Case No.

1
G.R. No. 172909

March 5, 2014

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA, Petitioners,

vs.
GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON
GOLOSENO, Respondents.
Facts:
In CA-G.R. SP No. 59859, CA ruled that the Plaza siblings were the owner of the
agricultural land in question and the decision became final and executory. However, the
respondent's successors have continued occupying the property.
On September 14, 1999, the petitioners filed a complaint for injunction with damages
against the respondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be
enjoined from taking the possession of the subject property. They alleged that they acquired the
property from Tuazon, the highest bidder and winner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the
City of Butuan.
On the other hand, the respondents alleged that they were never delinquent in paying land
taxes and were not aware that the property was auctioned. Moreover, Tuazon, being a
government employee, was disqualified to bid in the auction. As Tuazons participation in the
sale was void, she could have not transferred ownership to the petitioners. In lieu of these
irregularities, the petitioners had no right to the injunction and TRO prayed against them.
RTC denied the prayer for a writ of injunction and ordered the possession and occupation
of the land be returned to the respondents because of the irregularities. Through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioners challenged the RTCs order before the CA.
While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners
filed an action for specific performance8 against the City Government of Butuan. According to
the petitioners, they acquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they
redeemed it from Tuazon. The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a
certificate of sale. The CA affirmed the RTCs ruling, found the petitioners guilty of forum
shopping, dismissed the case, and referred the case to the Court and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation and institution of the appropriate administrative action.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were guilty of form shopping.

Held:
Yes. The Court affirmed the CA's decision that the petitioners committed forum
shopping. the Court laid down the three ways forum shopping may be committed: 1) through litis
pendentia filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved; and 3) splitting of causes of action filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action but with different prayers the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res
judicata. "The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such
that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other.
The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners claim of
ownership of the land when they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from
Tuazon. This ownership is the petitioners basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing
them of the property. On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City
Government of Butuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the
petitioners ownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of
Butuan or from Tuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present
injunction case is different from what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause
of action which serves as the basis for the reliefs remains the same the petitioners alleged
ownership of the property after its purchase in a public auction.
Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum
shopping of the third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers. As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum
shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise
substantially the same issues.

Case No 2
G.R. No. 179408, March 05, 2014
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs. ABIGAIL R. RAZON ALVAREZ AND VERNON R. RAZON, Respondents.

FACTS:

During a test call placed at the PLDTACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a
PLDT telephone number (28243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was
originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDTs
Integrated Customer Management (billing) System, the ACP Detection Division
(ACPDD) learned that the subscriber of the reflected telephone number is Abigail R.
Razon Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound, Barangay
Don Bosco, Paraaque City. It further learned that several lines are installed at this
address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents), among others, as
subscribers.
Similar test calls subsequently conducted using the prepaid cards Unity Card and
IDT Supercalling Card revealed the same results. The calleridequipped receiving
phone reflected telephone numbers that are in the names of Experto Enterprises
and ExpertoPhils, as subscribers, with a common address at No. 38 Indonesia St.,
Better Living Subdivision, Barangay Don Bosco, Paraaque City. It turned out that
the actual occupant of these premises is also Abigail. Subsequently, a validation
test was also conducted, yielding several telephone numbers registered in the name
of ExpertoPhils./Experto Enterprises as the calling numbers supposedly from the
United Kingdom.
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDTs
Quality Control Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), conducted an ocular inspection at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio
Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision both in Barangay
Don Bosco, Paranaque City and discovered that PLDT telephone lines were
connected to several pieces of equipment.

On December 3, 2003, Police Superintendent Gilbert C. Cruz filed a consolidated

application for a search warrant before Judge Francisco G. Mendiola of the RTC, for
the crimes of theft and violation of PD No. 401. According to PLDT, the respondents

are engaged in a form of network fraud known as International Simple Resale (ISR)
which amounts to theft under the RPC. Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrants applied for. Accordingly, four search warrants were
issued for violations of Article 308, in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW A1 and
SW A2) and of PD No. 401, as amended (SW B1 and SW B2).
ISR is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using
lines, cables, antennae and/or wave frequencies which are connected directly to the
domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined (terminating
country); and, in the process, bypassing the IGF at the terminating country.
On the same date, the PNP searched the premises indicated in the warrants. On
December 10, 2003, a return was made with a complete inventory of the items
seized. On January 14, 2004, the PLDT and the PNP filed with the Department of
Justice a joint complaintaffidavit for theft and for violation of PD No. 401 against
the respondents.
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with the RTC a motion to quash the
search warrants essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority
to issue search warrants which were enforced in Paraaque City; second, the
enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked particularity; and third,
there was no probable cause for the crime of theft.
On March 12, 2004, PLDT opposed the respondents' motion.
In a July 6, 2004 order, the RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash. Having
been rebuffed in their motion for reconsideration, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the respondents' petition for certiorari
and quashed SW Al and SW A2 (for theft) on the ground that they were issued
for nonexistent crimes. The CA also ordered the return of the items seized under
these provisions. While the same stock phrase appears in paragraphs 7 and 8, the
properties described therein i.e., printer and scanner, software, diskette and tapes
include even those for the respondents' personal use, making the description of
the things to be seized too general in nature.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, PLDT went to the Court via Rule 45
petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in granting or denying the
motion to quash based on facts then existing.

RULING:

The Court partially granted the petition. It adopted the ruling in the case of
Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA involving copyright infringement, holding that the
focus was not on whether the facts and circumstances would reasonably lead to
the conclusion that an offense has been or is being committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense were in the place to be searched the
primary points of focus of the present case. Columbias focus was on whether the
evidence presented at the time the search warrant was applied for was
sufficient to establish the facts and circumstances required for establishing
probable cause to issue a search warrant. It further held that Columbia serves as a
neat guide for the CA to decide the respondents' certiorari petition. In Columbia, the
Court applied the principle of nonretroactivity of its ruling in 20th Century Fox,
whose finality was not an issue, in reversing a CA ruling. The Courts attitude in that
case should have been adopted by the CA in the present case a fortiori since the
ruling that the CA relied upon was not yet final at the time the CA resolved to quash
the search warrants.
As for the stare decisis aspect, the Court held that the issue is whether the
commission of an ISR activity, in the manner that PLDTs evidence shows,
sufficiently establishes probable cause for the issuance of search warrants for
the crime of theft. Unlike in Savage, the Court in Laurel was not confronted with the
issue of decriminalization (which is a legislative prerogative) but whether the
commission of an ISR activity meets the elements of the offense of theft for
purposes of quashing an information. Since the Court, in Laurel, ultimately ruled
then an ISR activity justifies the elements of theft that must necessarily be alleged
in the information a fortiori, the RTCs determination should be sustained on
certiorari.

Case No 3
G.R. No. 180069
March 5, 2014
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now BDO UNIBANK, INC.)
vs. FRANCO
FACTS:
Plaintiff secured from defendant PCIB the following four different Trust Indenture Certificates.
Despite demands, defendants refused to return to plaintiff the trust amounts, plus the stipulated
interest. PCIB represented to plaintiff that[,] in making the trust investment, plaintiff was
actually providing for his future since the money invested was going to be managed and
administered by their PCIB-Trust Services Group and will be commingled, pooled and
automatically rolled- over for better investment return.
On June 22, 2000, plaintiff received a letter signed by defendants counsel, denying plaintiffs
request for payment by stating that due to the conversion of all outstanding PCIBank trust
indenture accounts into common trust certificates, all such PCIBank trust indenture certificates
have been rendered "null and void." Plaintiff prays for the payment of the amounts under the
Trust Indenture Certificates, plus interest, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Defendants admit the issuance by defendant PCIB of the Trust Indenture Certificates subject
matter of the complaint, but deny the allegation that the investments subject of the Trust
Indenture Certificates are automatically rolled-over as such certificates have their own fixed term
and maturity date, and that the present action had already prescribed.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favour of the plaintiff which the CA further affirmed.
ISSUE:Whether defendants evidence prove itsalleged payment on the subject trust
certificate indentures.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled:
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving
it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. 9 When the
creditor is in possession of the document of credit, he need not prove non-payment for it is
presumed. The creditor's possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been
discharged by payment.
In this case, respondent's possession of the original copies of the subject TICs strongly supports
his claim that petitioner Bank's obligation to return the principal plus interest of the money
placement has not been extinguished. The TICs in the hands of respondent is a proof of
indebtedness and a prima facie evidence that they have not been paid. Petitioner Bank could have

easily presented documentary evidence to dispute the claim, but it did not. In its omission, it may
be reasonably deduced that no evidence to that effect really exist. Worse, the testimonies of
petitioner Bank's own witnesses, reinforce, rather than belie, respondent's allegations of nonpayment.

Case No. 4
G.R. No. 180134

March 5, 2014

RAFAEL VALES, CECILIA VALES-VASQUEZ, and YASMIN VALESJACINTO, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LUZ CHORESCA GALINATO, ERNESTO CHORESCA, TEOFILO AMADO,
LORNA PARIAN MEDIANERO, REBECCA PORCAL, and VIVENCIO
ORDOYO, Respondents.
Facts:
On March 3, 1972, Spouses Perfecto and Marietta Vales (Sps. Vales) executed a Deed of
Sale conveying five (5) parcels of registered agricultural land, o their three (3) children, herein
petitioners (subject sale). However, the subject sale was not registered, hence, title to the subject
lands remained in the names of Sps. Vales. At the time of the sale, the subject lands were
tenanted.
Several months later, Presidential Decree No. (PD) was passed decreeing the emancipation of
tenants. As required under Letter of Instruction No. (LOI) 41 issued, petitioner Rafael Vales
executed a sworn declaration, asserting that he and his sisters are co-owners of the subject lands.
This notwithstanding, the subject lands were placed under the coverage of the governments
Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program as properties belonging to Sps. Vales, not to petitioners.
Invoking the landowners retention rights,petitioners filed, on December 23, 1975, a letterrequestfor the retention of the subject lands with the Office of the Agrarian Reform, which was
not acted upon.On March 31, 1980, they filed a petitionbefore the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform-Region VI, praying that they be certified as owners of the subject lands which they have
declared in their names for tax purposes as early as November 29, 1972.They further prayed that
they be allowed to partition the subject lands with the end in view of obtaining titles for their
respective shares. The petition, however, remained unresolvedfor nearly two (2) decades.
Meanwhile, during the period July to August 1987, petitioners entered into several Agricultural
Leasehold Contracts. The following year, 1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to
certain tenants of the subject lands. Petitioners claimed, however, that such issuances were made
"without [their] knowledge and despite their vehement protest and opposition."
On January 12, 1998, petitioners filed a petition before the Regional Office of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), asking for: (a) the resolution of the earlier petition dated March 31,
1980; (b) the exemption of the subject lands from the coverage of the OLT Program; and (c) the

affirmation of petitioners right to retain seven (7) has. as provided under PD 27, which they
requested way back in December 1975, but to no avail. Significantly, petitioners admitted in their
petition that the subject sale was not registered and thus, the titles to the subject lands were not
transferred to their names. This was supposedly due to the fact that the lands were tenanted, and
that the Minister of Agrarian Reform refused to issue the required certification for purposes of
registration.
The DAR Regional Director declared that ownership over the subject lands remained with Sps.
Vales due to petitioners failure to effect the registration or even the annotation of the subject
sale. Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied.
The DAR Secretary reversed and set aside the orders of the DAR Regional Director. They ruled
that petitioners were able to prove by substantial evidence that the tenants had knowledge of the
subject sale in their favor and had even recognized petitioners as the new owners of the subject
lands as they paid rentals to them.
Some of the tenants and/or their relatives namely, herein respondents Ma. Luz
ChorescaGalinato, Ernesto Choresca, Teofilo Amado, Lorna Parian Medianero, Rebecca Porcal
and VivencioOrdoyo (respondents) filed a motion for reconsiderationwhich was initially
denied but subseqently granted by the DAR Secretary in an order.
In granting the motion and reversing his earlier decision, the DAR Secretary held that the tenants
must be shown to have acquired actual knowledge of the subject sale prior to October 21, 1972
in order to grant validity thereto. However, it appears from the date of the earliest receipts
evidencing the rental payments to petitioners that the tenants knew of the said sale only in 1977.
As such, petitioners never became valid owners of the subject lands, 32thus warranting the denial
of their petitions for exemption and retention.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the OP. The OP affirmed, which thereby prompted
petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration.
In a Decision43 dated July 25, 2007, the CA denied petitioners appeal, holding that since their
predecessors-in-interest (i.e., Sps. Vales) were not entitled to exemption and retention under PD
27 given that their aggregate landholdings consist of 58.606 has., neither could petitioners avail
of said rights under RA 6657.
Issue/s:
Whether or not DAR secretary decision is proper.

Held:

The Court finds no merit in petitioners claim that the December 11, 2002 Order of the DAR
Secretary granting the petitions for exemption and retention had already attained finality and can
no longer be reconsidered, reversed or modified, especially on a second motion for
reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading.In his September 25, 2003 Order, the DAR
Secretary explained that a "palpable mistake" and "patent error" had been committed in
determining the date of the filing of respondents motion for reconsideration, which upon review,
was shown to have been timely filed, warranting reconsideration of his earlier order. Settled is
the rule that issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform are within the
domain of the DAR Secretary.By virtue of such special competence, he should be given an
opportunity, even on a second motion for reconsideration, to rectify the errors he may have
committed. The time-honored rule is that if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
priorlyexhausted.Besides, rules of procedure are construed liberally in administrative
proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound by the technicalities applicable to courts of
law, hence, should not be used to override substantial justice, as in this case.
All told, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the denial of the tribunals a quo of the
petitions for exemption and retention herein considered.

Case No. 5
G.R. No. 184371

March 5, 2014

SPOUSES MARIO AND JULIA CAMPOS, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Facts:
On November 17, 2003, the petitioners applied for the registration of a 6,904 square meter-parcel
of land situated in Baccuit, Bauang, La Union, particularly described as Lot No. 3876, Cad-474D, Case 17, BauangCadastre. The petitioners bought the subject land from Roberto Laigo, as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties on July 26, 1990.
In support of their application, the petitioners presented, among others, the following evidence:
(1) testimony of petitioner Mario Campos; (2) testimony of adjoining lot-owner, Leopoldo
Subang; (3) Linen cloth of Lot 3876 of AP-1-002221, Cad-474-D; (4) Original technical
description of the lot; (5) Certificate of Assessment; (6) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 26,
1990; (7) Certified true copies of Tax declarations for the years 1948 and 1953 in the name of
Margarita Laigo, the mother of Roberto Laigo; (8) Certified true copies of Tax declarations for
the years 1970, 1974, 1980, 1985 and 1987 in the name of Roberto Laigo; (9) Certified true
copies of Tax declarations for the years 1990, 1994, 1995 and 1998 in the names of the
petitioners; (10) Tax receipts for the years 1991-1994, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003 and 2004;
and (11) Certification from the DENR-CENRO that Lot 3876 falls within the alienable or
disposable land of the public domain.5
Based on the evidences presented, it is appearing that the applicants have established a
satisfactory proof that they have a registrable title over the property subject of these proceedings,
they, being qualified to own that land being Filipino citizens, it being established also that their
possession and that of their predecessor-in-interest of the parcel of land subject of this
application have been open, continuous, exclusive and adverse against the whole world for more
than fifty-six (56) years since the oldest documentary evidence, Tax Declaration No. 235 series
of 1948 and in the name of Margarita Laigo shows that Margarita Laigo, mother of Roberto
Laigo from whom the applicants bought this land subject of this case, has owned it since 1948.
Besides, witness Leopoldo Subang, the owner of the land adjacent to this land subject of this
case, confirmed that their possession was probably before 1948 because he knows Roberto Laigo
as the present owner of the land when he sold it to the applicants; and that this property was
originally owned by Margarita Laigo, mother of Roberto Laigo. Hence, this Court conclusively
presumes that Margarita Laigo was the original owner even before the Second World War.7
The CA, in its assailed April 30, 2007 decision, reversed and set aside the MTCs decision and
dismissed the petitioners application for registration of title. It ruled that, contrary to the MTCs
findings, the evidence failed to prove the nature and duration of the petitioners possession and
that of their predecessors-in-interest; that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse

possession of Lot 3876 since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The CA further held that the petitioners failed to establish when the subject land became
alienable; that while the DENR-CENRO La Union certified that "Lot 3876 falls within the
Alienable and Disposable land of the Public Domain as per Project No. 9, L.C. Map No. 3330 of
BauangCadastre as certified on January 21, 1987," such certification (as annotated in the lots
Advance Plan) was inadequate to prove that the subject land was classified as alienable and
disposable on said date.

