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HSE
The main objective of this report is to improve the integrity of the mooring systems on Floating Production
Systems (FPSs). It is intended to be read and understood by non mooring specialists such as FPS
Operational staff - so that the people who live and work on FPSs will be better able to become more
involved in the vital task of looking after their own mooring systems. Meanwhile the included feedback on
the actual performance of mooring systems in the field should assist designers and manufacturers to
improve future mooring designs. Hence, the report attempts to identify gaps in the existing knowledge of
mooring behaviour and components to provide a road map for future work. Appendix C includes a paper
presented at the 2005 Offshore Technology Conference (OTC) which represents a stand alone summary
of the key points of the JIP.
This report and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its contents,
including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do not
necessarily reflect HSE policy.
HSE BOOKS
CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
SECTION
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
11
17
3
3.1
3.2
3.3
MOORINGS OVERVIEW
Mooring Basics
Mooring Line Constituents
Determination of Minimum Break Load (MBL) & Maximum Stresses
22
22
39
58
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
SIGNIFICANCE
Long-Term Degradation Mechanisms
Multiple Line Failure Incidents
Petrojarl 1 Multiple Lines Failure (1994)
65
65
74
76
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
77
77
79
81
82
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
85
85
86
93
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
99
99
101
108
112
113
118
8
8.1
8.2
8.3
122
122
123
124
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
126
126
130
143
10
10.1
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
145
145
146
151
155
158
160
160
163
165
165
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168
13
13.1
13.2
13.3
169
169
171
174
14
14.1
14.2
14.3
14.4
14.5
14.6
177
177
177
182
186
189
193
15
15.1
15.2
15.3
15.4
15.5
197
197
205
215
219
2 22
16
16.1
16.2
16.3
223
223
224
225
17
17.1
17.2
17.3
226
226
227
232
18
18.1
18.2
18.3
18.4
18.5
18.6
18.7
18.8
238
238
239
242
246
247
247
255
257
19 SPARING OPTIONS
19.1 Contingency Planning - Spares and Procedures
261
261
SPECIFICATION
20.1 Installation Parameters
264
265
21
21.1
21.2
21.3
267
267
268
270
22
272
23
278
24
279
25
280
26
20
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1-1 - North Sea Mooring Line Failure Data, 1980 to 2001 [Ref. 1] ................................... 12
Table 3-1 Summary of Chain Design Parameters (modified from Vicinay Chain Catalogue).. 41
Table 3-3 Chain Geometry Implications for Inspection and Maintenance ................................ 42
Table 3-5 Example of Indicative Surface Hardness Values for Various Chain Grades (courtesy
of Vicinay)............................................................................................................................. 46
Table 3-6 Illustration of Indicative Wire Rope Material Properties [Ref. 2] ............................. 49
Table 3-7 - Comparison of the Advantages of Spiral and Six Strand Wire (courtesy of Bridon) 50
Table 3-8 - Comparison of the Cons of Spiral and Six Strand Rope ............................................ 50
Table 3-9 - Wire Rope Recommendations for Varying Field Lives (courtesy of Bridon) ........... 50
Table 3-10 - Stipulated MBL and Proof Load Values for Various Sizes and Grades of Chain
(courtesy of Vicinay)............................................................................................................. 62
Table 5-1 - Line Failure Cost Estimate, 50,00bpd North Sea FPSO ............................................ 83
Table 5-2 - Line failure Cost Estimate, 250,000bpd West African FPSO .................................... 84
Table 7-1 - Example of Specified Corrosion and Wear Allowances from One Classification
Table 12-1 - Summary of the Pros and Cons of Sliding and Roller Bearings [Ref. 48] ............. 167
Table 13-1 - Example of the First Page of the Questionnaire see appendix B for a Full Listing
............................................................................................................................................. 169
Table 13-2 - UK Sector of the North Sea Data [Ref. 49].......................................................... 174
Table 13-3 - UK Sector of the North Sea Data [Ref. 49]........................................................... 174
Table 13-4 Number of Anchor Incidents in the Period of 1990-2003 in the Norwegian Sector
Table 15-1 Comparison between Chain Tension-Bending Fatigue Parameters Note that values
in italics are derived from BOMEL measured stress factor. ............................................... 203
Table 15-2 : Wire Rope Fatigue Reduction Due to Tension Bending [Ref. 31]......................... 216
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1 - Red Arrows Indicate Key Areas subject to Degradation on a .................................. 14
Figure 3-7 - Typical Spread Moored Unit, Girassol FPSO offshore West Africa (courtesy of Stolt
Offshore) ............................................................................................................................... 26
Figure 3-9 - Typical Spread Moored Catenary System (Courtesy of Vryhof) ............................. 28
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Figure 3-12 Illustration of Surge, Sway, Heave, Roll, Pitch and Yaw ...................................... 30
Figure 3-13 Example of Optimising the Stiffness of the Load offset Curve ............................ 32
Figure 3-17 - Illustration of Deepwater Breaking Wave Types (Plunging Break on the Left and
Figure 3-18 - Illustration of the Damage Caused to Schiehallions Bow by an Unusually Steep
Figure 3-19 - Model Illustration of the Effect of a Breaking Wave on a FPSO (Courtesy of APL
website) ................................................................................................................................. 38
Figure 3-20 - Isambard Kingdom Brunel in front of Studded Chain for the Great Eastern steam
Figure 3-21 Comparison of the Geometry of Modern Studded and Studless Chain.................. 40
Figure 3-22 - SPATE Contour Map of a 76mm Loose Stud Chain Link [Ref. 8]..................... 43
Vicinay) ................................................................................................................................. 47
Figure 3-26 - Illustration of the Make Up of Different Wire Rope Types (courtesy of Bridon) .. 49
Figure 3-27 Chronology of Deep Star Funded Synthetic Mooring Studies ............................ 51
Figure 3-28 - Accurate Drag Anchor Placement by Crane in Good Weather Conditions (courtesy
Figure 3-29 Installation and Normal (Vertical) Load Position (courtesy of Vryhof ) ................. 53
Figure 3-30 Anchor Pile + Chain Tail Deployed by a Twin Crane Construction Vessel (courtesy
Figure 3-32 - Example of a Tensile Test on a Steel Sample cut out from a Chain Link ............. 58
Figure 3-34 - Example of Terminology during a Tensile Test (courtesy of Ashby & Jones, [Ref.
17]) ........................................................................................................................................ 59
Figure 3-35 - Stress Strain Curves for R3, R4 and R5 Chain Steel (Data courtesy of Vicinay).. 61
Figure 3-36 Approximation of the Stress Distribution in a Typical Chain Link ....................... 63
Figure 4-1 Illustration of some of the Main Factors which Influence Mooring Integrity.......... 65
Figure 4-3 Fulmar SALM after Breakaway (courtesy of BBC film clip) .................................. 68
Figure 4-7 - Helicopter Rescue from the Free Drifting North Carr Lightship after Mooring
Figure 4-8 - Illustration of the North Carr Link Failure Relative to a 1999 North Sea FPSO Link
Figure 4-9 - Dutch Lightship Number 11 whose Mooring Failed in a Force 10 Gale in October
1991 which also broke a number of semi-sub moorings see Section 4.2........................... 73
Figure 4-10 - Fifth Generation Deepwater Nautilus Broke free of all her Moorings during
Hurricane Ivan....................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 4-11 - Petrojarl 1 which experienced two broken lines at the same time when hit by a
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Figure 5-2 Illustration of Riser Stretch After Loss of Position Following Mooring Line
Failure.................................................................................................................................... 79
Figure 5-4 - Example of how Mooring Integrity Philosophy can affect Production .................... 81
Figure 6-1 - Spooling Fibre rope onto a Powered Reel from Standard Containers ...................... 85
Figure 6-2 - Illustration of the Weight and Handling Issues Associated with Mooring
Figure 6-4 - Illustration of Twist on a FPSO Mooring Line during Recovery ............................ 90
Figure 6-5 Illustration of a Hockle in Spiral Strand Wire during Recovery of a FPSO
Figure 6-6 - Example of Damage to the Bend Stiffener on an Open Socket ................................ 91
Figure 6-8 - Mid Line Buoy Swivel Connection Link (courtesy of MoorLink AB). ................... 92
Figure 6-9 Pre-Stretching Polyester lines During Installation to Minimise the Requirement for
Figure 6-10 - Illustration of the Potential Difficulty in offshore alignment of pins on large
Figure 6-11 - Sledge used to Protect H Connector during Deployment over the Stern Roller
(Courtesy I. Williams)........................................................................................................... 97
Figure 7-1 The Balmoral Benchmark FPV which has been continuously on station since 1986
(Courtesy of CNR) ................................................................................................................ 99
Figure 7-3 Illustration of the Extent of General Corrosion on a Recovered Floating Production
Figure 7-5 Example of the Damage Caused to the Crown of the Links .................................. 105
Figure 7-6 Arrow shows the Apparent Grinding Action on the Inner Face of One of the Links
............................................................................................................................................. 105
Figure 7-7 Example of the Damage Caused to a Hanging Shackle Pin on a FPSO Mooring Line
............................................................................................................................................. 106
Figure 7-8 Finite Element Stress Contour Plot (compare red areas with Figure 7-6) [Ref. 8] .. 106
Figure 7-11 - Example of Wear and Pitting Corrosion on the Shackle Pin ............................... 109
Figure 7-12 -Test Rig Set Up for Break Testing of Mooring Components (Studless Chain in the
Figure 7-13 Illustration of Biologically Induced Pitting Corrosion in a Ballast Tank............. 112
Figure 7-14 - Crack Growth per Cycle versus Stress Intensity Range [Ref. 2] .......................... 113
Figure 7-15 Illustration of Excessive Chain Wear on a CALM Buoy [Ref. 34]...................... 115
Figure 7-16 Typical Temperature and Salinity Profile in the Tropical Oceans ....................... 116
Figure 7-17 Indicative Oxygen Concentration versus Water Depth (courtesy of BP)............. 116
Figure 7-18 Gulf of Mexico Snap Shot of Bottom Oxygen Concentration ............................. 117
Figure 7-19 - Measured Wear Rates of U3 and U4 Chain at 8,170lbs (300 tonnes equivalent)
Figure 8-1 Illustration of Line Tension Variations during a Payout/Pull-In Test .................... 123
Figure 9-1 - Turret Design in which Chain Lengths can be Adjusted (courtesy of Chevron-
Texaco)................................................................................................................................ 127
Figure 9-2 Generic Turret Design in which the Chains are Stoppered off at the Turret Base
Figure 9-3 - Spread Moored FPSO Single Axis Chain Stopper (courtesy of SBM)................... 128
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Figure 9-4 - External Cantilever Turret which experienced Chain wear at the Trumpet Welds
Figure 9-5 - Example of the Level of Inspection Detail which can be achieved using a Typical
Figure 9-6- Test Tank Mock-Up of Micro-ROV inspection of Chain Emerging from Turret
Figure 9-7 - Micro-ROV Photograph of Chain Wear Notches where Chain Emerges at the
Figure 9-9 - Artificially Introduced Notch on to Spare Chain Links, note also Red Circular
Figure 9-10 - Example of Stretched Chain during Break Testing, the Blue Mark Shows the
Figure 9-12 - Photograph of a Recovered Link Showing a Wear Notch (courtesy of I. Williams)
............................................................................................................................................. 136
Figure 9-13 - An Example of the Chain Damage noted after the Notched Chains had been
Figure 9-14 - Turret Arrangement where the Chain Stopper (in red) is Behind the Rotation Point
Figure 9-15 Illustration of Potential Wear at Metal to Metal Contact (courtesy of I. Williams)
............................................................................................................................................. 138
Figure 9-16 - Fairlead Chain Stopper where the Chain Stopper is in Front of the Rotation Point
(used on some Spread Moored FPSOs) (courtesy of Maritime Pusnes) ............................. 138
Figure 9-17 - As Installed Photo Graph of the Design Shown in Figure 9-16 (courtesy of
Figure 9-18 Typical CALM Buoy Chain Stopper (courtesy of The Professional Divers
Figure 9-19 - Amoco CALM Buoy- Note Inclusion of Rubber Casting (courtesy of [Ref. 38]) 140
Figure 9-20 - Comparison of Alternative Fairlead Arrangements (courtesy of Bardex) ........... 142
Figure 9-21 Example of a Wire Rope Bending Shoe (courtesy of API RP25K) ..................... 143
Figure 9-22 - Example of a Chain Bending Shoe Design [Ref. 39]............................................ 143
Figure 9-23 - Bending Shoe Design which includes an Angle Sensor [Ref. 40] ........................ 144
Figure 10-1 Examples of the Subjectivity Associated with Assessing IWRC Rope Conditions
Figure 10-2 - Illustration of the Mooring Layout and Connections ............................................ 146
Figure 10-4 - Note End Plate also seems to be Falling Off on the Right Hand Side (courtesy of
Figure 10-7 - Repair Utilised Bigger Bolts and Allowed the Socket Pin to Rotate .................... 149
Figure 10-8 - Example of Retrofitted Anodes to Control Corrosion Rate .................................. 150
Figure 10-9 - Example of Disconnected Anodes after approximately 12 months of Service..... 150
Figure 10-10 - Example of Detached Clump Weight on the Sea-Bed ........................................ 151
Figure 10-12 Illustration of Where the Damage Occurred on the Mooring Catenary ............. 152
Figure 10-13 - Example of a Parallel Chain Excursion Limiter (courtesy of I. Williams) ......... 152
Figure 10-14 - Weighted Chain Option Utilising Parallel Chain Sections (courtesy of
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Figure 10-15 - Red Arrow Illustrates the Local Wear can take place when utilising Parallel
Figure 10-18 - Upper Gypsy Wheel Arrangement before Failure .............................................. 156
Figure 10-19 - Gypsy wheel structure after failure, i.e. Gypsy Wheel No Longer Present ........ 156
Figure 10-20 - Illustration of a New Design of Kenter Shackle intended to have improved
Figure 10-21 - Example of Windlass Crack (Red Arrow) due to Stress Raiser caused by Sharp
Figure 11-1 - General Arrangement of the Brent Spar Mooring System (courtesy of Shell) ..... 160
Figure 11-2 - Brent Spar Fairlead Chain Stopper in the Hull (courtesy of Shell)....................... 161
Figure 11-4 - Indentation from where the chain bore down on the Stopper (courtesy of Shell) 162
Figure 11-5 Red Arrow Illustrates wear on the chain, where it sat on the stopper (courtesy of
Figure 11-6 - Brent Spar Wire Sample Y1 prior to cleaning [Ref. 41]....................................... 163
Figure 11-8 - Example of Short Trumpets on a Long Term Moored Floating Loading Platform
Figure 13-1 - Comparison of Mooring Line Inspection Periods for Different FPS Categories. 173
Figure 13-2 Historical Failure Rates for Different Types of Units ......................................... 176
Figure 14-1 - Special Joining Shackle (courtesy of Vicinay Catalogue) .................................... 179
Figure 14-3 Illustration of Subsea Connectors which have been used on Pre-Installed Mooring
Figure 14-4 - Example of a Special Joining Plate - Note Electrical Isolating Bush ................... 181
Figure 14-5 Example of the Make Up of a Typical Closed Spelter Socket (courtesy of Bridon)
............................................................................................................................................. 182
Figure 14-8 - Connector or Termination Design Flow Diagram - Initial Phase ........................ 187
Figure 14-10 Illustration of a Purpose Designed connector allowing limited compliance in Two
Figure 14-11 - Example of a Dynamic Analysis to Estimate the Angle for the V Slot Size on
Figure 14-12 - Example of Material with a Non Clearly Defined Yield Point .......................... 194
Figure 15-4 - Photograph of Test Link Showing Bearing Plates [Ref. 10]................................. 199
Figure 15-5 - General View of Tension Bending Test Rig (protective screens removed for
Figure 15-6 - Broken Hardened Plates at the end of the First Test [Ref. 10] ............................. 200
Figure 15-7 - Twisted Link Due to Mis-aligned Butt Weld [Ref. 10] ........................................ 201
Figure 15-8 - Simple Out of Flatness Twist Measurement Jig [Ref. 10] .................................... 201
Figure 15-9 - Illustration of Failed Link Due to Tension Bending [Ref. 10].............................. 204
Figure 15-11 - Girassol Offloading Buoy Failure in Chain Link 5 [Ref. 55] ......................... 206
Figure 15-12 - Girassol Offloading Buoy Failure in Polyester Rope [Ref. 55] ...................... 206
Figure 15-13 - Chainhawser Arrangement and Location of Critical Link [Ref. 55] ................. 207
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Figure 15-14 - Out of Plane Bending Mechanism (See Section 25 [Ref. 56]......................... 208
Figure 15-15 - Schematic of SBM Test Rig [Ref. 55] ............................................................... 209
Figure 15-18 Illustration of Wire Rope Failure Modes (courtesy of Bridon) .......................... 217
Figure 15-19 - The 1.0MN Wire Rope Bending-Tension Fatigue Test Machine ....................... 218
Figure 15-20 - Tension Bending at Wheel Fairlead (Bearing Load Eccentricity) and Tension
Figure 15-21 - Comparison between Various Mooring Chain S-N Curves ............................... 221
Figure 17-1 - Sonar Fish for Deployment through Turret (courtesy Chevron Texaco) ............. 227
Figure 17-2 Sonar Fish Deployment Method (courtesy Chevron Texaco) .............................. 227
Figure 17-3 - Sonar Display Screen Showing 12 Mooring Lines and 2 Risers Close to the Centre
Figure 17-4 - Simple Pre-Installed Inclinometer with + or 1 Degree Accuracy ...................... 229
Figure 17-5 - Illustration of a Football Sized ROV (Courtesy of I. Williams) ....................... 229
Figure 17-6 - Instrumented Load Pin Shackle Link (courtesy of BMT/SMS)......................... 230
Figure 17-7 - Indication of the Data Available from Instrumented Mooring Lines (courtesy of
BMT/SMS).......................................................................................................................... 231
Figure 17-8 - Illustration of a New Sonar System due to be Installed in the North Seas (courtesy
Figure 17-9 - Close Up of the Proposed Sonar Head (courtesy of Ian Williams)...................... 233
Figure 17-10 - Response Learning Without Line Tension Input ................................................ 234
Figure 17-11 - Illustration of Riser Monitoring Instrumentation (courtesy of 2H) .................... 236
Figure 18-1 - Red Arrows and Black Line Indicate Key Areas subject to Degradation on a
Figure 18-2 - Example of a Weight Discontinuity which may Result In Enhanced Wear ......... 240
Figure 18-3 - Typical Turret Cross Section Illustrating that the key Mooring Components are
Submerged........................................................................................................................... 241
Figure 18-4 - Chain Stopper View Prior to Chain Installation with Pull in Rigging Present
Figure 18-5 - Illustration of ROV Deployed Optical Calliper Measurement System (courtesy
Figure 18-6 Illustration of Heavy Marine Growth on Long Term Deployed Chain............... 246
Figure 18-8 - Close Up Of Fairlead Pocket Note Slight Lip on the Right ............................... 248
Figure 18-9 - Example of Chain Wear From Sitting in a Wildcat Pocket .................................. 249
Figure 18-10 - Red Zones Highlight the Importance of Checking all Relevant Structural
Figure 18-11 - Example of a Parted Lubrication Line Feeding a Submerged Wildcat or Gypsy
Figure 18-13 - Buchan FPS Wire Rope NDT Inspection Head ................................................. 252
Figure 18-14 - Proposed Wire Rope Inspection Toll Delpoyed from a ROV............................ 253
Figure 18-16 - Partially Buried Shackle Illustrates the Difficulties in checking locking pins
Figure 18-17 - Example of the Wheel Tappers Approach Used for Detecting Cracks on Railway
Figure 18-18 - Example of Anchor Handling and Heading Control Tugs during a Mooring Line
Figure 18-19 - Use of Divers from a RIB to open up the Chain Stopper during a FPSO Mooring
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Figure 19-1 - Example of a Plate Shackle which may be useful for a Temporary Repair (courtesy
Figure 19-2 - Temporary Mooring Line Winch Deck on a Gulf of Mexico Spar....................... 263
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10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1
1.2
Introduction
Unlike trading ships, FPSs stay at fixed positions year after year without regular dry
docking for inspection and repair. Since they cannot move off station they must
withstand whatever weather comes their way. Hence, depending on location, at times
their mooring systems need to withstand high storm loadings. Typically, during design
for harsh environments, mooring systems do not have much reserve capacity above
what is required to withstand survival conditions. Therefore, deterioration of the lines
over time can increase the likelihood of single or multiple line failures. Multiple line
failure could conceivably result in a FPS breaking away from the moorings and freely
drifting in the middle of an oil field as has been seen in the past see Section 4.
Failure of two adjacent mooring lines mooring lines at the same time due to wave
shock loading has been seen and this could have serious implications if the risers are
pressurised at the time.
This JIP is concerned with assessing how mooring systems have performed in the field
to identify the level of degradation which has taken place. Hence, the JIP has looked at
FPSOs, Semi-submersible production units and Spars through out the world. From the
survey it has become apparent that certain, potentially significant, problems have
occurred and thus the JIP wishes to publicise these so that they can be taken account of
during inspection of existing units and during the design of future units.
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11
1.3
Type of Unit
Number of Operating
Years per Failure
Drilling Semi-submersible
4.7
Production Semi-submersible
9.0
FPSO
8.8
Table 1-1 - North Sea Mooring Line Failure Data, 1980 to 2001 [Ref. 1]
Given the safety critical nature of mooring lines and the likelihood of failure one might
imagine that they would be heavily instrumented with automatic alarms which would
go off in case of line failure. The following indicative statistics, based on data from the
majority of North Sea based FPSOs, give an indication that instrumentation is not as
prevalent as might be expected for such a heavily regulated region:
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33% of units cannot measure offsets from the no-load equilibrium position,
12
1.4
Description
Approx. Cost of
Single Line Failure
2M
10.5M
1.5
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13
1.6
From a number of units it has become clear that the less loaded leeward lines can be
subject to greater degradation than the windward lines. This seems to be due to greater
relative rotation on leeward lines since the line is typically under lower tension.
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14
1.7
1.8
Inspection Technologies
Inspecting moorings lines in situ is desirable due to the danger of damage during line
recovery to the surface and also during re-installation. There is also a significant cost
involved in mobilising intervention vessels to recover lines to the surface and then reinstall them.
In-water line inspection is difficult, particularly with respect to identifying possible
cracks. Despite this it has become clear that many possible problems can be identified
early on, using tweaks to existing technology. This has been successful as long as
suitably experienced people are involved in planning the inspection process and
examining the results.
Section 18 summarises the present available inspection technologies and includes a
prioritised list of possible future improvements.
1.9
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15
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16
2.1
There has been one FPSO line failure for every 5.4 operating years (this
figure has been updated during this study);
The study concluded that the potential for multiple line failure is greater than is
commonly perceived, and this should be a major cause for concern. The main reasons
for this situation are:
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Most UK sector FPSOs can not detect if they have lost a mooring line;
The risk of mooring line failure is often underestimated and the majority
of operators do not carry spares or have systems in place for dealing with
a line failure;
17
2.2
Scope Development
The JIP scope was developed to extend the previous UKOOA study to include
international experience, and reassess the conclusions of the UK sector study in more
global terms. In addition, a follow up has been carried on the recommendations of the
UKOOA study to investigate the levels of exposure to duty holders, and developing
measures to reduce the associated risks.
Specifically the work has covered the following:
x
The JIP scope has been adjusted during the project to take into account results found to
date and also the difficulties experienced in obtaining international data.
2.3
JIP Objectives
The basic objectives of the JIP are to:
x
Improve safety
This report is intended to be read and understood by non mooring specialists such as
FPS Operational staff. In this way the people who live and work on FPSs will be better
able to become involved in the vital task of looking after their own mooring systems.
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18
2.4
Project Organization
The project organisation is illustrated in Figure 2-1.
STEERING
COMMITTEE
Nigel Robinson
NDE Project Director
Martin Brown
Project Manager
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
MOORING PROBLEMS
CTR 11: Survey
of International
FPSO/FPSO/
FPS Experience
CTR
: Survey
of International
FPS Exp
CTR 44: Consequences
of Line
CTR
: Consequences
of Failure
Line Failure
DISSEMINATION
OF RESULTS
(CTR 10)
Lessons Learned
Bulletins/Steering
Detailedbriefings
Report
Committee
Integrity Check List
OTC paper
Detailed Report
INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
CTR 5 : Status Monitoring and Failure Detection
CTR 6 : Inspection, Repair & Maintenance, inc In
Water Survey
CTR 7 : Sparing Options
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19
2.5
Project Participants/Sponsors
The following list details the organisations which have sponsored the JIP plus the
personnel nominated to the Steering Committee. It is worth noting that the Steering
Committee meetings provided an excellent mechanism to obtain and distribute data.
Thanks are given to all members of the committee and the Chairman for their
participation.
1.
2.
Ansell Jones
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
Many people from various organisations helped out through out the JIP by providing
information. It is impossible to list them all, but their combined support has been
crucial in enabling a comprehensive picture to be pulled together. Particular thanks are,
however, given to Amerada Hess/Wood Group and Mr Ian Williams for making highly
relevant data readily available to the JIP. Thanks also to Diane for all her assistance
with the layout and editing of this document.
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20
2.6
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21
MOORINGS OVERVIEW
3.1
Mooring Basics
3.1.1
Restoring Forces
To appreciate how to preserve the integrity of a mooring system it is helpful to have a
basic understanding of the different types of mooring systems and how they work. This
subject is covered in this chapter, which also includes a simple introduction to how
such systems can be analysed.
The primary purpose of a mooring system is to maintain a floating structure on station
within a specified tolerance, typically based on an offset limit determined from the
configuration of the risers. The mooring system provides a restoring force that acts
against the environmental forces which want to push the unit off station. In the
following diagrams the main components of mooring system restoring force are
explained.
The connection between the mooring system and the body of the vessel is where the
restoring force of the mooring system acts, see Figure 3-1. At this connection point
there are two force components present; horizontal and vertical. The horizontal
component of the mooring lines tension acts as a restoring force. The vertical
component acts as a vertical weight on the vessel. In deep water the vertical force can
be quite considerable. For some designs of FPS, with limited payload capacity, the
vertical mooring force can have significant design implications.
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22
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23
3.1.2
Environmental Loading
When there is no external loading on the system the vessel will not move from its static
equilibrium position. When environmental loading does occur an imbalance in the
system will occur. To restore equilibrium the mooring system restoring force must
become equal to that of the environmental load. This is achieved through the vessel
offsetting from its original position. As this occurs the windward lines will pick up
tension and the leeward lines will shed tension. This is shown in Figure 3-4.
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24
The relationship between environmental load and vessel offset is often represented in a
Load Excursion curve, as shown in Figure 3-6. This figure illustrates the load
excursion characteristics of a 1,200m long, 76mm nominal diameter chain in 100m
water depth with a working or pretension tension of 100te. The plot emphasizes the
need to model the axial elasticity, even for chains, in order to get realistic results. Axial
elasticity depends on geometry and material. Since there are new materials and
geometries available in the market, it is important that designers should confirm with
manufacturers that the values they are using agree with full scale testing values.
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25
3.1.3
Mooring Configuration
The most common mooring configurations are Spread Moored and Single Point
Mooring systems, which are taken to include turret systems. The key attributes of each
are discussed in this section.
