People vs Nazareno: PDF

People vs Tabarnero
Facts:
Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto), where the
former used to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane),
Ernestos stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation during which the
latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death. Gary and his father, Alberto,
were charged with the crime of Murder. Gary surrendered to a barangay tanod.
Alberto was later on arrested. During pre-trial conference, Gary admitted having
killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense (hence, reverse
trial).
Issue:
1.) Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense be considered on the part
of Gary? 2.) Is Gary entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?
Held:
NO. Garys contention that the
unlawful aggression on the part of Alberto was when the latter struck him of a
lead pipe, his pleas outside their house could not be considered as sufficient
provocation, and that his defense was reasonable, are unmeritorious. His
testimony is insufficient and self-serving. The alleged initial attack on him when
he was about to leave seemed to be all-convenient considering that no one
witnessed the start of the fight. The nine stab wounds inflicted on Ernesto
indicate an intent to kill and not merely to defend himself. He further argues that
even if he is not qualified to the justifying circumstance of self-defense, he is still
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article
13(1). The court however, ruled that Gary failed to prove the presence of
unlawful aggression which is an indispensable element of self-defense whether
complete or incomplete. Hence, he is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance.
2.) NO. In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be
credited to the accused, the following should be present:

(a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. A
surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous,
i.e.,
there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and

expenses in capturing him. In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the

authorities after more than one year (almost one year and six months from the
October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one year and one month from the
issuance of the warrant of arrest against him on March 27, 2000 ) had lapsed
since the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the
victim. This neither shows repentance nor acknowledgment of the crime nor
intention to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in
his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was a
pending warrant of arrest against him. Hence, he should not be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender Others: *Alberto is a principal by
direct participation having actually participated in stabbing Ernesto.
Ernestos
dying declaration that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto who stabbed
him, proved to be very persuasive and entitled to the highest credence. *Killing of
Ernesto is qualified by treachery because he was held by two other persons
while he was being stabbed, which rendered him defenseless and unable to
effectively repel or evade the assault.

People v. Bokingco and Col

G.R. No. 187536, August 10, 2011
FACTS:
On February 29, 2000, at around 1:00 a.m., Bokingco was seen by Vitalicio, the
victims brother-in-law, hitting something on the floor inside Apartment No. 3.
Upon seeing Vitalicio, Bokingco pushed open the screen door and attacked him
with a hammer in his hand. A struggle ensued and Vitalicio was hit several times.
Vitalicio bit Bokingcos neck and managed to push him away. Bokingco tried to
chase Vitalicio but was eventually subdued by a co-worker. Vitalicio saw Pasions
body lying flat on the kitchen floor.
Elsa was in the masters bedroom on the second floor of the house when she
heard banging sounds and her husbands moans. She immediately got off the
bed and went down. Before reaching the kitchen, Col blocked her way. Elsa
asked him why he was inside their house but Col suddenly ran towards her,
sprayed tear gas on her eyes and poked a sharp object under her chin. Col then
instructed her to open the vault of the pawnshop, which formed part of their
house, but Elsa informed him that she does not know the combination lock. Elsa
saw Bokingco open the screen door and heard him tell Col: "Tara, patay na siya."
Col immediately let her go and ran away with Bokingco. Elsa proceeded to
Apartment No. 3. Thereat, she saw her husband lying on the floor, bathed in his
own blood.
Issue:
Did the CA err in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

Held:
Treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the crime to murder in the absence of
any proof of the manner in which the aggression was commenced. For treachery
to be appreciated, the prosecution must prove that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
Nobody witnessed the commencement and the manner of the attack. While the
witness Vitalicio managed to see Bokingco hitting something on the floor, he
failed to see the victim at that time.
People vs Vilbar
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 which modified the Judgment[2] promulgated on
August 6, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, of Ormoc City, in
Criminal Case No. 5876-0. The RTC originally found accused-appellant Vicente
Vilbar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for treacherously
stabbing with a knife the deceased Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert), but the Court of
Appeals subsequently held accused-appellant liable only for the lesser crime of
homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant with the crime of murder
reads:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2000, at around 7:00
oclock in the evening, at the public market, this city, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit, with treachery, evident premeditation
and intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab, hit and wound the victim herein GUILBERT
PATRICIO, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend
himself, thereby inflicting upon said Guilbert Patricio mortal wound
which caused his death. Post Mortem Examination Report is
hereto attached.
In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659, Ormoc City, June 13, 2000.[3]

When accused-appellant was arraigned on July 31, 2000, he pleaded not

guilty to the criminal charge against him.[4]

During the pre-trial conference, the parties already admitted that Guilbert
was stabbed at the Public Market of Ormoc City on May 5, 2000 at around seven
oclock in the evening, and that immediately before the incident, accusedappellant was at the same place having a drinking spree with a certain Arcadio
Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However, accused-appellant denied
that it was he who stabbed Guilbert Patricio.[5] Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza Patricio (Maria
Liza),[6] the widow of the deceased, and Pedro Luzon (Pedro),[7] an eyewitness at
the scene. The defense offered the testimonies of accused-appellant[8] himself
and Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo),[9] another eyewitness. On rebuttal, the prosecution
recalled Pedro to the witness stand.[10]

Below is a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for both sides:

Maria Liza testified that in the evening of May 5, 2000, she
was watching her child and at the same time attending to their store
located in the Ormoc City public market. It was a small store with
open space for tables for drinking being shared by other adjacent
stores. At around 7:00 oclock in the evening, her husband,
Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert) arrived from work. He was met by their
child whom he then carried in his arms. Moments later, Guilbert
noticed a man urinating at one of the tables in front of their
store. The man urinating was among those engaged in a drinking
spree in a nearby store. It appears that the accused was with the
same group, seated about two meters away. Guilbert immediately
admonished the man urinating but the latter paid no attention and
continued relieving himself. Guilbert then put down his child when
the accused rose from his seat, approached Guilbert, drew out a
knife and stabbed him below his breast. The accused, as well as
his companions, scampered away while Guilbert called for help
saying Im stabbed. At that time, she was getting her child from
Guilbert and about two feet away from the accused. She easily
recognized the accused because he would sometimes drink at their
store. Guilbert was immediately brought to the hospital where he
later expired 11:35 of the same evening. She declared that for
Guilberts medical and hospitalization expenses, the family spent
about P3,000.00. As for the wake and burial expenses, she could
no longer estimate the amount because of her sadness.

Pedro, an eyewitness at the scene, corroborated Maria

Lizas testimonial account of the events. On that night, he was
drinking together with a companion in Maria Lizas store. He
recalled Guilbert admonishing a person urinating in one of the
tables fronting the store. Thereafter, he saw the accused pass by
him, approach Guilbert and then without warning, stab the
latter. The accused then ran away and left. Together with his
drinking companion, they rushed Guilbert to the hospital. Pedro
asserted that the areas illumination was intense because of the
big white lamp and that he was certain that it was the accused who
attacked Guilbert.

