THE FIRST 100 DAYS OF THE

UKS CAMPAIGN AGAINST

THE ISLAMIC STATE
(30 SEP 2014 8 JAN 2015)
CRT BRIEFING, 22 JANUARY 2015

INTRODUCTION
As of 8 January 2015, the UK government had been militarily committed in Iraq for one hundred days.
During this time, it has carried out air strikes in areas primarily in the north and west of the Iraq
against Islamic State (IS) positions, compounds and military equipment. However, with the war against
IS increasingly looking likely to be a multi-year effort, more needs to be done.

THE BRITISH MILITARY EFFORT SO FAR

The UK has carried out strikes on thirty seven days since the beginning of its military
involvement (100 days of combat from 30 September to 8 January). It has therefore carried out
attacks on 37% of the days possible.
On thirty of the thirty seven days (81%) that strikes have been carried out, RAF Tornados
aircraft that were due to be decommissioned in April 2015 as part of military cuts were used.
Reaper Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), aka Reaper drones, have been used in
sixteen of the thirty seven days (43%).
The UK has carried out fifty four separate attack missions in the 100 days. Thirty five of these
attack missions have involved Tornados (65%). Eighteen have been carried out by Reaper
RPAS (33%). One mission involved an attack using both aircraft (2%).
The UK has significantly stepped up its number of attacks as the war has progressed. December
saw the highest frequency yet and even the first eight days of January had almost as many
strikes as all of October.

NUMBER OF ATTACKS PER MONTH

30
24

25
20
14

15
8

10

5
1
0
September

October

November

December

January

CHANGES IN IS TERRITORIAL CONTROL SINCE UK AIRSTRIKES

Maps taken from the Institute for the Study of War, available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/iraq-blog

TERRITORIAL CHANGES SINCE UK INTERVENTION

FORCE
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
IS
Peshmerga
Peshmerga/tribal
Isf/Kurdish Security Forces
Tribes
Unclear
Contested Area

OCTOBER 1 2014
14.5
15
5
1
1
2
11.5
13

JANUARY 7 2015
17.5
14
6
1
1
2
9.5
12

CHANGE
+3
-1
+1
0
0
0
-2
-1

CHANGES SINCE UK INTERVENTION

AREA
Sinjar, northern Iraq
Hit, al-Anbar, central Iraq
Nebai, central Iraq
Udhaim, central Iraq
Northern Babil, central Iraq
Sadia, east Iraq
Jalula, east Iraq

CHANGE
IS to contested
Unclear to IS
Unclear to contested
Contested to ISF
Contested to ISF
Contested to ISF
IS to Peshmerga

All data extracted from the Institute for the Study of War, available at: http://www.understandingwar.org/iraq-blog

Therefore, there has been a slight increase in ISF controlled areas; a small increase in Peshmerga
controlled areas; and an equally small decrease in the scale of IS overall territorial control

SELECT KEY VICTORIES OVER IS

Rabia, in northwest Iraq, was recaptured from IS at the beginning of October. In one of its first
military contributions to the war, RAF Tornados had attacked a key IS position shortly
beforehand.
IS were defeated in Jurf al-Sakhar, a town 60km south of Baghdad and in close proximity to the
holy Shia city of Karbala, also in October.
The ISF recapturing parts of Bayji, north Iraq, has been particularly significant; the town was
previously under the almost complete control of IS.

DEATH OF IS LEADERS IN COALITION AIRSTRIKES SINCE UK

INTERVENTION
NAME
Abu Muhanad al-Sweidawi
Abu Suja
Abu Huthaifa al-Yamani
Radwan Taleb al-Hamdouni
Abu Muslim al-Turkmani,
Abd al-Basit
Haji Mutazz

SIGNIFICANCE
A member of IS military council and their Anbar governor1
A key advisor to al-Baghdadi2
Aide to al-Baghdadi3
IS leader in Mosul4
Al-Baghdadis right hand man5
IS military emir6
A key deputy to al-Baghdadi7

POLITICAL CHANGES
In mid-August, under intense American and Iranian lobbying, Nouri al-Maliki resigned as Prime
Minister. He was replaced by Haider al-Abadi, who has overseen some important changes.
DATE
September onwards

EVENT

SIGNIFICANCE

(a) Corrupt officials and military officers

that were al-Maliki loyalists are retired or
removed from their posts.8 9 10 (b) A new
approach to the the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG).