Spread Mooring
This conventional mooring approach is widely adopted for semi-submersible
drilling/flotel/production units. For floating production applications, spread moorings
are used primarily with semi-submersibles and non-weathervaning FPSOs (i.e. no
turret) see Figure 3-7. Since the wave loading on a semi-submersible is relatively
insensitive to direction, a spread mooring system can be designed to hold a semi on
location regardless of the direction of the environment, although there is probably an
optimum heading. However, a spread system can also be applied to ship-shaped
vessels, which are more sensitive to environmental directions, as long as the
environmental conditions are relatively benign and the weather direction is fairly
uniform without strong cross currents. In a location such as the North Sea, the forces
which can be generated on the beam of a spread moored FPSO, plus the motions in
such conditions, effectively prohibit such a mooring arrangement.
The mooring lines can be chain, wire rope, fibre rope or a combination of the three.
Either conventional drag anchors or anchor piles can be used to terminate the mooring
lines.
Figure 3-7 - Typical Spread Moored Unit, Girassol FPSO offshore West Africa
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Spread moorings are typically cheaper than turret moorings since they are mechanically
far less complicated. However, they are limited to where they can be used and they can
make offloading operations by a shuttle tanker somewhat more involved.
Single Point Moorings (SPMs)
Single point moorings (SPMs), such as internal or external turrets, are used primarily
for ship shaped units see Figure 3-1. They allow the vessel to weathervane, which is
necessary to minimise environmental loads on the vessel by heading into the prevailing
weather. There is a wide variety in the design of SPMs, but they all perform essentially
the same function.
3.1.4
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3.1.5
Vessel Dynamics
Waves will cause a vessel to move in all six degrees of freedom; surge, sway, heave,
roll, pitch and yaw. These degrees of freedom are illustrated in Figure 3-6.
The motion of the vessel to individual waves is called its wave frequency or first-order
response. As a mooring line moves through the water it will be subject to dynamic line
drag and inertia loading and sometimes a whipping effect. It is possible to take this
into account by undertaking a dynamic mooring analysis, but this does increase
computing time significantly.
Figure 3-12 Illustration of Surge, Sway, Heave, Roll, Pitch and Yaw
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The compliance of a mooring system is such that conventionally the presence of the
mooring system is not considered to affect the wave frequency response. The overall
mooring system stiffness and associated natural frequency will influence its second
order or low frequency slow drift response.
In deep water for certain floating objects, such as deep draft Spars, the wave frequency
motion is attenuated to a certain extent by the mooring system due to the higher system
stiffness. Hence, a coupled analysis is sometime undertaken. The general conclusion
from this type of analysis appears to be that the mooring quasi-static tension has an
impact on a floater's wave frequency response, which in turn will affect the mooring
dynamic tension. On the other hand, the effect of dynamic tension is less important to a
floater's wave frequency response. For deep water the effect of risers on the vessel
response becomes increasingly important and this should be taken into account.
The coupled wave frequency motion of a floater can be calculated in the time domain
using the wave force, wave frequency added mass and damping, and mooring force at
each time step. Usually a convolution method needs to be adopted in the radiation
force calculation. Although the coupled wave frequency motion calculation in the time
domain is slower than the Response Amplitude Operator (RAO) based wave frequency
motion calculation, it is still acceptable. Typically a 3 hour simulation will take a few
minutes. However if there is very high mooring stiffness or if a mooring dynamic
analysis is performed, then the computing time will be high.
3.1.6
Mooring Design
The tensions experienced by a mooring system at any time are driven by the following:
x
x
x
The essence of mooring design is to optimise the behaviour of the mooring system such
that the excursions of the surface vessel do not exceed the allowable flexible riser
offsets, while at the same time ensuring that the line tensions are within their allowable
values. Thus the mooring system load offset curve should not be too hard or too soft
see Figure 3-13. Hence, considerable iteration work may be required to optimise a
system for a particular location.
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It is worth noting that spring buoys (mid water buoys) and clump weights can also be
used to obtain an optimised mooring system stiffness by extending the resistive forces
over greater distances, hence allowing clearance over subsea features. However, their
use should be treated with caution, particularly in areas subject to harsh environmental
conditions, where they have been known to come adrift see Section 9.3. Buoys and
clump weights are also likely to introduce bending effects which may have an
undesirable impact on the fatigue life see Section 15.
Figure 3-13 Example of Optimising the Stiffness of the Load offset Curve
3.1.7
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3.1.8
2.
All round length adjustment, including windward lines, so that the tensions are as
well balanced as possible at the limit of vessel surge.
If the leeward lines are slackened down too much this can result in greater
yawing/surging and reduced direction control which can lead to higher line tensions. In
other words, if there is too much slack in the system, there is an increased danger of
high line snatch loadings.
Windward line tension optimisation can also be problematic. To quote from Robert
Ingliss informative 1992 paper [Ref. 3]:
in practise rig operators are reluctant to adjust windward line tensions in
severe weather conditions and usually restrict adjustments, if any, to
slackening leeward lines. This is partly to do with limitations in winch stall
capacity and the risk of a winch or brake failure, but most importantly the
majority of rigs are not provided with suitable tension monitoring devices and
computerised winch control systems which would make extensive line tension
optimisation a realistic possibility. The general situation is that analysts
frequently utilise line optimisation to reduce tensions to meet acceptance
criteria but these line tension optimisation procedures are almost never
implemented in practice on a rig.
Based on this type of feedback the latest mooring design codes (e.g. ISO [Ref. 4] + OS
E301 [Ref. 5]) do not permit either windward or leeward active wincing to minimise
mooring line tensions apart from going from one operational state to another.
Thruster Assistance
A number of semi-submersibles and a relatively small number of FPSOs are equipped
with thruster assistance. The thruster assistance can be categorised as either Thruster
Assistance (TA) or Automatic Thruster Assistance (ATA). TA is based on manual
joystick thruster control. ATA makes use of automatic remote control algorithm
system to control the behaviour of the thrusters.
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It has been found that operation of the thrusters can be very effective in reducing peak
line tensions; even though the thrust delivered can be modest. Typically in a mooring
analysis the thrusters are considered to reduce the mean load applied to the mooring
system. However, thrusters also seem to damp down the magnitude of the slow drift
second order offsets. They can also be helpful with respect to heading control. This
can be particularly useful on a production vessel, if a small change in heading can result
in reduced vessel motions, thus improving the efficiency of the oil/water separation
process.
In practical terms, when operating in manual thruster mode, high line snatch loads can
be avoided by applying thrust as the wave train approaches. This will tend to push the
vessel in the direction of the advancing sea. As the wave passes it is necessary to ease
down on the thrust to avoid over slackening the windward lines. If these become too
slack there is an increased danger of snatch loading when the next wave train passes
through.
3.1.9
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3.1.10
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Figure 3-17 - Illustration of Deepwater Breaking Wave Types (Plunging Break on the
Left and Spilling Breaking on the Right)
In November 1998 the Schiehallion FPSO was struck by a wave which was felt
throughout the vessel. The wave caused tears in the forward shell plating of the
forecastle superstructure, buckling of supporting stiffeners and permanent deformation
of the forecastle tween deck see Figure 3-18. Production was shut down and non
essential personnel were evacuated to a nearby drilling rig. In this instance no damage
was reported to the mooring system, but it illustrates the danger presented by infrequent
steep breaking waves.
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Present day standard mooring analysis tools do not evaluate this potential shock load
effect on the mooring systems. Hence it is difficult to quantify. But there is a
possibility, based on the wave description, that it could have been a factor which led to
the virtually instantaneous multiple line failures experienced by Petrograd 1 in the
early 1990s (see Section 4.3). This might also be a factor in the relatively frequent
mooring line failures experienced by semi-subs. It is recommend that this topic should
be investigated further and that appropriate cross checks should be made with the real
life recorded response of FPSs in severe/steep sea weather conditions. However, it also
should be noted that such weather conditions do not occur very often.
Figure 3-19 - Model Illustration of the Effect of a Breaking Wave on a FPSO (Courtesy
of APL website)
The right hand side photograph of Figure 3-19 is perhaps an example of the type of
wave conditions which could impart a shock loading to the moorings, depending on the
FPSO offset at the time. If a mooring line had already broken and its failure had not
been detected (due to a lack of failure of instrumentation) the chance of additional line
failures would be high in these conditions.
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3.2
3.2.1
Introduction
Various different materials can be used to assemble a mooring line. This section
provides a brief description of the main components that typically constitute a mooring
line. The pros and cons of the various types of line components are explained. This
helps to aid understanding when considering how actual systems have performed in
situ. Connectors and terminations are considered separately in Section 14.
3.2.2
Figure 3-20 - Isambard Kingdom Brunel in front of Studded Chain for the Great
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Studless Link
Studded Link
Figure 3-21 Comparison of the Geometry of Modern Studded and Studless Chain
[Note: DNV Cert Note 2.6, states 3.3D to 3.4D for the of studless link width]
Fairly recent long-term applications of chains in the moorings of floating production
systems have brought about the development of studless chain. The studless chain link
has been redesigned with a smaller breadth to reduce the bending loads. These designs
are increasingly used for long-term moorings because loose and missing stud problems
are eliminated. Unfortunately, however, the fatigue life of studless chain has been
shown to be half that of comparable studded chain, based on the results of fatigue
testing [Ref. 8]. In other words the fatigue endurance of studded chains is twice that of
studless if the studs remain tight. Of the 70 fatigue failures reported in the Houston JIP,
52% occurred at an inner Half-Crown position, 34% at an inner Crown position and
14% at a mid leg position. The Crown refers the area of maximum bend and HalfCrown essentially refers to the area of the link where bending commences.
The studless link standard geometry of length of 6 x D and breadth of 3.35 x D came to
the market after 1989 as consequence of collaboration between DNV and Vicinay for
the Veslefrikk B project. For this chain the first tentative specification went out in
1995 with the DNVs Certification Note 2.6. More recent developments include
customised chain geometries also known as Variable Geometry and Weight (VGW) as
discussed in OTC paper 8148, 1996 [Ref. 9]. VGW provides flexibility to modify link
geometry and weight to suit a particular application see for example Section 18.8.2.
Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 summarise the relative merits of studless and studded chain in
terms of design, manufacturing, inspection and maintenance.
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Requirement
Recommended
Chain
Studless
Access for
connection
Studless
Studless
Studless
Studlink
shackle
and
accessory
through
windlasses
and
Reason
Both
Both
Open to discussion
Table 3-1 Summary of Chain Design Parameters (modified from Vicinay Chain
Catalogue)
Requirement
Recommended
Chain
Reason
Studless
Studless
Lack of stud
Studless
Studless
Lack of stud
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Recommended
Chain
Requirement
Reason
Studless
Studless
Studless
To be determined
Studless
Studlink
Both
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Sandbergs report [Ref. 12] discusses the effect of loose studs and reports the
following: (Page 11) This ovalization occurred at the point where the edge of the
footprint forms a notch effect, which in some instances appeared quite severe. It was at
this point that the fatigue cracks were initiated and then propagated through the side of
the link. However, on page 16 Sandberg advised that Not all loose studs had
developed cracks even where the end of stud play was up to 4.0mm indicating that
many factors play a part in the initiation and propagation of these cracks including the
ultimate tensile stress (UTS) of the studs. The mechanical properties for the stud are
important, particularly with regard to yield strength, for the setting of the chain under
the proof load. If the properties are not correctly balanced then fixing of the stud may
be significantly impaired which can affect the future serviceability of the chain.
Figure 3-22 shows a SPATE contour map which gives a crude indication of how a
loose stud can affect the stress distribution in a studded link where the stud has become
loose. The basic theory behind SPATE (Stress Pattern Analysis by Thermal Emission)
is the detection of minute changes in surface temperature due to the pseudo adiabatic
response of a material under stress. Through an infrared detector, scanning the surface
of a given material, relative changes in temperature are fed to a computer system for
correlation and finally presented as a pictorial colour image of the stress pattern over
the scanned area. These pictures can be interrogated further to obtain stress values at
any given point. As the stresses in the three principal planes contribute to the overall
temperature change, stress values obtained are a summation of the principal stresses
generated by the dynamic loading in each plane.
Figure 3-22 - SPATE Contour Map of a 76mm Loose Stud Chain Link [Ref. 8]
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Asymmetric Studs
Asymmetric studs were developed to reduce the amount of loose studs experienced in
the field. The Asymmetric stud is designed in such a way that gives equal foot prints
on either side of the link see Figure 3-23. In studlink chain, the asymmetric stud
design is claimed to provide more equal stud indentation and contributes to a more
symmetric stress distribution in the link.
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3.2.4
Oil Rig Quality (ORQ), dating from the beginning of the 1970s with 641MPa
issued by API
R3, dating from the mid 1980s with 690 MPa to meet ORQ + 10%
Description
Ultimate Tensile
Strength (MPa or
N/mm2)
Marine
Grade U1
310
Marine
Grade U2
490
Marine
Grade U3
690
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3.2.5
Chain Grade
Grade 3
220 250
R3
235 -260
R3S
250 275
R4
275 305
R5
305 - 325
Table 3-5 Example of Indicative Surface Hardness Values for Various Chain Grades
(courtesy of Vicinay)
The applied tension in a link and hence the resulting stresses could conceivably result
in a change in surface hardness. Vicinay has investigated this point and concluded that
the increase in superficial hardness of chains, due to tension, is insignificant.
One oil company chain specification states that the maximum hardness should not
exceed 350 HV10 (HV = Vickers hardness, similar to Brinnell in this range of
numbers) mainly due to a sensitivity to hydrogen induced crack growth. In general the
higher the hardness the more the sensitivity increases, but this depends on steel
composition. It is the minimum yield stress that determines the minimum hardness.
3.2.6
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During chain manufacture Crack Tip Opening Displacement (CTOD) values should be
evaluated both for the main body of the link and for the weld. For example Table 10-5
of DNV Certification Note 2.6 [Ref. 18] provides critical defect sizes which the metal
should achieve. CTOD gives a better indication of Fracture Toughness, compared to
Charpy-V impact test which only gives an indication of the toughness of a metal.
It is worth noting that the temperature of the test is important because almost all steels
have a zone of high stable values over a "plateau" region. But suddently, within very
few divisions of temperature variation, they fall to a zone of lower values.
3.2.7
of Vicinay)
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3.2.8
Wire Rope
Figure 3-26 shows the normal wire rope construction types used for offshore mooring
lines. Six strand independent wire rope core (IWRC) is typically used for mobile
drilling units due to its lateral flexibility and relative cheapness. Spiral strand wire is
generally torque balanced, the implications of which are discussed in more detail in
Section 6.2.2. Sheathing has been introduced to protect the wire from corrosion. It
will, however, be interesting to see if, over time, the sea water ingress causes corrosion
underneath the sheathing. At present there are no real techniques available to monitor
such corrosion, see also Section 18.8.
Figure 3-26 - Illustration of the Make Up of Different Wire Rope Types (courtesy of
Bridon)
The yield strengths of steel used in the construction of wire mooring ropes vary but are
very high, for example see Table 3-6.
Construction
1860
Spiral strand
1570
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The two main wire rope types utilised have differing properties. The pros and cons of
the two rope constructions are summarised in Tables 3-6 and Table 3-8:
Higher Elasticity
Greater Flexibility
Torsionally Balanced
Bridon)
Table 3-8 - Comparison of the Cons of Spiral and Six Strand Rope
Mooring wire is zinc galvanised to provide defence against corrosion; the major factor
along with fatigue determining mooring line service life. Heavier zinc coatings are used
on the larger wires of the spiral strand product enhancing corrosion protection
properties. The larger outer wires of the six strand product may also use heavier zinc
coatings to increase the attainable design life. An anti-corrosion blocking compound
may be applied during manufacture to add a further corrosion prevention measure.
Typical service life expectancy is shown in Table 3-9.
Design Life
up to 6 years
Six Strand
up to 8 years
up to 10 years
10 years plus
Spiral Strand
15 years plus
Table 3-9 - Wire Rope Recommendations for Varying Field Lives (courtesy of Bridon)
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Wire rope suppliers can provide sheathed products in yellow polyethylene with a black
longitudinal stripe. The yellow colour aids in service inspection as damage shows
black against the yellow background. The black stripe can highlight any turn
introduced into the wire during installation.
3.2.9
Fibre Rope
High strength and high modulus fibre materials offer certain advantages for offshore
mooring systems. The use of fibre ropes has increased substantially with the move into
deep water and as test results become available. Figure 3-27 illustrates the chronology
of the Fibre Rope test programme undertaken as part of the US Deep Star programme.
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3.2.10
Anchoring Options (Drag Anchors, Vertical Uplift Anchors, Piles, Suction Piles)
Drag embedment anchors (see Figure 3-28) are the most popular type of anchoring
point available today. This type of anchor has been designed to penetrate into the
seabed, either partly or fully. The holding capacity of the drag embedment anchor is
generated by the resistance of the soil in front of the anchor. The traditional drag
embedment anchor is very well suited for resisting large horizontal loads, but not for
large vertical loads.
Drag embedment anchors are generally installed by applying a load somewhere close to
the maximum anticipated intact load. At this time the anchor will have penetrated to a
certain depth, but will still be capable of further penetration as the ultimate holding
capacity of the anchor has not been reached. By this stage the anchor will have
travelled a certain horizontal distance, called the drag length. Following installation the
anchor is capable of resisting loads equal to the installation load without further
penetration and drag. When the installation load is exceeded, the anchor should
continue to penetrate and drag until the soil is capable of providing sufficient resistance
to match the applied load or drag failure takes place.
Figure 3-28 - Accurate Drag Anchor Placement by Crane in Good Weather Conditions
(courtesy of Stolt Offshore)
Vertical load anchors (VLAs) are installed in a similar manner to a conventional drag
embedment anchor. During installation the load arrives at an angle of approximately
45 to 50 to the fluke. After triggering the anchor to the normal load position, the load
always arrives perpendicular to the fluke. As a VLA is deeply embedded and always
loaded in a direction normal to the fluke, the load can be applied in any direction.
Consequently the anchor is ideal for taut-leg mooring systems as long as complete
embedment is achievable.
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Figure 3-29 Installation and Normal (Vertical) Load Position (courtesy of Vryhof )
Piled anchors (see Figure 3-30) are hollow steel pipes that are installed into the seabed
by means of a piling hammer or vibrator. The holding capacity of the pile is generated
by the friction of the soil along the pile and lateral soil resistance. It is usually
necessary for the pile to be installed at considerable depth below the seabed to obtain
the required holding capacity. Piles are capable of resisting both horizontal and vertical
loads.
Figure 3-30 Anchor Pile + Chain Tail Deployed by a Twin Crane Construction Vessel
(courtesy of Stolt Offshore)
Suction anchors (see Figure 3-31), like piles, tend to be hollow steel pipes, although the
diameter of the pipe is much larger than for the pile. The suction anchor is forced into
the seabed by means of a pump connected to the top of the pipe, creating a pressure
difference. When pressure inside the pipe is lower than outside, the pipe is sucked into
the seabed. The pump is then removed following installation. The holding capacity of
the suction anchor is generated by the friction of the soil along the length of the pipe
and the lateral soil resistance. The anchor is capable of withstanding both horizontal
and vertical loads.
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3.2.11
Chain
Jack
Pros:
Powerful
mean of
tensioning.
Cons:
Slow
manipulation.
Powered
Windlass
Most common
method for
handling and
tensioning
chain.
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Linear
Winch
Most
applicable in
permanent
applications
when high
tension and
large-diameter
wire rope are
required.
Cons:
Requires a
large diameter
take-up reel to
coil the wire
rope after it
passes through
the linear
winch.
DrumType
Winch
Most
conventional
method used
for handling
wire rope.
Pros:
Operation of a
drum-type
winch is fast
and smooth.
Cons:
1-As the
requirement
for line sizes
and lengths
increases, the
size of the
winch can
become
impractical.
2-When wire
rope is under
tension at an
outer layer on
the drum,
spreading of
preceding
layers can
occur causing
damage to the
wire rope.
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Pros:
The Traction winch has been developed for high tension mooring
applications as well as for handling combination mooring systems. It
1-Compact
consists of two closely spaced parallel mounted powered drums, which
size.
are typically grooved. The wire rope makes several wraps (typically 6 to 2-Capability
8) around the parallel drum assembly. The friction between the wire
to provide
rope and the drums provides the gripping force for the wire rope. The
constant
Traction
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3.3
3.3.1
Figure 3-32 - Example of a Tensile Test on a Steel Sample cut out from a Chain Link
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Figure 3-34 - Example of Terminology during a Tensile Test (courtesy of Ashby &
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Tensile testing will produce a load versus displacement curve which is then converted
to a nominal stress versus nominal strain or Vn versus n curve where:
Vn = Force/Area prior to testing (A0)
n = Displacement/Length prior to testing (l0)
The advantage of plotting Vn versus n is that it allows comparison of specimens with
different A0 and l0 on the same graph, thus examing the properties of the material
unaffected by speciment size.
The following terminology is illustrated on Figure 3-34:
VY = Yield strength (F/A0 at onset of plactic flow)
V0.1% = 0.1% Proof Stress (F/A0 at a permanent strain of 0.1%. 0.2 % proof stress
is also sometimes quoted see also section 14.5. Proof stress is useful for
characterising yield of a material which yields gradually and thus does not show a
distinct yield point)
VTS = Tensile Strength (F/A0 at onset of necking)
f = (Plastic Strain after Fracture or Tensile Ductility. The broken pieces arr put
together and measured and f calculated from (l l0)/l0, where l is the length of
the assembled pieces and l0 is the legth at time 0.
The behaviour past the onset of necking (see Figure 3-34) depends on material
characteristics as well as the rate at which the load is applied. Thus the continuation of
the curve beyond the maximum load is difficult to obtain, both during tests and in a
theoretical analysis of a component. Hence it is of no practical value from the
viewpoint of the structural integrity of the mooring system.
Figure 3-35 illustrates how the shape of the stress strain curve will vary depending on
material charaterisitics/grade of chain. It can be seen that as strength has increased the
strain before fracture has decreased. Brittle fracture was a problem in the early days of
developing grade 4 mooring chain in the first half of the 1980s. However, by carefully
controlling the alloy constituents and the quenching and tempering process it is now
possible to manufacture a high strength steels, such as R4 or R4S+ (R5), with a grain
structure which is more ductile and hence is resistant to brittle fracture. High
tempering temperatures may be utilised to optimise Ductility/Toughness Properties.
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1000
Stress (N/mm^2)
800
R3 - R3S
R4
R4S+ = R5
600
400
200
0
0
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Strain (%)
Figure 3-35 - Stress Strain Curves for R3, R4 and R5 Chain Steel (Data courtesy of
Vicinay)
For a strong, fairly ductile (non brittle) material one potentially has a choice as to what
to value to select for MBL. It could either be the load recorded in the test bed when the
material fails or it could be the maximum load before the loads drops away prior to
breaking. The load recorded at which the material breaks is related to the rate at which
the load is applied, so it is somewhat variable. Internation Association of Classification
Societies (IACS)W22 [Ref. 66] states: each sample shall be capable of withstanding
the specified break load without fracture and shall not crack in the flash weld. It shall
be considered acceptable if the sample is loaded to the specified value and maintained
at that load for 30 seconds. At the end of the break test, in general the tested
component should be scrapped.
It can thus be appreciated that manufacturers have to confirm by physical testing that
they have achieved the specified MBL and proof load values. In general it would be
desirable that sufficient testing should be undertaken to obtain a spread of results.
However, since chain is only as strong as its weakest link the minimum value achieved
should be considered to be representative of the MBL, not for example the mean or the
mean minus a number of standard deviations.
Therefore, the catalogue specified minimum break load (MBL) is actually an agreed
specified strength which has an associated testing requirement to ensure that this is
achieved. Table 3-10 below indicates the MBL and proof loads for various sizes and
grades of chain. The d in the expressions refers to the chain diameter in mm.
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Stud Link
Studless
KN
KN
KN
KN
0,0140 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0211 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0154 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0232 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
KN
KN
KN
KN
KN
0,0168 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0253 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0156 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0223 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0018 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0174 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
KN
KN
KN
KN
KN
0,0249 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0216 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0191 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0274 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,02376*d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0201 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,03014 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
Proof Load R5
Minimum Break Load R5
KN
KN
0,0251*d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,0222 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
0,03186 *d^2*(44-0,08*d)
Table 3-10 - Stipulated MBL and Proof Load Values for Various Sizes and Grades of
Chain (courtesy of Vicinay)
3.3.2
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3.3.3
63
During forging and the flash butt welding residual stresses will be introduced into a
link. Such stresses will tend to be minimised during the heat treatment process.
However, Vicinay have evaluated the influence of residual stresses created during the
proof loading process. During two separate analyses it was found that the effect of the
residual stresses were negligible. Still it would be useful to have more data available
on the effect of residual stresses see Section 14.5.
(Courtesy of Vicinay)
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4.1
B e n d in g & T e n s io n
C o r r o s io n
H ig h e s t T e n s io n s
I m p a c t & A b r a s io n
W e a r a n d f a t ig u e
Figure 4-1 Illustration of some of the Main Factors which Influence Mooring
Integrity
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Some of the most severe conditions occur in the so called Thrash Zone, when the
chain comes in contact with the sea-bed at the end of the catenary. It is at this point
that most cyclic movement occurs and increased stresses may be encountered due to
momentum of the moving material. This movement may also cause damage if the seabed is hard where the chain contacts it. Another problem resulting from this
movement, if the chain is studded, will occur if the studs are able to move. When the
studs are loose enough to move freely in the link, then corrosion in the footprint, of
both the stud and side of the link will be enhanced due to the fretting action removing
the corrosion products and exposing a clean surface. As the process progresses, the rate
of corrosion will become higher. This may also be enhanced by crevice corrosion in
the early stages [Ref. 12].
4.1.1
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After 6 years on station the TW58 broke completely away from its moorings. The
following description describes the sequence of events that led to the breakaway. The
information is taken from a HSE database, in which the identity of the units involved
has been deliberately removed.
In 1981 the converted semi-sub producing from a subsea manifold abandoned
production due to the fierceful weather. At 01:19 hrs a 9-ft heave and an 82-knot
wind was recorded and the conditions continued to deteriorate and at 02:36 hrs,
anchor chain no. 4 parted (tension: 200,000 lbs). Some 20 mins later two other
anchor chain parted. Now the rig was 65 to 80 feet off location. At 05:13 hrs
anchor chains 6 and 7 parted after the rig had been hit by an unusually large wave.
Two helicopters were mobilized. The weather continued to build and 20 mins
later the breakaway of the rig appeared imminent and anchor chains 10, 11 and 12
were cut. This action was taken to prevent the overrun of these anchors and
possible capsizing of the rig as a result. Only anchor chain no. 1 was left
dragging. This prevented the rig to drift directly towards the sbm. The rig's mat
tanks scraped over but cleared the <...>'s mooring lines. Once clear of the <...>
The evacuation could start. 48 persons were evacuated while 22 remained
onboard. The rig continued to drift another 1.5 days before being secured by a
towline. The rig had drifted some 27 miles from original position. The rig was
towed to <...> for inspections and replacement of anchor chains.
The breakaway of a production semi submersible with a wire mooring system may not
seem too relevant to most modern custom designed FPSOs. However, the fact that
conditions developed which caused a multiple line failure is reasonably significant in
itself. For the TW58 it was extremely beneficial that the steel risers were designed to
be disconnected in severe weather. This is not the normal situation for as FPS with
flexible risers. Hence, if all the moorings fail on a FPSO which has no dynamic
positioning assistance, the likelihood is that the risers would all be ripped out at either
at the sea-bed or the vessel, or a mixture of the two - see also Section 5.3.