Denial was the accuseds main plea in exculpating himself

of the charge that he killed Guilbert. He claimed that in the evening
of May 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the public market (new
building) to collect receivables out of the sale of meat. Afterwards,
they took a short cut passing through the public market where they
chanced upon his wifes acquaintances who were engaged in a
drinking spree while singing videoke. Among them were Dodong
Danieles (Dodong for brevity) and his younger brother. They
invited him (the accused) and his wife to join them. While they
were drinking, Dodong had an altercation with Guilbert that
stemmed from the latters admonition of Dodongs younger brother
who had earlier urinated at the Patricios store premises. Suddenly,
Dodong assaulted Guilbert and stabbed him. Fearing that he might
be implicated in the incident, the accused fled and went to the
house of his parents-in-law. Thereafter, he went back to the market
for his wife who was no longer there. When he learned that the
victim was brought to the Ormoc District Hospital, he went there to
verify the victims condition. He was able to talk with the mother
and the wife of Guilbert as well as the police. He was thereafter
invited to the precinct so that the police can get his statement. The
next day, the parents of Dodong Danieles came to his parents-inlaws house to persuade him not to help the victims family. He
declined. Half a month later, he was arrested and charged for the
death of Guilbert Patricio.
The defense also presented one Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo) who
claimed to have personally witnessed the stabbing incident
because he was also drinking in the public market on that fateful
night. He insisted that Guilbert was stabbed by someone wearing a
black shirt, whose identity he later on learned to be Dodong
Danieles.[11]

On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accusedappellant guilty of murder and decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the Court
finds the accused Vicente Vilbar alias Dikit GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, and hereby
sentences him to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered]
to pay the offended party the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity, the
sum of P3,000.00 as medical expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his period of detention shall be
credited to him in full if he abides by the term for convicted
prisoners, otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.[12]

The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly elevated to us for our review,
but in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[13] we issued a
Resolution[14] dated December 1, 2004 referring the case to the Court of Appeals
for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorneys Office, [15] and
plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General,[16] filed their Briefs
on August 15, 2006 and April 30, 2007, respectively. The Court of Appeals made
the following determination of the issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review, accused (now accused-appellant)
seeks the reversal of his conviction for the crime of murder or in the
alternative, the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime of
homicide. He argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to
the inconsistent, irreconcilable, and incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) the exact number of persons
drinking with accused-appellant in the adjacent store; (2) what
Maria Liza was doing at the exact time of stabbing; and (3) the
accused-appellants
reaction
after
he
stabbed
the
victim. Moreover, accused-appellant argues that if he was indeed
the culprit, why did he approach Guilberts family in the hospital
immediately after the stabbing incident? Granting without admitting
that a crime of murder was committed, accused-appellant insists
that he could only be held guilty of homicide for it was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt that treachery and evident premeditation

existed. He specifically directs our attention to the following details:

(1) there was a heated argument between the victim and a member
or members of his group; (2) the stabbing happened in a spur of the
moment; and (3) the victim then was not completely defenseless.
Meanwhile, the OSG stresses that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
minor and inconsequential given the positive identification of the
accused-appellant as the assailant. As to accused-appellants
contention that he is innocent because he even went to the hospital
and conferred with Guilberts relatives immediately after the
stabbing incident, the OSG maintains that such actuation is not a
conclusive proof of innocence.
The issues for resolution are first, the assessment of
credibility of the prosecution witnesses; and second, the propriety
of conviction of the accused-appellant for murder.[17]

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on February 14, 2008, in

which it accorded great respect to the assessment by the RTC of the credibility of
the witnesses. The inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are relatively trivial, minor, and do not impeach their
credibility. The positive identification and categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert prevail
over accused-appellants self-serving denial. However, the appellate court did
not find that treachery attended the stabbing of Guilbert and, thus, downgraded
the crime to homicide. It also reduced the award of civil indemnity. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision sentenced accused-appellant
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the 1 August 2001 Decision appealed from
finding accused-appellant VICENTE VILBAR @ Dikit guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds
the accused appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Guilbert Patricio
the amounts of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as
moral damages, and Php3,000.00 as actual damages.[18]

Accused-appellant now comes before us on final appeal.

In our Resolution[19] dated April 15, 2009, we gave the parties the
opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs, but the parties manifested
that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals.[20]
After a scrutiny of the records of the case, we find that the submitted
evidence and prevailing jurisprudence duly support the findings and conclusion of
the Court of Appeals.
Evidence in this case chiefly consists of testimonial evidence. Both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals gave credence and weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.
Case laws mandate that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court,
since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[21] There is
no compelling reason for us to depart from the general rule in this case.
Prosecution witnesses Maria Liza and Pedro both positively and
categorically identified accused-appellant as the one who stabbed Guilbert.
Maria Liza vividly recounted her traumatic moment as follows:
Q:
A:

Mrs. Patricio, do you know the accused in this case in

the person of Vicente Vilbar alias Dikit?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Why do you know him?

He used to go there for drinking in our store.

Q:
A:

How long have you known this person?

About three (3) months.

xxxx
Q:
A:

Mrs. Patricio, can you recall where were you in the evening
at about 7:00 oclock of May 5, 2000?
I was at the store.

Q:
A:

Where?
In the market.

Q:
A:

What were you doing in the store?

I was watching after my, attending to my child there.

Q:
A:

How old was the child?

Two (2) years old.

Q:

When you were attending to your child at this particular

time, what happened?
My child saw my husband arriving.

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

What happened after your child saw your husband arrived

at the store you were tending?
He met him.
And what did your husband do when he was met by your
child?
He cradled the child.

Q:
A:

What happened after that?

So at 7:00 oclock that evening there was somebody
urinated and my husband told that someone not to urinate
that place because that was a table.

Q:
A:

Do you know who was this someone admonished by your

husband not to urinate because that was a table?
No, sir.

Q:
A:

Do you know where did he come from?

They were drinking.

Q:

Do you know who was his companion while they were

drinking?
No, only that Vicente Vilbar.

A:
Q:

From where he came from or from where he was drinking in

the group of persons together with the accused Vicente

A:

Vilbar, how far was the place wherein they were drinking to
where he urinated from where the group was drinking?
Just near.

Q:

When you said near, can you estimate the distance?

COURT INTERPRETER
The witness estimated a distance at about 2 meters.
xxxx
Q:
A:
Q:

What was the reaction of the person urinating when your

husband told him not to urinate?
He continue urinating.

A:

What was the reaction of your husband when he did not

heed to the advice not to urinate?
He put down the child, this Vicente Vilbar rose.

Q:
A:

Rose from where?

From the table.

Q:
A:

And what happened?

Without any word stabbed my husband.

