Warrantless Search and Seizure

G.R. No. 164815

September 3, 2009

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr. Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying
that our February 22, 2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a new one be
entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and
under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco
(Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and
Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp
Crame. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer
directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso checking his hideouts in
Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a

tricyle. Disuanco and his team approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No.
52315, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was
not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc,
Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the
defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at
Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in
civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his
hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched and ransacked
the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong
baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. However, the raiding team
was not armed with a search warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the
subject firearm and its ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as
charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was further ordered
confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision. Valeroso filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 which was denied with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20 imploring this Court to once more take a
contemplative reflection and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its Comment on
Valerosos Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22

In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now recommends Valerosos acquittal.
After a second look at the evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for
the defense more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More
importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by the police officers
in violation of Valerosos constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject firearm was
admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be convicted of the crime, since he was able to
establish his authority to possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
After considering anew Valerosos arguments through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSGs
position recommending his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign
supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration. While a second
motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion
of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be
better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case from
the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzmans
motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second
motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to
the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In that case, we said that if
we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would surely
experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed
after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier
decision, re-examined the records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development
Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized
the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondents
second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a reexamination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside
our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination of the findings of
fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the

application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was arrested, is different from
the version of the defense. The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central
Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso
under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of
his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the
police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they discovered the
subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration of the joint appeal for acquittal by
Valeroso and the OSG, we find that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valerosos appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure alleged to have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution which states:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that, as a general rule, the procurement of a
warrant is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or
effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section 3(2), that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding."31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances
where searches and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on
the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building
regulations.33
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of reasonableness laid down above, is the
warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and
seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.

We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v.
Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the
parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to
remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order
to prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latters reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40 The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with
ransom. At that time, Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He was
awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed. They pulled him out of the room, placed
him beside the faucet outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of Disuanco.43
The other police officers remained inside the room and ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they
found the subject firearm and ammunition.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the
warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure,
the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within
his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any
evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the
tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But
under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk
drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful
arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed
with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The
exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the case

before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valerosos
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an incident to a
lawful arrest.48
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or
to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v. Leangsiri:51
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used
to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valerosos children, because they were
supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a
prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover
may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just accidentally
discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence
against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it
may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding
the rights of an individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.54

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This
explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position
of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valerosos conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient
evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
measured by the required moral certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was not enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it
would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict
one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional
rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the
government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution
are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GEORGIA v. RANDOLPH
certiorari to the supreme court of georgia
No. 041067.Argued November 8, 2005Decided March 22, 2006
Respondents estranged wife gave police permission to search the marital residence for items of drug
use after respondent, who was also present, had unequivocally refused to give consent. Respondent was
indicted for possession of cocaine, and the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence as
products of a warrantless search unauthorized by consent. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed. In
affirming, the State Supreme Court held that consent given by one occupant is not valid in the face of
the refusal of another physically present occupant, and distinguished United States v. Matlock,415 U. S.

164, which recognized the permissibility of an entry made with the consent of one co-occupant in the
others absence.
Held: In the circumstances here at issue, a physically present co-occupants stated refusal to permit
entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him. Pp. 419.
(a) The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of a premises when the
police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share,
common authority over the property, and no present co-tenant objects. Matlock, supra, at 170; Illinois
v. Rodriguez,497 U. S. 177, 186. The constant element in assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness
in such cases is the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are influenced
by property law but not controlled by its rules. Thus, Matlock not only holds that a solitary coinhabitant may sometimes consent to a search of shared premises, but also stands for the proposition
that the reasonableness of such a search is in significant part a function of commonly held
understandings about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each others
interests. Pp. 46.
(b) Matlocks example of common understanding is readily apparent. The assumption tenants usually
make about their common authority when they share quarters is that any one of them may admit
visitors, with the consequence that a guest obnoxious to one may be admitted in his absence. Matlock
placed no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical arrangements, absent reason to
doubt that the regular scheme was in place. Pp. 68.
(c) This Court took a step toward addressing the issue here when it held in Minnesota v. Olson,495 U.
S. 91, that overnight houseguests have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their temporary quarters.
If that customary expectation is a foundation of a houseguests Fourth Amendment rights, it should
follow that an inhabitant of shared premises may claim at least as much. In fact, a co-inhabitant
naturally has an even stronger claim. No sensible person would enter shared premises based on one
occupants invitation when a fellow tenant said to stay out. Such reticence would show not timidity but
a realization that when people living together disagree over the use of their common quarters, a
resolution must come through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to authority. Absent some
recognized hierarchy, e.g., parent and child, there is no societal or legal understanding of superior and
inferior as between co-tenants. Pp. 810.
(d) Thus, a disputed invitation, without more, gives an officer no better claim to reasonableness in
entering than the officer would have absent any consent. Disputed permission is no match for the
Fourth Amendment central value of respect for the privacy of the home, Wilson v. Layne,526 U. S.
603, 610, and the States other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh it.
A co-tenant who has an interest in bringing criminal activity to light or in deflecting suspicion from
himself can, e.g., tell the police what he knows, for use before a magistrate in getting a warrant. This
case, which recognizes limits on evidentiary searches, has no bearing on the capacity of the police, at
the invitation of one tenant, to enter a dwelling over another tenants objection in order to protect a
resident from domestic violence. Though alternatives to disputed consent will not always open the door
to search for evidence that the police suspect is inside, nothing in social custom or its reflection in
private law argues for placing a higher value on delving into private premises to search for evidence in
the face of disputed consent, than on requiring clear justification before the government searches
private living quarters over a residents objection. Pp. 1016.

(e) There are two loose ends. First, while Matlocks explanation for the constitutional sufficiency of a
co-tenants consent to enter and search recognized a co-inhabitants right to permit the inspection in
his own right, 415 U. S., at 171, n. 7, the right to admit the police is not a right as understood under
property law. It is, instead, the authority recognized by customary social usage as having a substantial
bearing on Fourth Amendment reasonableness in specific circumstances. The question here is whether
customary social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority to prevail over the co-tenants
objection, a question Matlock did not answer. Second, a fine line must be drawn to avoid undercutting
Matlockwhere the defendant, though not present, was in a squad car not far awayand Rodriguez
where the defendant was asleep in the apartment and could have been roused by a knock on the door; if
a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the co-tenants
permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not part
of the threshold colloquy, loses out. Such formalism is justified. So long as there is no evidence that the
police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance specifically to avoid a possible
objection, there is practical value in the simple clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing the cotenants permission when no fellow occupant is on hand, the other according dispositive weight to the
fellow occupants expressed contrary indication. Pp. 1618.
(f) Here, respondents refusal is clear, and nothing in the record justifies the search on grounds
independent of his wifes consent. Pp. 1819.
278 Ga. 614, 604 S. E. 2d 835, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., and Breyer, J., filed concurring opinions. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which Scalia, J., joined. Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., filed dissenting opinions. Alito, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
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SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City;
HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla
for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be
briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO,
AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE
was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The
record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against
NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by
respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged that the search was
conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a
Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined
tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock
surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA."
AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doa
Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT
CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted
by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were
examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been
submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the
premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the
National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended
to be used for rebellion. 1
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and
2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. 3
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made
in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention
was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was
signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal
Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILARROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying,
inter alia, that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that
are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which
AGUILAR-ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents
"shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings
under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground
that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently
not aware of the Order of Judge Pao of December 13th issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant
issued by respondent RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to
Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it
does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable
cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness.
The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised
cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed
Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples
Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions,
manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely
described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable
regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what
the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to
make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite
guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar
description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the
objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as
'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other
subversive materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to the search team as
to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not

worse than, the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of
Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to
include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal
or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which
is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for
Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the
Court would like to know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many suspicious persons with
documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front, Organization of the
Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List
of possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public
and support money from foreign and local sources.

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious
man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.

10

Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The

3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities
to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The
examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may
issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the
Court that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In
fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during
the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion
to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had questioned the legality of
the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of
justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a
criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later
criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal
case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly
provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an offense may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person
who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and
reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that,
in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of
the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's
right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that
the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we
are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search
warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in
the Rebellion Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission No.1 to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent
from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby
made permanent, the, personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible
introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission No. 1,
without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to
return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J.; took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The
questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision
as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of
Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained
evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the
exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by
outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state
and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution
mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot
be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of
Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has held that "in
issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the

Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights
secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest,
her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even
without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription
and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting
portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group
themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in
question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person
who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his
arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the
place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a
public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could
"later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if
not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued
by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera.
In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and constitutional
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the
military. In either case his action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No.
SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice Cuevas. for
the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas, statement
that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the
subversive materials seized by the government agents." What are subversive materials?
Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the
determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact
that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of Playboy magazines were
seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician
who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.

CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting

I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 8084 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not specify with
requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in
the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec.
3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the
basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the
aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by,
the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned
only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are
limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense." Hence
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime
or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping
or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs.
Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person
lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other
things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. US
267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank
Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest
was made. When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended and

the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot
be sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199.
(Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the
general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident
to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it
is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with
the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make
an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then
search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani
vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall
St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the
arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents
claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayn
St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where
petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is
that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of
nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was
incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of
the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is
ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties
seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under
the exclusionary rule. However, not all the things so seized can be ordered returned to their
owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot be
returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials
seized by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the
law can and must be retained by the government.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting.

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The
questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision
as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of
Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained
evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the
exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by
outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state
and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution
mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot
be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of
Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court has held that "in
issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights
secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest,
her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even
without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the constitutional proscription
and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting
portion of his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group
themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in
question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person
who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his
arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the
place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a
public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could
"later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if
not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant
No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Pao for the reasons adduced by Justice
Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and
constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be
used by the military. In either case his action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No.
SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with Justice Cuevas. for
the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas, statement
that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the
subversive materials seized by the government agents." What are subversive materials?
Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the
determination? Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact
that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of Playboy magazines were
seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician
who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 8084 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not specify with
requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in
the nature of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec.
3, 1973 Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the
basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the
aforequoted provision (Sec. 12, Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by,
the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned
only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are
limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of the offense." Hence

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime
or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping
or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs.
Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be
contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have
been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place
where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person
lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to search the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other
things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs. US
267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank
Agnello's house was several blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest
was made. When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended and
the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot
be sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199.
(Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the
general rule is that, in addition to a lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident
to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it
is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with
the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make
an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then
search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani
vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall
St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976. The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the
arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same day (as respondents
claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayon
St., Quezon City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where
petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record. But what appears undisputed is
that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of
nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was
incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of

the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is
ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties
seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under
the exclusionary rule. However, not all the things so seized can be ordered returned to their
owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot be
returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials
seized by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by anyone under the
law can and must be retained by the government.
ARIZONA V. GANT
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ARIZONA v. GANT
certiorari to the supreme court of arizona
No. 07542.Argued October 7, 2008Decided April 21, 2009
Respondent Gant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in a patrol
car before officers searched his car and found cocaine in a jacket pocket. The Arizona trial court denied
his motion to suppress the evidence, and he was convicted of drug offenses. Reversing, the State
Supreme Court distinguished New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454which held that police may search
the passenger compartment of a vehicle and any containers therein as a contemporaneous incident of a
recent occupants lawful arreston the ground that it concerned the scope of a search incident to arrest
but did not answer the question whether officers may conduct such a search once the scene has been
secured. Because Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, requires that a search incident to arrest be
justified by either the interest in officer safety or the interest in preserving evidence and the
circumstances of Gants arrest implicated neither of those interests, the State Supreme Court found the
search unreasonable.
Held: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest
only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or
that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Pp. 518.
(a) Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357. The exception for a search
incident to a lawful arrest applies only to the area from within which [an arrestee] might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel, 395 U. S., at 763. This Court applied that
exception to the automobile context in Belton, the holding of which rested in large part on the
assumption that articles inside a vehicles passenger compartment are generally within the area
into which an arrestee might reach. 453 U. S., at 460. Pp. 58.
(b) This Court rejects a broad reading of Belton that would permit a vehicle search incident to a
recent occupants arrest even if there were no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at

the time of the search. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimels exception
authorize a vehicle search only when there is a reasonable possibility of such access. Although it does
not follow from Chimel, circumstances unique to the automobile context also justify a search incident
to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be
found in the vehicle. Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615, 632 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). Neither Chimels reaching-distancerule nor Thorntons allowance for evidentiary searches
authorized the search in this case. In contrast to Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with
four unsecured arrestees, five officers handcuffed and secured Gant and the two other suspects in
separate patrol cars before the search began. Gant clearly could not have accessed his car at the time of
the search. An evidentiary basis for the search was also lacking. Belton and Thornton were both
arrested for drug offenses, but Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended licensean offense for
which police could not reasonably expect to find evidence in Gants car. Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S.
113, 118. The search in this case was therefore unreasonable. Pp. 811.
(c) This Court is unpersuaded by the States argument that its expansive reading of Belton correctly
balances law enforcement interests with an arrestees limited privacy interest in his vehicle. The State
seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake, and it exaggerates both the clarity provided by a
broad reading of Belton and its importance to law enforcement interests. A narrow reading of Belton
and Thornton,together with this Courts other Fourth Amendment decisions, e.g., Michigan v. Long,
463 U. S. 103, and United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, permit an officer to search a vehicle when
safety or evidentiary concerns demand. Pp. 1114.
(d) Stare decisis does not require adherence to a broad reading of Belton. The experience of the 28
years since Belton has shown that the generalization underpinning the broad reading of that decision is
unfounded, and blind adherence to its faulty assumption would authorize myriad unconstitutional
searches. Pp. 1518.
216 Ariz. 1, 162 P. 3d 640, affirmed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined
except as to Part IIE.