4.1.2
Points of Significance
In summary, the key issues, from an up date perspective, to note from this incident are
as follows:
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1.
Single line failure followed by multiple line failure led to a complete loss of
station.
2.
There was a potential danger of capsize which was prevented by cutting the
remaining mooring lines, which fortunately in this instance, were accessible
from the deck.
3.
4.
5.
6.
4.1.3
Figure 4-3 Fulmar SALM after Breakaway (courtesy of BBC film clip)
Although the Fulmar SALM is an unusual design, it does have basic similarities to
present day turret moored FPSO. The damage it could have caused if it had collided
with other oil and gas installations while it was freely drifting can be imagined.
The time on station for both the TW58 (6 years) and the Fulmar SALM (7 years) before
problems occurred roughly ties in with the statistics reported in Noble Dentons
UKOOA report. Overall both incidents illustrate the importance of not being
complacent about mooring integrity as systems age.
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Points of Significance
The key issues, from an up date perspective, to note from the Fulmar breakaway are as
follows:
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
69
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4.1.5
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Interestingly a certain number lightship mooring failures did not occur at the height of a
storm, but a short period after the worst weather had passed. A similar behaviour has
been noted for mooring line failures on semi-submersible rigs.
It is significant that most British lightships were not equipped with any form of
propulsion and hence were at the mercy of the waves if they broke free. Many FPSOs
also do not have any form of propulsion and thus would be unable to steer out of
trouble if they should break free. Although the likelihood of a FPSO totally breaking
free is low, if it should happen the consequences of a collision could be extremely
severe. Since thrusters can help stabilize offloading operations and can help process
equipment motions by adjusting FPSO heading, it can be argued that there are three
good safety reasons for specifying their inclusion on FPSO projects from the outset.
Even in recent times lightship moorings fail with depressing regularity, see Figure
4-9). Hence, all mariners on Light Ships live with the perpetual fear that the moorings
might fail and thus take appropriate safety precautions. It would be highly desirable if
this mariner watchfulness about the integrity of moorings could be more widely
distributed.
Figure 4-7 - Helicopter Rescue from the Free Drifting North Carr Lightship after
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Figure 4-8 - Illustration of the North Carr Link Failure Relative to a 1999 North Sea
Figure 4-9 - Dutch Lightship Number 11 whose Mooring Failed in a Force 10 Gale in
October 1991 which also broke a number of semi-sub moorings see Section 4.2
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4.2
4.2.1
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Hurricane Ivan, which passed through the Gulf of Mexico in September 2004, is
reported to have left the following in its wake:
x
The 5th generation Deepwater Nautilus semi (see Figure 4-10) broke all her
moorings and drifted 120 kilometres north-east from its pre-storm location. It is
understood that the Rig had a composite fibre rope and steel mooring system.
Full details of the failure are, unfortunately, not in the public domain, but it is
understood that all the failures occurred in the steel wires not the fibre rope. The
steel wires were of 3 (95mm) diameter and each line was designed to
withstand a force of 693t (6,800kN or 1,500kips)
Figure 4-10 - Fifth Generation Deepwater Nautilus Broke free of all her Moorings
during Hurricane Ivan
Results to date indicate that hurricane Ivan did not cause any damage to the mooring
systems of the permanently moored Spars and production semi submersibles in the Gulf
of Mexico. It would, however, be interesting to follow the track of Hurricane Ivan and
to see how close it came to any of the permanent mooring systems. It is also worth
noting that the majority of long-term mooring systems in the Gulf of Mexico are still
relatively new and thus fatigue, corrosion and wear effects will not yet have fully
developed.
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4.3
Figure 4-11 - Petrojarl 1 which experienced two broken lines at the same time when
hit by a steep wave
4.3.1
Points of Significance
The key issues, from an up date perspective, to note from this incident are as follows:
1. There was double line failure when hit by a smaller than the design wave.
2. The presence of thrusters prevented an uncontrolled break away.
3. The multiple failures were due to fatigue damage which developed at around
about the same time to a number of mooring lines.
4. Unusually this particular type of turret design allowed rapid identification that a
line failure had occurred.
4.3.2
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5.1
Overload/overstress
Brittle fracture
Corrosion
In many cases several of the above will interact, for example fatigue damage at a
sheave followed by overload of the remaining ligament under storm conditions. A
potential failure scenario is illustrated overleaf in Figure 5-1.
Although, at present, there are no fixed regulatory requirements for the timescale under
which damaged lines should be replaced, the continued operation of a unit with one
damaged mooring line should lead to re-appraisal of the reduced mooring system using
the higher intact condition safety factors. Where the full design condition cannot be
achieved, consideration should be given to reduced operating conditions. In fact, in the
era of uncertainty following a line failure, it can be argued that the safety factors on the
remaining lines should be raised until it has been determined with reasonable
confidence why the original line failed.
Revised operating conditions could be identified prior to loss of a line, permitting a
more rapid assessment of the damaged condition. It is recommended that a summary of
reduced environmental parameters for production should be available on board all
operating FPSs in case of line failure.
This single line failure condition falls within the normal design criteria for the mooring
system and should not threaten the integrity of the unit directly. Under certain
conditions the falling chain could damage sub sea infrastructure. For example, a
flexible could be swept below mooring lines under high current conditions, exposing it
to impact. This could be of most concern to a gas riser and should be considered as
part of the detailed design process.
For specific units in deep water hydrocarbon conditions could cause riser blockage due
hydrate or waxing in case of an extended shutdown. If a unit from a process point of
view cannot tolerate shut down, it will be cost effective in the long-run to add in
additional contingency in the mooring system. This should be specified in the design
brief, see Section 20.
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Deterioration
Failure
Detection
Shutdown
Inspection
Reduced operations
Repair
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78
5.2
g _
_ q _
)(
20 m
Figure 5-2 Illustration of Riser Stretch After Loss of Position Following Mooring
Line Failure
There have been several instances of multiple line failure of a fixed floating unit.
Factors which contribute to the likelihood of multiple (as opposed to single) line failure
include the following:
Design:
Age:
fatigue, corrosion and wear will tend to deteriorate all mooring lines,
particularly in the same quadrant, to roughly the same extent over
time.
79
A potential multiple line failure scenario is illustrated in Figure 5-3. Figure 5-4
illustrates how prompt detection of line failure and good quality inspections can reduce
the danger of multiple line failure.
Deterioration
1st Failure
Unzipping
Excursion
Shutdown
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5.4
Loss of one mooring line and as a result shutting down for 2 days to
identify the extent of the damage
An indicative costing for the above incident has been worked out inTable 5-1. Note it
is assumed that suitable spares, including connectors, are available. Hence the capital
cost of spares and replacements has not been included.
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Item
Deferred Prdn
DSV
Heading
control tug
AHTs
Calculation
2 x 50,000
x $25
(2+2) x
70,000
(2+2) x
15,000
2 x (2+2) x
15,000
Total
Value
Notes
1,470,000
Assuming
1.7$ to 1
280,000
60,000
120,000
1,930,000
2M
2 days mob /
demob
plus 2 days
diving
Table 5-1 - Line Failure Cost Estimate, 50,00bpd North Sea FPSO
The $25 per barrel rate for oil is based on deferred production cost and will be field
specific depending on operating costs, etc. It has been estimated using the following
typical formula:
Value of deferred production = Deferred volume x Margin x Discount factor
The following terminology applies:
Margin = the prevailing oil price less the production facilities cost of delivery
including all appropriate costs (depreciation, variable lifting and transportation
costs, etc.)
Discount factor = 1/(1+discount rate)n
The Discount rate has been taken to be the fairly industry standard level of 10%
and n is the period in years.
If one assumes that the present oil price is about $45/barrel and that the lifting or
recovery cost is approximately $10/barrel, the price per barrel of the deferred
production in n years time is as follows:
Deferred production cost ($/barrel) = (45 10) x 1/(1.1n)
Hence, if a line failure occurs in year 7 and the anticipated field life is 20 years the
calculation becomes:
Deferred production cost in 20 years = 35 x 1/(1.120-7) $10/barrel
Value of product today $45 - $10 = $35/barrel
Lost value in deferring production $35 - $10 = $25/barrel
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83
Loss of one mooring line and as a result shutting down for 2 days to
identify the extent of damage
An indicative costing for the above incident has been worked out Table 5-2. Again it is
assumed that suitable spares including connectors are available. Hence, the capital cost
of spares and replacements has not been included. It is worth noting that the
mobilisation time and costs are significantly higher for a West African FPSO than for a
North Sea FPSO. In practice it may be the case that suitable vessels are available
locally, but this cannot be relied upon.
Item
Calculation
Deferred Prdn
2 x 250,000 x $25
DSV
(30+2) x 70,000
AHTs
2 x (30+2) x
15,000
Total
Value
Notes
Table 5-2 - Line failure Cost Estimate, 250,000bpd West African FPSO
Two simple conclusions can be drawn from the above calculations.
x
Financial costs associated with mooring line failure are large, particularly
relative to the capital cost of the failed component.
Where the platform is remote from the main offshore operating centres, deployment of
suitable vessels may take several weeks. If the integrity of FPSO or subsea
infrastructure after the incident cannot be demonstrated using local resources, a lengthy
shutdown may be required. A long shut down would increase the cost of deferred
production dramatically.
Repair of the system may require the procurement of special connectors or replacement
line segments. These may have lead times of 4 to 6 months, requiring medium term
operation either with one line down or a short term connector solution see Section 19
on contingency procedures and spares. The cost of the repair will increase if two repair
mobilisations are required, in other words an initial short term fix followed by the long
term repair.
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84
6.1
Transportation/Transfer
Mooring lines are not simple items to transport due to their length and weight. Any
damage to lines during transportation of transfer can have serious implications for longterm mooring integrity. Manufacturers typically have detailed instructions for
transportation and transfer of their products and these instructions should be followed
to the letter. Poor practice during transportation and handling potentially can destroy
project schedules.
Figure 6-1 gives a good indication of the great care needed while handling fibre ropes
with careful level winding and proper back tension when the ropes are installed on the
reels.
During transportation, transfer to installation spools and installation of sheathed wire
rope, particular care must be taken to ensure that sheathing remains undamaged.
Figure 6-1 - Spooling Fibre rope onto a Powered Reel from Standard Containers
[Ref. 24]
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85
6.2
Many FPS units operate in deep water locations. As a result a complex line
make-up including wire rope, man made fibre segments and occasionally mid
line buoys may result.
The FPS requirement for the mooring system to support extreme conditions
without moving off station can lead to large heavy mooring system
components (Figure 6-2 gives an indication of the manual handling issues). It
is clear that items such as bend stiffeners can be relatively easily damaged.
This has been seen on recovery of a North Sea FPSO mooring system at the
end of a relatively short deployment see Figure 6-6.
Figure 6-2 - Illustration of the Weight and Handling Issues Associated with Mooring
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86
6.2.1
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87
It will be interesting to see if, over the respective field lives, the dog legs/wavy lines
are pulled straight or not, and this should be monitored during annual ROV surveys. If
straightening occurs the implications for mooring line tensions and fatigue loading
should be re-evaluated. If Dog Legs are still present at the end of the field life, this
could indicate some conservatism in the design process, particularly if during this time
the FPSs have experienced survival conditions.
6.2.2
Torque
More complete expressions, taking into account twisting of the rope, the increased
torsional stiffness of rope under tension and even cross terms between these various
components are given by Chaplin [Ref. 25]. The simplest of these expressions is given
below.
Torque
where A
G
A u Rotation
Length
75,000
Newton
mm 2
The first term is equivalent to the coefficient presented by Bridon. The coefficient on
rotation represents the geometric torsional stiffness of the wire rope, plus an additional
term reflecting interaction between tension and torsional stiffness.
It should be noted that the numerical coefficients listed above vary even within the
reference quoted above, and as such predictions of the numbers of turns for a given
condition should be treated with care.
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88
The four different types of line segment used in the deployment and operation of
mooring lines exhibit very different torsional characteristics. Both the torsional
stiffness and the tension induced torque vary.
x
Six (or eight) strand wire rope is not torque balanced. This means than
when an axial tension is applied, torsion is developed in the line. The
greater the tension, the larger the torsion.
Chain demonstrates little torsional stiffness for low levels of rotation, very
high stiffness for greater rotation (in excess of 3 degrees per link). A chain
with no twist will not develop torsional moments under tension.
Polyester rope has a low torsional stiffness, due to the small diameter of
individual fibres. There is little tendency to develop torsional moments
under tension.
In the design of mooring systems, consideration must be given both to the interaction of
the individual components in the operating condition, and to the implications of this
during installation. It is very important when deploying chain that no twists should be
included, but in practical terms for a long length of chain this is not simple to achieve in
practice.
Clearly, where one component has a tendency to rotate and develop line torsion, this
may result in the twisting of adjacent components. Each line type has different issues
associated with the imposition / release of torsional loading.
x
Where six or eight strand wire rope is subjected to dynamic axial loads with
no torsional restraint it will rotate. The combination of tension and rotation
is much more subject to fatigue than tension cycling with ends restrained.
There may also be issues associated with the whirling of heavy fittings or
adjacent chain segments increasing damage rates.
The performance of chain when subjected to torsion plus tension is not well
understood. Where line tension drops below a limiting value there is some
possibility of knotting of the chain, which will reduce strength and fatigue
resistance. Under significant tensions chain is able to accept small levels of
rotation without apparent damage.
Spiral strand wire rope is both relatively stiff in torsion and sensitive to
damage when twisted. This damage occurs due to slippage between layers
of (torque balanced) wire. In extreme cases this can develop into hockles,
where the lay of the wire is so distorted that some wires twisrt right away
from the body of the rope see Figure 6-5 and Figure 6-7).
Fibre ropes appear to be able to accept quite large levels of rotation without a
significant impact on their performance.
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89
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90
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91
6.2.3
Figure 6-8 - Mid Line Buoy Swivel Connection Link (courtesy of MoorLink AB).
Mid line buoys can result in greater relative rotation at the connections which in certain
instances has been known to lead to premature failure see Section 10.3.2. Therefore,
the use of mid line buoys should be treated with caution.
6.2.4
It is often desirable to pre-lay mooring lines. This permits location and securing of
anchor points prior to the arrival of the FPS. Separation of the installation programme
into discrete segments reduces the vulnerability of the programme to weather windows
and removes these operations from the critical path.
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92
Deploying an anchor pile, chain, spiral strand wire or polyester rope as one operation
can be problematic, unless a high specification construction vessel is employed and
great care is taken. Potential difficulties include:
x Risk of rotation, possible interference and damage
x Difficult to control simultaneous lowering of multiple handling systems
x Difficult to reverse the process.
However, a reliable subsea connector is required if lines are going to be pre-installed.
If the subsea connector is not reliable, over time a weakness may be introduced into the
system. Assuming a reliable subsea connector is available its use may help with
respect to possible mooring line repair operations which may be needed at some stage
during the field life. It is important, to minimise relative rotation and wear, that the
weight per metre of the connector should not be too much higher than that of the
mooring line to which it attached.
6.3
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93
Although polyester is a durable material, the braided jacket and even the core, can
be subject to damage during installation if not properly handled, much like sheathed
spiral strand wire [Ref. 26].
At present it is customary not to allow polyester rope to come in contact with the sea
floor due to concern that particle ingression will cause harmful abrasion of the fibres.
With the introduction of soil particle filter clothes just under the jacket this may be no
longer necessary [Ref. 26] but at present it is customary to adhere to and this will
impact the installation procedures. Balmoral Group Norways experience with
MODUs and fibre ropes indicates that this may not be required. However, it is still
difficult to know what would happen during a true long-term deployment.
Installation Ground Rules
It can be helpful to provide Installation Contractor with succinct ground rules for
installation including any special considerations, e.g. handling of polyester ropes, such
as:
x
Limits on twist
No sea-bed contact
Contingency measures
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94
6.3.1
Polyester rope lengths can vary and it is important to understand the different
categorisations namely:
x
Manufactured length,
The total variation through out this process may vary as much as 50 to 100m. Short
Term Creep and Long Term Construction Stretch may lead to a need for the rope being
manufactured somewhat shorter than its final required length.
Common practice calls for polyester to never come into contact with sharp edges, high
heat or steel work wires. It is vital to ensure all equipment free of sharp edges and
where necessary to use special padding material such as burlap or lamiflex to
further aid in protecting the rope jacket from snags and tears.
On fibre rope moorings the majority of fibre rope creep should occur in the first year of
service. This creep is likely to result in a requirement to re-tension the mooring system.
On the Red Hawk Spar there is no requirement for spar offsetting for well drilling or
maintenance operations. Hence a single chain windlass located at one position on the
Spar deck with fairleading access to the six mooring stations was assessed to be
sufficient for pre-tensioning and mooring line adjustment purposes if required. This
single chain windlass was integrated into the topsides rather than at a dedicated
winching deck as on previous spars. To reduce the necessity of future line length
adjustments, some of the fabrication stretch was removed as illustrated below. This
required application of a tension level of 40% of the MBL for 1 hour, namely
approximately 500 t. The geometric amplification provided by this means seems to be
capable of achieving such a tension. It appears that this method of tensioning up the
lines is not very precise and there must be a danger of increased dynamic loading of the
tensioning tow line due to tug motion/changes in tow line angle. Hence it will be
interesting to see how such lines perform in situ.
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95
Figure 6-10
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96
Not all fibre rope connectors have made use of thimbles so it will be interesting to see
if over time wear/abrasions becomes an issue. Unfortunately inspection access to this
area is difficult see Section 18.6.1/Figure 18-15.
An important point for the use of fibre ropes is careful labelling for
identifying/avoiding confusion on fibre rope segments.
Overboarding Operations
Overboarding of heavy items (anchors, sockets, etc.) may need special protection as
may be provided by a sledge arrangement see Figure 6-11 for example which shows
an H shackle launch. The sledge can be recovered using a work wire on to a capstan
winch after the heavy item has been deployed over the stern roller.
Figure 6-11 - Sledge used to Protect H Connector during Deployment over the Stern
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6.3.3
Anchors
Once anchors have been installed and successfully pre-tensioned on FPSs they seem to
have proved reliable in situ. The difficulties which have been experienced in the field
are typically when soil conditions turn about to be different than predicted. Hence, it is
desirable to collect sufficient soils information prior to the FPS deployment.
If project schedule and vessel availability allow, it is recommended that the following
site survey work should be undertaken prior to installation:
x
Carry out bore hole soil sampling at two locations on each mooring line.
In certain instances only limited borehole data may be available. In such cases it makes
sense to be on the conservative side when selecting the size and weight of the proposed
anchors. Anchor steel is relatively cheap compared to the day rate of installation
vessels!
When a drag anchor is installed it is very difficult to determine the depth of the sea-bed
penetration. This can make accurate determination of line pretension difficult if, during
installation, the length of all the mooring line sections was carefully noted on the basis
that this can be used to back calculate the pre-tensions.
Drag anchors normally have minimal corrosion protection, just a basic paint coating.
Despite this corrosion has not been a problem even for anchors on drilling rigs, which
have a much harder life than an anchor which sits deep into the sea-bed. Still given that
field lives can be extended and that high quality coatings are available, it would seem
logical to make greater us of such coatings.
Drag anchor fatigue life is typically far superior to that of the chain, which they are
attached to. Hence, anchor fatigue life is normally only checked if specified by the
anchor manufacturers client.
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CORROSION,
STUDIES)
FATIGUE
AND
7.1
WEAR
(CASE
The Balmoral Floating Production Vessel (FPV) represents an early North Sea semisubmersible production unit (see Figure 7-1). Unusually for the time, it was a purpose
built production unit utilising a new GVA design and was built in Gothenberg in 1986.
Hence, today (2005), it has been in continuous operation without dry docking for some
19 years.
It is also worth noting that the Buchan, Amerada Hess 001 semi-submersibles and
the Brent Spar have also seen long deployment periods. Some of the experience
which has been gained from these units is discussed in Sections 8 and 11.
The Balmoral FPV was provided with a Rolls Royce mooring system consisting of
driven anchor piles and 92mm R4 studded chain made in accordance with the new
DNV standard to avoid brittle failures. The chain, when new, had a minimum break
load (MBL) of 853t MBL. In addition, the FPV has 4 x 39 tonne maximum nominal
thrust azimuthing thrusters, which are used in storm conditions to reduce mooring line
tensions.
Figure 7-1 The Balmoral Benchmark FPV which has been continuously on station
since 1986 (Courtesy of CNR)
Despite some built in redundancy the FPV has experienced a number of line failures
which are summarized in the plan view in Figure 7-2.
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99
6456500
Touchdown
Pile 2
No measurements
Pile 1
+2.7%
Missing or
loose studs
6456000
Northing
6455500
D-shackles
Pile 3
-1.9%
Pile 8
-25.7%
6455000
6454500
Pile 4
+11.6%
Pile 7
+33.5%
6454000
Pile 6
No measurements
6453500
563500
564000
564500
565000
Pile 5
+7.5%
565500
566000
566500
Easting
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7.2
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101
(mm/year)
Regular inspection
1)
(mm/year)
Splash zone3)
0.4
0.2
0.82)
Catenary4)
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.4
5)
Bottom
No Inspection
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7.2.1
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Figure 7-5 Example of the Damage Caused to the Crown of the Links
Figure 7-6 Arrow shows the Apparent Grinding Action on the Inner Face of One of
the Links
Another example of how the dynamic action of a moving link may cause damage to an
adjacent item is shown in Figure 7-7. This photograph shows the beginning of a failure
of a small hanging shackle which attaches an excursion limiting weighted chain section
to the main links of a FPSO mooring line. The failure of the hanging shackle pin is
likely to have been caused by the dynamic pinching action of the adjacent link plus the
general rotation of the hanging shackle pin see also Section 10.3.
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Figure 7-7 Example of the Damage Caused to a Hanging Shackle Pin on a FPSO
Mooring Line
When a chain is subjected to an applied load it is subject to a complex combination of
tension, bending and shear loads. A finite element derived indicative stress pattern for
a loaded link is shown in Figure 7-8. In this plot the highest stresses areas are coloured
red. Comparing Figure 7-8 with Figure 7-6 shows that the area of apparent grinding
damage approximately corresponds with one of the areas of maximum stress (see also
3.3.3). Hence damage in this area could result in a relative rapid reduction in break test
capability. Another related factor here is the effect of corrosion pitting which in certain
cases can be in excess of 3mm (see earlier).
Figure 7-8 Finite Element Stress Contour Plot (compare red areas with Figure 7-6)
[Ref. 8]
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In Figure 7-8 it should be noted that the stress contours show a weak asymmetry
about the X-Y plane due to simply supported constraints applied to the static end of the
chain model and a static load applied to the dynamic end.
7.2.2
The data in Figure 7-9 is based on a detailed measurement programme on a line which
was bought back to shore after many years of use on a North Sea semi-sub FPS.
Although there is quite a lot of scatter, the black poly line on the graph indicates
maximum wear at the touchdown point indicated by the red dashed vertical line.
983m
946m
909m
835m
761m
687m
1250
1450
1650
94
92
90
88
86
84
82
80
450
650
1050
850
FPV
BREAK POINT
API Minimum
Line 4 Thickness
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7.3
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Figure 7-11 - Example of Wear and Pitting Corrosion on the Shackle Pin
The as forged dimensions on this shackle are not known with certainty, but typical
dimensions are known. The pin of the shackle goes through the end of a common link
of studded chain and the bow of the shackle goes through the studless chain. Based on
nominal or typical dimensions significant wear appears to have occurred at the bow of
the shackle with the bar diameter down from 170mm to 158mm (12mm) a major
reduction in less than 7 years.
7.3.1
Since chains and shackles are typically forged the final dimensions after manufacturing
are not known with any certainty, unless as built data is measured, recorded and the
item can be identified. If this is not done the final as manufactured bar diameter at the
inter-grip area may well not be known. As chain is manufactured it is bent around an
anvil when red hot and this tends to reduce the bar diameter particularly where it is
bent.
Based on the nominal chain diameter of the studless 142mm chain this shows an
apparent maximum in field combined wear/corrosion of (142 134.5) 7.5mm over less
than 7 years which at 1.07mm/year is high. So far the apparent wear and pitting
corrosion seen on this chain has been 3.6 times (1.07/0.3) higher than was allowed for
during the design process.
Based on the nominal diameter of the studded 137mm chain this gives a maximum
combined wear/corrosion of (137 132) 5mm over less than 7 years which at
0.71mm/yr is also in excess of what was allowed for in the design process.
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In this case it would be useful to compare the relative shackle surface hardness with the
existing chain to see if this or galvanic type corrosion is the cause of the high apparent
wear/corrosion rate.
7.3.2
It is appreciated that the quoted apparent North Sea wear/corrosion rate may well not be
applicable to all geographical areas and unit types. However, if the rate is even roughly
correct this may well have potentially serious consequences for units intended for longterm field lives. Thus it is important that this area is investigated further as a matter of
priority - see Section 21.1.
7.3.3
At the end of perhaps a 20 year deployment period the minimum break load of all
mooring components on a FPS should still be able to meet the calculated maximum
design load multiplied a suitable safety factor. However, we do not know how
grinding, wear or pitting corrosion will affect the chains break load. An approximate
estimate of the break test load could be obtained by using a finite element model
representation. With such a model it would be difficult to have confidence that the
finite element model is representative, particularly when hairline cracks may be
present. Hence, it is recommended that as used mooring lines and components become
available, either due to line failure or the completion of a FPS assignment, that
representative lines should be break tested to see what their actual break load is after
X years service. Figure 7-12 illustrates a test rig set up from a mooring chain break
test.
Break testing such lines may also reveal the presence or otherwise of any fatigue
cracks. Such cracks may not always be detectable using conventional inspection
techniques. For example, Magnetic Particle Inspection (MPI) on recovered semisubmersible chain has found crack like indications at the inner bend region of all links.
The materials testing laboratory doing the inspection judged these to be Laps. This
feature occurs as the result of two mating links rubbing together, which causes a fold on
the material surface. Due to the rough nature of the surface in this area it is not
generally possible to do ultrasonic testing to assess the depth of these cracks like
indentations. Hence, the desirability to obtain confirmation of the presence or
otherwise of any obscured fatigue cracks.
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Figure 7-12 -Test Rig Set Up for Break Testing of Mooring Components (Studless
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7.4
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7.5
C 'K
In this expression a is the crack length, N is the number of cycles, 'K is the range of
stress intensity factor. C and m are material and environment dependent constants
which are typically determined in the laboratory. For chain, Vicinay has measured
values for the exponent m in different environments. The figures for dry air are lower
(around m = 2.7), compared with the values of free corrosion in seawater that are m =
2.88. Below a threshold value of 'K cracks do not grow at all. Above a high level of
'K crack growth is much more rapid as is illustrated in Figure 7-14.
Figure 7-14 - Crack Growth per Cycle versus Stress Intensity Range [Ref. 2]
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For certain oil and gas projects the required design life for production facilities may
reach 30 years. An example of such a project is the Belanak offshore liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) FPSO facility offshore Indonesia. This hull has been designed
and built to last 30 years without the need for dry docking and all mechanical
equipment has been specified to last for this period. Such a long design life presents
real challenges for a system which is exposed to continuous wear and corrosion, yet at
the end of the field life must still be able to withstand a 100 year return period storm.
