotterdam identity’ likely to be preserved, and to be used as a basis for future intermunicipal
cooperation? Will the towns to be created in the area of Rotterdam be prepared to cooperate
in ways that reflect a sense of shared history? Will they seek to preserve and extend urban
cohesion, or will they rather pursue their own interests? And if they seek to foster urban
cohesion, what are the relevant conditions? Since the formation of a ‘town province’ has no
precedent, at least not in the administrative and political landscape in the Netherlands, it is
very difficult to predict the administrative processes and relations to develop.

4. Simulation of administrative reform: questions, criteria, design

We developed a simulation on intermunicipal cooperation in the future town province, on

7
request of the ‘Project Bureau Regionalization’ of the city of Rotterdam . Previous research
(interviews, literature) and simulation design were largely performed in the first half of 1994,
that is a year before the referendum was held.

- 11 -
We suggested our client, the Project Bureau, to simulate the transformation process. Our
argument was that implementation of large-scale administrative reform seldom fully
corresponds to the initial plan, simply because actors involved may and will react in
unanticipated ways. As outlined above, actors ‘use’ their repertoires and perceptions to react
to plans, measures, or whatever incentive. These repertoires and perceptions differ between
actors, and so do reactions. It is the interplay of different reactions that makes development
processes somewhat unpredictable. As a result, frequent redefinition and adjustment of policy
plans is rule, rather than exception, a phenomenon that is captured in the notion of
incrementalism (Lindblom, 1959), which implies that only minor changes can be implemented
rather reliably. In short, we suggested to focus the simulation to be made on the
transformation process since we expected this process to influence profoundly the future
relations and administrative practices in the town province.
The suggestion was not adopted by our client, not so much because of the theoretical
argument in it, but because the Bureau was prepared to consider only a particular application
of simulation: its use as an instrument that might contribute to adapting, refining, and
enlarging the Lex Specialis - which our client regarded a proper and sufficient, if not the only
way to assure intermunicipal cooperation. Thus we were asked to concentrate on the
situation that the plan was operative, that is, a situation in which there is a town province
under the regime of the Lex Specialis. In particular, the simulation to be designed should
answer questions like:

§ what types of intermunicipal problem will appear, especially between municipalities on the
territory of the present city of Rotterdam
§ will the instruments of the town province suffice to solve intermunicipal conflicts
§ will additional formal or informal arrangements be necessary in order to achieve both a
forceful regional administration and ‘vital’ local authorities
§ who will take care of the cohesion of the city of Rotterdam
§ who will take responsibility when typical metropolitan problems arise that transcend the
borders of the future municipalities

In addition to this, it was granted that the simulation might also contribute to the
transformation process, in the sense of offering officials involved the possibility to gain ex
ante experience with at least some aspects of the future situation. The objectives of the
simulation project can now be summarized as follows:
development and utilization of a simulation depicting (the structural administrative aspects
of) the future town province, in order to investigate the relational and behavioral patterns
that may be typical of the future situation (research objective), and to support the
transformation process by providing participants with ex ante experience about the future
situation (development objective).

From these objectives and from the theoretical picture of policy and administrative processes
as given in the first paragraphs, we derived three sets of design criteria, concerning structural
arrangements, complexity and heterogeneity of administrative processes, and contents of the

- 12 -
simulation.

STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS
The objectives formulated above require first of all that the simulation to be designed must
have an initial situation in which the town province has already come into being. More
specifically, this means that a ‘strong’ province is present, as well as several autonomous
municipalities (a number of these replacing a former large city); both provincial and municipal
authorities have to deal with a system of legal arrangements - an abridged version of relevant
parts of the draft of Lex Specialis. We took this draft as a starting point, not because we
believed it to be a correct representation of what was actually to be put into practice (in the
mean time it has become clear that it will not) but because with our clients we were interested
in the potential dynamics of these anticipated arrangements.
Here a dilemma presents itself. No real institutional setting consists only of formal, judicial
elements. Therefore we had to make suppositions about further organizational or institutional
patterns the transformation process would give rise to. An example is what will happen with
the municipal service organizations of Rotterdam. We supposed that some services would be
split up and linked to the new municipalities while others would remain intact in a more
independent mode, having contracts with different municipalities. Note that this holds for the
beginning of the simulation; it can be changed by participants, if so desired. Suppositions of
this kind do not affect the validity of the simulation, we think, when credible, although
simplified, representations are made of arrangements in the reference situation.

COMPLEXITY AND HETEROGENEITY OF POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES

A valid simulation of inter-administrative processes requires the degree and kind of
complexity and multiplicity to be reproduced that is characteristic for the real life situation
referred to. Above, we presented a theoretical picture of policy and administrative processes
to be found in polycentric policy networks. From this picture, applied to intermunicipal
relations in the future town province, the following design criteria are derived:

§ the design should encourage a variety of repertoires to emerge, to a measure that suffices
to have real life inter-administrative processes represented
§ the ‘contents’ of these repertoires should reflect major preoccupations of (groups of)
actors in real life
§ patterns of relations should be established or encouraged that may represent such patterns
in typical real life policy networks

A simulation that meets these criteria (in addition to the structural arrangements mentioned)
can be used to explore and experience the dynamics of administrative arrangements in the
future town province. In order to design such a simulation, the following questions must be
answered successively:

§ what are the outlines of relevant repertoires and relational patterns?

