Dinio V Dinio To San Luiz V San Luiz Fam Code

G.R. No.
146683
November 22, 2001
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

vs.
ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI
C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A.
COMILLE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No.
4593, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its
subsequent resolution3 denying reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in
Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters. 4 After the death of Zosima on
October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to
Francisco.5 On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds.6
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, 7 the latter's
cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,8 and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the
store inside.9
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo
said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,10 while Erlinda Tabancura,11another niece of
Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.12 On the other hand, Cirila said she was a
mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any
case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse.13
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. 14 Cirila
testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for
the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time;15 and that his health eventually deteriorated and he
became bedridden.16 Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his
lot near the public streets.17 He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her
family with food and lodging.18
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his
house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square
meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila
Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." The deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr. 19and later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner .20
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a
market value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.21
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of
donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the
donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be
void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under this
provision of the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of one "Cirila Comille." The documents were (1) an application for a business
permit to operate as real estate lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature "Cirila
Comille";22 (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate showing the signature "Cirila
Comille" in black ink;23 and (3) the death certificate of the decedent with the signature "Cirila A. Comille" written in
black ink.24 The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page
No. 3; Book No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex " A " to the
Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty
(30) days after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.25
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As
already stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia,
Erlinda, and Cirila; (2) the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirila's use of Francisco's surname; (3) a
pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila as Francisco's common-law wife; and (4) the fact
that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not
correct and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of
circumstances detailed by the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay
evidence, and grounded on mere speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other
cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts and their J urisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39
SCRA 504; Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in away probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
jurisprudence in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.26
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the
circumstances of this case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there
is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and G) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.27 It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the
general rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than
sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent
together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. 29In this
jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the
parties,30 a conviction of concubinage,31 or the existence of legitimate children.32
28
Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one
roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco
therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated
that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other
indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents
apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." As previously stated, these are an application for a business
permit to operate as a real estate lessor,33 a sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health
certificate,34 and the death certificate of Francisco.35 These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's
common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Francisco's
lessees in "Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil Case No.4719 (for collection
of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as "the common-law spouse of Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila did
not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver-employee, but
Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. 36 It is difficult to
believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is
void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF
MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the
spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision
Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If
the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno
al otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale
Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence
of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist
lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES
WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes
does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962.
She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff,
as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a
donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant
Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living
maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would
uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latters stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having
had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response
that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court.
The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute
ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that
defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her
marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19,
1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their
respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in
question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by
defendant; (3) That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later
said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not
be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what
is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible
in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El
espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As
provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to
the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The
questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in
question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the
above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIO, Respondent.
DECISION
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under
the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and
Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they
married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed." 6
CARPIO, J.:
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses
during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language
of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno
[according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur
of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be
doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out
by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot
stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a
situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the
law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular
The Case
The Antecedent Facts

Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital
obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go
on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that
respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was
already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to
the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Pias prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between
the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent
was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early
formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondents disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically
incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Pias City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.5
The Decision of the Trial Court

Hence, the petition before this Court.
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayags psychological report, the allegations in the
complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological incapacity against
respondent. The trial court found that respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest
of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of
the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad
and married another man.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family
Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
The petition has merit.
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIO on January 14,
1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued
after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner
argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51
of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor,
Las Pias City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City, for their information and guidance.
We agree with petitioner.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the
Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property
and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon
termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of
the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by
mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights
of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted.1avvphilUnder Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled:
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9

All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the
property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and
148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of
the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in
proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid
until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.12 In both instances under
Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of
gains14 unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment
could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. 16The
rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity
of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married.
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which
was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees
in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE
INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87,
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT
OF THE FAMILY CODE.[8]
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.[10] In
such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering
such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.[11]
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.
He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the
deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred fortysix thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her
answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of
the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to
the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,[17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in
the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig,
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased
as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in
common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This
article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the
Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common
children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System,[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established
by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently,
whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands
share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.[21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to
be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact
valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO L. GONZALES, Petitioner, v.
ERMINDA F. GONZALES,Respondents.
Promulgated: December 16, 2005
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
3.
Nasugbu, Batangas property
4.
Corinthian house and lot
5.
Sagitarius condominium
6.
Office
7.
Greenmeadows lot
8.
White Plains
9.
Corinthian lot
None
DECISION
P 10,000,000
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision dated April 2, 2003 and Resolution dated
August 8, 2003, both issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, entitled, Erminda F. Gonzales,
plaintiff-appellee versus Francisco L. Gonzales, defendant-appellant.
In March 1977, Francisco Gonzales, petitioner, and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started living as husband and
wife. After two (2) years, or on February 4, 1979, they got married. From this union, four (4) children were born,
namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres, Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel.
On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, for
annulment of marriage with prayer for support pendente lite, docketed as Civil Case No. 32-31111. The complaint
alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for no
justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty. During the time
they lived together, they acquired properties. She managed their pizza business and worked hard for its
development. She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner averred that it is respondent who is psychologically incapacitated. He
denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
existing during their marriage.
In her reply, respondent alleged that she controlled the entire generation of Fiesta Pizza representing 80% of the
total management of the same and that all income from said business are conjugal in nature.
The public prosecutor, in compliance with the directive of the trial court, and pursuant Section 48 of the Family Code,
[1] certified that no collusion exists between the parties in asking for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and
that he would appear for the state to see to it that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
Each party submitted a list of the properties with their valuation, acquired during their union, thus:
5,000,000
18,000,000
2,500,000
30,000,000
10,000,000
7,000,000
12,000,000
P 6,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
23,000,000
2,000,000
24,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
Valuation of respondent
(Record,
None
p. 110)
Valuation of petitioner (Record,