The recent OMAE Speciality Symposium on FPSO Integrity in Houston August 30 September 2, 2004 included a paper looking at Mooring Chain Corrosion Design
Considerations for an FPSO in Tropical Water [Ref. 33]. This paper reviewed US
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) data on corrosion rates from its 16 year test
programme in a tropical area and from corrosion data for other geographical areas from
other sources. In summary the US NRLs test results indicate that a corrosion
allowance of 0.2mm per year on one side should be sufficient for compensating the
actual corrosion damage. This gives 2 x 0.2 = 0.4mm/year on diameter which ties in
quite well with the existing codes. However, this is lower than the North Sea reference
number reported in Section 7.2.1, i.e. 0.6mm/year.
What is perhaps significant here is that the 0.4mm/year rate discussed in the OMAE
paper seems to only correspond to corrosion, the effect of wear seems to have been
neglected. North Sea experience seems to indicate that wear can be quite considerable.
In locations such as West Africa, where less extreme but regular FPSO motion can be
expected year after year, the effect of wear is expected to be significant. Hence it is felt
that a 0.4 mm/year rate to cover corrosion and wear is not conservative, at least for the
North Sea. But still more data is needed from other types of units, which have seen
long-term deployments in different geographical locations.
The design of the surface floating facility, the type of mooring and metocean conditions
will affect wear rate. For example in 1982 4.5 inch diameter U4 grade chain on a
CALM buoy failed due to excessive wear after two months, see Figure 7-15 [Ref. 34].
In this case the buoy anchor pattern was asymmetric with distinct strong and weak roll
stiffness axes and surge stiffness axes. However, this incident shows that accelerated
wear can be a real issue.
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Figure 7-15 Illustration of Excessive Chain Wear on a CALM Buoy [Ref. 34]
7.5.2
The following factors will influence corrosion rate all of which will vry to some degree
depending on geographical location. :
x
Dissolved oxygen
Temperature
Salinity
All other factors being equal corrosion rates are approximately proportional to the level
of dissolved oxygen in the water. Oxygen content is influenced mainly by water
particle velocity and temperature. As can be seen in Figure 7-16, (also see Figure 7-17)
temperature drops with increasing water depth and hence oxygen content increases.
Thus this is a potentially undesirable effect from a corrosion perspective for deepwater
FPSs.
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Figure 7-16 Typical Temperature and Salinity Profile in the Tropical Oceans
Figure 7-17 Indicative Oxygen Concentration versus Water Depth (courtesy of BP)
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Wang and DSouzas OMAE paper identified an inconsistency between the mooring
chain inspection requirements defined in API RP 2I (In-service Inspection of Mooring
Hardware for Floating Drilling Units, and RP 2SK (Recommended Practice for the
Design and Analysis and Stationkeeping Systems for Floating Structures.) Although
RP 2I is not necessarily appropriate for a FPSO it would be logical to apply it to a semi
submersible production unit.
Section 3.4 of RP 2I states Links having any of the following problems should be
removed: an average diameter of two measured diameters less than 95% of the nominal
diameter (about 10% reduction of cross sectional area) or a diameter in any direction
less than 90% of the nominal diameter. This is a different approach to the corrosion
rate specified in RP 2SK.
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An example helps to illustrate the difference between the two approaches. Take a chain
designed to have a net diameter of 105mm for a 30 year service life. Applying a
0.4mm per year corrosion allowance results in a final diameter of (30 x 0.4) + 105 =
117mm. After 25 years assuming the 0.4mm per year corrosion allowance the chain
will still have a sound diameter of 117 (25 x 0.4) 107mm which would still meet
the original design requirement. However, this remaining diameter of 107 fails the RP
2I inspection criteria of 0.95 x 117 111mm.
Obviously it is undesirable to have an inconsistency between two API reports. It is
believed that API 2I is due to be revised and it would be desirable for this inconsistency
to be resolved at this time.
7.6
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Figure 7-19 - Measured Wear Rates of U3 and U4 Chain at 8,170lbs (300 tonnes
equivalent) [Ref. 34]
These experimental tests identified wear rate coefficients which are dependent on
applied tension and whether the chains were in air or sea-water.
Using this data a modified form of Archards wear equation was developed of the
following form:
N 1
TMV
i 1
Fi 1 Fi
Ii 1 Ii
r .i
........
>3@
2
180
where:
F
chain tension
number of records
TWV =
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7.6.1
The conclusions from Shoup and Muellers paper are interesting and have potential
implications for the reliability of the mooring systems on deep water floating
production facilities. Hence, they are reproduced in full below:
The most important result of the study is the realization that wear is an important
criteria for anchor leg design, especially for deepwater systems. Deepwater catenary
systems are prone to anchor chain wear because:
1. Overall system elasticity and surge motion increases with water depth. As
surge motion increases, interlink motions also increase.
2. Catenary chain moorings have large pretension interlink forces in deep
water. The wear study shows wear rate increases dramatically with
increasing load (particularly at the floating structure interface).
Catastrophic wear failure of catenary anchor leg lines (at the floating structure
interface) can be prevented by:
1. Placing large links below the chainstoppers to keep the gross contact
pressure below the high wear rate regime.
2. Using a stopper casting support which is free to rotate about two
perpendicular axis. This will eliminate most of the wear generating
interlink motions.
3. Studying the behaviour of links in the wear zone to determine if a
particular mooring arrangement generates large relative sliding distance
between links.
With respect to point 2 it is worth noting that that most FPSOs only allow stopper
rotation about one axis rather than two (see Figure 9-3). For spread moored FPSOs it
will be interesting to see if wear experienced in the field may make adopting a twin
axis approach worthwhile.
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7.6.2
With modern dynamic analysis mooring packages, it is possible to predict the relative
rotation between individual links for different line tensions/sea states. There are now a
number of FPSs which have been operational for a number of years and from which
indicative wear rates are available. Hence, there is benchmark data which can be
potentially used to validate a wear analysis assessment and assist with the selection of
wear rate coefficients. Thus, it is recommended that such an exercise should be
undertaken (see Section 21). Once a good validation has been achieved it should be
possible to apply the developed methodology to a planned new deep water long-term
FPS. It should be possible to take into account the system specified pretension and
expected environmental conditions and vessel response. In this way the calculated
wear rate can be compared with the code specified wear and corrosion rates (see
Section 0). If the calculated value is higher than the code specified value a cost benefit
analysis may be required to assess whether increasing the line diameter is more cost
effective than carrying out a replacement operation some time during the field life.
7.6.3
Enhanced Wear and the Possible Development of Loose Studs in the Chain
Lockers
On all the lines in the chain locker on the FPSO with adjustable lines discussed in
section 9.1, there will be two slack sections where the chain hangs off from the bitter
end shackle and down from the ceiling mounted gypsy wheel. As the FPSO responds
to the environment these slack chain sections will move around and may be subject to
wear within the locker, which might not normally be expected for un-tensioned chain in
the chain locker. The motion of the chain added to the possibility of corrosion inside
the chain locker could lead to the development of loose studs. On this unit loose studs
were found in a 17 link, chain section, which was pulled out from the chain locker.
Previous experience with chain storage in lockers on semi-subs indicates a potential for
corrosion pitting damage. To quote, chain which normally remained in the locker
exhibited severe localized corrosion in the form of deep pitting. This was unexpected.
However, the severe pitting probably resulted from the formation of oxygen
concentration cells at points of contact within the stored pile of chain. The moist salty
environment provided electrolyte and the varying local concentrations of oxygen
provided the anode/cathode galvanic potential [Ref. 35].
Pitting corrosion and the wear are both potentially significant points, since you do not
want to adjust line lengths to reduce wear and possibly by doing so introduce weak
links into the system, which were not previously under high tension see Section 9.1.
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UNBALANCED
STUDIES)
LINE
8.1
PRE-TENSIONS
(CASE
When a mooring analysis is undertaken the pre- or working tensions are set at specific
values, which are often identical. This is a reasonable approach as long as the unit in
the field can set their line tensions to comparable values. If the set up line pre-tensions
on a FPS are unbalanced, this can lead to increased maximum line tensions and reduced
fatigue lives. In addition, in case of a single line failure this can lead to an increased
transient excursion, which might exceed the allowable watch circle.
On a North Sea semi-sub FPS the offshore personnel doubted the tension readouts were
accurate because:
x
Sometimes the wire became partially bedded into, and/or damaged the lower
wrap on the winch drums
When grappling for certain components on the mooring line they were not
found at the expected depth.
Therefore, an underwater ROV survey was taken of the flounder or tri-plate connectors
on the mooring lines to obtain their x, y and z co-ordinates. From these positions and
knowing the submerged weight of the line it was possible to undertake a catenary line
calculation to determine the actual line tension. These tensions can then be compared
to the tension readouts on the rig at the time that the ROV position check was made. It
was found from this process that the calculated tensions and the measured tensions
could be out by up to 160% in the worst instance!
There are a number of potential reasons why the tension meters were so far out. These
include:
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The tensions are measured at the base of the winches in board of the fairleads
122
8.2
Line No11
195.0
194.0
193.0
192.0
191.0
190.0
189.0
188.0
187.0
186.0
185.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
Tension (te)
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8.3
8.3.1
Historically semi submersible drilling units have been subject to relatively frequent
mooring line failures which equate to approximately one failure per three operating
years. Sometimes these failures cannot be attributed to obvious causes. The work
reported in this section shows that it is possible for a carefully set up Rig to have a
seriously unbalanced mooring pattern, which may well not be detected by the Operator.
Such a Rig would thus be in greater danger of mooring line failure.
If the tension meters are well positioned, working properly and their calibration is in
date, a likely cause of unbalanced line tensions is partial seizure of the gypsy wheels.
This can be confirmed by a simple line Payout/Pull-In test. If this reveals that some of
the gypsy wheels are partially seized an attempt should be made to free them up.
However, if the unit is on station it may not be feasible to undertake such work in situ.
In such a case the line tensions out with the fairlead should be determined by other
measures such as:
x
ROV or possibly diver monitoring of the chain angles where they emerge
from the fairleads
From these measurements it is possible to back calculate the actual line tensions as long
as this is done in calm conditions with minimal tidal variations.
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At present it is not known how common a problem this could be for other operating
units. Seized wheels may be more likely on a wire sheave than on a chain
gypsywheel/wildcat. Hence, it is recommended that similar Payout/Pull-In tests are
repeated for a number of different ages and designs of Semi-Submersibles. This is
recommended in the HSEs recent research report 219, Design and Integrity
Monitoring of Mobile Installation Moorings [Ref. 36].
Azimuth Checks and Marine Growth
If a gypsy wheel is partially seized with respect to rotation it may also be seized relative
to azimuth rotations. Hence, as well as checks gypsy wheel checks on free running, the
ability of the fairlead assembly to freely slew or azimuth should also be confirmed. If
the fairleads cannot azimuth freely increased chain wear is likely to occur. In practice
the best way to achieve this in the field may be to examine the marine growth at the
fairlead to see if it has been displaced as the gypsy wheels azimuth. If there is no
evidence of removal of marine growth it is likely that the fairleads may be seized in the
azimuth direction and may also have problems rotating!
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MOORING BEHAVIOUR AT
INTERFACE (CASE STUDIES)
THE
VESSEL
The design of the vessel interface needs to minimize the potential for wear, corrosion or
other forms of degradation. However, in field experience is demonstrating that this is
not always being achieved. This is discussed in this chapter. The key points are
relevant to mooring systems in general, not just to one particular design or even type of
floating platform. Although turrets are discussed in detail the key points are relevant to
Spars, spread moored FPSOs and semi-subs.
9.1
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Figure 9-1 - Turret Design in which Chain Lengths can be Adjusted (courtesy of
Chevron-Texaco)
Figure 9-2 Generic Turret Design in which the Chains are Stoppered off at the Turret
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If the line lengths are never adjusted during the field life this means that the same links
in the thrash zone and at the turret interface will need to withstand the majority of the
degradation. In addition, inspecting lines in situ is more difficult, since the chain is
relatively inaccessible inside the trumpet/chain stopper. It is also much more difficult
with such designs to pick up the chain off the sea-bed to make it more accessible for in
water inspection (see Section 18).
Being able to adjust line lengths can introduce its own perils, although these should be
controllable. During a regular line tension adjustment operation on one North Sea
FPSO there was a failure of the lifting and locking mechanism resulting in a complete
line run out (see Section 0).
On type a) systems the trumpets are typically pivoted about a single axis so as to
minimize chain rotation and wear. Since the rotation is only about one axis and the
trumpets are arranged around an approximate circle, the pivoting action cannot
eliminate chain rotation for all the lines at the same time. Thus, to minimize wear over
a long field life, there may be arguments for selecting a design which can pivot about
two axes, although this would be mechanically more complicated. This may be
particularly relevant to spread moored FPSOs which cannot weather vane. Hence,
there may be more wear at the chain/hull interface when the weather is not directly on
the bow. Depending on location the weather coming in on the vessels quarters may
occur for a significant proportion of the time.
Figure 9-3 - Spread Moored FPSO Single Axis Chain Stopper (courtesy of SBM)
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Trumpets or guides are normally included on type a) FPSO designs to help guide the
chain into the chain stopper. The trumpets themselves may include angle iron guides
to ensure that the chain is in the right orientation when it enters the chain stopper. Once
the chains are tensioned the trumpets have no real purpose unless they are required in
the future for a new chain pull in operation. Interestingly, the pivoting chain stopper
design which was adopted for the Brent Spar buoy did not include trumpets to help
guide in the chain see Section 11. However, in this case the chains in the stoppers were
probably pre-rigged before the Spar was towed out to location. A kenter joining
shackle was then used to connect up the chain in the field before the line was tensioned
up. If you have a reliable method of connecting up in the field this approach does have
some advantages. For example, the trumpets can be dispensed with and it is also easier
to undertake a change out of the top chain section at some stage during the field life if
required without cutting the chain. This illustrates the importance of having long-term
reliable connectors, which is an area which still requires further work.
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9.2
9.2.1
External Turret
On a number of type a) turret configurations wear has been experienced where the
chains have been rubbing against the weld beads, where the bell mouth joins with the
parallel trumpet section (see Figure 9-6). This was first experienced on an early S.E.
Asian external turret moored FPSO. For this external turret, in air access was such that
it was possible to shroud the chains where they were rubbing against the weld beads
with a replaceable material (ultra high molecular weight polyethylene (UMPHE)
sheeting). This whitish material can just be seen on Figure 9-4 poking out of the
trumpets. In this case the weld beads were left as they were with no attempt to grind
them down smooth. On this project UMPHE has been successful in stopping the chain
wear, however, the sheeting needs regular inspection and replacement when it becomes
worn or damaged. Hence, this is a solution which is only suitable where access is
good, not for a submerged turret, in a harsh environment.
Figure 9-4 - External Cantilever Turret which experienced Chain wear at the Trumpet
Welds which was halted by use of UMPHE (courtesy of Shell)
Considerable wear has also been noted on the chains which are normally in air on a
benign climate external turret unit. Water lubrication may be a possibility to minimize
the wear rate on such units see section 7.6.
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9.2.2
In the North Sea mooring lines are typically inspected utilising a work class ROV
which performs a fly by of the lines. During one of these surveys a slight shadow was
seen on one of the chains at the trumpet interface during the annual workclass ROV
chain survey. Unfortunately, the large work class ROV was unable to get close in
enough to inspect this shadow to determine whether it was simply removal of marine
growth and mill scale, or if a notch was being ground into the chain (see Figure 9-5).
To investigate this apparent anomaly further, a test tank mock up of the chain and
trumpet assembly was built so that the capability of using a football sized micro-ROV
(see Figure 17-5) to get in close to the bell mouth could be evaluated. This test tank
test is illustrated in Figure 9-6. Micro-ROVs are particularly attractive for inspecting
around the base of the turret since they can be deployed from the FPS itself rather than
employing the services of a ROV support vessel. A micro-ROV can typically be
deployed over the side of the FPSO either by hand or using a simple lowering frame.
In addition, on some FPSOs there may be a spare I tube which is wide enough for the
micro-ROV to be lowered down through. The test of the micro-ROV was successful
ands it was subsequently deployed in the field. Figure 9-7 illustrates one of the
photographs taken by the micro-ROV in the field. Marks can be clearly seen on both
left hand and right hand faces of the chain where it has been in contact with the
trumpet.
Figure 9-5 - Example of the Level of Inspection Detail which can be achieved using a
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Figure 9-6- Test Tank Mock-Up of Micro-ROV inspection of Chain Emerging from
Figure 9-7 - Micro-ROV Photograph of Chain Wear Notches where Chain Emerges at
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Even with the better image resolution provided by the micro-ROV, quantifying the
exact extent of the chain wear was difficult. However, it can be seen from
Figure 9-8 that it was potentially significant if the illustrated reduction in bar diameter
is correct. In addition, it can be seen from Figure 9-10 that the location of the notch is
in an area which is subject to significant reduction in bar diameter when a chain is
loaded up to its MBL. Unfortunately, there is little data available on how reduction in
bar diameter can affect chain strength. To try and determine as reliably as possible how
a notch in the chain would affect strength, a notch was ground into some spare chain
links left over from the original installation see Figure 9-9. This link was then break
tested to assess how much the chain MBL had been reduced by the presence of the
notch.
1
6
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Figure 9-9 - Artificially Introduced Notch on to Spare Chain Links, note also Red
Figure 9-10 - Example of Stretched Chain during Break Testing, the Blue Mark Shows
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The results from this break test of the notched chain indicated that it was likely that
some of the as installed mooring lines would no longer meet the required mooring line
safety factors. Even if the lines were still within the required safety factors, it would
just be a matter of time until they became out of specification and when this might
happen could not be reliably quantified. In addition, there was some possibility that
fatigue cracks could have developed due to the regular knocking action which, if
present, would reduce the break strength considerably. At present no technology exists
which can check for fatigue cracks underwater, particularly in such an inaccessible
area. Therefore, the decision was made to undertake a repair operation to change out
the links going through the trumpets by custom built chain links of the same length as
the existing chain, but made from a larger bar size. In addition, the new links were
given a special hard cobalt chromium anti wear coating see Figure 9-11. Further
details of the repair operation can be found in Section 18.8.2.
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Figure 9-13 - An Example of the Chain Damage noted after the Notched Chains had
been recovered back to Shore (courtesy of I. Williams)
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9.2.4
It is significant to note that the chain stopper on type a) designs is typically inboard of
the pivot point - see Figure 9-14. This means that the trumpet assembly does not
automatically follow the motion of the chain. In fact it is contact between the chain and
the outer face of the bell mouth which causes the trumpet to rotate see Figure 9-21. It
is this contact, plus an associated sliding/sawing action, which seems to have led to the
chain notches.
Figure 9-14 - Turret Arrangement where the Chain Stopper (in red) is Behind the
Rotation Point (2 black concentric circles)
Should the Stopper be behind or in front of the Pivot Point?
It is helpful to consider the pros and cons of having the pivot point behind the chain
stopper (i.e. the rotation point is closest to the hull). Some spread moored units have
gone the other way (see Figure 9-16). This approach seems to ensure that the
compliance introduced by the bearing takes out as much of the motion as possible and
the metal to metal contact as illustrated in Figure 9-15 is avoided. It will be interesting
to see how much wear is experienced in the field by the designs with the stopper
outboard of the pivot point. It will also be interesting to see what happens to the chain
which is under low tension from the stopper up to the deck of the FPS see Section
9.2.5.
Implications of Long Trumpets
For chain stoppers which are inboard of the pivot points it would appear that long
trumpets are not helpful after the completion of the installation process. Thus it is
recommended that careful checks should be made on any FPSOs which fit this category
[Ref. 37].
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Williams)
Figure 9-16 - Fairlead Chain Stopper where the Chain Stopper is in Front of the
Rotation Point (used on some Spread Moored FPSOs) (courtesy of Maritime Pusnes)
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Figure 9-17 - As Installed Photo Graph of the Design Shown in Figure 9-16 (courtesy
of Maritime Pusnes)
Compatible Surface Hardness
In general achieving compatible chain surface hardness is important for long term
integrity, since it affects wear. Unfortunately, at present chain hardness and wear do
not seem to be evaluated in any detail. These factors should be taken account of during
detailed design, but more work is needed on this area before it becomes part of the
standard design process.
Having the pivot point behind the chain stopper may date back to the original design of
CALM buoys (see Figure 9-18). However, as far as can be determined the early Shell
buoys did not have long trumpets and thus wear at the end of the trumpets may not
have been an issue. Given that a tried and tested working design from CALM buoys
was already available it is not surprising that this detail was incorporated into early
FPSO turret designs which were not initially deployed in harsh environments.
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Figure 9-18 Typical CALM Buoy Chain Stopper (courtesy of The Professional
Divers Handbook [Ref. 38])
On the subject of CALMs Figure 9-19 shows an Imodco buoy with a rubber casting
used to minimise wear at the lip of the trumpet. Thus, it is clear that potential wear in
this area has been an issue for a number of years. Significantly during installation it is
apparently difficult to get the rubber castings in exactly the right place.
Figure 9-19 - Amoco CALM Buoy- Note Inclusion of Rubber Casting (courtesy of
[Ref. 38])
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9.2.5
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9.3
Figure 9-21 Example of a Wire Rope Bending Shoe (courtesy of API RP25K)
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For wire rope cyclic stresses from bending will shorten its service life because of
fatigue. Fatigue resistance (service life) increases as a ratio of bend shoe diameter to
wire diameter (D/d) increases. Individual wires move relative to one another and to the
bearing surface as the rope bends causing abrasion. Abrasive wear increases as D/d
decreases. Under heavy loads, the rope flattens against the bearing surface, increasing
relative motion between strands and wires. Lubrication and large D/d ratios mitigate
the adverse affects of bending. Minimum D/d ratios are available for different rope
constructions [Ref. 19 7-2.12].
Chain works most efficiently when loaded in pure tension. Tensioning chain that is
bent over a surface introduces bending stress that reduces load carrying capability. It is
thus recommended that Chain should not be tensioned over surfaces with diameters less
than seven times the chain diameter. Thus sharp bends and corners should be avoided
[Ref. 19 7-29].
The bending shoe design illustrated in Figure 9-23 includes an angle sensor which can
be used to back calculate the static line tension. However, given the problems outlined
in Section 0 it will be interesting to see if the dynamic behaviour of the chain at this
point over time may cause wear problems. The particular application illustrated is in
deep water and hence line dynamics (whipping/fluid drag) will affect tension. In other
words the recorded angle may not give an accurate idea of the tension in the line.
Figure 9-23 - Bending Shoe Design which includes an Angle Sensor [Ref. 40]
Another point to note on this project is that the chain is locked off and it is not planned
to be moved regularly. In fact the chain jacks were removed after installation and will
be re-installed as required during chain inspection. Not being able to work the chain
will affect its fatigue life, so it will be interesting to see how well this mooring system
performs over time.
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10
10.1
AH001
Buchan FPS
Emerald Producer FPSO
A number of wires from these units were removed and examined as part of two
previous JIPs [Ref. 41 and Ref. 42]. The inspection of these lines confirmed that wire
will be subject to degradation at the fairlead region and in the thrash zone. Hence, if
IWRC wire is used in these locations it will typically need to be replaced after about 8
years service see Table 3-9. Further information on when to discard IWRC mooring
lines can be found in Chaplin 1992. Figure 10-1 from Chaplin 1992 [Ref. 43] gives an
idea of the type of degradation which IWRC rope can be subject to :
Figure 10-1 Examples of the Subjectivity Associated with Assessing IWRC Rope
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10.2
On a North Sea dis-connectable FSU (see Figure 10-2) the mooring wire and socket
was found to have parted from the triplate assembly. An in-water survey showed the
line to be in normal alignment, but separated by 36m from the triplate assembly, which
was still securely attached by the mooring chain to the suction anchor. Inspection of
the mooring line socket showed the socket retaining pin to be displaced, as one of the
circular retaining plates which keep the pin in place had parted from the socket body
(see Figure 10-3). It should be noted that the initial design prevented pin from rotating,
also Section 14.1.2.
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Offshore)
Figure 10-4 - Note End Plate also seems to be Falling Off on the Right Hand Side
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10.2.1
There was a relatively steep change in mass per unit length at the triplate. This meant
that the line at the forged tri-plate was subject to:
x
repeated pick up and set down contacts with the seabed, and
x quite large relative rotations between chains, the wire and the tri-plate
elements.
This resulted in rotational torque being transmitted from the wire socket through the
retaining pin into the tri-plate and finally out to the chain cable via the LTM shackle.
The pin retaining plate is bolted both to the pin and to the socket body the pin. The pin
cannot rotate and the torque must be resisted by these bolts. These bolts either became
loose and fell out, or failed in shear/fatigue.
How was it Rectified?
The problem was rectified by using more and bigger bolts on the end plate and
allowing it to rotate see Figure 10-7. The issue of whether or not to allow the pin to
rotate is discussed in greater detail in Section 14.1.2.
Figure 10-7 - Repair Utilised Bigger Bolts and Allowed the Socket Pin to Rotate
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10.2.2
Anode Failures
Excessive corrosion was noted on the moorings wires discussed in Section 10.2.
Therefore a series of anodes were retrofitted on the lines to control the corrosion level
see Figure 10-8. The anodes were inspected after approximately 12 months service
see Figure 10-9, where it can be seen that a number had become disconnected. There
are a number of possible reasons for the anodes becoming disconnected and, due to
commercial reasons it is not possible to discuss these in detail. However, from a
mooring integrity point of view the key message seems to be keep your catenaries
clean see also Section 10.3. In other words avoid adding anything on to the
catenary, particularly in the thrash zone.
Service
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10.3
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Figure 10-12 illustrates an alternative weighted chain design utilising hung off chain
tails. However, this design has also seen problems as is discussed in Section 7.2.1 and
illustrated in Figure 7-7.
General Location of
Damaged Shackles
General Location
of Excessive
Wear
Figure 10-12 Illustration of Where the Damage Occurred on the Mooring Catenary
10.3.1
Figure 10-10 illustrates an excursion limiting weighted chain design which has
operated successfully in the North Sea since the later half of the 1980s. As can be seen
it utilises a parallel chain design.
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If adopting such a solution with more than 2 parallel chains it is necessary to appreciate
that the chains will not be of identical length and thus will experience different tension
ranges. Hence the chains need to be suitably sized. In addition, it is important to still
inspect the chains regularly. Figure 10-15 shows the extent of wear that can still occur
due to the dynamic motion in the thrash zone. Thus whatever connectors are selected
need to be robust.
(courtesy of N.Groves)
Figure 10-15 - Red Arrow Illustrates the Local Wear can take place when utilising
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10.3.2
Problems with submerged mooring line buoys have been encountered on a European
based FPSO (see Figure 10-16). Figure 10-16 and a semi-submersible production unit.
It is interesting to note that in Figure 10-16 the failures have occurred on leeside or
breasting lines, not windward lines.
Line 10,
shackle
buoy
failed,
2001
Line 1,
shackle
buoy
failed,
2004, sea
bed wire
corroded
Line 2,
buoy chain
cracked &
replaced
Line 3,
buoy chain
failed
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10.4
Chain load was taken on the gripper and the chain rose up to remove load
from stopper.
Opened the stopper and the chain was pulled up by fully extending the lift
cylinders.
Attempted to close the stopper but was not possible because the stopper
was contacting chain link. The operator considered that either tensioner
was not fully extended or that chain links were too long.
The chain was lowered and the exercise repeated, but it was still not
possible to engage the lower stopper.