§ how can these repertoires and patterns be incorporated in the simulation design?

- 13 -
The first question is an intricate one, since we are dealing with a situation that does not yet
exist. In fact, this was another reason for us to prefer a simulation of the transformation
process over a simulation of an already formed future situation; in the latter case, there is no
way to make sure that relevant patterns and repertoires are reproduced in the simulation. All
that can be done is selecting one out of a variety of possible futures.
A remark can be made to alleviate this point, namely that repertoires as such do not have to
be incorporated in the simulation design itself. As implied in our theoretical line of argument,
repertoires have a rather interactive nature, i.e. they are generated, reproduced and changed
by actors involved. Since repertoires reflect both personal history, in the sense of preceding
interactions in which actors have been involved, and their present position in the setting, the
main design question is not what the repertoires will look like, but what histories and
structural positions must be present in the simulation design. For this reason, we studied the
course of discussion on the town province up till now, including the perceptions and
expectations of various actors: officials of the municipality of Rotterdam, members of the
Project Bureau, managers of various municipal services, officials of several district
administrations within Rotterdam. Furthermore, we made an inventory of main social, cultural
and economic features of diverse sub-areas and municipalities within the future town
province. Finally we made a list of issues on a range of policy domains that are likely to show
up, especially issues that may - from one perspective or another - require inter-administrative
coordination.
These elements have been used to design a simulation which involves a number of
dependencies (often, but not always mutual dependencies), resource differences (Klijn et al.
1993) and other incentives that may encourage participants to adjust (or add to) their
repertoires in ways relevant to the question at hand. Here, it is important to add that the
development of diverse repertoires is not only depending on characteristics of the simulation
setting, but also on participants’ backgrounds (their ‘repertoires ex ante’). Below, we will
elaborate on this point.

CONTENT CRITERIA
In addition to meeting the above design criteria concerning structure and process, a
simulation to be designed should involve plausible contents, in the sense that adequate
selection of policy domains and issues is necessary, but also in the sense that participants in
8
the simulation must be able to view and experience the simulation as authentic . These
content criteria refer, probably more than the other criteria mentioned, to social context of
application. We discuss two important social contexts, client and participants (between which
there is some overlap in the Rotterdam case).

Client
Being an actor (or a group of actors), a client will have perceptions, problem definitions, and
desires concerning the reference situation that is being simulated and concerning the role to be
fulfilled by simulation. These perceptions etcetera will, however, not be shared fully by other
actors. This presents a further dilemma in simulation design. On the one hand various

- 14 -
perspectives have to be present in the simulation for reasons of validity, but on the other hand
the setting will have to meet the client’s viewpoint to a certain extent, in order to be accepted
as a useful contribution to real life adaptation and reform.
In the Rotterdam project the client was primarily interested in a simulation that could be used
to identify shortcomings in the formal arrangements relating to the future town province. For
that purpose, the simulation would have to reveal how intermunicipal cooperation and
coordination would function in policy areas like public order and public services. About other
areas such as environmental planning and infrastructure, our client appeared quite certain.
However, in the interviews we conducted, we found that these latter policy areas were
viewed as very important and problematic by many officials, especially at the sub-municipal
level. Moreover we found (as our theory already suggested) that it was not always evident
what the nature of an issue was. For example, when a road is scheduled in an allotment area,
is this an issue of infrastructure, of recreation, of the quality of living conditions? We decided
that it was necessary to include issues that allowed such a diversity of interpretations. We
thought and still think that it is not possible to build a valid simulation on a single, well-
defined issue or policy area, a point that is pertinent to the central question of the project.
Our client did acknowledge this, but was not willing to accept the unavoidable consequence:
that the simulation might show developments that they do not consider realistic, or focuses on
problems that they do not consider relevant. Instead, our client asked for provisions made to
guarantee that the simulation would produce the phenomena they see as relevant. The risks
involved in making such provisions:

§ that participants experience ‘unnatural’ limitations in the simulation, which may lead to
reactions to the simulation model replacing reactions to its subject matter
§ that other actors come to see the simulation setting or its result as unrealistic
9
§ that the dynamics and results of the simulation will be invalid and hence that wrong
conclusions may be drawn.

Despite these risks, our client stressed a simulation to be designed around a single issue,
public order, and to be kept very simple furthermore. Eventually, a certain plurality of issues
was agreed upon. About the degree of complexity no such agreement was reached; it was
decided to discuss the matter further after one or two tests had taken place.
Our client was not convinced by the tests, however, still considering the degree of complexity
too high and viewing the phenomena in the simulation as being too general and therefore not
realistic enough. (We tend to see these two points of critique as hardly compatible, since we
believe that highly specific and ‘real’ processes to come about require a high degree of social
complexity.)
Our client decided that the simulation would not be used for research purposes, but that it still
could be used for development purposes during the transition process. A role in this decision
was also played by the fact that, at the time of the second test, the draft law was adapted in
the sense that province authorities were given additional instruments to handle intermunicipal
conflict.