Arizona v. Gant
Argued: October 7, 2008
Decided: April 21, 2009
Facts
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and
usually requires an officer to have both probable cause and a warrant in order to
search a person or her property. There are, however, a number of exceptions to
this requirement. One of the times when an officer does not need a warrant to
search someone is at the time of a lawful arrest. Typically, in the interest of the
officers safety and evidence discovery and preservation, the officer can search
an arrestee and the area within his immediate control without first obtaining a

warrant. This case addresses the extent of an officers power in searching an

arrestees vehicle after he has been arrested and placed in the back of a police
car.
On August 25, 1999, the police responded to an anonymous tip of drug activity at
a particular residence. When they arrived, Rodney Gant answered the door and
identified himself. He informed police that the owner of the house was not home
but would return later that evening. When the police left, they checked records
and discovered that Gant had a warrant for his arrest for driving with a
suspended license.
The officers returned to the home later that evening and arrested two
individuals. After both arrestees were handcuffed and placed in the back of
police cars, Gant arrived at the house driving a vehicle. When he stepped out of
his car, he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. After Gant was
handcuffed and placed in the back of a third police car, officers searched Gants
car. They found a gun in the car along with a bag of cocaine in a jacket pocket on
the backseat.
Gant was charged with possession of the cocaine. He sought to have the
evidence found in his car suppressed at trial because, he claimed, the search of
his car had been unreasonable. The trial court denied Gants motion and Gant
was convicted. The state appellate court and the Arizona Supreme Court
reversed the trial courts conviction, ruling that the search of Gants car was not
allowed because it did not promote officer safety or evidence discovery and
preservation. Because the search violated Gants Fourth Amendment rights, the
evidence found in Gants car should have been suppressed and not presented at
trial. The State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Issue
Does the Fourth Amendment require that police officers, when arresting a recent
occupant of a vehicle, demonstrate either a threat to officer safety or a need to
preserve evidence related to the crime in order to conduct a search of that
vehicle without a warrant?
Constitutional Amendment and Precedents
The Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Chimel v. California (1969)
Officers came to Chimels home with a warrant for Chimels arrest for
burglary; they did not have a search warrant. After they arrested Chimel
they asked to search his home. Chimel refused, but the officers informed

him that they could search his house anyway on the basis of his lawful
arrest.
The Court ruled that an officer could search the area within an arrestees
immediate control if the officers safety was at risk or the arrestee could
destroy evidence relating to his arrest. A search of Chimels entire home
went beyond the area that was within Chimels immediate control and,
therefore, the Court ruled in favor of Chimel.
New York v. Belton (1981)
A police officer pulled over a car with four male passengers for speeding.
The policeman smelled marijuana and saw what appeared to be an
envelope that contained marijuana lying on the floor of the car. He arrested
all four men for unlawful possession of marijuana, but did not place them
in the back of a police car. The officer then searched the passenger
compartment of the car, including Beltons jacket that was lying in the
backseat, while the four arrestees stood nearby. In the jacket pocket the
officer found a bag of cocaine. Belton was then also charged with criminal
possession of a controlled substance.
The Court ruled that because the jacket was within the passenger
compartment of the car it was within Beltons immediate control, even
though Belton was standing outside the car. Belton had been lawfully
arrested, and therefore a warrantless search of the arrestees vehicle was
lawful.
Thornton v. U.S. (2004)
Before a police officer could pull Marcus Thornton over for a violation
involving the tags on his license plate, Thornton parked his car and got out.
The officer approached Thornton and after Thornton agreed to be patted
down, the officer found marijuana and crack cocaine on his person. The
officer then arrested Thornton and searched his car, finding a firearm.
The Court ruled that the firearm was seized incident to a lawful arrest, and
therefore no warrant was needed. The Court ruled that the search of a
vehicle was unique and therefore not only could an officer search the
arrestee and the immediate area in the interest of officer safety and
evidence preservation, but he could also search the vehicle if it was
reasonable to believe that doing so would turn up evidence relevant to the
arrest.
Arguments for Arizona
Officer safety and evidence preservation are vital government interests. If
necessary, police officers should temporarily be able to limit an arrestees
privacy to promote these interests.
Thornton clearly established that vehicles are unique because they are
mobile and evidence of a crime that remains in the vehicle is at much

greater risk of being lost. Officers should therefore have more power to
secure evidence of criminal activity from a vehicle.
Due to the unique nature of vehicular searches, Chimel does not apply
because Chimel involved the search of a home.
Belton has been interpreted as giving officers the power to search a vehicle
during an arrest as long as the arrestee remains at the scene of the arrest
and the search is close in time to the arrest, even if the arrestee cannot
reach the passenger compartment of the car.
A ruling for Gant in this case would require a departure from the typical
interpretation of Belton. This would, in effect, overturn Belton. In order to
overturn precedent, a great burden must be met. Overturning the
precedent would cause undue hardship, and circumstances have not
changed enough to warrant overturning Belton. Therefore, the great
burden is not met.
Arguments for Gant
Warrantless vehicular searches are subject to the limitations set out in
Chimel. Therefore, an officer can only search the area within the
immediate control of the arrestee in order to promote officer safety or to
preserve evidence from being destroyed. In this case, Gant was locked in
the police car at the time of the search. The passenger compartment of his
car was not within his immediate control, and therefore neither officer
safety nor evidence preservation was an issue.
Thornton says that police are allowed to search a vehicle if it is reasonable
to believe that doing so would uncover evidence related to the arrest of the
occupant. Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license. It was
not reasonable to think that searching the car would uncover any evidence
in relation to that charge.
Belton has been misinterpreted in the past; rather than allowing officers to
search a vehicle at the time of an arrest under any circumstances, Belton
only allows officers to search the vehicle if the arrestee is within reach of
the passenger compartment at the time of the search.
Interpreting Belton this way (allowing officers to only search the vehicle if
the arrestee is within reach of the passenger compartment) still ensures
officer safety and evidence preservation while also respecting the rights of
the individual arrestee.
Decision
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Scalia,
Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg joined. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, in
which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined.
Majority

In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Courts ruling. In
order for a warrantless vehicular search at the time of an arrest to be
constitutional, the arrestee has to be within reach of the passenger
compartment, or it has to be reasonable that a search of the vehicle will turn up
evidence of the crime for which the person is being arrested.
Gant was handcuffed in the back of the police car with five police officers
guarding him. Therefore, the Court reasoned, he was not within reach of the
passenger compartment and officer safety and evidence preservation was not an
issue. Further, he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. Therefore,
it was not reasonable for the police to believe that a search of Gants vehicle
would turn up evidence related to that charge. Because neither of these
requirements was met, the search in this situation was not constitutional.
Finally, the Court asserted that they were not violating stare decisis because they
were not overruling Belton. The interpretation of Belton that the State relied
upon was inaccurate; therefore, the Court was not overruling Belton, but rather
interpreting it properly.
Dissent
The dissenting justices argued that Belton was meant to give police officers the
power to search a vehicle at the time of arrest regardless of the arrestees ability
to reach the vehicle, and the Courts interpretation of Belton, which limits the
area of search to the area within the arrestees reach, in effect, overruled
precedent. They noted that while their interpretation of Belton may be imperfect,
it is precedent that has been followed for twenty-eight years. The burden to
overturn precedent is great, and that burden is not met here. Therefore, the
Court should follow precedent and rule that, because the search was close in
time to the arrest, Gants Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.

RESOLUTION FOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

[G.R. No. L-69803. January 30, 1987.]
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO,
Petitioners, v. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City; HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

For resolution are petitioners and public respondents respective Motions for Partial Reconsideration
of this Courts Decision of October 8, 1985, which decreed that:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive
Judge Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents Case hereby made permanent, the personalities seized may be retained by the
Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1,
pending before Special Military Commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque
objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant
documents and articles." (Rollo, p. 154; 139 SCRA 165)
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, public respondents maintain that the subject Search
Warrant meets the standards for validity and that it should be considered in the context of the criminal
offense of Rebellion for which the Warrant was issued, the documents to establish which are less
susceptible of particularization since the offense does not involve an isolated act or transaction.
chanrobl es virtual lawlibrary

In their own Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners assail that portion of the Decision holding
that, in so far as petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque is concerned, the search made in her premises was
incident to her arrest and could be made without a search warrant. Petitioners submit that a warrantless
search can be justified only if it is an incident to a lawful arrest and that since Mila Aguilar was not
lawfully arrested a search without warrant could not be made.
On April 10, 1986, we required the parties to MOVE in the premises considering the supervening
events, including the change of administration that have transpired, and pursuant to the provisions of
Section 18 of Rule 3 in so far as the public respondents are concerned (which requires the successor
official to state whether or not he maintains the action and position taken by his predecessor-in-office).
In their Compliance, petitioners maintain that the arrest of petitioners and the search of their premises
thereafter are both illegal and that the personalities seized should be ordered returned to their owners.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of public respondents, "in deference to the dissenting opinion of then
Supreme Court Justice (now Chief Justice) Claudio Teehankee," now offer no further objection to a
declaration that the subject search is illegal and to the return of the seized items to the petitioners.
Respondents state, however, that they cannot agree to having the arrest of petitioners declared illegal.
The pertinent portion of the dissenting opinion referred to reads:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Courts decision as
a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that the right of the people to
be secure on their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights
orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: Any evidence obtained in violation of
this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sec. 4[21). This constitutional
mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved by historical experience to be the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures by
outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and
police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is
beyond the power of the courts to change or modify.

