G.R. No.

201858

June 4, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JENNY LIKIRAN alias "Loloy", Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr.
(Sareno ). In its Decision1 dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00
actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This court has no
jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19,
2000 in BarangayBugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a
dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon
(Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified
that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m.
After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome
Likiran3 (Jerome), the accused-appellants brother, punched Mercado on the mouth.
Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short
firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed off.
Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area, heard the commotion.
Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen,
the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident
first-hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to
bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno
was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab
wound at the left scapular area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. Heand Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was located
and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accusedappellants defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and
that it was some other unknown person, and not the accused-appellant, who was the
culprit; and Eleuterio Quiopa stating that he was with the accused-appellant and Jerome
inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellants
culpability.5 Prosecution witness Dagangons positive identification of the accusedappellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder. 6 The
RTC also rejected the accused-appellants defense of denial as it was not supported by
evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to
prove that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the night of March
19, 2000.7
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision8 dated
July 27, 2011, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant
as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTCs
conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-appellant, and
that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. According to the
CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for
the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the accused-appellant ganged up on
the victim.10
The CA, however, sustained the RTCs finding of treachery.11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction.12 According to him, the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant
argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant and his
culpability.13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional
reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence and
affirmed by the CA.14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal.15In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by the
testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellants argument that
it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no
evidence to show that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the
CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and
had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted
Dagangons attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome
during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive
identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial.17 Such positive identification
gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely
testify against an accused.18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his
instantaneous death.19 The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record
established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person.20 At this juncture, the
Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants the
accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the accused-appellant
who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that Jerome
died on March 12, 2005.21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellants contention and ruled that "the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.22 And
even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accusedappellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Courts ruling in People v.
Pilola.23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CAs
disregard of the accused-appellants argument.

The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon
and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death
issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by
the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of
death due to multiple stab wound scapular area."24 Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is
allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.25 In this case, while it appears that
the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the
same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission.26 Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the
victim.27 Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause

DOA

Antecedent cause

Multiple GSW

Underlying cause

Stab wound scapular area (L)28

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sarenos cause of death. 29

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the
shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to
the latters death. In Quinto v. Andres,30 the Court stated that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual
act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. A different doctrine
would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and
essential safeguard. x x x[.]31 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CAs conclusion that the killing of
Sareno was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are
shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means,
method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.32 Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the
sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the
victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment.33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the
shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of
the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the
accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they
would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the prosecution evidence was that
Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately became a target of the accusedappellant and Jeromes rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable
only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years.34 In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty should

be imposed in its medium period,35 or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,36 the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal medium,37 and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense,38 or prision mayor in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years.39 There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the Court thereby sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral
damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the matter. 40 These,
on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further,
the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing
on record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's
fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed under the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 42 and absent any evidence
supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual basis.1wphi1
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby
found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197204, March 26, 2014
DANILO O. GARCIA AND JOVEN SD. BRIZUELA, Petitioners, v. SANDIGANBAYAN
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision dated 14
October 20102and Resolutions dated 9 March 20113 and 1 June 20114 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 20574 entitled People of the Philippines v. Dir. Gen.
Cesar P. Nazareno, P/Dir. Guillermo T. Domondon, C/Supt. Armand D. Agbayani, P/Supt.
Van D. Luspo, C/Insp. Joven SD. Brizuela, C/Insp. Juan G. Luna, and C/Insp. Danilo O.
Garcia.
The Facts
For the 3rd quarter of calendar year 1992, the PNP Office of the Directorate for
Comptrollership issued and released two Advice of SubAllotments5 (ASA): (1) ASA No.

4363 dated 11 August 1992 for P5,000,000, and (2) ASA No. 4400 dated 18 August 1992
for P15,000,000, in the total amount of P20,000,000, for the purchase of combat clothing
and individual equipment (CCIE) items of the Cordillera Regional Command (CRECOM) of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) located at Camp Bado, Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet.
The ASAs were addressed For the Chief, Philippine National Police; by Guillermo T.
Domondon, Director. The PNP Chief and PNP Director for Comptrollership at the time
were Cesar P. Nazareno (Nazareno) and Guillermo T. Domondon (Domondon),
respectively. On behalf of Domondon, the ASAs were signed by P/Supt. Van Luspo
(Luspo), then Chief, Fiscal Division, Budget and Fiscal Services of the PNP Directorate for
Comptrollership, by virtue of a Memorandum6 dated 31 January 1991, where Domondon
gave Luspo and a certain Supt. Reynold Osia, the authority to sign for him and on his
behalf, allotments for personal services in the amount not exceeding Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000), and in his absence, the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000).
Thereafter, the proceeds of the two ASAs were transferred to CRECOMs deposit account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio Branch.
After receipt of the ASAs, petitioner Chief Inspector Danilo O. Garcia (Garcia), then
CRECOM Assistant Regional Director for Comptrollership, directed the preparation of cash
advances in the form of 15 disbursement vouchers,7 4 dated 12 August 1992 and 11
dated 21 August 1992, in the total amount of P20,000,000. The disbursement vouchers
were signed and approved by either Garcia or Armand D. Agbayani (Agbayani), then
CRECOM Regional Director, and issued in favor of petitioner Chief Inspector Joven SD.
Brizuela (Brizuela), then CRECOM Disbursing Officer, as lone payee and claimant.
After the approval of the disbursement vouchers, Chief Inspector Juan Luna (Luna), then
CRECOM Finance Officer, issued 250 LBP checks8 (Check Nos. 037483037533 and
037584037783) of various dates, from 11 to 22 August 1992, in the amounts of P50,000
or P100,000 totalling to P20,000,000. Luna and Garcia were the signatories of the checks
issued in the amount of P50,000, while Luna and Agbayani were the signatories of
checks amounting to P100,000. The 250 LBP checks were all issued in favor of Brizuela
as payee, in his capacity as disbursing officer.
On 13 August 1992, Brizuela encashed the check dated 11 August 1992 from the LBP,
Baguio Branch. Again, on 26 August 1992, Brizuela encashed the checks dated 18, 19,
20, 21 and 22 August 1992. All the proceeds of the encashed checks amounting to
P20,000,000 were turned over by Brizuela to Garcia in the presence of Luna.
For the purpose of liquidating the cash advances, CRECOM Regional Accountant Jocelyn
VersozaHinanay received the following documents: (1) original copies of the
disbursement vouchers; (2) 250 LBP checks; (3) corresponding Clothing Requirements
and Certifications that were signed by the heads of the various commands and units of
CRECOM; and (4) PNP Personnel Payrolls that were also signed by the various CRECOM
command heads, approved payable by Luna, and certified by Brizuela that the amount
of P11,270.00 representing CCIE for the 3rd quarter of 1992 was paid to each payee
whose name appears on the (above) payroll.
The various CRECOM command and unit heads, who allegedly signed the Clothing
Requirements and Certifications and the PNP Personnel Payrolls, were identified
as:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Supt. Manuel T. Raval of PNP Abra;

Supt. Rolando C. Garcia of PNP Benguet;
C/Insp. Prospero C. Noble, Jr. of PNP Ifugao;
Supt. Rodrigo F. Licudine of the Regional Mobile Force;
Supt. Juan T. Refe of the Northern Luzon Training Center;
Supt. Conrado R. Peregrino, Jr. of PNP KalingaApayao; and
Supt. Amparo C. Cabigas of the Headquarter Services.

Thereafter, for postaudit purposes, the documents were submitted to Adelaida C.

Urbanozo (Urbanozo), State Auditor II of the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned at

CRECOM PNP.
On 26 February 1993, after the postaudit, PNP Chief Inspector General Benjamin
Valenton directed a PNP IG FactFinding Team to conduct an investigation on the alleged
fictitious CCIE purchase of CRECOM PNP worth P20,000,000. The fact finding team was
composed of team leader P/Supt. Rafael Jayme, P/C Insp. Ricardo M. Orot (Orot) and P/Sr.
Insp. Evangeline L. Candia (Candia).
In the course of the investigation, the fact finding team invited for questioning and took
the statements of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)
(8)

Supt. Manuel T. Raval who executed a Sworn Statement dated 23 March 1993
stating that Personnel Payrolls for PNP Abra were fabricated and that his
signature indicated in said payrolls was not his;
Supt. Rolando C. Garcia who executed a Sworn Statement dated 23 March 1993
stating that Personnel Payrolls for PNP Benguet were fabricated and that his
signature indicated in said payrolls was not his;
Ciriaco C. Wagan, then Regional and Supply Accountable Officer of CRECOM,
who executed a Sworn Statement dated 17 February 1993 stating that CRECOM
did not receive any CCIE for the 3rd quarter of 1992;
Dominador Pamolar, Carlos D. Capinding, and Sanilo Dosdos, Jr., who executed
a JointAffidavit dated 2 March 1993 stating that no CCIE, in cash or in kind,
was received by CRECOM Headquarters for the 3rd quarter of 1992;
SPO4 Romulo B. Rosido, Chief Clerk of the Office of the Regional Inspector, PNP
CRECOM; SPO4 Wilson B. Pulido, Chief Clerk of the Office of the Regional Police
Legal Service (RPLS); and SPO2 Jorge S. Benitez of the Office of the RPLS, who
executed a JointAffidavit on 2 March 1993 stating that CRECOM did not receive
any CCIE for the 3rd quarter of 1992;
Brizuela who executed a Sworn Statement dated 22 February 1993;
Garcia; and
Luna who executed a Sworn Statement dated 4 March 1993.

The fact finding team also gathered Personnel Payrolls, covering the 3rd quarter of
calendar year 1992, which contained the names of the members of the PNP in Abra,
Benguet and KalingaApayao. The payrolls were prepared by CRECOM and signed by
Supt. Manuel T. Raval or Supt. Rolando C. Garcia and Brizuela.
In an Investigation Report9 dated 2 April 1993, the fact finding team revealed the
irregularity of the release of the ASAs worth P20,000,000 by the PNP Office of the
Directorate for Comptrollership. Based on the documents collected and the sworn
statements taken from CRECOM personnel and other witnesses, the fact finding team
discovered the following: (1) that the ASAs were issued without the corresponding
Personnel Program from the PNP Directorate of Personnel, the office which determines
the needs of the units of the PNP; (2) that the ASAs were received by CRECOM
Comptroller Garcia from PNP Headquarters; (3) that Garcia received the proceeds of the
ASAs from CRECOM Disbursing Officer Brizuela in the presence of CRECOM Finance
Officer Luna after Brizuela encashed the 250 LBP checks; and (4) that all the liquidating
documents, consisting of the Clothing Requirement and Certifications and the list of the
PNP Personnel Payrolls, supposedly signed by the various CRECOM command and unit
heads, were all fictitious. The signatures appearing in the liquidating documents were
forged and the personnel listed in the respective Official Rosters of the officers
commands did not receive any CCIE for the 3rd quarter of 1992.
On 11 May 1993, the fact finding team filed its Investigation Report and recommended
the filing of appropriate criminal charges with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno,
Domondon, Agbayani, Garcia, Luna, and Brizuela for (1) Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents, and (2) violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or
the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After the preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Amended

Information10dated 28 July 1997 for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, docketed as

Criminal Case No. 20574, against all the police personnel, as recommended by the fact
finding team, allegedly involved in the procurement of the fraudulent CCIE purchase,
including Luspo. The Amended Information states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about August 1992, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City and Baguio City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused public officers, namely: Maj. Gen. Cesar Nazareno, then Director General,
Philippine National Police (PNP); P/Dir. Guillermo Domondon, then Director for
Comptrollership, PNP; C/Supt. Armand Agbayani, then Regional Director, Cordillera
Regional Command (CRECOM), PNP; P/Supt. Van Luspo, then Chief, Fiscal Division,
Budget and Fiscal Services, Office of the Director for Comptrollership, PNP; C/Insp. Joven
Brizuela, then Disbursing Officer, CRECOM, PNP; C/Insp. Juan Luna, then Finance Officer,
CRECOM, PNP; and C/Insp. Danilo Garcia, then Comptroller, CRECOM, PNP, while in the
performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith, cause undue injury
to the government by: approving without budgetary basis the release of Advise of Sub
Allotment SN No. 4363 dated August 11, 1992 in the amount of PHP 5,000,000.00 and
Advise of SubAllotment SN No. 4400 dated August 18, 1992 in the amount of PHP
15,000,000.00 for the procurement of combat, clothing and individual equipment (CCIE)
for the use of PNP personnel of CRECOM, La Trinidad, Benguet; causing to be issued and
encashed Land Bank Check Nos. 037483 to 037533, 037584 to 037611, 037613, 037615
to 037777, 037779 to 037783, 137612 and 137614 with an aggregate amount of
TWENTY MILLION PESOS (PHP 20,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for payment of ghost
purchases of the said CCIE items; falsifying the signatures of the military personnel listed
in the payroll of CRECOM to make it appear therein that the military personnel of
CRECOM have received the said CCIE items; and, thereafter, misappropriating the said
amount of PHP 20,000,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11 (Emphasis supplied)
All the accused, except Agbayani, who was still at large and beyond the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, refused to enter any plea upon their separate arraignments. The
Sandiganbayan entered a plea of not guilty for each of them.
In the PreTrial Order dated 17 May 2005 issued by the Sandiganbayan, all the accused
agreed to the following stipulation of fact and issue:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
III
Stipulation of Fact
The parties stipulated that all the accused were public officers, occupying their
respective positions as described in the Information, at the time the matters of this case
allegedly occurred.
IV
Issue
The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether or not the accused, individually or in
conspiracy with one another, committed manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence in the performance of their public functions in connection with
the subject matter of the Information, thereby causing undue injury to the government.
Respondent People of the Philippines, as plaintiff in the case, presented the following
witnesses:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Retired Senior Supt. Rafael E. Jayme;
(2) Supt. Rolando C. Garcia;
(3) Supt. Manuel T. Raval;

(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Candia;
CRECOM Regional Accountant Jocelyn VersozaHinanay;
COA State Auditor Adelaida Urbanozo;
Gen. Nicasio Javier Radovan, Jr., then Provincial Commander of Mountain Province;
SPO1 Carlos D. Capinding, a PNP officer assigned at CRECOM in 1992;
Ret. PNP Officer Brigilio Balaba, then CRECOMs Assistant Regional Director for
Logistic; and
(10) Ret. Gen. Rufino Ibay, the PNP Director for Comptrollership in April 1993.
During the trial held on 1 August 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order containing
the stipulations of the prosecution and defense on the testimonies of five police officers,
intended to be called to the witness stand, and dispensed with their testimonies. The
relevant portions of the Order state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Gen. Prospero C. Noble, Jr., Provincial Commander, will testify that the signatures
appearing on Exhibits B43 up to N47, consisting of payrolls, clothing requirements
and certifications purporting to be his are actually not his signatures and that the listed
personnel have not been paid their CCIE;
2. Supt. Rodrigo F. Licudine, then Commander of the Regional Mobile Force, will testify
that the signatures appearing on Exhibits C71 up to T79, consisting of payrolls,
clothing requirements and certifications purporting to be his are actually not his
signatures and that the listed personnel have not been paid their CCIE;
3. Supt. Juan T. Refe II, Commander of the Northern Luzon Training Center, will testify
that the signatures appearing on Exhibits P33 up to A13, consisting of payrolls,
clothing requirements and certifications purporting to be his are actually not his
signatures and that the listed personnel have not been paid their CCIE;
4. Supt. Conrado R. Peregrino, Jr., Provincial Commander of KalingaApayao, will testify
that the signatures appearing on Exhibits R50 up to C57, consisting of payrolls,
clothing requirements and certifications purporting to be his are actually not his
signatures and that the listed personnel have not been paid their CCIE; and
5. Supt. Amparo C. Cabigas, Camp Commander, Headquarters Service, will testify that
the signatures appearing on Exhibits U79 up to H85, consisting of payrolls, clothing
requirements purporting to be his are actually not his signatures.12
For the defense, accused Domondon and Luspo intended to present as witness
Superintendent Leonilo Lapus Dalut (Dalut), the Program and Budget Officer of the PNP
Directorate for Personnel from 1989 until 1993. However, since Dalut had already
testified before another division of the Sandiganbayan in other cases, where some of the
accused in this case were also the accused in the other cases, Domondon and Luspo
merely adopted the testimony of Dalut in those cases, including the crossexamination
conducted on Dalut.
Accused Brizuela presented the prosecutions witness, Candia, as his witness pursuant to
a subpoenaissued by the Sandiganbayan. After the presentation of Candia, Brizuela did
not present any other testimonial evidence and merely adopted the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the other accused.
Likewise, accused Garcia did not present any testimonial evidence and merely adopted
the evidence of the other accused.
Accused Luna, on the other hand, testified on his behalf and presented documentary
evidence.
On 8 December 2005, while this case was pending, Nazareno died. Upon motion to
dismiss filed by counsel, with the original certificate of death issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar as basis, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order dated 3 February 2007
dismissing the case against Nazareno.