The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision but the CA denied their motion in a
resolution dated August 22, 2008, hence, the filing of the present petition for review for certiorari
with this Court
Issues:
Whether or not that the sole issue raised by the Republic was merely on the discrepancies on the
area and description of the subject land as indicated in the documents and evidence presented,
which issue the petitioners already addressed in their appeal brief before the CA.
Held:
As the CA did, we find that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The oldest
documentary evidence presented by the petitioners was a 1948 tax declaration over the subject
land in the name of Margarita Laigo. The petitioners failed to present evidence of their
possession prior to 1948. In fact, the petitioners, in their application for registration, base their
possession of the subject land only from 1948, and not "since June 12, 1945, or earlier" as
required by law.
We emphasize that since the effectivity of P.D. No. 107313 on January 25, 1977, it must be shown
that possession and occupation of the land sought to be registered by the applicant himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, which totally conforms
to the requirement under Section 14(1) of P.D. No 1529. A mere showing of possession and
occupation for thirty (30) years or more is no longer sufficient.14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM the April 30,
2007 decision and August 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84620.

Case No. 6
G.R. No. 193684

March 5, 2014

ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC.,* Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO G. BARIC, Respondent.
FACTS:
James Palado owned a parcel of land with commercial building. Baric is one of the
lessees in the commercial building of Palado.
Baric sold his property to One Network Rural Bank. Palado sent a written notice to Baric
to return the property within 40 days. Thereafter, Palado demolished the said commercial space.
Baric took the matter to the Lupon. On the two scheduled hearings, Baric failed to attend which
prompted the Barangay Chairman to issue a certificate to bar action. Baric filed a case for
forcible entry against Palado and One Network and asked the court to reinstate his possession on
the said leased property. However the land was now transferred in the name of One Network and
it then constructed a new building.
The MTC dismissed the complaint. The RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
Baric moved to reconsider, but the RTC stood its ground. Thus, he filed a Petition for Review
with the CA. CA held that Palado was guilty of forcible entry and awarded nominal damages
(since re-possession is no longer possible) for which One Network and Palado are solidarily
liable.
One Network Rural Bank filed a petition in SC arguing that they are not liable to Baric
since they are buyer in goodfaith. Baric in his Comment merely echoes the CAs pronouncements
and maintains that Network Bank should be held liable for "surreptitiously transferring" title in
its name. He nonetheless disapproved of the CAs failure to restore him in his possession and
award damages in his favor; presumably, he implores the Court to grant him continued
possession of the premises and damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not One Network be held solidarily liable.
2. Whether or not Baric should be reinstated to the premises and be awarded damages.
RULING:

1. NO. One Network Bank did not violate any of Barics rights; it was merely a purchaser
or transferee of the property. Surely, it is not prohibited from acquiring the property even while
the forcible entry case was pending, because as the registered owner of the subject property,
Plado may transfer his title at any time and the lease merely follows the property as lien or
encumbrance. Any invasion or violation of Barics rights as lessee was committed solely by
Palado. One network Bank may not be implicated or found guilty unless it took part in the
commission of illegal acts, which does not appear to be so from the evidence on record. On the
contrary, it appears that Baric was ousted through Palados acts even before One Network
acquired the property or came into the picture. Thus it was error to hold the bank liable for
nominal damages.
2. NO. That may not be allowed. He did not question the CA ruling in an appropriate
Petition before this Court. "It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision
cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. An appellee
who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than the ones granted in the decision of the court below."

Case No 7.
GR No. 193768

05 March 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
JERRY CARANTO Y PROPETA, Accused-Appellant

FACTS: Jerry was arrested through a buy-bust operation, wherein a police officer went to his
residence and bought shabu worth five hundred pesos. Marked money was used so that when
Jerry gave a heat sealed plastic of shabu, he was subsequently arrested and the marked money
was taken out of his pocket.
The plastic of shabu was turned over to a forensic chemist, who gave her findings as
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Jerry was convicted by RTC for violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act 9165 (The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and was sentenced with life imprisonment and a
fine of five hundred thousand (Php500,000.00). The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUES: I. The trial court erred in not finding the accused-appellants search and arrest
Illegal;
II. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: The decision of the CA affirming the judgment of RTC is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Caranto y Propeta is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention.
The court gave cognizance of the issues raised for the first time by accused-appellant in the
interest of justice. The lower courts failed to discuss the issues of proper documentation of the
shabu taken from the accused. The procedure embodied in RA 9165 and its IRR states how the
shabu evidence should be documented and the chain of custody, where it is ensured that the
shabu seized from the accused is the same one seen and examined by the forensic chemist and
the same one presented in court. This was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, hence the
accused was acquitted.

Case No 8.
PEAFRANCIA SUGAR MILL, INC., vs. SUGAR REGULATORY
ADMINISTRATION,
G.R. No. 208660

March 5, 2014

FACTS:

SRA issued Sugar Order No. 2, that provided, that from September 11, 1995 until
August 31, 2005, a lien of P2.00 per LKG-Bag shall be imposed on all raw sugar
quedan-permits, as well as on any other form of sugar, such as Improved Raw,
Washed, Blanco Directo, Plantation White, or Refined, in order to fund the Philippine
Sugar Research Institute, Inc. (PHILSURIN). Questioning the validity of the Assailed
Sugar Orders, PENSUMIL filed a petition for prohibition and injunction before the
Naga City-RTC and alleged that the Assailed Sugar Orders are unconstitutional in
that: (a) they were issued beyond the powers and authority granted to the SRA by
EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount levied by virtue of the Assailed Sugar Orders
constitutes public funds and thus, cannot be legally channelled to a private
corporation such as PHILSURIN.

SRA and PHILSURIN filed their respective motions to dismiss on the ground of forumshopping. The SRA alleged that there is a pending case for declaratory relief in the
Quezon City-RTC and that the main issue raised in both the Naga and QC Cases is
the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders. For its part, PHILSURIN noted the
existence of a pending collection case that it filed against PENSUMIL that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for in the Naga and Makati Cases are founded on the
same facts such that a final judgment in one will constitute res judicata on the
other.

RTC ruled in favour of PENSUMIL, reconsideration denied. On petition for certiorari,

CA reversed the decision. PENSUMIL moved for reconsideration, which was also
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum-shopping in filing the case

RULING

SC held that resolving the procedural issue on forum-shopping as herein raised

would not afford the parties any substantial relief or have any practical legal effect
since the case has become moot and academic. During the pendency of the instant
petition, the SRA has issued Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014,25 which revoked the
Assailed Sugar Orders. As a result thereof, all mill companies were directed to cease
from collecting the lien of 2.00 per LKG-Bag from all sugar production, effective
immediately.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such
instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to,
and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is
because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal
effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced

Case No 09
G.R. No. 191360 March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SHERWIN BIS y AVELLANEDA, Accused-Appellant.
Facts
On November 26, 2006, a civilian informant tipped the San Fernando City Police Station about
the alleged drug pushing activity of appellant.Hence, a team went to the area on the same day to
conduct surveillance and during the surveillance they confirmed that indeed drug activities were
happening in that place.
Based on their report their superior ordered them to conduct a buy-bust operation on November
28, 2006. Espejo was designated as poseur-buyer while Arce and Casem were to serve as backups. Following the usual procedure, Espejo was provided with a P1,000.00 bill bearing the
initials "MCE" as marked money.
At about 10:40 p.m., the team proceeded to the target area on a tricycle. Upon arriving at the
locus criminis, Arce and Casem posted themselves at a store near appellants house while Espejo
approached appellant who was standing in front of his house. He told him, "Pardspakikuha ng
isangbulto." Appellant looked at Espejo and asked "where is your money?" After Espejo handed
the P1,000.00 bill to appellant, the latter went inside the house. He emerged after a while and
gave Espejo three plastic sachets placed in another plastic container. Convinced that the white
crystalline substance inside the plastic sachets is shabu, Espejo made the pre-arranged signal by
putting his hand on top of his head. At once, Espejo introduced himself together with Arce and
Casem who already rushed to assist him, as members of the San Fernando City Police.
Forthwith, appellant was placed under arrest and apprised of his constitutional rights.
Thereafter, he was brought to the police station wherein a further search on him by Espejo
yielded aluminum foils6 and the marked money.
In the meantime, Espejo marked the three plastic sachets he bought from appellant with the
initials "MC-1," "MC-2" and "MC-3."7 Afterwards, the team brought the Request for Laboratory
Examination8 together with the confiscated items to the Regional Chief of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service. The results of the laboratory examination on the specimen yielded positive
for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.Appellant
denied all the allegations against him and he claimed that while he was just set up.

RTC and CA finds the accused GUILTY. On appeal, appellant questioned the CA Decision on the
ground that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He also averred that the police
officers failed to regularly perform their official functions.
Issue:
On appeal, appellant questioned the CA on the ground that appellant guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The court finds no merit in the appeal.
Credibility of witnesses not affected by minor inconsistencies.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncement by the Supreme Court that a few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details which do not touch the
essence of the crime do not impair their credibility. It is now too well-settled to require extensive
documentation that "inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor
details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where
there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the
accused."
Chain of custody properly established.
On the matter of handling the confiscated illegal drugs after a buy-bust operation, Section 21(1),
Article II of RA 9165 provides:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
Case law has it that non-compliance with the abovequoted provision of RA 9165 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. "What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.In the present case, the
totality of the prosecutions evidence shows the integrity of the drugs seized to be intact. The

identity of the drugs was proven and the chain of its custody and possession has been duly
accounted for and not broken and this can be gleaned from the testimonies of the witnesses.
Appellants defense of denial properly rejected.
Appellants defense hinges principally on denial. But such a defense is unavailing considering
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate buy-bust operation. "The defense of
denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Case No 10
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 192123 | 2014-03-10
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992[2] with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall,[3] enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body.
Gerald, then 3 years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation,
petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum) was the anestesiologist. During the operation,
Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma.[8] His coma lasted for two weeks,[9] but he
regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries against the attending
physicians.
She states that Accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail and neglect
to use the care and diligence as the best of his judgment would dictate under said circumstance,
by failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said
GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications,
causing as a consequence of his said carelessness and negligence, said GERALD ALBERT
GERCAYO suffered a cardiac arrest and consequently a defect called hypoxic encephalopathy
meaning
insufficient oxygen supply in the brain, thereby rendering said GERALD ALBERT GERCAYO
incapable of moving his body, seeing, speaking or hearing, to his damage and prejudice.
Judgment of the RTC

RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries
Decision of the CA
CA affirms the decision of RTC
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where
the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where
common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the
patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is
appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission
complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary
conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Issues:
whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturwas applicable herein;
and (b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling:
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The
doctrine res ipsa loquiturmeans that where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.[24] It is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior
logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa
loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.[25]
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure,
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason
is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly
within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge
of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only
physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient

has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However,
testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and
manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a
physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert
testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would
not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may
be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical
evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it
occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between
the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and
management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the
standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy
part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of
the body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under
the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it
does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res
ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge
and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily
have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to
secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the
service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular
practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturcan have no application in a
suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific
treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired
result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the
desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is
whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside
of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional
activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the
average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is
called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.

In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be
satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.[29]
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.
Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were
present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the
control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could
not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. Luz
delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation.
Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his
submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during the operation, causing loss
of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the
brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not
ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of
anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his
attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the
anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer
atropine to the patient.[30]
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines
whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.[32] Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act.[33]
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly
regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane.
In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and
conclusions in his report except for an observation which, to all intents and purposes, has
become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information regarding
the dosage of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake
in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the records it should have been 100%

oxygen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P.
Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries;
and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 11
G.R. No. 195374, March 10, 2014
PEDRO LUKANG
v.
PAGBILAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
The patriarch of the family, Arsenio and Mercedes lived as husband and wife in Calamba, Laguna, from
1922 to 1934 and begot three (3) children, namely, Domingo, Rosalina and Olympia. In 1935, he started
cohabiting with Leoncia, with whom he had ten (10) children, namely, Elpidio, Socorro, Manuel, Pedro,
Teresita, Simeon, Eugenio, Hilaria, Concepcion, and Carlos. During their cohabitation in Lucena,
Quezon, they acquired 4 parcels of land located in Pagbilao, Quezon. The said properties were then
registered in the name of ARSENIO LUKANG, married to Mercedes, share and Leoncia, single,
share. Arsenio and Leoncia later acquired four (4) more parcels of land. It was allegedly agreed that the
said properties should be registered in the name of Simeon, one of their children, in trust for the other
heirs and should be owned in common by their family. When Arsenio died, his 13 children and Mercedes,
executed the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, in which they agreed to adjudicate and transfer among
themselves the rights, interest and ownership of the four (4) parcels of land. There was, however, no
agreement to partition the properties as they remained common to all the heirs. Years later, after the
execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Mercedes, together with her three (3) children,
Rosalina, Domingo, and Olympia, executed another document, denominated as Pagbabahaging Labas sa
Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod sa Karapatan, wherein the parties declared that they were the only heirs of
Arsenio and partitioned the half portion of the four (4) parcels of land among themselves, with Mercedes
waiving her supposed share in favor of her three (3) children. Simeon, alleging that the certificates of title
of the properties were lost, filed a petition for the issuance of the owners duplicate copy before the RTC
Lucena City. As a result, new owners duplicate copies of the allegedly lost titles were issued in his favor.
Thereafter, Simeon, in a deed of donation, transferred the said properties in favor of his children,
Benedict, Heile and Madeleine. Leoncia and her children, claiming that the titles were not lost but in her
(Leoncias) possession, filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial partition, affidavit of segregation
and annulment of the new certificates of title. While the Cases were still pending, respondent Pagbilao
Development Corporation (PDC) purchased from Simeon, Mercedes and Rosalina the six (6) properties
which were the subject of the two cases. When Pedro and the other heirs learned of the sale of the subject
properties to PDC, they filed a motion to require Simeon and Rosalina to explain why they sold the
properties without permission from the RTC. They also filed an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction with ex-parte prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO). They alleged that they were
in actual and physical possession of the subject properties; and that PDC entered into the said premises,

destroyed some structures therein and started to construct improvements on the properties without their
consent. The RTC granted the issuance of the TRO effective for a period of twenty (20) days.
ISSUE:
whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the May 13, 2008 Order
granting
the
writ
of
preliminary
injunction.
HELD:
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as well as a
preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations
between the parties during the pendency of the suit. 34 The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated.
Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. 35 Under Section 3,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be granted if the
following grounds are established:c
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right
of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. 36 While a clear showing of the right is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. Hence, to be entitled to the writ, it is sufficient that the complainant shows that
he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. 37crallawlibrary
The well-entrenched rule is that the grant or denial of the writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the
sound discretion of the court. The trial court is given a wide latitude in this regard. Thus, in the absence of
a manifest abuse, such discretion must not be interfered with. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In the present case, the Court finds the RTC grant of injunction to be in order.