"All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be
used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman v.
Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985) . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library

ACCORDINGLY, considering the respective positions now taken by the parties, petitioners Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of this Courts Decision of October 8, 1985 is GRANTED, and the dispositive
portion thereof is hereby revised to read as follows:
chanrobl es virtual lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge
Ernani Cruz Pao is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondents from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive
Documents Case hereby made permanent. The personalities seized by virtue of the illegal Search
Warrant are hereby ordered returned to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I felicitate my colleagues for granting petitioners motion for reconsideration and now totally applying
the exclusionary rule by declaring that the search and seizure of the personalities at petitioner Mila
Aguilar Roques dwelling at Mayon Street, Quezon City was illegal and could not be deemed as
incident to her arrest earlier on board a public vehicle on the road away from and outside of her
dwelling. Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez stand in support hereof signifies one more great step
in fulfillment of the pledge of the present government of granting full recognition and restoration of the
civil and political liberties of the people and rejecting the oppressive and repressive measures of the
past authoritarian regime.
The original majority decision citing sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 1 had held that said Rule
states "a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made
can also be searched without a search warrant. In this latter case, the extent and reasonableness of the
search must be decided on its own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the extent of
the place or premises which may be searched. What must be considered is the balancing of the
individuals right to privacy and the publics interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals."
This pronouncement had the support of a majority of nine (9) Justices of the Court at the time. Three
(3) members had dissented, 2 while two (2) other members took no part or reserved their vote. 3
As the petitioners stressed in their motion for reconsideration," (I)f the majority opinion becomes
settled law, the constitutional protection would become meaningless. The military or police would no
longer apply for search warrants. All that they would do is procure a search (sic) 4 warrant or better

still, a PDA, for the person whose house they would want to search. Armed with a warrant of arrest or a
PDA, the military or police would simply wait for the person to reach his house, then arrest him. Even
if the person arrested does not resist and has in fact been taken away already from his house, under the
majority ruling, the arresting party would still have the right to search the house of the arrestee and cart
away all his things and use them as evidence against him in court.
"In such a situation, what then happens to that stringent constitutional requirement that no search
warrant . . . shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officers as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the things to be seized and the constitutional injunction that any evidence obtained in violation of
this . . . shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" 5
The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided in Rule 126, sec. 12 and
that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person
at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to "dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in
a place other than the place of arrest. 6
Applying the aforestated rule to this case, the undisputed fact is that petitioner Mila Aquilar Roque was
arrested at 11:30 a.m. aboard a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margal Sts.). The
pronouncement by the majority at that time, that as an incident to her arrest, her dwelling at 239-B
Mayon Street could be searched even without a warrant for evidence of the charges of rebellion filed
against her was contrary to the constitutional proscription, as defined by law and jurisprudence. It was
tantamount to sanctioning an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the basic constitutional right
and guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.
With the Court now unanimously upholding the exclusionary rule, in toto, the constitutional mandate is
given full force and effect. This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has
proved by historical experience to be the practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby
removing the incentive on the part of the military and police officers to disregard such basic rights.
This is of special public importance and serves as a shield in the remote provinces and rural areas to the
people who have no access to courts for prompt and immediate relief from violations of their
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.
chanrobl es virtual lawlibrary

In this case, the arresting CSG group of the military themselves knew that they needed a search warrant
but they obtained the void general warrant in question. Necessarily, the seizure of documents and
personal effects with such a void warrant could not be justified "as an incident of an arrest" outside
petitioners dwelling and the Constitution bars their admissibility as evidence and ordains their return
to petitioners.
Endnotes:

1. "Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense."
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2. Claudio Teehankee, Vicente Abad Santos and Serafin Cuevas, JJ.,

3. Ramon Aquino and Hermogenes Concepcion Jr., JJ.,
4. A manifest error: This clearly refers to arrest warrant, from the thrust of the argument.
5. Record, page 201.
6. The 1985 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure expressly clarifies this through a change in the
caption, as follows: "Sec. 12 Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant." (Rule 126)

JOHNSON V. U. S. , 333 U.S. 10 (1948)

333 U.S. 10
JOHNSON
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 329.
Argued Dec. 18, 1947.
Feb. 2, 1948. [ Johnson v. U. S. 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ] [333 U.S. 10 , 11]
Mr. James Skelly Wright, for petitioner.
Mr. Robert Erdahl, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted on four counts charging violation of federal narcotic laws. 1 The only question
which brings the case here is whether it was lawful, without a warrant of any kind, to arrest petitioner
and to search her living quarters. [333 U.S. 10 , 12] Taking the Government's version of disputed events,
decision would rest on these facts:
At about 7:30 p.m. Detective Lieutenant Belland, an officer of the Seattle police force narcotic detail,
received information from a confidential informer, who was also a known narcotic user, that unknown
persons were smoking opium in the Europe Hotel. The informer was taken back to the hotel to
interview the manager, but he returned at once saying he could smell burning opium in the hallway.
Belland communicated with federal narcotic agents and between 8:30 and 9 o'clock went back to the
hotel with four such agents. All were experienced in narcotic work and recognized at once a strong
odor of burning opium which to them was distinctive and unmistakable. The odor led to Room 1. The
officers did not know who was occupying that room. They knocked and a voice inside asked who was
there. 'Lieutenant Belland,' was the reply. There was a slight delay, some 'shuffling or noise' in the room

and then the defendant opened the door. The officer said, 'I want to talk to you a little bit.' She then, as
he describes it, 'stepped back acquiescently and admitted us.' He said, 'I want to talk to you about the
opium smell in the room here.' She denied that there was such a smell. Then he said, 'I want you to
consider yourself under arrest because we are going to search the room.' The search turned up
incriminating opium and smoking apparatus, the latter being warm, apparently from recent use. This
evidence the District Court refused to suppress before trial and admitted over defendant's objection at
the trial. Conviction resulted and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 2
The defendant challenged the search of her home as a violation of the rights secured to her in common
with others, by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. [333 U.S. 10 , 13] The Government defends
the search as legally justifiable, more particularly as incident to what it urges was a lawful arrest of the
person.
I.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
'The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.'
Entry to defendant's living quarters, which was the beginning of the search, was demanded under color
of office. It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional
waiver of a constitutional right. Cf. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 .
At the time entry was demanded the officers were possessed of evidence which a magistrate might have
found to be probable cause for issuing a search warrant. We cannot sustain defendant's contention,
erroneously made, on the strength of Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 , that odors cannot be evidence
sufficient to constitute probable grounds for any search. That decision held only that odors alone do not
authorize a search without warrant. If h e presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he
finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden
substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant.
Indeed it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law en- [333 U.S. 10 , 14] forcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime. 3 Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant
would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers. 4 Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to
society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which
chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or Government enforcement agent.

There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement
against the [333 U.S. 10 , 15] right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search
may be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered for not obtaining a search
warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and
present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and, in these
circumstances, certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was
fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No
evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction, except perhaps the fumes which
we suppose in time will disappear. But they were not capable at any time of being reduced to
possession for presentation to court. The evidence of their existence before the search was adequate and
the testimony of the officers to that effect would not perish from the delay of getting a warrant.
If the officers in this case were excused from the constitutional duty of presenting their evidence to a
magistrate, it is difficult to think of a case in which it should be required.
II.
The Government contends, however, that this search without warrant must be held valid because
incident to an arrest. This alleged ground of vai dity requires examination of the facts to determine
whether the arrest itself was lawful. Since it was without warrant, it could be valid only if for a crime
committed in the presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he had reasonable cause to
believe defendant guilty. 5 [333 U.S. 10 , 16] The Government, in effect, concedes that the arresting
officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until he had entered her room and found her to
be the sole occupant. 6 It points out specifically, referring to the time just before entry, 'For at that time
the agents did not know whether there was one or several persons in the room. It was reasonable to
believe that the room might have been an opium smoking den.' And it says, '* * * that when the agents
were admitted to the room and found only the petitioner present they had a reasonable basis for
believing that she had been smoking opium and thus illicitly possessed the narcotic.' Thus the
Government quite properly stakes the right to arrest, not on the informer's tip and the smell the officers
recognized before entry, but on the knowledge that she was alone in the room, gained only after, and
wholly by reason of, their entry of her home. It was therefore their observations inside of her quarters,
after they had obtained admission under color of their police authority, on which they made the arrest. 7
Thus the Government is obliged to justify the arrest by the search and at the same time to justify the
search by [333 U.S. 10 , 17] the arrest. This will not do. An officer gaining access to private living
quarters under color of his office and of the law which he personifies must then have some valid basis
in law for the intrusion. Any other rule would undermine 'the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects,'8 and would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions
between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are
the law.
Reversed.
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON dissent.

Footnotes

[ Footnote 1 ] Two counts charged violation of 2553(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.
2553(a), 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code, 2553(a), and two counts charged violation of the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act, as amended, 21 U.S.C. 174, 21 U.S.C.A. 174.
[ Footnote 2 ] 9 Cir., 162 F.2d 562.
[ Footnote 3 ] In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 , 423, 82 A.L.R. 775, this Court said: '*
* * the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what
searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the hurried action
of officers and others who may happen to make arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more
likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty
officers while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of crime. * * *'
[ Footnote 4 ] 'Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house,
furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. And such searches are held
unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.' Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33 , 6, 51 A.L.R. 409.
[ Footnote 5 ] This is the Washington law. State v. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 55 P. 626; State v. Lindsey,
192 Wash. 356, 73 P.2d 738; State v. Krantz, 24 Wash.2d 350, 164 P.2d 453; State v. Robbins, 25
Wash.2d 110, 169 P.2d 246. State law determines the validity of arrests without warrant. United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 .
[ Footnote 6 ] The Government brief states that the question presented is 'whether there was probable
cause for the arrest of petitioner for possessing opium prepared for smoking and the search of her room
in a hotel incident thereto for contraband opium, where experienced narcotic agents unmistakably
detected and traced the pungent, identifiable odor of burning opium emanating from her room and
knew, before they arrested her, that she was the only person in the room.'
[ Footnote 7 ] The Government also suggests that 'In a sense, the arrest was made in 'hot pursuit'. * * *'
However, we find no element of 'hot pursuit' in the arrest of one who was not in flight, was completely
surrounded by agents before she knew of their presence, who claims without denial that she was in bed
at the time, and who made no attempt to escape. Nor would these facts seem to meet the requirements
of the 'Washington Uniform Law on Fresh Pursuit.' Session Laws 1943, ch. 261.
8. In Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 302 , 303, 263, this Court said: 'It would not be possible to
add to the emphasis with which the framers of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 , in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , L.R.A.1915B, 834, Ann.Cas.1915C, 1177, and
in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (24 A.L.R. 1426)) have declared the
importance to political liberty and to the welfare of our country of the due observance of the rights
guaranteed under the Constitution by these two (Fourth and Fifth) Amendments. The effect of the
decisions cited is: That such rights are declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property'; that they are to be regarded as of the very essence of
constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are the
guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the individual citizenthe right to trial by jury, to the writ
of habeas corpus, and to due process of law. It has been repeatedly decided that these amendments
should receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 'gradual

depreciation' of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or by well-intentioned,

but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.'

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
1

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of the decision, dated August 31, 1990,

The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell to one SGT. AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves,
knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty. 3
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation made against
the appellant; (2) T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of Zamboanga City, who was the
NARCOM team leader of the buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Document Examiner and
Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of the
prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga,
leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City,
instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of
Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari Musa
was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent,
proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari
Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also
described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaperwrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and

turned over the newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected
the stuff turned over to him and found it to be marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani
was assigned as the poseur buyer for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883)
by Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief
of Investigation Section, and for which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team
under Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A pre-arranged signal was arranged
consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The
two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian vehicles. Belarga's team was
composed of Sgt. Belarga, team leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt.
Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari Musa, while the rest of the
NARCOM group positioned themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari
Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Mari Musa from
where he was. Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he
wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money.
After receiving the money, Mari Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado
Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and
inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards
his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian
vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari
Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be
Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house,
the woman, who was later known as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt.
Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money with him. Mari Musa
was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM team he has given the money
to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag containing dried
marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and
brought to the NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt. Belarga the two
newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin Musa. Later on, Mari Musa
gave his true name Mari Musa. T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaperwrapped marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped marijuana (bought at
the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego
inside the kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga City, for laboratory
examination. The turnover of the marijuana specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of
a letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was stamped "RECEIVED" by the
PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1") on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, examined the
marijuana specimens subjecting the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she
examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana. Mrs. Anderson reported the
results of her examination in her Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh.
"J", "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in court the two newspaper
wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the weight of each specimen written
with red ink on each wrapper (Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one newspaperwrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh.
"E-1"). Mrs. Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" & sub-markings.)

