System Protection Schemes

DEVELOPMENT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF SYSTEM
PROTECTION SCHEMES
Report to Electricity Commission
June 2009
Version
Date
15 June 2009
Prepared by
David Strong and Michael Green
Client
Electricity Commission
Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes
Version: 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
This report provides an introduction to System Protection Schemes (SPS), provides an outline of some
SPS used in Australia, and discusses potential opportunities for the use of SPS in New Zealand to
increase transfer limits on parts of the transmission network.
Overview of System Protection Schemes

SPS are tools that maintain the power system in a satisfactory operating state following a contingency,
and are usually additional to conventional power system control and protection schemes. Secure
power system operation means that, following a credible contingent event, the power system remains
in a satisfactory operating state. In this satisfactory operating state, all assets remaining in service
operate within equipment ratings, system voltages are stable and within allowed tolerances, power
flows are stable, and system frequency is within an acceptable tolerance.
An SPS may be installed to contain a frequency deviation following a contingency (Frequency Control
SPS) or to prevent thermal overloading or voltage collapse following a contingency (Network Control
SPS).
A Frequency Control SPS (FCSPS) may be implemented to trip generation to limit frequency rise
following loss of load, or to interrupt load to limit frequency fall following a large loss of generation.
The amount of SPS action is generally a function of the power system conditions at the time and this
requires software to calculate the correct SPS action using operational data from a SCADA system.
A FCSPS will need to be fast acting, generally within a few hundred milliseconds of the initiating event.
It will therefore need to use high speed protection signalling to securely transfer trip signals to the
generating units or load blocks.
A Network Control SPS (NCSPS) is generally implemented to prevent the thermal overloading of
transmission network elements following a specified contingency. The selection of load or generation
to be tripped will depend on the location of the transmission element to be protected. If a generating
unit is tripped during NCSPS operation, other generation will need to increase output to maintain the
network frequency. The increase in output would be expected to be provided mainly by those
generating units that have been dispatched to provide Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS).
As an example of an NCSPS implementation, Figure E1 shows a transmission corridor with two
circuits in parallel. The conventional operational practice would be to limit the flow in the corridor to
the rating of one circuit to avoid the overloading of the remaining in service circuit. This is referred to
as N-1 as it allows for an outage of one circuit without overloading the remaining in service circuit. If
there was generation at A that could be tripped in the event of a circuit outage and generation at or
downstream of B that could increase output, an SPS could be implemented to rapidly reduce flow
following a circuit outage. With an NCSPS in place the corridor maybe loaded to approximately 95%
of the combined rating of both circuits.
1
Figure E1 Example of NCSPS application
The time for an NCSPS to reduce flow in a corridor would generally be in the range of seconds to
minutes depending on the pre-event circuit loading.
15 June 2009
Page i
Version: 1
SPS Experience in Australia

There are a number of SPS operating in Australia some of which have been in service for many years.
These include:
Basslink (frequency control and network loading);
Victoria to South Australia interconnector (frequency control);
Snowy to Victoria interconnector (network loading);
Tamar Valley Power Station (frequency control);
Western Sydney (network loading); and
Snowy to NSW interconnector (network loading).
Runback schemes can also be categorised as a type of SPS. These have been widely used
internationally used on generators connections and HVDC links for many years. Examples of these in
Australia include:
Woolnorth Wind Farm; (generation runback for network loading)
Eyre Peninsula Wind Farms; (generation runback for network loading) and
Murraylink interconnector (HVDC interconnector runback network loading and voltage control).
In Australia, the most complex SPS has been designed to accommodate the Basslink HVDC. This
SPS consists of an FCSPS to manage frequency in Tasmania for an outage of the Basslink HVDC,
and an NCSPS which enables transmission corridors to be operated up to 95% of the combined
thermal rating of each circuit. The Basslink SPS involves equipment installed at two control centres,
ten power stations and three major industrial customers.
The Basslink SPS enables Tasmania to export up to 630 MW and import up to 480 MW from the
mainland. Tasmania has a maximum demand of 1760 MW and a minimum demand of about 900 MW.
The Basslink FCSPS has operated successfully on more than twenty occasions since Basslink
commissioning in April 2006.
There were significant commercial and stakeholder issues that had to be addressed during the
development of the Basslink SPS. These issues are discussed in Appendix 2.
Potential Applications of SPS in New Zealand

It is noted that Transpower has some existing SPS to prevent circuit overload or transient instability
following specific circuit outages. There are also runbacks on the interisland HVDC link which can
operate for either north flow or south flow. At Haywards runbacks are initiated by loss of North Island
circuits or equipment in the Haywards area, or by loss of communications between Haywards and
Benmore.
Preliminary analysis has identified further potential opportunities for the implementation of SPS to
increase transfer capacity in the New Zealand transmission network. Possible applications for the
uses of SPS in New Zealand include:
the Wairakei Ring;
the Waitaki Valley;
Roxburgh to Waitaki Valley; and
Southern South Island.
15 June 2009
Page ii
Version: 1
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEWOFSYSTEMPROTECTIONSCHEMES
SPSEXPERIENCEINAUSTRALIA
POTENTIALAPPLICATIONSOFSPSINNEWZEALAND
I
II
II
CONTENTS
III
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEWOFSYSTEMPROTECTIONSCHEMES
2.1 CONCEPTUALOVERVIEW
2.2 SPSDESIGNSTUDIES
2.2.1
FrequencyControlSPSDesign
2.2.2
NetworkControlSPSDesign
3
2
2
2
2
5
SPSEXPERIENCEINAUSTRALIA
3.1 SYSTEMPROTECTIONSCHEMES
3.1.1
BasslinkSystemProtectionScheme
3.1.2
VictoriatoSouthAustraliaInterconnector
3.1.3
SnowytoVictoriaInterconnector
3.1.4
TamarValleyGeneratorContingencyScheme
3.1.5
WesternSydney
3.1.6
NSWImportCapabilityfromSnowy
3.2 RUNBACKSCHEMES
3.2.1
WoolnorthWindFarm
3.2.2
EyrePeninsulaWindFarms
3.2.3
MurraylinkRunback
3.3 NETWORKCONTROLANCILLARYSERVICES
14
APPLICATIONOFSPSINNEWZEALAND
4.1 GENERICAPPLICATIONS
4.1.1
TrippingGeneration
4.1.2
TrippingLoad
4.2 EXISTINGAPPLICATIONS
4.3 POTENTIALAPPLICATIONS
4.3.1
WairakeiRing
4.3.2
SouthIsland
14
14
14
15
16
16
17
REVIEWOFSPSSECTIONSOFTRANSPOWERTRANSMISSIONCODE
5.1
5.2
5
5
9
10
10
10
11
11
11
11
11
12
22
22
23
DEFINITIONOFANSPS
SPECIFICCOMMENTSONCODE
26
SUMMARY
27
GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS
DEFINITIONS
27
28
REFERENCES
29
APPENDIX1AUSTRALIANINDUSTRYSTRUCTURE
30
15 June 2009
Page iii
Version: 1
33
APPENDIX2SPSIMPLEMENTATIONPROCESS
A2.1 INTRODUCTION
A2.2 FUNCTIONALSPECIFICATION
A2.2.1 Reliability
A2.2.2 Availability
A2.2.3 SCADASystem
A2.2.4 Software
A2.2.5 OperatorUserInterface
A2.2.6 DataArchive
A2.2.7 PerformanceStandard
A2.3 TECHNICALSPECIFICATION
A2.3.1 HardwareandCommunications
A2.4 DUEDILIGENCE
A2.5 RISKANALYSIS
A2.6 TESTING
A2.7 DOCUMENTATION
A2.8 TRAINING
A2.9 GOLIVEPROCESS
A2.10 POWERSYSTEMOPERATION
A2.10.1
PowerSystemSecurity
A2.10.2
ContingencyAnalysis
A2.11 MAINTENANCEANDUPGRADES
A2.12 PROJECTMANAGEMENT
A2.13 STAKEHOLDERMANAGEMENTANDCOMMERCIALISSUES
A2.13.1
PolicyMakers
A2.13.2
IndustryRepresentatives
A2.13.3
Investors
A2.13.4
Retailers
A2.13.5
MarketOperatorsandPowerSystemOperators
A2.13.6
Suppliers
A2.13.7
CommercialIssues
APPENDIX3NEMREVIEWOFNETWORKSUPPORTANDCONTROLSERVICES
15 June 2009
33
33
33
33
33
34
34
34
34
35
35
35
35
36
37
37
37
38
38
38
38
38
40
42
42
43
45
45
45
46
48
Page iv
Version: 1
INTRODUCTION
The Electricity Commission of New Zealand engaged David Strong & Associates to provide advice on
current practices associated with the development and implementation of System Protection Schemes
(SPS 1 ).
SPS are tools that maintain the power system in a satisfactory operating state following a contingency,
and are usually additional to conventional power system control and protection schemes. Secure
power system operation means that, following a credible contingent event, the power system remains
in a satisfactory operating state. In this satisfactory operating state, all assets remaining in service
operate within equipment ratings, system voltages are stable and within allowed tolerances, power
flows are stable, and system frequency is within an acceptable tolerance.
This report outlines recent experience gained implementing SPS within the Australian National
Electricity Market, particularly in Tasmania, where an extensive SPS was required to accommodate
the Basslink HVDC project. A number of aspects of SPS use are discussed, such as the application of
technology, resources required, SPS development, and SPS operational experience. Issues
surrounding the design, contract negotiations, construction, installation, commissioning and operation
of SPS are also discussed.
The report builds on previous discussions with the Electricity Commission regarding SPS deployment
to support the New Zealand electricity transmission system.
To provide more background in the report, Transpower, the New Zealand transmission system asset
owner and system operator, was consulted. This was to obtain an understanding of any special
circumstances applicable to their situation, determine current practices regarding power system and
market operations, and discuss opportunities for increasing the existing power system operating
envelope.
These schemes may also be referred to as Special Protection Systems
15 June 2009
Page 1
Version: 1
OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM PROTECTION SCHEMES
Developing an SPS from concept through to commissioning should be approached in the same
manner as any other power system project, the difference being that it may involve more parties than
a transmission line or substation project. These include offtake customers, generators, and the
transmission network asset owner. If there is an independent system operator, it will also need to be
involved, as the dispatch process will require SPS operational data.
A proposal for an SPS may arise as part of a new generation development, a new major industrial
load, or as one of a range of options considered by a transmission planner to address a transmission
network constraint. In some cases, an SPS may be the only technical solution.
2.1
Conceptual Overview
The first SPS design step is to define the objectives of the scheme, which could be, for example, to:
contain a frequency deviation following a contingency;
prevent thermal overloading of transmission circuits following a contingency; or
prevent voltage collapse.
For each objective it will be necessary to define exactly what SPS actions will be necessary following
the contingency and how those actions can be implemented.
2.2
SPS Design Studies
Power system studies will be required as the first part of the design process, and would be carried out
by the SPS proponent or designer. Boundary cases defining the extremes of power system operation
should be developed as the starting point for the power system studies.
The studies need to determine power system conditions following SPS action to ensure that the power
system remains in a satisfactory operating condition following the contingency and SPS operation.
This would cover post contingent network voltages, transient stability and frequency. In a weak power
system SPS action could have a significant impact on post contingent voltages.
2.2.1
Frequency Control SPS Design
A Frequency Control SPS (FCSPS) may be implemented to trip generation to limit frequency rise
following loss of load, or to trip load to limit frequency fall following a large loss of generation.
In the first instance, power system studies need to be carried out to identify an empirical relationship
between the size of the contingency and amount of SPS action required. This will be a function of the
power system conditions at the time.
At the end of these studies, an algorithm can be developed which is used to calculate the correct SPS
action for the power system operating condition at the time. Additionally, the algorithm will also specify
the control logic to select the correct generating units or load blocks for tripping, to ensure the power
system lands in a satisfactory state following the contingent event.
2.2.2
Network Control SPS Design
A Network Control SPS (NCSPS) is generally implemented to prevent the thermal overloading of
transmission network elements following a specified contingency. The selection of load or generation
to be tripped will depend on the location of the transmission element to be protected.
15 June 2009
Page 2
Version: 1
If a generating unit is tripped during NCSPS operation, other generation will need to increase output to
maintain the power system frequency. The increase in output would be expected to be provided
mainly by those generating units that have been dispatched to provide Frequency Control Ancillary
Services (FCAS).
However experience has shown that there is likely to be a response from some of the generating units
that have not been dispatched for FCAS. If this is the case and if any remaining generating units are
located such that they can re-load the transmission asset being protected then this needs to be
addressed in the NCSPS design process.
The operational characteristics of the generating units which may re-load the transmission asset
need to be taken into consideration when investigating options to prevent this. Some options are:
ensure that generating units, which could re-load the protected transmission asset, are not
dispatched for FCAS raise services;
ensure that there is sufficient FCAS raise available from generating units on the downstream
side of the outage;
automatically lock the generating unit governors behind the outage following an NCSPS
initiated tripping; and
trip extra generation so that if some re-loading occurs the protected transmission asset will
still be within its rating.
Parallel power flow paths also need to be taken into account when determining the amount of
generation that would need to be tripped. For example, the amount of flow reduction through a
protected transmission circuit, from a 1 MW reduction in generation output, will vary due to its location
in the network to the protected circuit. The contribution of each generating unit can be determined
from load flow studies and then the worst case reduction used in the algorithm. This is referred to as
the generator contribution factor.
The examples below are used to illustrate these issues.
Figure 1 shows a transmission corridor with two circuits in parallel. The conventional operational
practice would be to limit the flow in the corridor to the rating of one circuit to avoid the overloading of
the remaining in service circuit following a sudden outage of any one of the circuits. This is referred to
as N-1 as it allows for one outage. If an SPS is implemented to rapidly reduce flow following a circuit
outage the corridor could be loaded to approximately 95% of the combined rating of both circuits. The
reason for the 95% is so that the circuit has some thermal capacity available for a short time. If the
flow is reduced rapidly (within about ten seconds) the temperature of the conductor will not exceed the
design temperature.
In example A (Figure 1), for an outage of circuit A-B 1, the post contingent current in the remaining
circuit will be slightly greater than the total pre-contingent current due to increased losses. The
amount of generation that needs to be tripped at A to prevent overload of the remaining circuit would
be the difference between the post contingent circuit loading and the continuous rating of the
remaining circuit. In this case the generator contribution factor for the generators at A will be 1.0.
The SPS would have a circuit-outage ID for each of the A-B circuits.
1
Figure 1 Example A all generation through two parallel circuits
Example B (Figure 2) is a different scenario as there is a parallel path and generation in two locations.
The NCSPS could be protecting the two D-E circuits and the C-E circuit. For an outage of a D-E
circuit the D generators would have a higher generator contribution factor than the C generators.
15 June 2009
Page 3
Version: 1
The D generator contribution factor will be less than 1 as some of the post-contingent output from
there will flow through the C-D and C-E circuits. As a consequence a 1MW reduction in the D
generator output will reduce D-E circuit flow by less than 1MW.
Finally there would be a circuit-outage ID for loss of each D-E and C-E circuit.
E
2
1
Figure 2 Example B generation sharing between parallel paths
Example C (Figure 3) is a network where the flow in a circuit could be in either direction depending on
the load and generation pattern. An NCSPS may be used to protect the F-H circuit against an outage
of an F-G circuit when the flow in F-H is from F to H, and an outage of a G-H circuit when the flow in FH is from H to F.
In the case of flow from F to H generation at F would be tripped to reduce the loading on circuit F-H.
In the case of flow from H to F, generation at H or J would be tripped.
G
L
2
H
J
L
Figure 3 Example C power flow in either direction