Whilst lowering the tensioner a loud noise occurred and operator thought
that chain was slipping through the tensioner and ran for cover.
Due to dust from the chain being detected by smoke detectors, a platform
general platform alert (GPA) occurred and all personnel were mustered.
The FPSO was shut down until an ROV could be mobilized through fear
of damage to risers and other mooring lines.
The design of this particular mooring system was revised during the latter stages of
fabrication. This was a result of further load cases which required a stronger mooring
system. This was identified when the turret fabrication was well advanced. Thus, with
the positions of equipment fixed, compromises in the design were made. Critical to
these were the relative position of the tensioner to the chain locker spurling pipe which
had the effect of fixing the size of the gypsy wheel and therefore the number of pockets
in the wheel - see Figure 10-18. Also the tolerances of forged chain links had not been
properly taken account of. Modifications to the lifting and locking mechanisms should
prevent another incident of this type occurring. It is worth noting that line run-outs are
far from unknown on semi-submersible drilling rigs [Ref. 45] and OTO 98086 [Ref.
46].
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Figure 10-19 - Gypsy wheel structure after failure, i.e. Gypsy Wheel No Longer Present
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The Manufacturer of the Linear Tensioner assembly which failed has confirmed that
this FPSO is unique in its use of a combined upper gripper and lower stopper assembly
in one installed unit. BUT this does not necessarily mean that there is no danger of
possible chain run out on other units which are able to adjust mooring line tensions.
Hence the lessons learnt need to be distributed through out the industry. This incident
highlights the importance of reviewing all similar mechanical systems to check that,
during the course of a long period of operation, chain/stopper wear or link dimensional
variation may not jeopardize the integrity of the mechanism.
10.4.1
On an early North Sea FPSO it was discovered that a number of mooring lines had
loose studs. The lines were repaired with a new design of kenters (see Figure 10-20).
However, at present the classification society is stating that, despite the expected
superior fatigue performance of these kenters, they will still need to be examined in the
dry after 5 years service. Recovering kenters on to the back of an anchor handler, so
that they can be dissembled and examined, is a major cost. Since kenters themselves
are not that expensive relative to boat time, it makes sense to replace any kenters which
have to be recovered for inspection. The replaced kenters can then be examined in
detail back on land to evaluate whether there is deterioration or cracking. If this shows
that the new improved fatigue life kenters have behaved well in the field, there would
be more of an argument for leaving them in situ for longer between inspections.
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As FPS units get older, the desirability of repairing lines using components, such as
kenters, which are as similar as possible to common link chain, will increase. Hence, it
will be important to record the performance of all new designs of kenters both on FPS
and semi submersible applications. Since flotels and drilling semis recover their
mooring lines regularly this should give increased scope for inspection compared to a
permanent FPS mooring. It is worth noting, however, that at present no type of kenter
is permitted to be part of a permanent mooring system in the Gulf of Mexico.
10.5
Windlass Failures
This incident relates to a South China Seas production semi. Eleven mooring lines
made of 5 inch spiral strand wires and 4.75 inch chains moor the semi. The windlasses,
by paying in and out of the upper chains, are used to adjust the position of the semi
over the subsea trees. In the early phase of the project the wells were batched drilled
and completed. This led to a significant chain mileage. A year after first oil, one of the
windlass wheels started to wobble. A closer inspection discovered that the windlass
wheel was split into two pieces by a circumferential crack, see
Figure 10-21. Inspection of the other wheels indicated similar damage. Since the
windlasses could not be used, all the chains were locked on the chain stoppers. The
wheels were not of a standard design. The wheels designed for a 5 inch chain had
been modified to accommodate two chain sizes: 5 inch and 3 inch. The 3 inch chain
was used to pull in the 5 inch mooring chain at installation. An additional
circumferential groove had been machined in the wheel to accommodate clamps
between the 3 inch to 5 inch chain. The roots of the main wheels were squared up to
accept these clamps. The circumferential groove had no fillet.
Figure 10-21 - Example of Windlass Crack (Red Arrow) due to Stress Raiser caused by
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The following summarises the Operators conclusions from this incident which are
informative from a mooring integrity point of view:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
In a one of a kind design there are many unknown unknowns that may
load the system in unanticipated ways.
5.
159
11
SPARS AND
STUDIES)
11.1
OFFLOADING
BUOYS
(CASE
The Brent Spar Buoy, although now famous for the nature of its abandonment, was a
successful design from a mooring integrity point of view. It had a 19 year operational
life and minimum wear was found on the chains at the stoppers when they were
examined when the Spar was cut up in Norway, see Figure 11-4 and Figure 11-5 . The
MBL of the IWRC wire rope was found to have had no loss of strength when break
tested after the line had been recovered see Figure 11-6. Indeed if the strength had
changed at all it had marginally increased.
Figure 11-1 - General Arrangement of the Brent Spar Mooring System (courtesy of
Shell)
Brent Spars motion characteristics are probably significantly better than either a semisub or a FPSO. Loop currents do not occur in the North Sea and hence vortex induced
hull vibration on Brent Spar does not seem to have occurred, unlike some Gulf of
Mexico Spars. Brent Spar is interesting in that, relative to most FPSO designs of today,
there were no trumpets or hawse pipes to guide the chain into the stopper. Figure 11-3
and Figure 11-2 show the fairlead arrangement used on Brent Spar.
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The chain is likely to have been pre-rigged which would have made things easier in the
field, but this meant that a kenter was introduced at the connection. Thus this does not
seem to be a particularly desirable solution for a long-term moored FPSO. Still it
would be good to find a way of lining up chain in a stopper without using trumpets and
angle iron as a guide, since these items can cause problems over time, see Section 9.2.
It is believed there was one mooring failure on Brent Spar, but this was at a kenter
connecting link. Such a failure is not surprising, since standard kenters are known to
have low fatigue lives. There are, fortunately, now new designs of kenters with
improved fatigue lives, but these still do not at present have classification society
approval for long-term mooring see Section 10.4.1. In addition, one of the Brent Spar
mooring lines got damaged by an anchor line from a drifting vessel.
Figure 11-2 - Brent Spar Fairlead Chain Stopper in the Hull (courtesy of Shell)
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Figure 11-4 - Indentation from where the chain bore down on the Stopper (courtesy of
Shell)
Figure 11-5 Red Arrow Illustrates wear on the chain, where it sat on the stopper
(courtesy of Shell)
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Figure 11-6 - Brent Spar Wire Sample Y1 prior to cleaning [Ref. 41]
11.2
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Figure 11-8 - Example of Short Trumpets on a Long Term Moored Floating Loading
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12
12.1
A long service life with limited opportunity for in depth inspections while
deployed.
There are numerous different types of turret, some of which are driven and others are
freely weather-vaning. Turrets can be located at different positions on a FPSO and this
tends to influence the turret type. Active turrets are supported on sliding bearings while
other suppliers tend to use wheels or rollers. Table 12-1 summarises the advantages
and disadvantages of the two bearing approaches [Ref. 48].
A key concern from a mooring integrity point of view is if the turret fails to rotate
which could result in the FPSO becoming partially or totally beam on to survival storm
conditions. This may well lead to twisting of the mooring system which could cause
damage.
Active or driven turrets are not normally at the bow or the stern of a FPSO. Thus such
systems tend not to naturally weathervane. Hence, the FPSOs thrusters combined with
the turrets turning and locking system are used to turn the FPSO so it stays head on the
weather. It can thus be appreciated that an active turret is probably more susceptible to
FPSO power loss than a naturally weather-vaning turret. In practice blackship or no
power conditions have occurred in the past on active turrets which have led to the
FPSO being exposed to beam sea conditions. What is significant from a mooring
design point of view is that FPSOs with turrets are not analysed for survival beam sea
conditions. The wave frequency motion of a FPSO exposed to survival beam sea type
conditions will be high and in certain cases this could lead to extremely high mooring
line tensions. As well as blackship conditions active turrets can also be susceptible to
thrusters coming out of the water in extreme storm conditions. In such cases if has
been known for the thrusters to race in air, overload and trip. Even temporarily losing a
thruster in the middle of a storm is undesirable.
Good references for turret behaviour in the field are HSE Offshore Technology Report
2001/073 [Ref. 47] and Turret Operations in the North Sea: Experience from Norne
and Asgard A [Ref. 48].
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From a mooring integrity point of view the key points for the two different turret
systems seem to be as follows:
x
If the active turret turning system or power supply fails or is operated wrongly
there is a danger that the FPSO could end up broadside to the waves.
However, the turning system includes redundancy, for example two of the
four cylinders have sufficient capacity to turn the turret, even for maximum
friction. These need to be designed for good access for servicing and repair.
For the passive turret if the bearings fail and the turret seizes up there is a
danger of ending up broadside to the weather. A serious failure may require
talking a FPSO off station to dry dock. Depending on location, even in an
emergency it will take several days or weeks to put in place arrangements to
take a FPSO off station. Hence the FPSO could have to ride out storms
broadside to the weather, condition which the mooring lines are typically not
designed to be able to withstand. The probability of complete bearing is
likely to increase with age. It would be interesting to know what level of
bearing deterioration has been noted when FPSOs have been removed from
station at the end of a particular assignment. A related point is how quickly
these systems can deteriorate if, for some reason, there is inadequate
lubrication.
Active turrets do not utilise the turret turning and locking systems all the time. Instead
the system is only activated when the turret has absorbed about 7 degrees of twist. This
is different to passive turrets and hence it will be interesting to see if this results in any
different wear mechanisms than active turrets. In actual fact this will be difficult to
differentiate since passive turrets tend to be stoppered off at the base of the turret while
active turrets have a gypsy wheel arrangement at the turret base. Wear at the gypsy
wheel may be more similar to that which is typically encountered on a semi
submersible submerged gypsy wheel fairlead.
Recommendation
A check should be made on a typical FPSO to see how great the increases in line
tension are if the vessel cannot weathervane and thus has to ride out a storm broadside
to the weather.
12.1.1
An interesting question is whether on active turrets the mooring line tensions have
decreased over time due to straightening of the chain on the sea bed? On two
Norwegian FPSO the line tension monitoring has not revealed any tension values close
to the maximum design values. The line tension has not been found to decrease (or
increase) significantly during the first years of operation.
Fatigue cracking was experienced on the grippers of a Norwegian FPSO at a stress hot
spot. All grippers on this unit have been upgraded to improve their fatigue
performance by removing the sharp notch.
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Sliding Bearings
Advantages
Disadvantages
Extremely high
vertical load capacity
Redundant system
allowing partial repair
or substitution
Minimum wear on
swivel
Wide fabrication
tolerances
Adapts to vessel
deformations, hence
promotes a central
turret position with
minimum riser loads
Daily turning
operations
More frequent
maintenance
Roller Bearings
x
Passive system
requiring no daily
operations
Promotes passive
weathervaning, hence
suitable for vessel with
limited or no thrusters
Small fabrication
tolerances
Vulnerable to vessel
deformation
Table 12-1 - Summary of the Pros and Cons of Sliding and Roller Bearings [Ref. 48]
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12.1.2
12.2
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13
13.1
Questionnaire Process
A custom designed questionnaire was developed to undertake an international survey of
worldwide FPS operations including FPSOs, production semis and Spars. A typical
custom designed questionnaire is included in appendix B. The questionnaire is based
on an Excel spreadsheet based with drop down boxes in an attempt to make completion
as quick and easy as possible. The questionnaire was partially filled in making use of
information in the public domain before emailing to Operators and Contractors. If the
answer to certain issues is yes a standard series of questions are generated in a new
worksheet. A filled out example is also included as part of the spreadsheet.
QUESTIONNAIRE
A. GENERAL DETAILS
Kuito FPSO
Spread FPSO
Sep
383
W est Afric a
1999
Yes
Classification Society:
??????
No
A9. Was the unit ever removed from site and then re-installed?
No
A10. Can the mooring system be disconnected in case of typhoons or ice bergs ?
A11. If the moorings can be disconnected, how often has this happened to date ?
No
N.A.
Table 13-1 - Example of the First Page of the Questionnaire see appendix B for a Full
Listing
The questionnaire is now available in the public domain and it is hoped that the format
for reporting incidents will continue to be of use to the offshore community after the
completion of the JIP.
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13.1.1
Initially it was hoped that offshore personnel would be able to complete the majority of
the questionnaires. Despite considerable time spent preparing and chasing up
questionnaires and the ease of email communication, it became clear that the
questionnaire was not given a high priority by hard pressed offshore and office based
personnel. A degree of past knowledge is necessary to complete the questionnaire
properly and with personnel change outs on units this knowledge can easily get lost.
This is itself is a somewhat worrying result for such complicated production facilities.
Getting detailed information on units operating outside the North Sea was particularly
difficult. The problem was not necessarily lack of interest, just a lack of time with
operational issues taking precedence. It is noted that good data could be obtained by
visiting FPSs and auditing the condition of the set up of their mooring systems and
reviewing inspection records. Quite often there is reasonable data available and the key
problem is gaining access to this data which may not be centrally stored.
Although it was difficult to get data on as many units as initially hoped, the data which
was obtained was in general of high quality (see Case Studies) and is believed to be pof
relevance to the vast majority of FPSs in the world today.
13.1.2
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13.2
Can Be
Adjusted
50%
Lines
Locked Off
50%
Units with
67%
Units
witho ut
33%
Units with
50%
Units
witho ut
50%
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Units with
22%
Units
witho ut
78%
Units with
33%
Units
witho ut
67%
Units with
13%
Units
witho ut
87%
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It is interesting to compare the average mooring line inspection periods for various
different types of FPS units in different locations. This is illustrated in Figure 13-1.
1.2
1.6
Figure 13-1 - Comparison of Mooring Line Inspection Periods for Different FPS
Categories
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13.3
97/98
98/99
99/00
00/01
01/02
Total
Moorings/DP
FPSO/FSU
Total
Incidents
11
10
15
22
10
11
79
Mooring/DP
percentage of
FPSO/FSU
incidents
0%
0%
6.7%
9.1%
10%
27.3%
8.9%
Anchor
Failure
Production Semis
Accommodation
Semis
170
0.211
0.111
23
FPSOs
N
0.113
Incident Description
Production
Single Failure
Multiple Failures
Table 13-4 Number of Anchor Incidents in the Period of 1990-2003 in the Norwegian
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Even though considerable resources have been devoted to the international survey, it is
quite possible that that only a fraction of the total number of mooring incidents which
have occurred outside of the North Sea have been reported. In the North Sea there are
statutory requirements for mooring incidents to be reported to the UK Health and
Safety Executive (HSE). Although the North Sea is a hostile climate, units intended for
use here are in general designed to a high standard. In addition, a number of the units
in the North Sea have been around long enough for age related problems to start
making an appearance. It thus seems prudent to consider official statistics for this
region to be a reasonable indicator of the likelihood of mooring line failure.
These statistics indicate that it would not be totally unexpected for the crew on a FPS to
expect a mooring line failure sometime during a field life which exceeds 9 years.
Exactly how these statistics can be related to milder environments is difficult to
estimate without access to more data. But it is worth noting that but fatigue may be
more of an issue for milder locations - see Figure 15-11.
This concern that offshore staff on a FPS should always be prepared and ready to react
appropriately in case of mooring line failure is reflected in the following quote from
from Ref. 3. Although the background of this paper is mooring operations of semisubmersible units, the basic sentiment is felt also to be appropriate for FPS units in
general.
The high failure rate of individual mooring lines means that a unit must
always be prepared to deal with a mooring line failure as an almost routine
operational matter. It is unrealistic to operate a unit on the assumption that a
mooring line failure is unlikely to occur.
It is not perhaps surprising that when FPSs first became more prevalent that their
mooring systems suffered some initial teething troubles as new designs were
introduced. These early problems seem to have been largely resolved and thus in
general terms one might expect a plateau period of mooring failures. What will be
interesting to see is how the number of failures increase as the mooring lines age and
are subject to corrosion, wear and fatigue.
As a FPS operator, it is probably helpful to think in terms of average historical line
failure rate per FPS unit operating year.
Figure 13-2 illustrates historical failure rates for different types of North Sea units. The
failure rate for FPSOs is closer to the UKOOA study reported value of once every 5.4
operating years. Given that North Sea designed FPSOs are carefully regulated it would
be expected that the reliability of these units should be good. Hence it is disappointing
that the failure rates for FPSOs is only slightly better than production semis and only
about twice as good as a drilling semis.
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NDEs UKOOA report referred to DNVs data for 1980 to 1998, which reported 7
FPSO/FSU anchor system failures. This gave 0.186 failures per unit operating year or
one failure every 5.4 operating years. Hence, it can be seen that the failure rate seems
to have improved somewhat from 1998 to 2001.
Comparison of North Sea Failure Rates for Different Unit Types (1980 - 2001)
10
0
Drilling Semi
Production Semi
FPSO
Type of Unit
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14
14.1
Background
Connectors and line terminations (e.g. spelter sockets or fibre rope splices) are vital
components in a mooring system, since they are typically necessary to join up different
types of line e.g. chain to wire, or to suit manufacturing/transportation limitations on
line lengths. However, the need for some type of opening and closing mechanism
means that, to achieve the required strength, the connectors tend to be heavier than the
lines to which they are attached. Thus connectors and line terminations tend to be areas
of discontinuity on a mooring system with respect to weight per metre and also bending
and torsional stiffness. This is because they are unlikely to flex in the precisely the
same way as the chain, wire or fibre rope to which they are connected.
In general, where there is a weight discontinuity on a mooring line there is an increase
in relative rotation. This rotation can result in wear plus possibly some fatigue loading.
Yet it is typically fairly difficult to inspect connectors in situ for wear see for example
Figure 18-15. Hence, due to the long-term effect of these degradation mechanisms,
failures have occurred see for example Section 10.2 and the problems associated with
traditional Kenters, Baldt, Pear and C Links on drilling rigs.
The design of chains and wire rope does not tend to change dramatically from one
project to another. This is not necessarily true of connectors which may need changes
for new applications. Hence this section attempts to summarise what connectors and
line terminations are available at present. It then goes on to consider what should be
taken account of when designing new connectors see the flow diagram in Section
14.3. The section concludes with any gaps in the existing knowledge base and
identifies topics which merit further investigation.
14.2
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14.2.1
Traditional Kenter
The traditional design of Kenter link dates back to a 1905 patent by Max Kenter. The
patent description is as follows :
Improvements in Chain Coupling-links - A coupling-link for chains
consists of two similar parts a, b, which are adapted to engage laterally and
are locked in their engaged position by the grooved piece f. Movement of
the piece f is prevented by the inclined taper-pin h secured in place by the
lead plug i. [Ref. 52].
The great merits of a kenter are that it can pass through a gypsy wheel in the same way
as normal chain and its dynamic behaviour is very similar to chain, since it is of
comparable weight and geometric arrangement. If kenters are tight fitting and are
properly assembled with a lead plug added after assembly, they can perform quite well.
For example some drilling rigs end up with kenters in the thrash zone and these can last
quite well for a temporary application. Still assembly tolerances vary in practice, and
thus having a kenter in the thrash zone should only be considered as a temporary repair.
Kenters are discussed in more detail in Section 10.4.1. It should benoted that if the lead
plug comes out in service there is a danger that the kenter could open up.
14.2.2
A SJS can be used to connect studless common link chain to studless common link
chain without the need for an enlarged end links, which would typically be required if a
normal shackle were to be used. Enlarged end links can only be added to a chain at a
Forge so their inclusion reduces flexibility with regard, for example, to trimming chain
during line hook up operations.
The bow of a SJS needs to be trimmed compared to a standard D shackle to allow
studless link connection. To qualify for LTM designation typically a double locking
mechanism for the shackle pin is required, as well as a demonstration of fatigue life. In
addition, the same quality material is typically used for the shackle body, pin and
locking nut.
In the design illustrated in Figure 14-1 the pin of the shackle is oval which means that it
normally cannot rotate in the shackle body. Normally when two chain links rotate
against each other the surface profile and the harness for the links is very similar.
However, when a chain is connected to a SJS the surface hardnesses of the chain link
and the shackle, as well as the geometry may be somewhat different. If the
combination is such that this leads to accelerated wear of the chain link, which is of
thinner section than the shackle, then this could lead to early loss of integrity. In
addition, due to the weight discontinuity it is likely that there will be more relative
rotation between the link and the joining shackle.
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178
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179
Other types of subsea connectors are illustrated in Figure 14-3. Requirements for
subsea connectors are discussed in more depth in section 6.2.4. More temporary types
of connectors include Baldt or C connectors and pear links. Sometimes these are a
rattling good fit and the general perception is that they fail more often than kenters.
They should not be considered for long term mooring systems, even for temporary
fixes, unless they are all that is available. Standard kenters are better machined, fit
tighter and are more suitable for a short term repair.
Designed to
Subsea
facilitate
Connector
connection &
(Delmar)
disconnection
Female
Male
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180
Subsea
Connector
Designed to
facilitate
connection &
(Ballgrab)
disconnection
Figure 14-3 Illustration of Subsea Connectors which have been used on Pre-Installed
Mooring Lines
Figure 14-4 - Example of a Special Joining Plate - Note Electrical Isolating Bush
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14.3
Terminations General
To be of practical use a rope must be provided with means for connecting it at its ends
into the mooring system. The task of the termination is to transfer the predominantly
axial load in the rope into an engineering component which can be attached to standard
mechanical/structural components which form part of the platform being moored.
Nearly all rope terminations depend to some degree on developing radial forces - and
through them friction - to allow the axial load in the rope to be transferred to another
element. The splice is the basic example of this in which, when the rope is placed in
tension, the geometry of the splice generates radial loads between the rope strands and
these allow sufficient friction forces to be generated to transfer the load from one strand
to another. In other terminations the radial forces are generated by means of a
mechanical device.
It is well documented that during break or fatigue testing many rope specimens are seen
to fail at or very close to the terminations. This is due to the additional stresses
introduced into the rope at or close to the termination.
The termination components may have to support many other additional loads, such as
bending and shear, other than the axial load in the rope. Finally the termination may
have to survive abrasion, fatigue and corrosion.
14.3.1
Spelter Sockets
Splicing of wire ropes is complex and difficult on account of the weight and stiffness of
the large size of typical mooring ropes. An alternative which has developed is the use
of the spelter socket (see Figure 14-7) in which the rope is inserted into a metal collar
with an internal conical hole. The wire rope is cleaned and teased out to form a brush
which adopts the internal conical space of the termination. Into the cone is poured a
molten spelter alloy which solidifies and acts to grip the wire when it is pulled.
Figure 14-5 Example of the Make Up of a Typical Closed Spelter Socket (courtesy of
Bridon)
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Wire rope terminations or sockets can be either open (Figure 14-6) or closed (Figure
14-7).
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183
Although epoxy potting has been used for some small size fibre ropes it has not proved
effective for larger ropes due to the difficulty in providing sufficient circumferential
area over which to distribute the shear loads needed to carry the axial load out of the
rope. Solutions have been proposed in which the rope is divided into component
strands each with its own potted termination but so far the complexity of this approach
has been a major obstacle to its use.
It is important that, when being prepared for potting or speltering, a rope must be
accurately set so that the termination is not at an angle to the axis if the rope. If this
happens the rope will be subjected to a degree of bending when the load is applied and
this can seriously weaken the capacity of the rope. This effect is particularly apparent
when only a short specimen of rope is being terminated as in such cases the limited
length of the rope means that the uneven loading over the rope cross section has less
chance of being absorbed in the stretch of the rope. This leads to a concentration of
bending effect and earlier failure. This can be particularly important when preparing
short specimens for prototype testing.
14.3.2
At present during detailed design S-N curves for common link chain seem to be often
applied. This is not really appropriate and requires further consideration on live
projects.
The Bend stiffener and attachment mechanism also needs to be suitably designed, see
for example the damage shown on Figure 6-6.
Other areas to consider for sockets include:-
If the spelter sockets are not vertical they will be subject to cyclical bending stresses,
which over time might cause a fatigue problem, depending on their design. It is also
important to be able to check whether the insulating PTFE bushes are present or not.
14.3.3
This is the prevalent form of termination for fibre ropes throughout the industry. There
is a large degree of experience available when considering terminating large diameter
fibre mooring ropes with eye splices. Other techniques (Grip and Potted) are much less
well documented. A splice in a polyester rope has been shown to have an efficiency
approaching 1.00, depending on the quality of the splice. It should be noted that the
certified minimum break load (MBL) of a fibre rope is that of the spliced rope ([Ref.
53] or OCIMF hawser guideline).
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Splicing has been described as an Art; there is a movement within the rope industry
pushing for this to be changed to a Technology. There are papers which describe
modelling of splices (see for instance Ref. 67) and recent offshore projects in the Gulf
of Mexico have described various means of controlling and documenting splice
production in ropes with a breaking strength in the region of 2,000 tonnes.
In terms of fatigue testing, most assessments have been made with splice terminations.
Here the fatigue lives for polyester and aramid ropes are described as being well above
that of steel wire rope at normal working loads.
For large diameter synthetic fibre ropes under long term cyclic loading the only verified
technology for their termination is by use of a splice.
Two types of spliced eye hardware are described. The first is a construction involving
a metal thimble and shackle arrangement which has been used successfully for years at
single point mooring terminals. This type of connector is, however, described as
making rope handling particularly cumbersome and awkward [Ref. 68].
To-date most offshore experience of large fibre mooring ropes has relied on this type in
which the thimble can be slipped into a prepared soft-eye splice when the connection is
being made-up on the deck of the mooring installation vessel. The thimble is supported
by a shackle and provides a suitably large diameter over which the fibre rope can be
bent. Advice on the choice of spool diameter is available from guidance documents
such as Ref. 69. The thimble diameter should be large enough to develop the best axial
tension and fatigue strength while minimising abrasion and wear as the stretching rope
slides against the metal of the spool. In order to minimise this problem the splice eye is
often wrapped locally with a binding tape in order to minimise wear on the fibre rope.
When the line goes into tension the spliced eye pulls tight and prevents the thimble
from falling out. However, during over-boarding when there may low line tensions and
eccentric loads on the connection care must be taken to stop the line slipping-off the
thimble and being caught on the shackle instead.
It is important that the fitting between the eye and the spool is tight enough so that the
two do not become separated. This is described as being most likely to occur during
rope handling when the rope is slack.
This is often achieved through encapsulating the thimble in polyurethane. However if
the splice is provided with a permanently fitted hard eye in this way it means that there
are additional problems when handling the rope on its transportation and deployment
spools as the thimble must be prevented from abrading and damaging the rope on the
spool.
Various novel terminations are currently being proposed and evaluated. These seek to
improve the efficiency of terminations for very large ropes by splicing the sub-ropes
individually to themselves to create a number of eyes. These are then supported on
multiple pins. High performance materials (e.g. titanium or super duplex) are used in
order to minimise the weight of the metal components.
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14.4
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Calculations are not typically undertaken to size locking pins based on high
line tensions and frictional forces
186
YES
NO
YES
Assess the ease of deployment, including
connection/disconnection & the likelihood of
unintentional disconnection
UNSATISFACTORY
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187
Commence Detailed
Design Process
Strength Assessment
- Hand/Simple
Calculations
- Finite Element Analysis
- Material Testing
- Physical Testing
Corrosion Assessment
- Avoidance e.g.Anodes
- Allowance
e.g.Corrosion Margin
- Physical Testing
- Past Observation
- Calculations
Wear Assessment
- Proposed Methodology
- Justification
- Past Observation
- Guidelines
- Codes
NO
Design
Iterations
Successful?