On 14 October 2010, the Sandiganbayan found Brizuela, Luna and Garcia guilty of the
crime charged and acquitted Domondon and Luspo. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOVEN SD. BRIZUELA, JUAN
G. LUNA, and DANILO O. GARCIA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged in the
Information and sentencing each of them to suffer [the] indeterminate penalty of six (6)
years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, and to suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
Government the total amount of P20 Million representing the losses that it suffered, and
to proportionately pay the costs; and for insufficiency of evidence, ACQUITTING accused
GUILLERMO T. DOMONDON and VAN D. LUSPO with cost de oficio. In this connection, the
respective cash bonds posted by the said two (2) accused are hereby RELEASED to them
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures, and the Hold Departure Orders
issued against them are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
With respect to accused ARMAND D. AGBAYANI, who is atlarge and beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court, this case is ordered ARCHIVED.
SO ORDERED.13
Luna, Brizuela and Garcia filed their respective motions for reconsideration with the
Sandiganbayan.14 Later, Brizuela and Garcia filed separate supplements to their motions
for reconsideration.15 In a Resolution dated 9 March 2011, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motions for reconsideration.
Thereafter, Garcia filed a Manifestation and Motion to Take a Second Look16 dated 30
March 2011 and Brizuela filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration17 and Second Motion for Reconsideration18 dated 2 April 2011. In
separate Resolutions19 dated 1 June 2011, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The issues are (1) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying their second
motions for reconsideration.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners submit that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third essential
elements of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 to convict them of antigraft and corrupt practices.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that all the essential elements of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and a second motion for
reconsideration or a motion to take a second look is a prohibited pleading. Respondents
also question petitioners defense of regularity in the performance of their functions as
Assistant Regional Director for Comptrollership and Disbursing Officer which was raised
only for the first time before the Sandiganbayan when they filed their separate
supplements to their motions for reconsideration.
Petitioners were charged for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
The three essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (1) that the
accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2)
that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) that the accused caused undue injury to any party including the
Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.20
On the first element, the records show that at the time the procurement of the CCIE
occurred, petitioners Garcia and Brizuela were public officers discharging their officials
functions in the Philippine National Police as Assistant Regional Director for
Comptrollership and Disbursing Officer, respectively. In the course of the trial, the
Sandiganbayan issued a PreTrial Order dated 17 May 2005 which contained the
stipulation of fact that all the accused were public officers, occupying their respective
positions as described in the Information, at the time the matters of this case allegedly
occurred. Thus, petitioners were public officials holding positions in the PNP on the
questioned dates as clearly stipulated in the Amended Information filed by the
Ombudsman. Indisputably, the first element was met.
With regard to the second element, that the public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, the case of Albert v.
Sandiganbayan21 explained the different modes by which the crime may be
committed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed,
that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence. In Uriarte v. People, this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may
be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable
negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain
inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. Evident bad
faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and
dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse
motive or ill will. Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even
the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected.
In this case, the Amended Information22 filed by the Ombudsman specifically states
evident bad faith as the mode by which the crime has been committed. As defined
in Albert, evident bad faithconnotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing
for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive or self interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes.
In their petition, Garcia and Brizuela maintain that their duties and functions in the PNP
show that they did not participate in the alleged crime. Garcia asserts that while he was
the Assistant Regional Director for Comptrollership (ARDC) at the time of the purchase of
the fictitious CCIE items, his functions as ARDC would show that he did not take part in

the anomalous offense. Garcia states that it was incumbent upon him, in his ministerial
function as ARDC, to control and employ funds through the preparation of Request for
Obligation of Allotment (ROA) and Regional Allotment Advice (RAA). Garcia emphasizes
that he was not a signatory to the disbursement vouchers contrary to the allegation of
the prosecution that he directed the preparation of the 15 disbursement vouchers
totalling P20,000,000. Garcia states that it was only a matter of procedure that he affixed
his signature at the dorsal portion of the disbursement vouchers to manifest that a pre
audit and inspection had been conducted. As ARDC, it was his management function to
conduct the preaudit and inspection before any payment or disbursement was made.
Garcia adds that he merely complied with the directive when the ASAs were issued For
the Chief, Philippine National Police by Domondon, although the ASAs were signed for
Domondon by Luspo, then Chief of the Fiscal Division, Budget and Fiscal Services of the
PNP Directorate for Comptrollership. Garcia further claims that he was not privy to and
had no direct or implied participation in the payroll presentation although his name
appeared in the payrolls submitted. Garcia alleges that his purported signatures affixed
in the payrolls were forged.
On the other hand, petitioner Brizuela insists that while he was the payee indicated in
the questioned disbursement vouchers and LBP checks, he was merely performing his
duty as Disbursing Officer to disburse funds against approved expense vouchers. This
assigned task was given by the Regional Director who had the authority and the right to
command and demand compliance upon him as a subordinate. Brizuela adds that his
compliance with a perceived lawful order does not connote that he committed the
offense through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence,
as defined in the second element of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
We are not convinced.
Petitioners anchor their defense on the nature of their respective positions to prove that
they acted within the bounds of their functions. However, Garcia and Brizuela only raised
their functions as ARDC and Disbursing Officer, respectively, for the first time before the
Sandiganbayan when they filed their separate Supplements to Motion for
Reconsideration and after a decision had already been rendered by the Sandiganbayan.
The settled rule is that issues not raised in the court a quo cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal23 in this case, in a motion for reconsideration for being offensive to
the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.24 Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are barred by estoppel and
cannot be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Also, in United Special Watchman Agency v. Court of Appeals,25 we held that a
second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 5, Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court.26 The effect of filing a second motion for reconsideration is to make
the questioned decision final and executory.
Nevertheless, we find that the defense of Garcia and Brizuela is weak since their defense
mainly rests on the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their official functions.
As shown by the records, Garcia, after receipt of the ASAs, signed and approved the
disbursement vouchers, together with Agbayani, as testified to by the Regional
Accountant of CRECOM, Jocelyn VersozaHinanay. After the vouchers were signed and
approved, Luna issued 250 LBP checks in the amounts of P50,000 and P100,000. Garcia
and Luna were the signatories of the P50,000 checks and Luna and Agbayani were the
signatories of the P100,000 checks. The table27 below shows that Garcia signed a total of
100 pieces of P50,000 checks issued on two dates, 18 and 19 August 1992, in the total
amount of P5,000,000:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Date
081192
081892
081992
082092

Quantity of Checks
51 pieces (P100,000 each)
41 pieces (P50,000 each)
59 pieces (P50,000 each)
49 pieces (P100,000 each)

Number
037483037533
037584037624
037625037683
037684037732

Amount
P 5,100,000
2,050,000
2,950,000
4,900,000

082192
082292

26 pieces (P100,000 each)

24 pieces (P100,000 each)
250 pieces

037733037758
037759037783

2,600,000
2,400,000
P20,000,000

In his defense, Garcia maintains that he merely complied with the directive of the ASAs.
Given that Garcia performed his duty from the preparation of the ROA and RAA until the
approval of the disbursement vouchers in accordance with his regular duties and
functions in the PNP, he did not refute the allegation made by Brizuela that he turned
over the total amount of P20,000,000 to Garcia in the presence of Luna. As attested by
the Sworn Statement28 of Brizuela on 22 February 1993 taken by Candia in the presence
of Orot at the Office of the PNP Inspector General, Camp Crame, Quezon City, Brizuela
admitted that after encashing the 250 LBP checks in the total amount of P20,000,000, he
gave the entire amount to Garcia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Candia:

Brizuela:

Candia:
Brizuela:
Candia:
Brizuela:
Candia:
Brizuela:

Showing you a list of checks and bundle of checks with a total of 250
checks submitted by Ms. Jocelyn S. Versoza, Chief PNP Regional
Accountant issued on your name as payee, will you explain why these
checks were issued on (sic) your name and the purpose of its
issuance?
Since I am the Disbursing Officer, the checks were issued on (sic) my
name as payee and that the requisition voucher was on (sic) my name.
I was informed by my CO, RFSU that the amount will be cash advanced
for the procurement of CCIE.
Except for [the] requisition voucher, is there [any] other document to
support the claim for CCIE?
None.
After encashment of the check, to whom did you give the
money?
I gave the entire amount to the ARCDS6 for Comptrollership
C/INSP DANILO GARCIA in the presence of C/INSP JUAN LUNA.
Was there a receipt to support your answer in par. 11?
There was no receipt but I gave the money due to trust and
confidence. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Garcia claimed that the signatures appearing above his names in the PNP
Personnel Payrolls, as well as the issued LBP checks, were forged. However, Garcia did
not endeavor to prove otherwise. Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence29 and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery.30 In the present case, Garcia merely relied on the evidence of the other
accused and did not present his own testimonial and documentary evidence to show that
his signature in the personnel payrolls were falsified. Thus, the presumption of validity
and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud.
Brizuela, on the other hand, insists that as the named payee in the questioned
disbursement vouchers and LBP checks, he was merely performing his regular duty as
disbursing officer to disburse funds against approved expense vouchers. However,
contrary to his allegation, Brizuela admitted in his sworn statement that he gave the
entire amount of P20,000,000 to Garcia after encashing the checks. Brizuela did not even
question why the said amount should be turned over to Garcia nor did Brizuela report the
unusual transaction to higher authorities. He even raised the defense of compliance with
a superiors perceived lawful order and disowned accountability for funds he disbursed
which were eventually used for illegal or unauthorized purposes. The facts as established
show that Brizuela took part in the act of issuing and encashing government checks,
then in misappropriating the funds by submitting documents showing that the funds
were allegedly used to pay personnel in the payroll but the personnel later turned out to
be fictitious persons. As CRECOM Disbursing Officer, Brizuela should have seen to it that
the funds were legally and properly disbursed for the purpose for which they were
released. Clearly, Brizuelas actions were tainted with evident bad faith.
Even Luna, in his Sworn Statement31 on 4 March 1993 taken by Candia in the presence of

Orot at the PNP Office of Complaint and Investigation Division, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, admitted that he signed the 250 LBP checks and that he was present when the
P20,000,000 cash was handed by Brizuela to Garcia. The relevant portions of Lunas
Sworn Statement state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Candia:

Luna:
Candia:
Luna:
Candia:
Luna:
Candia:
Luna:
Candia:
Luna:

It was mentioned in the sworn statement of P/CHIEF INSP JOVEN

BRIZUELA PNP that you (C/INSP LUNA) told him that the amount will be
cash advanced for the procurement of CCIE, what can you say about
this?
That is true.
So, was the amount of Twenty Million Pesos intended for the CCIE for
1992 of CRECOM personnel, cash advanced and if so, who cash
advanced [the] same?
Yes, it was requisitioned for cash advanced by CHIEF INSPECTOR
BRIZUELA.
Were the checks worth P20,000,000 encashed? If encashed, who
encashed [the] same, from what bank?
Yes, the checks were encashed by CHIEF INSPECTOR BRIZUELA from
Land Bank Baguio City Branch.
After encashing the checks worth Twenty Million Pesos, where
did the money go?
CHIEF INSPECTOR BRIZUELA personally delivered the
P20,000,000 cash to C/INSPECTOR GARCIA in my presence.
What happened next, after C/INSP BRIZUELA handed the money to
C/INSP GARCIA in your presence?
I have no more knowledge. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Brizuela certified, in the PNP Personnel Payroll submitted to CRECOM Chief
Regional Accountant Jocelyn VersozaHinanay, that the amount of P11,270.00
representing CCIE for the 3rd quarter of 1992 was paid to each payee whose name
appears on the (above) payroll. In its Decision dated 14 October 2010, the
Sandiganbayan found that the names in the payroll, who were the personnel who
supposedly received the CCIE, were fictitious. The relevant portions of the Decision
state:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appears, however, that the names of the personnel listed in the said PNP Personnel
Payrolls who purportedly have each received the amount of P11,270.00 CCIE for the 3rd
Quarter of 1992 are fabricated or fictitious because the names listed therein, when
compared with the Official Rosters submitted by the heads of the different CRECOM
commands, do not appear in the said official rosters. Besides, the heads of the different
CRECOM commands, namely, Supt. Manuel Raval of PNP Abra, Supt. Rolando Garcia of
PNP Benguet, C/Insp. Prospero Noble of PNP Ifugao, Supt. Rodrigo F. Licudine of the
Regional Mobile Force, Supt. Juan T. Refe of Northern Luzon Training Center, Supt.
Conrado R. Peregrino, Jr. of PNP KalingaApayao, and Supt. Amparo Cabigas of the
Headquarter Services testified that their respective signatures appearing in the Clothing
Requirements and Certifications and in the said PNP Personnel Payrolls are forgeries
because the signatures appearing above their typewritten names in said documents are
not theirs and that the personnel of their respective commands listed in the Official
Rosters submitted by them, never received any CCIE for the year 1992.
Moreover, a close examination/scrutiny of the signatures of the personnel listed in the
said PNP Personnel Payrolls, reveals that the said signatures were signed by one person
as shown by the similarity of the style and strokes of the signatures therein which is a
clear indication that said payrolls are fabricated and the personnel named therein are
fictitious or nonexistent.32
Here, Garcia and Luna were the ones who approved the PNP Personnel Payrolls
containing the false entries and it was Brizuela who certified that the police personnel
listed in the payrolls received their intended CCIE when in fact they did not. Clearly,
these are acts of evident bad faith at the least. In submitting fabricated and forged

personnel payrolls as supporting and liquidating documents to cover up the illegal

release of P20,000,000, petitioners orchestrated a conscious wrongdoing to serve some
ulterior motive or selfinterest.
Lastly, the third element of the offense that the act of the accused caused undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused was
also established. Proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that
the injury suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not
merely negligible.33
In the present case, the prosecutions evidence duly proved that petitioners, using their
official positions, by dishonesty and breach of sworn duty, facilitated the approval and
release of government funds amounting to P20,000,000 supposedly for the purchase of
CCIE items of PNP personnel. However, the recipients of the P20,000,000 turned out to
be fictitious PNP personnel, and up to now the P20,000,000 remains unaccounted for.
Thus, petitioners should be made liable for their deceit and misrepresentation and should
compensate the government for the actual damage the government has suffered.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 October 2010
and Resolutions dated 9 March 2011 and 1 June 2011 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 20574.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193217

