You are on page 1of 8

Midterms Cases

1. Dignos vs. CA- A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of
Conditional Sale" where nowhere in the contract in question is a proviso or stipulation to the effect
that title to the property sold is reserved in the vendor until full payment of the purchase price, nor
is there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the contract the moment the
vendee fails to pay within a fixed period. The contract is what the law defines it to be, not what it
is called by the parties.
2. Artates vs. Urbi- A sale of homestead land in satisfaction of a debt contracted before the
expiration of five years is null and void. Whether it be viewed as an exemption or as a condition
attached to the grant to encourage people to settle and cultivate public land, the immunity in
question is in consonance with the definite public policy underlying these grants, which is to
"preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which the State
has given to him" so he may have a place to live with his family and become a happy citizen and
a useful member of society, and the exemption should not be given restrictive application.
3. Heirs of Enrique Zambales vs. CA- The bilateral promise to buy and sell the homestead lot
at a price certain, which was reciprocally demandable, was entered into within the five-year
prohibitory period and is therefore, illegal and void. Further, the agency to sell the homestead lot
to a third party was coupled with an interest inasmuch as a bilateral contract was dependent on it
and was not revocable at will by any of the parties. To all intents and purposes, therefore, there
was an actual executory sale perfected during the period of prohibition except that it was
reciprocally demandable thereafter and the agency to sell to any third party was deferred until
after the expiration of the prohibitory period. The law does not distinguish between executory
and consummated sales. The"rentals" were ostensibly to be paid during the five-year prohibitory
period, and the agency to sell made effective only after the lapse of the said period, was merely a
devise to circumvent the prohibition.
4. Quiroga vs. Parsons- A contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what it is called by
the contracting parties. There was the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to supply the beds,
and, on the part of the defendant, to pay their price. These features exclude the legal conception
of an agency or order to sell whereby the agent received the thing to sell it, and does not pay
its price, but delivers to the principal the price he obtains from the sale of the thing to a
third person, and if he does not succeed in selling it, he returns it. By virtue of the contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter, on receiving the beds, was necessarily obliged
to pay their price within the term fixed, without any other consideration and regardless as to
whether he had or had not sold the beds.
5. CONCRETE AGGREGATES, Inc. vs. CTA- A specialty contractor is one whose operations
pertain to construction work requiring special skill and involves the use of specialized building
trades or crafts. The manufacture of concrete and cement mix do not involve the foregoing
requirements as to put it within such special category. The habituality of the production of goods
for the general public characterizes the business of petitioner
6. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION vs. CA- When a lot was conditionally
or contingently awarded, and the proposed consolidation of the subdivision plan is subject to the
approval by a board, such as the city council in the case, such withdrawal of the same is within
the rights of the directors of the board.The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that
moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the law governing the form
of contracts.
7. Toyota Shaw v. CA- A definite agreement on the manner of payment of the price is an
essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. This is so
because the agreement as to the manner of payment goes into the price such that a

disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.


Definiteness as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to sell personal
property.
8. SOUTHWESTERN SUGAR AND MOLASSES COMPANY vs. ATLANTIC GULF- It is true
that under article 1324 of the new Civil Code, the general rule regarding offer and acceptance is
that, when the offerer gives to the offeree a certain period to accept, "the offer may be withdrawn
at any time before acceptance" except when the option is founded upon consideration, but this
general rule must be interpreted as modified by the provision of article 1479 above referred to,
which applies to "a promise to buy and sell" specifically. As already stated, this rule requires that a
promise to sell to be valid must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
9. ATKINS, KROLL and CO., INC. vs. CUA HIAN TEK- If the option is given without a
consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale, which is not binding until accepted. If,
however, acceptance is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale,
even though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration.
10. SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS- Even supposing that petitioner granted an option which is not
binding for lack of consideration, the authorities hold that: If the option is given without a
consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale, which is not binding until accepted. If,
however, acceptance is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even
though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration
11. NATINO vs. IAC- A commitment by the bank to resell a property within a specified period,
although accepted by the party in whose favor it was made, is considered an option not
supported by consideration distinct from the price and therefore not binding upon the promissor.
12. SERRA vs. CA- In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise
before the acceptance by the creditor, the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to
buy, because upon acceptance by the creditor of the offer to sell by the debtor, there is already a
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the thing which is determinate and the price which is
certain. In which case, the parties may then reciprocally demand performance. On the other
hand, Article 1479 of the Code provides that an accepted unilateral promise to buy and sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a
consideration distinct from the price. In the present case, the consideration is even more onerous
on the part of the lessee since it entails transferring of the building and/or improvements on the
property to petitioner, should respondent bank fail to exercise its option within the period
stipulated.
An optional contract is a privilege existing only in one party, the buyer. For a separate
consideration paid he is given the right to decide to purchase or not, a certain merchandise or
property at anytime within the agreed period at a fixed price. This being, his prerogative, he may
not be compelled to exercise the option to buy before the time expires.
13. ROMAN vs. GRIMALT- A sale shall be considered perfected and binding as between
vendor and vendee when they have agreed as to the thing which is the object of the contract and
as to the price, even though neither has been actually delivered. The sale of the schooner was
not perfected and the purchaser did not consent to the execution of the deed of transfer for the
reason that the title of the vessel was in the name of one Paulina Giron and not in the name of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff promised, to perfect his title to the vessel, but he failed to do so. If no contract of
sale was actually executed by the parties the loss of the vessel must be borne by its owner.
14. NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. vs. CA- The issuance of a sales invoice does not prove
transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed

statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been considered a bill of sale.
In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery whether constructive or actual be
couple with intention of delivering the thing
15. SOUTHERN MOTORS, INC., vs. MOSCOSO- In sales on installements, where the action
instituted is for specific performance and the mortgaged property is subsequently attached and
sold, the sale thereof does not amount to a foreclosure of the mortgage, hence, the seller-creditor
is entitled to deficiency judgment.
16. PASCUAL vs. UNIVERSAL MOTORS CORP.- To sustain defendant's argument is to
overlook the fact that if the guarantor should be compelled to pay the balance of the purchase
price, the guarantor will in turn be entitled to recover what she has paid from the debtor-vendee
(Art. 2066, Civil Code); so that ultimately, it will be the vendee who will be made to bear the
payment of the balance of the price, despite the earlier foreclosure of the chattel mortgage given
by him. Thus, the protection given by Article 1484 would be indirectly subverted, and public policy
overturned.

17. FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION vs.CA- The device contract of lease with option to
buy is at times resorted to as a means to circumvent Article 1484, particularly paragraph (3)
thereof.Through the set-up, the vendor, by retaining ownership over the property in the guise of
being the lessor, retains, likewise, the right to repossess the same, without going through the
process of judicial foreclosure, in the event the vendee-lessee defaults in the payment of the
installments. There arises therefore no need to constitute a chattel mortgage over the
movable sold. The vendor, after repossessing the property and, in effect, canceling the contract of
sale, gets to keep all the installments-cum-rentals already paid. It is thus for these reasons that
Article 1485 of the new Civil Code provides that: The preceding article shall be applied to
contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy, when the lessor
has deprived the lessee of possession or enjoyment of the thing.
18. LAYUG vs. IAC- R.A. 6552, which took effect at the time the execution of the contract, shall
govern the sales of real estate on instalments as in the case at bar. It recognizes the vendor's
right to cancel such contracts upon failure of the vendee to comply with the terms of the sale, but
imposes, chiefly for the latter's protection, certain conditions thereon. Even in residential
properties, at Act recognizes and re-affirms the vendors right to cancel the contract to sell upon
breach and non-payment of the stipulated instalments. In such a case of cancelled contract, only
a right to refund of the cash surrender value of payments equivalent to 50% of total payments
made is attributable to the buyer
19. Spouses dela Cruz v. CARemedies under Recto Law are alternative and not cumulative.
The seller-mortgagee may still recover unpaid balance of purchase price where property was not
sold at public auction. If there is no actual foreclosure of mortgaged property, mortgagee may still
resort to an ordinary action for collection of the unpaid balance of the purchase price.
20. AGUSTIN vs. CA- Where the mortgagor plainly refuses to deliver the chattel subject of the
mortgage upon his failure to pay two or more installments, or if he conceals the chattel to place it
beyond the reach of the mortgagee, it logically follows as a matter of common sense, that the
necessary expenses incurred in the prosecution by the mortgagee of the action for replevin so
that he can regain possession of the chattel, should be borne by the mortgagor. Recoverable
expenses would, in our view, include expenses properly incurred in effecting seizure of the chattel
and reasonable attorneys fees in prosecuting the action for replevin.

