77

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

CARMELINA TABAR y CARMILOTES and ROMMEL ARRIESGADO y TABAR

Carmelina Tabar y Carmilotes and her nephew, Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar, of Tres de Abril, Punta Princesa,
Cebu City, were charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A.No. 6425, as amended, in an
Information filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu City with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on 9
February 1989, the accusatory portion of which reads a follows:
That on or about the 8th day of February 1989, at about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell and deliver, without authority of law, Three (3)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol. of
Sec. 4, Art. 11, of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Act of 1972. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-14863 and after it was raffled off to Branch 15 of the said
court, the accused were forthwith arraigned. Carmelina entered a plea of not guilty while Rommel, then
seventeen (17) years of age, with the conformity of the prosecution, entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense
of possession of marijuana under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. 2 As a consequence of his
plea, the trial court handed down on 24 April 1989 an Order which reads in part as follows:
Therefore this court being satisfied that the accused herein is the same Ramil Tabar described in Annex 1
(Certificate of Birth) of the said accused, and it appearing that he is still a minor (17 years), he is entitled to a
suspended sentence of the penalty for possession of marijuana which is a jail term of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) pesos (Sec. 8 RA 6425 as amended of B.P. 179,
March 2, 1982).
WHEREFORE, the accused Rommel Tabar y Arriesgado is hereby discharged on probation (Sec. 32 of RA
6425 as amended by B.P. 179) and committed to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, Cebu Regional Office (No. 7) until he reaches the age of majority, or otherwise finally discharged
upon orders of this court pursuant to P.D. 603 and B.P. 179, but to be placed under the Supervision of the
Dangerous Drugs Board, the alleged crime being drug related, and for a period of one (1) year from date hereof.
The Regional Director of the DSWD is hereby ordered to conduct and submit a case study of the accused minor
to this court, within sixty days and to report on his conduct once every four months, to this court. 3
Thereafter, trial proceeded as against Carmelina alone. The prosecution presented Pfc. Josephus Trangia and
Myra P. Arreola, a forensic analyst of the PC Crime Laboratory Service, as its witnesses. The testimony of Pfc.
Raul Tumakay was ordered stricken out since he could not be cross-examined. The defense had only Carmelina
as its witness.
On 22 December 1990, the trial court promulagated its decision, dated 17 December 1990, 4 finding Carmelina
"guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, for (sic) violation of Section 4, Article II RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drug Act of 1972 as amended by PD 1675" and sentencing her to "Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 for the act of selling and distributing marijuana." 5
The conviction is premised on the following findings of fact:
From the evidence which consists of the testimony of Pfc. Josephus Trangia, the court gathered that at about
3:00 P.M. of February 8, 1989, he was with Pfc. Romeo Cortes and Gualberto Gabales on a buy-bust operation
for marijuana after receipt of information about marijuana pushers in Punta Princesa, Cebu City and that they
had their informant go ahead of them after giving the P5.00 bill for him to purchase marijuana.
He continued saying that their informant stood in front of a shanty while they posted themselves at a distance of
about 50 meters from the place where their informant was standing. And that they saw a young boy approached
their informant and handed cigarettes to him who in turn handed the marked money to the young boy. Then,
1