The circuit-outage IDs discussed above relate to an intact system with all circuits in service. If the
system was operating with a circuit out of service, such as during maintenance, the ratio of post to pre
contingent circuit loading, and the generator reduction ratios would be different from those of an intact
system. The SPS or the specific circuit-outage IDs could be set to disabled for a not intact system.
Alternatively there could be a separate circuit-outage ID with the post to pre contingent and generator
reduction ratios.
15 June 2009
Page 4
Version: 1
SPS EXPERIENCE IN AUSTRALIA
This section discusses the Australian experience with SPS and run-back schemes, which are either in
service or are presently being developed. The Australian experience has so far covered SPS use to
reduce constraints on generation dispatch, meeting customer demand, and maximising transfers
across a merchant transmission link and regulated interconnectors.
The National Electricity Market which covers the eastern and southern states of Australia has an
independent system operator and multiple transmission network service providers. The operation of
the NEM is governed by the National Electricity Law, National Electricity Regulations and the National
Electricity Rules 2 , and is centrally managed by NEMMCO. The market dispatch is subject to network
security constraints and co-optimisation of energy and frequency control ancillary services (FCAS)
markets. Appendix 2 provides an outline of the industry structure and regulatory framework.
3.1
System Protection Schemes
3.1.1
Basslink System Protection Scheme
The most complex SPS in Australia is the Basslink 3 SPS(1). This scheme comprises a frequency
control SPS to manage the Tasmanian frequency for a trip of the Basslink HVDC either under export
or import conditions. This SPS also incorporates a network control SPS that monitors 18 AC
transmission circuits in Tasmania, ensuring that transmission circuit thermal overloads do not occur in
the event of specified outages.
Basslink
Basslink(2) is a 400kV, monopolar HVDC link with a metallic return comprising 290km of undersea
cable, 65km of overhead line with a rated continuous power transfer capacity of 500MW. It has a
dynamic rating of 630MW for a period of up to 6 hours a day. Basslink went into commercial service
on 29 April 2006.
Basslink connects the Australian island State of Tasmania to the State of Victoria. In Tasmania,
Basslink comprises a 2km 220kV overhead AC line from Transend 4 Networks George Town
substation, to the Tasmanian converter station, and a10km overhead DC line to the coast.
In Victoria there is 7km of shore based underground DC cable, 55km of overhead DC line to the
converter station and a short section of 500kV overhead AC line to SP-AusNets 5 Loy Yang
substation.
Basslink Frequency Controller
As Basslink is an asynchronous HVDC link, the Tasmanian system frequency is not synchronised with
the main Australian interconnected power system, similar to the North and South Islands of New
Zealand. Basslink has been provided with a control action that modulates DC power flows, the
objective of which is to align the separate system frequencies in accordance with the different
frequency standards that apply in Tasmania and mainland Australia.
The frequency controller aims to modulate Basslink power flows so that the relative frequencies lie on
the line shown in Figure 4, which illustrates the Basslink frequency controller objective function.
2
3
4
5
http://www.aemc.gov.au
http://www.basslink.com.au
http://www.transend.com.au
http://www.sp-ausnet.com.au
15 June 2009
Page 5
Version: 1
53
Frequency (Victoria)
52
51
50
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
49
48
47
46
Frequency (Tasmania)
Figure 4 Basslink frequency controller objective function