NO
YES
Finalise Design Reports &
Drawings; issue to Class
Society & Client
Manufacture in accordance
with Quality Plan & Class
Society inspections
Documentation to be
stamped with Class
Approval
Issue Recommendations
for Connector
Transportation, Installation
& Long Term Inspection
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14.5
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189
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190
Figure 14-11 - Example of a Dynamic Analysis to Estimate the Angle for the V Slot
Size on the H Shackle
Certain connectors, such as Long Term Mooring (LTM) D shackles, have been
available on the market for a number of years and thus have established track records.
Still it is prudent when selecting connectors to determine where they have been used
before and if any problems have been identified. Even with an established track record,
connectors must still be evaluated on a case by case basis, since different pretensions,
vessel motions and position on the mooring line can affect their long term behaviour.
14.5.1
From a mooring perspective castings are normally considered only suitable for mass
produced, intricate items. For example, Wire rope sockets are cast because of their
inherent elaborate design. Forging is the preferred method of manufacturing mooring
accessories, since it helps to ensure that the items are strong but ductile. Impact
strength is a key element in any mooring accessory design.
The following list details the advantages of forgings versus castings [Ref. 51] :
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Higher strength
Unmatched toughness
14.5.2
More consistent
composition)
machining
(uniform
microstructure
and
chemical
At present it appears that each Classification Society has their own rules and
regulations for assessing whether a connector is suitable for a long term mooring
application. It would be helpful if, perhaps under the auspices of IACS (International
Association of Classification Societies), that a standard protocol could be developed for
designing and testing these connectors/terminations.
14.5.3
API RP2SK provides the following Data for other types of connecting links (i.e. apart
from Kenter or Baldt links) are insufficient for generating design curves. Limited data
indicates that the fatigue life of D-shackles is comparable to that of common links of
the same size and grade, provided that the shackle is machined fit with close tolerance,
no cotter pin is used through the shackle body and the shackle is the narrow throat
type. Since spiral strand sockets are not D shackles or Baldt or Kenter links it can be
argued that it is not valid to assess their fatigue performance using a S-N curve for
common link chain based on API RP 2SK. However, this technique appears to have
been used on a number of North Sea FPSOs.
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192
Apart for a few general types of connectors, such as kenters or Baldt links, specific S-N
curves are not available. In such cases it is common practice to assume that the
behaviour of a large, heavy connector will be superior to that of the chain or wire to
which it is connected. Considering the cost associated with mooring failure or
intervention, this is not a re-assuring situation in terms of long term system reliability.
Hence it is important that a valid fatigue assessment is undertaken for each individual
part of a mooring system. This should be reflected in the mooring design specification.
As is discussed further in Section 0, wear can be a significant issue over the life time of
a mooring system. Where there is an abrupt change in weight per metre of a mooring
line at a connector, greater relative rotation can be expected. This may not be too much
of an issue for the connector itself which may be oversized. However, over the long
term it may become an issue for whatever is connected up to the connector, e.g.
common link chain. This should be assessed on a case by case basis and if considered
to be a possible cause of concern, suitable analysis or testing should be undertaken.
14.6
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193
Figure 14-12 - Example of Material with a Non Clearly Defined Yield Point
Proof loading of chain is carried out for a number of purposes including to check the
stiffness (elongation) of chain and to ensure the studs are fixed following heat
treatment which otherwise relaxes the initial clamping forces applied. Proof loads are
generally defined in codes and standards as a proportion of the minimum 0.2% proof
stress or minimum UTS combined with the nominal section area.
Proof loading of the chain into the plastic range leaves a small permanent set when the
load is removed. The component geometries means this induces locked in residual
stresses in the chain and these are compressive at the inner shoulders of the links. This
means that applied tensions have to reverse the residual compressive stresses before
tension is induced in these fatigue prone areas and the proof loading may therefore be
considered to be beneficial to fatigue endurance.
Evidence for this was obtained, inadvertently in the BOMEL JIP. The first two tension
fatigue tests delivered extraordinary results and were halted, without evidence of
cracking, when the predicted lives were exceeded by a factor of around three. In
consultation with the chain supplier, it was concluded that the chain had been subjected
to an excessive proof load during manufacture. It was noted that such treatment was
allowed under the specification and the practice is not uncommon to stretch the chain
when it is under-length.
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194
Amoco (one of the BOMEL JIP sponsors) proceeded to undertake further testing to
assess proof loading effects on the fatigue life of chains, in conjunction with the
University of Tulsa [Ref. 54]. A range of proof load levels was investigated (up to
82% of break strength) and it was concluded that proof loading substantially increases
the fatigue life and this was attributed to the residual stresses generated. Importantly
they noted that in addition to the level of proof loading, the ability of the material to
sustain the residual stresses without redistribution under cyclic loading was another
factor affecting the consequences for fatigue life.
A difficulty for high strength (e.g. R4) chain is that the proof stress is cited with
reference to the minimum UTS/breaking load. If a batch has a significantly higher
UTS (which in many senses is desirable), the degree of plasticity brought about at the
proof load level may be significantly less than assumed with the minimum specification
material. This means that the degree of residual compressive stress within the links
will vary depending on the actual material properties. Furthermore with the high
strength steels used for chain, the proof stress to UTS ratio can exceed 0.95, something
that is generally precluded with a limit around 0.85 in steel for structural purposes.
High actual PS/UTS ratios would further limit the degree of plastic deformation /
residual compressive stresses achieved through the standard proof loading procedure.
A more consistent approach for specifying the proof load would be in relation to the
batch UTS, something that is invariably tested.
Although the above discussion relates the effects of proof loading to the consequences
in terms of fatigue performance, in the case of studlink chain appropriate levels of
proof loading are equally important. If the degree of plasticity achieved under proof
loading is less than anticipated, studs will be more likely to become loose in service.
The above discussion highlights the importance of:
x Developing a more meaningful specification for effective proof loading during
chain manufacture
x Undertaking research (using finite element analysis and physical testing) to
define any beneficial effect of proof loading of chain for fatigue performance
and translating this into manufacturing specifications, as appropriate.
14.6.1
OTC paper 10798 1999 [Ref. 70] states on page 268 that a connector failed the
minimum break load test because the rate of load application was faster than had been
specified by the manufacturers test procedure. Another connector plate was tested
using a slower rate of load application and passed the minimum break load test.
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195
This is of considerable interest since, depending on the slow drift offset of the FPS, a
mooring system can experience very rapid increases in line tensions due to first order
wave frequency response. As far as can be determined classification societies
(including IACS) typically do not specify the rate of application of the break test load.
Hence it is believed that this is a matter which requires further consideration, since
intrinsically it is not desirable to have a means of testing which:
a) poorly replicates the offshore loading environment,
b) can lead to either a pass or a fail depending how the test is done.
Whilst performing a "real" scale test would be a rigorous/ideal way forward, it is
unknown whether all the test houses / manufacturers would be able to undertake this for
the larger sized items and more research is needed. In general the ramping period does
not appear to be recorded unless specifically requested by reference to a manufacturer's
or client specification. This seems a simple and informative piece of information which
should, by default, be included in the as built documentation.
It is appreciated that failure through shock loading may be caused by brittle failure
instead of the traditional tensile failures (necking). Therefore, one option may be to
have more onerous requirements for impact tests or at lower temperatures. This may be
of more particular interest with high tensile steels which may be more prone to the
brittle failure due to defects / flaws. But still there is a need to correlate this back to the
ramping speed break test performance of real connectors.
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196
15
15.1
The photographs above demonstrate both fatigue cracking and the mechanical damage
with can result from the high stresses experienced by a chain link at a fairlead.
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197
15.1.1
The load mechanism is related to the eccentricity of thrust lines with respect to the bar
neutral axis (centroid). This effect is enhanced where the change of angle is greater
(for a five pocket as opposed to a seven or a nine pocket fairlead). It may also be
increased where wear of the fairlead moves the contact point away from the end of the
link. The imposed hogging moment is balanced by a counter effect at the other end of
the link.
The chain links within the fairlead are thus subjected to an out of plane bending
moment which is proportional to the tension in the mooring line. Tension variations in
the mooring line result in a stress range due to both the axial and out of plane loading in
the link.
During the early 1990s BOMEL conducted a Joint Industry Project into the design of
anchor chains [Ref. 10]. As part of this study work they conducted a series of tests to
examine the influence of the tension bending effect on mooring line fatigue.
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198
Figure 15-4 - Photograph of Test Link Showing Bearing Plates [Ref. 10]
The programme included the use of a test rig representing a five pocket fairlead (see
Figure 15-4 and Figure 15-5). The horizontal link was supported at four points on a
mounting point which was cycled vertically in order to develop varying tension in the
two fixed links. The tests were conducted on 54 mm diameter K3 chain with welded
studs.
Figure 15-5 - General View of Tension Bending Test Rig (protective screens removed
A4163-01
199
BOMEL monitored the mean and range of the imposed loads in the horizontal link and
used strain gauge readings to assess the response of the chain. The result set was
limited to 6 tests. The test conditions represented a different number of stress ranges.
The figure below demonstrates damage to the mounting plates during the first test. It
can be seen that two of the four hardened bed plates are cracked diagonally opposite
each other. The wear marks on the plates and on the links indicate that the two which
cracked were more heavily loaded than the other pair. The crack in the link occurred
over one of the fractured bed plates, also indicating heavier loading at this location.
These wear and crack locations demonstrate the significance of twist or out of
flatness in the unstressed link. The initial out of flatness was measured for all
subsequent tests see Figure 15-8. As can be seen in Figure 15-7 in certain cases out
of flatness can be quite significant.
Figure 15-6 - Broken Hardened Plates at the end of the First Test [Ref. 10]
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200
Figure 15-7 - Twisted Link Due to Mis-aligned Butt Weld [Ref. 10]
When set in the fairlead the link position support restraints include bearing of the
shoulders of the link against the fairlead plus of the bend at each end against the
corresponding sections of adjacent links. As a result imperfection in any of the three
links, or in the fairlead itself, can prevent the link from initially bearing on four
shoulders.
As the link is relatively stiff BOMEL found that the load required to deform it
sufficiently that load is transferred through all four bearing points may approach or even
exceed the 0.2% permanent strain value.
Figure 15-8 - Simple Out of Flatness Twist Measurement Jig [Ref. 10]
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201
15.1.3
A factor on the nominal stress in the link was defined as the local (measured) stress
divided by the nominal link stress.
Facnom = Factor on nominal stress = Local (Measured) stress/ Nominal link stress
Nominal link stress = LineTension/Area = LineTension /(2 x x (Bar Dia/2)2)
? Nominal link stress = (2 x LineTension) / x (Bar Dia)2
The measured Facnom value associated with two point bending was 5.2. A lower Facnom
of 3.6 was measured under 4 point bending. The two point bending Facnom compares
well with a value of 5.9 derived from the difference between the intercept for the
fatigue performance curves for tension bending and for pure tension (all conducted in
the same JIP). The stress factors for a given material can be compared using an
expression of the form given below.
log( ATensionTension )log( ATensionBending )
10
u FacTensionTension
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202
DNV 9 pocket
API
API quote an upper bound fatigue life reduction factor of 0.2 which given the curve
gradient of 3.36 amounts to an effective stress factor of 1.61, in this case producing a
comparative factor of 6.0 on the nominal stress in the link.
Source
SN Curve
Gradient
5 Pkt
BOMEL JIP
3.173
5.9
DNV OSE301
3.00
API RP2SK
3.36
7 Pkt
5 Pkt
7 Pkt
9 Pkt
0.06
0.30
0.23
9.3
9.0-6.0
9 Pkt
5.6
0.05-0.20
Note that values in italics are derived from BOMEL measured stress factor.
Clearly both API and DNV take account of the twist / two point bearing effect and the
impact that this has on fatigue at wheel fairleads. The upper bound factor from API is
generally consistent with the BOMEL results for 2 point bending, with the DNV
guidance appearing somewhat more onerous.
Use of the two point bending factor can be further justified by consideration of stiffness
of a chain link. Even for a relatively perfect bearing geometry (0.8 mm link out of
flatness on a machined support bed) approximately half of a load cycle occurs under
two point bending. For a link with 3 mm out of flatness in the test rig the entire load
cycle occurs under two point bending. Clearly this indicates that the higher SCF is
applicable for fatigue calculations, as reflected in both DNV and API guidance.
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203
Figure 15-9 - Illustration of Failed Link Due to Tension Bending [Ref. 10]
Reference should also be made to Vargas et al Stress concentration factors for studless
mooring chain links in fairleads, OMAE 2004-51376 which tends to demonstrate that
the usual SCFs recommended by some Rules are overestimated. In addition, DNVs
requirement for stress factors of 2.5 and 1.5 for 7 and 9 pocket fairleads is no longer
present in the latest edition of OS-E301 (Oct 2004) [Ref. 5].
15.1.4
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204
API makes recommendations regarding the design of the fairlead and management of
the line to ensure that a link is only exposed to tension bending for a limited period of
time.
15.2
15.2.1
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205
Figure 15-11 - Girassol Offloading Buoy Failure in Chain Link 5 [Ref. 55]
Figure 15-12 - Girassol Offloading Buoy Failure in Polyester Rope [Ref. 55]
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206
A review of the original design calculations indicated that the design had been
generally consistent with the load mechanisms within the body of the chain. Repeated
failures at the fifth link however indicated that an additional effect must be inducing
greater fatigue loading at this location.
15.2.2
Figure 15-13 - Chainhawser Arrangement and Location of Critical Link [Ref. 55]
Under low tension this rotation would be provided by slip between the links. Under
higher tensions a significant inter link friction has to be overcome before this slip can
occur as well as local flattening at the point of contact. These effects result in torsion in
the bar at the contact point, which is represented by out of plane bending in the body of
the link.
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207
Figure 15-14 - Out of Plane Bending Mechanism (See Section 25 [Ref. 56]
The critical bending stress required to overcome interlink friction is proportional to the
line tension and friction coefficient. For a friction coefficient of 0.1 the nominal critical
bending stress amounts to approximately 40% of the nominal axial stress (total value,
not range) in the chain, which is surprisingly high value. The local flattening
/embedment pushes this figure higher.
Calculation
Z nom
V bnom
V tnom
PTD
2SD 3
2SD 2
, Anom
, M nom
, P 0.1
32
4
2
M nom u Anom PTD u 32 u 2SD 2
0.40
Z nom u T
2 u 2SD 3 u T u 4
Notation:
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Area (m2)
Friction coefficient
nom
Suffix nominal
Suffix bending
Suffix tension
208
Notes :
i) The bending component reverses, doubling the range of extreme fibre bending
stress.
ii) Stress will tend to cycle tension to tension.
iii) The above comparison is based on nominal stresses. It is anticipated that the SCF
associated with interlink friction will be less than that for a link in the catenary
under a tension range.
Individual links are extremely stiff. As a result very high out of plane bending moments
and thus stresses can be developed, even at relatively small angular deflections. Under
high tensions the interlink behaviour thus prevents links from slipping, providing a
beam like behaviour in the chain sections.
15.2.3
SBM carried out a series of tests using a rig designed to reproduce the load regime at
link 5. Strain gauges were mounted on the link in order to quantify the out of plane
bending stress developed. The test was carried out under both dry and in-water
conditions.
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209
Using this relationship with the DNV B1 curve [Ref. 57] and a limiting range in
interlink angle of 3.8 degrees (imposed by geometry of chainhawse) SBM computed a
life to failure of 107 days. This calculation assumed that the full pitch rotation was
imposed on a single link, and that the friction coefficient was sufficient that no slip
occurred up to the limiting angle of 3.8 degrees (amplitude) where the 7th link touches
the chainhawse.
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210
15.2.4
It can be seen from the Girassol failures that under certain conditions, the interlink
friction driven fatigue can result in very rapid fatigue damage. This mechanism
appears not to govern for many mooring systems, though the basic mechanics will be
present for all chains.
Stopper plates,
holding a
horizontal link
Pivot point
of trumpet
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211
The relative significance of these is not yet totally clear at present. Due to the
individual stiffness of chain links, large bending stresses can be developed by relatively
small end rotations. These will tend to be relieved, either by slip or contact with the
trumpet, for larger motions. The proportion of the rotation imposed at a single link may
depend upon the chainhawse design, but this has not been studied. Friction coefficients
for interlink friction combined with the line tension will determine the stress developed
prior to slip, but little data is available in this area.
The simplified calculations below illustrate the accumulation of fatigue in a mooring
chain. The first calculation relates to Girassol (high pre-tension and an assumed annual
damage of 1.0 from the failure history). Example 2 relates to real example for a FPSO
in moderate water depth and a relatively low pre-tension. Example 3 relates to an FPSO
in deep water with high pretension. These calculations are intended to be indicative
only, it is appreciated that the wave climate, directionality and chain hawse geometry
are not represented.
In the following examples the notation listed below is applicable:
D
Area (m2)
SCF
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Friction coefficient
nom
Suffix nominal
Suffix bending
Suffix tension
212
123.5Te, P
0.1
2SD 3
PTD
, M nom
32
2
Z nom
2 u 2SD 3 SD 2
Z nom
V bnom
log(N )
47MPa
6 u10 6
10
11.46 6.778
log( 94 ))
3.173
3.7 u SCFratio
0.318
1.18
However, the interlink frictrion will impose a bending force on both sides of the link.
Above example developed from BOMEL JIP ([Ref. 10] Section 3.11.1, page 29).
Log10N = 11.32 3.173 log10('Vnom)
The report expression is:
Log(N) = logA mlog(2 x SCF x Vbnom)
M = 3.173 is the SN curve gradient. 'Vnom is the nominal stress range in a link during
fatigue testing. This has been set to be equal to 2 x SCF x Vbnom. The 2 takes into
account that the link can move both clockwise and anticlockwise about an axis through
the line of the chain.
Within the catenary there are many chain links, increasing the likelihood of failure.
The design value of logA is typically 2 standard deviations below the test mean.
BOMEL took a value of 4.4 to reflect the number of chain links with a standard
deviation of 0.184. BOMEL results are from tests in air. Submerged chain will fatigue
more rapidly (logA increases by 0.301 based on standard fatigue texts for in air and
cathodically protected in water).
In this instance Log A has been taken to be 11.46 rather than 11.32 as shown below.
Considering a single link seems appropriate for the link being bent at the hawsepipe.
logA = 11.762 relates to a single link in air.
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N1 year = 6 x 106 cycles is based on a wave frequency indicative period of 5.3 seconds,
i.e. (365 days x 24 hrs x 60mins x 60 sec)/5.3 seconds = 6 x 106 cycles. This is a crude
approximation.
The annual damage amounts to (6 x 106 cycles)/Inv. Log(11.46 3.173 x log(2 x 47 x
0.318)) = 1.0002, which means the fatigue life is consumed in less than a year. This is
not too different to what happened in practice on the Girassol buoy
Example _ 2
D 120mm, T
60Te, P
0.1
Z nom
V bnom
log(N )
2SD
PTD
, M nom
32
2
10MPa
Z nom
2 u 2SD 3 SD 2
log A m log(2 u SCF u V bnom )
3.173, SCF
1.18, N 1year
6 u10 6
1.18
log(N ) 11.46 3.173 u log(
u 2 u 10)
3.7
N 10 8.91
N 1year
0.007
AnnualDamage
N
Example 2 results in a fatigue life of approx 143 years
Example _ 3
D 114mm, T
Z nom
V bnom
log(N )
143Te, P
0.1
2SD 3
PTD
, M nom
32
2
Z nom
2 u 2SD 3 SD 2
27MPa
3.173, SCF
1.18, N 1year
6 u10 6
1.18
u 2 u 27)
log(N ) 11.46 3.173 u log(
3.7
N 10 7.54
AnnualDamage
N 1year
N
0.17
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15.3
15.3.1
Both DNV OS-E301 and API RP2SK [Ref. 31] make reference to bending tension (BT) fatigue of wire ropes at sheaths, pulleys and fairleads in addition to providing
guidance on the calculation of tension-tension (T-T) fatigue.
API offers some indication of fatigue life reduction factors taken from experience of
operations of Semi-submersibles in the North Sea. It is interesting that DNV does not
provide any specific guidance on the increased rate of fatigue under tension-bending.
The lack of clear guidance for calculation of this mechanism is partly due to its
complexity. The objective of this section is to increase understanding of this area,
rather than to provide guidance.
15.3.2
A series of tests were carried out at the National Engineering Laboratory to examine
fatigue of wire ropes under bending tension conditions in 1988 [Ref. 58]. These tests
were carried out on a 40 mm diameter six strand rope with an independent wire rope
core. A test rig was developed for the purpose - see Figure 15-19. The set up permitted
the rope to be cycled both with respect to tension (load amplitude) and movement over
the sheave (bending length) under a given mean tension.
The conclusions were as follows:
i)
The rate of fatigue damage is highly dependent upon the bending length up to a
travel of 25% of the lay length.
ii)
The mean tension is the next most significant parameter in determining the rate
of fatigue damage.
iii)
The load amplitude (i.e. the range in tension) on the wire rope has relatively
little influence on tension-bending fatigue.
The last item is perhaps surprising; indicating that load cycling on the rope is not the
dominant source of fatigue for tension bending.
The requirement to consider a loading source other than the tension range is reinforced
in OTH 91 341 [Ref. 59] where it is concluded that although the tension-tension fatigue
life is driven by the load range, the bending-tension fatigue life is governed by the
mean load and bending over sheave (BOS) behaviour.
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15.3.3
API give some specific guidance on the reduction in fatigue life associated with this,
tabulating 3 types of wire rope at 2 bend to wire diameter ratios. Similar information
can be found in table A6 of ISO 19901-7 [Ref. 4].
Wire
Type
Rope Gradient
m
D/d
Ratio
Factor on TT Life
Six strand
4.09
20
0.03
Six strand
4.09
70
0.08
Multi-strand
4.09
20
0.05
Multi-strand
4.09
70
0.15
Spiral strand
5.05
20
0.005
Spiral strand
5.05
70
0.015
Table 15-2 : Wire Rope Fatigue Reduction Due to Tension Bending [Ref. 31]
From the tabulated values it can be seen that the fatigue lives associated with tensionbending (T-B) are very small in comparison those for tension-tension (T-T).
Unfortunately the above data makes no reference to either mean tension or bending
length, the two parameters identified as critical to bending tension fatigue. The
implication is that B-T fatigue can be estimated by directly factoring the calculated T-T
fatigue life, which lacks consideration or either parameter. This approach could only
be useful for a particular class of vessel under a specific climate.
The serious deterioration in fatigue life when bending is present has implications for
Flex Boots/Bend Limiters at wire rope sockets. Evidence has been seen in the field of
Flex Boots becoming detached over time. If the Flex boots become detached the wire
at the socket is more likely to fail due to tension combined with bending. Figure 15-18
shows how wires which have failed due to fatigue can be recognised. Failure of Flex
Boots may also result in additional torque induced fatigue at the spelter socket. This
will tend to be more a factor for non torque balance IWRC rope.
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OTH 91 341 [Ref. 59] introduces a useful distinction within B-T fatigue between an
upper bound T-T life and a lower bound Bending over Sheave (BOS) value. T-T
fatigue damage rates would be derived from the load range history of the mooring line
and would apply to the full length of the wire rope. BOS fatigue damage rates would
be developed from a combination of the mean line tension and mooring line to sheave
rotations.
It is possible that the two mechanisms can be considered independently. This would
depend upon the potential for bending length due to wire stretch under the tension load
range. It is understood, however from OTH 91 that the BOS damage rate would be
dominated by mooring line to vessel rotations, justifying independent treatment of BOS
and T-T fatigue.
15.3.4
Conclusions
A large body of research has been conducted toward understanding bending tension
fatigue of wire ropes. But no generally applicable quantitative guidance is offered by
DNV or API on this subject.
The fatigue process and loadings associated with bending tension appears to be well
understood. Substantial test work has been carried out permitting the definition of
load-cycle curves for various configurations.
Therefore, the development of specific design guidance for the estimation of bending
tension fatigue for offshore mooring systems appears to be feasible. It is recommended
that this be incorporated into calculations for integrity of wire rope mooring systems.
This is likely to become of increasing importance as the age of the wires in
combination wire/chain systems increase.
Figure 15-19 - The 1.0MN Wire Rope Bending-Tension Fatigue Test Machine
[Ref. 42]
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15.4
15.4.1
Both API and DNV guidance includes recommendations on the design for tension
bending fatigue of chain at wheel fairleads. Both sets of recommendations represent an
extension to the calculations already performed for fatigue of chain within the catenary.
Depending upon the design approach used, tension bending in a wheel fairlead may be
calculated directly from the catenary line tension by applying a factor on the nominal
stress, or from the catenary fatigue life by applying a different factor.
Neither design code provide any guidance on the interlink friction effect associated
with the Girassol buoy. It is recommended that within design of the mooring system
this fatigue mechanism be considered in addition to wheel fairlead tension bending, as
applicable. Note that the two effects will coexist, their relative importance governed by
the relationship between line working tension and dynamic tension range.
Figure 15-20 - Tension Bending at Wheel Fairlead (Bearing Load Eccentricity) and
Tension Bending from Interlink Friction (Torque at Contact)
The calculation of fatigue damage due to interlink friction at requires consideration of
the chainhawse geometry and the friction coefficient. Having developed a relationship
between link bending stress and motions of the unit, taking account of limiting values
due to the chainhawse geometry and slip between links, a conventional fatigue analysis
can be carried out. Various S-N curves have been proposed for the damage calculation.
As the cracking appears to occur away from the flash weld, in a similar location to that
for tension fatigue, a modified chain fatigue curve is thought to be appropriate.
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15.4.2
Fatigue curve parameters proposed by DNV and API are outlined in the Table below:
Source
Gradient
m
Intercept
A
Notes
BOMEL JIP
3.173
11.46
BOMEL JIP
3.173
11.02
DNV OSE301
3.00
11.079
API RP2SK
3.36
11.653
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In Service Inspection
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15.5
Recommendations
The constraint offered to a chain link in a wheel fairlead is such that severance of one
limb of a chain link can occur without release of the mooring line. On this basis it
could be argued that repositioning of fairlead chain links into the mooring catenary be
avoided unless detailed inspection of the affected links has been possible. However,
for normal field operations this is not a feasible process.
No guidance on the applicable friction coefficient for sliding between chain links is
available. As this value is critical to the interlink friction tension bending fatigue
problem, it is recommended that further work be done to identify suitable values for
this.
Interlink friction tension bending fatigue and where applicable wheel fairlead tension
bending fatigue should be addressed in the design of permanent mooring systems.
Bending at sheave calculations should be performed for wire rope mooring systems to
identify rates of fatigue damage associated with bending-tension at the fairlead.
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16
FRACTURE
MECHANICS
CRACK SIZE
AND
CRITICAL
Experience has shown that chains and connectors are susceptible to fatigue cracking.
Thus this section looks at the potential of Fracture Mechanics to help reduce the
likelihood of cracks leading to complete failure.
The basis of Fracture Mechanics is that it provides quantitative answers to structural
integrity questions, such as the following:
x What is the critical crack size at service loads?
x How safe is the system if it contains a crack?
x How long might it take for a crack to grow from initial to critical size?
x How often should a particular structure be non-destructively inspected?
Fracture Mechanics provides a quantitative relationship, between material, design and
fabrication, or more simply between stress, flaw size and toughness. Fracture
mechanics is not only a powerful tool for analytical evaluation of Non Destructive
Testing (NDT) flaw indications, but is also helpful for the initial design, materials
selection and any subsequent failure analysis.