February 26, 2014

CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner
Corazon Macapagal of the crime of Estafa;2 the Order denying her Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial;3 and the Order4 dated June 29, 2010 denying her
Notice of Appeal,5 in Criminal Case No. 98-166722.
For a proper perspective, a brief statement of the factual and procedural antecedents of
the case follows:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800,000.00,
which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry.6 Petitioner received the
decision on
January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in
an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009.
She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal7 on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on
June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.8
Aggrieved, petitioner comes directly before the Court in this petition for review on
certiorari with the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING
THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BY THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT.
II.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA.
III.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 9, GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND/OR NEW TRIAL FILED BY THE HEREIN
PETITIONER-APPELLANT.9
We deny the petition.
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural
infirmities which this Court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It appears
that petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise
seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below,
the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioners complete disregard of the procedural
rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of her
notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law,
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the
appeal itself.10 A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of
appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However,
the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken.11 The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal
shall be taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved
party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in

availing of the wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the
appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.12
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to
follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or
imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause.13
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts.14 Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not
be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which an application will be directed.15 Direct resort to this Court is allowed only
if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out
in the petition, which are not present in this case.16
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for
yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier,
petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also
the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for
reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the
petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to
attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision
convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. 17 A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a
certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed decision, final order or
judgment.18 Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition.19
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation
of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions,
decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material
and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records
of the lower court.20
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of the
Rules and the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution21 dated September 15,
2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service on
the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid
certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly
accomplished jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least
one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February
2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsels contact details pursuant to the En
Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from
notice. x x x22

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her
counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance.
Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondents Comment
to the petition.
On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance
and asked for more time within which to comply with the Courts resolution, because of
heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred
residence. In a Resolution23 dated
August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension requested,
admonished petitioners counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner
failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsels
explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners counsel claimed
that he could not prepare the required reply because the documents needed had been
destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest efforts
to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point.24 After the Court required him
again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for not complying with
the Courts resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate with his client proved futile,
he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on
record.25 In a Resolution26 dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to
comment thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.1wphi1
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice.27 It is the duty of the counsel to
make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court
has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. 28 Any error in
compliance may be fatal to the client's cause.29 It should be stressed that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural
remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing its exercise.30 The requirements of the rules on appeal
cannot be considered as merely harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded
at whim. In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations,
parties have to abide by these rules with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189833

February 5, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JAVIER MORILLA Y AVELLANO, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano (Morilla) from
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and that of his coaccused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing them2 to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each.

The Regional Trial Court Judgment

On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y
Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan,
Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as they all help
one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in fact, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of two (2) motor vehicles,
namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with commemorative plate to read
"Mayor" and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan, Quezon Province, methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is commonly known as shabu, and with an
approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without
authority whatsoever.3
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City4 on 1 August 2007 convicted Morilla
and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon, of illegal
transport5 of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, with an
approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos. However, it
absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecutions failure to present sufficient evidence
to convict them of the offense charged. The dispositive of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Ronnie
Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie Yang y Yao and
Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately released from custody
unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative
sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over to
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.6
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles driven
by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an ambulance
with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired prior knowledge
that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation of dangerous drugs.
During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned out to be accurate and
indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more than five hundred kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.7
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport
them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the
request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise
dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality
of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just transporting wooden
tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the
ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the
vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.

The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were
caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by
each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their explanations, the
validity of their apprehension was sustained.8
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the testimonies
of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two vehicles, the
Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by Morilla, left Infanta,
Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the ambulance was able
to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance driven by
Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police
officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied
that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles.
Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for
further inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline
granules were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the
sacks. At this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an
attempt to persuade them to let him pass.9 His request was rejected by the police
officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.10 This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the
Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor
Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the
operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the
ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was
rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain
sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.11
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court
for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The court ruled that Dequillas and Yangs mere presence inside the vehicle as
passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra and
Morilla.12
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the
finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to
transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their
respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport
methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive the
ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the
lead vehicle, the Starex van.13
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal
contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was
implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume.14
Courts Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.

In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for
conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the
Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged
in the Information.15
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure16 to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information
itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named
accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x." He
argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information.17
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this
point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it as a ground in a
motion to quash before entering his plea.18
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to
contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or
neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.19
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.20 To determine conspiracy, there must
be a common design to commit a felony.21
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved in
the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole.22 In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs.
Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from
Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the
police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was
requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered
on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was not
involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers that
he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he
just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said
vehicle likewise bears no merit.

Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting
the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous
Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another."23 It was well established
during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of Mayor Mitra, who
was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special law.
The fact of transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs need not be
accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge. 24
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,25 this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full of
marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a
checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,26 the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683,27 the penalty was amended to
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The
penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659,28 where the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid
by each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter
penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which
the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand,
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory
penalties.29
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,30 thus:
As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate court, we
find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that at the time
of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425 was
already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that for violation
of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A. No. 7659
further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20, Article IV of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty prescribed in
Section 15 was changed from "life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
fromP20,000.00 to P30,000.00" to "reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 to P10 million." On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659
amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided by the
amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous drugs
involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion perpetua
under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No. 7659 could

be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in view of its
having a less stricter punishment.1wphi1
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:
"In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that the
amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x
x."
And, since "reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have,
as to him, a retroactive effect," the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is
proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which is reclusion
perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon petitioner, the
same being more favorable to him.31
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13 July 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead
of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200148, June 04, 2014
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner, v. TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
For review is the instant Petition1 filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong (Syhunliong) seeking the
reversal of the Decision2 rendered on July 11, 2011 and Resolution3 issued on January 6,
2012 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110335. The CA set aside the
Orders dated December 4, 20084 and June 18, 20095 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 84, which denied the Motion to Dismiss/Quash on Jurisdictional
Challenge6 (Motion to Quash) filed by the herein respondent, Teresita D. Rivera (Rivera),
in Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802, an action for libel.cra1awredjgc
Antecedents
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in
Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and
Development Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant
and hospital businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager
of BANFF. She was hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.
About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her
resignation to be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued
working for BANFF until March of the same year to complete the turn over of papers
under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.
Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her
remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits
would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her
incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.7

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFFs official cellular phones held by Lumapas:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng lastpay
ko. I dont deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless
ras[.]8 [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.9 (Italics
ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including incentive up to the
last date na nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.10 (Italics
ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month
and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48.11
On April 16, 2007,12 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition. The
information, dated June 21, 2007, charged Rivera with the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 6th day of April, 2006, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
with malicious intent of impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of one
RAMON A. SYHUNGLIONG [sic] and with evident intent of exposing the complainant to
public dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and maliciously publish in the form of text messages and/or caused to be
publish[ed] the following defamatory statements through the companys cellular phone,
to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
that with the said text message, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in
fact she did mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that
tends [sic] to destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon Syhunliong, with no good
or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good
name, honor, character and reputation of the said complainant and to expose it, as in
fact [he] was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash14 the aforequoted information. She argued that the text
message, which was the subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress
she had suffered due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and
incentives. Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of
libel as the elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public
consumption were wanting. Her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite, but
was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests.
During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty.15
The Orders of the RTC
On December 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 denying Riveras Motion to Quash on
these grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he grounds raised by [Rivera] in the motion to quash [are] evidentiary in nature[,]
which can only be threshed out in a full blown hearing to determine if said [t]ext
message falls squarely within the parameters of Privileged Communication or the

elements of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code [are] not fully established by the
Prosecutions evidence.
The Rule on Criminal Procedure in the prosecution of any felony or offense requires only
the existence of probable cause in order to indict an accused of the crime charged. x x x
[P]robable cause was established seasonably during the preliminary investigation.
[Rivera] should have participated during the preliminary investigation or filed a
Motion for re-investigation [if] she was not accorded such right and raised these
grounds, before she enter[ed] her plea during arraignment.
The Supreme Court ruled that [i]t should be noted that the libelous material [or text]
must be viewed as a whole. In order to ascertain the meaning of [the] published article
[or text message], the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase must be
construed in the light of the entire publication.
The Supreme Court held that writing [or texting] to a person other than the person
defamed is sufficient to constitute publication, for the person to whom the letter [text
message] is addressed is a third person in relation to its writer and the person defamed
therein. In this case, the wife of the complainant[,] who received the unsealed letter[,] is
held a third person to whom the publication is made.[?]17 (Citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC thereafter issued an Order18 on June 18, 2009 denying Riveras motion for
reconsideration to the foregoing. Citing Lu Chu Sing and Lu Tian Chiong v. Lu Tiong
Gui,19 the RTC explained that the privileged character of a communication merely does
away with the presumption of malice. However, the plaintiff is not precluded from
proving the existence of such malice. The RTC once again concurred with the Public
Prosecutors finding that there was probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to
Syhunliong the possession of a vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to
cause dishonor or discredit to the latters name.
Rivera challenged the orders issued by the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari20 filed
before the CA. Quoting Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), she emphasized
that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in a private
communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty.21 Citing Brillante v. Court of Appeals,22 Rivera enumerated the requisites,
compliance with which would make a statement fall within the purview of a qualified
privileged communication, viz: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one [for] whom it is made; (2) the
communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or
duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the
statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.23 Rivera
likewise stressed that under Sections 3(a)24 and 9,25 Rule 11726 of the Rules of Court, an
accused may move to quash the information even after arraignment if the facts charged
therein do not constitute an offense. She thus concluded that the text message she sent
to Lumapas was in the nature of a qualified privileged communication, it being merely an
expression of her legitimate grievances over the delay in the release of her unpaid
salaries and other entitlements. Rivera texted Lumapas because the latter was in the
best position to help expedite the release of the checks. Rivera had no intent to injure
anyones reputation. Lastly, Rivera labeled as erroneous the RTCs declaration regarding
the necessity of a full blown trial since facts sufficient for the resolution of the case were
allegedly already extant in the records.cra1awredjgc
The CA Ruling
On July 11, 2011, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision27 directing the dismissal
of the information for libel filed against Rivera. The CA favorably considered her
argument that when the facts in an information fail to charge an offense, the said ground

can be invoked by the accused in a motion to quash filed even after arraignment. The
CA likewise explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The focal issue to the parties in the present case is whether the facts charged in the
information[,] as well as the undeniable facts appearing on the record[,] show that an
offense of libel has been committed. Our criminal law convincingly provide us with a
definition of libel It is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect ... or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of ... a person. x x x.
The first procedural requisite in the determination of the existence of libel is whether
there is a defamatory imputation. The history of the law on libel abounds in examples of
utterances or statements that are not necessarily considered libelous because they are a
[sic] mere expression[s] of an [sic] opinion[s] of a [sic] person[s] in connection with a
[sic] plea[s] or grievance[s]. Libel is inherently a limitation on the liberty of speech and
press freedom, and must be construed in a manner that does not trench upon
constitutionally protected freedoms.
x x x There can be libel only if the words used are calculated to induce the hearer or
reader to suppose and understand them as impeaching the honesty, virtue or reputation
of another. The question is not what the writer or speaker meant by his words but what
they convey to those who heard or read them.
xxxx
We can break up the text message of [Rivera] to [Lumapas] into three parts. The
utterance is mercifully short so that it could not be difficult to infer the whole sense and
understanding of the message from the standpoint of Lumapas to whom the message
was conveyed. In context, [Rivera] was seeking payment of her wage claims consequent
to her resignation and receiving [BANFFs] response through Lumapas. [Rivera] retorted
with three things in her message to Lumapas (1) that she suffered a lot in collecting her
last pay from [BANFF] Grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha ng last pay
ko.[;] (2) that she does not deserve to suffer this way [because she] did [her] job when
[she was] still there[;] and (3) turning to [Syhunliong] himself [she] said God bless
ras[.] [S]ana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.
If libel is to be understood as an imputation of a crime, vice or defect to another, there
can be no libel in the first two of the three statements which announced only the
sufferings, albeit undeserved[,] of [Rivera]. The proposition gets to be dicey in the third
statement because now she makes a distinct reference to [Syhunliong][,] [b]ut is the
imputation defamatory? We hesitate to reach this conclusion, and all doubts in criminal
law, we are basically taught, must be resolved in favor of the accused. To articulate
the legal wisdom, [Rivera] has the right to express an opinion in a matter in which
she has an undeniable interest.
[Rivera said] in the last part of the text that [Syhunliong] should understand the real
meaning of the mass when he goes to attend it. It is in this tail end of the message that
[Syhunliong] is mentioned. But what is conveyed by the words []sana alam niya real
meaning?[?] Does it impute a crime, vice or defect in [Syhunliong], either directly or by
way of innuendo? But the innuendo can only be explanatory of a libelous imputation and
cannot alter the sense of the words claimed to be libelous. If the publication is not
actionable per se, an innuendo cannot make it so, and if the publication is actionable per
se, the innuendo would not even be necessary.
We hold that the text message is not actionable libel. It does not serve to cast a shadow
on [Syhunliongs] character and integrity[,] there being no direct and personal
imputation of a venality to him. At best, the statement that [Syhunliong] should
understand the meaning of the mass suggests that [Syhunliong] should be
morecompassionate and caring to the employee. But is being the converse
of compassionateand caring suggestive of a vice or defect in the person alluded to? We
do not think so. Otherwise, even courts should be exposed to contempt and ridicule for

