Torts

Barredo vs Garcia - Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of
the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
Elcano vs Hill - It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. (T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
Virata vs Ochoa - The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before
Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a
separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasidelict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is
not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The source of the
obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission
punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Banal vs Tadeo - what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal
liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action. Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The
payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Occena vs Icamina - In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and
sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability
arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person
who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the
individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or
omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no

civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private
person.

Alfredo Pacis - Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 1[12] of the Revised Penal
Code,2[13] the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements
of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. 3[14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person
in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to
prevent any injury being done thereby. 4[15] Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve
little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of
care.
Right to institute separate civil action
People vs Amistad - Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought
simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the
offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the
ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed,
the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an
offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.
Jarantilla vs CA - The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved virtually
the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly
declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal;
that his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages,
1
2
3
4

especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case
being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent complaint for
damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the aspect of civil
liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by
Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Hun Hyung vs Choi -In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. 34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in
such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it
does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the
court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only
recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when
there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent
such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in
Salazar v. People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist

Extinction or survival
PP vs Navoa - It appears that the accused, Mario Navoa, died on June 14, 1984 due to a cerebro-vascular
attack as shown by the Death Certificate attached to the Motion for Reconsideration. When counsel for
the accused manifested that fact before the Appellate Court on June 20, 1984, he was unaware that the
latter had already certified the case to this Court, which, in turn, promulgated its Decision on July 31,
1984 unaware of appellant Mario Navoas death. The judgment of conviction will thus have to be set
aside as against him. However, the plea for extinguishment of the deceaseds civil and criminal liability is
without merit. Only his criminal liability is extinguished by his death but the civil liability remains.

PP vs Badeo - The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre 24 similarly
dismissing the case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate
Justice Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the term "
pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished from "
pecuniary liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to a
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses 25
whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not punishable by

law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an appellant is
extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs of the deceased appellant
are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil liability.
Philtranco vs PP - The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed
written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its
decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. 5[3]
Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence must exist
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in
some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
(4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of these
conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil,
has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
PP vs Amistoso - n People v. Bayotas,18 the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to
final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:cralawlibrary
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may
5

be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same
is
based
as
explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action
by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.
No independent action to recover civil liability arising from BP 22
Heirs of Simon vs Elvin Chan - This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with
B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged
in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect
his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The
inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to significantly lower the number of cases
filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks.
It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases,
one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that
the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even
prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil
case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are
allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case.
Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously
observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks
would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay
the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may
be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22,
Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.

Liability of employers
Franco vs IAC - On the other hand, under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, liability is based on
culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of its employees subject,
however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.
Respondent appellate court relies on the case of Arambulo, supra, where it was held that the defense of
observance of due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees is

not applicable to the subsidiary liability provided in Article 20 of the Penal Code (now Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code). By such reliance, it would seem that respondent appellate court seeks to enforce the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer without a criminal conviction of the party primarily liable
therefor. This is not only erroneous and absurd but is also fraught with dangerous consequences. It is
erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the
employer's subsidiary liability 10 and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced with a situation
where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously
established. It is likewise dangerous because, in effect, the employer's subsidiary liability would partake
of a solidary obligation resulting in the law's amendment without legislative sanction.
Negligence of Professionals
Batiquinvs CA - Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, her positive
testimony [that a piece of rubber was indeed found in private respondent Villegas' abdomen] prevails over
the negative testimony in favor of the petitioners.
As such, the rule of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption
or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing
injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not happen
in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is [a] rule of evidence whereby negligence of [the] alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from [the] mere fact that [the] accident happened provided [the] character of
[the] accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in [the] absence of negligence
it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under [the]
management and control of [the] alleged wrongdoer . . . . Under [this] doctrine . . . the happening of an
injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that [the] injury
was caused by an agency or instrumentality under [the] exclusive control and management of defendant,
and that the occurrence [sic] was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
Garcia-rueda vs Pascasio - Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr.
Reyes, a physician-patient relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in
effect represented that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field, they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their
patients.i[13] They have a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional
duties of skill and care, or their improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is
injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. ii[14] Consequently, in the event that any
injury results to the patient from want of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held
answerable in damages for negligence.iii[15]
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity of
expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff, have been applied
in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a patient under
excessive or improper anaesthesia.iv[16] Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence: evidence as to the
recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a showing that the
physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment. v[17]
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether the
doctors actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause of the
patients injury.vi[18] Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the victims