The key benefits of the frequency control action are that:
it enables Tasmania to participate not only in the main Australian energy market but also in
the frequency control ancillary services markets;
it improves the quality of Tasmanian frequency control; and
it supports the Tasmanian Network Control System Protection Scheme (as detailed below).
Basslink Frequency Control SPS
As the interconnected southern and eastern Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) has a total
demand in excess of 30 GW, the connection of Basslink into the Victorian transmission system did not
present any significant issues. On the other hand, the Tasmanian power system has a summer
minimum demand of approximately 900MW, and a winter maximum demand of 1800 MW. With a
maximum capacity of 630 MW, Basslink can represent a significant portion of both the Tasmanian
demand (export from Tasmania) and Tasmanian supply (import into Tasmania).
Given that Basslink HVDC is monopolar, a pole fault will result in the total loss of DC transfer. If the
DC transfer is a significant percentage of the Tasmanian system load at the time, excursions in the
Tasmanian system operating frequency would almost certainly breach standards.
In order to contain these frequency excursions, a combination of Tasmanian sourced frequency
control ancillary services and rapid tripping of generation and/or load is initiated. The SPS is designed
to ensure that generation or load is disconnected from the system within 650 milliseconds after the
Basslink fault.
This scheme is known as the Basslink Frequency Control System Protection Scheme (FCSPS). In the
Basslink FCSPS, the amount of generation or load to be interrupted is calculated every 4 seconds and
is a function of the Tasmanian demand and Basslink power flow.
Basslink Network Control SPS
The introduction of Basslink effectively increased the Tasmanian maximum demand by approximately
one-third. This was achieved without the need for costly network augmentations, by utilising the
security capacity of the existing transmission network and enabling operation up to nearly N
capability. Up to this point conventional practice was to operate the transmission network to its N-1
capability.
The implication of operating transmission corridors at N capability is that the loss of any circuit within
a transmission corridor will result in overloading the remaining in service circuits. In the Basslink
15 June 2009
Page 6
Version: 1
example, circuit overloads are removed by the Basslink Network Control System Protection Scheme
(NCSPS).
The NCSPS consists of a generic algorithm that can be used to prevent overloading of a specified
circuit following a specified circuit outage. This generic algorithm is then used with specific
parameters to provide a specific circuit outage calculation. There are 40 circuit outages currently
implemented in the NCSPS. Most of these circuit outage calculations apply for system normal
conditions but some have been developed for specific maintenance or operational outage conditions.
There are qualifiers that are used to determine which circuit outage calculations should be running at
any time. The qualifiers relate to power system conditions such as specific circuits in of out of service,
or direction of circuit power flow. The NCSPS carries out a calculation each four seconds for each of
the active circuit outage IDs. This calculation determines what action will be taken in the event of an
outage of the specified circuit.
Currently the Basslink NCSPS only operates for export from Tasmania, but it also has the capability of
providing Basslink import SPS functionality. However the discussion in this report is limited to the
export case where a transmission network contingency requires a reduction of generation behind that
contingency.
The Basslink NCSPS relates to nine transmission corridors and eighteen circuit contingencies as
illustrated in the below diagram. If a circuit contingency occurs the NCSPS initiates a reduction in
generation behind that contingency sufficient to remove circuit overloads.
Basslink
7
4
11
L
L
10
8
12
5
2
1
220kV
13
14
110kV
Load
Generation
16
17
15
L
18
Figure 5 Tasmanian transmission circuits relevant to the NCSPS
15 June 2009
Page 7
Version: 1
The loss of generation would normally result in the Tasmanian system frequency falling outside the
acceptable range; however, this is prevented through a combination of locally sourced frequency
control ancillary services and a reduction in HVDC transfer via the Basslink frequency controller.
It is important that the response of the locally sourced frequency control ancillary services does not
result in circuit re-loading. This is achieved automatically by inclusion of constraints within the
electricity market dispatch software.
The amount of generation reduction is calculated every four seconds and is a function of circuit precontingent loadings and sets of pre-determined factors that relate:
generator output to resultant circuit loadings; and
circuit post-contingent to pre-contingent loading ratios.
The algorithms for determining the required NCSPS generation reduction have two important
characteristics in that they provide for directional flow in certain transmission corridors and also take
account of circuit outages.
Extra care was taken when including network topology changes from the normal state, as the
complexity of NCSPS logic, algorithms and integration into the constraint formulation for dispatch
becomes increasingly complex. A key decision is to determine the scope of SPS operation and under
what conditions the power system will operate outside the SPS design boundary; a situation requiring
the SPS to be taken out of service.
The reduction in generation can be either fast or slow acting depending on the time estimated by the
NCSPS for transmission circuit conductors to reach their design operating temperature (and hence
have the potential to breach minimum ground clearance requirements). Fast acting control trips the
generator fully whilst slow acting control runs back generation by tripping hydro governor solenoids.
This ensures that the generators themselves remain connected to the power system.
Corridors can be operated up to their 95% N capability to allow for overloading that occurs between
the time a contingency occurs and NCSPS action is completed. This margin was determined based on
NCSPS action being completed before the conductors reach the design operating temperature.
Terminal equipment ratings were checked against their I2t capability based on fault withstand ratings.
Basslink SPS Design
Extensive studies across a wide range of Tasmanian power system operational scenarios were
conducted to design the FCSPS and NCSPS algorithms. This was also as part of a detailed due
diligence exercise to check the power system would remain in a satisfactory operating state following
SPS action.
The SPS uses a combination of SCADA and protection equipment. The SPS software is integrated
with the Transend Network Operational Control System and uses SCADA data to calculate the actions
to take in the event of specified contingencies. The tripping signals are issued using protection grade
hardware and high speed communications circuits.
The FCSPS software sends controls to an RTU at each of Transends two control centres to arm
generating units or load blocks. In the event of an outage of Basslink a loss-of-link signal is issued by
the Basslink control system. This is transferred to the RTUs in the Transend control centres (in
Tasmania) by tele-protection signalling units and high speed communications circuits. This loss-of-link
signal initiates trip signals to be sent to each armed generating unit or load block. The trip signals are
received at the generator or customer trip relays within 60 milliseconds of the signal being issued by
the Basslink converter station control system.
NCSPS action will be initiated if there is a transmission corridor operating above its firm rating, and the
SCADA system receives a circuit breaker open status indication from the RTU at either end of the
relevant transmission circuit. This will initiate the issue of trip signals to pre-determined generating
units.
15 June 2009
Page 8
Version: 1
The SPS has equipment installed at two Transend Control Centres, ten power stations and three
major industrial customers.
Acceptance Tests
The performance of the Basslink SPS was considered to be essential to maintain power system
security. A range of testing was carried out to prove the performance of the SPS. This testing
included
point to point testing of all wiring;
factory acceptance testing of the software and hardware;
site acceptance testing of the installed hardware software and communications,
remote asset commissioning (to prove the performance of the generating unit and load block
tripping); and
live tests to prove the power system response following SPS operation.
Operational Experience
The FCSPS operated six times during the Basslink commissioning process, three of which were
planned SPS tests, and has operated over twenty times since Basslink entered commercial service.
The FCSPS has operated correctly each time it has been required to disconnect load or generation
from the system.
There was an event that resulted in incorrect FCSPS interruption of customer load. This was due to a
problem in the RTU used to issue the trip signals. This problem has been addressed and monitoring
has been implemented to detect any further hardware problems.
There has only been one NCSPS operation and that was caused inadvertently by switching for
planned maintenance. Standard operating procedure requires that the NCSPS circuit-outage IDs
applicable to a transmission corridor should be disabled prior to switching a circuit in that corridor out
for maintenance.
3.1.2
Victoria to South Australia Interconnector
The first Victoria to South Australia (VIC-SA) interconnection is via a double circuit 500 kV line from
Moorabool (near Geelong) to Heywood near the South Australian border. This 500 kV line also
supplies a large smelter load of several hundred MW at Portland (near Heywood). The VIC-SA
interconnector had a rating of 500 MW. The loss of both 500 kV circuits could result in a loss of over
1000 MW of load from the Victoria system.
A system protection scheme was implemented so that a simultaneous outage of both 500 kV circuits
would result in tripping of a 500 MW generating unit at Loy Yang to limit the frequency rise in Victoria.
South Australia
275 kV
500 kV
Melbourne
Smelter
15 June 2009
Page 9
Version: 1
Figure 6 Victoria to South Australia interconnector
3.1.3
Snowy to Victoria Interconnector
Victoria relies on high generation import from the Snowy Mountain generation on hot summer days.
The transfer capacity from Snowy to Victoria can be increased if required by enabling a network
control SPS, installed in the late 1980s. This SPS trips a large industrial load in Victoria to prevent
circuit overloading if there is an outage of a 330 kV circuit between Snowy and Melbourne on the
Dederang to Murray transmission line.
The SPS reduces power flows into Victoria and permits the transmission corridor to operate above its
N-1 limit under normal system conditions. The scheme is only invoked under certain circumstances
to prevent pre-emptive load shedding that would otherwise be required to maintain the power system
in a secure operating state.
The SPS is enabled when the Victorian or South Australian regions of the Australian National
Electricity market fall into the condition of Lack of Reserve 2 (LOR2) meaning a situation:
when NEMMCO considers that the occurrence of the credible contingency event which has
the potential for the most significant impact on the power system is likely to require involuntary
load shedding. This would generally be the instantaneous loss of the largest generating unit
on the power system. Alternatively, it might be the loss of any interconnection under abnormal
conditions.
This scheme is further detailed in NEMMCOs 2008 Statement of Opportunities (3) under Network
Loading Control Ancillary Services, and provides 350 MW of service.
3.1.4
Tamar Valley Generator Contingency Scheme
A scheme, referred to as the Tamar Valley Generator Contingency Scheme, is being developed as
part of the establishment of a 209 MW Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) generator in northern
Tasmania. This generator will be owned and operated by AETV Power
The Australian Energy Market Commissions (AEMC) Reliability Panel carried out a review of the
Tasmanian frequency operating standards and issued a final report in December 2008 (4). The
revised Tasmanian frequency operating standards, along with tightening allowable frequency
excursions, specified the maximum effective generation contingency to be 144 MW.
The Reliability Panel conducted economic cost benefit analysis in arriving at the revised standards; in
particular, the decision included limiting market costs of procuring Frequency Control Ancillary Service
(FCAS). This was accomplished by requiring that any generator which could lose more than 144 MW
for a single credible contingent event must implement arrangements so that the impact of a
contingency would be no greater than 144 MW.
In order to connect to the network, the 209 MW CCGT will require the ability to interrupt load for a
CCGT trip whenever its output is greater than 144 MW. AETV will implement an SPS and will contract
with one or more large industrial customers to provide interruptible load for this scheme.
3.1.5
Western Sydney
TransGrid, the transmission network service provider for the State of New South Wales (NSW),
proposed in its 31 May 2008 Revenue Proposal (5) to the Australian Energy Regulator, stage four of a
500 kV transmission ring development encircling the Newcastle/Sydney/Wollongong load area. This
project is known as the Western 500 kV Conversion with a commissioning date in 2009/10. In
addition to network augmentation, the project includes network support from embedded generation
and contingent load reduction in the Newcastle/Sydney/Wollongong area.
15 June 2009
Page 10
3.1.6
Version: 1
NSW Import Capability from Snowy
TransGrid planning studies indicate that transmission constraints will occur on import, from southern
NSW, to the major load areas of Sydney, Wollongong and Newcastle following the commissioning of
the 640 MW, open-cycle; gas-fired Uranquinty Power Station (located approximately 500 km south
west of Sydney and 200 km west of Canberra).
To alleviate the constraints, TransGrid have proposed a scheme that would interrupt load in NSW and
trip generation south of Yass/Canberra. The generation participating in the scheme can be either
within the Snowy Mountains or in Victoria.
3.2
Run Back Schemes
Run back schemes can be delineated from SPS in that their action is aimed at alleviating localised
issues though reductions in generation or transmission circuit flows where they are controllable. Run
back schemes would probably be better characterised as transmission line loading controllers.
Australian examples that are outlined below include wind farm generation and a DC interconnector.
3.2.1
Woolnorth Wind Farm
The 140 MW wind farm in North Western Tasmania is connected to the Tasmanian power system via
a single circuit 110 kV transmission line. While the transmission line rating is determined dynamically;
that is, the rating is updated in real time based upon the prevailing weather conditions, there are times
when the available wind resource exceeds the transmission line capacity. Under such circumstances,
the output of the wind farm is limited to the transmission line dynamic capability through localised
generation control.
3.2.2
Eyre Peninsula Wind Farms
Unlike the Tasmanian example, there are two separately owned wind farms on the Eyre Peninsula in
South Australia that share a common transmission corridor, and at times the combined generation of
the wind farms can exceed the single transmission circuit capacity.
Under such circumstances, the respective generation from each wind farm output is limited to ensure
the transmission circuit thermal rating is not exceeded. Each wind farm output is reduced in relation to
its capacity to the combined wind farm capacity.
Historically, wind farms in Australia have had the ability to self dispatch. However, as the amount of
wind generation and intermittent generation has increased, network security management of the
National Electricity Market has become more complex, in particular; forecasting the required amount of
centrally controlled dispatchable generation.
As a consequence, the Australian National Electricity Market Rules have been recently amended. This
is to provide for semi-dispatchable generation under which intermittent generating systems are
required to make offers into the market and to follow dispatch instructions.
3.2.3
Murraylink Runback
Murraylink was commissioned in 2002 and comprises voltage sourced HVDC lite converters and
underground cables with a nominal capacity of 200 MW. It interconnects the Victorian 220/110 kV
terminal substation at Red Cliffs, to the South Australian Monash 132/66kV substation. Murraylink
was developed initially as a market network service provider (merchant link) but has since been
converted to a regulated interconnector.
15 June 2009
Page 11
Version: 1
ElectraNet, the State of South Australias transmission network service provider states, in its Annual
Planning Review (6), that the import capability into South Australia is 200 MW (for system normal
summer operating conditions). The capability of Murraylink to inject power into South Australia is
influenced by the ability of the Victorian transmission system to supply Murraylink. Under high load
conditions it is this factor that limits the amount of power that can be supplied into South Australia by
Murraylink.
Export capability from South Australia varies considerably as it is dependent on complex interactions
between load and generation across electrical regions within South Australia.
In its July 2003 submission to the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission on Murraylinks
Application for Conversion to a Prescribed Service (7), the South Australian Electricity Supply Industry
Planning Council noted that:
Unlike other parts of the interconnected network, Murraylink incorporates control schemes
that run back and trip Murraylink when incidents occur on either the South Australian or
Victorian transmission networks. The Planning Council notes in recent clarification by
Murraylink, that VENCorp require Murraylinks runback scheme to be triggered by outages of
any of a number of additional Victorian transmission lines, in order to achieve Murraylinks
claimed transfers.
The Murraylink run back scheme comprises:
a fast run back with an operating time of 200 milliseconds to 6 seconds that prevents:
voltage collapse in Victoria; and
thermal overloads in both South Australia and Victoria; and a
slow runback that results in partial run back after time delay in response to low voltages.
As Murraylink flows are controllable, its run back scheme is fairly unique in that it is not associated
with interruption of load or tripping of generation. As Murraylink effectively operates in parallel with
conventional AC interconnections, its runback simply results in the re-distribution of power flows in the
network.
3.3
Network Control Ancillary Services
In the Australian context, Network Control Ancillary Services (NCAS) are transmission network
services procured by NEMMCO that are critical to the maintenance of secure and reliable operation of
the power system. Additionally they also increase the power transfer capability of the transmission
network. The Australian National Electricity Rules (8) define NCAS as:
A service which provides NEMMCO with a capability to control the real or reactive power flow into
or out of a transmission network in order to:
a) maintain the transmission network within its current, voltage, or stability limits following a
credible contingency event; or
b) enhance the value of spot market trading in conjunction with the central dispatch process.
NCAS are currently procured and deployed by both Transmission Network Service Providers and
NEMMCO using the facilities provided by Registered Participants. They are categorised as:
Network Loading Control Ancillary Service (NLCAS); and
Reactive Power Ancillary Service (RPAS).
An NLCAS rapidly changes active power flow on transmission lines allowing short-term ratings to be
utilised. The benefit of NLCAS is that it allows greater utilisation of network capability. Without
NLCAS, pre-contingent flows would be limited to ensure more conservative short-term ratings were
15 June 2009
Page 12
Version: 1
not exceeded. Limiting pre-contingent flows can result in a supply shortfall and inappropriate load
shedding.
NEMMCO procures RPAS under contractual arrangements for ancillary services with appropriate
Registered Participants. This is to meet its obligation to maintain power system voltage conditions, so
that the power system remains in a satisfactory operating state following a contingency. Without
adequate RPAS, the power system would need to be operated more conservatively to avoid voltage
collapse. Depending on contingent event location, generation may need to be constrained, or a supply
shortfall could arise, resulting in inappropriate load shedding.
Currently, NEMMCO is conducting a review into NCAS, or as it is being more broadly termed Network
Support and Control Services (NCSC). The objective is to identify and address issues surrounding the
current arrangements for the procurement and delivery of NSCS by Transmission Network Service
Providers and NEMMCO. This review is further discussed in Appendix 3
15 June 2009
Page 13
Version: 1
APPLICATION OF SPS IN NEW ZEALAND
The predominant application for SPS in New Zealand appears to be for network control following an
outage of a critical circuit.
The actions of an SPS would be to trip generation behind a constraint to prevent line overloading or to
trip load to prevent line overloading or voltage instability. The issues associated with each of these
actions are discussed below.
4.1
Generic Applications
4.1.1
Tripping Generation
SPS are well suited where there is a need to operate a transmission corridor at more than its N-1
capacity, and when it is not economic to install additional transmission capacity. The SPS may be
feasible due to the intermittent or limited amount of time that the additional transmission capacity is
required and other generation is available to meet system peak demand.
Wind generation located remote from load centres and the transmission network is an obvious
application for SPS or runback schemes. In this scenario it may not be economic to provide the
transmission capacity to meet the full rating of the wind generation, given that it is likely to operate at
less than its full output most of the time.
If an SPS is implemented in relation to a particular network constraint it could potentially allow a higher
level of generation behind the constraint than if the transmission network was operated at N-1
capacity.
In the case of an SPS that, either trips or runs back generation, there will be a frequency deviation.
Other generation in the power system will need to pick up output to bring the frequency back to its
target value. It is important that other generating units behind the constraint do not contribute to this
increase in output as this has the potential to overload the relevant circuits.
The SPS design should include generating unit runback as an alternative to tripping where the time
response before transmission circuit integrity is compromised, is in minutes rather than seconds.
Hydro generation is particularly suited to this type of runback arrangement as a hydro unit can be
easily run down to zero output over the period of a minute. This will have less impact on the power
system than opening the generator circuit breaker.
4.1.2
Tripping Load
There may be a situation where a large customer plans to locate in a region such that the region peak
load cannot be supplied in the event of specific transmission contingencies. In this example the
customer may want to consider an SPS to interrupt customer load in the event of a relevant circuit
outage.
If the customer has a single load block or process, the SPS could be a simple intertrip system where
the trip of a relevant circuit directly trips the customer load. If the customer has multiple loads there
could be an optimisation algorithm that determines the amount of interrupt for the real time line
loading.
The first issue will be to identify customers that are willing to have their load tripped. This may be
either larger customers that have individual load blocks that can be interrupted, or smaller loads that
could be sourced through a demand aggregator. If loads are tripped to prevent circuit overloading or
voltage instability, the issue of how soon the load can be restored will need to be addressed. This will
depend on the type of load, how soon a customer would want to reconnect its load, and the ability of
the power system to supply the reconnected load without circuit overload or voltage instability.
15 June 2009
Page 14
Version: 1
Capacity for the load to be reconnected could be provided by increased generation dispatch on the
downstream side of the constraint, or by restoring an outaged line to service.
4.2
Existing Applications
It is noted that despite the requirements of Transpowers recent draft Transmission Code, which
appears to restrict SPS use in most situations, Transpower have many existing SPS and runback
schemes already in operation. Table 1 lists some of these existing SPS schemes.
Generation
Limit(Summer/Winter)
Constraint
Te Apiti wind
farm
Notes
BPE-WDV
110kV 1 or 2
Anchor
Generation
Karapiro
Generation
Karapiro generation is limited