Q:

What did he use in stabbing your husband, this Vicente

Vilbar?
Knife.

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Do you know, were you able to see where he kept the

knife which he used in stabbing your husband?
From his waist.

A:

When the said Vicente Vilbar delivered the stabbed

thrust to your husband, was your husband hit?
He was hit.

Q:
A:

On what part of his body was your husband hit?

Just below the breast.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Below the left nipple?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

What happened after your husband was hit below the left
nipple?
Vicente Vilbar ran away and my husband told me to call for
some help and he said, Im stab.
xxxx

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

By the way, how far were you to your husband Guilbert

Patricio when he was stabbed?
I was behind Vicente Vilbar.
When you said you were behind, how far from Vicente
Vilbar?
Just near, sir, from my husband next was the one who
urinated,
next
Vicente
Vilbar
and
I
was
behind.[22] (Emphases supplied.)

Pedro corroborated Maria Lizas testimony, recalling the same sequence

of events the night of May 5, 2000, viz:
Q:
A:

Who was the companion of Guilbert when he arrived in the

vicinity?
He was alone.

Q:
A:

So what happened after his arrival?

When he arrived he was with his child.

Q:
A:

And what did he do with the child?

He carried his child in his arms.

Q:
A:

And then what happened after he carried his child?

There was someone who [urinated] somewhere behind us
and he was admonished by this Guilbert Patricio by saying,
Bay, dont urinate there it would somehow create a bad
smell and considering that this is a drinking area.

Q:
A:

Who was that person who relieved himself just nearby?

I did not know.

Q:
A:

Whose group was he coming from?

From Vicente Vilbars companion.

Q:
A:

Did that person who was admonished accede to the request

of Guilbert Patricio not to relieve just nearby?
He just did not do something, he just relieved.

Q:
A:

So that person who was admonished in fact urinated?

Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

And so what happened?

I saw this Vicente Vilbar stood up and pass behind me
and went to Guilbert Patricio and just immediately
stabbed him.

Q:
A:

What was the weapon used in stabbing?

It seems like a knife (and the witness demonstrated to
the Court the length of the weapon at about 10 inches
with the width of about 2 inches).

Q:

When this stabbing incident took place, was it in front of you

or was it behind?
In front of me but I was facing his back.

A:

xxxx
Q:

Will you please point to us a part of your body that he was

hit by the stab thrust?

COURT INTERPRETER
The witness demonstrated below his left nipple and the
witness was pointing to the position below his left nipple.
xxxx
Q:
A:

At the time of that incident which was on the evening

of May 5, 2000, did you already know that the person
whom you just pointed earlier was Vicente Vilbar?
I did not know about his complete name but I know of
him as Dikit as alias and his face.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Under what circumstance that you learned of his name?

Because I ask the victim himself, that Guilbert Patricio
by saying, Who was that person who stabbed you
Dong?, and then he said He is known to be Dikit and
his real name is Vicente Vilbar.

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Prior to the incident, have you seen this Dikit or Vicente

Vilbar?
Yes, because after we had our tuba drinking spree in
that same day they were there also.
Would you recall how many times you have seen
Vicente Vilbar prior to the incident?
I could not just count how many times but what Im sure
is we know him.
Could it be more than five (5) times?
It could be.[23] (Emphases supplied.)

The RTC, assessing the aforequoted testimonies, declared:

Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she
was just behind him when he stabbed her husband who was facing
the accused. There was proper illumination of the place x x x and
her testimony was not destroyed in the cross-examination. Her
testimony is positive and spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in
her demeanor and flow of testimony that would indicate some
contradiction or incredibility.
The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony
of Maria Liza Patricio. x x x.[24]

The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro,[25] these being
relatively trivial and insignificant, neither pertaining to the act constitutive of the
crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also, these minor
contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their
impressions of the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and the
accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being present at the scene and
time of the commission of the crime but asserted that one Dodong Danieles was
the perpetrator thereof. Yet, the RTC was unconvinced by the version of events
as testified to by accused-appellant himself and Cerilo, because:

In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent

and he talked unintelligibly. His testimony is not credible and
perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with
him at the time of the incident and he was not involved in the
stabbing, why did he have to leave the place and his wife and go to
the house of his parents-in-law rather than their house? The
accused should have presented his wife to corroborate his
testimony in that regard, and also his parents-in-law so the latter
can testify regarding the alleged visitors, the alleged parents of one
Dodong Danieles who came to their place when the accused was
also there days after the incident, telling him not to help the family
of the victim.
The accuseds witness, Cerilo Pelos, is the farthest of the
expected witnesses for the defense. He and the accused were not
acquaintances and they only came to know each other in prison
where Pelos is also detained for another charge. x x x. The
testimony of the witness is hazy and full of generalities, even the
way he speaks, the Court notes some inconsistency in his voice
and incoherence in his testimony.[26]

A closer perusal of the testimony of accused-appellants corroborating

witness, Cerilo, reveals just how incoherent and elusive he was in giving
particular details about the stabbing incident:
Q:
A:

Now, while you were there, what happened?

When I arrived there, I arrived with this people having a
drinking spree and I myself went to the other table near
this people and this quite thin or slim guy was standing
in front of them and one of these people who were
having drinking spree seemed to relieve himself not to
the C.R. but beside the store.

Q:

Now, you said a while ago that there were four (4)
companions of the accused. Now, tell us, were all of the four
(4) people that you are referring to that exclude the
accused?
There were four (4) of them including the accused, sir.

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Now, you said that there was somebody from the group who
relieved himself, is that right?
Yes, sir, urinated.
And what happened when he urinated?

A:

He was confronted by that slim guy because he did not

urinate in the C.R. but just beside the store.

Q:
A:

And what happened when the confrontation took place?

They exchanged words and after that th[e] slim guy left the
one who urinated because it seemed that they were having
an argument.

Q:
A:

And then, what happened after that?

The one who confronted left and this accused stood up went
to this slim guy and talked to him.

Q:

This slim guy you are referring to is the person who

urinated?
Yes, sir.

A:
Q;
A:

And so what happened with that meeting between the

accused and the slim guy that you are referring to?
They were still and they were talking, sir.

Q:
A:

Were you able to hear what they were talking about?

No, sir, because the place was quite cacophonic.

Q:
A:

And what happened after that?

They were still talking when the one who urinated went back
to the table.

Q:

And what happened after this person who urinated

went back to the table?
They conversed with the one wearing black and after
the conversation he stood up and went to the slim guy.

A:
Q:
A:

Who stood up?

The one named Dodong, the one who was in black and
the one who stabbed.

Q:

So, you said that this one wearing black approached

the slim guy?
Yes, sir.

A:
Q:
A:

And what happened after that?

So then, he stabbed him and the one he stabbed ran
away, because he was hit.

Q:

How about the accused, where was the accused then

when the man in black stabbed the slim guy?