Case No 12
G.R. No. 204894

March 10, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y
DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.

Facts: PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. and P02 Francisco Pangilinan spotted a taxi that was
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza
and Alabang-Zapote Roads and after doubting on the documents showed by the driver Enojas,
the latter was asked to go with them to the police station for questioning. While on their way to
the police station, PO2 Pangilinan went down from the mobile car to relieve himself there. As he
approached the 7-11 stores door, he came upon two suspected robbers and shot it out with them.
Someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an
armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from
the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The
latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for
help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused Enojas, the
taxi driver they had with them had fled. Suspecting that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled,
was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a mobile
phone that Enojas apparently left behind. PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they
monitored the messages in accused Enojas mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated
with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the
arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture
accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.

RTC rendered judgment,finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the
conviction of the accused.The CA, however, found the absence of evident premeditation since
the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before committing it.
The accused appealed from the CA to thE Supreme Court.

Issues: WoN the text messages is admissible in eveidence against Enojas and other accused?
WoN the circumstantial evidence against the accused is enough to convict them?

Ruling: Yes,the text messages are admissible, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the
Courts earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text
messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

Yes, there was a circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides
basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab
suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing
him with them to the police station because of the questionable documents he showed
upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas mobile phone that
contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who
were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police
station where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had
something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter
and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running
away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2
Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was
hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked
the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping
accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.

6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly
made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the
gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized
group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with
call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile
phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.

Case No. 13
G.R. No. 208232

March 10, 2014

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA vs. LINDO

FACTS:

Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), inherited in 1983 a free-patent land located in Poblacion,

Lupon, Davao Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (1572) P6144. A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees,
herein respondents, via a notarized deed of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two
months later, OCT No. (1572) P-6144 was canceled and Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.
Three years after the sale, or on August 5, 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for
repurchase against respondents before the RTC, Branch 32, Lupon, Davao Oriental,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1798,2 anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise known as the "Public Land Act," which
reads:

SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and
laches, as defenses.

Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was substituted by
petitioner Epifania G. Bautista (Epifania).

Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise

agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand
two hundred and thirty square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to
waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each
other. The compromise was approved by the RTC.

Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed
to state the value of the property sought to be recovered. Moreover, that the properties
is P16,500, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the
property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional
ceiling.

Acting on the motion, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Whether or not that an action for repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

RULING:

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In determining whether an action is one
the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These
cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a
free patent. While the deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale
is subject to repurchase by the applicant within a period of five (5) years from the date
of conveyance, still, such legal provision is deemed integrated and made part of the
deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law is deemed written into every
contract. It is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce.
That is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to
recover the lot subject of free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific
performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.

At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of
the lots he sold to respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP 20,000,
then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case. This proposition is incorrect
for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-in-interests, the
present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the
latter to redeem said lots. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely
dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the
principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality,
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to real property or an interest
therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP 129,
as the total selling price is only PhP 16,000 way below the PhP 20,000 ceiling, still, the
postulation of respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because
respondents have actually participated in the proceedings before the RTC and
aggressively defended their position, we note that aside from the belated filing of the
motion to dismissit having been filed nine (9) years from the filing of the complaint
and by virtue of which they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC
following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.

Case No 14
OCAIPI No. 12204CAJ, March 11, 2014 - RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO.
Facts
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37storey condominium project located along
Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in WackWack, Mandaluyong City. Due to
the projects location, AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging
area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the WackWack
Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which
ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along Fordham Street that it
enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up
a fence to deny access to AMALIs construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Pasig City. The petition, which included an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI). On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted
AMALIs prayer for the WPMI.
AMALI brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had conspired
with the counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D.
JaudFetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had
been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to
cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent
Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 1, Rules
10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
No.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for
its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the Judiciary
must be supported by at least substantial evidence.But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the

service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the charge is penal in character.
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial officers who rule against it in
its cases. That impression is not at all devoid of basis. The complaint herein is actually the
second one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the performance of
their judicial duty in the same case.
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are identical, with the complaint
herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended
to intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial functions.

Case No 15.
TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) v. THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO TAN,
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., AND COMMISSIONER HEIDI L.
MENDOZA,
G.R. No. 204869, March 11, 2014
FACTS:
-

TESDA audit discovered that for the calendar years 20042007, TESDA paid EME twice
each year to its officials from two sources: (1) the General Fund for locallyfunded
projects, and (2) the Technical Education and Skills Development Project (TESDP) Fund
for the foreignassisted projects.
the audit team issued Notice of Disallowance disallowing the payment of EME for being
in excess of the amount allowed in the 20042007 GAAs. In addition, the EME were
disbursed to TESDA officials whose positions were not of equivalent ranks as authorized
by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), contrary to the provisions of the
20042007 GAAs. Notice of Disallowance indicated the persons liable for the excessive
payment of EME: the approving officers, payees and the accountants.
TESDA, filed an Appeal Memorandum arguing that the 20042007 GAAs and the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual allowed the grant of EME from both the
General Fund and the TESDP Fund provided the legal ceiling was not exceeded for each
fund.
o According to TESDA, the General Fund and the TESDP Fund are distinct from
each other, and TESDA officials who were designated as project officers
concurrently with their regular functions were entitled to separate EME from both
funds.
COAs ruling: disallowed payments of Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses (EME)
by the TESDA to its officials.
o The GAA provision on EME is very clear to the effect that payment of EME may
be taken from any authorized appropriation but shall not exceed the ceiling stated
therein.
o It also held that the designation of TESDA officials as Project Managers in
concurrent capacities to offices under TESDP, forms part only of their additional
functions without another appointment. The EME is covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office and not for every project handled.
o That the creation of said positions [was] not supported with authority or approval
from the DBM. Neither was there a DBM document identifying the equivalent
ranks of these positions as basis for ascertaining the amount of EME to be paid.
TESDA filed a petition for review with COA.

COA denied TESDAs petition for lack of merit. The COA adopted the findings of both
the TESDA audit team and the COA Cluster Director that the grant of EME exceeded the
allowable limit in the 20042007 GAAs. Accordingly, the COA ruled that the failure of
the TESDA officials to adhere to the 20042007 GAAs negated their claim of good faith.
Thus, the COA ordered them to refund the excess EME they received.
Hence, TESDA filed a Petition for Certiorari w/ Prayer for TRO/Preliminary Injunction/

ISSUE:
Did COA err in disallowing the payments made by TESDA to its officials of their EME from
both general fund and TESDP fund?
RULING:
-

No. The Constitution vests COA, as guardian of public funds, with enough latitude to
determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. The COA is generally accorded
complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and the Court generally
sustains its decisions in recognition of its expertise in the laws it is entrusted to enforce.
Only when COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court grant a petition
assailing COAs actions. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in
contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism
SC did not find grave abuse of discretion when COA disallowed the disbursement of
EME to TESDA officials for being excessive and unauthorized by law, specifically the
20042007 GAAs, to wit:
The GAA provisions are clear that the EME shall not exceed the amounts fixed in the
GAA. The GAA provisions are also clear that only the officials named in the GAA, the
officers of equivalent rank as may be authorized by the DBM, and the offices under them
are entitled to claim EME not exceeding the amount provided in the GAA.
The COA merely complied with its mandate when it disallowed the EME that were
reimbursed to officers who were not entitled to the EME, or who received EME in excess
of the allowable amount. When the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, there
should be no room for interpretation but only its application.

Case No 16
Marcelo vs. Pichay
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1838
March 12, 2014

Facts:
Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Paraaque City. The defendants therein, Sps. Magopoy, were ordered by the MeTC to vacate
and surrender the possession of the property. A writ of execution was issued, and later
implemented by the branch sheriff. On the evening of the same day, Sps. Magopoy re-entered the
property and regained its possession.
Sps. Marcelo moved to cite Sps. Magopoy in contempt for disobedience/resistance to
lawful court processes. The MeTC, did not cite them in contempt but, instead, ordered them to
surrender the subject property to Sps. Marcelo within ten days from receipt of the order.
Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in view of the continued refusal of Sps.
Magopoy to surrender the property. This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order to the Sheriff
three days within which to effect Sps. Magopoys eviction from the property. Sps. Magopoy filed
a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by Sps. Marcelo.
The hearing on the aforesaid motion was conducted. Sps. Magopoy filed their
Supplemental Motion and Reply alleging that the miscellaneous sales application of Sps.
Marcelo over the property had been denied by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
Instead of resolving the pending incidents, Judge Pichay, in an Order, directed Sps.
Marcelo to file their comment and/or opposition to Sps. Magopoys supplemental motion within
five days from receipt of the order, with a warning that upon the expiration of said period, the
court will resolve the pending incidents. Despite the directive of the court a quo, Sps. Marcelo
failed to file their comment and/or opposition. Nonetheless, Judge Pichay, set Sps. Magopoys
previous motion for reconsideration as well as their supplemental motion for hearing.
Sps. Marcelo filed an administrative complaint24 on March 10, 2010 before the Office of
the Court Administrator , charging him and Sheriff Epres with inordinate delay in the disposition
of the pending incidents. Judge Pichay, in his defense contended that , he considered the denial
of the sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property, as brought to his attention by
Sps. Magopoy, as a supervening event that may materially change the situation of the parties and,
thus, render the execution of the subject decision inequitable.

The OCA recommended that Judge Pichay be held administratively liable for undue delay
in the resolution of the pending incidents relative to the execution of the subject decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in the Civil Case.
Ruling:
The Court concurs with the OCAs recommendations, subject to the modification of the
recommended penalty to be imposed against Judge Pichay.
The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in
deciding cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is
three (3) months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution.
The Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and
expeditiously under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge
should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the
performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a
case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency
warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge.

Case No 17
EstacionJrvs Sec of DAR
FACTS: In September 1995, spouses Jose M. Estacion, Jr.1 and Angelina T. Estacion
(petitioners) filed a petition for just compensation over two parcels of land with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).They
contested the coverage, claiming that it was untenanted and primarily devoted to crops other than
rice and corn. Despite their protest, their properties were forcibly covered for agrarian purposes.
Instead of filing an answer, Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion to Dismiss, which, according to the petitioners, is a prohibited
pleading under Section 164 of P.D. No. 946.5 In their Motion to Dismiss, public respondents
claimed that: (1) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case; (2) the petitioners have no legal
personality to sue the public respondents; (3) the petitioners have no cause of action against the
public respondents; and (4) the case is barred by the statute of limitations, among others.6 The
petitioners filed a Comment on the Motion to Dismiss.
On July 23, 1999, the SAC issued an Order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
and lack of cause of action.The SAC also ruled that the petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies when they failed to secure prior determination of just compensation by
the DAR. CA dismissed their appeal.
ISSUE: WON the ruling of SAC dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action
is correct.
HELD:It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at
the time of the commencement of the action. At the time the petitioners filed their case for just
compensation in 1995, P.D. No. 946, which reorganized the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)
and streamlined its procedure, has already been superseded by R.A. No. 6657, which created,
among others, the SACs. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 expressly provides that the SACs shall
exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under said Act.20 More
importantly, Section 57 further provides that "[t]he Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the [SACs], unless modified by this Act.
The Rules of Court,21 therefore, was the rule of procedure applicable to the cases filed
before it. Under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and even under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, a motion to dismiss is not a prohibited pleading. Consequently, the SAC
had every right to admit and resolve the motions to dismiss filed by respondents

Case No 18
G.R. No. 169778, March 12, 2014
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. SILICON PHILIPPINES,
INC. (FORMERLY INTEL PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING, INC.), Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue empowered to perform
the duties of said office including, among others, the power to decide, approve and grant
refunds or tax credits of erroneously or excessively paid taxes.
Silicon Philippines, Inc., on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged primarily in the business of
designing, developing, manufacturing, and exporting advance and largescale integrated
circuits components (ICs).
Silicon Phils. filed with the OneStop Shop InterAgency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center of the Department of Finance (DOF) an application for Tax Credit/Refund of VAT
paid for the second quarter of 1998 in the aggregate amount of P29,559,050.44, representing
its alleged unutilized input tax.
Thereafter, since no final action has been taken by petitioner on respondents administrative
claim for refund, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA) on 30 June 2000.
CTA:partially granted respondents Petition and ordered petitioner to issue a tax credit
certificate in favor of the former in the reduced amount of P8,179,049.00 representing input
VAT on importation of capital goods and claim for refund of input VAT in the sum of
P21,338,910.44 attributable to zerorated sales is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
CA:reversed and setaside the CTA decision and granted respondents claim for tax
refund/credit in the total amount of P21,338,910.44
ISSUE:Whether or not the CTA properly acquired jurisdiction over respondents instant claim
taking into consideration the timeliness of the filing of its judicial claim.
RULING: NO
It should be recalled that the CTA is a court of special jurisdiction. As such, it can only take
cognizance of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. In view thereof, although the
parties have not raised the issue of jurisdiction, nevertheless, this Court
may motuproprio determine whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over respondents judicial
claim for refund taking into consideration, the factual and legal allegations contained in the
pleadings filed by both parties and found by the court a quo.
Prior to seeking judicial recourse before the CTA, a VATregistered person may apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax attributable to zerorated or
effectively zerorated sales within two (2) years after the close of taxable quarter when the sales
or purchases were made.

Additionally, further reading of the provisions of Section 112 shows that under paragraph (D)
thereof, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is given a 120day period, from submission of
complete documents in support of the administrative claim within which to act on claims for
refund/applications for issuance of the tax credit certificate. Upon denial of the claim or
application, or upon expiration of the 120day period, the taxpayer only has 30 days within
which to appeal said adverse decision or unacted claim before the CTA.
In the case at bench, although respondent has indeed complied with the required twoyear period
within which to file a refund/tax credit claim with the BIR by filing its administrative claim on 6
May 1999 (within the period from the close of the subject second quarter of taxable year 1998
when the relevant sales or purchases were made), it appears however, that respondents
corresponding judicial claim filed with the CTA on 30 June 2000 was filed beyond the 30day
period.
Since respondents judicial claim for the aforementioned quarter was filed before the CTA only
on 30 June 2000, which was way beyond the mandatory 120+30 days to seek judicial recourse,
such noncompliance with the said mandatory period of thirty (30) days is fatal to its refund
claim on the ground of prescription.