to the capability of the
remaining circuit plus the
Hinuera and Te Awamutu load.
HAM_KPO 1 or
2
Anchor Generation is reduced

to zero following a contingency
of either the HAM_KPO 1 or 2
circuits
Manapouri
Generation
Generation limit of 775 MW
Transient
stability
Circuit outage intertrips

generator at local bus
Maraetai and
Waipapa
Generation
202/246 MW
MTI-WKM 1 or 2
Cobb
Generation
COB-STK 66 kV
1 or 2
Coleridge
Transient
stability
SPS trips all but one of the

large units at Coleridge
Table 1 Existing SPS and runback schemes in New Zealand

There is also a runback scheme on the HVDC link which can operate for either north flow or south flow
and is initiated by loss of North Island circuits or equipment in the Haywards area, or by loss of
communications between Haywards and Benmore.
This HVDC SPS will runback to a specified MW value depending on the number of interconnecting
transformers, condensers, or 220 kV circuits that are planned to be out of service (9) or tripped out of
service. It will also optimise the mix of static and dynamic reactive plant to suit the HVDC transfer
conditions. This is a very complex SPS and has apparently been operational and trouble free since
1991. It is likely that a similar scheme will have to be developed to accommodate the new HVDC pole
when this is proposed to be commissioned in 2012.
It is understood that Transpower has been obtaining experience with demand side response through a
trial being conducted in the South Island.
Meridian Energy also has a runback scheme for wind generation at White Hill in the southern South
Island which is connected to a grid exit point 70 km away by a 66 kV line (10).
15 June 2009
Page 15
4.3
Version: 1
Potential Applications
Some specific situations where an SPS could be implemented in New Zealand to relieve network
constraints are discussed below.
4.3.1
Wairakei Ring
The Wairakei Ring (Figure 7) consists of a loop of transmission lines with five transmission connection
points on the loop. This loop contains the connection points for existing generation and planned new
generation, with the power flow direction variable depending on the generation dispatch pattern.
Transpowers 2009 Annual Planing Report (11) notes that northward power flows could be constrained
during peak periods as early as 2010. The Electricity Commission recently approved a Transpower
grid upgrade plan involving a new double circuit 220 kV transmission line from Wairakei substation
with one circuit terminating at Whakamaru North substation and the other terminating at Whakamaru
substation (12).
The proposed commissioning date of this project is expected to be mid 2013. The project was
approved as an economic investment rather than a reliability investment. This indicates that there is
generation to the north of the Wairakei Ring that could be dispatched if generation to the south of the
Wairakei Ring was tripped by an SPS following a circuit outage.
An SPS could provide an economic option to increase the north transfer capacity in the period prior to
the planned new 220 kV circuits.
The circuits to be monitored by this SPS would be the 220 kV circuits in the loop and possibly some of
the circuits through the Bay of Plenty that form a parallel path to the Ohakuri-Atiamuri circuit.
Power system studies would be required to determine which generation would need to be tripped or
run back for each specific contingency. The generating units at Wairakei and Rangipo would provide
the greatest contribution to northward flow through the Wairakei Ring. These would likely be the
preferred generating units to be part of an SPS to increase north transfer capacity.
It is noted that there are plans for further generation in this area. This has the potential to create flow
constraints on parts of the loop even after the planned upgrade work. A Wairakei Ring SPS could
remain in service even after the transmission upgrade to provide increased transfer capacity for further
generation south of the ring.
15 June 2009
Page 16
Version: 1
Whakamanu
Ataimura
Ohakuri
Poihipi
Wairakei
Rangipo
Figure 7 Wairakei Ring 220kV transmission network
4.3.2
South Island
The Transpower Annual Planning Report 2009 considers South Island grid backbone planning issues
under the categories discussed below. This discussion is at a high level, based on information
contained in the Annual Planning Report 2009, and has not had the benefit of detailed analysis of
power system capabilities and generation demand scenarios.
Upper South Island and West Coast supply security
The Upper South Island and West Coast supply security relates to transmission north of Islington
substation to Kikiwa and associated radial extensions. The current Upper South Island demand
includes approximately 90 MW in the West Coast region plus 200 MW in the Nelson/Marlborough
region.
The Upper South Island region appears well served in terms of thermal transmission capacity with
1050/670 MVA (N / N-1), although due to the long distances involved is exposed to potential voltage
stability issues. Other than support from local generation and reactive compensation, another option
to cater for voltage issues would be to shed load under contingency. Given the present transmission
configuration it is likely that options other than load shedding could also provide a net market benefit.
Similarly, relatively low cost investments associated with mitigating very low probability, high impact
events are likely to provide a net market benefit.
North of Waitaki Valley to Christchurch
The current load in the Upper South Island is approximately 290 MW, with 820 MW demand in the
Canterbury region. The Canterbury region, which goes on to supply the Upper South Island, appears
well served in terms of thermal transmission capacity with 2,600/1,800 MVA (N / N-1) from Twizel and
Livingstone. However, similar to the Upper South Island region, there is potential for voltage stability
issues due to the long transmission distances involved.
15 June 2009
Page 17
Version: 1
Other than support from reactive compensation, another option to cater for voltage issues would be to
shed load under contingency. Given the present transmission configuration it is likely that options
other than load shedding could also provide a net market benefit.
Transmission capacity through the Waitaki Valley
The region between Livingstone and Twizel is characterised by minimal load, over 1,500MW of
installed hydro generation, and the connection at Benmore of the HVDC link between the South and
North Islands.
The Annual Planning Report 2009 states that for HVDC northward flow:
An outage of one of the 220 kV Aviemore - Benmore circuits may cause the remaining
Aviemore - Benmore circuit to overload during light and peak loads.
Constraining off Otago Southland generation and limiting HVDC north power flows will
alleviate this issue to some extent.
The summer/winter capability of each of the Aviemore - Benmore circuits is 202/246 MVA. It may be
possible to operate this transmission corridor at up to 190% of 202/246 MVA by implementing a
network control system protection scheme, which could trip generation and initiate run-back of
northward flow on the HVDC link, should a circuit contingency occur. That is, each line could be
operated at up to 95% of its rating and if an outage of one circuit occurred, NCSPS action would
reduce the loading of the other circuit to within its rating. This would enable much higher transfers
under normal system conditions.
This would require either:
a frequency controller on the HVDC link that provides fast runback of northward flow in
response to tripping of South Island generation along with prevention of frequency response of
South Island generation that could re-load the Aviemore - Benmore corridor;
constraining South Island generation that provides response to low frequency to locations that
do not re-load the Aviemore Benmore corridor; or
the SPS design over tripped generation to take account of any likely re-loading due to short
term generator frequency response.
Care would also need to be taken to operate the South Island system in such a way so that loss of
load in the South Island does not give rise to overloading of the Aviemore Benmore corridor resulting
from HVDC link frequency control action. The circumstances leading to such an overload would be:
HVDC Link operating in a northward direction.
loss of a large South Island load, resulting in:
the South Island system frequency would tend to rise due to the surplus of generation,
the HVDC link frequency controller would act to increase transfers from the South Island to the
North Island,
to support this increased transfer would require increased loading of the Aviemore Benmore
corridor.
The Annual Planning Report 2009 states for HVDC southward flow:
The 220 kV Aviemore - Benmore circuit will overload following an outage of the other Aviemore
- Benmore circuit; and
The 220 kV Benmore- Twizel circuit will overload following the loss or outage of either the
Aviemore Waitaki, or Ohau B Twizel or Ohau C Twizel circuits.
These issues depend on the amount of power being exported south .., and are presently
managed operationally by constraining on Otago Southland generation and limiting HVDC
south power flows.
15 June 2009
Page 18
Version: 1
The summer/winter capability of each of the Aviemore - Benmore circuits is 202/246 MVA and the
Benmore Twizel single circuit is 404/493 MVA. Operating the Aviemore - Benmore corridor precontingency above 202/246 MVA, that is, possibly operating each of the circuits as high as 95% of
202/246 MVA rather than the conventional 50% (meaning the corridor operates at 190% of its precontingency capability), and the Benmore Twizel single circuit near 95% of 404 MVA/493 MVA may
provide an opportunity for a NCSPS. This NCSPS would interrupt load for the loss of a circuit and
initiate run-back of HVDC link southward flow.
Such a scheme would have the added benefit of preserving hydro storages during low inflow or low
water storage situations.
Similar implementation issues to those discussed above for northward HVDC flows would apply but an
SPS would need to cater for the interruption of load rather than the tripping of generation.
Transmission capacity between Roxburgh and Waitaki Valley
For high Otago Southland generation (northward flow) the Annual Planning Report 2009 identifies:
thermal overload conditions including the outage of one of the:
two 220 kV Clyde Cromwell Twizel circuits, which may cause the remaining circuit to
overload; and/or cause the Livingstone Naseby Roxburgh circuit to overload; and/or
lead to dynamic stability; and/or
two 220 kV Clyde Roxburgh circuits, which may cause the remaining circuit to overload.
The Annual Planning Report 2009 also raises the potential for significant wind generation in this area
which would likely be connected into Roxburgh. The development of this generation has the potential
to exacerbate the amount of constrained off generation in the region. If the amount of wind generation
installed to the south of the constraint was such that it became economic to install a new transmission
circuit the SPS could then be extended to cover the new circuit.
The following analysis assumes that high export from Otago Southland generation gives rise to
either:
northward flow on the HVDC link that can be reduced or
there is a South Island frequency control service that increases generation without breaching
South Island transmission capability until re-dispatch returns South Island transmission to a
secure operating state.
The summer/winter capability of each of the Roxburgh - Clyde circuits is 347/382 MVA and the
Roxburgh Naseby Livingstone single circuit is 202/246 MVA. Operating the Roxburgh - Clyde
corridor above 347/382 MVA (190%) and the Roxburgh Naseby Livingstone single circuit near
202/246 MVA (95%) would appear to provide an opportunity to implement a network control system
protection scheme.
This SPS could operate on the basis that a circuit outage would trip generation south of Roxburgh and
initiate an HVDC northward flow run-back. Another option is that the response from an appropriately
located South Island frequency control service to increase generation. It is possible that a suitably
designed SPS could potentially increase the transfer capacity by over 300 MW.
In addition to exploiting wind generation opportunities this SPS could provide another benefit. The
SPS could reduce the amount of hydro spill that arises at Manapouri due to any demand reduction at
Tiwai and transmission constraints north of Roxburgh, that limit northward transfer capacity.
The generation capacity south of and including Roxburgh plus Clyde exceeds 1,500 MW. The peak
Otago Southland demand is 1,100 to 1,200 MW noting that New Zealand peak demands are usually
in winter and that the high hydro yield period is spring/summer. These statistics indicate that the
operation of the southern New Zealand transmission system and the reasons for constraints is
15 June 2009
Page 19
Version: 1
complex. As a consequence, to develop an SPS covering the transmission circuits north of Roxburgh
would require a detailed understanding of the power flows; in particular, flow directions.
Transmission capacity south of Roxburgh
The region south of Roxburgh is characterised by 750 MW of generation at Manapouri and a peak
demand of between 1,100 MW and 1,200 MW. The double circuit 220 kV line from Roxburgh to
Invercargill has minimal support from the regional transmission from Roxburgh via Three Mile Hill.
The constraint issues raised in the Annual Planning Report 2009 concern meeting regional demand
during low hydro yield periods, specifically low availability from Manapouri. An SPS associated with
the Roxburgh Invercargill circuits could permit increased southward flows. Following a transmission
line outage, demand would be interrupted either during a circuit outage or until generation from
Manapouri could be brought on line.
At a high level, the summer/winter capability of each of the Roxburgh Invercargill circuits is
347/382 MVA, giving an opportunity of increased transfer of about 300 MVA. This assumes that the
regional transmission via Three Mile Hill has second order implications and possibly a requirement for
voltage support from Manapouri.
The advantage of such a scheme would be to preserve high value hydro storage during low inflow
periods.
15 June 2009
Page 20
Version: 1
Twizel
Livingstone
Cromwell
Naseby
Clyde
Roxburgh
Manapouri
Three
Mile
Hill
North Makaewa
Invergargill
Tiwai
Figure 8 Lower South Island 220kV transmission network
15 June 2009
Page 21
Version: 1
REVIEW OF SPS SECTIONS OF TRANSPOWER TRANSMISSION CODE
This section provides a review of Section 3 and Appendix A of the preliminary issue of the Transpower
Transmission Code dated 4 March 2009 (13).
5.1
Definition of an SPS
The first point that needs to be clarified is the definition of an SPS. Transpower has broadly defined
SPS to include:
Conventional power system controls that are deployed as a matter of course these controls
support normal operation of the power system and act in isolation from each other in
response to local power system conditions that arise from both normal operations and
disturbances.
Defence plans are about minimising the impact of multiple simultaneous contingencies and
plans for restoring the system following a major disturbance. Some of the cited tools are
normal defence plan practice; however, some of the items listed would appear not to be
defence plans; for example, power swing blocking is to prevent operation of distance
protection schemes and others appear to be more about re-building a power system following
a major incident.
Conventional power system controls and defence plans cater for particular circumstances and perform
specific roles. They should not be confused with SPS that are designed to respond to a particular
contingency event or set of contingency events. The following power system applications are not
system protection schemes.
Fast response excitation and discrete excitation control
Power system stabilisers
HVDC control and protection
Generator dynamic braking
Static and dynamic reactive compensation
Automatic switching of reactive compensation
Controlled line switching
Tap changer blocking
System main and backup protection
Pole slipping protection
Automatic reclosing
Power swing blocking
Tie line tripping
The Code could benefit from limiting discussion in the main body to the prime purpose of an SPS
being to:
provide a method of maintaining or enhancing transmission system performance without the
requirement for additional reinforcement.
An alternative definition of an SPS that does not limit their application is:
An SPS is a protection system designed to enhance transmission system capacity without the
need for additional reinforcement by protecting power system assets or the power system in
15 June 2009
Page 22
Version: 1
response to a specific contingency or in response to a power system moving outside