This has been part of significant efforts to reform and

rebuild Iraqs security institutions;11 12 13 (b) Kurdish
politicians have been sworn into the most recent Iraqi
cabinet, boosting cooperation and dialogue between
Erbil and Baghdad; a large tranche of federal funding
withheld from the Kurds because of their attempts to

Fate of Islamic State chief unclear following U.S. airstrikes on groups leadership in Iraq, Washington Post, 9 November
2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/fate-of-islamic-state-chief-unclear-following-us-strikes-on-groupsleadership-in-iraq/2014/11/09/b5f6d262-8f61-4e1e-8703-2462eed53750_story.html
Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's close aide killed in US air strike, The Telegraph, 9 November 2014, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11219630/Islamic-State-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadis-close-aidekilled-in-US-air-strike.html
Aide to Islamic State's Baghdadi killed near Falluja: Iraqi TV, Reuters, 10 November 2014, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/11/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKCN0IU0V720141111
Islamic State: Senior IS leader Radwan Taleb al-Hamdoun reportedly killed in air strike in Mosul, ABC, 20 November
2014, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-11-21/senior-islamic-state-figure-killed-in-mosul-sources/5908008
Abu Muslim al-Turkmani: From Iraqi officer to slain ISIS deputy, Al-Arabiya, 19 December 2014, available at
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2014/12/19/Abu-Muslim-al-Turkmani-From-Iraqi-officer-to-slain-ISISdeputy.html
Three top Islamic State leaders killed in air strikes - U.S. officials, Reuters, 18 December 2014, available at
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/12/18/uk-mideast-crisis-usa-leaders-idUKKBN0JW29A20141218
Ibid.
Iraqs Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders, Institute for the Study of War, 13 November 2014, available at:
http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html
Iraqi PM retires 24 interior ministry officers, Al-Arabiya, 1 December 2014, available at
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/12/01/Iraqi-PM-sacks-24-Interior-Ministry-officials.html
Abadi shakes up military leadership after Anbar massacre, Iraq Oil Report, 24 September 2014, available at
http://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/abadi-shakes-military-leadership-anbar-massacre-13413/
Iraqs Prime Minister Reshuffles the Security Commanders, Institute for the Study of War, 13 November 2014, available at:
http://iswiraq.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/iraqs-prime-minister-reshuffles.html
Iraqi PM retires 24 interior ministry officers, Al Arabiya, 1 December 2014, available at
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/12/01/Iraqi-PM-sacks-24-Interior-Ministry-officials.html
Abadi shakes up military leadership after Anbar massacre, Iraq Oil Report, 24 September 2014, available at:
http://www.iraqoilreport.com/news/abadi-shakes-military-leadership-anbar-massacre-13413/
1

7
8

10

11

12

13

exploit and export oil resources through Turkey has

now been released to them;14 a long-term accord has
been struck to share the countrys oil wealth equitably;
and Iraqs central government will now pay the salaries
of Peshmerga fighters.
October

Al-Abadi dismantles the Office of the Maliki had previously used this office to monopolise
Commander in Chief.15 The security Iraqs national security apparatus.
portfolio is now divided up between
Khaled Al-Obeidi, a Sunni, instated as
Defence Minister and Mohammed alGhabban, a Shiite, as Interior Minister.16

November

The formation of National Guard units is While this is welcome, there are concerns over the
proposed, who are to be recruited and length of time it will take for the National Guard to be
trained to fight locally on a province-by- fully operational and combat effective.
province basis, focusing on protecting their
native populace.17