A:

There, and they were still convering (sic) with each

other with the slim guy, sir.

Q:

And what did he do after the man in black stabbed the slim
[g]uy?
He ran away passing by the Apollo and (while the witness
was demonstrating by pressing his hand to his chest) that he
was hit.

A:

Q:
A:

How about you, what did you do after that?

When the commotion of the people subsided, I asked from
the people around there about the name of the man in black
and after getting the name of the said person, I called up the
Police Precinct I to inform them about the incident.
xxxx

Q:
A:

Now, this person whom you said who stabbed the victim,
did you meet him before?
Not yet, sir.
xxxx

Q:
A:

As such a police asset, did you endeavor to know the

personalities who were involved in that stabbing incident?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:

Now, did you get name?

I only got one name only the name of that guy in black, sir.

Q:
A:

Why, did you interview the man in black?

I asked from those who were there hanging out if ever
they know that person.

Q:

Did you not follow the assailant after the stabbing

incident?
No sir, because after I asked about his name from the
bystanders, I immediately called up.[27] (Emphases
supplied.)

A:

Cerilo failed to mention what weapon was used to stab Guilbert or

describe the manner Guilbert was stabbed. Cerilo also appeared to have mixedup the personalities in his narration. He first identified the slim guy to be
Guilbert who reprimanded the person who urinated, but he subsequently referred

to the slim guy as the person who urinated. Moreover, Cerilos identification of
the purported assailant of Guilbert as a certain Dodong is highly unreliable,
given that Cerilo admitted that he learned of said assailants name from an
unidentified spectator of the stabbing incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert to death on
the night of May 5, 2000 was already established beyond reasonable doubt. The
next question is what crime for which accused-appellant should be held liable:
murder as held by the RTC or homicide as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of
homicide in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,[28] we ruled that
treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and
unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was not established. Surveying the leading decisions
on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Thus,
for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must
establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a)
that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused
and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the
attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been

aptly observed the accused could not have made

preparations for the attack, . . .; and the means,
method and form thereof could not therefore have
been thought of by the accused, because the attack
was impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from
the mere suddenness of the attack. . . . In point is
the following pronouncement we made in People
v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was
present merely from the fact that the attack was
sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not of
itself, suffice to support a finding ofalevosia, even
if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision
was made all of a sudden and the victim's
helpless position was accidental. . . .
In People v. Bautista, it was held:
. . . The circumstance that an attack was sudden
and unexpected to the person assaulted did not
constitute the element of alevosia necessary to
raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear
that the aggressor consciously adopted such
mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the
killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot
be appreciated if the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such manner
as to insure the commission of the killing or to
make it impossible or difficult for the person
attacked to retaliate or defend himself. . . .
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the
prosecution has not proven that the killing was committed with
treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim from behind,
the fact was that this was done during a heated argument.
Accused-appellant, filled with anger and rage, apparently had no
time to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he consciously
adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate
the killing without risk to himself. Accordingly, we hold that
accused-appellant is guilty of homicide only.[29]

Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant
case merely showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and
unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-appellant consciously adopted
such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden,
the surrounding circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that
is, the open area, the presence of the victims families and the
attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accusedappellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him,
he could have chosen another time and place to stab the
victim. Yet, accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a
public market at 7:00 oclock in the evening. The place was welllighted and teeming with people. He was indifferent to the
presence of the victims family or of the other people who could
easily identify him and point him out as the assailant. He showed
no concern that the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate
in behalf of the victim. In fact, the attack appeared to have been
impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the heat of anger or
extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accusedappellant deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and
place. Thus, we can reasonably conclude that accused-appellant,
who at that time was languishing in his alcoholic state, acted
brashly
and
impetuously
in
suddenly
stabbing
the
victim. Treachery just cannot be appreciated.[30]

Lastly, we review the penalty and damages imposed by the Court of

Appeals upon accused-appellant.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion
temporal.[31] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending
circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the
maximum of the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and
one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum

should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.
As to the award of damages to Guilberts heirs, we affirm the amounts
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Medical
and burial expenses were indisputably incurred by Guilberts heirs but the exact
amounts thereof were not duly proven. So in lieu of actual damages, we award
Guilberts heirs P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Article 2224 of the Civil
Code provides that [t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[32]
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
appeal
of
accused-appellant
is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar is found GUILTY of the
crime of HOMICIDE, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Guilbert
Patricio the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luague, Wilfredo
Toledo; G.R. No. 190862, October 9, 2013
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one
circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Facts:

On February 26, 1996 at the house of Jose at Bayawan Negros Oriental accused
Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luague, and Wilfredo Toledo killed Emeterio, Proferia
and Analiza while they were sleeping.
About 10 meters away from the house, Jose and Rolly heard the sound of a
gunshot coming from inside the house, after which they saw Luague come out
saying, Ti, tapos ka man! (There, now you are finished!). Jose and Rolly heard
womens cries for help immediately followed by a series of rapid gunfire coming
from the back of the house. Dearo and Toledo emerged from the back of the
house carrying long firearms, walk with Luague towards the road. After the
perpetrators lef, Jose and Rolly found the victims with gunshot wounds inside the
house, with Emeterio and Porferia already dead, and Analiza still moaning in
pain.
In three Informations, the accused were charged with murder, all committed by
conspiracy and attended by treachery and evident premeditation.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count. On appeal to the CA, Luague and appellants Dearo and Toledo decried
the alleged violation of due process due to supposed partiality and vindictiveness
of Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr. (Judge Bandal). They also pointed out the lack
of evidence, which do not satisfy the standard of proof of beyond reasonable
doubt. On 7 July 2009, the CA rendered a Decision affirming RTCs ruling.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the guilt of accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt
even if the evidences were circumstantial
2. Whether or not the crime was attended with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery
Ruling:
ISSUE I
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, applies when no witness has seen the
actual commission of the crime. It states:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Under the rule on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances shown must be
consistent with each other. They should all support the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and, at the same time, be inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the accused is innocent.
We agree with the RTC and the CA in their finding that the following
circumstances, proven by the prosecution and uncontroverted by the defense,
combine to leave no reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kill the
victims:
a) Luague was at odds with Porferia regarding the sharing of their inherited tract
of land, as a result of which Luague had threatened her life a few times before.
b) Emeterio was the overseer of the land.
c) Three days before the killing, appellant Dearo vowed to kill Emeterio.
d) About 10 meters away from the house, Jose and Rolly heard the sound of a
gunshot coming from inside the house, after which they saw Luague come out
saying, Ti, tapos ka man! (There, now you are finished!).
e) Jose and Rolly heard womens cries for help immediately followed by a series
of rapid gunfire coming from the back of the house.
f) Appellants Dearo and Toledo emerged from the back of the house carrying
long firearms.
g) Jose and Rolly found the victims with gunshot wounds inside the house, with
Emeterio and Porferia already dead, and Analiza still moaning in pain.
h) A ballistic examination of the recovered metallic fragments and cartridge cases
showed that they were fired from an M-16 rifle, along firearm.