their informant gave them the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head with his right hand; that after the
signal, he and his companions immediately approached the young boy and the informant introduced them as
police officers. This young boy was about 16-17 years old, by the name of Rommel Arriesgado y Tabar. He had
earlier pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of mere possession of marijuana and was, in fact, already convicted
by this court. Upon being shown a P5.00 bill with the initials written thereon as: GDG-89 and bearing SL L F
637396, he identified the same bill as the one given to their informant and marked as Exh. "A" for the
prosecution. He explained the initials GDG which stands for Gualberto G. Gabales, his team member. He
further declared that after the pre-arranged signal from their informant, they immediately proceeded to the scene
and were given three sticks of marijuana by their informant after buying the same from the boy, Rommel
Arriesgado and that they proceeded to confiscate the P5.00 bill from the boy. At this juncture, he claimed that he
observed that after the transaction, the boy went inside the shanty and the moment he got out, he handed the
three sticks of marijuana to the informant. In fact, he claimed that after the proceeding to the shanty, they met
Carmelina Tabar, accused herein, and that Carmelina Tabar was holding a white pants from where they found
other marijuana sticks in cigarette packs which they confiscated. That they brought Carmelina Tabar to Fuente
Police Station for investigation. He claimed that there were 75 sticks of marijuana in the Hope Cigarette pack;
22 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in the Philip Morris pack and 99 sticks of marijuana in the Mark cigarette pack.
He said that they also confiscated the pants, but only the marijuana sticks were submitted for testing to the PC
Crime Laboratory. That pursuant to this requested analysis, Lieut. Fortunato Quijon of the Police issued a
Certification of Field Test, Exh. "B" which showed that three sticks of handrolled cigarettes marked Rommel-89
were positive for marijuana. Shown the three packs of cigarettes distincly marked as Hope, Mark and Philip
Morris, he identified the same as the ones confiscated from Carmelina Tabar. So did he identify the creamcolored pants he said they confiscated from Carmelina Tabar and which according to him was used to wrap
marijuana sticks inside the pack. He finally told the court that this team was composed of Gualberto D. Gabales,
Romeo Cortes, Pfc. Tumakay and himself.
On cross-examination, this witness affirmed that when he asked the boy, Rommel where he got the marijuana
sticks, he was told he got it from his aunt, the accused herein. He further told the court that they arrested
Carmelina Tabar later. When the young boy went inside, they presumed the marijuana came from inside the
shanty and that when the accused Carmelina Tabar went out, suspicious-looking and pale and afraid to face
them, they told her to stop from going left towards the houses and asked her to open the pants which revealed
the three cigarette packs contaning marijuana. The witness candidly admitted they had no search warrant at the
time they effected the arrest and confiscation.
From the testimonies of Mrs. Myrna Areola, Police Lieutenant, Forensic Analyst of the PC Crime Laboratory, it
was established that the specimens submitted to her were positive of marijuana. She then identified Exh. "C", as
her Chemistry Report C-038-89. She also identified her signature, Exh. "C-4" thereon and her findings "All are
positive of Marijuana", Exh. "C-3"; the specimens submitted as Exh. "C-2" and the name of the subject,
Carmelina Tabar as Exh. "C-1". She confirmed her findings on all handrolled cigarettes in all cigarette packs;
Hope, Exh. "E-1" to "E-75"; Philip Morris pack, Exh. "F-1" to "F-22" and Mark cigarette pack, Exh. "G-1" to
"G-99". She informed the court that the specimens were submitted to her by Pfc Gabales on February 11, 1989,
at about 10:50 A.M., and that she examined the sticks one by one and handrolled them again. She also claimed
that the police did not ask for a copy of her report and that this is the first time it is presented in court. She
informed the court that she placed the specimens in her evidence store room, with keys, she herself kept.6
The trial court discredited the bare denials of Carmelina and unfavorably considered against her an admission
that she had been arrested before by the CANU for possession of marijuana, was charged for the violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 in Criminal Case No. CBU-8573, was convicted therein, but is now on
probation. 7 It further considered against her an allegedly very damaging admission, thus:
She made a very damaging admission to the court when the Presiding Judge asked her whether it is not true that
she kept on crying because she was caught again and she said, "Yes" and at which juncture she admitted to the
court that she was serving probation for the same offense.
It then concluded that:
2

[A]ccused actually employed her nephew, Rommel Arriesgado to sell marijuana from her store and that she has
been in that illicit business for quite sometime now. The evidence notwithstanding, talks in the community
where the accused lives is rife with accusations (sic) that she is indeed engaged with members of the family, in
the sale and distribution of prohibited drugs such as marijuana. Between the positive testimony of the arresting
officers, who appear to be more credible than the accused's worthless and untrustworthy denials, the court gives
credence to the evidence of the prosecution. 9
Unable to accept the verdict, Carmelina filed her notice of appeal 10 manifesting therein that she is appealing
from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In its Order of 27 February 1991, 11 the trial court gave due course to
the appeal and directed the clerk of court "to submit all the records, evidences (sic) and trancripts of this
proceeding to the Hon. Court of Appeals, for proper disposition." Considering that the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua, the Court of Appeals transmitted to this Court the records of the case on 12 August
1991. 12 In the Resolution of 11 September 1991, this Court accepted the appeal.
In her Appellant's Brief, 13 Carmelina, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, imputes upon the trial court the
commission of the following errors in the appealed decision:
I.
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS (sic) OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, ARTICLE II,
REPUBLIC ACT 6425 AS AMENDED WHEN THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT WARRANT IT.
II.
. . . IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE SEIZED WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT. 14
As to the first assigned error, the appellant claims that the prosecution presented no evidence that she sold
marijuana and since there exists no convincing, positive and conclusive proof of conspiracy between her and
her co-accused, Rommel Arriesgado, she cannot be held liable for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended.
In support of the second assigned error, the appellant maintains that the marijuana cigarettes seized from her are
inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure.
After a careful perusal of the records and evaluation of the evidence, this Court is inclined to agree with the
appellant that she should not be convicted under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No, 6425. We rule, however, that
she is liable under Section 8, Article II of the said Act. Her conviction by the trial court under Section 4 is
primarily based on its conclusion that the appellant "actually employed her nephew Rommel Arriesgado to sell
marijuana from her store and that she had been in that illicit business for quite sometime now." This conclusion
is based on the trial court's sweeping statement that "talks in the community where the accused lives is rife with
accusations that she is indeed engaged with members of the family, in the sale and distribution of prohibited
drugs such as marijuana." We find no evidence on record to sustain this charge. It may thus be said that such a
conclusion is not based on established facts but on "talks in the community." If indeed such was the fact, it
would not have been difficult for the prosecution to provide the court with overwhelming evidence. Yet, it
presented only Pat. Trangia who, rather unfortunately, did not even testify or volunteer information that the
main target of the busy-bust operation was the appellant. He did not also disclose in his testimony that the
appellant was among the reported "pushers" in Punta Princesa, Cebu City. It may be recalled that the buy-bust
operation on 8 February 1989 was conducted because, as he alleged:
A. Before that time we have already received information from the community of Punta Princesa regarding
marijuana pushers in that
place.
Nevertheless, the prosecutor who conducted the direct-examination of Trangia did not ask further as to identity
of the pushers such that it was not proven that the appellant was one of them. The Solicitor General, however,
maintains that there was conspiracy, established by circumstancial evidence, between accused Rommel
3