- 15 -
Participants
In relation to participants, two design criteria are important. The first pertains to the question
who are to be participants and what requirements they have to meet, the second to the
question if the simulation is performable (doable) for a given group of participants. If a
simulation is designed for a specific group of participants, like for development purposes, only
the second criterion applies. But in other, more research oriented cases, selecting and
preparing participants is a major design element.

As stated above, one way of introducing relevant repertoires in a simulation setting is the
selection of participants. Participants bring along their repertoires, the cognitive result of their
personal history and their present social positions. These repertoires will be used to make
perceive what is going on in the simulation setting and act accordingly. Therefore, the pattern
of repertoires and relations to develop in the simulation can be viewed to reflect the culture of
a group of participants (Vandermeer 1983: 52-56, 289-295). If elements of a relevant cultural
context can be specified in advance, and when the people purveying that culture can be
identified, careful selection of a specific sample of participants may help to bring about a
relevant setting.
In the Rotterdam case it was surmized that the culture(s) of already existing administrations
are an important factor in the sense making and construction processes that will shape
administrative practices of the new town province. It was therefore decided to carry out the
simulation experiments mainly with participants from present administrations.

Performability of a simulation depends on ‘technical’, ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ conditions,

the first of which are quite straightforward: the simulation must not be too complex.
Participant should be able to perform relevant tasks and activities without lengthy
preparation. Within a few hours development processes should already become visible. Thus,
the simulation setting should be as simple as possible; due to time pressure, however,
participants often experience a considerable degree of complexity anyway. In the present
simulation we introduced only four municipalities (in reality 27 were planned), we described
for each of them the initial situation in only three or four pages, we devised very simple
procedures, financial calculations, etc. But a ‘year’ only lasted 80 minutes.
Social and psychological criteria relate to the experiences of participants: they should be able,
individually and collectively, to make sense of the simulation setting and to act upon it. In
particular, they should recognize the setting and be able to believe that it may approximate
reality. If so, participants are likely to act and interact in ways relevant in view of the aims for
which simulation is applied.

In line with the criteria and choices discussed above we developed a social simulation, called
‘Polis’ after the town province existing in it. The province encloses four municipalities:
Breehave, Langekamp, Buurwegen en Biesdam. The first three of these used to be the
constituents of a large city called Biesmond. In addition to these five administrations, there is
an Information and Consultation Agency (ICA), that can be engaged by administrative
authorities for research or advice. Each of these six groups consists of 4 or 5 participants.

- 16 -
Within each of the administrations, a distinction is made between political functions (Royal
Commissioner and Provincial Executives or Mayor and Aldermen) and civil servants (one of
whom is mainly responsible for finances, another for town and country planning).

Before the start of the simulation, participants receive materials about simulation in general,
about the design of ‘Polis’ (initial situation, history, communication rules, time schedule), and
about legal arrangements that are operative in the recently formed town province (materials
are described in Vandermeer et al. 1994). Participants are assigned a position in the initial
situation (random assignment, usually), and they receive materials that relate to the position
assigned to them. This ‘specific instruction’ includes:

§ history, and an outline of present characteristics of own corporation (province, town, or

service agency)
§ existing plans (province: integrated strategic plan; municipality: zoning plan)
§ local regulations
§ budgets, including estimates for the years to come
§ an official document containing urgent policy issues (municipality)

As regards the goals to be pursued in the simulation: participants are asked to make their own
objectives, and ideals come true, thereby using the position assigned to them as a starting-
point. For this, they may develop their own strategies, make agreements, create new formal
or informal arrangements, etcetera. Here, only two strict limitations apply: a ‘year’ lasts 80
minutes, and communication between groups in the simulation is somewhat restricted (only
free telephonic and written communication, else on request). In addition to these boundary
conditions, participants will face restrictions that arise from other actors’ behaviours. For
instance, a change attempt undertaken by one participant will have implications for other
participants. These implications should not be thought of in terms of eventual outcomes alone
(structural, procedural, etc.), but also in terms of the impact a change attempt will have on
various ongoing processes in the simulation: participants are enrolled, or refuse to be so,
priorities have to be articulated, relations or even groups may become redefined, and so forth.
More or less similar implications may result from measures, questions, comments, and other
‘inputs’ from various ‘outside world actors’ (represented by the facilitator of the simulation).