Case No 19
G.R. No. 171482, March 12, 2014
ASHMOR M. TESORO, PEDRO ANG AND GREGORIO SHARP, Petitioners, v. METRO
MANILA RETREADERS, INC. (BANDAG) AND/OR NORTHERN LUZON
RETREADERS, INC. (BANDAG) AND/OR POWER TIRE AND RUBBER CORP.
(BANDAG), Respondents.
FACTS:

Ashmor M. Tesoro, Pedro Ang, and Gregorio Sharp used to work as salesmen for
respondents Metro Manila Retreaders, Inc., Northern Luzon Retreaders, Inc., or Power Tire
and Rubber Corporation, apparently sister companies, collectively called Bandag.Bandag
offered repair and retread services for used tires.
In 1998, however, Bandag developed a franchising scheme that would enable others to
operate tire and retreading businesses using its trade name and service system.
Petitioners quit their jobs as salesmen and entered into separate Service Franchise
Agreements (SFAs) with Bandag for the operation of their respective franchises.
Under the SFAs, Bandag would provide funding support to the petitioners subject to a regular
or periodic liquidation of their revolving funds.
The expenses out of these funds would be deducted from petitioners sales to determine their
incomes.
At first, petitioners managed and operated their respective franchises without any problem.
After a length of time, however, they began to default on their obligations to submit periodic
liquidations of their operational expenses in relation to the revolving funds Bandag provided
them.
Consequently, Bandag terminated their respective SFA.
Petitioners: filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, nonpayment of wages, incentive
pay, 13th month pay and damages against Bandag with the NLRC contending that,
notwithstanding the execution of the SFAs, they remained to be Bandags employees, the
SFAs being but a circumvention of their status as regular employees.
Bandag:Pointed out that petitioners freely resigned from their employment and decided to
avail themselves of the opportunity to be independent entrepreneurs under the franchise
scheme that Bandag had. Thus, no employeremployee relationship existed between
petitioners and Bandag.
LA:dismissed the complaint on the ground that no employeremployee relationship existed
between Bandag and petitioners.
NLRC: affirmed the LA. MR denied.
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals
(CA) ascribing grave abuse of discretion.
CA:dismissed the petition for lack of merit. MR denied

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners remained to be Bandags salesmen under the franchise scheme
it entered into with them.

RULING:
Bandags SFAs created on their faces an arrangement that gave petitioners the privilege to
operate and maintain Bandag branches in the way of franchises, providing tire repair and
retreading services, with petitioners earning profits based on the performance of their branches.
When petitioners agreed to operate Bandags franchise branches in different parts of the country,
they knew that this substantially changed their former relationships. They were to cease working
as Bandags salesmen, the positions they occupied before they ventured into running separate
Bandag branches. They were to cease receiving salaries or commissions. Their incomes were to
depend on the profits they made. Yet, petitioners did not then complain of constructive dismissal.
They took their chances, ran their branches, Gregorio Sharp in La Union for several months and
Ashmor Tesoro in Baguio and Pedro Ang in Pangasinan for over a year. Clearly, their belated
claim of constructive dismissal is quite hollow.
Petitioners cannot use the revolving funds feature of the SFAs as evidence of their employer
employee relationship with Bandag. These funds do not represent wages. They are more in the
nature of capital advances for operations that Bandag conceptualized to attract prospective
franchisees. Petitioners incomes depended on the profits they make, controlled by their
individual abilities to increase sales and reduce operating costs.

Case No 20.
G.R. No. 183034

March 12, 2014

SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS vs.

LOLITA ALCAZAR

Facts:
Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of LCC, instituted a Complaint for sum of money against the
spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and construction materials
obtained by the latter from LCC which remained unpaid despite written demand. Petitioners filed
a Demurrer to Evidencearguing that the Acknowledgment respondents Exhibit "A" which was
presented in court was not an original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners receipt of the
written demand was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction materials were
not covered by delivery receipts; and respondents testimony was merely hearsay and
uncorroborated. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioners demurrer for lack of merit.
On the day of the scheduled hearing, petitioners counsel failed to appear, prompting the
trial court to issue an Order 1) denying petitioners March 15, 2006 motion to reset for lack of
merit and for violating Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) declaring that
petitioners have waived their right to present evidence; and 3) declaring that Civil Case No. 9954
is deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners went up to the CA on certiorari questioning the denial of petitioners demurrer.
They also interposed an appeal with the CA claiming that the trial court erred in allowing
respondent to present her evidence ex parte; the Acknowledgment has not been authenticated; the
adjudged liability in the amount was not sufficiently proved by respondent, as she failed to
present receipts and statements of account which would show the true amount of their obligation,
including interest; the trial court based its findings on erroneous conclusions, assumptions and
inferences; and the trial court erred in declaring them to have waived their right to present
evidence.
While the case was pending, the trial court ruled that petitioners, in their Answer,
admitted that they entered into transactions with the respondent for the delivery of paint and
construction materials, which remained unpaid; that from the Acknowledgment, Exhibit "A,"
signed by Fernando and duly presented, authenticated, and identified by respondent during trial,
petitioners admitted that their unpaid obligation including interest; and that petitioners plea for
reformation has no basis.

CA dismissed petitioners certiorari petition and sustaining the trial courts denial of their
demurrer. The CA also denied the interposed appeal by the petitioners.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the photocopy presented and offered in evidence is inadmissible and could not
be the basis for arriving at a finding of liability on their part, pursuant to the best evidence rule
2. Whether or not receipts and statements of account were no longer necessary in proving such
liability
3. Whether or not Ma. Elenas undue inclusion in the judgment of liability, when it is evident
from the Acknowledgment that it was executed and signed by Fernando alone
4. Whether or not the trial court deprived them of their day in court in denying them to present
their evidence

Ruling:

The Court denies the Petition.Respondents failure to present the original copy of the
Acknowledgment during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of
a mere photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. It
was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect petitioners
cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the original exists and was
made part of the records of the case when respondents evidence was first taken. Though
respondent now claims that she had lost the original, the CA proclaimed that the document
resides in the record. This would explain then why respondent cannot find it in her possession; it
is with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it evidently appears that there is no question raised on the
authenticity and contents of the photocopy that was presented and identified in court; petitioners
merely insist that the photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondents failure to present the
original, which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the
case.
2.
The admission of liability resulting from petitioners admission of indebtedness in their
Answer and other pleadings, their failure to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the Acknowledgment, as well as their waiver of their right to present evidence all
these did away with the necessity of producing receipts and statements of account which would
otherwise be required under normal circumstances.
3.
The fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the genuineness and

due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. "By the admission of the
genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at
the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.
4.
The Court notes that despite reminders and admonitions by the trial court, petitioners
caused several continuances of trial, which understandably prompted the trial court to finally
deny their March 15, 2006 motion to reset the scheduled March 20 hearing and declare a waiver
of their right to present evidence.
An attorney retained in a case the trial of which is set for a date on which he knows he
cannot appear because of his engagement in another trial set previously on the same date, has no
right to presume that the court will necessarily grant him continuance. The most ethical thing for
him to do in such a situation is to inform the prospective client of all the facts so that the latter
may retain another attorney, If the client, having full knowledge of all the facts, still retain[s] the
attorney, he assumes the risk himself and cannot complain of the consequences if the
postponement is denied and finds himself without attorney to represent him at the trial.

Case No. 21
Carmencita Suarez vs. Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr.
andMarilouEmboy_Delantar
G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014
FACTS:
At the center of the dispute is a 222square meter parcel of land, situated in
Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of issued in the
name of Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot
which was partitioned.
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in the subject
lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had occupied the subject lot
during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become her share. They had thereafter
stayed in the subject lot for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who
had in turn succeeded her own parents.
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins, who are the
Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot .They refused to comply insisting that
Claudias inheritance .
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencitas counsel, a demand
letter, requiring them to vacate the subject lot.
They were informed that
Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot from the
formers relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the demand. Instead,
they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot and uncovered possible
anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations, in the execution of a series of
deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907A. On August 13, 2004, they filed before
the RTC of Cebu City a complaint for nullification of the partition and for the
issuance of new TCTs covering the heirs respective.
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against the
respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant petition.
She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios, Moreno, Veronica and
Dionesia, the registered owners thereof and the persons who allowed the
respondents to occupy the same by mere tolerance. As their successorininterest,
she claimed her entitlement to possession of the subject lot and the right to
demand from the respondents to vacate the same.
The MTCC upheld Carmencitas claims. The respondents were ordered to vacate the
subject lot.
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgment through Petition for
Review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carmencitas complaint against the respondents had

sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
HELD: Carmencita had not amply alleged and proven that all the requisites for
unlawful detainer.
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in
actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the
proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to
satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In Spouses Valdez, Jr., the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property

(a) accioninterdictal; (b) accionpubliciana; and (c) accionreivindicatoria.

Accioninterdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy,
threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in
forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and
that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful
detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in
said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accionpubliciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted
for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better
right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of
the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accionpubliciana. On the other hand, accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover
ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be
alleged and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the respondents
entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon it. Carmencita was likewise
conspicuously silent about the details on who specifically permitted the respondents
to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came about.4 Instead,
Carmencita cavalierly formulated a legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation,
that (a) the respondents initial occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of
tolerance by the registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants
unlawfully withholding the subject lots possession after Carmencita, as purchaser
and new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the property. It
is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes even more
importance in the light of the respondents claim that for decades, they have been
occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.

Case No 22
G.R. No. 188191

March 12, 2014

ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS,
ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.
SERENO, CJ:
Facts:
The case stemmed from a criminal case of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and
multiple physical injuries filed against petitioner in the MTC of Labo, Camarines Norte. The
court found petitioner guilty and was sentenced to suffer prison correctional in its medium and
maximum period.
Petitioner filed an application for probation. The Prosecutor opposed the application on
the ground that he was uncooperative, habitually absent and failed to inform the court of his
change of address. The MTC denied his application prompting the petition to file a special civil
action with the RTC.
In the RTC, a supplemental petition was made wherein petitioner assailed the validity of
the promulgation of judgment and impleaded private complainant. Further petitioner averred that
the judgment itself was premature and flawed because the MTC never ruled upon his formal
offer of exhibits.
RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment
because petitioner was not present at the time violating Sec 6 Rule 120 of RC. The case was then
forwarded to the MTC for further proceedings and ordered the release of petitioner from the
BUCOR in Muntilupa City.
In the CA, the RTC ruling was set aside ordering the dismissal of appellees petition for
certiorari. The CA said that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not
the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner application for probation.
The RTC erred in taking cognizance of supplemental ground assailing the judgment conviction
because an application for probation is a waiver ofthe right to appeal from judgment of
conviction and effectively renders the same final.
Issues:
1. The CA committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
petitioner judgment of conviction.

2. The CA committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly in nullifying
petitioner judgment of conviction
3. The CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to probation.

Ruling:
On the first issue, petitioner argues that in Criminal cases that offended party in the state
and the private complainants interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefore.
The respondent countered that while the petition originated from a criminal proceeding,
what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action in which the petitioner himself
impleaded private respondent. He cannot now change belated by change his stance to the
prejudice of private respondents who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action
they did not initiate. In a previous supreme court ruling, It was held that only the solicitor general
may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, represent the people or
the state in criminal proceedings pendingin the CA, the ends of substantial justice would be
better served and issues in this action could be determined in a more, speedy and inexpensive
manner, by entertaining the petitioner at bar.
On the second and third issues the court underscored the erroneous understanding of the
nature of probation
Probation is not a right but a mere privilege and an act of clemency conferred by the state
which may be granted to a deserving defendant. The grant of probation rest solely upon the
direction of the court
In the present case, petitioner cannot make up of his mind whether to question the
judgment or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.
While he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the
conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. 968 as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and
protection mutually exclusive remedies.
Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still
allowed the filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit
The court ruled in denying the petitioner for lack of merit. The CA decision is affirmed.

Case no. 23
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., Petitioner vsREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, Respondent.
GRs 189434 and 189505; March 12, 2014
Subject: Separate Judgment, Action in Personam and Action in Rem
FACTS: Republic filed in a Civil Case a petition for forfeiture with Sandiganbayan pertaining to
the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. Among those listed as assets for recovery were the 5 Swiss
accounts. Compromise agreements were signed by the Marcos children and PCGG for a global
settlement of the assets. Said accounts were the subject matter of the Swiss Deposits Decision
which affirmed the partial summary judgment over the Swiss deposits in favor of the Republic.
However, it did not include the assets of Arelma, Inc., which was held by the banking company,
Merrill Lynch in New York.
Upon motion, the Sandiganbayan granted the Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment filed by the
Republic. It declared that the Civil Case proceedings had not yet been terminated, as the Petition
for Forfeiture included numerous other properties, which the Sandiganbayan and Supreme Court
had not yet ruled upon. Marcos opposed, hence this Petition.
ISSUE#1: Whether or not the Partial Summary Judgment on the Civil Case bars other actions of
the Republic on other assets, particularly Arelma, Inc.?
HELD: No, the partial summary judgment over the Swiss deposits does not bar subsequent
judgment over the other assets and properties which are expressly sought to be forfeited.
Republics success in obtaining the summary judgment over the deposits does not preclude it
from seeking recourse over a different subject matter covered by the same petition for forfeiture.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan is a separate judgment and is allowed by the Rules of Court
under Sec.5, Rule 36.
Separate judgments Whenmore than one claim for relief is presented in an action, thecourt, at
any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims
arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may render a
separate judgment disposing of such claim.Action shall proceed as to the remaining claims.In
other words, other assets can still be subject to the motion for summary judgment.
ISSUE#2: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan must first acquire territorial jurisdiction over the
Arelma proceeds before judicial action may proceed?
HELD: Petitioner contended that RA 1379 is a penal law therefore the action should be in
personam, not in rem. However, the Court said forfeiture proceedings are actions considered to
be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem. One way to acquire jurisdiction over res
can be as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. Thus, its not necessary for the court to take actual custody of the
property. Potential custody is sufficient.

Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 April 2012 filed by petitioners Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

Case No 24
G.R. No. 192100 March 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
ASIA PACIFIC INTEGRATED STEEL CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts
Asia Pacific Integrated Steel Corporation (respondent) is the registered owner of a
17,175-square meter property situated in Barangay Sta. Monica, Municipality of San Simon,
Province of Pampanga and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 271813-R. On
March 1, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) through the Toll Regulatory Board
(TRB) instituted expropriation proceedings against the respondent over a portion of their
property. Subsequently, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of
possession, stating that it deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) the amount of
P607,200.00 (100% of the value of the property based on current zonal valuation of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue [BIR]) in accordance with Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8974.
The trial court issued an order granting petitioners motion and directing the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga to cause the annotation of the writ of possession on TCT No. 271813-R.
respondent questioned the TRBs authority to expropriate the subject property and objected to
petitioners offered compensation which respondent deems unjust because the basis thereof - the
BIR zonal valuation - was an unofficial valuation, being merely based on an internal
memorandum issued by BIR Revenue District No. 21, not by the Asset Valuation Department of
the BIR National Office. Respondent asserted that just compensation should be at P3,036,000.00
or at P1,500.00 per square meter plus consequential damages, considering the fair market value
and the industrial classification of the subject property. On June 1, 2004, the trial court granted
respondents motion to withdraw the P607,200.00 deposited by petitioner with the LBP as partial
payment for just compensation. In the absence of bonafide sales transaction in the area, the
Assessors Office being aware of the actual conditions of subject property decided to use opinion
values in the determination of the current and fair market value for the purpose of payment of
just compensation.
The Court finds the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php1,300.00) per square meter as just compensation for the property subject of expropriation.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, arguing that the just compensation should not be more than

P300.00 per square meter and that the correct rate of interest is 6% per annum. The CA upheld
the trial courts ruling, reiterating the principle that the determination of just compensation is an
inherently judicial function.
Issue
Whether or not CA erred in affirming the trial courts award of just compensation.
Ruling
In this case, the trial court considered only (a) and (d): (1) the classification of the subject
property which is located in an area with mixed land use (commercial, residential and industrial)
and the propertys conversion from agricultural to industrial land, and (2) the current selling
price of similar lands in the vicinity the only factors which the commissioners included in their
Report. It also found the commissioners recommended valuation of P1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per
square to be fair and just despite the absence of documentary substantiation as said prices were
based merely on the opinions of bankers and realtors.
The Court held that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair market value of
the subject property as it failed to consider other relevant factors such as the zonal valuation, tax
declarations and current selling price supported by documentary evidence. Indeed, just
compensation must not be arrived at arbitrarily, but determined after an evaluation of different
factors. We agree with the trial court that it was not bound by the assessment report of the
commissioners and that it had the discretion to reject the same and substitute its own judgment
on its value as gathered from the record, or it may accept the report/recommendation of the
commissioners in toto and base its judgment thereon. However, the decision of the court must be
based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and competent evidence. The court is
proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.
It is settled that the final conclusions on the proper amount of just compensation can only
be made after due ascertainment of the requirements set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merely
based on the declarations of the parties. Since these requirements were not satisfactorily
complied with, and in the absence of reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value of the
condemned property, remand of this case to the trial court is in order.