reaching at times decisions in favor of capital and against labor. x x x To follow the intent
of the message as ordinarily conveyed by the words and the context in which they are
said, it can only suggest the intention of [Rivera] to describe [Syhunliong] as strict and
selfish. But[,] there are legitimate reasons why a person who acts in the interest of the
employer may appear strict and selfish to the other side. One may have to be so to
protect the interest of his company and, indeed, the outcome of the labor case
vindicates the stand of [Syhunliong] against giving [Rivera] the claims she sought after.
A responsible officer whose decisions may affect the fortunes of others and who is faced
with criticism such as in this case should not be so onion-skinned as to react through the
criminal law. Instead, he should use methods of discussion and persuasion to dispel the
misgivings over his decisions. He should, in particular, explain through the same source
that told him of the comment why [BANFF] cannot satisfy all [of Riveras] claims.
x x x The matter contained in the text message is privileged communication under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code which [negates] the existence of malice in a
private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
[moral] or social duty. x x x It was Lumapas who told her of the stand of [Syhunliong] on
the matter of her wage claims, and her reaction through the text message may be
deemed a part of her duty to seek redress of her grievances through the same source.
She was speaking in response to duty and not out of an intent to injure the reputation of
the person who claims to be defamed. There was no unnecessary publicity of the
message beyond the necessity of conveying it to the party concerned.28 (Citations
omitted and italics supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA denied Syhunliongs motion for reconsideration to the above through the herein
assailed Resolution29 dated January 6, 2012.cra1awredjgc
Issues and Arguments of the Parties
Undaunted, Syhunliong now presents to this Court the issues of whether or not: (a) the
trial courts denial of a motion to quash information may be validly assailed through a
special civil action forcertiorari; (b) Rivera may validly question the denial of her motion
to quash before the CA after voluntarily allowing herself to be arraigned even during the
pendency of such motion to quash; (c) the CA may validly review on certiorari what was,
at best, an error of judgment made by the RTC; (d) the CA correctly ruled that the facts
charged in the information do not constitute the offense of libel; and (e) the CA
committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal of Criminal Case No. Q-07147802 on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were privileged
communication.30
In support of the petition, Syhunliong cites Soriano, et al. v. People, et al.31 where the
Court declared that in assailing the denial of a motion to quash an information, the
accused should not file a special civil action for certiorari. Instead, the accused should
enter a plea, go to trial sans prejudice to present the special defenses he or she had
invoked in the motion to quash, and if an adverse decision is rendered, file an appeal
therefrom.
Syhunliong further avers that Rivera was arraigned on October 11, 2007. Section 1, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that the accused may only be allowed to file a
motion to quash at any time before entering a plea. In Riveras case, she had already
voluntarily entered a plea; hence, it was tantamount to an effective abandonment of her
motion to quash.
It is also Syhunliongs argument that the CA improperly arrogated unto itself the power
to review the Public Prosecutor and RTCs uniform finding of the existence of probable
cause. Even if it were to be assumed that the RTC erred in its disposition, it was a
mistake of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
Syhunliong also refutes the CAs finding that the facts charged in the information did not
constitute the crime of libel. The text message was apparently an indictment of his

personality and character since it portrayed him as a hypocrite.

Lastly, Syhunliong invokes People v. Judge Gomez32 which enunciated the doctrine that in
a libel case, the privileged nature of a communication is not a ground for a motion to
quash, but is merely a matter of defense to be proven during the trial.
In Riveras Comment,33 she reiterates the arguments in the Motion to Quash filed with
the RTC. Additionally, she contends that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Syhunliongs complaint. The text message was sent on April 6, 2006. Per
Syhunliongs narration in the instant petition, his complaint was filed on August 18,
2007,34 beyond the one year prescriptive period for instituting actions for libel provided
for in Articles 9035 and 9136 of the RPC.
Further, the ground that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an
offense can be raised even after arraignment and is broad enough to cover within its
ambit lack of probable cause. This, the court can re-assess in the exercise of its inherent
power of judicial review.
Rivera also laments that she was deprived of due process and of the opportunity to
submit countervailing evidence during preliminary investigation.
Our Ruling
There is no merit in the instant petition.
Prescription had set in.
Syhunliong raised five issues before this Court, but the Courts resolution of the same
would be a superfluity in the light of Riveras unrefuted averment that prescription had
set in before the complaint for libel was instituted.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo,37 the Court, partially quoting People v. Moran,38 stressed
the reason behind and the character of prescription of penal offenses, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and
declaring the offense to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a
statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that
after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; x x x that from henceforth[,]
he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence[,] it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor
of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and
notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of
innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of
guilt. Independently of these views, it must be remembered that delay in instituting
prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State, but of peril to public justice
in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It
is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing
such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace,
but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns,
and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained.
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from
the liberality of the State. x x x Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the
grantee thereof, the accused.39 (Italics supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the case at bar, it is extant in the records that Syhunliong filed his complaint against
Rivera more than one year after the allegedly libelous message was sent to Lumapas.
Whether the date of the filing of the complaint is April 16, 2007 or August 18, 2007,40 it
would not alter the fact that its institution was made beyond the prescriptive period

provided for in Article 90 of the RPC. The Court finds no persuasive reason why Rivera
should be deprived of the benefits accruing from the prescription of the crime ascribed to
her.
People v. Castro,41 on the other hand, is instructive anent the effect in criminal
proceedings of the failure of an accused to raise prescription as a ground in a motion to
quash an information, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to
raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?
A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. x x x [T]he court ruled that the crime
had already prescribed holding that this defense can not [b]e deemed waived even if the
case had been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme
Court. The philosophy behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows: Although the
general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly set up in
the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken
advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal
cases, such as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for
the State not having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish,
or continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its
action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare. And elaborating
on this proposition, the Court went on to state as follows:
As prescription of the crime is the loss by the State of the right to prosecute and punish
the same, it is absolutely indisputable that from the moment the State has lost or waived
such right, the defendant may, at any stage of the proceeding, demand and ask that the
same be finally dismissed and he be acquitted from the complaint, and such petition is
proper and effective even if the court taking cognizance of the case has already
rendered judgment and said judgment is merely in suspense, pending the resolution of a
motion for a reconsideration and new trial, and this is the more so since in such a case
there is not yet any final and irrevocable judgment.
The ruling above adverted to squarely applies to the present case. Here, the rule
provides that the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the
accused pleads to the charge, as otherwise the defense would be deemed waived; but,
as was well said in the Moran case, this rule is not of absolute application, especially
when it conflicts with a substantive provisions of the law, such as that which refers to
prescription of crimes. Since, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court has only the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law, and cannot cover substantive rights (section 13, article
VIII, of the Constitution), the rule we are considering cannot be interpreted or given such
scope or extent that would come into conflict or defeat an express provision of our
substantive law. One of such provisions is article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that the prescription of crime has the effect of totally extinguishing the criminal
liability. And so we hold that the ruling laid down in the Moran case still holds good even
if it were laid down before the adoption of the present Rules of Court.42(Italics supplied)
While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view
of Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the
defense of extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed
waived even if the accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Riveras
case, the issue of prescription is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this
Court. Syhunliong does not specifically refute Riveras averment, thus, it is deemed
admitted.
In sum, even if the Court were to sustain Syhunliongs stance that Rivera availed of the
wrong remedy when she resorted to filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail
the RTC orders denying the motion to quash, the result would only prove circuitous.
Even if the trial proceeds and an adverse decision is rendered against Rivera, she can
appeal the same, but the CA and this Court would still be compelled to order the
dismissal of the information on account of prescription of the crime.

Prescription of the crime is already a compelling reason for this Court to order
the dismissal of the libel information, but the Court still stresses that the
text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good faith
on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or concerning which
he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding duty.43
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer
or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the
power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice.44
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial of
the latters claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong. Rivera
expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At that time,
Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of Riveras claims.
Prescinding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CAs declaration that
Riveras text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication
since she was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not out of
an intent to injure the reputation45 of Syhunliong. Besides, [t]here was no unnecessary
publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party concerned.46
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision rendered on July
11, 2011 and Resolution issued on January 6, 2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 110335 ordering the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84, to dismiss the
information for libel filed by Ramon A. Syhunliong against Teresita D. Rivera
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199689

March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This appeal challenges the Decision1 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision2 dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (R TC), Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516, which
found accused-appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit" (Constantino),
guilty of the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly
known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Information3 filed before the R TC charged Constantino, as follows:

That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law
and without permit to sell, transport, deliver and distribute dangerous drugs, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, transport, distribute and deliver two
(2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a dangerous drug to a member of the PNP,
Tuguegarao City who acted as a poseur-buyer; that after receiving the two (2) plastic
sachets, the poseur-buyer simultaneously handed to the accused the marked money
consisting of one (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL (P500.00) with Serial No.
QP278070 and five (5) pieces of ONE HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053,
PS724429, XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of P1,000.00 and this led to
the apprehension of the accused and the confiscation of the dangerous drug together
with the buy-bust money by the said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao City
Police Station who formed the buy bust team in coordination with the PDEA.
When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.)
Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report
from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling illegal drugs in the said
city. P/Supt.
Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO)
2 Noel Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur Blaquera
(Blaquera), Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando
Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust
money, consisting of one P500.00 bill and five P100.00 bills, were dusted with
fluorescent powder and their respective serial numbers were recorded in the police
blotter.5
Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St.,
Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling
shabu. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team
hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes, Constantino
arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit described
by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit. When
Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang
stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how
much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu,
simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed
two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap
backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal,
the other members of the buy-bust team approached the scene at once and arrested
Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.6
Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and
money were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang.7 The recovered drugs were
then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police
blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and money. 8

Later that evening, at around ten oclock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang submitted
to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru,
Tuguegarao City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white
crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to determine the presence of dangerous
drugs;9 as well as both hands of Constantino, one piece P500.00 bill, and five
pieces P100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet powder.10 Per
Chemistry Report No. D-08-200511 and Physical Identification Report No. PI-042005,12 prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,13 Forensic
Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested positive for the presence of brightyellow ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framedup.
According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on January 20, 2005, he was
enjoying a joyride with his friend, Jeff Abarriao, on the latters motorcycle, within the
vicinity of Caritan Centro. After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go home. While
walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two vehicles suddenly stopped, one in front and
the other behind him. Five men, all in civilian clothes, alighted from the two vehicles. Two
of the men held Constantinos hands, while another poked a gun at him, asking him
where he came from and ordering him to bring out the shabu. Constantino answered that
he did not know what the men were talking about. The men then forced Constantino into
one of the vehicles. Inside the vehicle, one of the men frisked and searched Constantino,
and told him that he was being arrested for selling shabu. The men, who were now
apparently police officers, brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao City Police Station. At
the police station, the police officers took Constantinos cellphone and wallet. Also at the
police station, one of the arresting police officers brought out two pieces of plastic
sachets and money and turned it over to one of his companions. At around 9:30 in the
evening, the police officers brought Constantino to the PNP Crime Laboratory, but
nothing happened because he heard that the person who was supposed to conduct the
examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought back to the police station.14
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again brought Constantino to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. Along the way, one of the police escorts forced Constantino to
hold a certain amount of money. Constantino tried to resist but he could not really do
anything because he was handcuffed. After his examination, Constantino was detained
and was told that he was suspected of selling shabu.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding Constantino guilty as
charged. The trial court rejected the arguments of the defense, thus:
1. The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the arrangement with the accused
for the purchase of the shabu.
The Courts response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was detailed enough, corroborated
by other witnesses. It is the defense that has failed to show in what crucial detail the
prosecutions account is wanting.
2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not personally know the
accused until they were at the alleged place of transaction.

The Courts response: Substantive law does not require this; the rules of evidence do not.
Did they know he was Jojit? Yes, from the description given the informant. Domingo
asked whether he was Jojit. He answered "Yes".
3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Article II, Section 21 of
R.A. 9165 that requires that an inventory be taken and that photographs be taken of the
items seized.
The Courts comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270 enumerates the items seized.
This, the Court holds to be substantial compliance. Even assuming, without admitting,
that not all the requirements may not have been complied with, these omissions do not
operate to exclude the evidence nor to cause suppression thereof. They are directory,
not mandatory provisions.
4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.
The Courts comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and has been established by
evidence, thus:
a. Exhibit "B": The police blotter recording that on 20 January 2005 at 2100 hours,
mentioning the two sachets of shabu which according to the blotter the accused
admitted he handed over to Domingo; Domingo had testified that the markings A-1
NBT and A-2 NBT were placed on the sachets by Investigator Alexander Tamang;
b. Exhibit "F": Dated January 20, 2005, a request to the PNP Crime Lab Services for
the examination of "two plastic sachet (sic) with white crystalline substance
marked A1 and A2";
c. Exhibit "D": Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005 completed 21 January 2005
reporting a qualitative examination of the contents of two heat-sealed sachets
marked as A1 NBT and A2 NBT and identifying the substance as
"Methamphetamine Hydrochloride".
5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.
The Courts response: None was needed. Exhibit "H" clearly evidences that SPO1
Blaquera was authorized to conduct anti-drug operations. Domingo also answered the
question about coordination with PDEA when he testified: "During that time 3
representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were deputized in the PDEA in the persons
of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and the Chief of Police."
Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be reduced to the following story:
1 He went on a joy-ride that night with his friend aboard a motorcycle;
2 Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along Reyno Villa Street;
3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he did not know to be police
officers;
4 They took him to the police station and produced the sachets;
5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they forced him to hold marked
bills, although he was cuffed.