Several types of such ‘inputs’ can be distinguished. A first type of input is given with the
information in the initial situation. A second type is introduced during the simulation and
consists of issues raised, questions asked, proposals made by ‘outside world actors’
(residents’ associations, business companies, public welfare services, property developers).
These first two types are made in advance, and introduced according to a fixed schedule
(concerning type two, without participants being informed about this before). Inputs have
been devised in an attempt to make the intended cooperation and coordination issues appear
(these inputs, like any action, do not determine the reactions to follow). The inputs are listed
in Vandermeer et al. (1994).
Outside world actors may react to participants’ decisions (or the failure of these to appear);

- 17 -
they may also be presented, by authorities or officials, with announcements, questions, or
proposals (in written form, of course). In such cases too, the facilitator will represent ‘outside
world actors’, in a plausible way and if possible in a way that makes the question of
interadministrative cooperation reappear.

5. Conclusions

How can a simulation like the one described above contribute to the quality of public
administration. For the sake of argument, we will start from a rather basal idea of quality.
Public administrations, municipalities included, perform various tasks and deliver a range of
services. Quality in this respect can be taken to mean that tasks are performed accurately and
services delivered well. For example, we like to see public places clean and safe, we want the
police to be present when necessary (and not very present otherwise), we want customs
officers to be honest and not too loutish, we want a natty passport (see Koppenjan, 1990), we
hate town hall queues. And in addition to these rather concrete desires, we also want
adequate infrastructures, absence of inconveniences, no corruption, a smooth economy, and
so forth. Such a list of cases is clarifying; it shows that quite often it is easier to designate
quality in negative terms than to give a positive definition of it.

The notion of quality can be applied to effects of public policies, to the commodities and
procedures used to achieve these effects, and also to ways of decision making in this regard.
Each of these elements can be judged by a variety of criteria. These criteria are not always
clear and unambiguous (e.g. what is carefulness in decision making?), nor are they always
compatible. A general illustration of this second point: public requisites like legal security and
absence of arbitrariness presuppose elaborate procedures; for reasons of efficiency, these
procedures may be applied routinely; but societal change requires frequent adjustment of
these procedures and routines, anf flexible application.
These factors already make it difficult enough to reform existing or create new policies. The
process is still more difficult than that, however, since various actors will happen to interfere
(as stressed by the notion of polycentric networks), and because of the fact that often
decisions have to be made in the absence of an accurate picture of likely effects. How can the
quality of public administration be improved? Or differently phrased: how can policy actors be
enabled to improve their behaviors?
It is important here to recognize that actors themselves must (be able to) do it. There are two
reasons for this. (1) Very detailed instructions, advice, or procedures will have only limited
value; when circumstances change or when policy plans are adjusted, such instructions
etcetera cease to be valid. (2) Instructions etcetera cannot be specific to the extent that they
fully constrain other actors’ behaviors (the argument from autopoiesis, see Vandermeer et al,
1992).

If quality of public administration does depend on the performance of policy actors, quality
improvement means that either policy actors learn to improve their ways of acting, or that

- 18 -
performance improvements are fostered by changes in the environment in which actors have
to perform (like better structures). When considered more closely, this second option seems a
question of learning as well, but now it is learning by actors who are responsible for
(re)shaping the working environment.

Which are appropriate learning modes? The first reason mentioned above implies that ‘single-
loop learning’ will not always be useful. ‘Single-loop learning’ denotes ‘the ability to detect
and correct errors in relation to a given set of operating norms’ (Morgan 1986:87v). To be
sure, when circumstances change this given set of norms may no longer apply. Rather than
just solving the problem at hand (monoparadigmatic), proper teaching or advice strategies are
poly- and meta-paradigmatic (Feltmann, 1992). These concepts are very useful, indicating
that problems may disappear or become solvable when a new frame of perception is adopted.
Polyparadigmatic advising (or teaching) means that such a new frame is explicitly offered,
metaparadigmatic advising means that actors develop the capacity to produce a new frame by
themselves, if necessary. In more generally known terms, ‘learning to learn’ is recommended
for many situations.

Thus, it becomes a matter of serious consideration whether or not to take actors’ own policy
theories (Hoogerwerf 1987) for granted. Concentrating on the simulation of intermunicipal
cooperation: we think we would have done our client (and not only our client) an ill service,
had we followed our client in the view that policy questions (and accompanying social issues)
can be prevented or solved by using judicial means and nothing else. These means do have
limitations which we, with regard to our Rotterdam case, summarize by the paradox that it is
(to municipalities) forbidden to noncooperate. When it is suspected that lack of cooperation
might become a significant problem (on this point too, the actors we interviewed did not
agree at all), various strategies and instruments can be considered next to (or even instead of)
very detailed legislation.
We were thinking about cooperation-encouraging strategies to be tested in the simulation
(e.g. strategies to be conducted by provincial authorities) when receiving the message that the
project was stopped, at least the research part of it. By that time, two test runs had been
conducted. The primary aim of these tests was to inspect the simulations’ performability,
validity and relevance in more or less technical terms. We will not report on these topics here
(see Vandermeer et al. 1994). Rather we will discuss some observations about administrative
reform as found in the two tests. These observations are used to depict different ‘levels’ of
learning about administrative change; moreover, they elucidate the possible role of social
simulation.