Case No 25
G.R. No. 192717, March 12, 2014
MINDA S. GAERLAN, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gaerlan filed an Application for original registration of title over a parcel of
land. In her application, petitioner alleged that she acquired the abovementioned property from
Mamerta Tan in November 1989 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land.
After finding petitioners application sufficient in form and substance, the trial court set the case
for initial hearing. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed an Opposition to petitioners application for registration.
Petitioner presented and offered several exhibits to support her application for registration
of title. The trial court rendered Judgment granting petitioners application for registration of
title. The Republic, through the OSG, appealed from the aforementioned decision asserting that
the trial court erred in ruling that the subject parcel of land is available for private appropriation.
The CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the ruling of the trial court and
dismissing the application for registration of title filed by petitioner. The CA found that
petitioner failed to present any proof to establish that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court. In her Petition, petitioner submitted a CENRO Certification stating that Lot 4342, Cad
237 located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City falls within the alienable and disposable area under
Project No. 8, Block I. Petitioner also submitted LC Map No. 543 which was certified and
approved on December 31, 1925.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMSDENR,
certifications fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section 23 of Rule 132.
HELD:
No. The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMSDENR, certifications do not
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule
132. The certifications do not reflect entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer, x x x. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated
reproductions of original records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications
are not even records of public documents. x x x
In Republic v. Medida, the Court explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification
cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein:
Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the

Philippines,

or

of

foreign

country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments;
and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section
19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.
The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached
an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring the land alienable and
disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence,
even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.
Thus, as it now stands, aside from the CENRO certification, an application for original
registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable.

Case No 26
LUI ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents.
Facts:
Lui Enterprises and Zuellig Pharma entered into a contract of lease over a parcel of land
and the said land was registered under Eli Lui. On June 2003 Zuellig Pharma received a letter
from the Philippine Bank of Communications and claimed to the the new owner of the leased
property and asked that the former pay directly to the latter. As a consequence, Zuellig Pharma
informed Lui Enterprises of the bank's communications. Lui Enterprises insisted on its right to
collect the leased property rent.
Due to the conflicting claims of Lui Enterprises and Philippine Bank of Communications,
Zuellig Pharma filed a complaint for interpleader. In its complaint, Zuellig Pharma alleged that it
already consigned in court P604, 024.35 as rental payments. Zuellig Pharma prayed that it be
allowed to consign in court its succeeding monthly rental payments and that Lui Enterprises and
the Philippine Bank of Communications be ordered to litigate their conflicting claims.
The Philippine Bank of Communications filed its answer to the complaint. On the other
hand, Lui Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Zuellig Pharma alleged
representative did not have authority to file the complaint for interpleader on behalf of the
corporation.
According to Lui Enterprises, an earlier filed nullification of deed of dation in payment
case pending with the Regional Trial Court of Davao barred the filing of the interpleader case
against Philippine Bank of Communications.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati ruled that Lui Enterprises [was] barred from any
claim in respect of the rental payments since it was declared in default and there was no issue as
to which corporation had the better right over the rental payments. The trial court awarded the
total consigned amount of P6, 681,327.30 to the Philippine Bank of Communications and
ordered Lui Enterprises to pay Zuellig Pharma P50, 000.00 in attorneys fees. On Appeal, the CA
found that Lui Enterprises failed to show the excusable negligence that prevented it from filing
its motion to dismiss on time and ruled that the appellant's brief was insufficient. On its allegedly
meritorious defense, the CA ruled that the nullification of deed of dation in payment case did not
bar the filing of the interpleader case, with Zuellig Pharma not being a party to the nullification
case. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Lui Enterprises filed a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the trial court
erred in not setting aside the order of default since its failure to file a motion to dismiss on time
was due to excusable negligence. It further alleged that the pending nullification of deed of
dation in payment case filed where the same issue of which corporation had the better right over
the rental payments was being litigated. Thus, Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case in bad
faith.
Issues:

I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal for lack of subject index, page
references to the record, table of cases, textbooks and statutes cited, and the statement of issues
in Lui Enterprises appellants brief;
II. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises motion to set
aside order of default;
III. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of
Davao barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati; and
Held:
1. No. Lui Enterprises appellants brief lacked a subject index, page references to the record, and
a table of cases, textbooks, and statutes cited. These requirements were designed to assist the
appellate court in the accomplishment of its tasks, and, overall, to enhance the orderly
administration of justice. This court will not disregard rules on appeal in the guise of liberal
construction. For this court to liberally construe the Rules, the party must substantially comply
with the Rules and correct its procedural lapses. Lui Enterprises failed to remedy these errors.
All told, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Lui Enterprises appeal. It failed to
comply with Rule 44, Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on the required contents of the appellants brief.
2. Lui Enterprises failed to show that its failure to answer the complaint within the required
period was due to excusable negligence. The basic requirements of Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph
(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must first be complied with.131 The defendants motion
to set aside order of default must satisfy three conditions. First is the time element. The
defendant must challenge the default order before judgment. Second, the defendant must have
been prevented from filing his answer due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Third, he must have a meritorious defense. As discussed, Lui Enterprises never explained why its
counsel failed to file the motion to dismiss on time. It just argued that courts should be liberal in
setting aside orders of default. Even assuming that it had a meritorious defense and that its
representative and counsel had to fly in from Davao to Makati to personally appear and manifest
in court its meritorious defense, Lui Enterprises must first show that its failure to answer was due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. This Lui Enterprises did not do.
Lui Enterprises argued that Zuellig Pharma filed the interpleader case to compel Lui
Enterprises and the Philippine Bank of Communications to litigate their claims. Thus,
[d]eclaring the other claimant in default would ironically defeat the very purpose of the
suit.134 The Regional Trial Court of Makati should not have declared Lui Enterprises in
default.

3. No. The requisites of litis pendentia are :( 1)

represents the same interest in both actions;

Identity of parties or at least such as

(2)
Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and
(3)
The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in
one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.144
All of the requisites must be present.145 absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.146

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the
nullification of deed of dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a
party to the nullification case filed in the Davao trial court.
There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the
first case to nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of
Communications. Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the
rental payments and extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and
was not instituted to harass either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.
Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.

Case No 27
G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,
v. FREDDIE LADIP Y RUBIO, AccusedAppellant.

FACTS:

That on or about 7th day of December, 2006, in Quezon City, a male confidential informant came to Police
Station 7 and reported that a certain Freddie Ladip was selling illegal drugs in Area 1, Barangay Batasan,
Quezon City. Consequently, a buybust operation was conducted on the same day whereupon the
accused was arrested for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
PO1 Sibal, who acted as poseurbuyer, and the informant went to the said house, wherein the accused
was already waiting for them outside the said house. The informant introduced PO1 Sibal to the accused
as a buyer ofshabu. Accused immediately inquired as to the quantity of shabu that he intends to purchase
by asking, magkano? PO1 Sibal replied that he wanted to buy P300.00 worth ofshabu. Accused then
asked for the payment, for which PO1 Sibal readily gave him the marked money consisting of three 100
peso bills. In return, accused handed to PO1 Sibal a transparent heatsealed plastic sachet containing
white crystalline granules. Upon the exchange and conveyance of shabu and the marked money having
been completed, PO1 Sibal gave the prearranged signal by removing the cap from his head to signify to
his backup team, strategically stationed near the scene of the crime, that the transaction was
consummated. Afterwards, the accused was arrested by the team.
While the accused was being apprehended, a certain PerlynUrbano y Dela Cruz (Perlyn) suddenly
emerged before them, hysterically shouting and asking why her husband was being arrested, and even
attempted to prevent the police operatives from consummating said arrest. Simultaneously, PO1 Tayag,
being one of the backup team, approached them and recovered another heatsealed plastic sachet on the
ground near Perlyn. Thereafter, both accused and Perlyn were brought to the police station where they
were detained and investigated.7
It was further stated under oath that, prior to the turnover of the evidence to the investigatoronduty in
said station, PO1 Sibal and PO1 Tayag revealed that they placed their respective markings on the two (2)
small heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, denominated as MSFL120706 and RTPU120706.
Subsequently, an inventory of the seized items was made in the presence of the police operatives and the
arrested persons. Photographs of the arrested persons, the marked money, and the seized items were
likewise taken, followed by various requests for laboratory examination of said specimens, and for drug
dependency examination of the arrested persons. Later on, the subject sachets were brought to the
Quezon City Police District (QCPD) Crime Laboratory.

The trial court ruled that the testimonies of the police operatives are credible and reliable. On the other
hand, the denials of the accused were found to be negative, weak, and selfserving.

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC and dismissed the appeal.It held that failure to comply
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal, nor will it result to the
inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment
operation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 when the confiscated drugs were not
marked immediately at the time and place of its seizure, and that the subsequent physical inventory
thereof was not made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media,
and any elected public official destroying the identity and integrity of the evidence against the accused.

RULING:

The Court held that the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from
the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
The Court further held that it is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated
or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. Thus, drug enforcement agents
and police officers involved in a buybust operation are required under R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules to mark all seized evidence at the buybust scene.
As often as there are occasions to apply the chain of custody rule, the Court has pronounced that the
requirements under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR are not inflexible. What is essential is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. It reiterated that the Court is not always looking
for the strict stepbystep adherence to the procedural requirements; what is important is to ensure

the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Furthermore, the Court did not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will
bring about the nonadmissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to noncompliance
with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is noncompliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given
the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.

Case No 28
G.R. No. 201601, March 12, 2014
MARYLOU CABRERA vs FELIX NG
FACTS:
Arising from a complaint for sum of money which the RTC decided in favour of the plaintiff Ng,
the defendant spouses Cabrera on August 14, 2007, filed with the RTC a motion for
reconsideration,6 which they set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses
Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru registered mail.It
was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007.
The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new
acting presiding judge of the said court had just assumed office. It was set for hearing on
September 25, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition8 to the motion for reconsideration
filed by the spouses Cabrera, alleging that the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of
paper since it violated the three-day notice requirement. The RTC issued another notice,9 which
set the said motion for reconsideration for hearing on October 26, 2007.On October 26, 2007, the
RTC issued an Order,10 which directed the parties to file their additional pleadings, after which
the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order11 which denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the spouses Cabrera, pointing out that the spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court.
On appeal, the CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007, which
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court ruled:
The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the
Rules of Court is mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.17
A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and
which the court has no authority to act upon.19 Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to
reconsider a decision, the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.
Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party
had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings

filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed
realized. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied
with.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse
party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of
procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their
strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice.
It is undisputed that the hearing on the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera
was reset by the RTC twice with due notice to the parties; it was only on October 26, 2007 that
the motion was actually heard by the RTC. At that time, more than two months had passed since
the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration on August 21, 2007. The
respondent was thus given sufficient time to study the motion and to enable him to meet the
arguments interposed therein. Indeed, the respondent was able to file his opposition thereto on
September 20, 2007.
Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four
days after the date set by the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was
not impinged as he was afforded the chance to argue his position. Thus, the RTC erred in
denying the spouses Cabreras motion for reconsideration based merely on their failure to
comply with the three-day notice requirement.

Case No 29
G.R. No. 201643

March 12, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE T. CAPULONG, Respondent.
Facts:
The case arose from the Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713,
Perjury, and serious dishonesty and grave misconduct, before the Ombudsman, against
respondent Jose T. Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the Bureau of Customs.These
charges were based on two particular acts: first, for failure to file the required Statements of
Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) and second, for failure to disclose in his SALNs for
calendar years 1999 to 2004 his wifes business interest in two corporations.
Capulong denied all the allegations against him, asserting that he had been diligently filing his
SALNs since his assumption of office. He further asserted that he was not informed by his wife
that she was made an incorporator of the aforementioned corporations; hence there was no
willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood on his part. Besides, the registration of both
corporations had already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as of
March 15, 2004.
On March 17, 2010, Capulong filed a Rejoinder. Thereafter he filed a motion to set the case for
hearing for the presentation of certified true copies of his SALNs for calendar years 1991 and
1998. He also filed a motion for early resolution of the complaint considering that the parties
have already filed their respective pleadings. However, the Ombudsman did not act on the said
motions.
On March 30, 2011, He received an undated Orderissued by the Ombudsman placing him under
preventive suspension without pay which shall continue until the case is terminated but shall not
exceed six months effective from receipt of the Order.Capulong filed an Urgent Motion to
Lift/Reconsider Order of Preventive Suspension with Motion to Resolvecontending that his
preventive suspension was not warranted because his continued stay in office will not prejudice
the investigation of the case against him.
Questioning the preventive suspension and wary of the threatening and coercive nature of the
Ombudsmans order, he filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, with urgent prayer for the
issuance of TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction.The CA granted the petition and issued a
TRO.

Subsequently, the Ombudsman liftCapulongs preventive suspension. On May 18, 2011,

Capulong filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File and Admit Memorandum asking
the CA to rule on the merits of the petition. On the other hand, the Ombudsman filed a
manifestation on June 9, 2011 declaring that the lifting of Capulongs preventive suspension had
rendered the case moot and academic; hence the petition should be dismissed.
CA granted Capulongs petition and dismissed the criminal charge.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs, whether
primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of preventive suspension.

Ruling:
Yes. CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should respect the
findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound by such findings of
fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear showing that the administrative
agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or in a capricious and whimsical
manner, such that its action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. These exceptions
exist in this case and compel the appellate court to review the findings of fact of the
Ombudsman.
In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against Capulong
does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the courts from passing
upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a manifestation of its constitutionally
mandated power and authority to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
The preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits
of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for
certiorari under Section 1,Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. While it is true that the primary
relief prayed for by Capulong in his petition has already been voluntarily corrected by the
Ombudsman by the issuance of the order lifting his preventive suspension, we must not lose
sight of the fact that Capulong likewise prayed for other remedies. There being a finding of

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for
the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Case No. 30
G.R. NO. 154390
March 17,2014
METROPOLITAN FABRICS,INC. and ENRIQUE ANG,Petitioners,
-versus
PROSPERITYCREDIT RESOURCES INC.,
Present:
SERENO, CJ,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR, andREYES,JJ,
DOMINGO Promulgated:
ANG and CALEB ANG, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------~--------x
Facts:
In this appeal, the mortgagors, who were the plaintiffs in the trialcourt, seek to reverse and undo
the judgment promulgated on July 23, 2002,
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the decisionrendered in their favor on
July 6, 1999 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 107, in Quezon City (declaring the real
estate mortgage and theforeclosure by respondents null and void; and ordering the reconveyance
ofRollo, pp. 41-59; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos (retired/deceased),
withAssociate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later Presiding Justice, and Member of the
Court/retired/deceased) andAssociate Justice Marina L. Buzon (retired) concurring. Decision 2
G.R. No. 154390the foreclosed properties to petitioners),
and dismissed their complaint aswell as the counterclaim of respondents.
Issues
The petitioners now submit for consideration by the Court:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALSCOMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN:
A. DISREGARDING THR FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THETRIAL COURT;
B. NOT HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF CONSENTMAKES A CONTRACT VOID,
NOT MERELY VOIDABLE;
C. NOT HOLDING THAT AN ACTION TO DECLARE ACONTRACT VOID DOES NOT
PRESCRIBE; and
D. NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT GUILTYOF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES.
Rulings:
The appeal has no merit.