acceptable parameters.
5.2
Specific Comments on Code
Generally the Transpower Transmission Code (Code) provides at a high level a framework for the
deployment of Special Protection Schemes (SPS) and a basis for their inclusion in economic analysis
of transmission investment options.
The intention of the Code is to:
define the practices, judgements, and standards that Transpower considers reflect GEIP in
relation to the matters set out in the Code. These practices, judgements, and standards have
been determined with reference to good international practice and consideration and analysis
of the New Zealand context. They reflect what Transpower considers would reasonably be
expected from a skilled and experienced owner and manager of New Zealands transmission
grid.
Further enhancements to the Code should be considered to assist deliver the stated intentions of the
Code and assist Transpower meet its Electricity Governance Rules (EGRs) obligation that
transmission investment options reflect good electricity industry practice.
Section 3.2 of the Code identifies circumstances under which an SPS could be deployed. There
would appear to be a mixture of implementation of operational procedures to cater for short term
operational requirements and SPS that meet the prime purpose.
It should be recognised that proper implementation of an SPS requires very careful planning, analysis,
design, liaison, development, testing and commissioning. Even a relatively simple SPS may take at
least 9 months to implement with longer times as the complexity and the number of parties involved
increases. There should be a distinction between an SPS and an interim operational procedure.
Section 3.3 of the Code discusses circumstances under which an SPS will be acceptable. The
following requirement would appear contrary to proven practice elsewhere.
Only schemes that would have a low impact on failure are acceptable. SPSs that would
have a high impact on failure are unacceptable
Following proper process and procedures in accordance with good electricity industry practice is
mandatory for the implementation of any SPS not only those that have the potential for wide spread
impacts. Experience internationally indicates that complex SPS with potential for wide spread impacts
can be implemented successfully and relied upon to perform as designed.
The cited exclusions would appear to be too narrow and restrictive in general an SPS should be in
service at all times to avoid unnecessary operator supervision and manual intervention.
Section 3.4, Risk assessment, aims to calculate expected probability of failure and the consequences.
It is not clear what this will provide and what decisions would arise from the analysis.
Part of the implementation process must be to undertake a comprehensive risk consequence
analysis and to have in place strategies for dealing with or at least a clear understanding of the
consequences. In particular alternative methods of meeting demand, back-up schemes, defence
schemes, and system restoration processes should be established and tested.
Section 3.5, Design Principles, generally outlines principles that are sound and can be converted into
design standards.
The principles include anticipate the specific power system conditions. It should be realised that
SPS are not forward looking - their operational actions should be based on the prevailing power
15 June 2009
Page 23
Version: 1
system conditions. However, the SPS design should be able to cater for future changes to the power
system, for example, transmission augmentations and changes to generation and demand patterns.
The meaning of, but must not use SCADA to detect system conditions that require operation in real
time is unclear and should be further explained if retained in the final Code. This could be associated
with using SCADA to deliver trip signals. The Basslink SPS uses Transends SCADA system and
communications to provide both real time operational data for the algorithms and to receive circuit
breaker status signals. However the Basslink loss-of-link signals and load and generation tripping
signals are transferred using tele-protection signalling equipment. .
It would be advantageous to have a maximum of two high level design principles and articulate a set
of design standards so that a proponent of an SPS clearly understands expectations of SPS
architecture and hence performance.
The principles could be:
reliability
robustness against future developments.
The following design standards could apply to SPS:
maximum operating time relevant to the situation;
designed, maintained, and operated to the same standard as protection systems;
have duplicate hardware and communications with route diversity to the extent possible;
have diagnostic and self-check features to detect and raise an alarm and disable action when
essential components fail or critical functions or inputs are not operational;
be totally independent of the operation of any other SPS;
not interrupt load or generation unless there is an agreement with or regulatory obligation for
that customer or generator to be part of the SPS;
may use SCADA to detect system conditions in order to determine post-contingency actions;
initiating signals may be derived from either protection or SCADA systems;
in general there should be duplicate initiating signals; and
not require frequent (routine) manual intervention (e.g. re-configuration of the SPS).
Appendix A.1 states SPSs can.. be implemented quickly.

As indicated above, it takes considerable time to implement an SPS; however, they can be
implemented in a shorter time frame than transmission line augmentations but probably in the same
time as adding a transformer to a substation.
Appendix A.1 states SPSs are not always highly reliable.
SPS must be and can be implemented with very high availability, reliability and predictability of
operation. This requirement must be the basic design principle and expressly catered for in every
consideration as the consequences of incorrect SPS operation can be wide spread.
Appendix A.5.1 deems SPS to be unsuccessful when they encounter system conditions that they
were not designed to protect against (and therefore fail to operate).
This is not a failure of the SPS. This is a failure of the dispatch process. The actions of an SPS form
part of the technical envelope of the power system within which the power system operator MUST
operate the power system. Operation of the power system outside the technical envelope would most
likely be a breach of the System Operator obligations.
15 June 2009
Page 24
Version: 1
Power system operators require assurance that they can rely on the SPS to perform to expectations
so that they can meet their regulatory obligations regarding maintaining the power system in a secure
operating state. As part of this, power system operators require descriptions of the SPS objective and
the permissible power system technical operating envelope. These are an important part of the
process so that the power system operator can integrate the actions of the SPS into constraint
equations used in the market dispatch algorithm. This ensures that power system conditions outside
of the operating design envelope of the SPS should not occur.
The relevance of Appendix A.5.2 is not clear other than to try and convey the false impression that
SPS are inherently unreliable. It is recognised that SPS can be complex; however, the Code should
recognise that complexity does not preclude successful implementation. The Basslink SPS has been
successfully implemented in Tasmania. The Basslink NCSPS monitors 18 circuits and covers 40
separate circuit outage cases. The Basslink FCSPS has operated successfully in excess of 30 times.
The scheme now operates in the back ground with minimal supervision and is relied upon by asset
owner operators and the power system operator for meeting its power system security obligations.
The statement that:
it is a recognised hazard that this degradation can occur without the system operator being
aware of the risks being incurred. Maintenance, testing, and extension of complex SPSs can
be particularly problematic
can be seen as an admission of failure of due process and procedures and is not a failure of the SPS.
Implementation of any new protection scheme requires coordination with existing schemes and the
need to follow established processes. Ideally, SPS should be based upon regions and minimise
overlaps of operation. Where there are overlaps then they must be clearly documented and
coordinated.
Similarly the statement that:
SPSs are inherently difficult to test, so that even with comprehensive maintenance it is
difficult to confirm their overall functionality
is not without challenge. SPS must go through comprehensive equipment acceptance tests, precommissioning and commissioning testing requiring proper coordination and planning. The comment
would appear to be only true for so called defence schemes where desk top testing and process
exercises are appropriate. There is no reason that a properly designed SPS can not be tested at least
as easy as normal power system protection.
15 June 2009
Page 25
Version: 1
SUMMARY
System Protection Schemes should be considered as an essential tool for transmission companies in
maximising network utilisation.
New applications for SPS in New Zealand are likely to be for network control rather than frequency
control.
The constraints on the existing Transpower network and the increasing amount of renewable energy
generation with low capacity factors provides potential opportunities to implement SPS as an effective
method of increasing transfer capacity in specific areas.
15 June 2009
Page 26
Version: 1
GLOSSARY
Acronyms
ACCC
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
AEMC
Australian Energy Market Commission
AEMO
Australian Energy Market Operator
AER
Australian Energy Regulator
AFMA
Australian Financial Markets Association
AIG
Australian Industry Group
ASX
Australian Securities Exchange
BCA
Business Council of Australia
BSPS
Basslink System Protection Scheme
CB
Circuit breaker
CCGT
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
COAG
Council of Australian Governments
DNP3
Distributed Network Protocol
ENA
Energy Networks Association
EPC
Engineer Procure and Construct (contract)
ESAA
Energy Supply Association of Australia
EUAA
Energy Users Association of Australia
FAT
Factory Acceptance Testing
FCAS
Frequency Control Ancillary Services
FCSPS
Frequency Control System Protection Scheme
MCE
Ministerial Council on Energy
MUX
Multiplexer
MW
Megawatt
NCAS
Network Control Ancillary Services
NCSC
Network Control Support Scheme
NCSPS
Network Control System Protection Scheme
NEMMCO
National Electricity Market Management Company Ltd
NGF
National Generators Forum
NLCAS
Network Loading Control Ancillary Services
OPGW
Optical Fibre Ground Wire
RPAS
Reactive Power Ancillary Services
RTU
Remote Terminal Unit
SAT
Site Acceptance Testing
SCADA
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SO
System Operator
15 June 2009
Page 27
SPS
System Protection Scheme
TNSP
Transmission Network Service Provider
TPS
Tele-Protection Signalling
UFLS
Under Frequency Load Shedding
Version: 1
Definitions
Basslink
An HVDC interconnection between Tasmanian and mainland Australia
operational data
Status indications, analogue values and control commands
frequency control
ancillary services
Services that are used by the System Operator to maintain power system
frequency within the specified limits. FCAS raise services are used to
increase the frequency when if falls below the nominal value. FCAS
lower services are used to reduce the frequency when it rises above the
nominal value.
generator reduction
ratio
The amount of reduction in circuit loading provided by a 1 MW decrease

in generator output
post-contingency
current
The current flowing in a circuit following an outage of another circuit
pre-contingency
current
The current flowing in a circuit prior to an outage of another circuit
15 June 2009
Page 28
Version: 1
REFERENCES
1
Strong D, The Basslink System Protection Scheme, The eesa 2007 Residential School in
Electric Power Engineering, February 2007.
Green M, Integration of Basslink into the Tasmanian Power System, The esaa 2007
Residential School in Electric Power Engineering, February 2007.
NEMMCO, Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity Market, NEMMCO,