IMAGES
In the simulation, a clear and sometimes sharp difference existed between the groups’ self-
images and the images held of other groups. For instance, other groups viewed the province
as rather passive and not very managerial, while provincial authorities tried to stimulate
intermunicipal cooperation by endorsing municipal initiatives rather than by resorting to a top-
down course of action (first simulation), or by creating funds to support municipal projects

- 19 -
(second simulation). Such endeavours in spite, in both simulations provincial authorities came
increasingly under attack from other groups, mainly because municipal authorities felt that it
was a provincial responsibility to steer and to offer a clear framework for their own policy
making. But provincial authorities were also, and sometimes in one breath, criticized for
acting too vigorously.

RELATIONAL PATTERNS
Between municipalities, there were surprisingly few bilateral contacts. In the first simulation,
municipalities engaged in multilateral negotiations about the foundation of the financial
allocation model. Soon these talks dissolved, which is remarkable in view of the image of a
passive province. Apparently, municipalities kept focusing on the province, regardless its
supposed passivity. The second simulation showed a similar pattern.
In both simulations the province was involved in most of the consultations. In the first
simulation, two regular consultations appeared. A first, involving the royal commissioner and
the mayors, largely concerned the question of the preferable kind of consultation to be held
between royal commissioner and mayors. The discussion tended towards: securing progress,
making sure that policy contents will be discussed by the assigned officials, and supervising of
policy processes - conclusions hat seem consistent with the province’s strategy. These good
intentions, however, could not prevent the discussion from recurrent substantial debate,
which meant overlap with the second regular consultation, that of the officials who were
responsible for town and country planning (portfolio holders).

DISCUSSION TOPICS
In the first simulation, the commissioner and mayors discussed two rather encompassing
subjects - next to more occasional topics. One is the foundation of the financial allocation
model. Some mayors blocked a plan according to which the province would draft a proposal
on the basis of municipalities’ desiderata; in their view, this plan might give the province too
much influence. The commissioner then invited the municipalities to present a joint proposal.
These talks did not lead to conclusions. The second subject was regional priority setting.
After considerable discussion it was decided that each municipality was granted two key
problems. The result: eight regional key problems...
In the second simulation too, portfolio holders devoted lengthy discussion to a list of key
problems. Here, an interesting question arose: to which degree can municipalies be allowed to
talk about each others’ key problems, and to which degree a key problem of one town could
be solved, at least in part, by developments in another town. These discussions passed off all
but easy.
Also in the second simulation, most of the interadministrative discussions took place within
structures already present by the start of the simulation, or developed right after the start. In
these consultations, often the provincial delegate was able to determine the kind of
consultation (usually this meant generating inventories or information, especially for the
purpose of provincial policy formation). Although the province was increasingly criticized, in
particular for not being communicative enough, few attempts were made to reshape existing
or to create new types of consultation. This had been more or less the case in the first

- 20 -
simulation as well. Interesting is a completely new form of communication that was
developed in the second simulation: the emission of (many) ‘press reports’. These press
reports, we add, did hardly encourage ‘regular’ consultation.

LEVELS OF LEARNING
What can be learned from these tests? We distinguish some different levels. The first is that
the simulation provides participants with experiences, and observers with impressions about
the future town province: its possible shape and ensuing complications. Differences between
the two tests are noticeable, though, which may be taken as evidence that simulation is not an
instrument to predict concrete outcomes. Still, the experiences and impressions gained may
help actors to anticipate future effects, intended or unintended: to recognize them in an early
stage and to react upon them.
The practices to emerge in both simulations did not agree with expectations many participants
said to have about the town province. This is not to say that results of administrative reform
will always be disappointing, but it does imply that dreams will not necessarily come true, not
even when they are shared. Now, an important question is: how did the actual shape of the
town province come about, and can this process be a subject of steering. We will discuss
some further levels of learning.

A second level of learning relates to the understanding of general social mechanisms that play
a role in administrative reform. An example, already mentioned, is the mutual formation of
images. Partly on the basis of the closing discussions (held after the simulation itself had come
to an end, see Vandermeer, 1983:116-22) we may say that the formation of images is very
often based presumptions about other actors’ ‘strategic’ behaviour (presumptions derived
from these other actors’ perceived ‘strategic’ position), rather than on actual information
about these other actors or on information originating from these actors. Some participants
tended to ascribe this to a culture of officials that is widespread in the realm of public
administration. Others blamed the simulation. Still others viewed presumptions about
‘strategic’ behaviour an almost inevitable aspect of interaction between equal partners, and
that precisely for that reason a strong higher level authority is necessary. The closing
discussions revealed, however, that participants’ intentions were quite often all but ‘strategic’
in the way presumed by others. It can be gathered that interadministrative behaviour in a
simulated setting is largely determined by (often untested, sometimes wrong) presuppositions
about the intentions and behaviours of other actors and about what is ‘rational’ in the given
context. Understanding of such mechanisms may help to achieve more ‘explorative’ and
‘communicative’ behaviours in ‘real life’, indispensible to prevent unintended effects.