1.
Acropolis property
2.
Baguio City property
Personal Property (Vehicles)

p. 111)
1.
Galant 83 model
2.
Toyota Corona 79 model
3.
Coaster 77 model
4.
Pajero 89 model
although such incapacity became manifest only after its solemnization. The defendants evidence, on the other hand,
on the psychological incapacity of plaintiff did not have any evidentiary weight, the same being doubtful, unreliable,
unclear and unconvincing.
5.
Corolla 92 model
On February 12, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
6.
L-300 90 model
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
7.
Mercedes Sedan 79 model
8.
Pick-up 89 model
1) Declaring the marriage contracted by and between FRANCISCO L. GONZALEZ and ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO
solemnized by Rev. Fr. Alberto Ampil, S.J. on February 4, 1979, at the Manila Hilton Chapel, Nuestra de Guia Parish,
Ermita, Manila, NULL and VOID ab initio with all legal effects as provided for under applicable laws;
9.
Mercedes wagon 80 model
10.
Nissan Sentra 89 model
11.
8Tamaraws
None
-
3) Ordering the parties to deliver the childrens legitimes pursuant to Article 50, in relation to Article 51 of the Family
Code;
4) Ordering the defendant to give monthly support to Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel in the amount of Forty
Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos within five (5) days of each corresponding month delivered at the residence of the
plaintiff staring January 1997 and thereafter;
5) Ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and dividing the conjugal properties between the
plaintiff and the defendant as follows:
2) Awarding the custody of minors Maria Andrea and Marco Manuel to the plaintiff, and Carlo Manuel and Maria
Angela with rights of visitation given to both parties under an arrangement mutually acceptable to both of them;
A. 1) Plaintiffs share of real properties:

120,000
80,000
150,000
500,000
180,000
350,000
1. Corinthian lot -------------------- P 12,000,000

2. Acropolis property -------------
6,000,000
3. Baguio property -----------------
10,000,000
4. Nasugbu property --------------
5,000,000
5. Greenmeadows property -----
12,500,000
6. Sagitarius condominium ------
2,250,000
220,000
100,000
300,000
200,000
Evidence adduced during the trial show that petitioner used to beat respondent without justifiable reasons, humiliating
and embarrassing her in the presence of people and even in front of their children. He has been afflicted with
satyriasis, a personality disorder characterized by excessive and promiscuous sex hunger manifested by his
indiscriminate womanizing. The trial court found that:
The evidence adduced by plaintiff was overwhelming to prove that the defendant by his infliction of injuries on the
plaintiff, his wife, and excessive and promiscuous hunger for sex, a personality disorder called satyriasis, was, at the
time of the celebration of marriage, psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
P 47,750,000
2) Personal:
1. Pajero 89 model --------------- P
500,000
2. L-300 90 model ----------------
350,000
3. Nissan Sentra 89 model -----
200,000
P 1,050,000
B. 1) Defendants share of real properties:

1. Corinthian house and lot ----
P 20,500,000
2. Office -----------------------------
27,000,000
P 47,500,000
2) Personal:
1. Galant 83 model --------------- P
120,000
2. Toyota Corona 79 model ----
80,000
3. Coaster 77 model --------------
150,000
4. Corolla 92 model --------------
180,000
5. Mercedes Sedan 79 model ---
220,000
6. Pick-up 89 model --------------
100,000
7. Mercedes wagon 80 model
300,000
P 1,150,000
8. Four (4) Tamaraws ------------6) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant in cash the amount of P2,196,125.
These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together
under a void marriage. Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their
union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have been acquired
through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. It further provides that a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
While it is true that all the properties were bought from the proceeds of the pizza business, petitioner himself testified
that respondent was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing the business. In his handwritten
letter to her dated September 6, 1989, he admitted that Youve helped me for what we are now and I wont let it be
destroyed.
It appeared that before they started living together, petitioner offered respondent to be his partner in his pizza
business and to take over its operations. Respondent started managing the business in 1976. Her job was to: (1)
take care of the daily operations of the business; (2) manage the personnel; and (3) meet people during inspection
and supervision of outlets. She reported for work everyday, even on Saturdays and Sundays, without receiving any
salary or allowance.
7) Ordering the defendant who has actual possession of the conjugal properties to deliver to plaintiff her share of the
real and personal properties, including four (4) Tamaraws, above-described, and execute the necessary documents
valid in law conveying the title and ownership of said properties in favor of the plaintiff.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of law
may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[2] Factual findings of the Appellate Court are generally
binding on, especially this Court, when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court,[3] as in this case. This is
because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[4]
Not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. He did not
contest that part of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
WHEREFOR, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66041, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
In its Decision dated April 2, 2003, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed Decision of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated July 23, 1997.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the court of Appeals erred in ruling that the properties should be divided
equally between the parties.
Let it be stressed that petitioner does not challenge the Appellate Courts Decision declaring his marriage with
respondent void. Consequently, their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147 of the
Family Code quoted as follows:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
and of the household."
G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner,
vs.
CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda
Agapay v. Carlina (Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz" dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership of two
parcels of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered
1) Dismissing the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs;
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 when he took private respondent Carlina (or Cornelia)
Vallesterol as a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, in
October 1949, he left to work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950.
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at Poblacion, Binalonan,
Pangasinan, as evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B including the old house standing therein;
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and during the entire duration of his
year-long sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and child. The trial court
found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he returned for good
in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan.
3) Confirming the ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe,
Binalonan, Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, Lot 1123-A to
Erlinda Agapay;
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda
Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of
Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of
10,080 square meters. Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said rice land was issued in
their names.
4. Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as his inheritance from his deceased father, Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of
the agricultural land situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No. 101736 in the name of
Miguel Palang, provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, within 15 days after this decision becomes final and
executory, a quit-claim forever renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of
all conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated October 30, 1975,
otherwise, the estate of deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled in another separate action;
A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975, allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee. TCT No. 143120 covering said property was later issued in her name.
5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.
On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement
to settle and end a case filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of
six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang. 4
Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December 6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel
and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15, 1981, Miguel
died.
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision on July 22,
1994 with the following dispositive portion;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision in hereby REVERSED and another one entered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the owners of the properties in question;
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein private respondents, instituted
the case at bar, an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private respondents sought to get back the
riceland and the house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736 is registered in their
names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to their son Kristopher Palang. She added
that the house and lot covered by TCT No. 143120 is her sole property, having bought the same with her own money.
Erlinda added that Carlina is precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated their
conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 dismissing the complaint after
declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Carlina and Miguel Palang. The lower court went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of
Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. The dispositive portion of the decision reads.
2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate and deliver the properties in question to herein plaintiffs-appellants;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and
to issue in lieu thereof another certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs-appellants.
No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two deeds of absolute sale covering
the riceland and the house and lot, the first in favor of Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the second, in favor of
Erlinda Agapay alone. Second, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court erred in not declaring Kristopher
A. Palang as Miguel Palang's illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent court
erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding that there is sufficient pleading and evidence that Kristopher A. Palang or
Christopher A. Palang should be considered as party-defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the trial court and in
CA-G.R. No. 24199. 8
After studying the merits of the instant case, as well as the pertinent provisions of law and jurisprudence, the Court
denies the petition and affirms the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals.
The first and principal issue is the ownership of the two pieces of property subject of this action. Petitioner assails the
validity of the deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of land. There is no dispute that the transfer of ownership
from the original owners of the riceland and the house and lot, Corazon Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes,
respectively, were valid.
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable
here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who
are notcapacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was
patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter'sde
facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common
property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved,
there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. 9
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and
had a sari-sari store 10 but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth
noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and
Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
property, 11 there being no proof of the same.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when
she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property
reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. 14
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, 15 for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better
than those in legal union. 16
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's estate is
here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making pronouncements
regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of
filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be ventilated
in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the
instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and possession." 17
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends that Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant in the
case at bar following the trial court's decision which expressly found that Kristopher had not been impleaded as party
defendant but theorized that he had submitted to the court's jurisdiction through his mother/guardian ad litem. 18 The
trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was, therefore, not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds that
there is no need for Kristopher to file another action to prove that he is illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error has been discussed in the preceding paragraph where the need for
probate proceedings to resolve the settlement of Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional rights has been
pointed out.
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited. In the
nature of an afterthought, said added assertion was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of
the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any
case, even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan,
Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland
should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel
and private respondent Carlina Palang.
LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner
Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate their conjugal property in favor of
their daughter Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in holding that the decision adopting their compromise
agreement "in effect partakes the nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between spouses and
the termination of the conjugal partnership." 12 Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not
take place except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express stipulation in the marriage
settlements. 13 The judgment which resulted from the parties' compromise was not specifically and expressly for
separation of property and should not be so inferred.
Promulgated: November 29, 2006
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169698
- versus YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 29,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of September 16, 2005,
reversing an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for Judicial
Partition of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against respondent Yolanda de
Castro.
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of Enrico Shipping
Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate. Despite Lupo being a
married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their
union, two children were born. However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial partition
between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said
court as Civil Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union with Yolanda
as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by Yolanda sometime in
1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was transferred by the seller in Yolandas name without his
knowledge and consent. He did not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving.
It was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her new live-in partner to live in
the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat as a co-owner.
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupos allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property for Two
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru
her own savings and earnings as a businesswoman.
In a decision[3] dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the
contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in equal
shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the defendant
YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO share-and-share alike and ordering the partition of said property between them. Upon the
finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of the Court a mutually agreed
project of partition of said property or, in case the physical partition of said property is not feasible because of its
nature, that either the same be assigned to one of the parties who shall pay the value corresponding to the share of
the other or that the property to be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between the parties after
deducting the expenses incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, therein
arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own name with her
own money. She maintained that the documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove
who actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupos assertions casting doubt as to her
financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision[4] of April 29, 2005, reversed and set aside that
of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The subject
property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned by defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that under the provisions of
Article 148 of the Family Code vis--vis the evidence on record and attending circumstances, Yolandas claim of sole
ownership is meritorious, as it has been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome
the burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[5] Lupo is
now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that pursuant to Article 144[6] of the Civil Code, he was in no
way burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without the
contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article 484[7] of Civil Code, as long
as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their extramarital union, such property would be legally
owned by them in common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts, or special
provisions.
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148[8] of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...[9] Proof of actual contribution is required.[10]
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.[11]
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up
the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.[12] Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[13]
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil cases, the burden of
proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue.
Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff must still
prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.[14] Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence.[15]
It is the petitioners posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the property in
question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise the amount needed
therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property
contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of
Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between
the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden. Perusing the records of the
case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of evidence
with regard to the source of the funds used for the purchase of the disputed property and ultimately the rightful owner
thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not be disturbed, unless some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially
affect the disposition of the case.
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase money used as consideration for the disputed
property, [Lupo] diverted the burden imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a shrewd and scheming
woman without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the extent thereof, over
the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He
presented documents pertaining to the ins and outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which
unfortunately failed to prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda] had a
limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn money from their bank accounts for
their behalf do not prove that the money she used in buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter,
came from said withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial capacity of the parties. On
one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the President and General Manager of two corporations and on
the other is [Yolanda], a Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well heeled than [Yolanda],
the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken advantage of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in
error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioners claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he
fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining
to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so
and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to
overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or
immaterial to warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the
Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent
sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an
accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She
presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented
her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the
purchase price of the subject property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the herein
challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743
February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029
February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion
to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled
to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting
the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent
and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It
found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested
rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent,
one intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile"
are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.43 Hence, it is possible that a person
may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children
to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the
Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should
be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest
in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change
the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie,
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to
the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis
added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified
the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse
of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the coowner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or
Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February
28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.