All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the circumstances around the
accuseds arrest and apprehension. For one thing, it is self-serving; for another, we are
not told any reason why the police officers should have wanted to apprehend him a
supposedly guiltless man; third, the Court never heard the testimony of his friend with
whom he was supposed to have had a joy-ride that night. In sum, his story does not
convince this Court.15 (Citations omitted.)
The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and a fine of P500,000.00.16
Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that:
1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses despite the patent irregularities in the conduct of the buybust operation.
2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the
prosecutions failure to establish that chain of custody of the drug specimens
allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellant.
3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecutions failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs constituting
the corpus delicti of the offense.
In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of
conviction of the RTC against Constantino. The appellate court held that Constantinos
defense of frame-up was not worthy of credence as his version of the incident was not at
all corroborated.
Constantino was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to PO3 Domingo, who acted as
the poseur-buyer, therefore, he was legally arrested without a warrant. The appellate
court also found that the chain of custody of the shabu had been preserved from the
time said drugs were confiscated from Constantino to the time the same drugs were
delivered to the crime laboratory and thereafter retrieved and presented as evidence
before the trial court. Lastly, the appellate court stressed that between the positive and
categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses, on one hand, and the
unsubstantial denial or negative statements of the appellant, on the other hand, the
former generally prevails; and that negative averments, unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, deserve no weight in law, especially vis-a-vis the time-tested
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty on the part of the apprehending
officers.
In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5, dated
15 April 2008, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.17
Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking the reversal of his conviction
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his conviction, averring inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the circumstances of the

marking of the two plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly confiscated from him.
Different people claim to have made the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets and
gave various explanations as to what the initials "NBT" stand for. In short, Constantino
argues that the prosecution failed to establish a crucial link in the chain of custody of the
shabu in this case.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by
the courts, being a self-serving negative evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional
presumption that an accused is innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption by presenting
the required quantum of evidence. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on its own
merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense.18
In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be
proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in]
prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or
sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence."19 And in the prosecution of these offenses, the primary consideration is to
ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have
been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their
presentation as evidence in court.20
Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be followed
in the seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
No. 9165 describes in more detail how the foregoing procedure is to be applied:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall
take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the procedure prescribed by law,
the IRR also explicitly excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds, but only if the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly
preserved for as long as the chain of custody of the same are duly established.
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, 21 defines "chain
of custody" as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence,
and the final disposition.
In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items is
established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.23

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds
glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from
Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp.
Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead
the Court to question whether the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were
the very same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke
the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early stage.
To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal
drug. In this case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu
from Constantino in exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put
any markings on the two plastic sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust
team with Constantino at the police station, PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic
sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who was also a member of the buybust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put the marking "NBT"
on the said sachets of shabu. Below are the excerpts from PO3 Domingos testimony:
Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos Constantino is shown to you
will you be able to identify the same?
A Yes, maam.
Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?
A There is an initials (sic), maam.
Q What initials are you referring to?
A A-1 initial NBT and A-2 initial NBT.
Q Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?
A The Investigator, maam.
Q And who is the investigator?
A Alexander Tamang, maam.
Q Where did he place those initials?
A In the police station after the apprehension, maam.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team, categorically pointed
to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put the marking
"NBT" on the plastic sachets upon the teams return to the police station, thus:
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused handed to the poseur buyer
in the person of PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you claimed
methamphetamine hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic sachets at that time when
they handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.

Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today will you be able to tell
that these two plastic sachets were the same plastic sachets that were handed by the
accused to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if these are the plastic
sachets that were handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets handed by the accused?
A Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the two plastic sachets to PO3
Rolando Domingo, sir.
Q Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets?
A These are the ones, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic sachets, do you know whose
markings are these?
xxxx
A It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.
The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly hidden.
COURT:
Q Who is Noel B. Taguiam?
A A member of the buy bust team also, sir.
PROS. NICOLAS:
Q You stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B. Taguiam, why do you know that he was
the one who placed this?
A Because I was present during that time when he placed his initial, sir.
Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials on those two plastic
sachets?
A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.
Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the conduct of the buy bust
operation?
A After a few hours, sir.
Q Where did he place those initials?
A In our office, sir.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,26 the Forensic Chemist, also declared
before the trial court that the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of shabu were
made by SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who received the
specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp. Tulauan testified:
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will you please tell us the
physical appearance of these items when you received the same?
A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your Honor.
B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2" when you received
these items Madam Witness?
A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Maam.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the use of a black pentel
pen.
PROS. ISRAEL:
Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness marked as NBT, what is
this marking all about?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.
Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was requested to be examined
Madam Witness?
A Yes, Maam because he is the one who received the specimen from the one who deliver
it, Maam.
Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you identified earlier, that there is
a marking "A-1," there is another marking NBT, what is this marking all about Madam
Witness?
A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Maam.27 (Emphases supplied.)
On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SPO3
Tamaray had claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu:
Atty. Aquino
Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made which are "A1" and "A-2", they are
not your markings, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that exhibit which you have
earlier identified, you did not see this duty officer placed his markings thereon, is it not?
A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said that he was the one who
placed the initial NBT, sir.28

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria29 the importance of marking the
seized item right after seizure:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking
upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the
evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence
from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to
mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody
that the law requires.1wphi1 (Citation omitted.)
Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer,
despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from
Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the
custody of the same to another police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door
for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs actually seized from Constantino
during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial court, especially considering
that three different people, during the interval, supposedly received and marked the
same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either SPO2
Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the
prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This omission
diminished the importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent
handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably
suspect the shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or
contaminated.30
The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal to its
case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. 31
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because the
Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a.
"Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and is ORDERED to be immediately released from detention unless he is confined
for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200304

January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The case before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated May 31, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04201. Said decision affirmed with modification
the Joint Decision2 dated August 6 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 41, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-164174 and 98-164175, which convicted the
appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 stemmed from a charge of violation of Section 15 Article III
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,3 which was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused not
having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for
sale, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute 45.46 grams, 44.27 grams, 45.34 grams,
51.45 grams, 41.32 grams and 20.14 grams or with a total weight of TWO HUNDRED
FORTY-SEVEN POINT NINETY-EIGHT (247.98) grams contained in six (6) transparent
plastic sachets of white crystalline substance known as "Shabu" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.4
Criminal Case No. 98-164175, on the other hand, arose from an alleged violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,5 which was said to be
committed in this manner:
That on or about April 3, 1998 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without
being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there
[willfully], unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control 1.61 grams, 0.58 grams, 0.29 grams, 0.09 [grams], 0.10 grams, 0.17 grams, 0.21
grams, 0.24 grams, 0.12 grams, 0.06 grams, 0.04 grams, [0].51 grams or all with a total
weight of four point zero three grams of white crystalline substance contained in twelve
(12) transparent plastic sachets known as "SHABU" containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription
thereof.6
Initially, Criminal Case No. 98-164175 was raffled to the RTC of Manila, Branch 23. Upon
motion7 of the appellant, however, said case was allowed to be consolidated with
Criminal Case No. 98-164174 in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.8 On arraignment, the
appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.9 The pre-trial conference of the cases was
held on July 27, 1998, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any
stipulation of facts.10
During the trial of the cases, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following
witnesses: (1) Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Jean Fajardo,11 (2) P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito,12 and
(3) Police Officer (PO) 2 Christian Trambulo.13 Thereafter, the defense presented in court
the testimonies of: (1) the appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan,14 (2) Angelina
Arejado,15 and (3) Anatolia Caredo.16
The Prosecutions Case
The prosecutions version of the events was primarily drawn from the testimonies of
P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo.
P/Insp. Fajardo testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant
went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal
drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good
commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp.
Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the
commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team
and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team on the same day,
which consisted of herself, PO2 Trambulo, PO1 Agravante, PO1 Pedrosa, PO1 Sisteno, and

PO1 De la Rosa. P/Insp. Fajardo was the team leader. With the help of the informant, she
was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The meeting was to be held at around 9:00
p.m. on that day at Cindys Restaurant located in Welcome Rotonda. She was only
supposed to meet alias Don that night but she decided to bring the team along for
security reasons.17
At about 9:00 p.m. on even date, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place
with the informant. The members of her team positioned themselves strategically inside
the restaurant. The informant introduced P/Insp. Fajardo to alias Don as the buyer of
shabu. She asked alias Don if he was indeed an employee of the NBI and he replied in
the affirmative. They agreed to close the deal wherein she would buy 250 grams of
shabu forP250,000.00. They also agreed to meet the following day at Cindys Restaurant
around 10:00 to 11:00 p.m.18
In the evening of April 2, 1998, P/Insp. Fajardo and her team went back to Cindys
Restaurant. Alias Don was already waiting for her outside the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money and she replied that she had the money with her. She
brought five genuine P500.00 bills, which were inserted on top of five bundles of play
money to make it appear that she had P250,000.00 with her. After she showed the
money to alias Don, he suggested that they go to a more secure place. They agreed for
the sale to take place at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998 in front of alias Dons
apartment at 765 Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. The team proceeded to the Western
Police District (WPD) Station along U.N. Avenue for coordination. Afterwards, the team
held their final briefing before they proceeded to the target area. They agreed that the
pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair, which would signify that
the deal had been consummated and the rest of the team would rush up to the scene.
The team then travelled to the address given by alias Don.19
When the team arrived at the target area around 1:15 a.m. on April 3, 1998, the two
vehicles they used were parked along the corner of the street. P/Insp. Fajardo and the
informant walked towards the apartment of alias Don and stood in front of the apartment
gate. Around 1:45 a.m., alias Don came out of the apartment with a male companion.
Alias Don demanded to see the money, but P/Insp. Fajardo told him that she wanted to
see the drugs first. Alias Don gave her the big brown envelope he was carrying and she
checked the contents thereof. Inside she found a plastic sachet, about 10x8 inches in
size, which contained white crystalline substance. After checking the contents of the
envelope, she assumed that the same was indeed shabu. She then gave the buy-bust
money to alias Don and scratched her hair to signal the rest of the team to rush to the
scene. P/Insp. Fajardo identified herself as a narcotics agent. The two suspects tried to
flee but PO2 Trambulo was able to stop them from doing so. P/Insp. Fajardo took custody
of the shabu. When she asked alias Don if the latter had authority to possess or sell
shabu, he replied in the negative. P/Insp. Fajardo put her initials "JSF" on the
genuine P500.00 bills below the name of Benigno Aquino. After the arrest of the two
suspects, the buy-bust team brought them to the police station. The suspects rights
were read to them and they were subsequently booked.20
P/Insp. Fajardo said that she found out that alias Don was in fact the appellant Donald
Vasquez. She learned of his name when he brought out his NBI ID while he was being
booked. P/Insp. Fajardo also learned that the name of the appellants companion was
Reynaldo Siscar, who was also arrested and brought to the police station. P/Insp. Fajardo
explained that after she gave the buy-bust money to the appellant, the latter handed the
same to Siscar who was present the entire time the sale was being consummated. Upon
receiving the buy-bust money placed inside a green plastic bag, Siscar looked at the
contents thereof and uttered "okey na to." P/Insp. Fajardo marked the drug specimen and
brought the same to the Crime Laboratory. She was accompanied there by PO2 Trambulo
and PO1 Agravante. She handed over the drug specimen to PO1 Agravante who then
turned it over to P/Insp. Taduran, the forensic chemist on duty. The police officers
previously weighed the drug specimen. Thereafter, the personnel at the crime laboratory
weighed the specimen again. P/Insp. Fajardo and her team waited for the results of the
laboratory examination.21

P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buybust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a
brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put
her initials "JSF" therein and signed it. She noticed that there were markings on the
envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but she did not bother to
check out what they were for or who made them. When she interrogated the appellant
about the brown envelope, she found out that the same was submitted as evidence to
the NBI Crime Laboratory. She also learned that the appellant worked as a Laboratory
Aide at the NBI Crime Laboratory. She identified in court the six plastic sachets of drugs
that her team recovered, which sachets she also initialed and signed. P/Insp. Fajardo also
stated that after the appellant was arrested, PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on
the two suspects. The search yielded 12 more plastic sachets of drugs from the
appellant. The 12 sachets were varied in sizes and were contained in a white envelope.
P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials and signature on the envelope. As to the 12 sachets,
the same were initialed by P/Insp. Fajardo and signed by PO2 Trambulo. 22
The testimony of PO2 Trambulo corroborated that of P/Insp. Fajardos. PO2 Trambulo
testified that in the morning of April 1, 1998, a confidential informant reported to them
about the illegal drug activities of alias Don. P/Supt. Domantay then tasked P/Insp.
Fajardo to form a buy-bust team. P/Insp. Fajardo was able to set up a meeting with alias
Don at Cindys Restaurant in Welcome Rotonda, Quezon City. At that meeting, PO2
Trambulo saw P/Insp. Fajardo talk to alias Don. P/Insp. Fajardo later told the members of
the team that she convinced alias Don that she was a good buyer of shabu and the latter
demanded a second meeting to see the money. After the initial meeting, P/Insp. Fajardo
briefed P/Supt. Domantay about what happened. PO2 Trambulo stated that on April 2,
1998, P/Insp. Fajardo was furnished with five genuine P500.00 bills together with the
boodle play money. P/Insp. Fajardo placed her initials in the genuine bills below the name
"Benigno Aquino, Jr." Afterwards, the team left the office. When they arrived at Cindys
Restaurant past 10:00 p.m., alias Don was waiting outside. P/Insp. Fajardo showed the
boodle money to alias Don and after some time, they parted ways. P/Insp. Fajardo later
told the team that alias Don decided that the drug deal would take place in front of alias
Dons rented apartment on Valdez St., Sampaloc, Manila. After an hour, the team went to
Valdez St. to familiarize themselves with the area. They then proceeded to the WPD
station to coordinate their operation. Thereafter, P/Insp. Fajardo conducted a final
briefing wherein PO2 Trambulo was designated as the immediate back-up arresting
officer. The agreed pre-arranged signal was for P/Insp. Fajardo to scratch her hair to
indicate the consummation of the deal. PO2 Trambulo was to signal the same to the
other members of the team.23
The buy-bust team went to the target area at around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. on April 3, 1998.
P/Insp. Fajardo and the informant walked towards the direction of alias Dons apartment,
while PO2 Trambulo positioned himself near a parked jeepney about 15 to 20 meters
from the apartment gate. The rest of the team parked their vehicles at the street
perpendicular to Valdez St. Later, alias Don went out of the gate with another person.
PO2 Trambulo saw alias Don gesturing to P/Insp. Fajardo as if asking for something but
P/Insp. Fajardo gestured that she wanted to see something first. Alias Don handed P/Insp.
Fajardo a big brown envelope, which the latter opened. P/Insp. Fajardo then handed to
alias Don a green plastic bag containing the buy-bust money and gave the pre-arranged
signal. When PO2 Trambulo saw this, he immediately summoned the rest of the team
and rushed to the suspects. He was able to recover the buy-bust money from alias Dons
male companion. Upon frisking alias Don, PO2 Trambulo retrieved 12 pieces of plastic
sachets of suspected drugs. The same were placed inside a white envelope that was
tucked inside alias Dons waist. PO2 Trambulo marked each of the 12 sachets with his
initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers then informed the suspects of their rights
and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.24
As regards the brown envelope that alias Don handed to P/Insp. Fajardo, the latter
retained possession thereof. The envelope contained six pieces of plastic bags of white
crystalline substance. When they got back to their office, the team reported the progress
of their operation to P/Supt. Domantay. The arrested suspects were booked and the
required documentations were prepared. Among such documents was the Request for