Arriesgado who was caught in flagrante selling three (3) sticks of handrolled marijuana to the informant and
accepting the marked money. We are not persuaded since the evidence for the prosecution does not show that
(a) the appellant was in the mind of the members of the team when they planned the buy-bust operation and
when they carried out such plan, (b) the three (3) sticks of handrolled marijuana came from the appellant, and
(c) the appellant used Rommel as her agent to sell the three (3) sticks to the informant. Moreover, if indeed the
prosecution truly believed that such conspiracy existed, it should not have willingly given its conformity to
Rommel's plea to the lesser offense of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. Having been caught in flagrante for selling marijuana, it was not difficult to prove
Rommel's culpability under Section 4, Article II of the Act. Yet it readily consented to his offer to plead guilty to
the said lesser offense.
It was, however, established beyond any shadow of doubt and, therefore, with moral certainty, that the appellant
kept in her possession handrolled sticks of marijuana placed in empty Hope, Philip Morris and Mark cigarrette
packs. 16 She does not have any authority to possess them. She may have acquired them with the intention to
sell them for profit; but without proof of sale, she cannot be held liable under Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. For such possession, her liability is covered by Section 8 of the said Article which
penalizes possession or use of prohibited drugs.
Appellant, therefore, may specifically be penalized under the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 8, Article II of
the Act. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 18 the penalty of eight (8) years as Minimum to twelve (12)
years as Maximum and a fine of P10,000.00 may then be imposed upon her.
The second assigned error is without merit. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that the appellant placed
the packs of marijuana sticks under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she
hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread it out, which she
voluntary did, the package containing the packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the
member of the team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule
113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense without the corresponding arrest and
search warrants. Her own counsel on cross-examination of prosecution witness Josephus Trangia further
obtained a affirmation of these facts, thus:
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were without a warrant, the appellant had
effectively waived her constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the seach and seizure.
In People vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, pages 631). The right to be
secure from unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly
or impliedly.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the challenged Decision of
Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Criminal Case No. CBU-14863 dated 17 December 1990 and,
as modified, finding appellant CARMELINA TABAR y CARMILOTES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of marijuana under Section 8, Article II of R. A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and, applying the Inderterminate Sentence Law, she is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).

78
PEOPLE v. MUSA
G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
4

Facts: The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC of Zamboanga City finding him
guilty of selling (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves in violation of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972).
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga, leader of a
NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a
certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Sgt. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P 10.00. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff
turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he
was given P20.00.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group
positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house.
T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached
Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff.
Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house
and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his
companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards
Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another
boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second
time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari
Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00
marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he
has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away).
Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa
was then placed under arrest and brought to the NARCOM office.
All submitted specimens were examined and gave positive results for the presence of marijuana.
According to the version of the defense, on December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was
in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife Ara, his one-year old child, a woman
manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at
one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep.
Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the
house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's
house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The
NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. Mari Musa, then,
was handcuffed and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM agent which investigation was
reduced into writing. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was asked
to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he was
not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the NARCOM agents he
wanted to be assisted by counsel.

Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed
which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. The fiscal asked
him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari Musa was brought to
the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents
because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he
had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell marijuana because he was
afraid that was against the law and that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a
wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.
After trial, the trial court found the accused Musa guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
1st Argument: The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani is not credible because: (1) prior to the buybust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or viceversa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant to
Sgt. Ani.
The Court finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension,
prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other
is without merit. The day before the buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully
bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain
the appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust
operation. Moreover, the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and
the seller, for quite often, the parties to the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.
2nd Argument: The appellant argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana while his wife,
cousin and manicurist were present.
But the place of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial and the
presence of other people apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the
illegal sale. As the Court observed in People v. Paco, these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission
of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the
appellant may have given him some assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.
3rd Argument: The appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from
Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.Ale
where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between
marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt.
Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani
cannot stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were
certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the
cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that: This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses marked as they are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two.

Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a
distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former
"something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the
appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence,
which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1)
T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant (2) later that
same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt.
Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the
following day; (4) on December 14, 1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to
Suterville, Zamboanga City; (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in
the buy-bust operation; (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house of the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned
themselves in strategic places; the appellant met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place.
The testimony of the poseur-buyer is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug.
MOST RELEVANT FACTS
4th Argument: Finally, the appellant assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the
pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant
said that he gave the marked money to his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen
and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen." They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found. At
the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial
court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence.
Issues: 1) Is the trial court correct in ruling that the red plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves was
admissible in evidence?
2) If No, does the inadmissibility have any effect on the innocence of Musa?
Held: 1) No. The Constitution declares inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest, but the "plain view" doctrine, which states that objects in the plain view of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without warrant or search and seizure and may
be presented in evidence, does not apply under the circumstances of the case.
(Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.)
The plastic bag was not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution because unlike in Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible
to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature
of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the
object in their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana.
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
7

The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, the admissibility of the package was challenged before the U.S. Supreme
Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana
did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view"
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence.
The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no
clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view"
of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.
2) None. The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect
of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in
violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Court holds that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of
marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the
crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Appeal was dismissed.