October 2008
AEMC Reliability Panel, Tasmanian Frequency Operating Standard Review, Final Report,
AEMC, 18 December 2008
TransGrid, Meeting Customer Needs , TransGrid Revenue Proposal 1 July 2009 30 July
2014, TransGrid, 31 May 2008
ElectraNet, Annual Planning Review 2008 2028, ElectraNet, May 2008
Electricity Supply Industry Planning Council, MTC Application for Conversion to a

Prescribed Service, Submission to the ACCC, ESIPC, July 2003
Australian Energy Markets Commission, National Electricity Rules
Transpower, HVDC: Bipole operating policy, TP.OG 48.02, Issue 4, July 2007
10
Brown R, Wind Generators Evolving Technology, Presentation by Meridian Energy, April

2008
11
Transpower, Annual Planning Report 2009, Transpower, March 2009,

www.transpower.co.nz
12
Electricity Commission, Reasons for Decision set out in Notice of Intention to approve
Transpowers Wairakei Ring Investment Proposal, Electricity Commission, 20 February
2009
13
Transpower Transmission Code, Preliminary Draft, Transpower 4 March 2009,

www.transpower.co.nz
14
NEMMCO, Statement of Opportunities for the National Electricity Market, NEMMCO,

October 2007
15
System Operations Planning and Performance, Final Determination Standard for Power
System Data Communications, Version No 1.2, NEMMCO, 7 April 2005,
www.nemmco.com.au
16
NEMMCO, Network Control Ancillary Service Description (NCAS Description), Version

1.0, 25 February 2008
17
NEMMCO, Review of Network Control & Support Services Draft determination report,
12 January 2009, http://www.nemmco.com.au/powersystemops/168-0105.pdf
Kema Limited, Technical Standards and Good Industry Practice Stage 1 Executive
Report, Transpower, 2 October 2008.
Kema Limited, Technical Standards and Good Industry Practice Stage 1 Technical
References, Transpower, 2 October 2008.
15 June 2009
Page 29
Version: 1
APPENDIX 1 AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRY STRUCTURE

The Australian electricity industry has been restructured over the last twenty years from government
owned monopolies to a mix of government and private ownership.
There is a National Electricity Market covering the interconnected jurisdictions of Queensland, New
South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. The National
Electricity Market Management Company Limited (NEMMCO) was established to be the market and
system operator. NEMMCO has overall responsibility for system operation, power system security
and market operation. NEMMCO delegates some of its system operator functions to transmission
network service providers.
As a result of re-organising the overall management and governance of the Australian energy markets,
a new entity, the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has been formed and from 1 July 2009
will take over the functions of NEMMCO and provide for the amalgamation of gas and electricity
markets.
Each State has a main transmission network service provider that has its own control centre which
provides the interface between NEMMCO and participants such as generators, transmission
connected customers and other network service providers in that State.
A network service provider, either transmission or distribution, will enter a Connection Agreement with
any Participant wanting to connect to the transmission network. Within a framework of automatic,
minimum and negotiated access standards, the network service providers, in consultation with
NEMMCO, are responsible for setting the technical conditions that the Participant has to comply with
in relation to the proposed generation or load.
ACCC
Jurisdictions
COAG
MCE
Committees
Working Groups
Industry organisations
Grid Australia
ESAA
ENA
ERAA
NGF
Jurisdictional
Regulators
AER
AEMC
NEMMCO/AEMO
Industry participants
Generators
Retailers
Network service providers
Traders
Other organisations
Customer organisations
EUA
BCA
AIG
Customers
ASX
AFMA
Figure 9 Electricity industry regulatory framework in Australia
15 June 2009
Page 30
Version: 1
NEMMCO
(SCADA)
Transmission
Network (RTU)
Generation
Control Centre
(SCADA)
Transmission
Control Centre
(SCADA)
Transmission
connected customer
(RTU)
Power Station
(RTU)
Power Station
(RTU)
Figure 10 Operational data flows in the Australian National Electricity Market
Region
Maximum
Demand
Queensland
Generation
(14)
8,677
11,167
14,274
13,322
150
3,509
10,415
8,363
South Australia
3,331
3,734
Tasmania
1,760
2,521
New South Wales

Snowy
Victoria
Table 2 Electricity supply and demand in the Australian National Electricity Market
System
operator
TNSP
Transmission
owner
State
Comment
VENCorp
Vic
Planning
Powerlink
Qld
TransGrid
NSW
Transend
Tas
Electranet
SA
Basslink
Vic-Tas
HVDC interconnector
Murraylink
Vic-SA
HVDC interconnector
Directlink
NSW
HVDC interconnector
Energy Australia
NSW
transmission and distribution
Country Energy
NSW
Vic
SP-AusNet
Table 3 Transmission Network Service Providers in the NEM
15 June 2009
Page 31
Version: 1
Queensland
Brisbane
Directlink
New South Wales
South
Australia
Murraylink
Sydney
Adelaide
Snowy
Victoria
Melbourne
Basslink
Tasmania
Base map data sourced from Geoscience Australia
Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia)
Hobart
Figure 11 National Electricity Market Interconnectors
15 June 2009
Page 32
Version: 1
APPENDIX 2 SPS IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

A2.1
Introduction
This appendix provides an outline of the process for implementation of a SPS and the issues that
need to be addressed.
A2.2
Functional Specification
A functional specification will set out the functional requirements for an SPS and should ideally cover
Algorithms and logic;
Operating time;
Reliability;
Availability;
SCADA requirements;
Software;
User interface;
Data archive; and
Performance reporting.
A2.2.1 Reliability
High reliability is essential for an SPS as this may be a front line protection scheme, and in some
cases it may be expected to operate multiple times per year. The system operator must have
confidence that an SPS will operate correctly when required so that the system can be dispatched on
the basis of SPS action
This generally requires full duplication of tripping circuits and equipment, with route diverse
communication to the extent possible.
The system should have a high level of monitoring with alarm indication of any failures. This will
ensure that the system operator is aware of any failure and can take the appropriate action.
A2.2.2 Availability
In most cases an SPS will be in service at all times and will be expected to have a very high
availability. The requirement for high availability will influence the design in terms of the reliability of
the hardware selected, the software platform, redundancy and spares.
A2.2.3 SCADA System

If an SPS is required to calculate actions dynamically then any SCADA system from which it is using
operational data must have a high performance and reliability. It is also recommended that it should
use a robust communications protocol such as DNP3.
15 June 2009
Page 33
Version: 1
A reliable and robust SCADA system for power system operation must be considered good electricity
industry practice for any transmission network system operator. Problems with the SCADA system or
RTUs have the potential to significantly impact power system and market operations.
The SCADA system should have duplication, with hot or warm standby for rapid failover in the event of
a server failure. The SCADA system also needs a function to monitor operational data quality. This
function needs to be able to flag bad quality data that fails to update, and any analogues that are
considered outside reasonable limits.
NEMMCO 6 introduced a standard for power system data communications (15) to address the problem
of operational data performance. This puts an obligation on all parties responsible for operational data
to meet the specified availability and latency requirements.
The rules for SPS status during a SCADA system outage will need to be specified.
A2.2.4 Software
Software will be required to implement any algorithms and logic. This software is likely to require
operational data from a SCADA system as the basis for the calculation of potential actions. The
software can either run on a SCADA system or on an Intelligent Electronic Device at either a
substation or control centre.
The advantage of software running on the SCADA server is that it can be monitored and alarmed to
indicate SPS software problems.
The SPS will need to run frequently enough to change its potential actions to match the changing
power system conditions. A typical SCADA scan cycle is four seconds, and this should be a suitable
time for the SPS software to run adequately.
A2.2.5 Operator User Interface

It is essential that the control centre operators have good visibility of the SPS. This requires the
development of screens that present a clear and concise picture of SPS status. The minimum
requirement will be a screen which shows the status of the SPS software and hardware, generating
units or load blocks that are selected for SPS action, and status to indicate SPS action.
A2.2.6 Data Archive

It is likely that the system operator or owner of the SPS will want to verify that the SPS acted correctly
following a power system contingency. Input and output data from each SPS calculation should be
archived to allow for analysis of any SPS calculation and operation.
A2.2.7 Performance Standard

The performance standard for an SPS will depend on any contractual obligations on the parties
involved in the SPS.
Where the SPS is owned and operated by one party for the benefit of another, the party receiving the
benefit will want some contractual obligations on the SPS operator of the SPS to ensure that it has a
suitable level of reliability and availability. The performance requirements may include:
overall availability
component availability
National Electricity Market Management Company Ltd http://www.nemmco.com.au
15 June 2009
Page 34
time to repair failed component; and
operational data availability.
Version: 1
A2.3 Technical Specification

The preparation of a technical specification may be undertaken by the proponent or a contractor engaged to
engineer, procure and construct the SPS (EPC contractor). The technical specification will set out the
requirements for hardware and communication to meet the functional specification.
A2.3.1
Hardware and Communications
The extent of the SPS hardware will be determined by the functional requirements such as SPS operating
time and reliability. The communications will depend on the functional requirements, particularly the time
taken to execute a trip signal, from an originating event, to the load or generation to be tripped.
The operating time for a frequency control SPS is generally critical and will typically be in the order of a few
hundred milliseconds. There is generally more time for a network control SPS, particularly if it is protecting
against thermal overload of transmission assets. Operating times for network control SPS can typically be in
the order of seconds to minutes.
There are various suppliers that can provide signalling units that can send a trip signal between remote
locations in a few milliseconds. The timing depends on the signal bandwidth and the number of intervening
devices such as multiplexers.
Faster communication times can be obtained with higher bandwidth communications. However, generally
communication time is likely to be a small percentage of the overall operating time. Fault detection, trip relay
and CB operating times will all have a greater influence on the overall SPS operating time.
A2.4 Due Diligence

A system operator needs to understand the range of possible power system conditions that will result
following SPS operation, and be confident that the power system will remain in a satisfactory operating state
after that operation.
When the SPS design has been established the network service provider or system operator will generally
carry out its own power system studies.
A2.5 Risk Analysis