A third level of learning relates to more specific elements in the simulation setting. Again an
example from the discussion above. One of the reasons to form a town province is to
strengthen regional administration. This is seen as necessary since local administrations are
likely to pursue local interests, which may well conflict with ‘general interest’. Hence, a
strong authority is required to make municipalities act according to the general interest. In the
simulation a strong province, at least in the formal sense, was created, but nevertheless in

- 21 -
both replications local interests dominated the scene. Provincial efforts to achieve what it
viewed as ‘general interest’ - by encouraging cooperation in an attempt to escape the
‘prisoner’s dilemma’ that is generated by ‘strategic’ actors - were rejected, obstructed, or
simply ignored by others. This is noticeable and even distressing since not just a few
participants said to be aware of this prisoner’s dilemma character of many interadministrative
issues in ‘real life’, and believed that a strong town province is needed to overcome this
problem.
It was concluded, in the closing discussions, that the combination of formal arrangements and
individual convictions did not suffice to prevent or suppress NIMBY-like behaviours.
Apparently, the interplay of a new structure and ‘old’ administrative culture reproduced a
number of the problems of the old situation. Moreover it became clear that central authorities
face practical limitations when applying the legal instruments they have disposal of. Thus, it
appears that much attention should be paid to cultural transformation (a.o. with respect to
ideas about ‘own interests’), if the new administrative arrangements are to function properly.
Fourth-level learning from simulation could be helpful in such an effort.

The fourth level of learning, that includes knowledgeable experimentation and strategy
development, explicitly presents the (promised) link between polycentric policy theory and
guidelines for policy actors’ behaviours. An analysis or evaluative discussion with participants
as discussed in this section may be a starting point for developing strategies to support the
transformation process. We have shown how social simulation may enhance awareness of
problems and mechanisms involved in this. Such awareness, especially when it is shared, can
be quite beneficial, enabling conscious actions to steer the process. Simulation may contribute
to experimentation and to processes of strategy formation by providing a setting in which
ideas about how to do it can be tested. Because of the untimely end of the project, there as
beeen no opportunity to experiment with transformation strategies or with other conceivable
means to steer or influence patterns of interadministrative cooperation.

Going through these four levels one can observe a shift from learning what the new situation
is like, through learning why and how, to learning that may contribute to its construction. In a
sense the fourth level is in contradiction with the first. Eventual adminstrative practices and
patterns are not dictated by formal regulations, they must rather be seen as the outcome of
social construction processes. Legal and other formal regulations are only one possible input
in the process, and so are the intentions of policy makers. In a social simulation, or as a result
of it, various other inputs may be revealed, that can be explored, elaborated, and tested in
further ‘runs’. This precisely is why the method of social simulation adds value to processes
of administrative reform.

Notes

- 22 -
1. The interrelationship between ‘content’ (social-cognitive) factors and relational (social-
structural) factors is dealt with by Strauss et al., 1963; Vandermeer, 1983:40; Harbers, 1987:74-77;
Maas, 1988:108-09; Bolk, 1989:21-23; Vissers, 1994:50-51.

2. Ringeling (1990:62) refers to Rosenhal’s ‘Politiek, de staat en het staatsapparaat (1980); see
also Smith (1981).

3. Many policy studies present conclusions in terms of stability of the phenomena investigated,
even when empirical observations are made within a rather short period of time. Whether or not a
phenomenon can be viewed as stable depends largely on the time scale to apply, which does not
necessarily coincide with the time scale a researcher is used to. With respect to policy processes, the
question of a proper time scale has not too often been posed. Relevant here is that policy effects may
range over a longer time period - references can be found in Sabatier and Hanf (1985:303) and
Hoogerwerf (1993:225). When the stable character of policy network is emphasized, as is frequently
done, the possibility may be skipped over that a longer period of time is more appropriate, at least the
hidden suggestion is that already a short period will do. One could see this as a symptom of ‘policy
analytic impatience’, that is to hamper rather than facilitate an adequate picture of policy processes.

4. In this respect, pluralistic analyses like Rosenthal (1979) and Grin en Van de Graaf (1994)
might have been less statical.

5. Ex ante assessment is clearly distinguished from formative evaluation, in which information is

collected that is used primarily for ongoing program development and improvement (Dehar et al. 1993,
italics added).

6. Note that ‘not reacting’ is also a form of action, at least, other actors may perceive it that way.
In Delaat’s (1983:68) formulation: it is not possible no show ‘no behavior’.

7. The municipality of Rotterdam contracted Bestad BV (public administration advisors) of which

the first author is a partner. Next to the authors, Co Engberts participated in the research for and design
of the simulation.

8. There are also more general design criteria concerning feasibility and performability; these are
treated at length by Vandermeer (1983).

9. Although our theoretical approach implies that it is not possible to draw definite conclusions
about the future course of events, it is quite possible to build a simulation that can be demonstrated to be
invalid in relevant respects, which means simulation results that do not apply to the reference situation.