79
People Vs. Fajardo
[104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which
will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner,
enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit
to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located
along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a
place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds
of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook
8

that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty,
stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the
municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

80
Pacis vs. Pamaran
56 SCRA 16 (1974)

Power of Acting Commissioner of Customs to issue a warrant of seizure and detention

FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957, brought into the
country without payment of customs duty and taxes because its original owner, Donald James Hatch, was taxexempt. Santos later on paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.
On July 22, 1964, Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed by
the General Affairs Administration of the Department of National Defense that the automobile was a hot car.
By virtue thereof, Pacis, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office and found that
although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty,the amount collectible on the said car should
be P2,500.00, more or less.
Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. The
automobile was also taken by the Department of National Defense agents and brought to
the General AffairsAdministration for compound.
In answer, Santos filed a criminal complaint against Pacis for usurpation of judicial functions with the City
Fiscal of Manila, Manuel Pamaran, alleging that Pacis did not have authority to issue such warrant of seizure
and detention.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner, in the discharge of his official function, lay himself open to a criminal prosecution for
usurpation of judicial functions
HELD: It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, had the requisite
authority for theissuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned
by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could not be the basis of a prosecution for the
usurpation of judicial functions. The remedy of prohibition lies.

81
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMPACION
[G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001]

FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that accused-appellant was growing and
cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional
Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of
the residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental on July 9, 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall plants in the backyard of
the accused-appellant which they suspected to be marijuana plants.
9

Despite failing to obtain a warrant, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of
accused-appellant in the early morning of July 13, 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for
the accused-appellant. What happened thereafter is subject to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends
that the accused-appellant opened the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4
Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the
use of his wife who was suffering from migraine The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants.
Accused-appellants version of what transpired is that around one-thirty in the early morning of July 13, 1995
while he and his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing
with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he thought were members of the military,
entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered the
house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men told him to sit in the living room.
Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission
to search his house and the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure performed at the backyard of the accused was valid.
HELD: NO. In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of
accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under
any of he exceptions. Consequently, accused-appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was
clearly violated.
It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure
conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived
either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and
his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary
submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the
raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed.
As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that
view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the
following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search.
Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellant's premises without the
latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of
accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they
allegedly came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995,
their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant
but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the
marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellant's
residence.

82
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY GO, appellant.

10

On direct appeal before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, in Criminal
Case No. 99-174439 finding appellant Benny Go guilty of violating Section 16, Article III in relation to Section
2 (e-2), Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00.
The Information filed against appellant charged as follows:
That on or about June 14, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused without being authorized by
law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) knot tied transparent plastic bag containing TWO
HUNDRED FOUR (204) grams of white crystalline substance known as Shabu containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Subsequently, at
the pre-trial conference on August 10, 1999, the parties stipulated that (1) the subject Search Warrant is valid;
and (2) the Forensic Chemist conducted only a qualitative examination on the subject specimen.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Police Inspector Edwin Zata, Forensic Chemical Officer
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory; (2) PO2 Gerardo Abulencia (PO2 Abulencia); (3)
SPO1 Edgardo G. Fernandez (SPO1 Fernandez); and (4) SPO1 Ver M. Serquea (SPO1 Ver Serquea) whose
testimonies sought to establish the following facts:
On April 28, 1999, SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and a confidential informant conducted a test buy
operation at the residence of appellant at 1480 General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila during which they
purchased from him P1,500.00 worth of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The police officers did
not immediately arrest him, however. Instead, they applied for a Search Warrant for appellants residence from
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City based on their firm belief that there was a large quantity of illegal
drugs in his house.
On June 14, 1999, a raiding team composed of SPO1 Fernandez and SPO1 Serquea, together with PO2
Abulencia, PO3 Noel Adtu and PO2 Gerardo Jimenez, proceeded to appellants above-said residence armed
with Search Warrant No. 99-0038 issued by Br. 109 of the RTC of Pasay City commanding them to make an
immediate search anytime of the day or night of appellants residence and to seize and take possession of
METAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu), weighing scale, other drug paraphernalias and proceeds
of the above crime.
Soon after the police officers arrived at appellants residence at around 6:00 in the evening, they, to enable them
to gain entry to the two-storey house, sideswept (sinagi) a little appellants Toyota Corolla GLI car which was
parked outside. Jack Go, appellants son and the only one present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the
door of the house and the policemen at once introduced themselves, informed him that they had a warrant for
the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed him to a chair. SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea and PO2
Abulencia entered the house, while PO3 Adtu and PO2 Jimenez remained outside.
On instruction of SPO1 Fernandez, SPO1 Serquea left to summon barangay officials to witness the
search. SPO1 Serquea returned five minutes later with Barangay Kagawads Gaspar Lazaro (Kagawad Lazaro)
and Emmanuel Manalo (Kagawad Manalo) who were advised by SPO1 Fernandez to be witnesses to the search
and to afterwards sign the inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
As instructed, the two barangay kagawads proceeded to the upper floor of appellants house with SPO1
Serquea and PO2 Abulencia. While SPO1 Fernandez, who remained downstairs in the sala, instructed the
handcuffed Jack Go to witness the search, the latter refused since there will be no more left in the sala of the
house anyway there is a barangay official.

