Panaguiton VS DOJ

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums
of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made
formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon
Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During
the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.
However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the
case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson
averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several
criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued
the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a
partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was
filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it
was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered
his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the
Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had
already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations
penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition
before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg.
22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in
four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art.
90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and

punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods.
However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24
August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of
circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and
inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg.
22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information
against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.

PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007

Facts:

On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which
was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend
whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.

On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the
functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans,
whether behest or non-behest.

The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit:
"a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or
indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the
stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a
deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate
layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the
extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."

Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the
loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.

After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions,
the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of
NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.

Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by
way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan
value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit;
that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General
Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of
Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the
mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of
the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.

Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges
that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman,
prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case
based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890,
GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the
offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated
July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.

Issue:

Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically
corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act?

Held:

On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that
no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is
empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the
corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme
Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said
exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere
in its exercise.

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted
by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in
much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of

discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.

While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases,
such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution
is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply
here.

After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds
no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.

No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of

discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the
Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as
substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution

dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-950890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.