20. FIESTAN vs. CA- The prohibition mandated by par. (2) of Article 1491 in relation to Article
1409 of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case where the sale of the property in dispute
was made under a special power inserted in or attached to the real estate mortgage pursuant to
Act No. 3135, as amended. It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that, as between a specific
statute and general statute, the former must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than a general statute does. The Civil Code is of general character while Act No. 3135, as
amended, is a special enactment and therefore the latter must prevail. The representation is not
ordinary agency but primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for his own protection.
21. DIZON vs. SUNTAY- Where the owner delivered the diamond ring to another solely for sale
on commission but the latter instead pawned the same without authority to do so, the owner is not
estopped from pursuing an action against the pawnshop for the recovery of the possession of
said ring. An exception to Art. 559 where the possession of movable property acquired in good
faith is equivalent to a title is, when one has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
22. EDCA vs. SANTOS- It is the contention of the petitioner that the private respondents have
not established their ownership of the disputed books because they have not even produced a
receipt to prove they had bought the stock. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz
acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and
EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books. Furthermore,
Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to a title.
FINALS CASES
1. Carbonell vs. CAThe annotation of the adverse claim by the first buyer in good faith is
deemed to have been equivalent to the registration required under Article 1544. What is
registered is not the document but the right of ownership over the property.
2. Olivares vs. Gonzales In a consolidation case where the property was subjected to two
different sales, one, with pacto de retro which was unregistered and an absolute sale which was
registered, and the possession of the property is with the vendee of the latter sale, who were not
included as party-defendant in the case. Justice and equity demand that said vendees in
possession of property should be heard first before adjudication of the ownership of the property.
In other words, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the controversy between the
parties to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural technicality in the light of the
express mandate of the Rules that they be "liberally construed in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding."
3. Nuguid vs. CAAlthough the second sale was made by the heirs of the deceased the said
heirs are deemed the judicial continuation of the personality of the decedent. Essentially,
therefore, the first and second sales were made by the same person, as envisioned under Article
1544 of the Civil Code. The disputed property being immovable property, the ownership should
belong to the vendee who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property, pursuant to the
same article. Good faith is deemed to be present (a) when the original certificate of title was clean
and free from any annotation or encumbrance and (b) when there is lack of knowledge of the
prior sale.

4. Valdes vs. CA The rule is clear that a prior right is accorded to the vendee who first
recorded his right in good faith over an immovable property. An annotation of an adverse claim
made prior to a deed of assignment, establishes a superior right over the property and it was
effectively a notice to the whole world. This is equivalent to registration in good faith which Article
1544 provides.
5. Taedo vs. CAWhen two deeds of sale for an inherited property which were executed after
the death of the decedent and after a deed of extra-judicial settlement. And which said deeds of
sale where made on different dates, the ownership would vest in the deed which was registered,
even if the other deed is executed earlier. The same rule applies even if actual possession is in
the vendee of the deed executed earlier.
6. Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. PalileoArticle 1544 is not applicable to land not registered
under Act no. 496. Under Act. No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting registered lands is
without prejudice to a third party with a better right. Mere registration of a sale in ones favor does
not give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the owner of the land having
previously sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
Article 1544 cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though the
latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second sale was registered. This is because, the
purchaser of the unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale only steps into the shoes of the
judgment debtor, and merely acquires the latter's interest in the property sold as of the time the
property was levied upon.
7. Dagupan Trading Co. vs. MacamThe subsequent registration of the land is a technicality
that could not cancel and render of no effect the previous unregistered sale and conveyance of
title and ownership in favor of the first buyer, especially when the first buyer took possession of
the land conveyed as owner thereof and introduced considerable improvements thereon.
8. Cruz vs. Cabana In order that the provisions of Article 1544 of the new Civil Code may be
invoked, it is necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an
existing right in the thing and the power to dispose of it. It cannot be set up by a second
purchaser who comes into possession of the property that has already been acquired by the first
purchaser in full dominion, this not withstanding that the second purchaser records his title in the
public registry, if the registration be done in bad faith, the philosophy underlying this rule being
that the public records cannot be covered into instruments of fraud and oppression by one who
secures an inscription therein in bad faith. A purchaser who has knowledge of fact which would
put him upon inquiry and investigation as to possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to
make such inquiry and investigation, cannot claim that he is a purchaser in good faith.
Although the buyers were not able to register the absolute deed of sale, they are
considered to be the first ones to register in good faith their right over the property. As their failure
to register the deed of absolute sale was because the owners duplicate certificate was in the
hands of the bank where the property was mortgaged. Likewise, a buyer who succeeded in
registering the later sale in his favor was made in bad faith when he knew and he was informed of
the prior sale in favor of respondents-spouses. Such "knowledge of a prior transfer of a registered
property by a subsequent purchaser makes him a purchaser in bad faith and his knowledge of
such transfer vitiates his title acquired by virtue of the latter instrument of conveyance which
creates no right as against the first purchaser."
9. Caram v. LauretaOne who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title
in his vendor can not claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true
owner of the land or of an interest therein, and the same rule must be applied to one who has
knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be
necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.
--The fact that the second contract is not void under Article 1409 and
that Article 1544 does not declare void a deed of sale registered in bad faith does not mean that
said contract is not void. Article 1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of