11

In the course of the search of the premises which took place from 6:00 to 11:00 in the evening, Kagawad Lazaro
and PO2 Abulencia recovered one knot tied transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline
substancefrom the drawer of a cabinet.
Also seized from the residence of appellant were the following: (a) one plastic bag containing yellowish
substance found by SPO1 Serquea; (b) a weighing scale discovered by SPO1 Fernandez; (c) assorted
documents; (d) passports; (e) bank books; (f) checks; (g) a typewriter; (h) a check writer; (i) several dry seals
and (j) stamp pads; (k) Chinese and Philippine currency; (l) and appellants Toyota Corolla GLI car (the car).
With the exception of the car, all the seized items were brought to the dining table on the ground floor of
appellants house for inventory.
After the inventory had been taken, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a handwritten Inventory Receipt and a document
captioned Affidavit of Orderly Search, the contents of which he read to appellant. On instruction of SPO1
Fernandez, Jack Go also explained the contents of the documents to appellant who then signed them as
did kagawads Manalo and Lazaro and Jack Go as witnesses.
Appellant was detained while the others were eventually released. The arresting officers jointly prepared an
Affidavit of Arrest dated June 15, 1999 which, among other things, contained an enumeration of the seized
items identical to that in the handwritten Inventory Receipt. And SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Return of Search
Warrant 99-0038 dated June 18, 1999 and a referral paper 1st Indorsement with the same enumeration of
seized items.
Also on June 15, 1999, SPO1 Serquea brought the plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance
(Exhibit A) and the plastic bag containing the yellowish substance (Exhibit B) to the PNP Crime
Laboratory together with a request for laboratory examination. Upon examination, Exhibit A was found to
contain 204 grams of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug. Exhibit B, on the other hand, was found negative for any prohibited and/or regulated drug.
Meanwhile, the seized documents, passports, dry seals and stamp pads were brought to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, while the bank books were forwarded to the corresponding banks for verification.
The defense, which adopted the testimony of Kagawad Lazaro, presented appellant, his son Jack Go,
and Kagawad Manalo whose version of the facts of the case follows:
In November 1998, while appellant was walking along Gen. Luna Street, he was accosted by SPO1 Serquea
and another police officer who accused him of manufacturing shabu and divested him of money amounting to
more than P5,000.00. He was later released as the policemen could not charge him with anything.
On July 14, 1999 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, Jack Go opened the door of their house after hearing
somebody shout that the car had been bumped. Five armed policemen then entered the house, one of whom
handcuffed him while two went up to the upper floor of the house and searched for about thirty (30) minutes.
At past 6:00 p.m., as the two kagawads entered the house which was already in disarray, SPO1 Fernandez
formed two groups to conduct the search at the second floor: (1) that of PO2 Abulencia, with Kagawad Lazaro
to serve as witness, and (2) that of SPO1 Serquea, with Kagawad Manalo to serve as witness.
PO2 Abulencia, together with Kagawad Lazaro, searched the room of Jack Go. SPO1 Serquea, accompanied
by Kagawad Manalo, searched the study room where he seized documents, passports and assorted papers.
SPO1 Serquea and Kagawad Manalo then proceeded to the room of appellant followed by PO2 Abulencia
and Kagawad Lazaro. From the room of appellant, the policemen seized documents, passports, bankbooks and
money.
After the search, the policemen and barangay kagawads went down with three boxes containing passports,
money and assorted Chinese medicine.
12