ISSUE 2
We also find that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
properlyappreciated by the RTC and the CA. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party
might make. We have ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes
advantage of a situation in which the victim is asleep, unaware of the evil design,
or has just awakened.
Thus, it has been established that appellants killed Emeterio, Porferia and
Analiza. Appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the crime is
properly denominated as murder. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty of death has
been prohibited under RA 9346, accused is hereby sentenced the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Wherefore, the decision of Cebu City Court of Appeals in CA-G.R No. 00035 is
affirmed with modification. Accused Dearo and Toledo is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole for each of the three counts of murder and
ordered to pay heirs of Emeterio, Proferia and Analiza amount of P75, 000. 00 as
civil indemnity, P75, 000.00 moral damages, P30, 000.00 as exemplary damages
and P25, 000.00 as temperate damages plus legal interest at the rate of 6%
from finality of this decision.
INSTIGATION/ENTRAPMENT
People vs Naelga
For Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated 30 November 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
00304 entitled People of the Philippines v. Elly Naelga, affirming the
Decision[2] rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan,
Branch 53, in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, finding Elly Naelga guilty of the illegal
sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu.
By virtue of a Criminal Complaint, accused-appellant Elly Naelga y
Bongay (accused-appellant) was indicted before the RTC of Rosales,
Pangasinan, Branch 53, for violation of Sections 5[3] and 11(3),[4] Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 15,
2003, in Poblacion, Municipality of Rosales, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody the following, to wit: one (1) piece of small transparent
plastic containing Shabu weighing more or less 0.4 grams which
he sold to a poseur-buyer designated by the police, and without
having the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
Contrary to Article II, Sec. 5 and Sec. 11(3) of R.A. 9165.[5]

Upon arraignment on 27 August 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not

[6]

guilty.

A pre-trial conference was held on 16 September 2003 in the presence of

the government prosecutor, the accused and his counsel. Based on the pre-trial
order issued by the trial court on 16 September 2003, the defense only admitted
to the identity of the accused-appellant and the fact of his apprehension, but
denied any knowledge of the existence of a buy-bust operation. The defense
limited its testimonial evidence to that of accused-appellant himself. On the other
hand, the prosecution limited its testimonial evidence to the stipulations of Police
Officer (PO) 2 Noe Sembran, PO1 Rosauro Valdez, and Forensic Chemist
Emelda Besarra Roderos. The prosecutions documentary evidence included the
following: (a) Affidavit executed by PO2 Sembran who acted as poseur-buyer; (b)
the marked money/P100 bill with Serial No. GW877766 recovered from accusedappellant; (c) confiscation receipt; (d) Chemistry Report; and (e) sachet
of shabu handed by accused-appellant to PO2 Sembran. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution supported its version of the events through documentary
evidence and the testimonies of its two witnesses from the Rosales Police
Station in Rosales, Pangasinan, namely: PO2 Noe Sembran and PO1 Rosauro
Valdez.

PO2 Noe Sembran testified that upon receiving information from a civilian
asset that the accused Elly Naelga was peddling illegal drugs at the public
market of Rosales, Pangasinan, Police Chief Inspector Policarpio Cayabyab, Jr.
hatched a plan to conduct a buy-bust operation to apprehend the accused. PO2
Sembran was tasked to act as poseur-buyer, with PO1 Danilo Asis, Senior Police
Officer (SPO) 1 Jesus Caspillo, and PO1 Rosauro Valdez as backup
operatives. The money used for the buy-bust operation was provided by the
Rosales Treasurers Office and affixed thereto were his signature and that of the
municipal treasurer of Rosales.
In his testimony, PO2 Sembran narrated that on 15 July 2003, he was
informed by an asset that accused-appellant Elly Naelga was selling illegal drugs
at the Rosales Public Market in Pangasinan. Thereafter, at about three oclock in
the afternoon of the same day, PO2 Sembran went inside the public market and
approached accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was familiar with accusedappellant, because the polices confidential agent had been monitoring accusedappellants activities for several weeks. PO2 Sembran talked to accusedappellant, who asked the former if he was a security guard, to which he replied in
the affirmative. While engaged in this conversation, PO2 Sembran asked the
accused-appellant what he could use to keep him awake while on duty as a
security guard. Accused-appellant suggested that he drink Red Bull. PO2
Sembran replied that he already did, but this did not work, and that he was
caught sleeping on his post. Accused-appellant then declared that he knew
something more effective, as he passed his index finger under his nose as if
sniffing something. When asked what he meant, accused-appellant told PO2
Sembran that he was referring to bato or shabu. PO2 Sembran said he was
willing to try this and to buy Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) worth
of shabu. Accused-appellant told PO2 Sembran to give him the money and
committed to return with the shabu. PO2 Sembran gave appellant four One
Hundred Pesos (P400.00) in marked bills. Upon receiving the money, accusedappellant left. PO2 Sembran went back to the police station to plan the arrest of
accused-appellant.
Police Chief Inspector Policarpio C. Cayabyab, Jr. instructed PO2
Sembran to act as a poseur-buyer and the other members of the team as
backup. PO2 Sembran and his fellow police officers returned to the public

market almost an hour later. They waited for accused-appellant until he finally
arrived, alighting from a tricycle. PO2 Sembran followed him in an alley. There
were people sleeping on bamboo tables in the alley, and PO2 Sembran
expressed apprehension at being noticed. Accused-appellant reassured him that
they would not be disturbed and immediately asked for the balance of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00). PO2 Sembran gave accused-appellant the marked
money. Thereupon, accused-appellant took out a sachet containing white
granules and handed it to PO2 Sembran, who then revealed that he was a
policeman. Accused-appellant tried to run, but PO2 Sembran held on to the
formers belt. They struggled and fell to the pavement. PO1 Valdez came to help
PO2 Sembran arrest accused-appellant. PO2 Sembran was able to recover the
One-Hundred-Peso (P100.00) bill from accused-appellant, who had used the
Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00) he earlier received to buy shabu. Accusedappellant was taken into custody, and PO2 Sembran executed an affidavit of
arrest. The plastic sachet containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance
purchased from accused-appellant for P500.00 was marked EN and taken to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office in Camp
Florendo, San Fernando, La Union, for laboratory examination.[7] The four
marked One-Hundred-Peso bills earlier given to accused-appellant were no
longer with him, but the last P100.00 marked bill later paid to him was recovered.
PO1 Rosauro Valdez corroborated PO2 Sembrans testimony, narrating
how he acted as backup in connection with the buy-bust operation that led to the
arrest of accused-appellant.
The parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of the Chemist, Police
Inspector Emelda Besarra Roderos, who conducted the laboratory examination
of the subject drug, considering that the defense admitted the existence,
authenticity and due execution of Chemistry Report Number D-260-2003-U dated
16 July 2003, showing that the laboratory examination of the drug confiscated
from accused-appellant yielded a positive result for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. [8]
For the defense, accused-appellant took the witness stand.

