10-10-27

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIOHAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1968

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SUBJECT:

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FOR TUE DIRECTOR

The OI;.tlook in Vietnam

This Il.emorandum

do~s

not seek to eJ...1l1ore all aspects

of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over

a long term.

It is addressed only to the specific question

put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to

involve a continuation of ccmbat into the indefinite future nt

a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it

is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unabJ.e
to sustain such a level beyond a

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fe,~

months.

The current phase of combat ,{ill have a critical

bearing on the further course of the

be decisive.

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and may even prove to

\ole cannot be sure hO'.; long this phase will last,

but it seems likely that by ea.rly SUlmler the ilmnediste results

and the longer term implice.tions will be fairly clear to Hanoi,
Saigon, and Ilashillgaton.

At present, the key questions concern:

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(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their

current challenge, and wnether they can continue tne fighting
thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South

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Vietr~ese

political and military establishment to cope with the tasks

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imposed by the prescnt Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to

register significant milttary successes against US and

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especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heav'J losses,

physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to
produce a total situation favore.ble to a negotiated settlement

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on Communist terms.

The Communists are not likely to have e.

rigid timetable, but they probnbly hope to achieve decisive

results during the course of the summer.

The high

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i~portance

which Hanoi nOvl attaches to forcing the issue is evident from

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the risks and costs or. the enterprise.

4.

The toll on

Co~un1st

forces has been considerable,

even ir reportcd co.ouo.ltics nrc grel.tly inflat'.:<l by 1n01u.11on of'

low level recruits and impressed civilians.

To some ~~ent

these losses have been offset by measures already

t~~en.

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Heavy

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infiltration of both nell

is continuing.

\L~its ~~d

replacements from the North

A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was

made prior to the Tet attacks.

A significant part of the

guerrilla and }<lain forces could still be committed.

And. at

present. the Communists enjoy fUllcr access to the rural areas,

where they are recruiting heavily.

They will probably be eble

to recoup their recent locses, thougA at some sacrifice in

quality.

5. In any case. the

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probably will maintain their

offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept

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C~unists

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the high losses this entails.

indefinitely, houever, and they prObably will not be capuble

They cannot accept such losses

soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude

and widespread scale of 30-31 January.

But they ere almost

certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including

major battles with'US forces, assaults on selected cities, and
rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installationG.

6.

It is possible that the Comnunists re{>f!,rd the present

campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will

commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term

On balance. however, ~re tbin.1c it likely that even if their present

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push falls short they i'lill wish to be able to sustain a

protracted struggle.

Hence

they will probably not exercise

their capabilities in such a profligate

~er

themzelves the posaibility of continuing the

as to deny
should

~trugglc

the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.

rNNj ARVll Prospects

7.
r~~ain

8.

The will and capability of the GVl! and its armed forces
the keys to the eventual outcome.
In the llUlin, the ARVlI hnll o.cquittc(l itself fairly .Tcll

since 30 January, though the record is uneven.

up on the whole, and we

~ow

~!orale

of no unit defections.

has held

HOWever,

the ARVN is shoHing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has nOlr
lapsed into a static defensivc pOllture.
side has been sharply reduced.

Security in the country-

A long and costly effort would

have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position.

It is

highly unlikely that the ARVll will be in::pircd enough or stroncr

enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

9.

The rNN also performed adequately in the immedtate

emergency, particularly in the Saigon area.

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There nou appears

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wi th
of the nee d to pus h fon Ta rd
to be a gre ate r rec ogn itio n'
has no t ye t
Co~unist cha lle nge
ad dit ion al ~easures, bu t the
na l
ing an urg ent sen se of na tio
pro ved a cat aly st in sti mu lat

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the GOvernment has bee n

10. The ov era ll po sit ion of
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ck. of the Te t off en siv e; its (
sho
the
m
fro
ed
fer
suf
has
ge
Its pre sti
pul ar
haG bee n gre atl y red uce d. Po
con tro l ove r the cou ntr ysi de
eiv ed
tra dic tor y; the Vi et Cong rec
att itu de s are con fus ed and con
ng
bu t ne ith er was the re a ral lyi
vir tua lly no pap ula r ::u ppo rt,
as the
ssi vit y is lik ely to con tin ue
Pa
e.
sid
nt
me
ern
gov
the
to
mi lit ary
the po pu lat ion , bu t fur the r
dom ina nt att itu de in mo st of
nt.
swi ng away fro::! the gov ern me
def eat s cou ld cau se a. sud den
lla pse ,
in Sai gon is un lik ely to co
\'lh ile the cen tra l au tho rit y
tic lea der shi p tlIr oue ;ho ut the
its e.b iH ty to pro vid e ene rge
ser iou s dou bt. It is po ssi ble
cou ntr y and all lev els is in
all y
s cer tai n pro vin ces , ecp eci
tha t ov er the nex t feu mo nth
rity .
t to Sa igo n's eff ect ive aut hO
in I and IV Co rps , wi ll be los
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un ity and pur pos e.

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now cri tic al for So uth

The psy cho log ica l fac tor is
rea d
ili tar y app ara tus . The wid esp
Vie tna m's Whole po lit ica l-m
pto ma tic
l \lit h the Communists are sym
rum ors tha t the US con spi rec
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of popular anxieties over the future course of the wnr and US

attitudes toward a political settlement.

A~

'yet, h(.I1.fCver, there

arc no signs of a crisis of confidence \1ithin the goverrucent.

12.

If major military reverses occur, the political and

military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness.

If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and
inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the

Communist~

and the

general offensive appears to be contained, then the GV'N ",ight

manifest ne\; energy and confidence and dra\{ nel; support to

itself.

On balance, we judge that the chances are no better tban

even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase
without being still further weakened.
Alternative OUtcomes of Present Phase

13.

~le

believe that the Communists 'Till custain a high level

of military activity for at least the next two or three months.

It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain,
given the number of unknowable factors which will figure.
best estimate is as follows:

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a.

The least likelY outcome of the present phase i3

s~ch

that the Communist side will expend its r.eGources to

an extent as to be incapable

tl~reeftcr

of preventinG oteady

advances by the US/GVlI.

b.

the

Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that

.GIN/ARVN will

be so cri tical.ly weakened that it can play

no further significant part in the military and political.

prosecution of the struggle

c.

present push will be generally contained, but with severe

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l-Iore likcJ.y thun ei thcr of the above 1s that the

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losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a

period will set in

du:rin~

which neither will be capable of

registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATlmtoU. ESTTI1.ATES:

ABBOT SlflTII

Chairman

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