death after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact which, if
confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation of
negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not
conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the death
of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the symptoms of
malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily available to
counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. vii[19] Why these precautionary
measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
Rubi li vs CA - The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships
goes far back into English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of battery
(i.e., an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients
prior to performing a surgery or procedure. In the United States, the seminal case was Schoendorff v.
Society of New York Hospital6[53] which involved unwanted treatment performed by a doctor. Justice
Benjamin Cardozos oft-quoted opinion upheld the basic right of a patient to give consent to any medical
procedure or treatment: Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patients consent,
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. 7[54] From a purely ethical norm, informed
consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so that
a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to
disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to
disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff
was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff
to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her
decision to undergo it.
Doctors not guarantor of care
Dr. Cereno vs CA - Their cause stands on the mere assumption that Raymonds life would have
been saved had petitioner surgeons immediately operated on him;had the blood been cross-matched
immediately and had the blood been transfused immediately. There was, however, no proof presented that
Raymonds life would have been saved had those things been done. Those are mere assumptions and
cannot guarantee their desired result. Such cannot be made basis of a decision in this case, especially
considering that the name, reputation and career of petitioners are at stake.
In the case of Dr. Cruz v. CA, it was held that [d]octors are protected by a special law. They are not
guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against mishaps or
unusual consequences. Furthermore, they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment
6
7

Dr. Cruz vs CA- This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both
prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the
cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the
petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted
during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the
family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold
inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a
conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required to establish civil liability.
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence
this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent
manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances
leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the
loss of their mother up to the present time 46 and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and
commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved
one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper
in the instant case.

Captain of the Ship Doctrine

Ramos vs CA - That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship
doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due regard for the peculiar
factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.
From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the
very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda.
First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he
represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Drs. Hosaka
and Gutierrez had worked together since 1977. Whenever Dr. Hosaka performed a surgery, he would
always engage the services of Dr. Gutierrez to administer the anesthesia on his patient. viii[36]
Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda
showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another anesthesiologist and
cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda. ix[37]
Third, it is conceded that in performing their responsibilities to the patient, Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez
worked as a team. Their work cannot be placed in separate watertight compartments because their duties
intersect with each other.x[38]
While the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily for their
performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and
that one does not exercise control over the other, they were certainly not completely independent of each
other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician.
For his part, Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as a surgeon by
applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine.xi[30] Dr. Hosaka argues that the trend in United States

jurisprudence has been to reject said doctrine in light of the developments in medical practice. He points
out that anesthesiology and surgery are two distinct and specialized fields in medicine and as a surgeon,
he is not deemed to have control over the acts of Dr. Gutierrez. As anesthesiologist, Dr. Gutierrez is a
specialist in her field and has acquired skills and knowledge in the course of her training which Dr.
Hosaka, as a surgeon, does not possess. xii[31] He states further that current American jurisprudence on the
matter recognizes that the trend towards specialization in medicine has created situations where surgeons
do not always have the right to control all personnel within the operating room, xiii[32] especially a fellow
specialist.
Apparent Authority
Nogales vs CMC - In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractorphysician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is
the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. 44 This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent
authority."45 In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital,46 the Illinois Supreme Court explained the
doctrine of apparent authority in this wise:
[U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is
an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is
an independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows:
"For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1)
the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2)
where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that
the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon
the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."
The element of "holding out" on the part of the hospital does not require an express representation
by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is
satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing
the patient that the care is provided by independent contractors.
The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the plaintiff relies upon
the hospital to provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific physician.
The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an
independent-contractor physician.
The first factor focuses on the hospital's manifestations and is sometimes described as an inquiry whether
the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. 47 In this regard, the hospital need
not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an employee of the hospital;
rather a representation may be general and implied.
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code
provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Estoppel rests on this
rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising
out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

Petron vs Sps Jovero - To reiterate, petitioner, the dealer Rubin Uy acting through his agent,
Dortina Uy shared the responsibility for the maintenance of the equipment used in the gasoline station
and for making sure that the unloading and the storage of highly flammable products were without
incident. As both were equally negligent in those aspects, petitioner cannot pursue a claim against the
dealer for the incident. Therefore, both are solidarily liable to respondents for damages caused by the fire.
Petitioner was likewise negligent in allowing a tank truck different from that specifically
provided under its hauling contract with Villaruz. The enumeration and specification of particular tank
trucks in the contract serve a purpose to ensure the safe transportation, storage and delivery of highly
flammable products.

Negligence of ATTY
Burbe vs Magulta - Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the nonpayment of the formers fees. xiv[8] Hence,
despite the fact that complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that respondent
dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to
file the complaint he had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest possible time, in
order to protect the clients interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. xv[9] They
owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and the defense of the
clients rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally applied

Del Mar vs CA - The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in
this case was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal of the
appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans failure to appear
at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because petitioner was in default,
private respondents evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No wonder, the trial court decided
against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the appeal. One is bound by the decisions of ones
counsel regarding the conduct of the case, especially where the former does not complain against the
manner in which the latter handled the case. xvi[17]
In effect, petitioner consented to the shabby and negligent treatment of his case by his counsel. Hence, he
should not complain now of the negligence or fraud done to him by his lawyer. A partys counsel cannot
be blamed for negligence, if the party was likewise guilty of the same. xvii[18] Clients should suffer the
consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves
hired, and whom they had full authority to fire at any time and replace with another.