December

The salary of Ministers has been reduced A symbolic show of willingness from the Iraqi political
by 50% due to the Iraqi financial crisis.18
class.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE UK GOVERNMENT

Do more militarily
The UK military effort is vital. The UK intervention has contributed to IS momentum being checked,
forcing it focus on holding the land it already, has rather than taking large amounts more. Yet IS overall
territorial control is only slightly diminished since British military intervention began, so more needs to
be done.
The UK must not only step up its airstrikes, but also its training mission of the Iraqis, the Peshmerga
and tribal fighters that the US-led coalition has been able to support the harness of. Progress on this
front is currently too slow. In December 2014, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that
hundreds of British troops would be sent to Iraq to train Iraqi Security Forces and the Kurdish
Peshmerga. However, this appears to have been delayed after the May 2015 general election.19 This runs
the risk of appearing to be based on electoral calculations. While an increased US troop deployment

Baghdads Oil Deal With Kurdistan Quells Concerns of Iraqi Split, Foreign Policy, 2 December 2014, available at:
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/02/baghdads-oil-deal-with-kurdistan-quells-concerns-of-iraqi-split/
Iraq PM dismisses 24 interior ministry commanders, Daily Star, 1 December 2014, available at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Dec-01/279529-iraq-pm-dismisses-24-interior-ministry-commanders.ashx
Iraq crisis: MPs complete anti-IS government, BBC News, 18 October 2014, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-29674440
Pentagon aims to train leaner, meaner Iraqi army, Washington Post, 28 November 2014, accessible at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-seeks-to-build-lean-iraqi-force-to-fight-the-islamicstate/2014/11/27/f9539046-757b-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html
Iraqi Ministers Take 50 Percent Pay Cut as Oil Slumps, Bloomberg, 2 December 2014, available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-02/iraqi-ministers-take-50-percent-pay-cut-amid-financial-crisis.html
No UK troops for Iraq: Government delays plans to send soldiers to fight Islamic State amid fears of casualties in an election
year, Daily Mail, 7 January 2015, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2899834/No-UK-troops-IraqGovernment-drops-plans-send-soldiers-fight-Islamic-State-amid-fears-casualties-election-year.html
14

15

16

17

18

19

may be able to make up this shortfall, the US cannot be expected to do all the heavy lifting and should
expect UK assistance.

Begin to harness support for taking the war into Syria

IS has significant strongholds in Syria, including its capital city of Raqqa. Fighting a war without a Syria
component is ultimately self-defeating.
Therefore, the British government should begin to prepare both the House of Commons and the
general public for an expansion of the war into Syria. A previous Henry Jackson Society study has
outlined how this would be legally supported under international law by the fundamental principle of
self-defence: collectively, at the request of Iraq; and, individually, to protect British nationals held
hostage by the group. Consent is not required from Syrian President Bashar al-Assad because Syria has
shown unwillingness and inability to stop terrorists based in his territory from continually threatening
Iraq.20
It could also be argued that the scale of human suffering in Syria meets the standard required for the
use of force under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as long as the UK can show that no nonmilitary means can better alleviate this suffering.21
If the government chooses not to extend the war into Syria, a further option would be to take on more
of the military burden in Iraq in order to free up our allies to do so more effectively.

Support Haider al-Abadi but keep pushing for further political reform
The new Iraqi Prime Minister has made important steps towards political reconciliation, yet requires
consistent military and political support from the West. It is especially important that al-Abadi reduces
state-led sectarianism. If the war against IS is to succeed, that Sunni tribes that rise up against IS cannot
have reason to think that there will be a wave of Shia sectarianism emerging from Baghdad awaiting
them at the end of the conflict.