T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped marijuana through his initial, the
words "buy-bust" and the words "December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D").
Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"),
dated December 14, 1989, and his signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14, 1989, addressed to the PC
Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC
Crime Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1"). 4
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R.
Musa, his wife. The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari Musa was in his house at
Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old
child, a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa. About 1:30 that afternoon,
while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house,
putting their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced themselves as NARCOM
agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The
NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply announced that they
were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa
asked them if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM
agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did
not know if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
who was living in another house about ten arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed
and when Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM Office at Calarian,
Zamboanga City. Inside the NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM
agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or document was interpreted to
Mari Musa in Tagalog. The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari
Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong
to him. Mari Musa said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel,
although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers of his right hand and his
fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa
lost consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his wife was outside the
NARCOM building. The very day he was arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was
on the next day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three NARCOM agents. The
fiscal asked him if the marijuana was owned by him and he said "not." After that single question,
Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell the fiscal that he had been
maltreated by the NARCOM agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's
office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to
them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not
sell marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and that the person selling
marijuana was caught by the authorities; and he had a wife and a very small child to support.
Mari Musa said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before. 5
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter imposed without subsidiary
imprisonment. 6

In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the
buy-bust operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were personally known by the appellant or
vice-versa; and (2) there was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of marijuana by the appellant
to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy
operation on the appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for P15.00 from the latter. 7 He reported
the successful operation to T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. 8 Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga conducted a
conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the following day. 9
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a
certain Sgt. Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the appellant's house located in Laquian
Compound, Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga, whose other members
were Sgts. Lego and Biong. 10 Sgt. Ani was given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be used
in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned themselves at strategic places. 11 Sgt. Ani approached
the house. Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted. Sgt. Ani asked him for some more
marijuana. 12 Sgt. Ani gave him the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house and brought back
two paper wrappers containing marijuana which he handed to Sgt. Ani. 13 From his position, Sgt. Ani could see
that there were other people in the house. 14
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising
his right hand. 15 The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went inside the house and made the arrest.
The agents searched the appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him where it was. The
appellant said that he gave it to his wife. 16
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation,
which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid
and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other
is without merit. The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the
appellant. Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the appellant's confidence for the latter to
sell more marijuana to Sgt. Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover, the Court has held
that what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to the
transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery of the
marijuana. 17
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani, argues that it was impossible for the appellant to
sell marijuana while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place of the commission of the crime
of selling prohibited drugs has been held to be not crucial 18 and the presence of other people apart from the
buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed in
People v. Paco, 19 these factors may sometimes camouflage the commission of the crime. In the instant case, the
fact that the other people inside the appellant's house are known to the appellant may have given him some
assurance that these people will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The
appellant submits that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters away from Sgt. Ani and the
appellant, he could not have possibly witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale 20 where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15 meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between
marijuana cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt.

Belarga allegedly did not see the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated testimony of Sgt. Ani can
not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that case testified that he and his companion were
certain that the appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the poseur-buyer based on the appearance of
the cigarette sticks. The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses marked as they
are with contradictions and tainted with inaccuracies.
Bian testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes were marijuana cigarettes
because according to him, the rolling of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana
cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the type of rolling done on those
cigarettes from the distance where they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15
meters. 21
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two. The
relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's testimony reads: 22
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the house of Mari
Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt. Lego, Sgt. Biong
were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house near the road and he
was met by one person and later known as Mari Musa who was at the time
wearing short pants and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him,
thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and came back
later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a
distance of 90-100 meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the latter to give to the former
"something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the
appellant was marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless, corroborated the direct evidence,
which the Court earlier ruled to be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material points: (1) T/Sgt.
Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville,
Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; 23 (2) later that same day, Sgt. Ani went back to their office and
reported a successful operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of marijuana; 24 (3) T/Sgt.
Belarga then organized a team to conduct a buy-bust operation the following day; 25 (4) on December 14, 1989,
T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to Suterville, Zamboanga City; 26 (5) T/Sgt. Belarga
gave a P20.00 marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust operation; 27 (6) upon the arrival of
the NARCOM agents in Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of the appellant while some
agents stayed in the vehicles and others positioned themselves in strategic places; 28 the appellant met Sgt. Ani
and an exchange of articles took place. 29

The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the
Court has ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the poseur-buyer were unable to see
exactly what the appellant gave the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be fatal to the
prosecution's case 30 provided there exists other evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which
the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal
to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the house. They searched
him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he gave the
marked money to his wife. 31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what
T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen." 32 They
asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it and found dried marijuana
leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but
the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are admissible in evidence. 33
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares
inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to
this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the
necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make
a search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making
an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust
operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found
on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but
found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging
in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain

view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 41
In Ker v. California 42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that the defendant
husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building manager a passkey to
defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The
defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers, after identifying himself, observed through the
open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package
containing green leafy substance which he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as
evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was
challenged before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom, that "the
discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed
before him in full view. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal
on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the
prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view"
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. 45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit,
search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. 46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not
justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view"
of the object. 47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic
bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant
as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they
sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of
the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from
room to room with the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue
as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond,
they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police
officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents
of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain
view" was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag
was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its
contents are obvious to an observer. 48

We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to
Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the
other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and
T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.i[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven (11)
plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the abovecited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."ii[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the
North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received
information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities
in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation.
As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on
December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha
composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua

and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseurbuyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent
Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to
cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso
bill and six (6) one hundred peso billsiii[3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation. The market price of
one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed
their serial numbers in the police blotter.iv[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in
buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun"
instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he
got the marijuana from his associate.v[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3
Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped
in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua
rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry,
"Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth."vi[6] "Jun" led the
police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as
his associate.vii[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over
"Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He
saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside
the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."viii[8]
The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents
and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the
police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The
one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from
"Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.ix[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were
found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.x[10] The
prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio
Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the
gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain
"Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers,
accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and
accused him of being a pusher in their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men
led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes,
accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as
PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house
for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came
out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where
"Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time,
surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant

Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a carton box. Turning
towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside. PO3
Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to
police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.xi[11]Accusedappellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her
house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That
day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's
breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her
children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she
carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving
the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking
in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the way, they passed the
artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket
suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found
out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on
top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of
green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything
about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied
the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.xii
[12]After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The
trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accusedappellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations of
Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234 SCRA
555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions of Sec.
23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO
@ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City Jail
to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED."xiii[13]Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:
"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE
MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED
BY THE POSEUR-BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA
FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE."xiv[14]Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE
INCREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS
CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
VERSIONS OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY

WAS RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF

RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS
SEARCH LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT."xv[15]The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1)
the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the
validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and
the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of
the commission of an offense.xvi[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with
due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards.xvii[17]Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is
a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of
informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics
offenses.xviii[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the
formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law.xix[19] It also took
off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but
ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.xx[20]In the American jurisdiction, the term
"entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to
commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution
against him.xxi[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells
v. United States,xxii[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is
the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one
who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer."xxiii[23] It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement
officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design
in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime
is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.xxiv[24]It is recognized that in every
arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate
the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of
another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.xxv[25]
Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into
the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction
may be had.xxvi[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials
furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no
entrapment and the accused must be convicted.xxvii[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.Entrapment is recognized as a valid defensexxviii[28] that can be raised by an
accused and partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.xxix[29] It is a positive defense.
Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him
to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise.xxx[30]
When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the
"subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United Statesxxxi[31] to determine whether

entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the
offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.xxxii
[32] All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his
eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before
the crime.xxxiii[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense
rather than the officer's misconductxxxiv[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."xxxv[35] If the accused was found to have been
ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail
even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.xxxvi[36] Some states, however, have
adopted the "objective" test.xxxvii[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of
Grossman v. Statexxxviii[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.xxxix[39] The inquiry is focused
on the inducements used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his
predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.xl
[40] The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a
normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense;xli[41] for
purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to
commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.xlii[42] Official conduct
that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering,
cajoling or importuning,xliii[43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of
desperate illness, are not.xliv[44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an
entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his
guilt has been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime
"cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become
tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.xlv[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the
offense, the interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to
the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its
commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal
person.xlvi[46]Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It
is claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an
accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other
unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible.xlvii[47] Delving into the accused's character and
predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the accused
more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general disposition
were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with inordinate
inducements.xlviii[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for
considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police,
may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents
was proper.xlix[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that
he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to
irrelevancy.l[50]Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states
in the United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.li[51] In Cruz v. State,lii
[52] the Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be
determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was
predisposed to commit the crime.liii[53] In Baca v. State,liv[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court
modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a
defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is

charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation.lv[55] The hybrid approaches
combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently. As early as
1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught in
flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,lvi[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of
smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to
commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension
came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions.
Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to
the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where both of them could smoke this
drug.lvii[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible."lviii[58] In People v.
Abella,lix[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the testimony
of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a
tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there
was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his
testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.lx[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy
Se Tieng,lxi[61] we convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the
law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had already planned its importation
and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import
opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs
of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious
importers.lxii[62]It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tienglxiii[63] we first laid
down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus
Juris,lxiv[64] we held:"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice
of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored,
and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has
sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is
no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by
the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence or
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief
is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed
independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out
the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a
prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,' detective, or hired
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary."lxv[65]The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in
two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,lxvi[66] the appellate court declared that
"there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.lxvii[67] In People v. Tan Tiong,lxviii[68] the
Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the
lawbreaker."lxix[69]The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by
this Court in People v. Tiu Ua.lxx[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is
instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.lxxi[71]It can thus be seen that the

concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement in Philippine

jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation
that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.lxxii[72] To determine whether there is
entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers,
not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United
States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.lxxiii[73] Nevertheless, adopting the
"objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v.
Boholst,lxxiv[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust
operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded SigueSigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous convictions of other crimeslxxv[75] and
held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence
against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not
have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuclxxvi[76] thereby sustaining his defense
that led to his acquittal.The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very
material in anti-narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law
enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in
apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.lxxvii
[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of
society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.lxxviii[78] They are not the traditional type
of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or
those inherently wrongful and immoral.lxxix[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior
directed, not against particular individuals, but against public order.lxxx[80] Violation is deemed a wrong
against society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person.lxxxi
[81] These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to
avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts
mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that
government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of
aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be
present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants,
spies or stool pigeons.lxxxii[82]Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation,
the confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment
from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these
persons who deceive the police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or
other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly
mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an
inspiring one.lxxxiii[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and
exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors.
This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of caseslxxxiv[84] where we observed
that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons,
particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.lxxxv[85] The use of shady underworld characters as
informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of
trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have
compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases.lxxxvi[86] Criminal activity is such that
stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as
objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the
Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,lxxxvii[87]"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader
problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the
third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. Each is a

substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is condoned by the sinister sophism that the end,
when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of illegal
means."lxxxviii[88] It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with
studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and
the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.lxxxix[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the
purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.xc[90]
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent
person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.xci[91] We therefore stress that
the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of
the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.xcii[92] The manner by which the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of
the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same
time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the
accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should
look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they
are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement. In the case at bar, the evidence
shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the
pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of
marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment
for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and
handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The nonpresentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the
police.xciii[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited
drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,xciv[94] or there
are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,xcv
[95] or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,xcvi
[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.xcvii[97] There is no need to present the informant in court
where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.xcviii[98]The
inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The
source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that
the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he
sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit
was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension,
the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the

carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained
eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from
appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that
box?
AThis is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of
marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q

Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

PROSECUTOR

Witness bringing out from the said box...

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with
eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT

So be it.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box
showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT
Q

Noted.

Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x

x.

I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.

Point to the court, where are those markings?

Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.

PROSECUTOR
Q

Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.

Whose signature is that?

ATTY VALDEZ
Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to
what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR
Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor,
despite reconsideration.

COURT
court.

Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the

ATTY. VALDEZ
A

We submit, your Honor.

This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.

COURT

Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"

Yes, your Honor.

What makes you so sure?

A
I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q

What are you sure of?

I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

What makes you so sure?

A
Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
x

x.

PROSECUTOR
May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be
marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT

Mark it as Exhibit "D."

Q
To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on
this plastic?
A

This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."

How about this one?

I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR

May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."

A
sir.

This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings,

PROSECUTOR

May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95,
also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there
are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT

Noted. The court saw it.

Q
Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be
marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT

Tag it. Mark it.

Q
This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you
by whom?
A

It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Whereat?

At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.

How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x

x.

A
These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth,
sir.
x
x
x."xcix[99]The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana
"given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the
newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as
weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams.c[100]We also reject appellant's submission that the fact
that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one
kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the
circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual
"kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher.ci[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accusedappellant.cii[102]We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x
x
x."ciii[103]Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant
Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest
him even without a warrant.civ[104]The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person
and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.cv[105] The rule is, however,
not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances:cvi[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;cvii[107] (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle;cviii[108] (3) search in violation of customs laws;cix[109] (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view;cx[110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.cxi[111]The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a
warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise
made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the
arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The
direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
QThis particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A

It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Whereat?

At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.

How about the other items that you were able to recover?

ATTY. VALDEZ:
question.

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that

COURT

There is. Answer.