- 23 -
Literature

Albers, P., J. Bloem, W. Gooren (1994). Veranderende sturingsconcepties en beleids-

evaluatie. Een verkenning op basis van empirische ervaringen. In: Beleidsanalyse
94-3, 6-13.
Becker, H.A. (1987). Ex ante-evaluatie: consequentieanalyses. In: Percy B. Lehning en
J.B.D. Simonis (red.), Handboek beleidswetenschap. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom,
116-130.
Bolk, H. (1989). Organizing, changing, simulating. Delft: Eburon.
Boskma, P. (1986). Social Impact Assessment by Social Simulation. In: H.A. Becker and
A.L. Porter (eds.), Impact Assessment Today, Utrecht: Jan van Arkel.
Bougon, M., K. Weick, D. Binkhorst (1977). Cognition in organizations: an analysis of
the Utrecht Jazz Orchestra. In: Administrative Science Quarterly 22.
Bressers, J.Th.A. (1983). Beleidseffectiviteit en waterkwaliteitsbeleid: een
bestuurskundig onderzoek. Enschede.
Brief, A.P., H.K. Downey (1983). Cognitive and organizational structures: a conceptual
analysis of implicit organizing theories. In: Human Relations 36, 1065-1090.
Bruhèze, Adri de la (1992). Political construction of technology: nuclear waste disposal
in the United States. Enschede.
Bruijn, J.A. de, E.F. ten Heuvelhof (1993). Instrumenten voor netwerkmanagement. In:
J.F.M. Koppenjan, J.A. de Bruijn en W.J.M. Kickert (red.), Netwerkmanagement
in het openbaar bestuur. ‘s-Gravenhage: VUGA, 79-98.
Caluwé, L.I.A. de, D.Q.P. Fundter, W.J.H. van Spijker, F. Joldersma (1995).
Spelsimulatie voor een lerende overheid. In: Bestuurskunde 4, 157-65.
Dehar, M.A., S. Casswell, P. Duignan (1993). Formative and process evaluation of
health promotion and disease prevention programs. In: Evaluation Review 17, 204-
220.
Doorn, J. van, F. van Vught (1978). Forecasting; methoden en technieken van toekomst-
onderzoek. Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum.
Engbersen, G., R. van der Veen (1992). De onbedoelde effecten van sociaal beleid. In:
Beleid en Maatschappij, 214-26.
Feltmann, C.E. (1992). Adviseren ná het post-modernisme: naar een buitengewone
interventiekunde, M&O 46, 133-160.
Geurts, J.L.A. (1981). Model en spel. Nijmegen.
Grin, J., H. van de Graaf (1994). Handelingstheorieën en beïnvloeding in netwerken:
ongelijksoortige rationaliteiten en congruente betekenissen. In: Beleidswetenschap
8, 349-66.
Gründwald-Schindl, C.A., A. Kraan-Jetten (1987). Ex post-evaluatieonderzoek. In:
Percy B. Lehning en J.B.D. Simonis (red.), Handboek beleidswetenschap. Meppel/
Amsterdam: Boom, 131-53.
Harbers, H. (1987). Sociale wetenschappen en hun speelruimte. Groningen: Wolters-
Noordhoff.

- 24 -
Herweijer, M. (1987). De dynamiek van doelstellend gedrag: een struikelblok voor
evaluatieonderzoek. In: Percy B. Lehning en J.B.D. Simonis (red.), Handboek
beleidswetenschap. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom, 177-95.
Hoogerwerf, A. (1987). Beleid berust op veronderstellingen: de beleidstheorie. In: Percy
B. Lehning en J.B.D. Simonis (red.), Handboek beleidswetenschap.
Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom, 23-40.
Hoogerwerf, A. (1993). Een kwart eeuw beleidswetenschap: ontwikkeling, stand van
zaken en uitdagingen. In: Beleidswetenschap 7, 215-37.
Hupe, P.L. (1987). De mythe van de beleidsrelevantie. In: Percy B. Lehning en J.B.D.
Simonis (red.), Handboek beleidswetenschap. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom, 206-
225.
Hupe, P.L. (1990). Intenties en interacties, over post-moderne en andere vormen van
overheidssturing. In: J.A.M. Hufen en A.B. Ringeling (red.), Beleidsnetwerken:
overheids- semi-overheids- en particuliere organisaties in wisselwerking. ‘s-
Gravenhage: VUGA, 223-234.
Klijn, E.H., J. Koppenjan, K. Termeer (1993). Van beleidsnetwerken naar netwerk-
management, een theoretische verkenning van managementstrategieën in
netwerken. In: Beleid en Maatschappij, 230-43.
Koppenjan, J.F.M. (1990). De Barneveld-connectie versus de Staatsuitgeverij & Co. In:
J.A.M. Hufen en A.B. Ringeling (red.), Beleidsnetwerken: overheids- semi-
overheids- en particuliere organisaties in wisselwerking. ‘s-Gravenhage: VUGA,
137-156.
Koppenjan, J.F.M., J.A. de Bruijn, W.J.M. Kickert (red.) (1993). Netwerkmanagement
in het openbaar bestuur. ‘s-Gravenhage: VUGA.
Kreukels, A.M.J. (1987). Planning als spiegel van de westerse samenleving. In: Percy B.
Lehning en J.B.D. Simonis (red.), Handboek beleidswetenschap.
Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom, 266-76.
Delaat, W.A.M. (1983). Vragen naar de onbekende weg. Delft: Eburon.
Delange, M. (1995). Besluitvorming rond strategisch ruimtelijk beleid, verkenning en
toepassing van doorwerking als beleidswetenschappelijk begrip. Amsterdam:
Thesis.
Lindblom, C.E. (1959). The science of "muddling through". In: Public Administration
Review 19, 79-88.
Maarse, J.A.M. (1991). Hoe valt de effectiviteit van beleid te verklaren? In: J.Th.A.
Bressers en A. Hoogerwerf (red.), Beleidsevaluatie. Alphen a/d Rijn: Samson H.D.
Tjeenk Willink.
Maarse, J.A.M., J. Moen (1991). Instrumenten van beleid: de doorwerking vanuit een
organisatietheoretisch perspectief. In: Beleidswetenschap 5, 132-47.
Maas, A.J.J.A. (1988). Ongedefinieerde ruimten; sociaal-symbolische configuraties.
Delft: Eburon.
Mastop, J.M. en A. Faludi (1993). Doorwerking van strategisch beleid in dagelijkse
beleidsvoering. In: Beleidswetenschap 7, 71-90.
Morgan, G. (1986). Images of organization. London: Sage.