Be mindful of Iran
Al-Abadi is vulnerable to external pressure from other influential actors in the Iraqi political system:
especially Iran, a country engaged militarily in Iraq which has made an important military contribution
in terms of airstrikes, ammunition, weaponry and military advice.22
The Iraqi government remains dependent on this support, yet Irans assistance is conditional upon the
sway this allows it over Baghdad. Iran wants a sectarian, weak and divided government in Baghdad that
is vulnerable to their pressure. These aims clearly should not match those of the West.
Iran has also played a role in supporting various Shiite militias, contributing to IS defeats in areas such
as Baiji, Amerli and Jurf al- Sakhar.23 However, there have been reports of graphic abuses by these

Hannah Stuart, The Legal Case for British Military Action Against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Henry Jackson Society:
Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism, September 2014, available at http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/Legal-Case-for-British-Military-Action-in-Iraq-and-Syria.pdf
Ibid.
For example, see How much has Iran helped Iraq against the Islamic State? The answer is political, Christian Science
Monitor, 13 January 2015, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2015/0113/How-much-has-Iran-helpedIraq-against-Islamic-State-The-answer-is-political
Iraqi forces, Iranian-supported militias report success in Baiji, The Long War Journal, 14 November 2014, available at:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/iraqi_forces_shiite.php
20

21
22

23

Shiite militias on purported IS fighters and civilians presumed complicit with Sunni terrorists.24 Such
brutality will exacerbate sectarian tensions and undermine the narrative of inclusivity which is
fundamental to long-term success in Iraq.

Review the governments commitment to military spending

The importance of the Tornados in the UK governments contribution to the military effort in both
Iraq and Libya in recent years despite them being decommissioned displays the potential pitfalls of
rapid cuts to its military capacity.
The types of wars that the UK will have to fight in the future are unpredictable. To this end, whoever is
in power after the 2015 general election should consider reviewing the Strategic Defence and Security
Review of 2010 and re-assess whether ongoing cuts will leave the UK able to effectively project power
abroad in the future.

After victory in key Iraqi tow, time for revenge, Reuters, 26 October 2014, available at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/26/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-executions-idUSKBN0IF0W120141026
24

APPENDIX
MILITARY ACTION IN THE FIRST 100 DAYS25
DATE

CARRIER

EQUIPMENT USED

AREAS STRUCK

PURPOSE

30 September26

Tornado x 2

Unspecified area in
northwest Iraq

Assisting Kurdish troops

being attacked by IS

1 October27

(a) Tornado x 2; (b)

Tornado x 2

Paveway IV guided bomb x 1;

Brimstone anti-armour
missile x 1
(a) Brimstone anti-armour
missile x 4; (b) Paveway IV
guided bombs

(a) Unspecified area

west of Baghdad;
(b) Unspecified
area in northwest
Iraq (likely Rabia)28

(a) Attack two IS vehicles

including an armed pickup
truck; (b) assist Kurdish
forces being fired on by an
IS location

5 October

Unidentified aircraft
x 2 (likely Tornado
GR4)

Paveway IV guided bombs

Ramadi, Anbar
province, west of
Baghdad

Attack a building being

used by IS terrorists to fire
on Iraqi soldiers

7 October

Tornado GR4 x 2

Brimstone missiles; Paveway

IV guided bombs

8 October

Tornado (number
unspecified)
Tornado x 2

Unspecified

Ramadi, Anbar
province, west of
Baghdad
Unspecified

Attack an IS stronghold
from which terrorists were
firing on Iraqi troops
To assist the Iraqi
government against IS
Destroy an IS battle tank

19 October

Tornado (number
unspecified)

Brimstone missiles x 2

24 October

Tornado GR4 x 2

Paveway IV guided bomb;

unspecified quanity

1 + 2 November

(a) Tornado GR4 x

2; (b) Tornado

(a) Brimstone x 1; (b)

Brimstone x 1

4 November

Tornado GR4 x 2

Brimstone missile x 1

10 November

(a) Reaper RPAS

UAV x 1;
(b) Tornado GR4 x
2

(a) Hellfire missile x1; (b)