In theory, a Fracture Mechanics analysis, coupled with appropriate inspection
procedures, can provide a rational and quantitative method for enabling a component to
be kept in service safely, at least until a scheduled inspection or maintenance outage.
At this time it may be possible to undertake a repair with minimal loss of production.
Overall, therefore, it can be appreciated that Fracture Mechanics is potentially a very
useful tool to assist the mooring design and integrity monitoring process.
16.1
Required Data
A fracture mechanics evaluation of a particular flaw requires accurate knowledge of the
following:
1. The size and shape of the flaw,
2. The loading conditions/stress levels in the region of the flaw (Finite Element
Analysis or Direct Measurement)
3. The operating environment, e.g. sea-water, splash zone, etc.
4. The fatigue/fracture mechanics properties of the material.
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There are real practical difficulties in obtaining, particularly in situ, the above data for
mooring lines (see Section 18). If it is not possible to detect and assess crack sizes
accurately the remaining life of the component under consideration will be highly
uncertain. For mooring components there can be very large variations in applied loads
depending on the severity of any storms and the steepness of any waves which are
experienced.
Although it is difficult at present to detect cracks in situ, inspection technology will
continue to improve. Thus it is important to continue to develop our Fracture
Mechanics understanding with relation to mooring components. Although good work
has been done in this area see below, it is clear that more work is still required. For
example, it is important to identify the maximum defect size that can be permitted
during manufacturing, while still allowing a satisfactory mooring component field life.
16.2
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The measured growth rates were compared with the rates for medium strength carbon
manganese steels as found in standard codes e.g. BS7910. The measured growth rates
were well within the scatter band given for these steels freely corroding in air. The
crack growth rates found in seawater with cathodic protection were, however,
substantially lower than the rates given in BS7910. When a cathodic potential of -1100
mV was applied, crack closure was observed at medium levels of 'K. The explanation
is the formation of calcareous deposit in the wake of the crack front that gives
significantly reduced growth rates and finally leads to crack closure. This finding is a
surprise for high strength steel. The results are promising and should be investigated
further including the implications for the offshore operation of cathodic protection
systems.
A linear elastic fracture mechanics model was established to study the fatigue
behaviour in a studless link. The recorded growth parameters were used in conjunction
with a crack-like initial flaw with depth in the range from 0.12 to 0.25 mm. The
difference found between the growth rates in dry air and in free corrosion were in
accordance with tested fatigue lives for these two environments.
In general, after chains have been broken during fatigue testing microscopic
observations have been undertaken of the fatigue fracture surfaces to confirm the crack
growth process and any initial defect. In this way it has been possible to adjust the
validity of the fatigue model parameters.
16.3
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17
17.1
33% of units cannot measure offsets from the no-load equilibrium position.
If the level of instrumentation/alarms in the North Sea is patchy, it seems likely that
units operating in less heavily regulated regions will have even less instrumentation.
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17.2
17.2.1
This system is illustrated in Figure 17-1 and Figure 17-2 and is employed on a North
Sea FSU. The Sonar head is deployed through the centre of the chain table to
approximately 15-20 metres below the hull. The head is deployed every 2 weeks in
calm weather or after a storm to confirm that all the mooring lines are present.
Figure 17-1 - Sonar Fish for Deployment through Turret (courtesy Chevron Texaco)
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The illustrated system is fairly simple and is easy to repair if something does go wrong
with it. Figure 17-3 illustrates the image which can be seen on the sonar display screen,
namely 12 mooring lines and two risers close in to the centre. However, the system
does have two important limitations, namely:
1.
If a line breaks in the mud (not unknown) it will still have some
tension/catenary and thus the change in the screen appearance may not be
sufficient to indicate that a line has failed.
2.
A line could fail and not be detected for 2 weeks, during which time a
severe storm could develop.
Figure 17-3 - Sonar Display Screen Showing 12 Mooring Lines and 2 Risers Close to
the Centre (courtesty Chevron Texaco)
17.2.2
The possibility of a line failing in the mud and not being detected is a realistic concern.
For example one FPSO has experienced a break in the mud line approximately 8 years
into its field life. If, however, FPSs were equipped on installation with the type of
simple inclinometer shown on Figure 17-4 it would be possible to determine, in calm
weather if any of the mooring line angles have changed to a significant extent. The
inclinometers could be checked using a Football sized ROVs which can be deployed
directly from the deck of the FPS itself. This removes the need for expensive ROV
intervention vessels see Section 0. These small ROVs can be stored on the FPS itself
or can be sent out by a helicopter as the need arises. Simple inclinometers overcome
the difficulties sometimes encountered with damage to power and signal distribution
cables on more complex systems. Being able to do a fly by in good weather to read
all the inclinometers would show whether the mooring line tensions are still in balance,
or if for slack or dog legs have been pulled out of the system see Section 6.2.1.
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(Courtesy of Shell/SBM)
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17.2.3
Intrinsically the simplest way to finds out if a mooring line has failed is to include a
load cell in the line, ideally close to the fairlead, where the tensions are normally
highest. Such a system is illustrated in Figure 17-6. Figure 17-7 shows the very useful
data which can be obtained from such a system as long as it is working properly.
However, particularly for submerged turrets, because the mooring lines are not readily
accessible, if the sensor in or the wiring/connections fail, you are in the difficult
situation of not knowing whether the line has failed or the sensor has failed. If you
record all line tensions and a line fails you should see tension pulses on the adjacent
lines. These should be detectable if the recording interval is frequent enough and the
load cells are sufficiently sensitive, although this does mean that you end up
accumulating a lot of data. On one instrumented North Sea FPSO a mooring line
failed, but it took two weeks of data processing from the other lines to reveal the
tension spike that confirmed it was a real failure rather than an instrumentation fault.
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This quote shows the low priority which is typically assigned to mooring line
instrucmentation.
Figure 17-7 - Indication of the Data Available from Instrumented Mooring Lines
(courtesy of BMT/SMS)
Theoretically you could go for a simpler system, for example using limit switches
placed on the trumpet assemblies. However, without moving the trumpet assemblies it
is not clear how these could be tested in situ to confirm whether or not they are still
functioning. Moving the trumpet assemblies with the chains in situ is not feasible
without the use of powerful anchor handling tugs.
External Turret or Spread Moored Moorings Lines Visible
For FPSOs with internal turrets or spread moored units, where the chains come up onto
the deck, it is relatively easy to confirm that the mooring lines are still present by
simple visual observation. Again, however, there can be a difficulty if a mooring line
fails in the mud. For lines which cannot be seen clearly from the FPSO deck regular
checks should be made, for example by supply or standby vessels that all the lines are
present. This should be written into the standard operating procedures.
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17.2.4
If a mooring line fails the resulting equilibrium position would change and theoretically
it should be possible to detect this based on offset monitoring. However, apart from in
deep water, if a mooring line fails in moderate weather conditions it is difficult to
distinguish the change in offset from the normal offset changes due to wind, wave and
current effects. Perhaps surprisingly mooring lines do fail quite often in moderate
conditions, sometimes following on from storm loading.
In addition, the direction from which the weather comes from may influence the
effectiveness of offset monitoring for line failure detection. For example if a line fails
and the weather pushes the unit in the direction of the failed line, the offset from the
equilibrium position will be small compared to the weather pushing the unit in the
opposite direction to the failed line.
Satellite drift and possible gyro malfunction can affect the accuracy of offset
monitoring. For example a system is installed on one North Sea unit and this has
indicated out of position alarms when there were no line failures. This can be due to a
poor Global Positioning System (GPS) fix depending on the number of satellites
available at a particular time. In another incident the FPSOs gyro became unstable and
this resulted in high apparent offsets. However, as long as false alarms do not happen
so often that they are automatically discounted, the odd false alarm helps to keep
people thinking about moorings. In addition, it was helpful that the gyro problem was
noticed early on before it could have had an impact during say an offloading operation.
Overall offset monitoring and recording is cheap and worth having since it is surprising
what mariners can deduce from experience and relatively little data. For example, if
you are used to the FPSO taking up a certain offset in moderate south westerly
conditions and this, plus the overall response of the vessel seems to change, would be a
good trigger to deploy a micro-ROV to check out the condition of the lines see
Section 17.2.2.
It should also be noted that offset monitoring is a potential input to other possible line
failure detection techniques, see for example Section 17.3.1.
17.3
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Figure 17-8 - Illustration of a New Sonar System due to be Installed in the North Seas
(courtesy of I. Williams)
It will be interesting to see if this system proves to have sufficient resolution in practice
to pick up a line failure in the mud see Section 17.2.1.
Figure 17-9 - Close Up of the Proposed Sonar Head (courtesy of Ian Williams)
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17.3.1
Another line failure detection option may be a Response Learning System (RLS) which
takes into account the expected performance in measured weather conditions. The
response will be different if a line fails due to a resulting change in the mooring system
stiffness. If a unit is equipped with an environmental detection and recording system
and a DGPS (Differential Global Positioning System) location system it should be
possible to utilise learning algorithms, similar to those used by Dynamic Positioning
(DP) systems, to evaluate, for a given applied environment, what the excursions should
be for an intact and one line failed condition. Figure 17-10 includes a flow chart which
illustrates this process. Hence, if the excursions do not match the predictions then an
automatic alarm should be sounded, alerting the crew that a line may have failed.
Overall this is a fairly complicated procedure and will require investment to develop
further. However, it has the real benefit that it would be a relatively simple retrofit to
existing installations, avoiding the need for expensive intervention work such as
installing load cells and wiring. Also if the system breaks down it should be possible to
fix it without any wet intervention.
Measured
Wind Direction
& Magnitude
Vessel/ Mooring
mathematical
model
Predicted
Vessel
Position &
heading
Vessel response
to environment
Predicted
Tidal Current
& direction
Draft Sensor
Revise
mathematical
model
coefficients
Difference
between
predicted &
actual
Measured
Position &
Heading
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17.3.2
Install, at a suitable in air locations on the FPS a motion reference unit (MRU)
and data logger.
2)
Based on the data from this MRU the real time motion at each of the fairleads
can be determined and recorded.
3)
Input the motion time trace into a high quality line dynamics mooring
analyses programme to evaluate line tensions.
Although the previous approach will give an estimate of the line tensions the accuracy
will depend on whether the drag and damping evaluated by the line dynamics
programme is reasonably correct. Hence a further refinement recommended to cross
check the line tensions results. This cross check would comprise the following:
1)
2)
Collect motions data for this point on the mooring line while also recording at
the mooring line while also recording at the same time data on fairlead
motion.
3)
Compare the predicted motion at 30m down the mooring line with the actual
behaviour.
4)
What is interesting about this approach is that it provides a means to identify the
maximum tension in a mooring throughout its length. This is because, depending on
dynamic behaviour, the maximum line tension may not be at the top of a mooring line.
Remote sensing technology has been utilized to monitor the behaviour of flexible risers
see Figure 17-11. These sensors tend to be battery powered and low power. The
signal from the sensor can be acoustically transmitted to a data logger on the platform
without the need for wires. On risers the sensors have been changed out by a ROV
when their in-built batteries become exhausted after several months.
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The required sensors for mooring monitoring are basically low power. Hence there may
be some option to power sensors from the fluctuations in mooring line tensions and
transmit the signal acoustically to a transponder mounted on the FPS hull.
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17.3.3
The present position of the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) on failure detection
is that Operators should have in place suitable performance standards for the time taken
to detect a mooring line failure. This is particularly important as common mode failure
mechanisms, such as fatigue or wear, are likely to be prevalent on more than one
mooring line and early detection of a line failure with appropriate mitigation strategies
could prevent system failure. Depending on the inherent redundancy of the mooring
spread, the time taken to detect a failure could range from virtually instantaneous
detection to detection in a matter of days. It is clearly not appropriate to rely on annual
ROV inspection to check if a mooring line has failed. Monitoring the excursion of a
FPS, particularly using differential GPS is inexpensive and will provide mariners with a
feel for the mooring integrity. But without real time monitoring of the environment it is
unlikely to indicate a line failure in anything but storm conditions, unless in deep water
see section 17.2.4. Satellite drift is also a potential factor affecting the reliability of
offset monitoring.
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18
18.1
In Air-Inspection
Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODUs) need to recover their mooring lines and
anchors on a regular basis when they move from one location to another. This provides
periodic opportunities to undertake in-air mooring line inspection when the vessel is in
sheltered water. Alternatively a spare line may be bought or rented, which can be
swapped out with one of the existing lines while the original line is taken to the shore
for inspection and possible refurbishment.
FPSs spend much longer on location than MODUs. Hence, their mooring lines are
normally only recovered when the FPS moves off location. It is possible to recover
mooring lines part way through a field life, but this has two disadvantages, namely:
1. The lines may be damaged either during recovery or re-installation
2. The whole operation is expensive since the services of anchor handling and
possibly heading control tugs will be required for a number of days.
Given that even in-air inspection will not necessarily detect all possible cracks and
defects which may be present, there is an understandable interest among Operators to
undertake in-water inspection. However, there will still be times when anomalies are
identified which can only be resolved with true confidence by undertaking in-air
inspection. One definite advantage of in water inspection is that it is easy to identify
which parts of the chain have been in the thrash zone and at the fairlead. This is more
difficult to determine for long lengths of chain lying on a quayside.
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18.2
Orc aFlex at 0 8:30 on 05/04/02: Bloc k 5_Multiple_Static s _Adjus ted_Load_ 4_5_6_U ni_Sets _Steep_Sea_MPM_Ex c ur_Laden.dat (az imuth=280; elev ation=5) Static s C o m
50 m
Z
Y X
Z
Y X
Figure 18-1 - Red Arrows and Black Line Indicate Key Areas subject to Degradation
on a Mooring System (leeward likely to have worst wear)
In Figure 18-2 where there is a red arrow there will be weight per metre discontinuity
as you change from wire to chain. Where there is a weight per metre discontinuity one
may experience increased relative rotation and thus wear. This seems to be particularly
pronounced on leeside lines.
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Figure 18-2 - Example of a Weight Discontinuity which may Result In Enhanced Wear
18.2.1
For the majority of FPSOs (i.e. non Tentech designs) which have the lines stoppered off
at the base of the turret, adjusting line lengths is only possible as part of a major
operation with a dive support vessel present (DSV). Line adjustment is not intended to
be undertaken during annual or bi-annual inspection operations.
Not being able to adjust line lengths presents a real issue with regard to access for line
inspection operations. As has been seen from the Section 9.2.2 case study it is very
difficult to see what is happening inside or even at the outer edge of the trumpet or
hawsepipe. If it is possible to drop the line tension, so that the links which have either
been held in a chain stopper or otherwise been working in the pocket of a gypsy wheel
are accessible, this makes inspection much more straight forward. To fully inspect the
touch down point and thrash zone it is desirable to lift the chain off the sea-bed. The
simplest and safest way to do this would be to pull in on a winch in the turret. If this is
not possible, due to the FPSO design, theoretically it might be possible to grapple for
the chain using a J hook from anchor handler. However, this might damage subsea
infrastructure and may not be permitted. What this means in practice is that the static
touch down point and thrash zone, which for the static equilibrium position extends
both up the catenary towards the FPSO and along the sea bed section towards the
anchor, is difficult to inspect. In other words on many FPSs a section of mooring line
subject to some of the worst degradation is difficult to inspect properly.
In certain cases it may be possible to operate thrusters to pick up some of the sea bed
chain or even to utilise a tug to pull a FPSO away from its normal equilibrium position.
This will need to be risk assessed on a case by case basis. If a tug is used to move an
FPSO it is vital that all components are strong enough to take the applied loads
including any closed chock fairleads on the FPSO. There has been one incident of a
closed chock fairlead failing while load was being applied by a tug.
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18.2.2
In general, all the links in the trumpet area are difficult to inspect. Hence, if a link is
going to be exposed to 20 years of dynamic motion, does it make sense to place it
somewhere where it cannot be inspected, even if you have a high fatigue safety factor.
Figure 9-12 and Figure 9-13 show the level of wear noted on a mooring line which was
recovered back to shore after six years of deployment in the North Sea. At the turret
interface there are bending and twisting stress raisers, plus non perfect link geometry,
which make the situation worse compared to a pure tension-tension situation.
There are different designs of internal turrets and some may appear to give more ready
access to the chain stoppers than others. However, even for the type of turret illustrated
in Figure 18-3 and Figure 18-4, the room at the base of the structure is flooded. Thus
for example the picture in Figure 18-4 was taken by a camera mounted on a pole.
Figure 18-3 - Typical Turret Cross Section Illustrating that the key Mooring
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Figure 18-4 - Chain Stopper View Prior to Chain Installation with Pull in Rigging
Present (compare to Figure 18-3)
It is important, for future designs how to improve accessibility for inspection. This has
implications for mooring design brief or specification see Section 20.
18.3
In-Water Inspection
To date chain mooring components have been the subject of the greatest effort to
develop in-water inspection methods. This is because they are typically used in the
sections of moorings subject to the greatest deteriorative forces, particularly at the
seabed touchdown (thrash zone) and at the vessel interface. Both windward and
leeward lines should be inspected, but a particular check for wear should be undertaken
on the leeward lines, see Figure 3-4. Care is needed when inspecting the touchdown
zone, since potential hazards such as rocks or debris on the sea-bed can cause mooring
line abrasion. These hazards may be partially obscured by the sea bed/mooring line
and thus good visibility with powerful lighting is required.
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18.3.1
A number of in water mooring chain measurement systems have been developed with
varying success, ranging from simple diver-deployed manual callipers to a prototype
stand-alone robotic system and ROV deployed systems.
Diver inspections are, in general, not a favoured option. Mooring chains are highly
dynamic and therefore are potentially dangerous when divers are in close proximity.
Also diver inspection has been proven to generate inconsistent results and has inherent
depth limitations, for example, when checking the thrash zone.
A stand-alone robotic system has been developed, but to date this seems to have been
too large and cumbersome for practical offshore operations. In addition, it does not
appear able to inspect the vital seabed touchdown or get in close to the fairleads.
Possible ROV-deployed systems include both mechanical calliper and optical calliper
systems. Mechanical callipers have met with limited success, primarily because during
deployment onto chain they have the potential to be knocked out of true and
consequently may well have to be recalibrated between successive measurements.
The most established ROV-deployable chain measurement system is effectively an
optical calliper developed by Welaptega Marine Ltd. It comprises of multiple high
resolution video cameras and lights on deployment frame, which is equipped with scale
bars in pre-assigned orientations and at set distances from each other and the cameras
(Figure 18-5). The system measures the chain parameters by calibrating from the tool
scale bars and resolving dimensions and optical distortions using offline image analysis
software.
This type of system has no depth limitation, requires no physical recalibration and can
be configured to measure not only chain components at the seabed, but also in difficult
to access regions such as the vessel interface. It can also be configured to measure
other types of mooring jewellery such as connectors, shackles and kenter links.
The optical calliper chain measurement technology is used extensively by offshore
operators and is accepted by a number of offshore certification authorities. In this
respect, in at least one instance, it has been used as the basis for an extension of the
prescribed recertification period for an in-service FPS facility.
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Deployment
guide Underwater
light
Camera
block
As discussed in section 3.2.3 in studded chain, loose studs have been implicated in
crack propagation and fatigue. Accordingly studded chain inspection and recertification protocols require the assessment of the numbers of loose studs and degree
of looseness. However, there is no consensual industry opinion with respect to loose
stud reject criteria. Traditionally chains have had to be recovered for detailed loose
stud determinations and have relied on a manual test, either moving the stud by hand or
using a hammer to hit the studs. The resulting resonance (a ping or thud) is used to
assess whether a stud is loose or not.
Recently Welaptega Marine Ltd has developed an ROV-deployable loose stud
detection system. The system uses an electronically activated hammer to impact the
stud and uses a hydrophone and a micro-accelerometer as sensors. A software program
is used to distinguish between loose and tight responses. Cross checks can be
carried out in that very loose studs can be detected using a ROV manipulator or a ROV
deployed high pressure water jet.
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18.3.3
As well as chain dimension checking it is also important to assess link integrity and
condition. The overall, or general, condition of mooring components often gives
insights into the types of deteriorative processes that are at play. For example surface
pitting may be indicative of pitting corrosion, scalloping or indentations of wear,
fretting corrosion, or anvil flattening, and unusual geometry may indicate friction
bending, or plastic deformation (e.g. stretch).
Underwater visual condition assessment by ROV is particularly difficult because of the
inherent flatness of video images from standard 2D inspection cameras. With 2D
cameras it is very difficult to distinguish whether a visual artefact on a surface is
merely a mark, or a region from which material has been lost (e.g. a pit).
The shortcomings of 2D video can be addressed by using 3D visualization, a long-time
goal in the underwater inspection sector. Over the last two decades a number of 3D
visualization systems have been implemented but, until recently, with limited success
due to problems with user comfort and impractical and cumbersome viewing systems.
Advances in 3D camera design and the development of user-friendly viewing systems
have led to the introduction of a new generation of 3D video systems [Ref. 60]. These
cameras come in a range of configurations, sizes and depth ranges and have proven
very effective for the assessment of the surface condition and general geometry of
mooring components. Improvements have also been made in video asset management,
so that it is now easier to access data without trawling through hours and hours of video
footage.
As part of any in-water inspection it would be prudent to identify and inspect all
kenters and D shackles to confirm that they appear to be intact and that all split pins are
present.
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18.4
Figure 18-6 Illustration of Heavy Marine Growth on Long Term Deployed Chain
Cleaning options include manual brushing by divers, rotary brushing with wire or
synthetic fibre brushes and ROV deployed high-pressure water or grit-entrained high
pressure water. Each system has its own pros and cons.
Once marine growth is removed it is possible to conduct various levels of inspection
including general visual inspection (GUI), dimensional measurement and assessment of
mechanical fitness. Unfortunately cleaning off marine growth and scaling by high
pressure water jetting may accelerate corrosion by exposing fresh steel to the corrosive
effects of salt water. At present there are currently no in-water inspection methods for
mooring components that do not require the prior removal of marine growth. This
represents a technology gap, which warrants further investigation.
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The time required to remove marine growth depends largely on the cleaning option
chosen and in light of the cost of ROV vessels, can be a substantial component of the
cost of an inspection program. Consequently it is essential that the planning stage of
mooring inspection campaigns should consider the most suitable cleaning options for
the expected conditions.
18.5
18.6
Wildcat/Gypsywheel Inspection
In general, whenever in water mooring line inspection is undertaken, a check should be
made of the condition of the wildcat pockets. The chain must be pulled in or let out to
expose the wildcat pockets which are hidden at a given chain position / fairlead
orientation. It has been found on semi-submersibles that if the pockets are damaged
badly worn this typically leads to accelerated chain wear and damage see Figure 18-7,
Figure 18-8 and Figure 18-9.
At the gypsy wheel the key links are those that make regular contact with the pockets
on the gypsy wheel. These should be clear of marine growth and thus fairly easy to
identify once the line is slackened off. If this is not the case it would be good to mark
one of the links before the line is slackened off. If this is difficult to achieve the line
should be slackened off a precise number of links so that one knows which links were
on the gypsy wheel. Taking some still photographs before the chain is slackened off is
a wise precaution. It is desirable to take sufficient measurements at the top of the
catenary such that one can compare the wear on links on and close to the gypsy wheel
with those further down the catenary.
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(Courtesy of CNR)
Figure 18-8 - Close Up Of Fairlead Pocket Note Slight Lip on the Right
(Courtesy of CNR)
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(Courtesy of CNR)
Figure 18-10 - Red Zones Highlight the Importance of Checking all Relevant Structural
Connections (Courtesy of CNR)
The structural connections between the wildcat fairlead assembly and the hull structure
(see Figure 18-10) should also be regularly checked. Problems have been known to
develop in this area [Ref. 61].
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Figure 18-11 shows damage to a submerged wildcat or fairlead lubrication line as noted
during an abseiller based inspection operation. Although not all wildcats require
lubrication, if a system is designed to have lubrication it can be seen that it is fairly easy
for, even steel, lines which go through the splash zone to become damaged. This
illustrates the difficulty experienced running power and signal transmission lines
through the splash zone see Section 17.2.3. If the wildcats are designed for
lubrication and are without it for an extended period the chances of seizure are
inevitably increased see Section 8.
If a link which sits in a wildcat pocket or chain stopper is not flat (see for example
Figure 15-6, Figure 15-7 and Figure 18-12) it will be subject to regular bending
stresses. Over time this will have an impact on the fatigue life of the supported link
(see section 15.1.3).
Unfortunately, which a FPS goes on station, it is impossible to know in advance which
link will be sitting in a chain stopper or wildcat. Therefore, it is desirable to check the
flatness of all the links at the end of the chain which may be held/constrained. Figure
15-8 illustrates a simple gauge which can be used to check whether links are flat.
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18.6.2
Wire rope is particularly difficult to inspect and, at the present time, tends to be
somewhat subjective, see Figure 10-1 and Figure 11-6. Sheathed spiral strand wire is
even more difficult to inspect, since it is obscured by the sheathing. However it is
difficult to assess if the sheathing becomes damaged during installation, for example
going over the stern roller. If the sheathing is damaged letting in sea-water, this could
result, over time, in accelerated undetected corrosion. Also abrasion could occur on the
seabed and this would be difficult to determine.
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An in air based wire rope inspection unit which was tested on ther Buchan FPS wire
ropes is illustrated in Figure 18-13. Figure 18-14 shows a sketch of the proposed SEAL
tool deployed on an inclined mooring line from an ROV. Given the difficulties
involved in inspecting wire rope and the age of some of the wires presently in use, it is
recommended that consideration should be given to moving forward with Phases 2 and
3 of SEAL.
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Figure 18-14 - Proposed Wire Rope Inspection Toll Delpoyed from a ROV
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18.6.3
Acoustic Emissions
Acoustic emissions are short bursts of elastic energy released as stress waves resulting
from irreversible deformations in the material under test. Very small changes in
conditions at any point in a material normally produce a large number of emissions. In
theory these emissions can thus be used to detect, locate and characterise defects. A
prototype acoustic emission system was developed at Cardiff University but never got
to the stage of being sold on a commercial basis. A more update review of acoustic
emissions can be found in HSE Research Report 328 (2005) [Ref. 63]. The system
relied heavily upon instrument software and a very powerful post-processing and
analysis package [Ref. 64].
18.6.4
For mooring systems which are designed to have corrosion protection via impressed
current or sacrificial anode systems it is important to check whether the system is
operational. For example, on one FPSO the earthing cables to provide electrical
continuity between the FPSO hull and mooring chanins were never installed.
The status of the system can be checked by undertaking a Cathodic Potential (CP)
survey. NACE Standard [Ref. 71] states that using a silver/silver chloride reference
electrode readings between -800mV to -1,100mV suggests adequate protection.
Further information can also be found in European Standard EN 13173 Cathodic
Protection for Steel Offshore Floating Structures [Ref. 72]. Reference should also be
made to section 16.2 where the interesting observation is made that at a cathodic
potential of -1,000mV crack closure was observed due to the formation of calcareous
deposits in the wake of the crack front.
Lloyds Rules and Regulations for the Classification of a Floating Offshore Installation
at a Fixed Location (May 1999, part 8, ch 2.1.3, section 1.2.4) states a more negative
value may be used for those locations where sulphate reducing bacteria may be active.
Where higher cathodic protections are applied it is necessary to watch out for hydrogen
induced embrittlement see sections 7.3 and 7.4.