As SPS operation can have power system wide implications an evaluation of the consequences of all
possible incorrect operation and coincident system incidents and actions should be undertaken. This
analysis not only provides and understanding of the risks associated with the SPS but also gives guidance
as to the need for or otherwise and reliance upon other protection schemes or back-up schemes. Such
schemes include under frequency load shedding, over frequency generation tripping and transmission circuit
over current protection.
Some of the types of issues that should be evaluated include:
failure of SPS action initiation signals;
failure of load interrupt or generation tripping signals;
coincident SPS action triggering events; and
SPS action triggering events coincident with cyclic arming updates.
15 June 2009
Page 35
A2.6
Version: 1
Testing
Testing is an essential process to demonstrate the performance of both individual SPS components
and overall system.
An SPS will involve multiple parties. At a minimum an SPS will involve the transmission network
owner and a generator or customer. In some cases it will involve multiple generators and customers.
Testing of an SPS may be more complicated than other power system projects due to the number of
parties and sites involved. It may not be possible to do a complete end to end test of an SPS as there
may be no operation that involves all elements of a scheme. However, the tests must be designed
and carried out to prove each individual element of the SPS, and also all the interfaces between
elements.
The Factory Acceptance Testing (FAT) is normally carried out to prove the hardware and software
before equipment is installed. Test cases for the software should be developed to test each possible
outcome of each step in a logic diagram. A version of the software may be developed in a
spreadsheet and this can be used to check the software developed by the contractor providing the
SPS. Any defects in the hardware or software should be identified during FAT and rectified prior to
site installation.
The assets of any customer or generator providing interruptibility services must also be tested. In
particular the timing of trip relays and circuit breakers must be tested to ensure that they confirm to the
performance requirements.
When the hardware and software has been installed at the various sites, Site Acceptance Testing
(SAT) is carried out to prove the installation, communications circuits and interfaces between the
various elements. SAT can also be used to test the rectification of any issues identified during FAT.
The system operator or network service provider may require live tests of the SPS to be carried out to
provide confirmation of the SPS itself, or the impacts of SPS operation on the power system.
Stage
Tests
Comment
Objectives
Initiation signal testing
Component testing
Carried out at factory or

customer/generator site
Factory acceptance
testing
Carried out at factory
Remote asset
commissioning
Wiring, trip relay and CB operating

time
Operational data
Validate analogue values, status

indications, alarms and sequence of
events records
Site acceptance
testing
Soak testing
Live tests
Confirm timing and any logic
End to end test to the

extent possible
Hardware configuration and

performance, software performance
Prove installation, communications

circuits and interfaces
Impacts on SCADA system operation.
Software performance during power
system incidents
May be important if
size of SPS action is
significant in relation to
system
Demonstrate power system impacts
Table 4 Test steps
15 June 2009
Page 36
A2.7
Version: 1
Documentation
The owner and operator of the SPS should have a full set of SPS documentation, which needs to
include the following.
Functional Specifications;
Technical Specifications;
As Built Drawings;
Hardware instruction manuals;
Hardware configuration files;
Software sore code;
Hardware management software;
Test Plans;
Test Reports; and
Certificates.
A2.8
Training
There are a number of stakeholders that will require training in relation to the SPS. These
stakeholders include:
Operators;
Asset owners; and
Interruptibility service providers.
The training will include:
Concept and overview of the SPS;
Operator displays and interaction ;
Software configuration; and
Hardware maintenance and configuration.
A2.9
Go Live Process
When the testing has been completed and any issues arising from testing that would impact on live
operation have been resolved, the SPS may be signed off as ready for live operation.
A procedure is also required to move from a test condition, where trip links will be open, to a live
condition where all trip links are closed.
There should be a procedure or checklist to ensure that all the necessary signed documentation has
been received by the relevant parties.
15 June 2009
Page 37
Version: 1
A2.10 Power System Operation

A2.10.1 Power System Security
The correct operation of an SPS when a trigger event occurs is essential to maintaining power system
security. The system operator must be aware of the status of an SPS when dispatching the system.
The most effective way of ensuring that the status of any SPS is taken into account during dispatch is
by using the SPS status in a constraint equation.
If an SPS is always operationally live, the status will be continually updated in the SO SCADA system.
If an SPS is only enabled at specific locations, there is still benefit in having the status indications in
the SCADA system so that a failure of any element is alarmed at the time the failure occurs.
A2.10.2 Contingency Analysis

The contingency analyser used by the system operator must include any SPS so that any analysis
reflects SPS operation.
A2.11 Maintenance and Upgrades

It is important that the operator has confidence of the performance of an SPS. In most instances the
equipment should have high reliability and maintenance should be minimal.
There may be some situations where it is appropriate to carry out routine maintenance or inspect the
hardware on a regular basis. If there is full duplication of the equipment one of the two paths can be
taken out of service for maintenance while the SPS remains in service with a single path.
It may also be necessary to upgrade an SPS from time to time. This may be for an upgrade to the
software or hardware, or may be the addition of a new interruptibility service provider. In this instance
it may be necessary to have a procedure that allows site acceptance tests to be carried out on a new
generating unit or load with the SPS running on the live SCADA system.
A2.12 Project Management

Project management of the implementation of a SPS is even more critical than the project
management of a transmission line or substation project due to the number of different parties
involved.
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show a generic flowchart of the process for development and implementation
of a system protection scheme. The development of any actual scheme will vary depending on the
scope of the SPS, the parties involved, and the implementation time frame.
15 June 2009
Page 38
Version: 1
SPS concept
development
SPS
initiation
signal spec
Identify
interruptibility
providers
Agreement in
Principle
Develop
Functional
Specification
Power
system
studies
Draft project
plan and
budget
Draft
Functional
Specification
Op
Data
req
PSS/E
model
Commercial
negotiations
Develop
Project Plan
Due
Diligence
Implement
SPS
signal
Hardware
contract
Final Functional
Specification
Test SPS
signal
Gen/Cust
Contract
Tender
process
Software
contract
Comms
Contract
Hardware
procure
and
construct
Hardware
testing
Factory
Acceptance Test
Plan
Gen/Cust
installation
testing
Software
develop
ment
Hardware
test plan
Gen/Cust site
works
Gen/Cust
installation
test report
Technical
specification
Final project
plan and
budget
Factory acceptance
testing
Comms
installation
FAT report
Figure 12 SPS development process sheet A
15 June 2009
Page 39
Gen/Cust
site
installation
SAT
Plan
Develop
constraint
equations
Version: 1
Gen/Cust
installation
commisisoning
Installation
at central
location
Data
archive
and
access
Training
and
Procedures
Gen/Cust
assets report
Site
Acceptance
Testing
Develop Go
Live process
Soak
testing
Constraint
equations
SAT
Report
Go Live
process and
Documentation
Go Live
Issue
Resolution
Live tests (if

required)
Figure 13 SPS development process sheet B
A2.13 Stakeholder Management and Commercial Issues

The introduction and deployment of SPS within a power system requires careful setting, meeting and
management of all stakeholder expectations. An SPS project involves a coalition of a number of
parties with a common objective but a range of their own specific issues and concerns that need to be
addressed. Security, reliability, availability, and quality of electricity supply are increasingly crucial to
modern economies as they become more reliant on technology and anything that adversely impacts
will rapidly erode confidence in management capability.
15 June 2009
Page 40
Version: 1
It is not only technical issues such as generator and consumer access to electricity networks with
minimal constraints that need to be taken into account but also policy setting makers expectations
regarding meeting the challenge of issues as broad as the impacts of global warming and terms and
conditions of commercial arrangements between all parties involved in the delivery of a SPS.
To ensure successful deployment of SPS stakeholder management at all levels begins at the
conceptual stage of development and does not conclude until the SPS have operated successfully.
Unsuccessful or partially successful operation of an SPS, either technically or commercially, is not an
acceptable outcome with the potential for completely undermining the confidence of all stakeholders in
entity management and the ability of the SPS to either meet expectations or efficiently increase the
technical operating envelope of the power system.
The stakeholders can be categorised broadly under the following groups with Figure 14 showing the
stakeholders and their relationships.
policy makers covering government ministers, departments, and regulators;
industry representative and lobby organisations;
investment decision makers and asset operators covering generators, large consumers, and
transmission network owners;
retailers;
market and power system operators and managers; and
suppliers.
SYSTEM PROTECTION SCHEME

STAKEHOLDERS
Government
Departments
Market & Power System

Operators & Managers
Policy Makers
Regulators
Consumers
Generators
Investors
Industry
Representatives
Transmission
Owners
Retailers
Suppliers
Insurers
Financiers
Figure 14 SPS Stakeholders and relationships

The list of stakeholders is quite broad and each will need to be managed at different stages of the
introduction of SPS. The party responsible for managing individual stakeholders and at when that
takes place should be established at an early stage. It should be recognised that stakeholders can
have a dual role of being also stakeholder manager. In fact, the stakeholder and manager roles can
be reversed as the development process progresses.
15 June 2009
Page 41
Version: 1
A2.13.1 Policy Makers

Policy makers interests lie in the areas of ensuring that the appropriate incentives and processes are
in place for the delivery of goods and services at a quality and price that furthers broader community
economic development. Establishing an environment in which public and industry perceptions are that
policy settings are appropriate is essential to successful implementation of changed approaches to
delivery of services; particularly in situations where a cost service level optimisation has been
implemented.
Governance of the decision making process needs to be well understood, clearly allocating
responsibilities and accountabilities, and delineating between rule setting and rule compliance
oversight.
The key elements for policy makers are essentially:
How does it support the policy settings and objectives?
How will it improve or be different from the current situation?
How does it enhance the environment for investment?
What are the impacts on the wholesale market and trading?
What introduced risks are there and how are they managed?
Why do we need to take this approach?
What are the benefits and who are the beneficiaries?
What are the costs (financial and service levels) and who bears them?
How are the costs recovered?
The key to success is to establish the processes for communicating and developing relationships with
policy makers and their advisers. The communication issues that should be considered include:
What are the forums to liaise?
Who is involved in the forums?
What are the levels of communication?
By what methods are messages delivered and any issues or concerns allayed?
Who will deliver the messages?
By their nature, managing and operating electricity markets and power systems is highly technical with
its own unique concepts, language and jargon. As a result it is very easy to convey mixed messages
to policy makers and to instil an atmosphere of uncertainty and moves toward safety and retention of
the status quo.
Conveying highly technical based information in a non-technical environment in a readily understood
and digestible format without introducing misconceptions requires careful consideration and the ability
to have open and two way communications.
A2.13.2 Industry Representatives

Industry representatives to a large extent have similar if not the same issues as policy makers but with
emphasis on the particular sectors that they represent. Experience indicates that representative
concerns are largely around impacts on costs of service provision, from whom costs are recovered
and quantity and quality of service delivered.
Industry representatives have strong linkages back to policy makers hence common forums and
methods of message delivery and liaison can be beneficial.
15 June 2009
Page 42
Version: 1
A2.13.3 Investors
The category of investors includes generators, large industrial consumers and transmission asset
owners Transpower. It is within this grouping that SPS implementation stage efforts are
concentrated following the establishment of the policy settings and operational rules. Within the
investor category technical and commercial issues are resolved and contractual relationships are
established.
Generators seeking access to the power system make locational decisions based on a number of
inputs covering energy source availability and cost, cost of technology to utilise the energy source,
cost and availability of supporting services, and the level and cost of access to the power system.
Transmission connection and access issues are not generally the main determinant for generation
locational decisions. SPS do provide the opportunity to offer a lower cost of connection at an
acceptable level of access to the power system commensurate with any hedging arrangements with
retailers or consumers.
Similar arguments applicable to generators also apply to new entrant large industrial consumers and
existing consumers seeking increments to their demand. The differences being:
exposure to spot markets can, in addition to management through financial or physical

delivery contracts with generators, be managed through load demand participation and
profiling in the wholesale market. This participation can be manual in response to pricing
signals or automated in response to power system access constraints or contingency events.
consumer value of unsupplied energy can significantly exceed the prevailing spot price and
hence consumers have strong incentives for the duration of the demand response to be
minimised and assurances of maximum supply restoration times
Generators and customers can both be either beneficiaries of an SPS or participate in delivery of the
services required to support the SPS. Benefits accrue through power system access arrangements
and participation is through provision of trippable or run-back generation and interruptible loads.
The benefits of an SPS can accrue to either an individual market participant or to a coalition of parties
connected to the power system. The easier it is to ascribe benefits to a single entity the easier it is to
implement an SPS and for the associated parties to enter into agreed commercial arrangements.
Multiple agreements between numbers of parties are a normal consequence of situations where there
is a single beneficiary and a number of participants involved in the delivery of the service.
In situations where there are multiple beneficiaries and multiple participants to service provision the
complexity of contractual arrangements becomes such that a regulated obligation may be necessary if
a representative of the coalition of beneficiaries to act on the behalf of the beneficiaries cannot be
agreed. Normally, the entity in the best position to act as the proponent of the SPS would be the
transmission asset owner.
In offering to generators and consumers connection to the power system at agreed levels of access
transmission asset owners have the option to utilise the security capacity of their transmission
system through SPS applications thus increase transfer limits above those applied conventionally. In
this context security capacity refers to that capacity of the transmission system that is traditionally set
aside to allow for continued transport of electricity following the loss of one (or even more in some
locations where consumers ascribe a very high value to energy otherwise not consumed) of a number
of parallel transmission circuits.
Foremost, electricity transmission asset owners have to be certain that they can comply with their
regulatory obligations, licence conditions, and connection agreement provisions as applicable to
service delivery and access reliability standards. The regulatory regime and connection agreements
have to be such as to provide transmission licence holders the opportunity to meet those obligations.
From an operational perspective the capability of the transmission system in conjunction with possible
support services and processes must provide transmission asset owners the reasonable opportunity to
plan with certainty and perform required asset maintenance, replacements, and augmentations.
15 June 2009
Page 43
Version: 1
In introducing SPS into their toolkit for planning and developing the transmission system, transmission
investors also require certainty as to recovery of all costs of implementing such schemes inclusive of
the appropriate rewards for the level of risk assumed.
Operational personnel must have confidence in SPS efficacy so that operationally SPS become in the
back ground and do not require special oversight and supervision. Any scheme that requires micro
management by operational personnel only serves to act as a distraction to efficient operation and
appropriate responses to power system incidents.
In this context key stakeholder groups within the transmission asset owner are the asset managers
and operators. Their support of and confidence in any SPS are essential to successful
implementation. Experience indicates that there could be strong scepticism regarding the efficacy and
reliability and the operational complexity of schemes. Their involvement in the design,
implementation, training, commissioning, and ongoing maintenance and upgrades proved to be
effective in gaining their support for SPS. Figure 15 below is a poster providing an example of the
scepticism about the Basslink SPS, but following successful implementation and operational
experience there has been substantial praise and acknowledgement of success.
Figure 15 Scepticism of SPS Success