Laboratory Examination of the drug specimens seized. PO2 Trambulo said that he was
the one who brought the said request to the PNP Crime Laboratory, along with the drug
specimens.25
P/Insp. Marilyn Dequito, the forensic chemist, testified on the results of her examination
of the drug specimens seized in this case. She explained that P/Insp. Macario Taduran, Jr.
initially examined the drug specimens but the latter was already assigned to another
office. The results of the examination of P/Insp. Taduran were laid down in Physical
Science Report No. D-1071-98. P/Insp. Dequito first studied the data contained in
Physical Science Report No. D-1071-98 and retrieved the same from their office. She
entered that fact in their logbook RD-17-98. She then weighed the drug specimens and
examined the white crystalline substance from each of the plastic sachets. She
examined first the specimens marked as "A-1," "A-2," "A-3," "A-4," "A-5" and "A-6."
P/Insp. Dequitos examination revealed that the white crystalline substances were
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.26She also examined the contents of 12
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that also contained crystalline substances. The
12 plastic sachets were marked "B-1" to "B-12." The white crystalline powder inside the
12 plastic sachets also tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. P/Insp.
Dequitos findings were contained in Physical Science Report No. RD-17-98.27
The prosecution, thereafter, adduced the following object and documentary evidence: (1)
photocopies of the five original P500.00 bills28 used as buy-bust money (Exhibits A-E); (2)
Request for Laboratory Examination29 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit F); (3) Initial
Laboratory Report30 dated April 3, 1998, stating that the specimen submitted for
examination tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit G); (4) Court
Order31 dated September 2, 1998 (Exhibit H); (5) Physical Sciences Report No. D-10719832 dated April 3, 1998 (Exhibit I); (6) Drug specimens A-1 to A-6 (Exhibits J-O); (7) Big
brown envelope (Exhibit P); (8) Small white envelope (Exhibit Q); (9) Drug specimens B-1
to B-12 (Exhibits R-CC); (10) Physical Sciences Report No. RD-17-9833 (Exhibit DD); (11)
Joint Affidavit of Arrest34 (Exhibit EE); (12) Play money (Exhibit FF); (13) Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report35(Exhibit GG); (14) Request for Medical Examination 36 (Exhibit HH); (15)
Medico Legal Slip37 of Donald Vasquez (Exhibit II); and (16) Medico Legal Slip38 of
Reynaldo Siscar (Exhibit JJ).
The Defenses Case
As expected, the defense belied the prosecutions version of events. The appellants
brief39 before the Court of Appeals provides a concise summary of the defenses counterstatement of facts. According to the defense:
Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a Laboratory Aide II at
the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. His duties at the time included being a subpoena
clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from different police agencies to
have their specimens examined by the chemist. He also rendered day and night duties,
and during regular office hours and in the absence of the laboratory technician, he would
weigh the specimens. As subpoena clerk, he would receive subpoenas from the trial
courts. When there is no chemist, he would get a Special Order to testify, or bring the
drug specimens, to the courts.
On 1 April 1998, Donald Vasquez took his examination in Managerial Statistics between
6:00 to 9:00 oclock p.m. Thereafter, he took a jeepney and alighted at Stop and Shop at
Quiapo. From there, he took a tricycle to his house, arriving at 9:45 oclock that evening,
where he saw Reynaldo Siscar and Sonny San Diego, the latter a confidential informant
of the narcotics agents.
On 3 April 1998, at 1:45 oclock in the morning, Donalds household help, Anatolia
Caredo, who had just arrived from Antipolo that time, was eating while Donald was
asleep. She heard a knock on the door. Reynaldo Siscar opened the door and thereafter
two (2) men entered, poking guns at Reynaldo. They were followed by three (3) others.
The door to Donalds room was kicked down and they entered his room. Donald, hearing
noise, woke up to see P./Insp. Fajardo pointing a gun at him. He saw that there were six

(6) policemen searching his room, picking up what they could get. One of them opened a
cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donalds] possession in relation to his work as a
laboratory aide. The drugs came from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-1303 owned
by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug specimen
contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3
April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS
player, and his wallet containing P2,530.00.
Angelina Arejado, Donalds neighbor, witnessed the policemen entering the apartment
and apprehending Donald and Reynaldo from the apartment terrace.40 (Citations
omitted.)
The defense then offered the following evidence: (1) NBI Disposition Form 41 dated April 3,
1998 (Exhibit 1); (2) Sworn Statement of Idabel Bernabe Pagulayan42 (Exhibit 2); (3)
Photocopy of the buy-bust money43 (Exhibit 3); (4) List of Hearings44 attended by Donald
Vasquez (Exhibit 4); (5) Authorization Letter45 prepared by Acting Deputy Director Arturo
A. Figueras dated March 27, 1998 (Exhibit 5); and (6) List of Evidence 46 taken by Donald
Vasquez from 1996-1998 (Exhibit 6).
The Decision of the RTC
On August 6, 2009, the RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave
more credence to the prosecutions evidence given that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers was not overcome. The
trial court held that the appellant did not present any evidence that would show that the
police officers in this case were impelled by an evil motive to charge him of very serious
crimes and falsely testify against him. Also, the trial court noted that the volume of the
shabu involved in this case was considerable, i.e., 247.98 grams and 4.03 grams for
illegal sale and illegal possession, respectively. To the mind of the trial court, such fact
helped to dispel the possibility that the drug specimens seized were merely planted by
the police officers. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that the positive testimonies of the police
officers regarding the illegal drug peddling activities of the appellant prevailed over the
latters bare denials.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant was merely framed up by the
police, the trial court pointed out that:
[T]he accused should have reported the said incident to the proper authorities, or asked
help from his Acting Chief [Idabel] Pagulayan from the NBI to testify and identify in Court
the xerox copy of the Disposition Form which she issued to the accused and the Affidavit
dated April 17, 1998 (xerox copy) executed by her or from Mr. Arturo A. Figueras, Acting
Deputy Director, Technical Services of the NBI to testify and identify the Letter issued by
the said Acting Deputy Director in order to corroborate and strengthen his testimony that
he was indeed authorized to keep in his custody the said shabu to be presented or
turned over to the Court as evidence, and he should have filed the proper charges
against those police officers who were responsible for such act. But the accused did not
even bother to do the same. Further, the pieces of evidence (Disposition Form, Affidavit
of [Idabel] Pagulayan and Letter dated March 27, 1998 issued by Acting Deputy Director)
presented by the accused in Court could not be given weight and credence considering
that the said persons were not presented in Court to identify the said documents and
that the prosecution has no opportunity to cross-examine the same, thus, it has no
probative value.47
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Crim. Case No. 98-164174, finding accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN
@ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 15, Art.
III in Relation to Sec.

2 (e), (f), (m), (o), Art. I of R.A. No. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P5,000,000.00; and 2. In Crim. Case No.
98-164175, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, DONALD VASQUEZ y
SANDIGAN @ "DON" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Sec. 16, Art. III in Relation to Sec. 2 (e-2) Art. I of R.A. 6425 as Amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 179 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS and a fine of FOUR THOUSAND
(P4,000.00) PESOS.
The subject shabu (247.98 grams and 4.03 grams, respectively) are hereby forfeited in
favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to deliver
and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), upon the finality of this Decision.48
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal,49 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellate
court ruled that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal
sale and illegal possession of shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo on the conduct of
the buy-bust operation was found to be clear and categorical. As the appellant failed to
adduce any evidence that tended to prove any ill motive on the part of the police officers
to falsely charge the appellant, the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers had not
been controverted in this case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal
Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98164175, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional in its medium period, as maximum.50
The Ruling of the Court
The appellant appealed his case to this Court to once again impugn his conviction on two
grounds: (1) the purported illegality of the search and the ensuing arrest done by the
police officers and (2) his supposed authority to possess the illegal drugs seized from
him.51 He argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest at the time he was arrested. This occurred despite the fact that the police officers
allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him. Inasmuch as his
arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
inadmissible in court. As the corpus delicti of the crime was rendered inadmissible, the
appellant posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant further
insists that he was able to prove that he was authorized to keep the drug specimens in
his custody, given that he was an employee of the NBI Forensic Chemistry Laboratory
who was tasked with the duty to bring drug specimens in court.
After an assiduous review of the evidence adduced by both parties to this case, we
resolve to deny this appeal.
At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his
arrest. We reiterated in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment.
Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them before their
arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.
Any irregularity was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial courts
jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught

in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust

operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed
lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court
holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and
such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3)
customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.)
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his
arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
We now rule on the substantive matters.
To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.56 As held in People v. Chua Tan Lee,57 in a prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs, "what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti." On the other hand, the elements of illegal
possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.58
In the case at bar, the testimonies of P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo established that a
buy-bust operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to
entrap the appellant. P/Insp. Fajardo, the poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant
as the one who sold to her six plastic bags of shabu that were contained in a big brown
envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise identified the six plastic bags of
shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the same were seized
from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white crystalline
powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. We find that P/Insp.
Fajardos testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy-bust
operation was detailed and straightforward. She was also consistent and unwavering in
her narration even in the face of the opposing counsels cross-examination.
Apart from her description of the events that led to the exchange of the drug specimens
seized and the buy-bust money, P/Insp. Fajardo further testified as to the recovery from
the appellant of another 12 pieces of plastic sachets of shabu. After the latter was
arrested, P/Insp. Fajardo stated that PO2 Trambulo conducted a body search on the
appellant. This search resulted to the confiscation of 12 more plastic sachets, the
contents of which also tested positive for shabu. The testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo was
amply corroborated by PO2 Trambulo, whose own account dovetailed the formers
narration of events. Both police officers also identified in court the twelve plastic sachets
of shabu that were confiscated from the appellant.
In People v. Ting Uy,59 the Court explains that "credence shall be given to the narration of
the incident by prosecution witnesses especially so when they are police officers who are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence
to the contrary." In the instant case, the appellant failed to ascribe, much less
satisfactorily prove, any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to
why they would falsely incriminate him. The appellant himself even testified that, not
only did he not have any misunderstanding with P/Insp. Fajardo and PO2 Trambulo prior

to his arrest, he in fact did not know them at all.60In the absence of evidence of such ill
motive, none is presumed to exist.61
The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant
to criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him
up for selling and possessing illegal drugs. Such a move would not have been a daunting
task for the appellant under the circumstances. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the
appellant could have easily sought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief
of his office to extricate him from his predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in
evidence were mere photocopies of documents that supposedly showed that he was
authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the original documents and the
testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court did nothing to
help the appellants case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the appellant
failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers
that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount
of prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court
overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion,
the Court will not disturb the trial courts assessment of the facts and the credibility of
the witnesses since the RTC was in a better position to assess and weigh the evidence
presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of the appellate
court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court, unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.62
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the prosecution was able to
establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.
The Penalties
Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to
Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:
SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed. SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess
or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
1. 40 grams or more of opium;
2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
(Emphases supplied.)
In Criminal Case No. 98-164174 involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the
appellant was found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams
of shabu, which amount is more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for
the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the
death penalty.
Pertinently, Article 6363 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.1wphi1 Thus, in this case, considering that no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances attended the appellants violation of Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial
courts imposition of reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on
the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
the Court of Appeals properly invoked our ruling in People v. Tira64 in determining the
proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in Tira that:
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject
of the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua
(Emphases ours.)

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the
appellant amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance in this case, the imposable penalty on the appellant should be
the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years
and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable penalty. In Criminal Case
No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death.65
Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant
was a regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however,
cannot be taken into consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the
maximum, in accordance with Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.66Such a

special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which arises under special conditions to
increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period,67 was not alleged and
charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower
courts.
All told, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction of the appellant.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 31, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
04201 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176830

February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as
Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity
as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185587
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYl-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185636
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as Investigating
Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 190005
VICENTE P. LADLAD, Petitioner,
vs.

HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims
of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist
Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this
Courts jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners
have chosen to take recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant
national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this
Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation
and in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the
political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2 seeking the annulment of the orders
and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain
Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the
Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero
(Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaintaffidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several other
unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of
the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang
Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4 Recovered from the grave site were 67
severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. 5
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was
immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to
collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6Also, from 11-17 September 2006, an
investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and DNA experts,

conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the victims DNA
samples for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities of
the skeletal remains and even the length of time that they had been buried. The report
recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities of the remains and
the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the
Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the names
of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and examination based on testimonies of
relatives and witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD.
All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again.
They also expressed belief that their relatives remains were among those discovered at
the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid,
Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They
narrated that they were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.14 Allegedly,
petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G.
Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18 were then members of the Central
Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement
Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the
Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would
subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the "cleaners" of
those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the
movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and
executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a
subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and
those of their witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.23 Petitioners
Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not
served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of
an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita
Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto Ejoc,
6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo

Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14) Crispin Prado,
and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano
Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state
witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution. 30 The
Resolution was silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch
18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando) on 28
February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an
Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to
receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. 32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged."33 He ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary
liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No. 176830
seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the 16 February
2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the unconditional release
of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further
proceedings during the pendency of the petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the
political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as
murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and
the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its
Comment on 27 March 2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy
of petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion
charge against him in the RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days.45 On 3
April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under
a P100,000 cash bond.46
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of

murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New
Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in
abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the
pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January
2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007. 49 On 1
February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case
Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.51 Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008, but before
being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008
transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April
2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to
transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge Thelma
Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08262163.54 Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the
case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash
and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of
the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge
Medina.58 The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional and
immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration. 59
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30
April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the warrant of
arrest against petitioner Baylosis.61
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with
G.R. No. 176830.63 We required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner
Echaniss immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these
conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his attendance
and participation in the formal peace negotiations between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009;
and that his temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition

was later modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his
actual participation in the peace negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under
a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlads
motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the
motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70 denying the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August
2009.71
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27
August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos.
176830, 185587 and 185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment thereon.
The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636
and 185587.75 These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076 and on 21
January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated
Reply78 on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011,
petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG interposed no
objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to them considering that they were
consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding negotiations with the
GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed
their bail in the amount of P100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary
release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace
negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary
investigation and in the issuance of
the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is "not a casual affair."84 It is conducted to protect the
innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85 While the right
to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is
a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice.86

In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard.87 It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondents side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer
shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a
crime has been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise,
the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence
in support of one's defense."88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present ones own side of the
story cannot claim denial of due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint
and the attached documents or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not
served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P
C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.92Furthermore, even though
his counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor,
petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels addresses.93 Thus,
they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and
Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
in the records of the case without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original
affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting presided by
petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD was agreed
upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated 22 December
2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his escape in May
1985.96 Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12 January 2007
admitted that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and that the meeting actually
took place in June 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied the opportunity
to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying
petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of
Prosecutor Viveros Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known
address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other
hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed
to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective
counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed.
As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to

present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid. 100 The rule
was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the
prosecution of offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on
the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process.
It was only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known
addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address "53 Sct.
Rallos St., QC,"102 which had never been his address at any time.103 In connection with
this claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlads
wife,104 was sent to the same address, and that she was among those mentioned in the
Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlads counsel filed a
formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to
believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his
counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate
fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that "litigants represented by counsel should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case."106 Having
opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his
counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counteraffidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampos allegation of collusion to
surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There
was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an
earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the alleged
meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated.
Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his
counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the
opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias Piedads Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the right to be
heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of
the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the
prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the
indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses107attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the
Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:

Sec. 3. Period to appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/ reinvestigation if one
has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution. Only one
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March
2007,108 the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead,
petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this
Court on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce."
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of
the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested."110 Although
the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an
examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have
ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111 In fact, the judges
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no
probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined
the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed
the charge against them.114 Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando
did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding
of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial
judge.116 Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of
warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie
to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the
conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of
law. x x x.

Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution
of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to
the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of
the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable
cause for petitioners indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for
their arrest. As stated above, the trial judges appreciation of the evidence and
conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. Again, "he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and
on the basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with
which he is being charged."118
Judge Abandos review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the
following portion of the judges 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the
Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits
of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent documents issued
by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City,
pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the findings [sic] of
probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged. 119
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance
of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact
that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari,120 such as the
petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a
ground to dismiss the charge against
petitioners prior to a determination
by the trial court that the murders
were committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty."121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of
rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as
its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the wellentrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public
prosecutor.123

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the
alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the
accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not
for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v.
CA,126 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed
committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the
Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double
jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any

offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in

the former complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea
during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against petitioners and
several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944.1awp++i1 Even
before the indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo,
Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification
of the Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence.130 When the indictment
was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered the dismissal of
the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond
posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty until
the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.1wphi1
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release
from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each shall continue under the condition
that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation as
CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the
duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are
concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila,
Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty
under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the proceedings before
the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad
shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until their
actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the proceedings
before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y
CRUZ, AccusedAppellant.

DECISION
LEONARDODE CASTRO, J.:
The accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19,
2012 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed
in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 041556CFM and 04
1557CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape.
The Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor victims
mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3 ], a minor 13
years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her
vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age,
through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will. 5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 041558CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, BERNABE
PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victims mother by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a 13
years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was
sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victims mother who confronted the
accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed
against him.7 After the completion of the pretrial conference on September 16,
2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual
abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February
2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old9 ]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with
herein accusedappellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother,
together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x

x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAAs
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of
the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then,
[Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck
the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAAs anus.
Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed
outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003]
incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event
that she would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once.
According to AAA, [i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been
molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident],
with her mother not around while she and her halfsiblings were asleep, [Pareja] again
laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her]
and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was
AAAs mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while
the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAAs mother immediately brought AAA to the
barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay officials
that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29,
2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional MedicoLegal Report Number 2004030091. Her
medicolegal report stated the following conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hymen:
Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 57 oclock area, Type of hymen:
Crescentic
xxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medicolegal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAAs
mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA
against him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as
she is the daughter of his livein partner and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that
the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of
their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have
happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by
ten (10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the
house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with
houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside
her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could
possibly still go about with his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors noticing
the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against
him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of

revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents
separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but
convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and
February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the
charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 041558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 041556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness
and he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 041557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he
is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more
weight to the prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and imputation
of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAAs mother to
testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the
crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC could
not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had
no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping
at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which
on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04
1556 and 041557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED
and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16,
2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 041556 to 041557 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following
errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:

The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she
was raped.18
Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of
AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking
the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if
nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was
riddled with inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow
certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v.
Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
courts findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
(Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity
to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied
appellate courtsand when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.21 While there are
recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn
the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAAs
credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally
expected.22 As this Court stated in People v. Saludo23 :
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an
offense is not analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth
recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and
subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and nonconsequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAAs ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape

becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape
itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the
date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime.26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying
that our rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances
in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Parejas case. In particular, the main factor for
Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information
against him only stated that the crime was committed on or about the year 1992. We
said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of
the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be
alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. More
importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accusedappellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase on or about the year 1992 encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months
of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for
which accusedappellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure
of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the offense
and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the offense
as alleged in the Information, deprived accusedappellant of his right to intelligently
prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most,
accusedappellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated in the
Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
xxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accusedappellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture,
and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence
required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.29 (Citation
omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were
not specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike on or
about the year 1992. Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in
the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating the
allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim
in Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not
enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction,viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that
militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial
court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the
trial courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in
relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime
charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together

with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as
charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him and even
imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his conviction,
this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient
to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible
and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule
requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case.32
(Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering
that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when
the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who
would have noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him from
acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of
the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no
respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v.
Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped
space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less
disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them
around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members
to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being
committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than
grownups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night.
There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a room where
other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.
We have repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place, and rape can
be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was
raped. He said that the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her
strength and courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her
purity. Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any
commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus,
giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAAs
delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility
that he indeed committed the crimes. AAAs belated confession, he claimed, cannot be
dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her credibility.37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting
the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this
Court has recognized the fact that no clearcut behavior can be expected of a person
being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or
seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has
consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into

submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a
father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence.38 In this case, AAAs lack of resistance was brought about by her
fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the
incident.
AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja
is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be
expected to act within reason or in accordance with societys expectations. It is
unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience,
especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar
situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or
behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances. 39
Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered
that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v.
Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victims deferral in reporting the crime does not
equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons
close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the
conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused
are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an
indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal
charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good their threats to kill or
hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the MedicoLegal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force
or penetrating trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen, cannot be given any
significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were
inflicted. Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAAs hymen sustained trauma
cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in
December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the
basis of the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert
testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus at
the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical
examination actually bolsters AAAs claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one
occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to
capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender
age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated
solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and

immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender
years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime
so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 041557CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 041557CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged
and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No.
8353 or the AntiRape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the
recognition of sexual violence on sexrelated orifices other than a womans organ is
included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover genderfree rape.
The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against
persons and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the
traditional rape through carnal knowledge or rape through sexual intercourse. 44
Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal
Code and incorporated therein Article 266A which reads:
Article 266A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed
1)

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a)
b)
c)
d)

2)

Through force, threat or intimidation;

When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1

hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as
organ rape or penile rape. 45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse
is carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 46
2. Article 266A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called instrument or
object rape, or genderfree rape.47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as
follows:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender
may be a man or a woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the
offended party may be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while
the second is committed by inserting the penis into another persons mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person;
and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
Under Article 266A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual

assault is [b]y any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice
of another person.
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis
into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February
2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003,
thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her
testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and
probable.50
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape
through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault
even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and
substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not
necessarily included in the second, and viceversa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of
rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal
knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisin correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a.

By using force or intimidation; or

b.

When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c.

When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the abovementioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and
were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against
Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts
of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is
included in the crime of rape.54

Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People
of the Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in
crafting the Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary
duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 to the State, that
its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights
are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and
defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, does not render
full justice to the State, the offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public
prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 041556CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the
prosecution against Pareja, especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found
AAAs declaration on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in
a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did not
find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the
prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja.
In Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered
AAAs confusion as to whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and
eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that
aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However,
she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her
testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after
her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his
finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her
vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and
inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident.
Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall
under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included
in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both
her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the
courts a quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the
attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him
because she was angry that he caused her parents separation. Pareja added that these
cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such
imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her
father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge.58 Furthermore, motives such as
resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to
the testimony of a minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has
not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her
being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of childvictims are given full weight
and credit, since when a woman or a girlchild says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness

The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
is prisin correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty
next lower in degree,62 i.e.,arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6
months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper
penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of
Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
is the medium period of prisin correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows:
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.
H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accusedappellant
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to
two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4
years and 2 months of prisin correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the
victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170462

February 5, 2014

RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification
on the amount of damages, the joint decision3dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey
Guevarra (petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide.
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide under two Informations which read:
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and

without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez,
who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of
his body, which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erwin Ordonez, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide
as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin
Ordonez, which prevented his death.4
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and
without any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault,
attack, hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez,
who as a result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of
his body which directly caused his death.5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000,
the true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through
the records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were
jointly tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the
petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of
the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on
November 8, 2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of
Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their
companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his
house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the
basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw him, threatened
to kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand.
Rodolfo responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and
hacked and stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon
seeing Erwin and David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the
brothers to the hospital. He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house
in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip
breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5)

to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father Rodolfo say to the
three men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag-usapan,"10 and David
retorted in their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around
10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige
banatan ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones
at the house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three
men, "Why are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga
tarantado kayo!"13 David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners'
house. Balbino heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka
diyan sa kalsada at dito tayo magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house.
The stoning lasted for about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate
towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok
kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in
Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the following day. But
David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow
with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the
''panabas."
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right
foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where
Rodolfo got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two
brothers fall to the ground.
Version of the Prosecution
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who
survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his
brother David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners'
compound. He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when,
suddenly, Philip ran up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo.
While approaching the scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from
where his brother David was, Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his
arm and back. Thereafter, Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners'
compound and kept on hacking him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He
became weak and ultimately fell to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle.1wphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was
only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo
and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo
and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were
saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital.
David died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.

The RTC's Ruling

In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of
the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due
to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the
petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting
evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and
assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for
his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must be proven with
certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the
petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of
the victims, Erwin and David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of the crimes, the Court
hereby sentences each of the accused to suffer -In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for
Frustrated Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Three (3) years and one
day of prision correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum
and to indemnify the victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in the amount of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Cost against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David
Ordonez Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against the
accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19
The CA's Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the
crimes charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no
unlawful aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression,
to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily
harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to
defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that David challenged Joey
to a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held
that these acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as
no real or actual danger existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their
own home.
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature
and number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on

his arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and
stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that the assault was no
longer an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal aggression on the part of the
petitioners.21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No.
Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELFDEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October
24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition
for review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual
issues raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in
petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the
lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court's judgment or the appellate court's
misapprehension of the adduced facts.24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case.
Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the
evidence on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained the
legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes
of frustrated homicide and homicide.

In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts
and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we
uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully
established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim
sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code is present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had
the intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.27
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of
wounds sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the
conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the
victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.28 The CA
aptly observed that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually
caused his death, and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the
prosecution's theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and
Erwin.29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim
Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical
attendance."30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the
acts for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to
self-defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful
aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded.
There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.33
As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just
passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was
suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took
place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the
petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with

the nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the
petitioners did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The
petitioners were, in fact, the real aggressors.
As to the penalties and damages
awarded
We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges
provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.
In addition to the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by
the CA, we awardP25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the
actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code
states that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered
to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil
indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188694

February 12, 2014

RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated November 28,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 which affirmed the
Decision3 dated June 8, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 01-197425 and 01-197426, finding petitioners Ricardo L. Atienza
(Atienza) and Alfredo A. Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Robbery and Falsification of Public Document.
The Facts
Atienza and Castro (petitioners) are employees of the CA, particularly assigned to its
Budget Division and holding the positions of Budget Officer I and Utility Worker
I,4 respectively, at the time material to this case.
On March 20, 1995, at about past noon,5 Juanito Atibula (Atibula), Records Officer I and
Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporters Division, was invited by
Castro to attend Atienzas birthday party somewhere along Bocobo Street, Ermita,
Manila. At the party, Atienza introduced Atibula to a certain Dario and asked him to assist

the latter in searching for the CA decision6 in the case entitled "Mateo Fernando v. Heirs
of D. Tuason, Inc."7 (Fernando), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 36808-R.8
Thereafter, Atibula returned to the office followed a few minutes later by Dario and
searched for the aforementioned decision which was found compiled in Volume 260 of
the CA Original Decisions. As Dario was scanning through the said volume, Atibula
observed that he was comparing its pages9 to the discolored papers he was
holding.10 Dario likewise scanned Volumes 265 and 267,11 and placed check marks on the
papers he was holding.12
On March 24, 1995, after office hours, Atibula saw Dario outside the CA compound along
Maria Orosa Street.13 As they walked side by side towards the jeepney stop, Dario
requested Atibula to insert a Decision dated September 26, 1968 in one of the volumes
of the CA Original Decisions. However, Atibula refused and immediately left. 14
On April 21, 1995, Atienza offered Atibula the amount of P50,000.00 in exchange for
Volume 260,15 which the latter turned down. Atienza then ridiculed him saying, "duwag
ka, pera na nga ito ayaw mo pa," to which Atibula retorted, "ikaw ang duwag dahil
nagpapakita ka ng kabuktutan."
Disturbed by the situation, Atibula reported the incident to Atty. Arnel Macapagal16 (Atty.
Macapagal), the Assistant Chief of the CA Reporters Division, who then instructed him
(Atibula) to hide Volumes 260, 265 and 26717 in a safe place.18
On May 9, 1995, Atibula discovered that Volume 26619 covering the period from January
28 to February 12, 1969 was missing20 and, hence, immediately reported the same to
Atty. Macapagal. Two days after the discovery of the loss, Atibula encountered Atienza
near the canteen,21 shouting "[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami!"22
On May 18, 1995, a certain Nelson de Castro, Clerk IV detailed at the CA Reporters
Division,23 handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift-wrapped package which turned out
to be the missing Volume 266. He claimed that it was Castro who asked him to deliver
the said package to Atibula.24
Having been notified of Volume 266s return, Atty. Macapagal then directed Atibula to
ascertain who borrowed the volume. Records, however, disclosed no one. 25 Separately,
Atibula compared the contents of Volume 266 with the index of the decisions and noticed
that there were two new documents inserted therein,26 namely: (a) a Resolution27 dated
February 11, 1969 (subject resolution), ostensibly penned by Associate Justice Juan P.
Enriquez (Justice Enriquez) and concurred in by Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan
and Edilberto Soriano, recalling and setting aside the Entry of Judgment earlier issued in
the Fernando case; and (b) a Decision28 dated April 16, 1970 (subject decision), also
ostensibly penned by Justice Enriquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus Y.
Perez and Jose M. Mendoza, amending the original decision dated September 26, 1968 in
the aforementioned case. Consequently, Atibula reported his findings to Atty. Macapagal
who, in turn, informed Atty. Gemma Leticia F. Tablate (Atty. Tablate), then Chief of the CA
Reporters Division, of the same. They tried to verify the genuineness, authenticity and
existence of the subject resolution and decision, and found that the compilation of the
duplicate original decisions/resolutions of Justice Enriquez did not bear the said
promulgations. Atty. Tablate reported the incident to then CA Presiding Justice Nathanael
P. De Pano, Jr.29 who immediately requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation on the matter.30
Laboratory analysis and comparative examination of the subject resolution and
decision31 as well as of a decision in another case found in pages 906 to 922 of Volume
266 of the CA Original Decisions were conducted by the NBI.32 As a result, it issued its
Questioned Documents Report No. 937-1295,33 finding that: (a) Volume 266 had indeed
been altered;34 and (b) the signatures of the CA Justices in the subject resolution and
decision (questioned signatures) and their standard/sample signatures "were not written
by one and the same person,"35 leading to the conclusion that the questioned signatures
were forgeries.36