A
These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth,
sir.
Q

Whereat?

At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

And what happened upon arrival thereat?

We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.

You mentioned "him?"

Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.

And what happened?

At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x

x."cxii[112]SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

QWhat was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

A

To arrest her, sir.

Q
But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth
was there?
A

Yes, sir.

As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?

I saw her outside, sir.

She was fetching water as a matter of fact?

She was `sa bandang poso.'

Carrying a baby?

No, sir.

Q
At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside
the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?

No, sir.

Q
She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her
daily chores. Am I correct?
A

I just saw her outside, sir.

And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

Yes, sir.

Q
Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit
approached her?
A

PO3 Manlangit, sir.

You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?

Yes, sir.

Q
During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking
place, you were just in the side lines?
A

I was just watching, sir.

Q
So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you
your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A

Yes, sir.

Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?

PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Manlangit got the marijuana?

Yes, sir.

And the money from Aling Neneth?

I don't know, sir.

You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q
Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the
amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A

Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

Q
What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who
retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A

I saw it, sir.

It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q
It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what
you are trying to tell the Court?
A

No, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
I am through with this witness, your Honor."cxiii[113]Accused-appellant Gaddao
was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5
(a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was
no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."cxiv[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on
her.Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based
upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."cxv[115] The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested.cxvi[116] A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.cxvii[117]Accusedappellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused.
PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.cxviii[118] Appellant
Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with

whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the
money in her house,cxix[119] with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for
accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was
engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest
had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.cxx[120]Since the warrantless arrest of accusedappellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This
brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.cxxi[121] The "plain
view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.cxxii[122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.cxxiii[123] In the course of such
lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.cxxiv[124]
The object must be open to eye and handcxxv[125] and its discovery inadvertent.cxxvi[126]It is clear that
an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the
object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.cxxvii[127] In other words,
if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.cxxviii[128] It must be immediately apparent to
the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure.cxxix[129]PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on crossexamination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
AYes, sir.
Q

Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?

Yes, sir.

At that particular instance, you saw the carton?

Yes, sir.

This carton, according to you was under a table?

Yes, sir, dining table.

I noticed that this carton has a cover?

Yes, sir.

I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?

It was open, sir. Not like that.

COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A

Like this, sir.

PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q

At this juncture, you went inside the house?

Yes, sir.

And got hold of this carton?

Yes, sir.

Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

I asked her, what's this...

No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?

A
I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked
"Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q

Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?

Yes, sir.

Q
When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not
[sic]?
A

I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.

Who got hold of this?

I was the one, sir.

You were the one who got this?

Yes, sir.

Q
At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already
retrieved by Badua?
A

Yes, sir.

You went inside the house?

Yes, sir.

You did not have any search warrant?

Yes, sir.

Q
In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao
was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua
already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A

Yes, sir.

How far was this from the door?

Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

Under the table according to you?

Yes, sir, dining table.

Somewhere here?

It's far, sir.

PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A

Here, sir.

What you see is a carton?

Yes, sir, with plastic.

Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"

Yes, sir.

With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

Yes, sir.

That is all that you saw?

Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q

You were only able to verify according to you...

PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?

PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big
or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q
The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I
withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according
to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A

Yes, sir.

Siopao?

Yes, sir.

Canned goods?

Yes, sir.

It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...

Q
be.

I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly

It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the
prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
x
x
x."cxxx[130]PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house
because they were led there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no
information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her.cxxxi[131]

Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said
house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box
was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic. In his direct examination, PO3
Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself
checked and marked the said contents.cxxxii[132] On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he
merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buybust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and
transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in
the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink
or blue in color.cxxxiii[133] PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents
of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained
that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.cxxxiv[134] It was not immediately apparent
to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view
and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.cxxxv
[135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial
court.cxxxvi[136]The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuanacxxxvii[137] was found in
the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.cxxxviii[138] Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,cxxxix[139] viz:"The Court strongly
supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law
enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the
innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself."cxl[140]Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration,
delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer,
deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.
x

x."

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that
the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.cxli[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine
hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution,
however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in

the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua must be imposed.cxlii[142]IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and
modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.

i[G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging from six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December 28, 1995.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license and/or
prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic chemist and
chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3 Rolando
Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The prosecution evidence established
the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant[5] in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on

Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from accused-appellant.
The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accusedappellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search warrant was later
issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian
informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard people
inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered
the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started
searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of
dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint[9] having a total weight of
approximately 1,255 grams.[10] A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10, EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence.[13] The white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of
8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two
bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana.
[14]

For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his
mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to leave their
house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in
civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended through an opening in
the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside a folder was
waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was
withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the policemen
conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45

caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]

The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs on
accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accusedappellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano testified that
the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.
[19]

After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a minimum of
six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks are
hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence custodian of this
Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation pursuant
to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED EXCESSIVE
FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force
by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance.[22] Nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V.
AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to
believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St.,
San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated properties and bring said
properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable
cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void because no
evidence was presented showing the existence of drug paraphernalia and the same should not have
been ordered to be seized by the trial court.[23]
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer who acted as a
poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about
drug paraphernalia. He stated:
QBeing a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, do you
remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?
A

Yes, sir.

Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or surveillance?

A
Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q

Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?

Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Are you familiar with that place?

A
Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who introduced me

to the former.
Q

In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?

When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu, sir.

Were you able to buy at that time?

Yes, sir.

How much if you can still remember the amount involved?

A
I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.
Q
Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know where
the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A

Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.

How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

A
When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his room and I
saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.
Q

Do you know who is in control of the premises?

Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Q
How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT @
Robert is genuine shabu?
A
After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to our
office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of
shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the Chief PNP Central
Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a
regulated drug as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec.
95.
Q

Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

A
Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I wish
to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his price of One
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.

Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?

Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be
material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by
virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it
authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in
Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly
described other articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a
whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed
separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles.
The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books,
which formed the principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books,
if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so holding
we do not mean to suggest that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general
in character but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures
might be made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the
property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and particularly
describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge
erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold
that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an
undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for
drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense because
possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are
punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this Court
said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation of
R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of No.
628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control and custody of

marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics

preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense alleged to
have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425, without
specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried
marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic). This
Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense, hence,
in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic
juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal
possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this
theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu,
the second for illegal possession of marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia.
This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically
with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and
penalizes categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it
was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished several
offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so
related as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No.
1866. Thus, only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the
said law.
Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be searched with
sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:

. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, the trial
court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several
documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search warrant
which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street,
San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the
premises to be searched. In fact, the police officers who raided appellants house under the leadership
of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides
in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of
appellants place in Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants
house and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through
their informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.[33] For example, a
search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant Street,
Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in the basement and six
apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each floor.
However, the description was made determinate by a reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant
that the apartment was occupied by the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass.[34] In this case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on
record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants residence, Search
Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but
not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence.[35]
For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.[36] The question is
whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the police operatives,
it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of

the search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer provide any basis for
admitting the other items subsequently found. As has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason
for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search pursuant to
accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his immediate control.[38] The
rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to
commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or
contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accusedappellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by
SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify their
seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana
recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag which gave no
indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they
had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where
the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was
within their plain view, what may be said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag
clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that

its contents are obvious to an observer.[40]

No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he undertakes to
justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution.[41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly
found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were discovered.
Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without a warrant
was conducted in accordance with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searching
party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of
directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door
or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate
himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to gain entry and
had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or neighbors, has been
presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be
doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite
the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw the
suspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching
partys forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their
mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs
under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation
of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant Roberto
Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However,
the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE

G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO BARROS, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Bartolome F. Macliing for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:
Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information
which read as follows:
That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain
Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being a passenger in a Dangwa
Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242, destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried marijuana which the accused
intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a]
prohibited drug.
Contrary to law.

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as amended and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine
Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:
(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused;
(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation conducted
by four (4) soldiers one after the other under intimidating circumstances; and
(3) misappreciation of facts. 3
The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of
the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound
for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw
accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the
carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yagas and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to
inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that
it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but
nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the
suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw
accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan.
That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and
accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied
[this]. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called
for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of
marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the
carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").
. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital,
Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused
was probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused
Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That
after accused was medically examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the
P.C. detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was
also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit
"C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from
accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit "C-1") and
subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in connection with the
confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused
Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt.
Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A",
"A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").
. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in four separate envelopes, following an order of the court
to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted
two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of
marijuana as per his report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4
The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or possession of the
carton box containing the four (4) kilos of marijuana. The trial court summarized the story of the accused in the
following manner:
That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad, Baguio
City. That on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer Arsenio
Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from one Billy Cuanguey at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a
house where someone was tending a store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was
there and the man answered that he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man
if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter,

accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the
instruction of his manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking breakfast,
accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6, 1987, accused Bonifacio
Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio
City. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus and
checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and
shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the soldier went down with the
carton and moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his
baggage which consisted of a pasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the
soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his clothes removed and his wallet taken.
Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he refused.
. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted accused to the
hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded to the Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province.
That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the P.C. Camp and there he saw someone
typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to
sign but accused refused. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that
something will happen to him. That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who]
pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the paper and because of fear, he had to sign the
document marked Exhibit "C." Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and
asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X"
for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at Tadian for one night,
accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5
Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police authorities had
impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation, "under intimidating
circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The accused complains that he was not informed of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not waived his rights as an accused person, and that he had
signed a confession involuntarily and without the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the
confession is inadmissible as evidence against him.
We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros. For the trial
court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into consideration the statements which had been
obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted by the police officers. The trial court, so far as
can be determined from its decision, totally disregarded Exhibits "C", "E" and "B-5," the alleged uncounselled
confessions. The trial court made very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged confessions:
First M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the accused
carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain
Province. That accused is the owner of the carton (Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B")
which contained four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4")
was fished out from under the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused
himself.
Second That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio Barros and
that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that the accused was in anyway maltreated
by the police authorities, and this fact was also admitted by accused to the effect that he was
never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. Dra. Aleta also found that the accused was under
the influence of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked
marijuana. This is clear evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user
of said prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN Page 24 Orpecio).

Third The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court for
laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report
No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos Figueroa, forensical expert.
Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the ring of
truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this respect said:
The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear, positive and
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)."
6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros i.e., that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police authorities. The relevant
constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. . . .
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above quoted constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be inadmissible in
evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 8
The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is,
however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of which relates to the search of
moving vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc.
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle,
since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. 10
In carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks,
that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the
examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 11 the Court stated:
[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or

have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

12

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive search of
moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; 13
(2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a
confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted; 14 (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country on a particular airline flight on a given date;
15
(4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in
his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when
requested to do
so; 16 and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical
appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. 17
In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any circumstance which
constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the peace officers to search the carton box
allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not,
by itself, have convinced M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either that the appellant was a law
violator or the contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense.
The carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially those coming from the rural
areas since such boxes constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible. The peace officers here
involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an informer; no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the
police officers before or during the trial. The police officers also did not contend that they had detected the odor
of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a
seat during the trip to Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later
ascertained to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had
apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had searched the box in his
possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or indicate the presence of any such probable
cause.
M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:
Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987?
A: I went to Sabangan, sir.
Q: What transportation did you use?
A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.
Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?
A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.

Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started
for Baguio City from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it stopped at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, was there anything that happened?
xxx xxx xxx
A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a
baggage or carton and boarded the bus then took his seat, seat No. 18.
Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?
A: A carton.
Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?
A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.
Q: You mean inside the bus?
A: Yes.
Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a
carton and placed it in front of seat No. 18, what happened to the bus
afterwards?
A: It proceeded to Sabangan.
Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?
A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.
Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?
Atty. Sokoken:
He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.
Fiscal Ayochok:
We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of
counsel.
Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?
A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the
baggage of the suspect and when C2C .
Atty. Sokoken:
We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in
the narrative way.

Fiscal Ayochok:
He is answering the question.
Court:
Let the witness finish.
A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it
contained MJ.
Q: What do you mean MJ?
A: Marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx 18
For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:
Direct Examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were
particularly in the afternoon?
A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate]
No. ABZ-242 going to Sabangan.
Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?
A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.
Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what
did you see?
A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.
Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on
place that carton?
A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.
Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?
A: Inside the bus, sir.
Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton
baggage, where did he go?
A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.

Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the
carton, where was the carton exactly located?
A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.
Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton
luggage you saw reached Sabangan what happened there?
A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for
routinary inspection.
Q: What happened next?
A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at
Chackchakan.
Q: Did he inspect the baggage?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?
A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.
Q: You mean marijuana?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Cross Examination:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan,
Mt. Province for purposes of military check-up, is that correct?
A: Routinary inspection, sir.
Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?
A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.
Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that
person carrying this carton which is marked Exhibit "B"?
A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why
I called one of my men, sir.
Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to
Sabangan, there is already marijuana being carried inside that bus?

A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.

Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it
when you arrived at Alab? Why have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect
it?
A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.
Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage
here in Bontoc?
A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.
Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?
A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.
Fiscal Ayochok:
Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper
checkpoint.
Court:
Sustained.
xxx xxx xxx 19
The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally uninformative:
Direct Examination:
Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported
for duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything
unusual that happened that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that Mr. witness?
A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ242.
Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?
A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called
for me, sir, and they told me that a carton was placed under seat No. 18, sir.

Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18, did you
inspect that carton?
A: I inspected it, sir.
Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that
carton?
A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of
marijuana, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

20

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no circumstance which
might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant
Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by
appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess that appellant Barros might be carrying something in the nature of
contraband goods. There was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of
"actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record that could
have reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when
appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here
involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no "personable
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in
brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
non-permissible and invalid. 22 The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the four (4) kilos of marijuana
should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant Barros.
The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities which may have
attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that appellant Barros has waived the nonadmissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor General said:
. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of appellant, still
the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in the
case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later

G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONIFACIO BARROS, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Bartolome F. Macliing for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), in an information which read as follows:

That on or about September 6, 1987, from Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, to

Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused while being a passenger in a Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ 242,
destined for Baguio City, without lawful authority did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously carry with him as part of his baggage and transport about four (4) kilos of dried
marijuana which the accused intended for distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing fully well
that said marijuana is a prohibited drug or [a] source of [a] prohibited drug.

Contrary to law. 1

After trial, the trial court convicted Bonifacio Barros of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 as
amended and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua 2 and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.

Barros now appeals from the judgment of conviction and essentially asks this Court to determine

Whether the [trial] court deprived [the] accused of his right to due process by:

(1) ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory warrant in the arrest and search of the accused;

(2) admitting confessions extracted from the accused after two hours of interrogation conducted
by four (4) soldiers one after the other under intimidating circumstances; and

(3) misappreciation of facts. 3

The relevant facts as found by the trial court and as set forth in the court's decision are as
follows:

That on September 6, 1987, M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan, both members of
the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bearing Plate No. ABZ-242 bound
for Sabangan, Mountain Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province,
the bus stopped and both M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt. Ayan, who were seated at the back, saw
accused carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat No. 18 after putting the
carton under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, M/Sgt. Yagas and S/Sgt. Ayan before they alighted, it being their station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to
inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After C2C Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out that
it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers [who] the owner of the carton [was] but
nobody answered. Thereafter, C2C Bongyao alighted with the carton and S/Sgt. Ayan and C2C
Bongyao invited the herein accused to the detachment for questioning as accused was the
suspected owner of the carton containing marijuana. As both P.C. officers Yag-as and Ayan saw
accused, Bonifacio Barros carrying that same carton when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan.
That upon entering the detachment the carton was opened in the presence of accused and
accused Bonifacio Barros was asked if he owned the carton of marijuana and accused denied
[this]. That when accused denied ownership of the carton of marijuana, the P.C. officers called
for the bus conductor who pinpointed to Bonifacio Barros as the owner of the carton of
marijuana. That during the oral investigation of accused, he finally admitted ownership of the
carton (Exhibit "B") containing [four] 4 paper-wrapped packages of dried marijuana. (Exhibits "B1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4").

. . . [A]fter he was orally investigated, [the accused] was brought to the Abatan General Hospital,
Bauko, Mountain Province, for physical examination and a Medico Legal Certificate was issued
(Exhibits "F" and "F-1"), indicating that accused suffered no physical injuries and that accused
was probably under the influence of marijuana. That Dra. Danna Aleta inquired from accused
Bonifacio Barros if he smoked marijuana and accused admitted having smoked marijuana. That
after accused was medically examined, he was escorted by three members of the P.C. to the
P.C. detachment at Tadian, Mountain Province, where the carton of marijuana (Exhibit "B") was
also brought. That at Tadian, a seizure receipt was made together with a certification (Exhibit
"C") pointing out to the fact that approximately 4 kilos of dried marijuana leaves were from
accused Bonifacio Barros and which certification was signed by the accused (Exhibit "C-1") and
subscribed before Judge Romualdo P. Awisan (Exhibit "C-2"). That in connection with the
confiscation of the marijuana subject of the instant case and the apprehension of accused
Bonifacio Barros, the P.C. officers who figured in this case namely M/Sgt. Yag-as and S/Sgt.
Ayan and C2C Bongyao have correspondingly executed their sworn statements (Exhibits "A",
"A-1", "A-2", "D", "D-1", "D-2").

. . . [S]amples of the marijuana were taken from each of the four packages marked Exhibits "B1", "B-2", "B-3", and "B-4" and placed in four separate envelopes, following an order of the court

to that effect and were hand-carried by Police Officer Jack Masilian to Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for laboratory test. That Capt. Carlos Figueroa, the Forensic Expert conducted
two kinds of test on the four samples sent by the court and found them to be positive of
marijuana as per his report No. D-011-88. (Exhibits "I" and "I-1"). 4

The defense of the accused on the facts consisted of a simple denial of the ownership or
possession of the carton box containing the four (4) kilos of marijuana. The trial court
summarized the story of the accused in the following manner:

That accused Bonifacio Barros since 1984 was employed at the Honeymoon Disco Pad, Baguio
City. That on September 5, 1987, accused was sent by his Manager, Engineer Arsenio
Cuanguey to Bontoc, Mountain Province, to get their records from one Billy Cuanguey at
Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province. That upon arriving at Chackchakan, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, accused looked for the residence of Billy Cuanguey and he was pointed to a
house where someone was tending a store. That accused asked the man if Billy Cuanguey was
there and the man answered that he did not know where Billy went. So accused asked the man
if Billy left [in] his room the tapes and records and the man said he did not know. Thereafter,
accused asked the man to stay over night in that house where Billy was staying as it was the
instruction of his manager. That the following day, September 6, 1987, after taking breakfast,
accused, was going back to Baguio. On that morning of September 6, 1987, accused Bonifacio
Barros boarded the Dangwa Bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province bound for Baguio
City. That when the Dangwa Bus reached the P.C. Checkpoint, soldiers went inside the bus and
checked the baggages. That a soldier fished out a carton under the seat of [the] accused and
shouted who owns the carton but nobody answered. Thereafter, the soldier went down with the
carton and moments later returned to the bus and called accused Bonifacio Barros to alight from
the bus. That Mr. Barros was surprised why he was ordered to alight and accused took his
baggage which consisted of a pasiking and went down the bus. That accused was led by the
soldiers to a house where his pasiking was taken and his clothes removed and his wallet taken.
Accused was made to accept ownership of the carton of marijuana but he refused.

. . . [A]t 11:00 o'clock that same day, September 6, 1987, three soldiers escorted accused to the
hospital and from the hospital, they proceeded to the Municipality of Tadian, Mountain Province.
That upon reaching Tadian, accused was brought to the P.C. Camp and there he saw someone
typing. Later, the soldiers allegedly presented to accused some papers which he was asked to
sign but accused refused. That accused was threatened and if he refused to sign the papers that
something will happen to him. That moments later, accused was threatened [by] a soldier [who]
pointed a gun to him and told him to sign the paper and because of fear, he had to sign the
document marked Exhibit "C." Thereafter, the soldiers allegedly threatened again accused and
asked him to sign his name on the inside part of the cover of the carton of marijuana. Exhibit "X"
for the court and Exhibit "B-5" for the prosecution. That after staying at Tadian for one night,
accused was brought back to Sabangan and later transferred to the Bontoc Provincial Jail. 5

Turning to the legal defenses of the accused, we consider first his allegation that the police
authorities had impermissibly extracted confessions from him after two (2) hours of interrogation,
"under intimidating circumstances," by four (4) soldiers one after the other. The accused
complains that he was not informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel, that he had not
waived his rights as an accused person, and that he had signed a confession involuntarily and

without the assistance of counsel. He essentially contends that the confession is inadmissible as
evidence against him.

We find, however, that it is not necessary to pass upon the above contention of appellant Barros.
For the trial court in reaching its judgment of conviction had not taken into consideration the
statements which had been obtained from the appellant during the interrogation conducted by
the police officers. The trial court, so far as can be determined from its decision, totally
disregarded Exhibits "C", "E" and "B-5," the alleged uncounselled confessions. The trial court
made very clear the bases of its conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged; those bases did not include the alleged confessions:

First M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan testified that they saw the accused
carrying the carton (Exhibit "B") when he boarded the bus at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province. That the bus conductor pointed to accused at the checkpoint of Sabangan, Mountain
Province. That accused is the owner of the carton (Exhibit "B"). That the carton (Exhibit "B")
which contained four packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4")
was fished out from under the seat of the accused which fact was admitted by the accused
himself.

Second That per testimony of Dra. Danna Aleta, she examined accused Bonifacio Barros and
that he suffered no physical injuries that would show that the accused was in anyway maltreated
by the police authorities, and this fact was also admitted by accused to the effect that he was
never harmed by the police nor the soldiers. Dra. Aleta also found that the accused was under
the influence of drug[s] and that the accused admitted [to] her that he, accused, smoked
marijuana. This is clear evidence that accused is not only a pusher of marijuana but also a user
of said prohibited drugs. (See Exhibits "F" and "F-1" and TSN Page 24 Orpecio).

Third The samples taken from Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" sent by the court for
laboratory test at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet were all positive of marijuana per Report
No. D-011-88 (Exhibits "I" and "I-1") of Captain Carlos Figueroa, forensical expert.

Lastly, accused's testimony in his own behalf does not impress the court at it lacks the ring of
truth. Besides, it is devoid of any corroboration. Our Supreme Court in this respect said:

The weak and uncorroborated denial of the accused cannot prevail over the clear, positive and
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses [sic]." (People vs. Acelajao, 148 SCRA 142)."
6

We turn, therefore, to the second legal defense asserted by appellant Barros i.e., that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated by the police
authorities. The relevant constitutional provisions are found in Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witness as he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial
warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
above quoted constitutional
provision. 7 The evidence secured thereby i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure will be
inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding. 8

The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search
and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are certain exceptions recognized in our law, one of
which relates to the search of moving vehicles. 9 Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches
of moving vehicles automobiles, trucks, etc. without need of a warrant, it not being
practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. 10 In
carrying out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to
routine checks, that is, the vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to
physical or body searches, the examination of the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. In
Valmonte vs. De Villa, 11 the Court stated:

[N]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according
to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search. (Citations omitted)

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a lawoffender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense. 12

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; 13 (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the
Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; 14 (3) Narcom agents were informed or "tipped off" by an undercover "deep
penetration" agent that prohibited drugs be brought into the country on a particular airline flight
on a given date; 15 (4) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom
agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he
failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do
so; 16 and (5) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the
same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana. 17

In the case at bar, however, we have been unable to find in the record of this case any
circumstance which constituted or could have reasonably constituted probable cause for the
peace officers to search the carton box allegedly owned by appellant Barros. The carrying of
such a box by appellant onto a passenger bus could not, by itself, have convinced M/Sgt.
Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan either that the appellant was a law violator or the
contents of the box were instruments or the subject matter or proceeds of some criminal offense.
The carrying of carton boxes is a common practice among our people, especially those coming
from the rural areas since such boxes constitute the most economical kind of luggage possible.
The peace officers here involved had not received any information or "tip-off" from an informer;
no such a "tip-off" was alleged by the police officers before or during the trial. The police officers
also did not contend that they had detected the odor of dried marijuana, or appellant Barros had
acted suspiciously in the course of boarding the bus and taking a seat during the trip to
Sabangan, nor in the course of being asked whether he owned the carton box later ascertained
to contain four (4) kilos of marijuana. The testimony of the law enforcement officers who had
apprehended the accused (M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as and S/Sgt. James Ayan), and who had
searched the box in his possession, (C2C Fernando Bongyao), simply did not suggest or
indicate the presence of any such probable cause.