double sales. To give full effect to this provision, the status of the two contracts must be
determined and clarified. One contract must be declared valid so that one vendor may exercise
all the rights of an owner. While the other contract must be declared void to cut-off all rights which
may arise from said contract.
10. David vs. BandinThe issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer in case of double sales
is only relevant where the subject of the sale is a registered land and the purchaser is buying the
same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean, which incidentally is not in the
case at bar, where the subject properties where extra-judicially partitioned. One who purchases
an unregistered land should have been diligent regarding the true ownership of the properties
they bought. They should not have merely relied on the tax declaration shown to them by the
seller.
11. Mole vs IACIt is generally held that in the sale of a designated and specific article sold as
secondhand, there is no implied warranty as to its quality or fitness for the purpose intended, at
least where it is subject to inspection at the time of the sale. On the other hand, there is also
authority to the effect that in a sale of a secondhand articles there may be, under some
circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness for the ordinary purpose of the article sold or for the
particular purpose of the buyer. An express warranty such as the certification in this case of the
A1 condition of the machine would make the seller liable.
A redhibitory defect must be an imperfection or defect of such nature as to
engender a certain degree of importance. An imperfection or defect of little consequence does not
come within the category of being redhibitory. Therefore, a machine requiring major repairs before
it could be used is a redhibitory defect, which warrants rescission of the contract.
12. ENGINEERING & MACHINERY CORP. vs. CAWhere an action is one for breach or
damages and not for the enforcement of the warranties against hidden defects, Article 1715 on
contract for piece of work applies. However, inasmuch as this provision does not contain a
specific prescriptive period, the general law on prescription, which is Article 1144 of the Civil
Code, will apply. Said provision states, that actions upon a written contract" prescribe in ten
years.
13. De Leon v. SalvadorHaving acquired jurisdiction over the case and rendered judgment
that had become final and executory, a court retained jurisdiction over its judgment to the
exclusion of all other co-ordinate courts for its execution. Execution of its judgment having been
carried out by the sheriff with the levy and sale of the judgment debtors properties, the judgment
debtor could not in the guise of a new and separate second action ask another court of coordinate jurisdiction to interfere by injunction with execution proceedings to set them aside and to
order the holding of a new execution sale. The action should be brought in the first court.
14. Ramos vs. CAThe following undisputed circumstances prove that a Conditional Sale was
an equitable mortgage: (1) plaintiff vendor remained in possession of the properties she allegedly
sold to defendants; (2) the sums representing the alleged purchase price were actually advanced
to plaintiff by way of loans, and (3) the properties allegedly purchased by defendant have never
been declared for taxation purposes in their names. Settled is the rule that to create the
presumption enunciated by Article 1602, the existence of one circumstance is enough. The said
article expressly provides therefor "in any of the following cases," hence the existence of any of
the circumstances enumerated therein, not a concurrence nor an overwhelming number of such
circumstances, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the contract with the right of
repurchase is an equitable mortgage.
Sales with a right to repurchase, as defined by the Civil Code, are not favored. We will
not construe instruments to be sales with a right to repurchase, with the stringent and onerous
effects which follow, unless the terms of the document and the surrounding circumstances require
it. Whenever, under the terms of the writing, any other construction can fairly and reasonably be
made, such construction will be adopted and the contract will be construed as a mere loan unless
the court can see that, if enforced according to its terms, it is not an unconscionable one.