Meanwhile, sometime in the second week of July 1995, an inspection of the airconditioning units at the office of the CA Reporters Division was conducted, whereby it
was discovered that the improvised angle bar supporting the air conditioning unit at the
right most end from the main door was corroded with rust and the portion of the wall
holding the same was broken ("may bak-bak na").37 NBI Agents, Atty. Daniel D.
Daganzo38 (Atty. Daganzo) and Norman R. Decampong39 then conducted an ocular
inspection of the premises, and, in the course thereof, interviewed several personnel of
the CA Maintenance Division. Said investigation yielded the following findings: (a) there
were no signs of forcible entry;40 (b) the perpetrators gained entry to the office of the CA
Reporters Division "by passing through the hole on the concrete wall after removing the
air conditioning unit"41 located on the right most [sic] end from the main door;42 (c) there
was conspiracy to commit the crime of Falsification of Public Document between Atienza
and Dario in view of their "concerted efforts through previous or simultaneous acts and
deeds;"43 and (d) Castro assisted Atienza and Dario "to profit from the effects of the
crime by returning safely the missing volume to the [CA Reporters
Division]."44 Consequently, a criminal complaint was filed by the NBI and the Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman against Atienza, Castro, and
Dario before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the OMB, docketed
as OMB-0-97-2054,45 charging them for the following crimes: (a) Falsification of Public
Document; (b) violation of Section 3(a)46 of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,47 as amended;
and (c) violation of Section 848 of RA 6713.49
After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and 6713
were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,50 but it was contrarily determined that there
existed probable cause to charge Atienza, Castro, and Dario51 for the crimes of Robbery
under Article 299(a)(1)52 of the Revised Penal Code53 (RPC), as amended, and of
Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)54 in relation to Article 171(6)55 of the
same code. Thus, the corresponding Informations,56 respectively docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 01-197425 and 01-197426, were filed before the RTC. Petitioners posted
bail57 and, thereafter, pleaded "not guilty"58 to the charges during their arraignment,
while Dario remained at large.
In his defense, Atienza denied having anything to do with the questioned incidents59 as
he was not even summoned by the CA Clerk of Court or the Chief of the Reporters
Division,60 and became aware of the incident only when he and Castro were subpoenaed
by the NBI Special Investigators.61 Further, he gave the alibi that he was out of the office
4 days a week during the months of April to June 1995,62 reporting only on
Fridays,63 since he had to perform his duties as Budget Officer I of the CA Budget Division
and Liaison Officer to the Department of Budget and Management, the Committee on
Appropriation of the Congress, Committee on Appropriation of the lower house, and the
Committee on Finance of the Senate and the GSIS.
On the other hand, Castro did not endeavor to refute the allegations in the Informations
filed against him and the other accused.64
The RTC Ruling
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision65 on June 8, 2006, finding
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)
(1) of the RPC and Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1) in relation to
Article 171(6) of the RPC, and sentenced them to each suffer: (a) the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, for the first crime; and (b) the penalty of six
(6) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
maximum, and a fine of P5,000.00 for the second crime.
In convicting petitioners, the RTC found that "the evidence x x x of the prosecution is
replete with situations and/or events to prove [petitioners] guilt,"66 namely: (a) Atienza
requested Atibula to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 of the CA Original Decisions
from the CA Reporters Division, which the latter rejected despite offer of remuneration;
(b) Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing; (c) access to the missing

volume appears to have been acquired by entering through an opening in the premises
of the CAs Reporters Division because the air conditioning unit occupying the space
thereat was taken out for repair earlier; (d) Castro returned Volume 266 after its
loss;67 (e) Volume 266 bore badges of tampering evidenced by the "non-continuity of the
front and the back cover flaps x x x and the pages of the book/volume differences in the
cutting marks on the sides of the volume and the presence of artificial aging on [its]
sides";68 and (f) two (2) new documents which materially amended the original decision
and resolution in the Fernando case were inserted in the said volume.69 The RTC further
added that the manner by which petitioners committed the felonious acts reveals a
community of criminal design, and thereby held that conspiracy exists. 70
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed their conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision71 dated November 28, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs judgment of
conviction in toto. It held that while there is no direct evidence showing that the
petitioners committed the crimes charged, the testimonies of Atibula and NBI Agent Atty.
Daganzo with respect to what had transpired before and after Volume 266 was taken
from its shelf, when viewed together with the other circumstances in the case, constitute
circumstantial evidence which sufficiently point to the guilt of petitioners. 72 In addition, it
found that Atienzas defenses were self-serving negative evidence which cannot
outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his participation, 73adding too
that while there was no proof of previous agreement between petitioners to unlawfully
take Volume 266 out of the office of the CA Reporters Division and falsify the subject
documents, their conspiracy may be inferred from the fact that Castro was in possession
of the missing Volume 266 which was eventually discovered to have been falsified.74
Undaunted, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration75 which was, however, denied
in a Resolution76 dated July 7, 2009, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not petitioners conviction for
the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public Document should be upheld on account
of the circumstantial evidence in this case proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common
experience.77 It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To
uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to
a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others,
as the guilty person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accuseds guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence.78
Applying these principles to the facts that appear on record, the Court finds that no
sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented in this case to establish the elements of
Robbery under Article 299(a)(1)79 of the RPC and Falsification of Public Documents under
Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(6)80 of the same code, or of petitioners supposed
conspiracy therefor.

To this end, the Court examines the participation of and evidence against each petitioner
and forthwith explains its reasons for reaching the foregoing conclusions.
A. The Participation of and Evidence Against Castro
Notwithstanding Castros failure to refute the charges against him, the Court finds no
evidence to link him to the commission of the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of
Public Document, contrary to the conclusions reached by the RTC and concurred in by
the CA. To begin with, it is essential to note that Castros purported possession and
eventual return of Volume 266 was only premised upon the statement of one Nelson de
Castro (Nelson), i.e., the Sinumpaang Salaysay81 dated August 9, 1995, who averred that
on May 18, 1995, at around 11:50 in the morning, Castro told him to pass by his office
and there handed him a bag which, as it turned out, contained the missing Volume 266,
viz.:82
Noong Mayo 18, 1995 bandang 11:50 ng tanghali ay tumawag sa telepono si ALFREDO
CASTRO, ng Budget Division, at sinabihan ako na dumaan sa kanyang opisina dahil
mayroon daw siyang ibibigay para sa opisina namin. Pumunta po naman ako kaagad kay
ALFREDO CASTRO sa opisina at iniabot sa akin ang isang bag na malaki kulay parang
pink at may laman at sinabihan pa niya ako na buksan ko na lang daw ang bag
pagdating sa opisina. Pagdating ko sa opisina ay tinawag ko si Mr. ATIBULA at doon ay
binuksan naming dalawa ang bag. Nakita ko sa loob ang isang bagay na nakabalot sa
isang gift wrap at ng buksan namin o alisin ang gift wrap ay ang Original Decisions,
Volume 266 na nawawala mga ilang linggo na ang nakakaraan.
Nelson was not, however, presented before the RTC during trial, hence, was not
subjected to any in-court examination. It is settled that while affidavits may be
considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public (here, a
public officer authorized to administer oaths), they are still classified as hearsay
evidence unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon and the adverse party is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine them.83 With
the prosecutions failure to present Nelson to affirm his statement that Castro caused the
return of Volume 266,84 the prosecutions evidence on the matter should be treated as
hearsay and, thus, inadmissible to establish the truth or falsity of the relevant claims.
Consequently, there exists no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove Castros guilt.
B. The Participation of and Evidence Against Atienza
In similar regard, the prosecutions evidence on the circumstances in this case do not
sufficiently establish Atienzas guilt for the crimes of Robbery and Falsification of Public
Document.
While records show that Atienza was positively identified by Atibula as having attempted
to bribe him to take out Volume 260 of the CA Original Decisions from the Reporters
Division,85 the fact is that the alleged intercalation actually occurred in a different
document, that is Volume 266.
The discrepancy of accounts on the very subject matter of the crimes charged dilutes the
strength of the evidence required to produce a conviction. At best, the bribery attempt
may be deemed as a demonstration of interest on the part of Atienza over said subject
matter and in this regard, constitutes proof of motive. However, it is well-established that
mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a conviction,
most especially if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be
deduced that the accused was the malefactor.86
In fact, even if Atienzas bribery attempt is taken together with the other circumstance
couched as a relevant link by the prosecution in this case i.e., his averred encounter
with Atibula, on May 11, 1995, or two (2) days after the discovery of the loss of Volume
266, wherein the latter uttered

"[p]utang ina mo, Juaning, pinahirapan mo kami"87 the Court still finds the evidence to
be lacking. This allegation, even if proven as true, does not indicate that Atienza
howsoever affirmed the taking or even the falsification of Volume 266. Clearly, the
utterance was made by Atibula who did not bother to state Atienzas response thereto or
any other subsequent action connected therewith so as to bolster a finding of guilt.
Neither can this circumstance be properly linked to the act of Castro inviting Atibula to
Atienzas party. It would be a stretch to conclude that this mere invitation, without any
other proof of Castros participation, was instrumental or, at the very least, reasonably
connected to Atienza and his own alleged participation in the above-stated crimes.
In this relation, it may not be amiss to debunk the claim that petitioners conspired in this
case.1wphi1 While direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be
inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime which point to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests,88 records are, however, bereft of any showing as to how the particular acts of
petitioners figured into the common design of taking out the subject volume and
inserting the falsified documents therein. Hence, the prosecutions theory of conspiracy
does not deserve any merit.
All told, the prosecution has failed to show that the circumstances invoked constitute an
unbroken chain of events which lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioners
are, to the exclusion of the others, indeed the culprits. As such, their conviction, tested
under the threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, was not warranted. To be sure,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is the degree of proof that, after investigation of the
whole record, produces moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accuseds
culpability.89 Such moral certainty is, however, lacking in this case due to the
insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented.
C. Jurisdictional Defect: Falsification Case
Also, it bears mentioning that the RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Criminal Case No. 01-197426 (i.e., the falsification case) since Falsification of Public
Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 6 years91) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
pursuant to Section 32(2)92 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129,93 otherwise known as the
"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," as amended by RA 7691.94 While petitioners
raised this jurisdictional defect95 for the first time in the present petition, they are not
precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
The rule is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
raised for the first time on appeal.96
D. A Final Word
The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to
overcome such presumption of innocence, failing which, the presumption of innocence
prevails and the accused should be acquitted.97 This, despite the fact that his innocence
may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness or even absence of defense. If the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction, as in this case. Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to
convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.98

Accordingly, there being no circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conviction,

the Court hereby acquits petitioners, without prejudice, however, to any subsequent
finding on their administrative liability in connection with the incidents in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 28, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30650 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners
Ricardo L. Atienza and Alfredo A. Castro are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes of Robbery
and Falsification of Public Document on the ground of reasonable doubt, without
prejudice to any subsequent finding on their administrative liability in connection with
the incidents in this case. The bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are
consequently cancelled and released.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated
July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces
of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant
agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's
bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to
return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as
follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having
received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00;
one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies'
bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos

(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused
to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said
accused, once in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with
unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated
obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or
the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and
refused to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in
the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner,
which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May
2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to
vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4)
YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM,
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount
ofP98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of
the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on
the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate

penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of

prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7
years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES
OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED,
IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND
LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the
following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation
of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that
the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly
erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the
CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private
complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was
substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that
the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of
the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the
crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA
ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the
case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing
rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth
(5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the
same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside
from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due
date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the
said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient
compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim
that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months
from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline
came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?

a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the
items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used
to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere
query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is
silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of
the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for
funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same
way, however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces
of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991
with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry
sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after
the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner,
the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of
witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not
by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in determining
the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are
of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration
and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give
their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean
Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard
on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However,
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute
judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties
provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as
that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had
anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable
by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that
said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department
of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution
of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in
the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a
case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy
is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the

Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of
any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need
to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar
to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the
Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be noncommensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined
that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it
believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,"
that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence
on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the
matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification
of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their book, The
Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice
must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom
or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law
upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly
appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief
Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based
on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 . However, it
would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite
imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if
the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it
included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the
present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to
conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the

same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which
have increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the
legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00
plundered, the legislature lowered it toP50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature
lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but
if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200
pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed
50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under
the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and
the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said
amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the
value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted
under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for
the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision states
that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months

and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing
stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It
would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under
the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the
minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving
the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto
menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2
months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would
seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is
also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in
the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day
to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished
by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
(1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified
but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 8 years).25

2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,

punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4
months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder
is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not
so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this
is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite;
and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional,
the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty
rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get
you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand

(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United
States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional
provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and
not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide

whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and
gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes
are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not the
original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment
for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions.
Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher
penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the
helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employers loved
ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the
necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on
the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on
the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is
less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due
to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and
the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4
months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not
generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public
position to embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of
unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief,
where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage
caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of
the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will
now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force
employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime
of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the
former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00
now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation,
which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force
upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12
years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not
merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that
can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1
day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the
proposal, the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still
punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the
damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not
less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount
involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00
will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under the
existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is
categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the
RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on

the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or
impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the
property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real
property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or
landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor),
Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article
331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that
impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer
to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting,
gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as
an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law,
the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and
31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense
is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the offense.
Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of
Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the
penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative
because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position
to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such
is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to
conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due
proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or
other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at
present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised
Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that
were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings
were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it
shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or
give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the

law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law
is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government;
otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on
account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by
the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person
causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be
fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to
the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is
civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of
imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the
victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken
which is the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be
the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of
civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although
the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does
not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a
matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the

law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is that
the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the
courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00,
regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however,
from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no
longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be
meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic
twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the
law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably,
no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty
was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not
impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment"
within the purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its
non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the
present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the
concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the
present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be

accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and
weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be
made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and
lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to
validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to
wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso
you have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined
utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the
value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view
that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to
prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has
in the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of
the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts adjustment of
indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of
current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code
mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of
being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the
Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should

refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated
before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on
penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money,
but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount
that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted
as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling
of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus one (1) year for each additionalP10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the
penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time
each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article
6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which
exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article
315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every
additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be
increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut
by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited
judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner
Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN
DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.