Dinio V Dinio To San Luiz V San Luiz Fam Code

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G.R. No.

November 22, 2001

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner,

CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

ALAIN M. DIO , Petitioner,

The Antecedent Facts

2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

The petition has merit.

2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.

We agree with petitioner.

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void. 9

Nasugbu, Batangas property

Corinthian house and lot

Valuation of petitioner (Record,

Baguio City property

Personal Property (Vehicles)

Toyota Corona 79 model

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:

Mercedes Sedan 79 model

Mercedes wagon 80 model

Nissan Sentra 89 model

A. 1) Plaintiffs share of real properties:

1. Corinthian lot -------------------- P 12,000,000

3. Baguio property -----------------

4. Nasugbu property --------------

5. Greenmeadows property -----

6. Sagitarius condominium ------

2. L-300 90 model ----------------

3. Nissan Sentra 89 model -----

B. 1) Defendants share of real properties:

2. Toyota Corona 79 model ----

3. Coaster 77 model --------------

4. Corolla 92 model --------------

5. Mercedes Sedan 79 model ---

6. Pick-up 89 model --------------

7. Mercedes wagon 80 model

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

5) No pronouncement as to damages and attorney's fees.

LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner

Promulgated: November 29, 2006

- versus YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 133743

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

The petition lacks merit.

Brief Historical Background

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