The CA did not disregard thefactual findings of the RTC It is settled that the appellate court will
not disturb the factual findingsof the lower court unless there is a showing that the trial court
overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight andsubstance that would have
affected the result of the case. Indeed, the trialcourts findings are always presumed correct.
Nonetheless, the CA is notprecluded from making its own determination and appreciation of
facts if it
considers the conclusions arrived at by the trial court not borne out by theevidence, or if
substantial facts bearing upon the result of the case wereoverlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied. As an appellate court, the CA isnot necessarily bound by the conclusions of the trial
court, but holds the
exclusive authority to review the assessment of the credibility of witnessesand the weighing of
conflicting evidence.
In view of the conflicting findings and appreciation of facts by theRTC and the CA, we have to
revisit the evidence of the parties.
Petitioners insist that respondents committed fraud when the officersof Metropolitan were made
to sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank. According to Article 1338 of the Civil Code,
there is fraud when oneof the contracting parties, through insidious words or machinations,
inducesthe other to enter into the contract that, without the inducement, he wouldnot have agreed
to. Yet, fraud, to vitiate consent, must be the causal (dolocausante), not merely the incidental
(doloincidente), inducement to themaking of the contract. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, causal
fraud isdefined as a deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous tothe contract in
order to secure the consent of the other. Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Whoever alleges fraud affecting a transaction mustsubstantiate his
allegation, because a person is always presumed to takeordinary care of his concerns, and private
transactions are similarlypresumed to have been fair and regular. To be remembered is that
mereallegation is definitely not evidence; hence, it must be proved by sufficient evidence. Did
petitioners clearly and convincingly establish their allegation offraud in the execution of the deed
of real estate mortgage? The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document
byvirtue of its being acknowledged before notary public Atty. Noemi Ferrer. As a notarized
document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity.
Hence, it was admissible in evidence withoutfurther proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to
full faith and credit uponits face.To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence.

Case No. 31
G.R. No. 176055

March 17, 2014

SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ and AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY1 C. CAPCO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Amelia and Edmundo Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against the spouses Capco. They alleged that Teodora, mother of Amelia Dela Cruz, acquired
ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a Decision dated October 3, 1983 rendered by the
RTC of Pasig. The said property was eventually registered in her name of Teodora but out of
neighborliness and blood relationship she tolerated the spouses Capcos occupation thereof.
Subsequently, the subject property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to
construct a house thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business, the
spouses Dela Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. As the spouses
Capco refused, the matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation wherein
several meetings were held but to no avail. Hence, the said Complaint. In their Answer, the
spouses Capco pointed out that the Complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes
and bounds of the property. MTC ruled infavor of spouses Dela Cruz. The spouses Capco
appealed to the RTC. RTC find no merit to Capcos appeal and affirmed the decision of the
MTC.
On appeal in CA, the court ruled in favor of the spouses Capco. It declared that a
complaint for unlawful detainer must aver facts showing that the MTC has jurisdiction to try the
case by describing how the defendants entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. It found the Complaint wanting in this aspect, thus: In this case, the spouses Dela Cruz
complaint merely alleged that the spouses Capcos possession of the property was by the
tolerance of their predecessors-in-interest and out of neighborliness and blood relationship. The
evidence presented or adduced before the MTC does not show how the spouses Capco came into
possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is unlawful detainer and the MTC has jurisdiction.
RULING:
YES. The Court has already clarified in Delos Reyes v. Odones35 that:

The requirement that the complaint should aver, as jurisdictional facts, when and how
entry into the property was made by the defendants applies only when the issue is the timeliness
of the filing of the complaint before the MTC x x x.
This is because, in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the date of
defendants actual entry into the property; whereas, in unlawful detainer cases, it is counted from
date of the last demand to vacate. Hence, to determine whether the case was filed on time, there
is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint is one for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer; and since the main distinction between the two actions is when and how defendant
entered the property, the determinative facts should be alleged in the complaint.36
The timeliness of the filing of the Complaint for unlawful detainer is not an issue in this case.
Hence, the failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco came into
possession of the property does not mean that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. "To
give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony."
A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall under the jurisdiction
of the MeTC, must allege that:
1. initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latters right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and;
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.38
Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz predecessor-in-interest, Teodora, is the
registered owner of the property per TCT No. 31873 and that she tolerated the spouses Capcos
occupation of the lot. The spouses Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through
conveyance and they extended the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The spouses Dela Cruz
demanded for the spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail; hence, they sent the latter
a formal demand letter which, per the attached copy to the Complaint, is dated September 1,

2003.39 The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year from the time the formal
demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint sufficiently established a case for unlawful
detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

Case No 32
GR No. 201234

17 March 2014

HEIRS OF AMADA A. ZAULDA, namely: ELESEO A. ZAULDA and RODOLFO A.

ZAULDA, petitioners
vs
ISAAC Z. ZAULDA, respondent

FACTS: A complaint of possession and declaration of ownership filed by the heirs of Amada
AguilaZaulda, namely, Eleseo A. Zaulda and Rodolfo A. Zaulda, herein petitioners against
respondent Isaac Z. Zaulda before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Banga, Aklan
The respondent reportedly forcibly entered the premises and took bamboos and then built a
house of light material within the premises of the property with force and intimidation. He was
ordered to vacate the area but he refused.Claiming right to the mentioned property. The court
decided for the plaintiffs based on the preponderance of evidence, but the Regional Trial Court
reversed the decision.
An appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the case for filing out of time
and for lack of competent evidence on affiants identity on the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping. A motion for extension was filed, but the same was denied.
Hence the case was brought to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time
despite motion for extension of time having been timely filed; and
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not passing upon the issue of whether or
not the RTC erred in reversing the decision of the MCTC based on
erroneous finding of facts and on mere suppositions and presumptions
absent any evidence of the same.
HELD: The petition is GRANTED. The RESOLUTION of CA is set aside.
The court grants petition for extension accordingly and remands the case to the
CA for decision on the merits of the petition.
The court record showed that the case was filed on time, the division personnel of the CA was
incompetent that it took time for the petition to reach the ponente.
Courts should not be strict on procedural lapses. Technicalities that may impede the
administration of justice, so that the merits of the case are not given due attention.

Case No 33.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO MIGUEL v. HEIRS OF ANGEL MIGUEL
G.R. No. 158916 March 19, 2014

FACTS:

The petitioners are the surviving children of the deceased Cornelio Miguel, while the
respondents are the widow and the children of the petitioners own brother, Angel
Miguel. In a deed of donation6inter vivos dated December 28, 1973, the spouses
Cornelio and Nieves donated two lots to Angel. The donation of the property
described above became the subject of various suits between Cornelio, Angel, and
Angels siblings, and also between Angels siblings and Angels children.

The petitioners are now before this Court, argue that the Court of Appeals
misapplied the doctrine of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment.32
According to the petitioners, conclusiveness of judgment precludes only the re
litigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on
a different cause of action. They posit that there is no issue resolved on Civil Case
No. 1185 that is being litigated anew in Civil Case No. 2735. The petitioners
maintain that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1185 was dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action and not because the plaintiffs, Cornelio and the petitioners, had no
cause of action. In other words, the petitioners imply that they had a cause of action
in Civil Case No. 1185 but they only failed to sufficiently allege such cause of
action.33
The petitioners also point out that there is neither identity of subject matter nor
identity of cause of action between Civil Case No. 1185 and Civil Case No. 2735.
They say that the subject matter of Civil Case No. 1185 was the deed of donation
executed by Cornelio and Nieves in favor of Angel while the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 2735 is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880. The cause of action in Civil
Case No. 1185 was the reformation of the deed of donation executed by Cornelio
and Nieves in favor of Angel while the cause of action in Civil Case No. 2735 is the
reconveyance of Lot J of Psd. 146880 based on Angels violation of the implied trust
created in favor of the petitioners. 34
ISSUE:

WON Res Judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment will apply in this
case

RULING

The petitioners do not question the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there is
identity of parties in Civil Case No. 1185 and Civil Case No. 2735. What the
petitioners principally contend is that the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot
bar Civil Case No. 2735 as the two cases involve different causes of action and
different subject matters.
However, for res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment to apply,
identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. For purposes
of conclusiveness of judgment, identity of issues means that the right, fact, or
matter in issue has previously been either directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action45 by a competent court. In this case, the
issue of the transfer pursuant to the deed of donation to Angel of Lot J of Psd.
146880 and, corollarily, his right over the said property has been necessarily
involved in Civil Case No. 1185.

The claim of the petitioners that Civil Case No. 1185 was dismissed not because
they have no cause of action but because they failed to state such a cause of action
is wrong. The dispositive portion of the Order dated January 31, 1986 is clear: the
amended complaint was ordered dismissed for lack of cause of action.

The petitioners engage in hairsplitting in arguing that none of the issues involved
in Civil Case No. 1185 is also involved in Civil Case No. 2735. The primary issue in
Civil Case No. 1185 is whether the true intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves
as donors was to donate to Angel the property described in the deed of donation,
that is, Lot J of Psd. 146880. The issue in Civil Case No. 1185 is therefore the
identity of one of the properties donated by the spouses Cornelio and Nieves for
which Cornelio and the petitioners sought reformation of the deed of donation. As
stated above, the order of dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 1185
necessarily implied that, as the deed of donation is not subject to reformation, the
identity of the property subject of the donation is the property corresponding to the
technical description, Lot J of Psd. 146880. On the other hand, the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 2735 is the recovery of Lot J of Psd. 146880 on the petitioners claim

that a clerical error prevented the deed of donation from conforming to the true
intention of the spouses Cornelio and Nieves as to the identity of the property they
intended to donate to Angel. This boils down to the issue of the true identity of the
property, which has been, as earlier stated, necessarily adjudicated in Civil Case No.
1185. Thus, the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185 on the issue of the identity of the
land donated by Cornelio and Nieves to Angel is conclusive in Civil Case No. 2735,
there being a similarity of parties in the said cases.
The petitioners also question the validity of the deed of donation executed by the
spouses Cornelio and Nieves in favor of Angel. Indeed, that is the foundation of their
claim. However, that issue had been settled with finality in Civil Case No. 1185. The
petitioners who were parties against Angel in Civil Case No. 1185 cannot resurrect
that issue against the privies or successorsininterest of Angel in Civil Case No.
2735 without violating the principle of res judicata. In other words, Civil Case No.
2735 is barred by the conclusiveness of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1185

Petition was denied.

Case No 34
G.R. No. 177493, March 19, 2014
ERIC GODFREY STANLEY LIVESEY, Petitioner,
Vs
BINSWANGER PHILIPPINES, INC. AND KEITH ELLIOT, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Eric Godfrey Stanley Liveseyformer Managing Director of CBB filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with money claims against CBB Philippines Strategic Property Services, Inc. (CBB) and Paul
Dwyer. CBB was a domestic corporation engaged in real estate brokerage and Dwyer was its President.
In his decision dated September 20, 2002, LA Jaime M. Reyno found that Livesey had been illegally
dismissed and ordered CBB to reinstate Livesey to his former position as Managing Director and to
accrued salaries (from July to December 2001), and a month in back wages.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. Under the agreement, Livesey was to
receive US$31,000.00 in full satisfaction and CBB will pay on installment. CBB paid Livesey the initial
amount of US$13,000.00, but not the next two installments as the company ceased operations.
In reaction, Livesey moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. LA Eduardo G. Magno granted the
writ, but it was not enforced. Livesey then filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, alleging that in the process of serving respondents the writ, he learned that respondents, in a
clear and willful attempt to avoid their liabilities to complainant x xx have organized another corporation,
[Binswanger] Philippines, Inc.11 He claimed that there was evidence showing that CBB and Binswanger
Philippines, Inc. (Binswanger) is one and the same corporation, pointing out that CBB stands
for Chesterton Blumenauer Binswanger. Invoking the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction,
Livesey prayed that an alias writ of execution be issued against respondents Binswanger and Keith Elliot,
CBBs former President, and now Binswangers President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO).
In an order dated March 22, 2004, LA Catalino R. Laderas denied Liveseys motion for an alias writ of
execution, holding that the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was inapplicable in the case. He
explained that the stockholders of the two corporations were not the same.
Livesey filed an appeal which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) granted in its decision.
They order and declared the respondents jointly and severally liable with CBB for LA Reynos
decision of in favor of Livesey. The respondents moved for reconsideration, filed by an Atty. Genaro S.
Jacosalem, not by their counsel of record at the time, Corporate Counsels Philippines, Law Offices. The
NLRC denied the motion.

The respondents file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The respondents
charged the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for holding them liable to Livesey and in exercising
jurisdiction over an intracorporate dispute. They maintained that Binswanger is a separate and distinct
corporation from CBB and that Elliot signed the compromise agreement in CBBs behalf, not in his
personal capacity. It was error for the NLRC, they argued, when it applied the doctrine of piercing the veil
of corporate fiction to the case, despite the absence of clear evidence in that respect.
For his part, Livesey contended that the petition should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time.
He claimed that the respondents counsel of record received a copy of the NLRC resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration as early as January 19, 2006, yet the petition was filed only on May 15, 2006.
He insisted that in any event, there was ample evidence supporting the application of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction to the case.
The CA granted the petition, reversed the NLRC decision and reinstated LA Laderas order of March 22,
2004. The CA found untenable Liveseys contention that the petition forcertiorari was filed out of time,
stressing that while there was no valid substitution or withdrawal of the respondents former counsel, the
NLRC impliedly recognized Atty. Jacosalem as their new counsel when it resolved the motion for
reconsideration which he filed.
On the merits of the case, the CA disagreed with the NLRC finding that the respondents are jointly and
severally liable with CBB in the case. It emphasized that the mere fact that Binswanger and CBB have the
same President is not in itself sufficient to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of the two entities, and that
although Elliot was formerly CBBs President, this circumstance alone does not make him answerable for
CBBs liabilities, there being no proof that he was motivated by malice or bad faith when he signed the
compromise agreement in CBBs behalf; neither was there proof that Binswanger was formed, or that it
was operated, for the purpose of shielding fraudulent or illegal activities of its officers or stockholders or
that the corporate veil was used to conceal fraud, illegality or inequity at the expense of third persons like
Livesey.Livesey moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
1. The CA erred in not denying the respondents petition for certiorari for being filed out of time.
2. The CA erred in not applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction to the case.
Ruling:
The procedural question
1. The respondents petition for certiorari before the CA was filed out of time. The sixty (60)day filing
period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should have been counted from January 19, 2006, the date of
receipt of a copy of the NLRC resolution denying the respondents motion for reconsideration by the
Corporate Counsels Philippines, Law Offices which was the respondents counsel of record at the time.
The respondents cannot insist that Atty. Jacosalems receipt of a copy of the resolution on March 17, 2006

as the reckoning date for the filing of the petition as we shall discuss below.
The CA chided the NLRC for serving a copy of the resolution on the Corporate Counsels Philippines,
Law Offices, instead of on Atty. Jacosalem as it believed that the labor tribunal impliedly recognized Atty.
Jacosalem as the respondents counsel when it acted on the motion for reconsideration that he signed. As
we see it, the fault was not on the NLRC but on Atty. Jacosalem himself as he left no forwarding address
with the NLRC, a serious lapse that even he admitted. 40 This is a matter that cannot just be taken for
granted as it betrays a careless legal representation that can cause adverse consequences to the other party.
To reiterate, the filing of the respondents petition for certiorari should have been reckoned from January
19, 2006 when a copy of the subject NLRC resolution was received by the Corporate Counsels
Philippines, Law Offices, which, as of that date, had not been discharged or had withdrawn and therefore
remained to be the respondents counsel of record. Clearly, the petition for certiorariwas filed out of
time. Section 6(a), Rule III of the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure provides that [f]or purposes of
appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or
representative of record.
2. The respondents impugned the probative value of Liveseys documentary evidence and insist that the
NLRC erred in applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction in the case to avoid liability.
They consider the NLRC conclusions as mere assumptions.
It has long been settled that the law vests a corporation with a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation, by legal fiction and convenience, is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising
it. Nonetheless; the shield is not at all times impenetrable and cannot be extended to a point beyond its
reason and policy. Circumstances might deny a claim for corporate personality, under the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is an equitable doctrine developed to address situations where the
separate corporate personality of a corporation is abused or used for wrongful purposes. Under the
doctrine, the corporate existence may be disregarded where the entity is formed or used for non
legitimate purposes, such as to evade a just and due obligation, or to justify a wrong, to shield or
perpetrate fraud or to carry out similar or inequitable considerations, other unjustifiable aims or
intentions,45 in which case, the fiction will be disregarded and the individuals composing it and the two
corporations will be treated as identical.