Accused-appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that

he was employed by a Muslim named Khadi to sell compact discs (CDs) in a stall
located inside the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan. PO2 Sembran, who
introduced himself as a security guard, had previously been buying CDs from
him. One Saturday, the exact date of which he could not recall, PO2 Sembran
came at around 8:30 in the morning and bought a battery worth P5.00. On
Tuesday of the following week or on 15 July 2003, PO2 Sembran returned and
asked accused-appellant to buy shabu for him saying, We need that this
evening. He told PO2 Sembran that he did not know anybody selling shabu;
nonetheless, PO2 Sembran leftP400.00, which was placed beside him. He took
the money, because it might get lost. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of
the same day, PO2 Sembran came back to the stall and waited for him. When
he arrived, he gave to PO2 Sembran what he bought. Accused-appellant
admitted, although not certain, that what he bought was shabu, which he gave to
PO2 Sembran. After accused-appellant handed over the shabu and while he
was leaving the place, PO2 Sembran called him back uttering, Pare, come
here, and then handcuffed him. PO2 Sembran told him, Pare, I am a
policeman (pulis ako). On cross examination, accused-appellant admitted
buying the subject shabu in Urdaneta City.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment on the merits. Finding that
the prosecution had proven accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
the RTC promulgated its Decision on 21 June 2004 convicting him of the offense
charged, sentencing him to Life Imprisonment, and imposing on him a fine
of P500,000.00, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Elly
Naelga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale
of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu as charged, defined
and penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer life imprisonment; to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and, to
pay the costs of suit.[9]

Accused-appellant appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of

Appeals. On 30 November 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision
affirming the challenged decision of the trial court, reasoning thus:

[T]here is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust

operations. The choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers
is within the ambit of the police authority police officers have the
expertise to determine which specific approaches are necessary to
enforce their entrapment operations. The courts duty in these
cases is to ensure that the rights of the accused have not been
violated during buy-bust operations.
The failure of the police authorities to comply strictly with
the Dangerous Drugs Boards Resolution on the chain of custody of
the seized shabu and its preservation, by itself, is not fatal to the
prosecutions case. What is essential or necessary is that after the
subject shabu was seized, the same was duly identified, marked or
preserved, and duly submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. x x x.
xxxx
x x x We always adhere to the well-entrenched doctrine in
our jurisdiction that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the collective testimonies of the witnesses, its
assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
by the appellate court high respect. In the absence of any showing
that a judges factual findings were reached arbitrarily or without
sufficient basis, these findings are to be received with great respect
by the Supreme Court, and indeed are binding upon it.
Prescinding therefrom, We hold that the court a quo had
sufficiently and clearly established both the factual and legal basis
that led to the verdict of conviction of accused-appellant Naelga.
The Court a quos findings and pronouncement that the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation against accusedappellant Naelga, did so pursuant to their lawful exercise of police
functions should gain respect from Us. This is so because the
defense miserably failed to produce any contrary evidence that
would show even how remotely it was, that police officers Sembran
and Valdez were motivated with grudge or ill-will to allow injustice
to be committed against the person of accused-appellant if their
accusation was fabricated.[10]

Via a Notice of Appeal,[11] accused-appellant elevated the case to this

Court, which thereafter resolved to require the parties to simultaneously file their

respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from

notice.[12] Both the prosecution and the defense opted to adopt their respective
supplemental briefs filed before the Court of Appeals for purposes of
expediency.[13]
In its brief, the defense raises the following issues for resolution by this
Court:
I.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE
DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS
REGULARLY PERFORMED THEIR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.

We sustain accused-appellants conviction.

Accused-appellant denies the charges against him and attacks the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The core issue for resolution is the issue of the credibility of the witnesses.
Accused-appellant questions the trial courts reliance on the credibility of
the two prosecution witnesses in convicting him on several grounds. First,
material inconsistencies and gross contradictions in the testimonies of the police
officers destroyed their credibility. Second, accused-appellant alleges that the
police officers failed to observe the proper guidelines in securing the chain of
custody of the prohibited drugs; this alleged failure to follow proper procedure
raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and
presented in court was indeed the one retrieved from accused-appellant. Thus,
there can be no presumption of regularity.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General is for sustaining
accused-appellants conviction, arguing that the alleged inconsistencies are
minor and inconsequential and, in fact, do not negate the occurrence of the buybust operation and accused-appellants involvement.
The instant controversy involves no less than the liberty of accusedappellant. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a
basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules that place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This being an appeal of a criminal
case, opening the entire case up for review, we have carefully reviewed and
evaluated the records and the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
and find no reason to deviate from their rulings.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that prosecutions involving illegal
drugs largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the
buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and
impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of
the trial court.[14] This Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted.[15] This rule is consistent with the reality that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.[16] Thus, factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the
testimonies of the witnesses, and its conclusions anchored on its findings are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.
A successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous/prohibited drugs
must establish the following elements:
(1)

identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the

consideration; and

(2)

the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[17]

As correctly found by the trial court, accused-appellant was caught in a

buy-bust operation. He was caught in flagrante delicto selling a dangerous drug,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, to PO2 Noe Sembran on 15 July
2003 at the public market of Rosales, Pangasinan, established not only by the
clear, straightforward, and convincing testimony of poseur-buyer PO2 Noe
Sembran and corroborated by PO1 Rosauro Valdez, but also by accusedappellants testimony.
Accused-appellant himself confirmed and admitted to the occurrence of
said transaction. Following his testimony, he admitted to taking the P400.00 left
by PO2 Sembran for the purchase of shabu, thereafter going to his alleged
source in Urdaneta City, and then returning with the shabu to the Rosales Public
Market, and handing the sachet over to PO2 Sembran. The foregoing were not
only undisputed but were, in fact, admitted by accused-appellant himself in his
testimony. Thus, there is no denying that the said transaction indeed took place.
Desperate to get himself absolved from culpability, accused-appellant
submits in the alternative that the facts as presented by the prosecution reveal
that the law enforcers, specifically PO2 Sembran, instigated him to
sell shabu. Accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who approached
and asked him to buy shabu, leaving the money even if he said he did not know
anybody selling shabu.
We find no instigation in this case. The general rule is that it is no defense
to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done upon the decoy solicitation
of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity
in the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. This is
particularly true in that class of cases where the offense is of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense
was committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the
detective.[18]