Brimstone missile x1

Unspecified date
w/c 13 October

Brimstone missile x 1

Near Ramadi,
Anbar province,
west of Baghdad
Ramadi, Anbar
province, west of
Baghdad
Jar Silah, west of
Kirkuk, northern
Iraq
(a) al-Qaim, western
Iraq; (b)
unspecified
Bayji, north of
Baghdad
(a) Bayji, north of
Baghdad; (b)
al-Anbar, west of
Baghdad

Attack IS terrorists who

had an Iraqi military
convoy south of Fallujah,
including two trucks
Destroy a former military
base used by IS for logistics
(a) IS armed vehicle; (b) IS
pickup truck
Destroy an IS pick-up
truck
(a) Attack terrorists trying
to laying IEDs; (b) destroy
an IS shipping container
used to store equipment

All data taken from http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive/air-strikes-in-iraq-18112014 and

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/latest-iraq-air-strikes
RAF planes bomb Islamic State targets in Iraq for the first time, Guardian, 30 September 2014, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/30/raf-planes-bomb-islamic-state-targets-iraq-first-time
RAF Tornados expected to be saved from axe for Iraq bombing campaign, Guardian, 1 October 2014, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/oct/01/raf-tornados-iraq-bombing-campaign
British Tornado with female air crew bombs key Isil position, The Telegraph, 1 October 2014, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11134662/British-Tornado-with-female-air-crew-bombs-key-Isilposition.html
25

26

27

28

12 November
13 November

Reaper RPAS x 1
Reaper RPAS x 2

Hellfire missiles
Hellfire missiles

15 November

(a) Multiple
Tornado GR4; (b)
Multiple Tornado
GR4
(a) Tornado GR4;
(b) Reaper RPAS x
1;

(a) Brimstone missile x 1; (b)

Paveway IV missiles

20 November

(a) Multiple
Tornado GR4

Paveway IV bombs

26 November

Reaper RPAS x 1

Hellfire missile x 1

27 November

Multiple Tornado
GR4; Reaper RPAS
x1

Paveway IV guided bombs;

Brimstone missiles; Hellfire
missiles

Northern Iraq

1 December

(a) Tornado GR4

patrol; (b) Tornado
GR4 x 2; (c) Reaper
RPAS x 1; (d)
Reaper RPAS x 1

(a) Brimstone missiles; (b)

Brimstone missiles; (c)
Hellfire missiles; (d) Hellfire
missile x 1

(a) Near Tal Afar,

northwest Iraq; (b)
near Tikrit; (c)
unspecified (d)
northern Iraq

2 December

(a) Tornado GR4 x

2; (b) Reaper RPAS
x1

(a) Paveway IV guided bombs

and Brimstone missile x 1; (b)
Hellfire missile x 1

(a) Near Fallujah;

(b) Unspecified
area in Iraq

5 December

Multiple Tornado
GR4

Paveway IV guided bombs

6 December

Multiple Tornado
GR4

Brimstone missile x 1

7 December

Tornado GR4 x 2

Brimstone missile x 1

Near Rawah, Anbar

province, western
Iraq
Near Rawah, Anbar
province, western
Iraq
Near Bayji, north of
Baghdad

8 December

Multiple Tornado
GR4
(a) Multiple
Tornado GR4; (b)
Reaper RPAS

Brimstone missiles

Multiple Tornado
GR4s
(a) Reaper RPAS x

Paveway IV guided bomb x 1;

18 November

9 December

10 December
12 December

(a) Paveway IV bombs;

(b) Hellfire x1

(a) Brimstone missiles; (b)

Hellfire missile x 1

(a) Hellfire missiles (number

Kirkuk, north Iraq

Unspecified

Attack three IS positions

Attack an IS machine gun
position, checkpoint and
truck
(a) Western Iraq (b) (a) Destroy an IS
north of Mosul,
communications vehicle (b)
northern Iraq
Attack mortar, firing
positions and a bulldozer
(a) Unspecified; (b) (a) Destroy IS bunkers and
unspecified
tunnels; (b) destroy IS
bulldozer
Near Bayji oil
refinery, north of
Baghdad
Unspecified

Near Mount Sinjar,

northwest Iraq
(a) Near Mount
Sinjar, northwest
Iraq; (b)
unspecified

Near Rawah, Anbar

province
(a) Northern Iraq;

Attack an IS compound.