When appellants wife arrived at around 7:30 p.m., SPO1 Fernandez ordered her to open the safe (kaha de
yero) inside appellants room where the police officers seized money, passports, bankbooks, Chinese currency
and pieces of jewelry.
The seized items were placed on appellants table on the first floor of the house where they were inventoried by
SPO1 Fernandez during which the barangay kagawads did not see either Exhibit A, the plastic bag containing
the suspected shabu, or the weighing scale.
After SPO1 Fernandez prepared a two-page Inventory Receipt and Affidavit of Orderly Search, he asked Jack
Go to sign the receipt. While Jack Go initially refused, he eventually did sign both documents without having
read them completely after he was hit by the policemen. The two barangay kagawads also signed both pages of
the Inventory Receipt as witnesses.
When appellant arrived at around 8:30 p.m., he was handcuffed and likewise made to sign the Inventory Receipt
without having been able to read its contents. Jack Go was prevented from explaining its contents to him.
On the way to Bicutan, PO2 Abulencia, who boarded the same vehicle as appellant, told the latter that the
policemen wanted P10,000,000.00 from him or he would be charged with possession of illegal drugs. The
amount demanded was later reduced to P5,000,000.00, then to P2,000,000.00, and finally to P500,000.00.
Appellant refused, however, to heed the policemens demands since he did not commit any crime.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court rendered the appealed Decision on June 7, 2000, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby ordered rendered finding the accused Benny Go guilty of the offense
charged in the information and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
The subject shabu is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court is hereby
directed to deliver and/or cause the delivery of the said shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition, upon the finality of this Decision.
His Motion for Reconsideration of the decision having been denied by Order of July 24, 2000, appellant lodged
the present appeal. In his Brief, he assigns the following errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING THE POLICE OFFICERS THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY IN IMPLEMENTING THE SEARCH WARRANT
BASED ON THEIR TESTIMONIES, THERE BEING CONVINCING PROOFS TO THE CONTRARY.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 204 GRAMS OF SHABU WAS RECOVERED FROM
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON JUNE 14, 1999 BASED ON THE TESTIMONY OF PO1
GERARDO ABULENCIA AND THE SUPPORTING INVENTORY RECEIPT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE
COMPLETELY CONTRADICTED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS BARANGAY KAGAWAD
GASPAR LAZARO AS WELL AS BY DEFENSE WITNESSES.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204) GRAMS OF SHABU AS CHARGED IN
THE INFORMATION AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE (sic) PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND A FINE OF ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), INSTEAD OF ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (Emphasis supplied)
13

As appellant questions the legality of the search of his residence, the actions of the police officers, as agents of
the State, must be carefully considered in light of appellants right against unreasonable searches and seizures
guaranteed by Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a purely judicial question determinable from
a consideration of the attendant circumstances including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.
Since no presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer to justify an encroachment of rights secured by
the Constitution, courts must cautiously weigh the evidence before them. As early as in the 1937 case of People
v. Veloso, this Court held:
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions under
which it is issued. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly been held, must
be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will always be construed strictly without, however, going the
full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, a strict interpretation of the constitutional, statutory and procedural rules authorizing search and seizure
is required, and strict compliance therewith is demanded because:
x x x Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare,
still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
In arriving at the appealed decision, the trial court placed greater weight on the testimony of the police officers
to whom it accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, viz:
Coming to the first issue raised, the Court gives credence to the testimonies of the police officers and accords
them the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. The Court has observed the demeanor of
the witnesses and finds the prosecution witnesses more credible than the defense witnesses. x x x
On the other hand, there is no showing that the police officers had ill motive when they applied for and secured
the Search Warrant, raided the house of the accused and arrested him. Accused is a Chinese national who
appeared to have no quarrel with the arresting police officers and thus the police officers had no reason to
fabricate or trump up charges against him. Hence, there appears to be no reason the police officers should not
be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. As held by the Supreme Court,
(L)aw enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty, in the absence of the evidence to
the contrary. x x x We see no valid obstacle to the application of the ruling in People vs. Capulong, (160 SCRA
533 {1988}) that credence is accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for
it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duty in the absence of convincing proof to the
contrary. The appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by any improper motive
other than that of accomplishing their mission. (People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. Said Sariol Y
Muhamading, accused-appellant, 174 SCRA 238). (Emphasis supplied)
At the same time, the trial court based its finding that the search of appellants residence was proper and valid
on the so-called Affidavit of Orderly Search.
On the second issue raised, the validity of the Search Warrant is clearly shown by the Affidavit of Orderly
Search signed by the accused and his son Jack Go and his witnesses Salvador Manalo and Gaspar Lazaro. Such
14

Affidavit of Orderly Search coupled with the testimonies of the police officers have clearly established the
propriety and validity of the search. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule that a trial courts findings are accorded the highest degree of respect, it being in a position to observe
the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses, is not absolute and does not apply when a careful
review of the records and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence reveal vital facts and circumstances which the
trial court overlooked or misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter the result of the case.
In the case at bar, an examination of the testimonies of the police officers brings to light several irregularities in
the manner by which the search of appellants residence was conducted.
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that marijuana was found in
her possession but said admission embodied in a document entitled PAGPATUNAY previously prepared by
the police, is inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her
rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The records show that the
accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the document; neither was she informed of her right
to the assistance of counsel and the fact that the document may be used as evidence against her. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
In People v. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign receipts for property
allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and violative of the constitutional right to remain
silent, viz:
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be silent and that he may
refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that is why he refused to give a written statement
unless it is made in the presence of his lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was
made to acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were confiscated from him by
signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the P20.00 bill as purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold
to Pat. Mangila.
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged receipts which in effect
are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to
sign receipts for what were taken from him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have
signed such receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent
whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his right. Such a
confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being violative of appellants
custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team
conducted the search of appellants residence.
In fine, since appellant did not witness the search of his residence, his alleged Affidavit of Orderly Search,
prepared without the aid of counsel and by the very police officers who searched his residence and eventually
arrested him, provides no proof of the regularity and propriety of the search in question.
On the contrary, from the account of the police officers, their search of appellants residence failed to comply
with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses. No search of a
house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or
any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (Underscoring supplied)
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor,
which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing the shabu, did not take place in the
presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who
was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by law are
15

prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter
of the law:
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is strengthened by the manner in
which the search was conducted by the police authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala together
with Sgt. Yte when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered ito na. Apparently, the search of the accusedappellants house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which specifically
provides that no search of a house, room or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity
in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the second floor is of no
moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose
presence the search of the premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search
should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality only in the
absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family. Thus, the search of
appellants residence clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was present at the time. The
police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
The claim of SPO1 Fernandez and PO2 Abulencia that Jack Go voluntarily waived his right to witness the
search, allegedly because there would be no one left in the sala and anyway barangay officials were present,
cannot be accepted. To be valid, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Furthermore,
the presumption is always against the waiver of a constitutionally protected right.
While Jack Go was present from the time the raiding team entered the premises until after the search was
completed, he was, however, handcuffed to a chair in the sala. All alone and confronted by five police officers
who had deprived him of his liberty, he cannot thus be considered to have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to witness the search of the house. Consent given under such intimidating,
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.
The search conducted by the police officers of appellants residence is essentially no different from that
in People v. Del Rosario where this Court observed:
We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was actually seized or confiscated
at the residence of accused-appellant. In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent
and much-delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of accused-appellant, the police
officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and detained him in the living room while they
searched the other parts of the house. Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses
were called in only after the policemen had already entered accused-appellants residence (pp. 22-23, tsn,
December 11, 1991), and, therefore, the policemen had more than ample time to plant the shabu. Corollary to
the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved (Sec. 14 (2), Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in
order to convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis
consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 463 [1946]; People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653
[1964];People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 [1986]). The facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that
accused-appellant is innocent. (Emphasis supplied)
The raiding teams departure from the procedure mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, taken
together with the numerous other irregularities attending the search of appellants residence, tainted the search
with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the
seized articles inadmissible in evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Courts solemn duty to be
ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the
oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
16

In particular, Barangay Kagawads Lazaro and Manalo, the two witnesses to the search chosen by the police
officers in substitution of Jack Go, both categorically testified under oath that no shabu was recovered from
appellants residence by the police. Thus, Kagawad Lazaro testified that the plastic bag containing white
crystalline granules, later found positive for shabu, was not recovered from the room of Jack Go:
Atty. Reyes:
You were shown a while ago by the prosecution of (sic) an Inventory Receipt allegedly prepared by Officer
Fernandez which includes the list of the items seized from the premises of Benny Go, now, you said that theres
no white crystalline granules included in that list which you signed during the inventory?
The foregoing explanations are improbable and far from persuasive. Considering that a weighing scale was
among the items particularly described in Search Warrant No. 99-0038, it would be expected that the police
officers would be actively searching for it and, if found, they would take care to include it in the inventory and
the return of the search warrant. But while numerous seals, stamps, checks and documents not described in the
search warrant were seized and carefully inventoried by the raiding team, none of the five police officers
bothered to point out that the weighing scale had not been included in the inventory.
The implausibility of the story put forward by the police officers leads to no other conclusion than that the
weighing scale was introduced as an afterthought in order to bolster the case against appellant.
With the persistence of nagging doubts surrounding the alleged discovery and seizure of the shabu, it is evident
that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof and overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. It is thus not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more, this Courts constitutional duty to
acquit him. Apropos is the ruling in People v. Aminnudin, viz:
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the
Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against
any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said I think it is less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.
Return of Seized Property Not Described in the Search Warrant
Turning now to the Motion for Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia, the general rule is
that only the personal properties particularly described in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. Thus, inTambasen v. People, this Court held:
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule. Thus, evidence obtained through
a warrantless search and seizure may be admissible under the following circumstances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
To be valid, therefore, the seizure of the items enumerated in appellants Motion for Return of Personal
Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia must fall within the ambit of Search Warrant No. 99-0038 or under any
of the foregoing recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the plain view doctrine
to justify the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not
17

specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be ordered returned to
him.
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to
be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned and are hereby declared
confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and
passports not belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41, convicting appellant Benny Go
of violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2 (e-2) Article I of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Benny Go is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is hereby ordered immediately RELEASED
from confinement, unless he is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to forthwith IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.
Appellants Motion For Return of Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is GRANTED IN PART, and
the trial court is hereby ordered to return to him those items seized from the subject premises which belong to
him as listed in said Motion.
The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed to deliver
and/or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
The two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation are likewise ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.