Here, the law enforcers received a report from their confidential informant
that accused-appellant was engaged in illegal drug trade in the public market of
Rosales. Poseur-buyer PO2 Sembran then pretended to be engaged in the drug
trade himself and, with the help of his fellow buy-bust operatives, arrested
accused-appellant in the act of delivering the shabu to him. In an entrapment,
ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense,
and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and
conviction; in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has
been accepted as a valid and effective mode of arresting violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Law. In a buy-bust operation, the idea of committing a crime
originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit
the offense.[19] In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was formed by the
police officers precisely to test the veracity of the tip and in order to apprehend
the perpetrator.
While accused-appellant claims that it was PO2 Sembran who
approached and asked him to buy shabu for him, the same cannot be considered
as an act of instigation, but an act of feigned solicitation. Instigation is resorted
to for purposes of entrapment, based on the tip received from the police
informant that accused-appellant was peddling illegal drugs in the public market
of Rosales. In fact, it was accused-appellant who suggested to PO2 Sembran
to use shabu; and, despite accused-appellants statement that he did not know
anybody selling shabu, he still took the money from PO2 Sembran and directly
went to Urdaneta, where he claimed to have bought the illegal drug. Then he
returned to the Rosales public market and gave the drug to PO2 Sembran.
The records of the case disclose that PO2 Noe Sembran, the designated
poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, positively identified accused-appellant as
the seller of the confiscated shabu. His testimony was corroborated by PO1
Rosauro Valdez. The object of the corpus delicti was duly established by the
prosecution. The sachet confiscated from accused-appellant was positively

identified, marked and preserved as evidence, and upon laboratory examination

yielded positive for shabu.
Accused-appellants assertion that the police operatives failed to comply
with the proper procedure in the chain of custody of the seized drugs is premised
on the idea that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an
irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police
authorities in the performance of their official duties.
The argument fails.
Contrary to appellants claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of
the seized items, later on determined to be shabu, from the moment of its seizure
by the entrapment team, to its delivery to the investigating officer, to the time it
was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination. It was duly established by documentary, testimonial, and object
evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachet containing
the shabu indicating that the substance tested by the forensic chemist, whose
laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as that taken from
accused-appellant.
Failure of the buy-bust team to strictly comply with the provisions of said
section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
from applying. [20]
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section
21(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165:
(1)
The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of

Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic

Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:
(a)
The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; x x
x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

The above provision further states that non-compliance with the stipulated
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. The evident purpose of the procedure provided for is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Its
absence, by itself, is not fatal to the prosecutions case and will not discharge
accused-appellant from his crime. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. In the instant case, the integrity of the drugs seized remained intact,
and the crystalline substance contained therein was later on determined to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
Before the enactment of Republic Act No. 9165, the requirements
contained in Section 21(1) were already present, per Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite such regulation and the non-

compliance therewith by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied the
presumption of regularity, holding:
The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the
Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally
irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that
the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is
considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established x x x and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by
the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of
the Dangerous Drugs Board. [21]

Assuming arguendo that the presumption of regularity in the performance

of official duty will not apply due to the failure to comply with Section 21(a), the
same will not automatically lead to the exoneration of the accused. Accusedappellants conviction was based not solely on said presumption, but on the
documentary and real evidence; and, more importantly, on the oral evidence of
prosecution witnesses, whom we found to be credible. One witness is sufficient
to prove the corpus delicti - that there was a consummated sale between the
poseur-buyer and the accused - there being no quantum of proof as to the
number of witnesses to prove the same. To emphasize, accused-appellant
himself verified in his testimony that the said transaction took place.
The inconsistencies pointed out by the defense pertaining to whether or
not he was already inside the public market of Rosales at the time the operatives
returned, or if the buy-bust team saw him alighting from a tricycle, is an
inconsistency immaterial to the commission of the offense and, thus, cannot
affect the overall credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The records of the case indicate that after his arrest, accused-appellant
was taken into police custody. After the arrest, the seized item, which had the
marking EN and alleged to contain shabu, was brought to the PNP crime
laboratory for examination.[22] The request for laboratory examination and
transfer of the confiscated sachet to the PNP crime laboratory was prepared by
Chief of Police Policarpio C. Cayabyab, Jr.[23] The request indicated that the
seized item was delivered by PO3 Resuello, Jr. and received by Forensic

Chemist P/Insp. Emelda Besarra Roderos,[24] the same person who conducted
laboratory tests on the substance. The transparent plastic sachet containing a
white crystalline substance was later on determined to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
PO2
Sembran
positively
identified
the
plastic
sachet
containing shabu, which he had bought from accused-appellant in the buy-bust
operation. Thus, the identity of the shabutaken from accused-appellant had been
duly preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill
will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant
in this case bears the burden of making some showing that the evidence was
tampered or meddled with to overcome the presumption of regularity in the
handling of exhibits by public officers and the presumption that public officers
properly discharged their duties. There is no doubt that the sachet marked EN,
which was submitted for laboratory examination and found to be positive
for shabu, was the same one sold by accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer PO2
Sembran during the buy-bust operation.
Finally, accused-appellants claim that he is a victim of a frame-up is
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because being a victim can easily be feigned
and fabricated. There being no proof of ill motive on the part of the police
operatives to falsely accuse him of such a grave offense, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with
respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over the claim of the accusedappellant.[25] While the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption
of innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to
present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of
regularity, which the defense was not able to proffer.
Accused-appellant was charged with the unauthorized sale and delivery of
a dangerous drug in violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165.

Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
Thus, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly
imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 00304 convicting accused-appellant ELLY NAELGA of
violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ART 16-20
People vs Dulay PDF
People vs Gamboa PDF
Ong vs People
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 18 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Decision2 dated 06 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila. The RTC had convicted
accused Jaime Ong y Ong (Ong) of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree
No. (P.O.) 1612, otherwise known as. the Anti-Fencing Law.
Ong was charged in an Information3 dated 25 May 1995 as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about February 17, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines. the said
accused, with intent of gain for himself or for another. did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously receive and acquire from unknown person involving
thirteen (13) truck tires worth P65, 975.00, belonging to FRANCISCO AZAJAR Y
LEE, and thereafter selling One (1) truck tire knowing the same to have been
derived from the crime of robbery.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Ong entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued,
and the RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612.
The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that the prosecution has
established the guilt of the accused JAIME ONG y ONG beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 also known as Anti-Fencing
Law and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years
and 1 day to 16 years with accessory penalty of temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Ong appealed to the CA. After a review of the
records, the RTC's finding of guilt was affirmed by the appellate court in a
Decision dated 18 August 2009.
Ong then filed the instant appeal before this Court.
The Facts
The version of the prosecution, which was supported by the CA, is as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires,
described as T494 1100 by 20 by 14. He acquired the same for the total amount
of P223,401.81 from Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation, a domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of Firestone tires.
Private complainant's acquisition was evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565
dated November 10, 1994 and an Inventory List acknowledging receipt of the
tires specifically described by their serial numbers. Private complainant marked
the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them inside the warehouse in 720
San Jose St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Barangay San Antonio Valley 1, Sucat,
Paraaque, owned by his relative Teody Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker
of the warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold six (6) tires
sometime in January 1995, thirty-eight (38) tires remained inside the warehouse.
On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from caretaker Jose Cabal
that all thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of