M/Sgt. Francis Yag-as testified as follows:

Direct Examination by Fiscal Moises Ayochok:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: On September 6, 1987, do you recall if you reported for duty?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And where did you go on the morning of September 6, 1987?

A: I went to Sabangan, sir.

Q: What transportation did you use?

A: Dangwa Bus with Plate No. ABZ-242.

Q: Where did you board the Dangwa Bus?

A: At the Dangwa Terminal at Bontoc.

Q: When you said you boarded the bus with Plate No. ABZ-242 which started for Baguio City
from Bontoc, Mountain Province, and while it stopped at Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, was there anything that happened?

xxx xxx xxx

A: When the bus stopped at Sitio Chackchakan, we saw a person carrying a baggage or carton
and boarded the bus then took his seat, seat No. 18.

Q: What was he carrying that time Mr. witness?

A: A carton.

Q: And where did he place that carton which he was carrying?

A: In front of seat No. 18 where he sat.

Q: You mean inside the bus?

A: Yes.

Q: And after this person boarded the bus at sitio Chackchakan and holding a carton and placed
it in front of seat No. 18, what happened to the bus afterwards?

A: It proceeded to Sabangan.

Q: And at Sabangan, Mountain Province, what happened, if any?

A: The bus stopped for the routinary checkpoint and inspection.

Q: When they [were at] the routinary checkpoint, what happened?

Atty. Sokoken:

He did not say routinary checkpoint. He said routinary inspection.

Fiscal Ayochok:

We substitute the words inspection with checkpoint to satisfy the objection of counsel.

Q: What happened when you stopped for the routinary inspection?

A: We called C2C Bongyao a member of the detachment to inspect the baggage of the suspect
and when C2C .

Atty. Sokoken:

We request that [the] witness answers the question that he testifies [to] not in the narrative way.

Fiscal Ayochok:

He is answering the question.

Court:

Let the witness finish.

A: When Bongyao inspected the baggage of the suspect and he found out that it contained MJ.

Q: What do you mean MJ?

A: Marijuana.

xxx xxx xxx 18

For his part, S/Sgt. James Ayan testified as follows:

Direct Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And in the morning of September 6, 1987, do you recall where you were particularly in the
afternoon?

A: In the morning of September 6, 1987, we rode on a Dangwa bus [with Plate] No. ABZ-242
going to Sabangan.

Q: You said we. Who was your companion that time?

A: Master Sgt. Yag-as, sir.

Q: And when this bus reached Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, what did you see?

A: We saw a civilian board the bus we were riding carrying a carton.

Q: And where did this civilian who boarded the bus which you were riding on place that carton?

A: He placed the carton under the seat of No. 18.

Q: Inside the bus, Mr. witness?

A: Inside the bus, sir.

Q: And what about the passenger who boarded the bus carrying the carton baggage, where did
he go?

A: He sat facing the seat No. 18.

Q: Between seat No. 18 and the seat seated by the civilian who brought the carton, where was
the carton exactly located?

A: As far as I know, sir, it was located just beneath seat No. 18.

Q: When this bus which you rode on which the passenger carrying the carton luggage you saw
reached Sabangan what happened there?

A: When the bus reached Sabangan that we were riding, it was stopped for routinary inspection.

Q: What happened next?

A: We called C2C Bongyao to inspect the baggage that we have just seen at Chackchakan.

Q: Did he inspect the baggage?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what was the contents of that baggage if there was any?

A: It turned out that the contents of the baggage was MJ sir.

Q: You mean marijuana?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Cross Examination:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You stated that on September 6, 1987, a Dangwa bus stopped at Sabangan, Mt. Province for
purposes of military check-up, is that correct?

A: Routinary inspection, sir.

Q: But it was not you who entered the Dangwa bus for routinary check-up?

A: We were there riding in the bus, sir, and we called C2C Bongyao to come.

Q: So your purpose in riding inside the Dangwa bus was actually to see that person carrying this
carton which is marked Exhibit "B"?

A: No, sir, because I am a detachment commander at Sabangan and that is why I called one of
my men, sir.

Q: So that you have full knowledge that from Chackchakan, Bontoc, going to Sabangan, there is
already marijuana being carried inside that bus?

A: That is only our suspect [should be suspicion], sir.

Q: Would you please tell this Honorable Court why you have not inspected it when you arrived at
Alab? Why have you waited to reach Sabangan to inspect it?

A: Because it is the checkpoint, sir, at Nacagang, Sabangan.

Q: Are you now admitting that you do not have authority to inspect the baggage here in Bontoc?

A: We just wanted it checked in Sabangan, sir.

Q: Could you give us a very special reason why you have to wait in Sabangan?

A: Because we are stationed in Sabangan and that is the checkpoint.

Fiscal Ayochok:

Why argue with the witness? It is up for them to check it at the proper checkpoint.

Court:

Sustained.

xxx xxx xxx 19

The testimony of C2C Fernando Bongyao is much briefer, but equally uninformative:

Direct Examination:

Q: On September 6, 1987, at around 9:30 a.m., do you recall having reported for duty at
Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And while you were on duty at Nacagang, Sabangan, was there anything unusual that
happened that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that Mr. witness?

A: When we were on the checkpoint, the bus stopped bearing Plate No. ABZ-242.

Q: When the bus stopped, what did you do?

A: While on my way to check the bus, Master Sergeant Yag-as and Ayan called for me, sir, and
they told me that a carton was placed under seat No. 18, sir.

Q: And when you were told to inspect that carton under seat No. 18, did you inspect that carton?

A: I inspected it, sir.

Q: You said you inspected that carton, what did you do in inspecting that carton?

A: I inserted my hand inside and when I removed my hand, it was a stuff of marijuana, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 20

So far as the record itself is concerned, therefore, it would appear that there existed no
circumstance which might reasonably have excited the suspicion of the two (2) police officers
riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. They asked the police officers at the checkpoint at
Sabangan to inspect the box allegedly carried by appellant Barros apparently on a mere guess
that appellant Barros might be carrying something in the nature of contraband goods. There
was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of "actually
committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. 21 There was, moreover, nothing on the record
that could have reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe that "an offense [had] in fact
just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at Chackchakan or when he was
asked whether he owned the box here involved at the checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2)
police officers, according to the record, had no "personable knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested (appellant Barros) had committed it." There was, in brief, no basis for
a valid warrantless arrest. Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally
non-permissible and invalid. 22 The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure i.e., the four (4)
kilos of marijuana should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant
Barros.

The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant Barros had waived any irregularities
which may have attended his arrest. Presumably, the Solicitor General also argues that
appellant Barros has waived the non-admissibility of the carton (Exhibit "B") which contained
four (4) packages of dried marijuana leaves (Exhibits "B-1", "B-2", "B-3" and "B-4"). The Solicitor
General said:

. . . [E]ven assuming in gratia argumenti that irregularities attended the arrest of appellant, still
the same cannot be questioned at this late stage. Well-settled is the doctrine laid down in the
case of Callanta vs. Villanueva (77 SCRA 377), and later reiterated in the more recent case of
Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that "posting of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any
irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops him from questioning its validity." Here,
appellant had in fact posted the required bail to obtain his provisional liberty, albeit his
application was subsequently denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988, p. 65). Consistent with
jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived any irregularity attending his
arrest, if any there be, and cannot now be heard to assail the same. 23

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid

warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person.
The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest
effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting of bail for
provisional liberty, so as to estop as accused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of
his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily
constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former an argument that the Solicitor General
appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid
warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the
constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the
protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on
constitutional grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana
when these were formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. 24 We consider that
appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and
that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be
reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during during the trial.

In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had
waived his rights by his "stoic deportment" consisting of failure to object to the search by the
police authorities immediately after the opening of the carton box:

. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked
accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership of the box or
carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3, Decision). His demeanor should
therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the objection thereto
is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1
Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . . 25

It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it is
People vs. Burgos, 26 promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable. In
Burgos, this Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search conducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object"

. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65
Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S. 458). 27 (Emphasis supplied) .

Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found
that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the
warrantless search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a
Chinese merchant was found lying on the ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one
resulted in skull fracture and proved fatal. He died in the hospital to which he had been
immediately brought by a policeman. Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because when the victim
was found, still alive, and upon being asked who had attacked him, laconically answered,
"Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested and a search of his
person was conducted without objection from the accused. Before the body search of the
accused was carried out, the accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple
of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim and when asked if he had anything else to
surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The police thereupon conducted a
body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in the
production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Under these
circumstances, the Court ruled that:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol.
I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful
warrantless search or arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel

during trial, it is relevant to note that the law (the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when
objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that in the case at bar, a timely
objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the warrantless
search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained
by the Court in Burgos, 28 and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard
for the supremacy of the law."

It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the
four (4) kilos of marijuana. His guilt must, however, be established by constitutional means. The
non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by the
Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders inutile the
work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction which
this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc,
Mountain Province, in Criminal Case No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial
court not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., dissents.in the more recent case of Bagcal vs. Villaraza (120 SCRA 525), that "posting
of [a] bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person and estops
him from questioning its validity." Here, appellant had in fact posted the required bail to obtain
his provisional liberty, albeit his application was subsequently denied (see TSN, Feb. 10, 1988,
p. 65). Consistent with jurisprudence, therefore, he should be deemed to have waived any
irregularity attending his arrest, if any there be, and cannot now be heard to assail the same. 23
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest or a
warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity
of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by
applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop as accused from questioning the legality or
constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe,
however, that waiver of the latter (by, e.g., applying for and posting of bail) necessarily constitutes, or carries with
it, waiver of the former an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the
non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not
casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality
for the protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional
grounds to the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered
in evidence by the prosecution. 24 We consider that appellant's objection to the admission of such evidence was
made clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises

can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during during the trial.
In the dissenting opinion, my learned brother Melo, J. takes the view that appellant Barros had waived his rights
by his "stoic deportment" consisting of failure to object to the search by the police authorities immediately after
the opening of the carton box:
. . . In point of fact, when the police authorities inspected the carton of marijuana and asked
accused-appellant who owned the box, accused-appellant denied ownership of the box or
carton and failed to even mutter the least bit of protest (p. 3, Decision). His demeanor should
therefore be construed as implicit acquiescence to the search inasmuch as the objection thereto
is vulnerable to express or implied waiver (People vs. Kagui Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]); 1
Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First ed., 1987, p. 108). . . . . 25
It is submitted, with respect, that Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the case at bar; rather it is People vs.
Burgos, 26 promulgated fifty (50) years after Kaqui Malasuqui, that is applicable. In Burgos, this Court ruled that
the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion of his
warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object"
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65
Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by
Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson vs. Zerbts, 304 U.S. 458). 27 (Emphasis supplied) .
Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly found that there was
probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and therefore, the warrantless search effected
immediately thereafter was equally lawful. In Kagui Malasugui, a Chinese merchant was found lying on the
ground with several nasty wounds in the head; one resulted in skull fracture and proved fatal. He died in the
hospital to which he had been immediately brought by a policeman. Mr. Malasuqui became a suspect because
when the victim was found, still alive, and upon being asked who had attacked him, laconically answered,
"Kagui." On the same day, the accused Kagui Malasugui was arrested and a search of his person was
conducted without objection from the accused. Before the body search of the accused was carried out, the
accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities a couple of bracelets belonging to the deceased victim
and when asked if he had anything else to surrender, he, in a trembling voice, answered in the negative. The
police thereupon conducted a body search of the accused, without any objection from him; the search resulted in
the production of additional personal effects belonging to the deceased victim. Under these circumstances, the
Court ruled that:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol.
I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and

such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.

A propos my distinguished brother Melo, J.'s suggestion that the right against an unlawful warrantless search or
arrest is personal and may not be invoked by the accused's counsel during trial, it is relevant to note that the law
(the Rules of Court) specifies the proper time when objections to admission of evidence must be raised and that
in the case at bar, a timely objection was made by appellant Barros. Finally, the accused's silence during the
warrantless search should not be lightly taken as consent to that search, but rather construed as explained by
the Court in Burgos, 28 and as pointed out by Mr. Justice Laurel, a "demonstration of regard for the supremacy of
the law."
It is, of course, possible that appellant Barros may in fact have been guilty of transporting the four (4) kilos of
marijuana. His guilt must, however, be established by constitutional means. The non-admissibility of evidence
secured through a disregard of the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable searches and
seizures is the sanction imposed by the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one,
for it renders inutile the work done by the police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is a sanction
which this Court has no choice but to apply in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, in Criminal Case No. 687 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged, the evidence lawfully before the trial court not being sufficient to establish his guilt thereof
beyond reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., dissents.