The board of directors of a transmission company understand the risks and rewards of owning and
operating the assets of the company; however, the introduction of an SPS potentially increases the
risk profile of the company. This increased risk exposure rests with the potential wider power system
consequences of incorrect operation of an SPS. As a consequence, directors will require a clear
understanding of the operation of the SPS and the related commercial, regulatory, and contractual
relationships. In addition, directors will require assurance that their fiduciary duty of care to the
shareholders is fulfilled. The board will require demonstration that all reasonable and possibly a
higher standard of best efforts have been undertaken by the company to prevent foreseeable,
incorrect operation of an SPS. This places the company in a position to mount a successful defence
against any potential negligence action.
The board will also require that reasonable avenues for limiting liability have been explored and acted
upon and that appropriate insurance coverage has been secured. Limits to liability would be normal
provisions of connection and access agreements and SPS related agreements with the beneficiaries
and participants. However, unlimited liability exposure could remain to third parties that do not have a
contractual relationship. In these circumstances a deed of indemnity from the beneficiary is an option
for consideration.
Company insurers require full disclosure of asset related risks within the insurance proposal. Similarly
to directors requirements, the insurance proposal is likely to require SPS details covering purpose,
actions, design principles and operation and maintenance practices.
15 June 2009
Page 44
Version: 1
A2.13.4 Retailers
Retailer interests lie in managing their risks around contracts with consumers. Those risks involve
both wholesale price exposures and the nature of the product offered to the end consumers. SPS are
not about any shortfalls in wholesale electricity productive capability but the capability of the integrated
transport system. Thus retailers are concerned about the opportunities that the SPS presents for
bundling together groups of consumers to provide differentiated services. The bundled impact on
retailers wholesale electricity and transport costs for offering differentiated services and a clear
description of the services that the retailer and consumers can readily understand is essential.
The retailer will need to understand what services are available, what opportunities are there for
entering into specific arrangements, what certainty does the SPS deliver, and with whom do they enter
into such arrangements.
In an environment of competing retailers within the one geographic region the provision of different
service levels can represent specific challenges associated with potential free rider issues. The
future development of so called smart grids and opportunities presented by sophisticated two way
communications and customer information systems could eventually provide opportunities for better
delivery of differentiated services.
A2.13.5 Market Operators and Power System Operators

Market operator and power system operator interests concern the impacts on market outcomes and
the ability to maintain the power system in a secure operating state.
Market operators, whilst mainly concerned with spot price outcomes being in accordance with rules,
will want to understand how the SPS could influence the outcomes of the spot market and whether
there are opportunities for unusual outcomes or abnormal fluctuations.
Power system operators require assurance that they can rely on the SPS to perform to expectations
so that they can meet their regulatory obligations regarding maintaining the power system in a secure
operating state. As part of this, power system operators require descriptions of the SPS objective and
the permissible technical operating envelope.
They also require demonstration that the response of the power system to the initiating contingency
and subsequent SPS action across the range of power system dispatches within the technical
operating envelope is such that the power system is stable and resumes operation in a satisfactory
operating state.
These are important parts of the process so that the power system operator can integrate the
objectives of the SPS into constraint equations used in the market dispatch algorithm. This ensures
that power system conditions outside of the operating design envelope of the SPS should not occur.
Occurrence otherwise would mean that the power system operator has not met its power system
security retention obligations.
A2.13.6 Suppliers
In this context suppliers refers to the party or parties that engineer, procure, and construct (EPC) the
SPS. The SPS owner could engage either a single EPC contractor or project manage a number of
contractors with specific expertise. This section is not about the advantages and disadvantages of
different procurement options but outlines issues that can be encountered during implementation
phase.
In general an SPS will require assets to be installed within the premises of a number of SPS
participants. In addition for the need to coordinate SPS installation and outage requirements with the
normal production operations of participants, issues for resolution include EPC access to the site,
15 June 2009
Page 45
Version: 1
professional indemnity insurance, public liability insurance, workers compensation, site supervision by
the participant and participant insurance coverage.
The SPS will require interfacing with participant assets and for insurance reasons, the participant may
require that it undertake the associated works. The contractual relationships must clearly allocate
responsibilities and liabilities and coordinate installation, testing, commissioning and going live
processes.
The owner of an SPS will want to be I n a position to upgrade software functionality and write their own
code requiring access to the source code. If a proprietary software is used the supplier may want to
protect its intellectual property and not be prepared to provide the source code other than to have it
held in escrow on behalf of the SPS owner. This can expose the SPS owner to commercial
disadvantage under circumstances where the original supplier is the only option to implement
changes.
A2.13.7 Commercial Issues

Several commercial issues have been covered previously with this section addressing the remainder.
The previous discussions have to some extent been based on ownership and responsibility for the
SPS resting with the regulated transmission service provider but this may not be the case.
A key issue is to establish SPS asset ownership and responsibility boundaries. There are a number of
options of both ownership and boundaries. Potential owners include the transmission asset owner,
the power system operator, the proponent or beneficiary of the SPS, and a service provider. SPS
asset boundaries include the data acquisition system, telecommunications, central assets and
software, and participant site assets. Additional assets and boundaries can arise from requirements to
provide SPS status information back to the power system operator. Ownership and responsibility
boundaries are subject to negotiation but usually are determined by the party in the best position to
operate and maintain the assets and manage the associated risks. Other ownership issues include:
are enhancement of competition;
barriers to access to participate in an SPS;
avoidance of SPS ownership proliferation;
avoidance of dilution of allocation of roles and responsibilities associated with delivery of

power system capability and management of operational security; and
minimising the number of required contractual relationships.
To enable the SPS owner to trip or interrupt participant generators or loads requires the parties to
enter into agreements to do so. These participation agreements provide for performance obligations,
equipment inspection and testing requirements, reporting requirements, service availability
expectations, participation withdrawal protocols, liability allocations and caps, restoration expectations,
fees or compensation, load block or generator characteristics covering maximum and minimum
amounts available for participation, and withdrawal durations following a response SPS action. In
addition, these agreements would cover arrangements for assets not owned by the participant to be
located within the premises of the participant.
For each time that participant services are called upon a service delivery certificate could be required
detailing performance issues such as:
date and time of performance;
time to order to resume consumption or generation;
load or generation before service;
load or generation immediately after service;
load or generation profile to full restoration;
energy not served or delivered; and
15 June 2009
Page 46
Version: 1
assessment of performance.
The SPS proponent may have to procure participant services. They may approach potential
participants directly or embark on a tender process for the provision of participant services. The
procurement process can be lengthy and not well understood by potential participants for a number of
reasons including being a new experience, uncertain value or cost of participation, impacts on
insurances, likelihood of performance, unknown timing of performance, priority order in providing
services, requirement for confidentiality, and supply restoration or reconnection times and procedures.
It is needless to say that the time required to procure these services and enter into participation
agreements should not be under estimated.
A possibility is that once an SPS has been established that a prospective participant may approach
the SPS owner to have their facilities integrated into the SPS. This eventuality should be provided for
in the design. Integration of a new participant will incur costs to cover due diligence SPS and power
system performance studies, negotiation of agreements, integration into the software, and supporting
equipment covering central, communications, and participant site assets.
The SPS owner will incur a variety of costs that if they are the beneficiary will be covered by the
benefits. If the SPS is provided as a service, then the cost will need to be identified and recovered fro
the participants and beneficiaries. These costs include:
payments to SPS participants possible in the form of availability, performance and loss of
market trading income;
allocation of corporate costs possibly based on a published cost allocation mechanism;
recovery of SPS related additional corporate costs;
asset operation, maintenance, supervision and renewals;
regular testing and inspection;
software licence fees, maintenance & supervision;
preparation of service delivery certificates;
post SPS action evaluation of:
participant performance,
SPS actions, and
power system response;
participant agreement supervision;
performance improvement initiatives; and
evaluation of power system technical operating envelope.
15 June 2009
Page 47
Version: 1
APPENDIX 3 NEM REVIEW OF NETWORK SUPPORT AND CONTROL

SERVICES
Network Control Ancillary Services are transmission network services procured by NEMMCO that are
critical to the maintenance of secure and reliable operation of the power system, by providing the
capability to:
Maintain the transmission network within its current, voltage or stability limits following a
credible contingency event; and
Enhance the net value of spot market trading by increasing transmission network power
transfer capability within those limits.
In its NCAS description (16), NEMMCO describes network control ancillary services as:
Network Loading Control Ancillary Service (NLCAS) used to change the active power flow on
Transmission Power Lines rapidly allowing short-term ratings to be used, and
Reactive Power Ancillary Service (RPAS) to maintain the power systems voltage condition,
so that the power system remains in a satisfactory operating state. Without adequate RPAS,
the power system would need to be operated more conservatively with constrained generation
or inappropriate load shedding.
NEMMCO is conducting a consultation to inform its review of the now termed Network Support and
Control Services (NSCS) which have a broader scope than NCAS. Historically, both transmission
network service providers and NEMMCO procure NSCS under various legislative instruments and
obligations and the outcomes they seek to achieve, are in many ways difficult to distinguish. The
objectives of the review are to:
identify and address issues surrounding the current arrangements for the procurement and
delivery of NSCS by transmission network service providers and NEMMCO; and
evaluate and make recommendations on potential alternative arrangements for the more
efficient procurement and delivery of NSCS.
Under the proposed NSCS definition, services that might qualify as maximising net economic benefit
by increasing secure power transfer capability include:
Automatic generator run-back schemes;
Automatic load shedding schemes (such as NLCAS); and
Generators with automatic generation control (AGC) enabled in tie-line bias mode that
compensate for the output variations of intermittent (wind) generation located in their area, to
allow the tie-line with other areas to operate up to a higher limit using a less conservative
margin (although such a scheme might also create local frequency control ancillary service
requirements and increase costs.
It would appear that the review is leaning toward allocating the responsibility for procuring NSCS to
transmission network service providers (17).
All consultation details and relevant documents may be found on
http://www.nemmco.com.au/powersystemops/168-0089.html
15 June 2009
Page 48

System Protection Schemes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

System Protection Schemes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

DEVELOPMENT AND

Report to Electricity Commission

David Strong and Michael Green

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

Overview of System Protection Schemes

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

SPS Experience in Australia

Basslink (frequency control and network loading);

Victoria to South Australia interconnector (frequency control);

Snowy to Victoria interconnector (network loading);

Tamar Valley Power Station (frequency control);

Western Sydney (network loading); and

Snowy to NSW interconnector (network loading).

Woolnorth Wind Farm; (generation runback for network loading)

Potential Applications of SPS in New Zealand

the Wairakei Ring;

the Waitaki Valley;

Roxburgh to Waitaki Valley; and

Southern South Island.

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

These schemes may also be referred to as Special Protection Systems

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM PROTECTION SCHEMES

contain a frequency deviation following a contingency;

prevent thermal overloading of transmission circuits following a contingency; or

prevent voltage collapse.

SPS Design Studies

Frequency Control SPS Design

Network Control SPS Design

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

Figure 3 Example C power flow in either direction

Development and Implementation of System Protection Schemes

SPS EXPERIENCE IN AUSTRALIA