Case No 35
HEIRS OF TERESITA MONTOYA OCAMPO, PETITIONERS,
VS.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 181055 | 2014-03-19
Facts:
The Gonzaleses donated a portion of their landholding in Pandacaqui, Mexico, Pampanga as a resettlement site for
the thousands of displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. The donation[8] was signed in Malacaang
and per the terms of the donation, the Gonzaleses gave the landholdings tenants one-half share of their respective
tillage with the corresponding title at no cost to the latter. The Gonzaleses retained the property (pursuant to their
retention rights) and registered it in respondent Dorita Gonzales-Villars name.
Still needing additional resettlement sites, the NHA purchased the property on February 20, 1996.[9] The NHA,
thereafter, applied, before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for the conversion of the property to
residential from agricultural use. On November 30, 1996,[10] the DAR approved the NHAs application for
conversion.
In their complaint[11] filed before the PARAD, the petitioners claimed that they were the registered tenants of the
property, under the governments operation land transfer (OLT) program, per the April 25, 1996 certification of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Arayat, Pampanga.[12] They argued that the 1992 donation (that gave
the tenants one-half share of their respective tillage with the corresponding title at no cost) and the February 20,
1996 sale between the NHA and the Gonzaleses were intended to circumvent the provisions of Presidential
Decree(P.D.) No. 27[13] and of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988).
The petitioners further claimed that on March 15, 1996,[14] they informed the NHA of their objections to the NHAs
purchase of the property. Despite this notice, the NHA destroyed their rice paddies and irrigation dikes in violation
of their security of tenure.
The NHA answered,[15] in defense, that the Gonzaleses and the DAR assured them that the property was cleared from
any claim of tenants/squatters. It pointed out that on November 9, 1994, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer(PARO) concurred with the MAROs recommendation for the conversion of the property to be used as
resettlement site for the Mt. Pinatubo eruption victims and he (the PARO) indorsed this recommendation to the
Office of the DAR Secretary.[16] Also, on February 7, 1996, the NHA Board, through Resolution No. 3385, approved
the acquisition of the property for the stated purpose. It added that the DAR approved the propertys conversion as
having substantially complied with the rules and regulations on land conversion. Finally, it argued that the property
was already outside the land reform programs coverage per Section 1 of P.D. No. 1472.[17]
In their answer,[18] Dorita and Ernesto (collectively, the respondents) similarly pointed to the DARs November 30,
1996 conversion order. They also claimed, as special defense, that the petitioners had been remiss in their lease
rental payments since 1978. Lastly, they pointed out that they had already paid the required disturbance
compensation to the propertys tenants, save for the petitioners who refused to accept their offer.
The PARADs and the DARABs rulings
In its decision of March 1, 2000,[19] the PARAD denied the petitioners complaint. The PARAD found that the
propertys conversion to residential from agricultural uses conformed with the law and passed its rigorous
requirements. The DARs approval of the NHAs application for conversion made in compliance of the law legally
converted and effectively removed the property from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program(CARP). Additionally, the PARAD pointed to the presumption of regularity that the law accords to the
performance of official duties.
The PARAD also pointed out that the propertys removal from the CARPs coverage further finds support in P.D.
No. 1472, which exempts from the coverage of the agrarian reform program lands acquired or to be acquired by the
NHA for its resettlement projects. In this regard, the PARAD highlighted the purpose for which the NHA purchased
the property, i.e., as a resettlement site for the thousands of displaced victims of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

Lastly, the PARAD rejected the petitioners claim of deemed ownership of the property under Executive
Order(E.O.) No. 228,[20] in relation to P.D. No. 27. The PARAD pointed out that the petitioners presented only two
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), both under Jose Montoyas name that covered a 1.96 hectare area. Even then,
the PARAD held that the CLTs are not proof of absolute ownership; at best, they are evidence of the governments
recognition of Jose as the covered portions tenant.
Nevertheless, the PARAD recognized the petitioners entitlement to disturbance compensation in an amount
equivalent to five times the average gross harvest for the last five years, pursuant to Section 36(1) of R.A. No. 3844,
[21]
less the petitioners rental arrears.
In its August 17, 2005 decision,[22] the DARAB affirmed in toto the PARADs ruling. It subsequently denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration[23] in its October 4, 2006 resolution.[24]
The CAs ruling
In its August 31, 2007 decision,[25] the CA affirmed the DARABs ruling (that affirmed those of the PARADs). As
the DARAB and the PARAD did, the CA held that the propertys conversion complied with the laws requirements
and procedures that are presumed to have been done in the regular performance of official duties. And, as the NHA
acquired the property as resettlement sites, the CA pointed out that the property is exempted from the agrarian
reform programs coverage, pursuant to P.D. No. 1472. The CA additionally observed that the property was the
Gonzaleses retained area that Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657 specifically guarantees to them (as landowners) despite
the issuance of Joses CLTs.
Issue:
Whether or not the NHAs acquisition of property is valid under the existing law.
Ruling
We do not find the petition meritorious.
The petitions arguments present
proscribed factual issues
The petitioners essentially assail in this petition the validity of the NHAs acquisition of the property, in view of the
prohibition on sale or disposition of agricultural lands under E.O. No. 228, in relation to P.D. No. 27 and Section 6
of R.A. No. 6657. Resolution of this petitions core issue requires the proper interpretation and application of the
laws and the rules governing the governments agrarian reform program, as well as the laws governing the powers
and functions of the NHA as the propertys acquiring entity. As presented, therefore, this petitions core issue is a
question of law that a Rule 45 petition properly addresses.
This notwithstanding, the resolution of this petitions core issue necessitates the prior determination of two
essentially factual issues, i.e., the validity of the propertys conversion and the petitioners claimed ownership of the
property. As questions of fact, they are proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
The settled rule is that the Courts jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to resolving only
questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt exists as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [31] Under these
significations, we clearly cannot resolve this petitions issues without conducting a re-examination and re-evaluation
of the lower tribunals unanimous findings on the factual matters (of the propertys conversion and of the petitioners
ownership of the property), including the presented evidence, which the Courts limited Rule 45 jurisdiction does
not allow.
Moreover, this Court generally accords respect, even finality to the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, i.e.,
the PARAD and the DARAB, when these findings are supported by substantial evidence. [32] The PARAD and the

DARAB, by reason of their official position have acquired expertise in specific matters within their jurisdiction, and
their findings deserve full respect; without justifiable reason, these factual findings ought not to be altered, modified,
or reversed.
To be sure, this Rule 45 proscription is not iron-clad and jurisprudence may admit of exceptions. [34] A careful review
of this cases records, however, justifies the application of the general proscriptive rule rather than the exception.
Viewed in this light, we are constrained to deny the petition for raising proscribed factual issues and because we find
no reason to depart from the assailed rulings.
Even if we were to disregard this procedural lapse and decide the case on its merits, we are inclined to deny the
petition and affirm as valid the NHAs acquisition of the property on three main points, which we will discuss in
detail below.
The property was validly converted to residential
from agricultural uses
In declaring the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale valid, all three tribunals found that the property has already been
removed from the agrarian reforms coverage as a result of its valid conversion from agricultural to residential uses.
We find no reason to disturb their findings and conclusion on this matter.
All told, we find no error that we can reverse in the assailed CA rulings; the petitioners failed to show justifiable
reason to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the PARAD and of the DARAB, as affirmed by the CA.
Consequently, we deny the petition and affirm as VALID the Gonzaleses sale of the property in favor of the NHA.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the decision dated
August 31, 2007 and the resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97496.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 36
G.R. No. 189176, March 19, 2014
BARRY LANIER AND PERLITA LANIER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
While the determination of probable cause is primarily an executive function, the Court would not
hesitate to interfere if there is a clear showing that Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion
he
reached.
FACTS:
SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses attested that Task Force Roulette of the Aklan Police Provincial Office
(APPO) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received information from an asset that
petitioners Barry Lanier and Perlita Lanier (Perlita) were engaged in selling illegal drugs in Boracay
Island. The police operatives conducted a testbuy at petitioners residence in Barangay Balabag,
Boracay Island where they were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth
of marijuana from petitioners. On the basis of the testbuy operation, they were able to secure a search
warrant
from
the
RTC
of
Aklan.
The police operatives proceeded to the house of petitioners to serve the search warrant. After presentment
of the warrant, the police operatives, in the presence of the Barangay Captain and some members of the
media, conducted the search. In the living room in the second floor, they recovered three (3) sachets
of shabu weighing 10.4 grams more or less, inside a jewelry box. They also found one big pack
containing driedmarijuana leaves weighing 950 grams and two gift packs containing 9 bricks
of marijuana with an aggregate weight of 800 grams. A Receipt for Property Seized was prepared by
SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan, but petitioners refused to sign the same. Thereafter, petitioners were placed under
arrest.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorariseeking
to annul the DOJ Resolutions directing the withdrawal of the Information against petitioners and the
RTCs Order granting the Motion to Withdraw filed by the provincial prosecutor.
On 26 September 2008, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the DOJ Resolutions and the RTC
Order and reinstated the Information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 6972. The appellate court
declared that the petition for review was filed within the extension granted by the court; that the People,
through the OSG, correctly filed the petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because the Court of
Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice only in a petition forcertiorari under Rule
65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion; that the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
provincial prosecutor complied with the condition sine qua non of exhausting all plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law; and that the petition for certiorari bore the proper
verification
of
the
OSG
as
the
Peoples
statutory
counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion regarding the submission of petitioners that
the remedy from the RTCs Order to withdraw the filing of the Information should have been an ordinary
appeal
HELD:

There is, here, a basis for such finding.

When confronted with a motion to withdraw Information on the ground of lack of probable cause based
on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent
assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not
bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding farther with the trial. While the
Secretarys ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. When the trial courts Order rests entirely on
the assessment of the DOJ without doing its own independent evaluation, the trial court effectively
abdicates its judicial power and refuses to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.
The RTC erroneously held that it has not yet effectively acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused as no commitment order has yet been issued against them. In Crespo v. Mogul,21 the Court held
that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or
acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion
of the trial court. The rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even
before or after arraignment of the accused. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor
to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the
directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or
defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
The RTC clearly deferred to the finding of probable cause by the Secretary of Justice without doing its
own independent evaluation. The trial court even expressed its apprehension that no prosecutor would be
willing to prosecute the case should the motion to withdraw be denied. The only matter discussed by the
trial court was its concurrence with the DOJ relative to the service and conduct of the search for illegal
drugs. The trial court declared that the evidence is inadmissible in view of the manner the search warrant
was served. Settled is the rule that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a fullblown trial on the
merits. In the case at bar, the grounds relied upon by petitioners should be fully explained and threshed
out not in a preliminary investigation but during trial as the same are matters of defense involving factual
issues.

Case no 37
G.R. No. 195542, March 19, 2014
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. OUDINE SANTOS, Respondent.

Facts: An investment scam was exposed with the disappearance of its primary perpetrator, Michael H.K.
Liew (Liew), a selfstyled financial guru and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Performance
Investment Products Corporation (PIPCBVI), a foreign corporation registered in the British Virgin
Islands.
To do business in the Philippines, PIPCBVI incorporated herein as Philippine International Planning
Center Corporation (PIPC Corporation).
Because the head of PIPC Corporation had gone missing and with it the monies and investment of a
significant number of investors, the SEC was flooded with complaints from thirtyone (31) individuals
against PIPC Corporation, its directors, officers, employees, agents and brokers for alleged violation of
certain provisions of the Securities Regulation Code, including Section 28 thereof. Santos was charged in
the complaints in her capacity as investment consultant of PIPC Corporation, who supposedly induced
private complainants Luisa Mercedes P. Lorenzo (Lorenzo) and Ricky Albino P. Sy (Sy), to invest their
monies in PIPC Corporation

Lorenzo and Sy charge Santos in her capacity as investment consultant of PIPC Corporation who actively
engaged in the solicitation and recruitment of investors. Private complainants maintain that Santos, apart
from being PIPC Corporations employee, acted as PIPC Corporations agent and made representations
regarding its investment products and that of the supposed global corporation PIPCBVI. Facilitating
Lorenzos and Sys investment with PIPC Corporation, Santos represented to the two that investing with
PIPC Corporation, an affiliate of PIPCBVI, would be safe and fullproof.

SEC filed the instant case for alleged violation by respondents [therein, including herein respondent,
Santos,] of Section 8 of the SRC.
Sec. 8. Requirement of Registration of Securities. 8.1. Securities shall not be sold or offered for sale or
distribution within the Philippines, without a registration statement duly filed with and approved by the
Commission. Prior to such sale, information on the securities, in such form and with such substance as the
Commission may prescribe, shall be made available to each prospective purchaser.

Respondent Santos was charged for violation of Sec 8 of the Securities and Regulation Code.
Respondent Santos filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of the DOJ claiming that
she was a mere clerical employee/information provider who never solicited nor recruited investors, in
particular complainants Sy and Lorenzo, for PIPC Corporation or PIPCBVI. Santos also claimed dearth
of evidence indicating she was a salesman/agent or an associated person of a broker or dealer, as defined
under the Securities Regulation Code. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to EXCLUDE respondent
Oudine Santos from the Information for violation of Section 28 of the Securities and Regulation Code.
CA upheld the ruling of the DOJ.

Issue: Whether or Not the Secretary of DOJ and CA correctly overruled the finding of the state
prosecutor?

Ruling:No. Generally, at the preliminary investigation proper, the investigating prosecutor, and ultimately,
the Secretary of the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine
probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. The determination of probable cause is an executive
function where the prosecutor determines merely that a crime has been committed and that the accused
has committed the same. The rules do not require that a prosecutor has moral certainty of the guilt of a
person simply for preliminary investigation purposes.
However, the authority of the prosecutor and the DOJ is not absolute; it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or
capriciously. Where the findings of the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the
existence of probable cause are equivalent to a gross misapprehension of facts,certiorari will lie to correct
these errors.
While it is our policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, we have, on more than
one occasion, adhered to some exceptions to the general rule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2. when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
3. when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.
In excluding Santos from the prosecution of the supposed violation of Section 28 of the Securities
Regulation Code, the Secretary of the DOJ, as affirmed by the appellate court, debunked the DOJ panels
finding that Santos was prima facie liable for either: (1) selling securities in the Philippines as a broker or
dealer, or (2) acting as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer on behalf of PIPC
Corporation and/or PIPCBVI without being registered as such with the SEC.