Other professionals
Cullion Ice vs Phil Motors - A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat
was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The temporary tank in which the mixture was
prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the carburetor, with the result that when the fuel
line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the
carburetor could sustain. This was no doubt the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was
that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor, already saturated with gasoline,
burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly inflammable material near-by.
Ordinarily a back fire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak
along the pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent
mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire may have
been due either to the fact that the spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do
things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest
had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he
was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have
been sufficiently warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions
against the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of
Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The
burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense
an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill. The test
of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
Philam vs CA, Consunji - Logically, in order to raise the cranes boom, the operator must step on the
pedal; else, the 13-ton genset would not be brought down. Philam did not even present expert evidence to
challenge the need of increasing the power supply to move the boom. Since Philam failed to convince us
of actions that would lay the blame on DMCI, this Court agrees with the CA that DMCI exercised the
necessary care and precaution in lifting the genset.
Firstly, a whole team was involved in transferring the genset. Petitioners did not even the question the acts
of the other team members involved in the crane operations. Secondly, as found by the CA, 8[44] Del Pilar
exercised reasonable care and caution when he tested the crane four times right before actual operations
to make sure that it could lift the genset. Thirdly, as can be gleaned from the statements above, Del Pilar
stopped turning the controls, and it was only when the swinging stopped that he performed the next
maneuver. All of these acts, as proven by the evidence, showed due diligence in operating the crane.
Negligence of Hotels/Innkeepers
Makati Shangri-la vs Harper - There is no dispute that even prior to the untimely demise of Mr. Harper,
defendant was duly forewarned of the security lapses in the hotel. Col. De Guzman was particularly
8

concerned with the security of the private areas where the guest rooms are. He wanted not just one roving
guard in every three or four floors. He insisted there must be at least one in each floor considering the
length and the shape of the corridors. The trained eyes of a security officer was (sic) looking at that
deadly scenario resulting from that wide security breach as that which befell Christian Harper.
The theory of the defense that the malefactor/s was/were known to Harper or was/were visitors of Harper
and that there was a shindig along [the] three deserves scant consideration.
The NBI Biology Report (Exh. C & D) and the Toxicology Report (Exh. E) belie the defense
theory of a joyous party between and among Harper and the unidentified malefactor/s. Based on the
Biology Report, Harper was found negative of prohibited and regulated drugs. The Toxicology Report
likewise revealed that the deceased was negative of the presence ofalcohol in his blood. The defense even
suggests that the malefactor/s gained entry into the private room of Harper either because Harper allowed
them entry by giving them access to the vingcard or because Harper allowed them entry by opening
the door for them, the usual gesture of a room occupant to his visitors.
These minor incidents may be of little significance to the hotel, yet relative to the instant case, it speaks
volume. This should have served as a caveat that the hotel security has lapses.
Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel. The reasonable care that it must exercise for the
safety and comfort of its guests should be commensurate with the grade and quality of the
accommodation it offers. If there is such a thing as five-star hotel security, the guests at Makati
Shangri-La surely deserves just that

YHT vs CA - Noteworthy is the fact that Payam and Lainez, who were employees of Tropicana, had
custody of the master key of the management when the loss took place. In fact, they even admitted that
they assisted Tan on three separate occasions in opening McLoughlin's safety deposit box. 33 This only
proves that Tropicana had prior knowledge that a person aside from the registered guest had access to the
safety deposit box. Yet the management failed to notify McLoughlin of the incident and waited for him to
discover the taking before it disclosed the matter to him. Therefore, Tropicana should be held responsible
for the damage suffered by McLoughlin by reason of the negligence of its employees.
The management should have guarded against the occurrence of this incident considering that Payam
admitted in open court that she assisted Tan three times in opening the safety deposit box of McLoughlin
at around 6:30 A.M. to 7:30 A.M. while the latter was still asleep. 34 In light of the circumstances
surrounding this case, it is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the employees of Tropicana to the
opening of the safety deposit box, the loss of McLoughlin's money could and should have been avoided.
Under Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who, in the performance of their obligations, are guilty
of negligence, are liable for damages. As to who shall bear the burden of paying damages, Article 2180,
paragraph (4) of the same Code provides that the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which
the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Also, this Court has ruled that if an employee
is found negligent, it is presumed that the employer was negligent in selecting and/or supervising him for
it is hard for the victim to prove the negligence of such employer. 35 Thus, given the fact that the loss of
McLoughlin's money was consummated through the negligence of Tropicana's employees in allowing Tan
to open the safety deposit box without the guest's consent, both the assisting employees and YHT Realty

Corporation itself, as owner and operator of Tropicana, should be held solidarily liable pursuant to Article
2193.

Art. 2003. The hotel-keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by posting notices to the effect that he
is not liable for the articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the hotel-keeper and the guest
whereby the responsibility of the former as set forth in Articles 1998 to 2001 37 is suppressed or
diminished shall be void.
Article 2003 was incorporated in the New Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply
to situations such as that presented in this case. The hotel business like the common carrier's business is
imbued with public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the
business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary
stipulation in so-called "undertakings" that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotel keepers
on guests for their signature.

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