- 25 -
O’Toole, L.J., K. Hanf (1990). Na de top-down versus bottom-up controverse. In:
J.A.M. Hufen en A.B. Ringeling (red.), Beleidsnetwerken: overheids- semi-
overheids- en particuliere organisaties in wisselwerking. ‘s-Gravenhage: VUGA.
Peters, V.A.M., G.A.N. Vissers, G.A.W.M. Heyne (1995). The quality of simulations
and games. Paper prepared for ISAGA conference, Valencia, July 1995.
Raser, J.R. (1969). Simulation and society: an exploration of scientific gaming. Boston:
Allyn.
Ringeling, A.B. (1990). De overheid naast andere actoren? In: J.A.M. Hufen en A.B.
Ringeling (red.), Beleidsnetwerken: overheids- semi-overheids- en particuliere
organisaties in wisselwerking. ‘s-Gravenhage: VUGA, 55-70.
Rosenthal, U. (1979). Maatschappelijke, ambtelijke en politieke effectiviteit; Twents
effectenonderzoek noodzakelijk, niet voldoende. In: Beleid en Maatschappij, 336-
44.
Sabatier, P.A., K. Hanf (1985). Strategic interaction, learning and policy evolution: a
synthetic model. In: K. Hanf and Th.A.J. Toonen (eds.), Policy implementation in
federal and unitary systems. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
Smith, R. (1981). Implementing the results of evaluation studies, In: S. Barrett and C.
Fudge (eds.), Policy and action; essays on the implementation of public policy,
London, 225-45.
Strauss, A., R. Bucher, D. Ehrlich, M. Sabshin, L. Schatzmann (1963). The hospital and
its negotiated order. In: E. Friedson (ed.), The hospital in modern society, New
York: Macmillan, 147-69.
Vandermeer, F.B. (1983). Organisatie als spel. Dissertation, Enschede.
Vandermeer, F.B., L. Schaap, M.J.W. van Twist (1992). Communicatie en strategie-
dynamica. In: I. Pröpper en M. Herweijer (red.), Effecten van plannen en
convenanten, Deventer, 65-83.
Vandermeer, F.B., C. Engberts, G.A.N. Vissers (1994). Polis: een simulatie over
afstemmingsproblematiek in een stadsprovincie: rapportage van de bouw- en
testfase aan de gemeente Rotterdam.
Vandermeer, F.B. (1995). Social construction of impact; evaluation and learning in
policy processes. Paper prepared for international conference on "Transformation
of values in a pluriform society - a new steering vision for government on public
policy", Rotterdam, February 1995.
Vissers, G.A.N., F.B. Vandermeer (1991). De werking van strategieën in organisaties:
transformatie en beeldvorming. In: Gedrag en Organisatie 4, 22-42
Vissers, G.A.N. (1994). The production of strategy. Delft: Eburon.
Vissers, G.A.N., G.A.W.M. Heyne, V.A.M. Peters (1995). Spelsimulatie in bestuurs-
kundig onderzoek. In: Bestuurskunde 4, 178-87.
Voorontwerp van de Wet Bijzondere Bepalingen Provincie Rotterdam (Explanatory
Memorandum on draft Rotterdam Province Special Provisions Act) (1993).
Zajonc, R.B. and D.M. Wolfe (1966). Cognitive consequences of a person’s position in a
formal organization. In: Human Relations 19, 139-150.

- 26 -