83
In Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
MeTC of Manila
19 November 2008
Austria-Martinez, J.

Note: This is a consolidation of two administrative cases, but I believe it is only the first one (which deals with
privacy) that is relevant for our purposes, and so it is the only one Ive included in this digest.
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an unsigned, undated letter of complaint
regarding Atty. Miguel Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). The letter alleged that Atty. Morales
was consuming his work hours filing and attending to personal cases, and was using office supplies, equipment
and utilities.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot investigation and gained access to
Morales personal computer. Pleadings to two of Atty. Morales personal cases were found among the computer
files. The computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.
Morales filed a motion for the release of his computer. The Court granted his motion but ordered that the files
be retrieved first.
Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz for alleged conspiracy and
culpable violation of the Consti. Morales asserted that the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search
18

and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized should therefore be considered
inadmissible.
ISSUE: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal computer admissible in the administrative case
against him?
RULING: DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence
No
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons
and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures. Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars the
admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. Any violation of this right renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless search. DCA Dela Cruz claims that they were able to
obtain the pleadings with Atty. Morales consent.
However, the Court finds his assertion insufficient to make the present case fall under the exception. Consent to
a search must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. It
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that: (1) the right exists, (2) that the persons involved had the
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the right, and (3) that the person had actual
intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. He may have
agreed to opening his computer and printing the files during the spot investigation, but he immediately filed an
administrative case against the DCA and his team, specifically invoking his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

84
People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994]

Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
against the Government. At that time, various government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila
were being bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November
1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers
took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the
government television station. Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay
occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of
the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car
conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in
Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night of 30
November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division
that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away from the Eurocar
19

building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance
on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp
Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car
of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group
and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only
6 meters away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the
wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they
sought cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As
a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as
team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of
M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside
one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St.
Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present
inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team
arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building.
They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by
the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that time
there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel
forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the
courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a
certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de Gracia was charged in two
separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion,
and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried
jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not
guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition
and/or explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30
up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia
appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of the December 1989
coup detat.
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a
search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being
used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein
the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite the requests for them to do
so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store
and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It
is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered
firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general
chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in
the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable
cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
20

5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the
moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.

85
SEARCHES & SEIZURES (Art. III, Sec 2) Stop and Frisk
People of the Phil vs. Mengote (June 22, 1992)

Facts: Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen
pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. He pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the
poisonous tree. On August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer
that there were three suspicious-looking persons at Tondo, they there saw two men "looking from side to side,"
one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as
policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. Mengote was found with a revolver and his companion had
a fan knife. Danganan identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery
in his house in Malabon and pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.
Issue: Whether the arrest was lawful & whether the revolver is admissible as evidence
Ruling: A person can be arrested without warrant after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is
at least attempting to commit an offense or in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not
been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote was merely "looking from side
to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in
their presence. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the
prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against
Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime imputed to him. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses.

86
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN

FACTS OF THE CASE: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of
Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his
officers. While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.
from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an
unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from the boats
ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men
led by SPO1 Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there conferred with Almoite.
Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San.
When the speed boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed direction. Badua held Chuas right arm to
prevent him from fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not
understand what theyre saying. And by resorting of sign language, Cid motioned with his hands for the man
to open his bag. The man acceded to the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform
him of his constitutional rights.

21

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a
valid exemption from the warrant requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence
except if conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However,
warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:

search of moving vehicles,

seizure in plain view,
customs searches,
waiver or consent searches,
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
search incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of such
facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable cause means a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar,
there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not
identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore
no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating
an offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to justify a search incidental to a lawful
arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution that there was a waiver or consented
search. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he understand the police's
"sign language?" More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign
language" that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was held to be inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
87
PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ
88
PEOPLE vs PPO1 TRESTIZA (2011)

On Arrest --- Objection to warrantless arrest must be raised before plea; otherwise, objection is waived;
Illegality arrest does not set aside judgment of conviction if there was sufficient evidence to hold accused
guilty.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused (through his warrantless arrest) must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
The accused in this case was arrested for two crimes : kidnapping with ransom and illegal possession of
firearms. The illegal possession of firearms case was heard first and the accused fully participated therein. He
could not now object to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person by the court in the kidnapping with
ransom case.

22

Also, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. The fatal flaw of an invalid warrantless arrest becomes moot in
view of a credible eyewitness account.
Ombudsmans Grant of Immunity
89
G.R. No. 180452

January 10, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NG YIK BUN, KWOK WAI CHENG, CHANG CHAUN SHI,
CHUA SHILOU HWAN, KAN SHUN MIN, AND RAYMOND S. TAN

TOPIC: Warrantless Arrest (In Flagrante Delicto + Plain View Doctrine)

Doctrine: When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. (Plan
View Doctrine)
FACTS:
The accused, conspiring together, transported, delivered and distributed twenty-five (25) heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).
Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing
shipment of contraband.
Capt. Ibon and his team spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white
van.
Capt. Ibon asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van.
Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the
leader.
A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on
the premises.
An information for violation of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty
upon re-arraignment.
RTC: convicted accused-appellants of the crimed charged.
In questioning the RTC Decision, accused-appellants raised the lone issue of:
whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the absence of a warrant.
CA: affirmed RTC decision
Accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance into an L-300 van which, thus, justified their arrests and the seizure of the contraband.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure? - YES
RULING: A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the Constitution is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
23

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances
immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received
information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the
operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants
loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading
shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425,
as amendedis valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the
basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within
his view. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused-appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As
aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers.
And to write finis to the issue of any irregularity in their warrantless arrest, the Court notes, as it has
consistently held, that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not
raising the issue before entering their plea.

24