Support Iraqi soldiers

under fire from an IS
position
Attack an IS fighting
position and nine IS
vehicles (armoured
personnel carriers and
armed pick-up trucks)
(a) Attack and IS
compound containing
armoured personnel
carriers; (b) attack two IS
positions; (c) attack three
IS positions; (d) attack one
IS position
Attack a group of IS
vehicles (including armed
pick-up trucks and lorries);
(b) attack an IS vehicle
Attack an IS observation
tower and equipment
Attack an IS armoured
personnel carrier
Support Iraqi soldiers
under fire from an IS
position
Attack two IS armoured
personnel carriers
(a) Attack an IS
observation tower and
guard room at a
checkpoint; (b) attack a
hostile armoured
personnel carrier
Attacked an IS storage
compound
(a) Attacked two IS

1; (b) Reaper RPAS

x 1; (c) Multiple
Tornado GR4s; (d)
Tornado GR4s x 2

unspecified); (b) Hellfire

missile x 1; (c) Paveway IV
and Brimstone missiles; (d)
Paveway IV missiles

(b) unspecified; (c)

near Ramadi,
Anbar province,
west of Baghdad;
(d) unspecified

19 December

Reaper RPAS x 1

Hellfire missile x 1

Unspecified

23 December

Multiple Tornado
GR4s
(a)
Multiple
Tornado GR4s; (b)
Reaper RPAS x 1

Brimstone
missiles
and
Paveway IV bombs
(a) Brimstone missile x 1; (b)
Hellfire missile x 1

Al-Qaim, western
Iraq
(a) Unspecified; (b)
unspecified

24 December

25 December

(a) Tornado GR4s x (a) Brimstone missiles x 2; (b) (a) Al-Qaim,

2; (b) Tornado GR4s Brimstone missiles
western Iraq; (b)
x2
Euphrates, south of
Hadithah Dam

28 December

Reaper RPAS x 1

2 January

(a) Tornado GR4s; (a) Brimstone missile x 1; (b) (a) East of Al-Qaim,
(b) Tornado GR4 x Paveway IV bombs x 2
western Iraq; (b)
1
northwest
of
Ramadi,
Anbar
province
(a) Reaper RPAS x (a) Hellfire missile x 1; (b) (a) Unspecified; (b)
1; (b) Reaper RPAS Hellfire missile x 1
unspecified
x1
(a) Tornado GR4s; (a) Brimstone missile x 1; (b) (a) Al-Qaim,
(b) Reaper x 1
Hellfire missiles x 3
western Iraq; (b)
unspecified

4 January

5 January

8 January

Reaper RPAS x 1

Hellfire x 2

Hellfire missile

Northern Iraq

Anbar province

Note
a)
b)

Only missions with a known combat perspective i.e. not reconnaissance missions are included.
The quantity of missiles fired or aircraft deployed is unknown unless specified.

engineer vehicles; (b) IS

armed pick-up truck; (c)
assist Iraqi troops by
bombing IS fighting
positions and three vehicles
(including two armoured
personnel carriers); (d)
attack a fortified IS
compound
Targeted IS terrorists
planting IEDs
Engaged four IS armoured
pick-up trucks
(a) Attacked IS armed
vehicle at a former Iraqi
military compound (b)
Fired at one IS pick-up
truck
(a) Fortified position and
shipping
container
converted into a guard
room; (b) two IS armed
vehicles
Attacking
IS
fighting
positions
(a)
Attacked
an
IS
armoured
personnel
carrier; (b) Attacked IS
positions
(a) Engaged an IS vehicle
(b) Attacked an IS position
(a) Destroyed an IS
excavator vehicle; (b) Hit
an armoured vehicle, a
heavy
equipment
transporter and an IS
position
ISIL position

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