Article 1607 contemplates a contentious proceeding wherein the vendor a retro must be
named respondent in the caption and title of the petition for consolidation of ownership and duly
summoned and heard. An order granting the vendee's petition for consolidation of ownership,
without the vendor a retro being named as respondent, summoned and heard, is a patent nullity
for want of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the latter.
15. FLORES vs. SO The new civil code shall not be applicable to a Pacto De retro Sale
executed before it was enacted, hence the old civil code governs. It is provided in Article 1509
Old Civil Code that if the vendor does not comply with the provisions of Article 1518, (i.e. to return
the price, plus expenses) the vendee shall acquire irrevocably the ownership of the thing sold.
Under the old Civil Code, the ownership was consolidated in the vendee a retro by operation of
law. Hence Articles 1606 and 1607 of the New Civil Code which requires registration of the
consolidation of ownership in the vendee a retro only by judicial order, does not apply.
16. Alonzo vs. IACIt was not abandoning the necessity under Article 1088 of the Civil Code of
written notification to commence the running of the 30-day period of redemption. However as a
matter of exception and due to the peculiar circumstances of the case where the co-heirs only
brought an action for redemption of hereditary right sold by another co-heir only after 13 years,
after having actual knowledge thereof, by their actuations, when the co-heirs lived with the
purchaser in the same lot, they are deemed to have lost their right to redeem. The spirit of the
law, which is to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified is served notwithstanding the
absence of written notice, because there was actual knowledge among them.
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an
alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of
ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he
will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
17. Lee Chuy Realty v. CAA formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of
redemption price, is not essential where the right to redeem is exercised through a judicial action
within the redemption period and simultaneously depositing the redemption price. The filing of the
action itself within the period of redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
What is condition precedent to a valid exercise of the right of legal redemption is either
the formal tender with the consignation or the filing of a complaint in court. What is paramount is
the availment of the fixed and definite periods within which to exercise the right of legal
redemption.
LEASE
1. GUZMAN, BOCALING & CO. vs. BONNEVIEIt is not necessary to secure approval by the
probate court of the Contract of Lease because it did not involve an alienation of real property of
the estate nor did the term of the lease exceed one year. Only if the stipulations were enforced in
the Contract of Lease which provided for the lessees right of first priority to purchase the property
and when "all things and conditions being equal, is when it is necessary for the administratrix to
secure such approval by the probate court.
There should be identity of the terms and conditions to be offered to the lesses and all other
prospective buyers, with the lessees to enjoy the right of first priority, when there is a stipulation
that all things and conditions being equal. It only meant that a good bargain is necessary, such
that no inequity with regards to the purchase price offered to the prospective buyers as compared
to the lessee having the right of first priority
2. YAP vs. CRUZIn the absence of notice or demand to vacate, the lease contract on a monthto-month basis continues to be in force in favor of the lessee and cannot be deemed to have
expired as of the end of the month automatically. It must also be shown that the lessee effectively
relinquished his leasehold rights over the premises in view of the failure of negotiations for the
sale of the goodwill. Clearly, the transfer of the leasehold rights is conditional in nature and has

no force and effect if the condition is not complied with.


3. CLUTARIO vs. CAUnder the Rental Law, non-payment of rentals is a sufficient ground for
ejectment, but the arrears must be for at least 3 months. Corollarily, acceptance of rentals in
arrears does not constitute waiver of default in payment of rentals and would be a ground to
dismiss an action for ejectment.
- The need by the lessor of the leased premises is a valid ground for ejectment. Thus, if
an abode can be used for limited business purposes, we see no reason why it cannot be used as
an abode for persons rendering services usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and
enjoyment of a home and who personally minister to the personal comfort and convenience of the
members of the houses.
4. LEGAR MANAGEMENT & REALTY CORP. vs. CALease agreements with no specified
period, but in which rentals are paid monthly, are considered to be on a month-to-month basis.
They are for a definite period and expire after the last day of any given thirty-day period, upon
proper demand and notice by the lessor to vacate, even if the lease agreement was verbal in
nature.
5. UNITED REALTY CORP. vs. CA When the lease agreement refers to a dwelling unit or
land is for a definite period, the lessor has a right to judicially eject the lessee from the leased
premises, as exception to Section 4 PD No. 20 which suspends the application of Article 1673(1)
of the Civil Code, providing for the fixed period for the termination of leases. In addition, other
provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the Philippines on lease contracts insofar
as they are not in conflict with the provisions of PD 20 shall apply.
6. YEK SENG CO. vs CAWhen the rental was paid monthly and the term had not been
expressly agreed upon, the lease was understood under Article 1687 to be terminable from month
to month. When the lease contract has expired it could no longer be extended. However, it could
still be extended upon the sound discretion of the court, but was by no means obligatory upon it
as a merely ministerial duty. It may legally refuse to do so, if the circumstances surrounding the
case warrants such action.

You might also like