To get to that conclusion, the Secretary of the DOJ and the appellate court ruled that no evidence was
adduced showing Santos actual participation in the final sale by PIPC Corporation and/or PIPCBVI of
unregistered securities since the very affidavits of complainants Lorenzo and Sy proved that Santos had
never signed, neither was she mentioned in, any of the investment documents between Lorenzo and Sy,
on one hand, and PIPC Corporation and/or PIPCBVI, on the other hand.
The conclusions made by the Secretary of the DOJ and the appellate court are a myopic view of the
investment solicitations made by Santos on behalf of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPCBVI while she was
not licensed as a broker or dealer, or registered as a salesman, or an associated person of a broker or
dealer.

Case No 38
G.R. No. 161151, March 24, 2014
BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. LANUZO

FACTS:
On January 5, 1998, Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages 1 against BJDC
Construction, a single proprietorship engaged in the construction business. The company was the
contractor of the reblocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane of the national
highway.
Respondents figured in the accident that transpired at the site of the reblocking work at about
6:30 p.m., and that the companys failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the
project, especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the accident and the death of
Balbino.
In its answer, the company denied Nenas allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed
warning signs and lights along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time
of the incident, the lights were working and switched on.
The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident brought about by his own
negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation report that stated, among others, that
Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was
overtaking another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the road sign/barricade
installed on the road had a light.
The RTC subsequently directed the amendment of the complaint to include the children of Nena
and Balbino as coplaintiffs, namely: Janet, Claudette, Joan Bernabe and Ryan Jose, all
surnamed Lanuzo. Hence, the plaintiffs are hereinafter be referred to as the Lanuzo heirs.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the company. The Lanuzo heirs appealed to the CA.

The CA promulgated its decision declaring that the issue was whether the company had installed
adequate lighting in the project so that motorists could clearly see the barricade placed on the
newly cemented lane that was then still closed to vehicular traffic, thereby reversing the
judgment of the RTC.

Issues
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is preponderant to establish the negligence
of the petitioner.
Ruling of the Court
Inasmuch as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact on who was the negligent
party, the Court holds that an examination of the evidence of the parties needs to be undertaken
to properly determine the issue. The Court must ascertain whose evidence was preponderant, for
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court mandates that in civil cases, like this one, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. Generally,
the party who denies has no burden to prove. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party
who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. The burden of proof is on the
plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by
the Rules of Court, but it may rest on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the
essential allegations but raises affirmative defense or defenses, which if proved, will exculpate
him
from
liability.
Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the
Lanuzo heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of
evidence that the negligence on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal
accident of Balbino.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in
a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. And the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent
when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful
to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

In our view, the RTC properly gave more weight to the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1
Corporal than to those of the witnesses for the Lanuzo heirs. There was justification for doing so,
because the greater probability pertained to the former. Moreover, the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses and of their testimonies is preferred to that of the appellate courts
because of the trial courts unique firsthand opportunity to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor as such.

Absent any showing that the trial courts calibration of the credibility of the witnesses was
flawed, we are bound by its assessment. This Court will sustain such findings unless it can be
shown that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misunderstood, misappreciated, or misapplied
substantial facts and circumstances, which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the
case.
The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the company was not negligent in
ensuring safety at the project site. All the established circumstances showed that the proximate
and immediate cause of the death of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs
could not recover damages.

Case No 39
SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERVICES (PHILIPPINES), INC. AND JANETTE G.
LAGAZO, Petitioners, v. LARRY S. LABRADOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 193107, March 24, 2014
This is an appeal (via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) from the decisiondated December 18, 2009
and the resolutiondated July 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 110662.
The appealed decision affirmed the decision dated May 21, 2009 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), finding Larry S. Labrador illegally dismissed from the service.
FACTS:
Petitioner Sutherland Global Services (Philippines), Inc. (Sutherland) is engaged in the business
of process outsourcing and technology consulting services for international clients. In August
2006, Sutherland hired Labrador as one of its call center agents with the main responsibility of
answering
various
queries
and
complaints
through
phonedin
calls.
In his two years of working at Sutherland, Labrador committed several infractions. But it was
only on June 17, 2008 that Labrador was finally charged with violation for transgressing the
NonCompliance Sale Attribute policy clause stated in the Employee Handbook. Allegedly, on
May 13, 2008, one of Sutherlands customers complained that Labrador initially asked for her
credit card account, but only for purposes of verification. As it turned out, a second account was
created and a new order was placed under the same customers name. Thus, two sets of packages
were shipped to the customer who had to pay twice for the same product.Under Sutherlands
Employee Handbook, Labradors action is classified as an act of dishonesty or fraud. On May
24, 2008, Sutherland sent Labrador a Notice to Explain in writing why he should not be held
administratively
liable.
On May 28, 2008, an administrative hearing was conducted that took into consideration
Labradors past infractions. After investigation, a recommendation was issued finding Labrador
guilty of violating the Employees Handbook due to gross or habitual neglect of duty. On June
17,
2008,
Labrador
submitted
his
resignation
letter.
On October 27, 2008, Labrador filed a complaint for constructive/illegal dismissal before the
NLRC.
On February 27, 2009, Labor Arbiter (LA) Reynaldo Abdon dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. He found just cause to terminate Labradors employment, and that his resignation letter
had been voluntarily executed.Labrador filed his Memorandum on Appeal with the NLRC. In
Sutherlands Answer, it noted that there were formal defects in Labradors Memorandum on
Appeal warranting its immediate dismissal, namely: (1) he failed to state the date of receipt of
the appealed decision; and (2) he also failed to attach a certificate of nonforum shopping in
accordance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure.Notwithstanding these defects, the NLRC
reversed the LAs ruling on May 21, 2009. The NLRC applied a liberal interpretation of the rules
and admitted Labradors Memorandum on Appeal. It further ruled that Labradors resignation
was involuntary. Thus, it ordered Labradors reinstatement with payment of backwages and

allowances. Sutherland filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC likewise denied in a
resolutiondated July 14, 2009.
ISSUE
THE CA ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL DESPITE LABRADORS
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE NLRCS RULES OF PROCEDURE.
WHETHER LABRADORS OFFENSE CONSTITUTES GROSS NEGLIGENCE AS TO
WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.
Held
The petition is meritorious.
Technical rules are not necessarily fatal in labor cases; they can be liberally applied if all things
being equal any doubt or ambiguity would be resolved in favor of labor.These technicalities
and limitations can only be given their fullest effect if the case is substantively unmeritorious;
otherwise, and if the defect is similar to the present one and can be verified from the records (as
in this case), we have the discretion not to consider them fatal.The same reasoning applies to the
failure to attach a certificate of nonforum shopping. SC can likewise relax their treatment of
the defect. Additionally, while the 2005 NLRC Rules specifically stated that a certificate of non
forum shopping should be attached, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedureno longer requires it.
Jurisprudence, too, is replete with instances when the Court relaxed the rules involving the
attachment of the certificate of nonforum shopping.
Labrador offense constitutes gross negligence, thus he was dismiss legally.
Labrador repeatedly committed the act, thus it is considered a just cause to dismiss him. To
Sutherlands credit, it duly complied with the procedural requirement in dismissing an employee;
it clearly observed both substantive and procedural due process. Its action was based on a just
and authorized cause, and the dismissal was effected after due notice and hearing. After
Labradors subsequent infraction, Sutherland sent him a Notice to Explain and an administrative
hearing was thereafter conducted. During the hearing, Labrador himself admitted his faults.
These incidents were properly recorded and were properly discussed in Sutherlands
recommendation. But before Sutherland could finally pronounce its verdict, Labrador submitted
his resignation letter, impelled no doubt, as Sutherland alleged, by the need to protect his
reputation and his future employment chances. To be sure, Sutherlands explanation was not
remote, farfetched or unbelievable given the undisputable evidence on record of infractions.

Case No 40.
VILMA MACEDONIO v. CATALINA RAMO, et al.
FACTS:
-

Vilma Macedonio filed with the Baguio RTC (assigned to Br. 3) a civil case for rescission
of contract with damages (Case No. 5703-R), against respondent Catalina Ramo.
Macedonio alleged that she and Ramo entered into an agreement for the purchase
ofRamos unregistered lot located at Baguio City; that Ramo assured her that the subject
property was free from liens and encumbrances; that of the agreed P1,700,000.00 sale
price, petitioner paid P850,000.00 as earnest money; that Ramo failed to clear the
property of the mortgage; and that the petitioner prayed that deed of sale be rescinded and
for damages
During the course of the proceedings, the parties mutually agreed to settle.
However, the parties were not able to submit their Compromise Agreement.
As a result, the RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute considering its failure to
comply in submitting their compromise agreement.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an Order that until the
parties submit their Compromise Agreement, no incident will be taken up
The RTC Br. 3, upon petitioners motion, issued an Order stating that although the case is
already terminated, there is nothing in the law to prevent the lawyers from exhorting their
clients to comply with their obligations under an oral settlement.
Ramo, in a letter, admitted that she received the total amount of P850,000.00 as down
payment but proposing to return to petitioner only the amount of P255,000.00 within a
period of four years, without interest.
In October 2009, petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be set for pretrial since
all efforts to settle the issues between the parties failed. Ramo opposed the same
manifestation and motion, insisting that the case has been terminated.
RTC-Br. 3 did not act on petitioners manifestation and motion; instead, it issued another
Order that the case was already terminated.
On April 21, 2010, petitioner filed with the Baguio RTC another civil case against
respondents for specific performance, annulment of documents and titles, with damages
(Case No. 7150R) which was assigned to Branch 6, praying to rescind and nullify the
trust and sale agreements between Ramo and the other individual respondents; in the
alternative, rescind petitioner and Ramos agreements and order a refund of petitioners
payments with interest;
Ramo filed her answer with motion to dismiss the case, claiming that in filing the case,
petitioner violated the rule against forumshopping since there had already been a prior
terminated case (Case No. 5703R) and a pending Protest with the DENR.
RTC Br. 6 dismissed the case with prejudice due to: a) violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), that is, for failure to inform the court of
the existence of Civil Case No. 5703R and the DENR Protest; b) forum shopping; and
c) litis pendentia under Section 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules.
o The trial court held that petitioner filed multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, although with different prayers for relief; that while the first case filed was
for rescission and the other was for specific performance and annulment of

documents and titles, both cases are premised on the same cause of action
Ramos purported wrongful conduct in connection with the cancelled sale of the
subject property; that rescission and specific performance could not be prayed for
in two separate cases without violating the rule against splitting a cause of action;
and that the pending DENR Protest which seeks to nullify the sales patent and
certificates of title issued to Ramo and the other individual respondents is
identical to petitioners cause of action in Civil Case No. 7150R for annulment
of documents and titles
ISSUES:
- Did RTC Br. 6 err in dismissing the Civil Case No. 7150R for alleged forum-shopping?
RULING:
- Yes. RTC Br. 6 was incorrect in dismissing the case. The Court finds that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 7150R was unwarranted. It is true that while it was incumbent for
petitioner to have informed the trial court of Civil Case No. 5703R and the pending
DENR Protest, this Court is inclined to forego petitioners failure to abide by the
requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forumshopping, favor of
deciding the case on the basis of merit, seeing, as the Court does, that a rigid
interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result in substantial injustice to petitioner. The
circumstances require that substance must prevail over form, keeping in mind, as the
Court has held countless times, that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice; their application should be relaxed when they hinder instead of
promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should as much as
possible be resolved on the merits and not on technicalities. Besides, the Rules of Civil
Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.
In arriving at the foregoing conclusions, the Court took into consideration the evidence
and Ramos admissions that while she refuses to honor her obligations under the sale or
at least return petitioners money, she went on to subdivide and transfer or sell the
property to other individuals, which is absolutely unfair if not perverse. Apparently, this
injustice has been lost on the trial court, having decided the way it did by disregarding the
basic facts and adhering to technicalities.
Given the foregoing, if justice is to be truly served, the trial court should not have
dismissed Civil Case No. 7150R.
-

In resolving whether to dismiss a case for violation of the rules covering certifications
against forumshopping, the courts should be mindful of the facts and merits of the case,
the extant evidence, the principles of justice, and the rules of fair play. They should not
give in to rigidity, indifference, indolence, or lack of depth.

Case No 41
PACIFIC REHOUSE CORPORATION vs. CA
G.R. No. 201537
2014-03-24
Facts:
Pacific Rehouse Corporation et. al. filed a complaint against E-Securities for
unauthorized sale of DMCI shares. RTC rendered judgment directing E-Securities to return the
shares and directed Pacific Rehouse to reimburse previous payment representing buy back.
When the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, private respondents moved for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution to hold Export and Industry Bank, Inc. liable for the
judgment obligation as E-Securities is a wholly-owned controlled and dominated subsidiary of
Export and Industry Bank, Inc., and is, thus, a mere alter ego and business conduit of the latter.
E-Securities opposed the motion, arguing that it has a corporate personality that is separate and
distinct from petitioner. RTC concluded that E-Securities is a mere business conduit or alter ego
of petitioner.
Export and Industry Bank, Inc. filed an Omnibus Motion (Ex Abundanti Cautela)
questioning the alias writ because it was not impleaded as a party to the case. The RTC denied
the motion and directed the garnishment against petitioner and/or E-Securities.
Export Bank filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the RTC Order. CA issued a 60-day TRO
enjoining the execution of the Orders of the RTC.
On April 26, 2012, the CA rendered the assailed Decision on the merits of the case,
granting Export Banks petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Export Bank may be held liable in an alias writ of execution by piercing its
veil of corporate fiction.
2. Whether or not the Alter Ego Doctrine is applicable
Ruling:
1. No. The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and the resulting treatment of two
related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is
basically applied only to determine established liability; it is not available to confer on the court
a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case. Elsewise

put, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the courts process of piercing the
veil of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
corporation and, hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and its property would
infringe on its right to due process.
From the preceding, it is therefore correct to say that the court must first and foremost
acquire jurisdiction over the parties; and only then would the parties be allowed to present
evidence for and/or against piercing the veil of corporate fiction. If the court has no jurisdiction
over the corporation, it follows that the court has no business in piercing its veil of corporate
fiction because such action offends the corporations right to due process.
2.. The Alter Ego Doctrine is not applicable.
Where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are conducted so that it
is, in fact, a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other, the fiction of the corporate entity of the
instrumentality may be disregarded. The control necessary to invoke the rule is not majority or
even complete stock control but such domination of finances, policies and practices that the
controlled corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence of its own, and is but
a conduit for its principal. It must be kept in mind that the control must be shown to have been
exercised at the time the acts complained of took place. Moreover, the control and breach of duty
must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss for which the complaint is made.
The Court has laid down a three-pronged control test to establish when the alter ego doctrine
should be operative:
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of
finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its
own;
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate
the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must [have] proximately caused the injury or unjust
loss complained of.
The absence of any one of these elements prevents piercing the corporate veil in applying the
instrumentality or alter egodoctrine, the courts are concerned with reality and not form, with
how the corporation operated and the individual defendants relationship to that operation.

Case No 42
People vs GO
FACTS: On June 2, 2005 Sandiganbayan quashed the Information filed against Henry T. Go for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded
by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to
Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).While there was
likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary of Transportation and Communication Arturo
Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the
ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the
deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent,
who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not
be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the Sandiganbayan to grant the motion to quash by Respondent Go is valid.
HELD: A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of
the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of
collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the
conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for
the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary
Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and
tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be
done. It does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent.The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith
DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of the Criminal Case.