which was forcibly opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal,
reported the robbery to the Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.
Pending the police investigation, private complainant canvassed from numerous
business establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tires. On February 24,
1995, private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in
Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if
appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone tires, to
which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the
description, which private complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from
his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number thereon.
Private complainant asked appellant if he had any more of such tires in stock,
which was again answered in the affirmative. Private complainant then left the
store and reported the matter to Chief Inspector Mariano Fegarido of the
Southern Police District.
On February 27, 1995, the Southern Police District formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The team was
composed of six (6) members, led by SPO3 Oscar Guerrero and supervised by
Senior Inspector Noel Tan. Private complainant's companion Tito Atienza was
appointed as the poseur-buyer.
On that same day of February 27, 1995, the buy-bust team, in coordination with
the Western Police District, proceeded to appellant's store in Paco, Manila. The
team arrived thereat at around 3:00 in the afternoon. Poseur-buyer Tito Atienza
proceeded to the store while the rest of the team posted themselves across the
street. Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone
truck tires available. The latter immediately produced one tire from his display,
which Atienza bought for P5,000.00. Atienza asked appellant if he had any more
in stock.
Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out twelve (12) more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. After the twelve (12) truck tires
were brought in, private complainant entered the store, inspected them and
found that they were the same tires which were stolen from him, based on their
serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the prearranged signal to the buybust team confirming that the tires in appellant's shop were the same tires stolen
from the warehouse.
After seeing private complainant give the pre-arranged signal, the buy-bust team
went inside appellant's store. However, appellant insisted that his arrest and the
confiscation of the stolen truck tires be witnessed by representatives from the
barangay and his own lawyer. Resultantly, it was already past 10:00 in the
evening when appellant, together with the tires, was brought to the police station
for investigation and inventory. Overall, the buy-bust team was able to confiscate
thirteen (13) tires, including the one initially bought by poseur-buyer Tito Atienza.

The tires were confirmed by private complainant as stolen from his

warehouse.5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
For his part, accused Ong solely testified in his defense, alleging that he had
been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24)
years and denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in
Jong Marketing. He further averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon
Go (Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagatdagatan, Caloocan City, for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for P45,500,
for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February 1995 and with the
letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold
Link).6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ong displayed one (1) of the tires in his store and kept all the twelve (12) others
in his bodega. The poseur-buyer bought the displayed tire in his store and came
back to ask for more tires. Ten minutes later, policemen went inside the store,
confiscated the tires, arrested Ong and told him that those items were stolen
tires.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that the prosecution had sufficiently established that all thirteen
(13) tires found in the possession of Ong constituted a prima facie evidence of
fencing. Having failed to overcome the presumption by mere denials, he was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D.
1612.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the
minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correcional.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
OUR RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be
known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused

knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there
is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the RTC and the CA that the prosecution has met the requisite
quantum of evidence in proving that all the elements of fencing are present in this
case.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar),
whose testimony was corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the
warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen testified that the crime of
robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. Azajar was able to prove
ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November
1994 and an Inventory List.12 Witnesses for the prosecution likewise testified that
robbery was reported as evidenced by their Sinumpaang Salaysay13 taken at the
Southern Police District at Fort Bonifacio.14The report led to the conduct of a buybust operation at Jong Markerting, Paco, Manila on 27 February 1995.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the
robbery, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in
his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an
accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38)
missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.15 Ong
likewise admitted that he bought the said tires from Go of Gold Link in the total
amount of ?45,500 where he was issued Sales Invoice No.
980.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.17 Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twentyfour (24) years,18ought to have known the ordinary course of business in
purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered
to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the
tires.19 The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires
happened in just one day.20 His experience from the business should have given
him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his
first time to transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just
peddling the thirteen (13) tires in the streets.
In Dela Torre v. COMELEC,21 this Court had enunciated
that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant

buyer that the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of
robbery or theft. Such circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both
of which may not be in accord with the usual practices of commerce. The nature
and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that the seller is not regularly
engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the illegality of
their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the
presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that "mere possession of any
goods, . . ., object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing" a presumption that is,
according to the Court, "reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can
arise from the established fact of . . . possession of the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft." xxx.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires.
Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the
buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the necessary
clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police
in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of
obtaining clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to
resell but, in this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent
businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.
Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt
is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge
of fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the
issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that
Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence
presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction.
Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of
P.D. 1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the
buy-bust operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store,
Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption
of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the25 property.
The RTC and the CA correctly computed the imposable penalty based on P5,075
for each tire recovered, or in the total amount of P65,975. Records show that

Azajar had purchased forty-four (44) tires from Philtread in the total amount
of P223,40 1.81.26 Section 3 (p) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and
regular. Thus, the presumption of regularity in the ordinary course of business is
not overturned in the absence of the evidence challenging the regularity of the
transaction between Azajar ,and Phil tread.
In tine, after a careful perusal of the records and the evidence adduced by the
parties, we do not find sufficient basis to reverse the ruling of the CA affirming the
trial court's conviction of Ong for violation of P.D. 1612 and modifying the
minimum penalty imposed by reducing it to six ( 6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30213 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Mel Dimat
, Petitioner
vs.People of the Philippines
, Respondent
Abad, J.:Facts:
Sonia Delgado, wife of herein respondent, brought a Nissan Safari from Mel
Dimat. Spouses Delgadowhere driving along E. Rodriguez Ave. when they were
apprehended by the Traffic Management Group(TMG), afterwards they found out
that the vehicle was a stolen property. Samson and Mantequilla, theregistered
owner of the vehicle, filed charges against Mel Dimat for violation of the AntiFencing Law.On his defense he claims that he did not know Mantequilla, and that
he bought it in good faith for value.The RTC found him to guilty and which the CA
affirms with modification.
Issue:
Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold for gain the Nissan Safari which was earlier
stolen.
Ruling:
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the
accused, who took nopart in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses,
keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that
robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and
(4) he intends by thedeal he makes to gain for himself or for another.Dimat

testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the
Nissan Safarito him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him
the old certificate of registration andofficial receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official
receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists
that Tolentinos
failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could notproduce any certificate of registration or official receipt.Based on
the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properlydocumented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of
registration and official receipt.But this certainly could not be true because, the
vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had nodocuments to show. That
Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce newdocuments
undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still,Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no
effort to check the papers covering her
purchase. That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she
did not stand accusedin the case.WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 inCA-G.R. CR 29794.