18.6.5
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Measure the x, y and z co-ordinates of the mooring line touch down point. This
will be difficult to do precisely if the FPV is moving around much.
2.
18.7
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18.7.1
A ccess
d iffic u ltie s
fo r in w a te r
in s p e c t io n
f o r ja c k e t
a b ra s io n
Figure 18-16 - Partially Buried Shackle Illustrates the Difficulties in checking locking
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18.7.2
The padeyes on the piles are typically buried several metres down. From a simplistic
point of view jetting out soil from around the pile would loosen it and thus does not
seem desirable !
However, if one pile or padeye degenerates and fails the rest will probably be in a
similar condition. Thus the danger of the system unzipping with multiple line failures
cannot be discounted.
It is important that the fatigue capacity of the padeyes and piles should be checked and
be satisfactory based on a generous safety factor, probably in excess of 10. This is
because it is pretty well impossible to inspect these components in situ.
18.8
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18.8.1
As FPSs come off station at the end of their field lives this provides a good
opportunity to test worn mooring components.
There is also possible cross fertilization with flexible riser and particularly steel
catenary riser experience including touchdown zones and inspection techniques. For
example:
1.
2.
Figure 18-17 - Example of the Wheel Tappers Approach Used for Detecting Cracks on
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18.8.2
For the chain damage reported in section 9.2.2 a long term repair was required. This
involved changing out the worn chain at the trumpet with larger diameter chain with a
specially applied hardened coating (cobalt chromium) to reduce the severity of any
future wear. A special connector (see Figure 14-10) was developed to allow the new
chain to be connected up to standard common link chain. This approach avoided
disturbing the wire section of the mooring line on the sea-bed, which is relatively
susceptible to damage (birdcaging). The original system designer was included in the
review process for the repair operation. This represents good practice which, where
possible, it is recommended should be followed for any future FPS mooring repair
operations.
There were two potential options for changing out the links going into the turret,
namely:
1) Crop some links from the top section of chain, add a connector and re-install
2) Disconnect the chain at the sea bed
During the repair operation there was a strong desire not to disturb the spiral strand
wire since this can be relatively easily damaged see Figure 6-5. Hence option 2 was
selected.
Figure 18-18 and Figure 18-19 give an idea of the complexity and hence the cost of
such a repair operation including anchor handling plus heading control tugs, Dive
Support Vessel (DSV), divers and winch operations on the FPSO.
Figure 18-18 - Example of Anchor Handling and Heading Control Tugs during a
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Figure 18-19 - Use of Divers from a RIB to open up the Chain Stopper during a FPSO
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19
SPARING OPTIONS
19.1
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If a line does fail and no spares are available it may be possible to mix and match
making use of available equipment from the established marine supply and rental
companies. This may require the temporary use of second hand components such as
chain. However, the impact of introducing non standard elements (see Figure 19-1)
into a mooring system is best considered before a failure occurs. Long term mooring
(LTM) shackles should ideally be used as the connectors. Repairs of this nature should
give time for the procurement of the correct equipment, which may take around six
months depending on industry demand. Because the mooring system has been
damaged and then modified, it may be necessary to obtain concessions from the
relevant Classification Society/Independent Competent Person (ICP). A reduced
operating envelope may have to be accepted during the period that the temporary
repairs are effective.
Figure 19-1 - Example of a Plate Shackle which may be useful for a Temporary Repair
In a post project Lessons learned exercise on one FPSO the following was reported:
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19.1.2
Figure 19-2 - Temporary Mooring Line Winch Deck on a Gulf of Mexico Spar
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20
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x Line tensions monitored and the data permanently recorded at a suitable sampling
interval
x 24 hours monitored over tension alarms
x FPS offsets and bearings monitored and permanently recorded
x 24 hours monitored lines intact alarms
x 24 hour monitored FPS excursion alarms
For moderate environments, such as off West Africa, there is a much smaller difference
between operational and survival sea states compared to say the North Sea. This means
that if the operational sea state, or the response of the vessel in the operational sea state,
is underestimated there is significantly less of an in built safety margin compared to
harsher climates, particularly with regard to fatigue. Therefore, depending on the
criticality of the fatigue assessment, it may be appropriate to undertake sensitivity
studies to assess the effect of an under prediction of actual vessel motions.
20.1
Installation Parameters
It is important that the mooring design process should take due consideration of the
capabilities of the likely installation vessels and their past performance on previous
projects. It is appreciated that during the early design phase that the particular
installation vessels may well have not been identified. Hence, a degree of conservatism
should be incorporated in the design process, such that the required installation
tolerances do not prohibit otherwise capable and perhaps cheaper vessels. This means
that the mooring design brief should include suitable loadcases to account for lines at
non uniform pre-tensions and anchors which may be tens of metres away from their
planned positions. This is particularly likely for the case of drag embedment anchors,
since it is extremely difficult if not impossible to predict where they will hold and
whether they will follow a straight line as they are dragged during pre-tensioning.
20.1.1
During the mooring installation process it is important that the installation crew should
be fully aware of the key design criteria, such as handling of fibre ropes, pretension
accuracy, anchor placement accuracy, avoidance of chain twists, etc. Therefore, it is
recommended that a suitably experienced member of the mooring design team should
go offshore during the mooring installation and FPS hook up operation. This person is
thus ideally placed to answer operational questions as they arise. Again this should be
specified in the mooring design specification so that contractors expect this and work
with the mooring designers during the development of the installation procedures.
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On the majority of FPSs the initial survey after mooring installation appears to have
been only Close Visual Inspection (CVI) and General Visual Inspection (GVI), no
measurements are typically undertaken. But there is a need for accurate as built
baseline dimensions so that the extent of any future wear can be assessed see section
18.5.
20.1.3
At present mooring systems are typically designed by specialists who may have little
further involvement after installation. It is only if serious problems occur that the
designers may learn more about how the moorings have performed in situ. This is
particularly the case if a FPS is provided by a contractor who then hands over operation
to an Oil Company.
However, mooring systems are not as simple as they first appear and they need careful
management through out their design lives. Thus a life cycle approach to mooring
design and operation is recommended. In this way designers can feedback their
inspection requirements to Operators and then learn from whatever is found during
inspection. Hence, over time, mooring design should improve. At present designers
are not always involved with the in field behaviour mooring systems. Hence they may
not be aware of operational or inspection type issues. Thus new projects may repeat
designs from the past, which in some instances have certain limitations. Obviously if
something has been demonstrated to work well over a long deployment this is a good
argument for not changing it.
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21
KEY CONCLUSIONS
RECOMMENDATIONS
21.1
Overview
&
FUTURE
WORK
In this project, an extensive investigation has been carried out of materials, design,
operations and management issues affecting the long-term integrity of mooring systems
for floating production systems. A broad survey has been conducted of units around
the world, especially those in harsh environments. The in-depth experience of the
participating equipment suppliers, designers, regulatory authorities, Operators and
Noble Denton has been collected and compiled into this state of the art report. The
resulting document is intended as a reference point for designers and operators alike,
with guidance on current and future practices and lessons learnt from the past.
There are many success stories in operation around the world, but there are also a
number of cases where the integrity of the moorings has been compromised to some
extent by unforeseen reasons. In part this is to be expected in any innovative
technology, but there also appear to be some critical omissions in design and integrity
management strategies. Significantly, during the course of this project failures have
continued to occur. Clearly there is still much to learn on this subject and key areas
requiring further work are identified later on in this section.
Overall, based on the evidence acquired during the course of this JIP, as systems age, it
seems quite probable there will be mooring failures in the future, unless more proactive
inspection and remedial work is undertaken. Areas to watch include:
1.
2.
3.
Problems due to the chain stopper being outboard of the pivot point
resulting in dynamic link wear + possible wear on the trumpet structure,
4.
Given the difficulties associated with repair operations in deep water and the lack of
suitable spares, such failures would be expensive to repair and might attract publicity
which could be detrimental to floating production systems in general. Overall,
Operators need to get into the way of thinking that moorings are an integral part of their
production facility. This will encourage them to give them the attention that they merit
given the serious consequences associated with failure.
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21.2
Key Conclusions
Moorings on FPSs are category 1 safety critical systems. Multiple mooring line failure
could put lives at risk both on the drifting unit and on surrounding installations. There
is also a potential pollution risk. Research to date indicates that there is an imbalance
between the critical nature of mooring systems and the attention which they receive.
On many FPSs there is an important need to improve the knowledge base of offshore
personnel on the intricacies of their mooring systems and their potential vulnerability.
This will help to ensure that mooring systems receive the amount of attention they
deserve, particularly during inspection operations. One of the aims of this report is to
educate both offshore and onshore operational staff.
The interface between the surface vessel and the mooring line requires particular
attention for all types of FPS. Carefully planned innovative inspection, making use of
all possible tools, has been demonstrated to be able to detect problems relatively early
on before they become a potential source of failure. The use of micro-ROVs to gain
access to restricted areas not accessible by conventional ROVs and divers has been part
of the key to this success. The inspection which has been undertaken has shown the
importance of achieving compatible surface hardness, since it affects wear.
Unfortunately, at present chain hardness and wear do not normally seem to be
considered in any detail during the standard design process.
In situ in-water inspection techniques are continuing to improve, but further
developments are needed to provide dimensional data on links all around the inter-grip
area and to improve the marine growth cleaning off speed. At present no in-water
techniques exist to check for possible fatigue cracks and the development of such
technology should be encouraged which could include acoustic means see section 0.
Inspection access needs to be improved and this should be stipulated in the mooring
design brief or specification.
On two North Sea FPSs chain wear and corrosion has been found to be significantly
higher than what is specified by most mooring design codes. This wear seems to be
more pronounced on less heavily loaded leeward lines compared to the more loaded
windward lines. Hence, it appears that more interlink rotation is occurring on the
leeward lines. More in field data is needed to find out if this is a general finding which
could have long term implications for other FPSs in the North Sea and elsewhere.
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At present there is little data available which indicates how the break strength of long
term deployed mooring components will be reduced by wear, corrosion including
pitting and the possible development of small fatigue cracks. Thus to assess long-term
integrity with any confidence it is recommended that break tests on a statistically
representative sample number of worn components should be undertaken. Recovered
lines from the thrash zone and from the fairleads/chain stopper area would be ideal for
testing. Such material is likely to be available whenever a FPS comes off station or has
repairs done to its moorings. As well as break tests, Magnetic Particle Inspection
(MPI), photographs and comprehensive dimensional measurements should be
undertaken. It is important that this data should be fed back to the industry. Certain
North Sea Operators have shown a willingness to make this data available.
Offset monitoring has limitations in detecting quickly line failure unless a FPS is in
deep water. However, it is cheap and easily installed. Hence it should be installed as
standard on all units. In addition, all units should have readily available on board the
maximum sea state in which they can continue to produce in case one line fails. This
assessment should be based on intact system mooring line safety factors. On board
emergency procedures should identify what action should be taken in case of riser
rupture while the risers are still pressurized, although the likelihood of this happening is
low. During design the susceptibility of risers to be swept under moorings should be
assessed, since if a line fell on a pressurised riser the consequences are likely to be
serious.
Some large floating production projects have design lives of 20+ years. If a field is still
profitable there will always be a desire to continue production in excess of the design
life, but at this stage the moorings may no longer be fit for purpose. Hence, for long
field life projects a FPS Operator should review the budget for line repairs /
replacements part way through the field life based on up to date inspection findings
taking into account the experienced, rather than the anticipated, wear / corrosion.
A relatively simple wear model is reported in Shoup and Muellers OTC paper of 1984.
Given that there is now a limited amount of in field chain wear data from a few long
term deployed units, it would be desirable to undertake an up to date wear assessment
to see how the calculated values tie up. Once a validated methodology has been
developed it would be possible to use such an approach to estimate wear rates for 20
year plus required field lives.
A possible contributory mechanism for the relatively high line rate among drilling
semi-submersibles has been identified. This is believed to be due to rigs thinking they
have set up balanced pre-tensions, when in fact this has not been achieved. Hence, it is
recommended that in field Pay-In/Pay-Out tests should be undertaken to check whether
the line tension readings can be relied upon see section 0.
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Finally a general lack of suitable spare lines, connectors and repair procedures has been
noted. Given the substantial procurement lead-time associated with these items it is
recommended that Operators should review their assets to see how they could deal in
the short term with one or more failed lines. The reported statistics show that line
failures have been higher than might normally be expected for custom designed
systems which are not regularly recovered and redeployed. Thus the business
interruption potential due to mooring problems should not be underestimated.
In general there seems to be a need for periodic Mooring Audits to re-assess original
design parameters and review inspection records to assess whether the system is still fit
for purpose. When considering possible mooring line remedial works and when it
should be done it is logical to look at the anticipated future life of the chains based on
wear/corrosion rates experienced to date.
21.3
2.
3.
4.
Assess how increases in proof stress may help the fatigue endurance of
mooring components see Section 14.5.
5.
6.
The potential for cost effective micro/mini ROV mooring line inspection from
the FPS itself.
7.
8.
Based on in field data, assess how removal of marine growth for inspection
affects corrosion rates.
9.
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22
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Ref. 2
Ref. 3
Ref. 4
Ref. 5
Ref. 6
Ref. 7
Ref. 8
Noble Denton & Associates Inc Joint Industry Study Report Corrosion
Fatigue Testing of 76 mm Grade R3 & R4 Studless Mooring Chain dated
15 May 2002 (Report No: H5787/NDAI/MJW Rev 0).
Ref. 9
Ref. 10
Ref. 11
W.K. Lee and C.Z. Hua, "Theoretical and Experimental Stress Analysis to
Evaluate the Effect of Loose Studs in Anchor Chain," Conf. Proc.
Engineering Integrity Assessment, East Kilbride, Glasgow, 11-12 May
1994, pp. 171-191.
Ref. 12
Ref. 13
Ref. 14
272
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Ref. 15
Ref. 16
Ref. 17
Ref. 18
Ref. 19
Ref. 20
Ref. 21
Ref. 22
Ref. 23
Ref. 24
Jatar, S., Haslum, H., and Tule, J., The Design, Testing and Installation
of the Red Hawk Spar Polyester Taut Leg (TLM) System, 16th Annual
Deep Offshore Technology (DOT), New Orleans, Nov. 30th Dec. 2nd.
Ref. 25
Chaplin, Rebel & Ridge, Tension/Torsion Interactions in Multicomponent Mooring Lines, OTC012173.
Ref. 26
Ref. 27
Ref. 28
Ref. 29
Ref. 30
273
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Ref. 31
Ref. 32
Ref. 33
Ref. 34
Ref. 35
Dowdy, M.J. and Graham, D.J., A Method for Evaluating and extending
the useful Life of In-Service Anchor Chain, OTC 5719, 1988.
Ref. 36
Ref. 37
Ref. 38
Ref. 39
Ref. 40
Ref. 41
Ref. 42
Ref. 43
Ref. 44
A4163-01
Ref. 45
Ref. 46
Ref. 47
Ref. 48
Turret Operations in the North Sea: Experience from Norne and Asgard
A by Borre Knudsen and Bard A. Leite - Procs of the Eleventh (2001)
International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference, Stavanger,
Norway 17-22 June 2001.
Ref. 49
Ref. 50
Ref. 51
Ref. 52
Ref. 53
Ref. 54
OTC 6905, 1992, The Influence of Proof Loading on the Fatigue Life of
Anchor Chain, Shoup, George J., Tipton, S.M., and Sorem, J.R.
Ref. 55
Ref. 56
Ref. 57
DVN Fatigue Strength analysis of Offshore Steel Structures, DNV-RPC203, October 2001.
Ref. 58
Ref. 59
Ref. 60
Ref. 61
A4163-01
Ref. 62
Ref. 63
Ref. 64
Ref. 65
Ref. 66
Ref. 67
Ref. 68
Ref. 69
Ref. 70
OTC paper 10798, 1999 Genesis Spar Hull and Mooring System : Project
Execution, (W.F. Krieger, Chevron Petroleum Technology Co., J.C.
Heslop, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., B.E. Lundvall, Exxon Upstream
Development Co. and D.T. McDonald, Chevron U.S.A.
Ref. 71
Ref. 72
Ref. 73
Ref. 74
276
23
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278
24
A4163-01
APPENDIX
B
MOORING
QUESTIONNAIRE (EXCEL)
INTEGRITY
279
QUESTIONNAIRE
A. GENERAL DETAILS
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li
Turret FPSO
310
Mar
1996
Classification Society:
Yes
ABS
No
A9. Was the unit ever removed from site and then re-installed?
No
A10. Can the mooring system be disconnected in case of typhoons or ice bergs ?
A11. If the moorings can be disconnected, how often has this happened to date ?
No
N.A.
Polyester Rope
Catenary
B2. Configuration
No
Studlink
Chain
Not Possible
Drag Embedment
B7. Length & make up of first line segment FROM ANCHOR (eg. 25m of 120mm ORQ studless chain)
?
of
of
of
4.5" Bridon Non-Coated Spiral Strand W ire + subsea buoy + spiral stra
of
B11. If applicable position, make up & length of any weighted line sections or buoyancy modules
A draw ing of the 25te ne t buoya ncy subse a buoys
w ould be a ppre cia te d.
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Questionnaire
None
No
No
C4. Any thruster problems encountered which could affect mooring integrity?
No
C6. Any turret problem e.g. bearing or jacking/locking difficulties, but excluding swivel faults?
SOFEC
Free weathervaning
years
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Please Advise ?
20
years
Please Advise ?
Questionnaire
Please Advise ?
Chain Stopper
Vertically
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Questionnaire
Don't know
Vertically
F9. What is the approximate make up of the sea bed at the touch down points?
Other, please advise
Please advise ?
F10. Has signigicant wear been experienced at the sea bed touch down?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Yes
Yes
How Deep?
How Much?
???
??
mm
Questionnaire
G1. Who was the principal mooring installation & hook up contractor?
Yes
???
Don't know
G5. Are all the lines straight from the anchors to the fairleads ?
Don't know
G6. What is the approximate maximum tension variation between lines in dead calm conditions ?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
???????
Te
Please advise ?
Questionnaire
H3. If applicable what is the approximate accuracy of the tension readout (e.g. +/- 20 tonnes)
??
Te
During installation
No
H4. Are the line tensions recorded and the data permanently preserved ?
????
Yes
No
H8. Has the recorded data been validated against the original mooring design estimates?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Don't know
Questionnaire
No
????
No
No
I5. Please, provide details of any breakdowns of line failure detection devices, if known
Not applicable ?
I6. Is it possible to quickly distinguish between instrument failure and line breakage ?
No
I7. Please provide any details if there is any plan to install or add on existing system
????
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Questionnaire
Yes
J6. In case the chain stoppers are submerged, how can they be inspected?
Is visual inspection almost impossible due to the chain stoppers
being at the end of a trumpet or hawse pipe surrounded by the
spider structure ?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Questionnaire
J9. Any significant problems encountered with anchors during or since installation?
J10. Are the risers normally inspected at the same time as the moorings ?
Sometimes
J11. Has significant wear been detected where the chain emerges from the
trumpets at the base of the turret or at the fairleads ?
J12. For systems with studded chain, have loose or missing studs been detected?
Not Applicable
No
J13. Have you detected defects that are common to more than one line?
J14. Has wear been greater on windward (most heavily loaded) or leeward lines?
No
Not Recovered
J19. If weighted line/clump weights are used, have they stayed intact?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Don't know
Not Applicable
Questionnaire
K2. Are there pre-defined maximum environmental limits for continued operations after one line failed?
Yes, please supply details
????
K3. Are there 24 hours a day monitored alarms if the offsets exceed a pre-defined level?
K4. What triggers the decision to suspend production?
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Yes
Questionnaire
No
M. SPARES
M1. What mooring line spares do you have which are immediately available?
Connectors
Fibre Rope
W ire Rope
Instrumentation
Chain
M2. Do written contingency procedures exist for rapid deployment of a replacement mooring line?
M3. Are any mooring components routinely changed out?
No
No
N. PERSONNEL INFORMATION
N1. Name
N2. Position
Nan-Hai-Sheng-Li-(CNOOC-SOFEC)-sketches.xls
Questionnaire
1. Incident Description:
Failure of the retaining bolts on a w ire open socket w hich
allow ed the pin to come free and the mooring line to part.
3. Details of Failure:
On a turret moored moored floating storage unit the connection
detail betw een the chain and the w ire consisted of a w ire end
socket, a triplate and a D type shackle connecting to the
grounded chain. The w ire open socket w as connected to the
triplate by a round connecting pin that w as held in place by an
end plate secured to the socket by 3 bolts aorund its
cicumference ands to the pin by three bolts in a line. During a
subsea survey it w as found that the end plate had dropped off
and the pin dropped out. It w as also noted that the end plate
bolts had failed or backed off on a number of the other socket
connections althouh the pins had not yet dropped out.
4. Probable Incident Cause (if known) including weather conditions at the time of failure
The connection w a s inb the sea bed w orking section of the
cate nary (the thra sh zone ) a nd a s the w ire socke t w a s re pe a tedly
picke d up and se t dow n the re w as a la rge re lative motion
be tw ee n the socke t a nd thge he avie r tripla te a nd grounde d cha in
se ction tha t typica lly re ma ins on the se a -be d. It is thought that
this introduce d a la rge torsiona l/friction load betw e en the pin
anbd the body of the socke t tha t could not be accom modate d by
the end pla te re taining bolts a nd the se fa iled a llow ing the e nd
pla te to drop off and the pin to fa ll out. There ha d also bee n a
fa ilure to insulate prope rly the w ire section from the cha in
se ction and the cathodic prote ction on the w ire w e as draine d
dow n by the grounde d cha in section re sa ulting in a corrosive
environme nt tha t might ha ve contribute d to the fa ilure.
5. Incident Consequences:
Temporarily restricted offloading operations plus repair costs.
7. Remedial action?
Replacement of pins, modification to the retaining bolts and re instatement of the cathodic protection.
25
A4163-01
280
OTC 17499
Floating Production Mooring Integrity JIP Key Findings
Martin G. Brown, Noble Denton Europe Limited
Tony D. Hall, Welaptega Marine Limited
Douglas G. Marr, Balmoral Marine Limited
Max English, U.K. Health and Safety Executive
Richard O. Snell, B.P. Exploration
Abstract
Over the last two years Noble Denton has been undertaking a
Joint Industry Project (JIP) to investigate how to improve the
integrity of the moorings used by Floating Production Systems
(FPSs). The JIP has surveyed the world wide performance of
all types of FPS mooring systems including FPSOs, semi
submersible production units and Spars. Wide ranging
support from 23 sponsoring organizations including operators,
floating production contractors, regulatory authorities,
equipment suppliers and inspection companies has enabled
access to a significant pool of data.
This paper utilizes the JIP data to discuss the following:
Causes of system degradation
Consequences of mooring failure
Key areas to check on a mooring system
Fatigue implications of friction induced bending
Options for in-water inspection
The importance of connector design
Methods to detect line failure
Contingency planning
A few pioneering floating production units have now been on
station for many years. Review of inspection data from these
units shows that selective repair may be needed to maintain
the design specification right up to the end of the operational
life. It has been found that wear can be faster on leeside, as
opposed to windward lines and that certain weighted chain
designs are susceptible to damage.
[OTC 17499]
International Survey
Significant effort was made to try and ensure that the
international survey was as simple and straight forward as
possible for respondents. To this end a custom designed
spreadsheet based questionnaire with drop down boxes was
developed. This spreadsheet was partially completed by
Noble Denton, using information in the public domain, before
being emailed out for checking and final completion.
As well as the questionnaire face to face interviews were
carried out with key personnel from different areas of the
industry. Conference papers, in-house data and journals were
also consulted. Response to the questionnaire was reasonable,
but could have been better particularly for non North Sea
regions. This perhaps gives some indication of the priority
level that at present seems to be associated with mooring
systems. Initially it was believed that offshore based staff
would be able to complete the questionnaires. However, it
became apparent that in some assets there is little in-depth
knowledge about the make up and history of their mooring
systems. Overall though, in summary, good data was
obtained, but not on as many units as had been originally
planned.
Degradation Mechanisms
Intrinsically mooring lines present a fairly simple system for
keeping a floating object on station. However, experience
from the field has shown that mooring is in fact a particularly
difficult dynamic problem. Figure 1 illustrates a number of
the degradation mechanisms which a mooring system will be
exposed to every day of its operational life. Inevitably the
performance of the system will decrease over time. Despite
this, at the end of the field life, which in certain circumstances
could be in excess of 20 years, the mooring system normally
still needs to be capable of withstanding 100 year return period
storm conditions. This represents a stern test for any 20 year
old mechanical system. It is also logical that the longer a
mooring system is out there, the higher is the probability that it
will encounter extreme weather conditions.
Many of the mooring issues mentioned in this paper refer to
chain. This is because chain is normally selected at the two
most challenging locations, namely the vessel interface and
the sea-bed touch down. Since the loading regime is severe
degradation may sometimes occur. However, experience over
the years has shown that using wire in these areas does not
give a true long term solution. The same would almost
certainly apply to the use of fibre ropes.
Historical Incidents
Given these degradation mechanisms a search was made of
historical records to see what lessons could be learnt from past
incidents. This search identified the following incidents which
could have implications for present day systems, although
particularly for the SALM the failure mechanism was unique
to the system concerned:
[OTC 17499]
[OTC 17499]
Localised Wear
[OTC 17499]
In the case of the external turret, in air access was such that it
was possible to shroud the chains where they were rubbing
against the weld beads with a replaceable material (ultra high
molecular weight polyethylene sheeting). However, for the
submerged trumpets on the North Sea unit a more long-term
repair was needed which involved changing out the worn
chain at the trumpet with larger diameter chain with a
specially applied hardened coating (cobalt chromium) to
reduce the severity of any future wear. A special connector
(see Figure 15) was developed to allow the new chain to be
connected up to standard common link chain. This approach
avoided disturbing the wire section of the mooring line on the
sea-bed, which is relatively susceptible to damage (birdcage).
The original system designer was included in the review
process for the repair operation. This represents good practice
which, where possible, it is recommended should be followed
for any future FPS mooring repair operations.
On type a) systems the trumpets are typically pivoted about a
single axis so as to minimize chain rotation and wear. Since
the rotation is only about one axis and the trumpets are
arranged around an approximate circle, the pivoting action
cannot eliminate chain rotation for all the lines at the same
time. Thus, to minimize wear over a long field life, there may
be arguments for selecting a design which can pivot about two
axes, although this would be mechanically more complicated.
[OTC 17499]
[OTC 17499]
[OTC 17499]
Line No11
195.0
194.0
193.0
192.0
191.0
190.0
189.0
188.0
187.0
186.0
185.0
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
Tension (te)
[OTC 17499]
10
[OTC 17499]
[OTC 17499]
11
12
[OTC 17499]
26
A4163-01
281
7. Operators should inspect the mooring chains around and inside the mooring
trumpet during 2005, and take any necessary remedial action to ensure the
8. Periodic inspection of the chain around and inside the trumpet should be carried
out based upon the findings of the initial inspection.
Further information
Any queries relating to this notice should be addressed to:
Health and Safety Executive
Offshore Division
Fraser Place
Aberdeen
AB25 3UB
This guidance is issued by the Health and Safety Executive. Following the guidance is
not compulsory and you are free to take other action. But if you do follow the guidance
you will normally be doing enough to comply with the law. Health and safety inspectors
seek to secure compliance with the law and may refer to this guidance as illustrating good
practice.
x
x
x
x
x
x
Updated 27.09.05
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