[G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002]

RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision[1] of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 15,
1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding
herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
resolution[2] dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed
as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or elsewhere in the
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,

with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, the NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the
damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp., in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a
routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered
with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the
vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not
answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC). The
conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja asked appellant where the wires
came from and appellant answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought
to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with
the wires which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident of
Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification card
(ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a passenger jeepney,
he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in his jeepney conductor wires
which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had finished his last trip for the day from
Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he dropped by the NARCOM headquarters
and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos
advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires and that the former would act as back-up and
intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own vehicle, its
tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with kakawati leaves. The
loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised P1,000.00 for the job. Upon
crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat.
De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the police officers that the cables were loaded in

his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to
police headquarters where he was interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead
locked him up in jail for a week."[4]
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment[5] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of property
worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO (2) [YEARS],
FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National Power Corporation in the amount
of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to
wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that appellant
RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft, defined and
penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years, Nine (9) months and
Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity and no costs."[6]
Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers searched
his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when samples of the wires
and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged in an
entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to presumption of
innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and validity of
his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot again sustain such

view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, it has been held that
considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be
described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a requirement which borders on the impossible in the
case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place
to another with impunity, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of
practicability. The doctrine is not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No.
83988, May 24, 1990 (Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled
that automobiles because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested
and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a
large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, and People vs.
Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be made even without a warrant
where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances, the police officers are not only
authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused even without a warrant."[7]
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as
adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the
vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and
seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof,
which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;[8] (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view;[9] (3) search of moving vehicles;[10] (4) consented warrantless search;[11] (5) customs search;
(6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search);[12] and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[13]

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a
valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.[14]
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar was
not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the warrantless
search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[15] Thus, the rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.[16] Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or
'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.[17]
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.[18] Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject
to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[19] The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according
to the facts of each case.[20]

One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or
police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,[21] for as long as it is warranted by
the exigencies of public order[22] and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.[23] A checkpoint
may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;[24] (2) simply looks into a vehicle;[25] (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors;[26] (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;[27] (5) where the
inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;[28] and (6) where the routine
check is conducted in a fixed area.[29]
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires.
It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,[30] the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the
body of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a physical
intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not conduct a search
when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to see and to smell things he
could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his inspection went beyond that portion
of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent
police officers, and into the area protected by the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his
head inside the open window of a home."
On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable
or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.[31]
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National
Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana
would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers

when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;[32] (5) the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the
moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country.[33]
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q
Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A
Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the said
place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched the load of the
jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q
You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became suspicious, why did
you become suspicious?
A

Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q
When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you do next,
if any?
A

We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."[34]

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS
Q

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I
became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir." [35]

We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,[36] we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police
authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of probable
cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's
watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan
seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to
flee when he saw the police authorities, and the apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine
laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, confidential
report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug and/or the time and
place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or behavior, and suspicious
bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case.
There was no classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishing boats of the area did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become
a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.[37] Unfortunately, none exists in
this case.
II. Plain view doctrine
It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the

contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[38]
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks[39] and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately
apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and
branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case,
it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the
articles without further search.[40]
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the
consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that
there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific
words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied
acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion.[41] Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence.[42] The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.[43] Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;[44] (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found;[45] (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting.[46] It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.[47]
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted in
this wise:
"WITNESS
Q

On June 28, 1989, where were you?

We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said date
and time?
A

Yes, sir.

What is that incident?

A
While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving a
vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxx

xxx

xxx

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves, I
became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q

Did the vehicle stop?

A
Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by so
doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q

Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

What was the answer of Caballes?

A
He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told him I
will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q

And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?

A
I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the Cavinti area,
sir."[48]
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated
to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what
was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he

also understood the nature and consequences of such request.[49]

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,[50] the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said
search. In People vs. Lacerna,[51] the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding
the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in
mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing
to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,[52] the accused admitted that they signed a
written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents
to determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,[53] it was held that the accused
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced
or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In
People vs. Omaweng,[54] the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag
to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a
valid consented search.
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[55]
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was
flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the
police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner
that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court
upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in
no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police
officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his
vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when
Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner
stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was
only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked
twice in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was

that they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.[56]
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People vs. Barros,[57] appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where
two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When
asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search.
The Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the
ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,[58] to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
petitioners conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of
the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989

RICARDO C. VALMONTE AND UNION OF LAWYERS AND ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE'S
RIGHTS (ULAP), petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA AND NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION DISTRICT COMMAND,
respondents.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for himself and his co-petitioners.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to direct
the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the
protection of the people.
Petitioner Ricardo C. Valmonte sues in his capacity as citizen of the Republic, taxpayer,
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), and resident of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila; while petitioner Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Rights (ULAP) sues in
its capacity as an association whose members are all members of the IBP.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply
officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of
the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing
to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; 2 and, instances have
occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's Right (ULAP)
vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not allege that any of their rights
were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in interest.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. 5

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents
which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court
to determine whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all
searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not
to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. 6
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, 7 or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as
a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may
take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly
reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the
abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions which all
sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search
which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted within
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
Finally, on 17 July 1988, military and police checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a review and
refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and military manning the checkpoints was ordered by the
National Capital Regional Command Chief and the Metropolitan Police Director. 10
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland
declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the

fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures
are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and
much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region."
For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any
time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as
a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by
detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain
such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and
sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am
agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and
hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects.
(CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on
which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a
matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say
that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw
the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF
CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a
martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another
martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly
submit, repressive measures, the same measures against which we had fought so
painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated
a dictatorship. How soon we forget.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a
right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because
they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to

demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in

particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra,
4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint
searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is,
"checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is
"a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the
search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason:
No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein."
(Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every
move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority
refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however,
is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the
power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an
eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed
actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be
anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right
against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the
former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the
Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the
"showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let
this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the
checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland
declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the
fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures
are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of probable cause and
much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at 'establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region."
For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at any
time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers
manning the checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
I have no quarrel with a policeman flashing a light inside a parked vehicle on a dark street as
a routine measure of security and curiosity. But the case at bar is different. Military officers are
systematically stationed at strategic checkpoint to actively ferret out suspected criminals by
detaining and searching any individual who in their opinion might impair "the social, economic
and political development of the National Capital Region." It is incredible that we can sustain
such a measure. And we are not even under martial law.
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and
sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
SARMIENTO, J., dissenting:
I join Justice Isagani Cruz in his dissent, delivered so staightforwardly and eloquently. I am
agreed that the existence alone of checkpoints makes search done therein, unreasonable and
hence, repugnant to the Constitution.
The Charter says that the people enjoy the right of security of person, home, and effects.
(CONST., art. III, sec. 2.) It is also the bedrock the right of the people to be left alone on
which the regime of law and constitutionalism rest. It is not, as the majority would put it, a
matter of "occasional inconveniences, discomfort and even irritation." (Resolution, 4.) To say
that it is, is so I submit to trivialize the plain command of the Constitution.
Checkpoints, I further submit, are things of martial rule, and things of the past. They first saw
the light of day by virtue of General Order No. 66 (AUTHORIZING THE CHIEF OF
CONSTABULARY TO ESTABLISH CHECKPOINTS, UPDATE LISTS OF WANTED
PERSONS AND CONDUCT DRAGNET OPERATIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES), a
martial law issuance, as amended by General Order No. 67 (AMENDING AND AMPLIFYING
PARAGRAPH 7 OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 66 DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 1980), yet another
martial law issuance. (See O.G. 4224-4226; 4226-4227 [Aug., 1983].) They are, so I strongly
submit, repressive measures, the same measures against which we had fought so
painstakingly in our quest for liberty, a quest that ended at EDSA and a quest that terminated

a dictatorship. How soon we forget.

While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as my brethren advance, is a
right personal to the aggrieved party, the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because
they had been, or had felt, aggrieved. I submit that in that event, the burden is the State's, to
demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in
particular, need not, therefore, have illustrated the "details of the incident" (Resolution, supra,
4) in all their gore and gruesomeness.
In any event, the absence alone of a search warrant, as I have averred, makes checkpoint
searches unreasonable, and by itself, subject to constitutional challenges. (Supra.) As it is,
"checkpoints", have become "search warrants" unto themselves a roving one at that.
That "[n]ot all searches and seizures are prohibited," the majority points out, is fine. And so is
"a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case." (Supra) But the question, exactly, is: Is (are) the
search(es) in this case reasonable? I submit that it (they) is (are) not, for one simple reason:
No search warrant has been issued by a judge.
I likewise do not find this case to be a simple matter of an "officer merely draw(ing) aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle ... or simply look(ing) (supra) there, "or flash(ing) a light therein."
(Supra) What we have here is Orwell's Big Brother watching every step we take and every
move we make.
As it also is, "checkpoints" are apparently, State policy. The American cases the majority
refers to involve routine checks compelled by "probable cause". What we have here, however,
is not simply a policeman on the beat but armed men, CAFGU or Alsa Masa, who hold the
power of life or death over the citizenry, who fire with no provocation and without batting an
eyelash. They likewise shoot you simply because they do not like your face. I have witnessed
actual incidents.
Washington said that militia can not be made to dictate the terms for the nation. He can not be
anymore correct here.
"Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence ... and on individual's right
against a warrantless search, which is reasonably conducted, "so my brethren go on, the
former shall prevail. (Supra) First, this is the same lie that the hated despot foisted on the
Filipino people. It is a serious mistake to fall for it a second time around. Second, the
checkpoint searches herein are unreasonable: There was no warrant.
A final word. After twenty years of tyranny, the dawn is upon us. The country is once again the
"showcase of democracy" in Asia. But if in many cases, it has been "paper democracy", let
this Court anyway bring to pass its stand, and make liberty in the land, a living reality.
I vote then, to grant the petition.
Footnotes

ii

iii

iv

vi

vii

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONG.R. No. 136292

15, 2002

January

RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 15,
1998 which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding
herein petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the
resolution2 dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 16, 1989, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft committed as
follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent of gain, and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, the NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors, valued at
P27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power Corp.,
in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
"[At] about 9:15 p.m. of June 28, 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on
a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep
unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down
the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did
not answer; he appeared pale and nervous.
With appellant's consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of
3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NPC). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55, 244.45. Noceja

asked appellant where the wires came from and appellant answered that they came from
Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, appellant and
the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo
Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over
to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days
in the Municipal jail.
In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. He testified that he is a driver and resident of
Pagsanjan, Laguna; a NARCOM civilian agent since January, 1988 although his identification
card (ID) has already expired. In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he was driving a
passenger jeepney, he was stopped by one Resty Fernandez who requested him to transport in
his jeepney conductor wires which were in Cavinti, Laguna. He told Resty to wait until he had
finished his last trip for the day from Santa Cruz, Laguna. On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that something
unlawful was going to happen. Sgt. Callos advised him to proceed with the loading of the wires
and that the former would act as back-up and intercept the vehicle at the Sambat Patrol Base in
Pagsanjan.
After receiving those instructions, he went back to see Resty. Although Resty had his own
vehicle, its tires were old so the cable wires were loaded in appellant's jeep and covered with
kakawati leaves. The loading was done by about five (5) masked men. He was promised
P1,000.00 for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two vehicles separated but in his case, he was
intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De Castro. When they discovered the cables, he told the
police officers that the cables were loaded in his jeep by the owner, Resty Fernandez. But
despite his explanation, he was ordered to proceed to police headquarters where he was
interrogated. The police officers did not believe him and instead locked him up in jail for a
week."4
On April 27, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property worth P55,244.45, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment from TWO
(2) [YEARS], FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the complainant National
Power Corporation in the amount of P55, 244.45, and to pay the costs."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen materials were recovered and modified the penalty imposed, to
wit:
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
appellant RUDY CABALLES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in theft,
defined and penalized under Articles 308 and 309, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, and there being
no modifying circumstances, he is hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years,
Nine (9) months and Eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum term, to Eight (8)
years, Eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term. No civil indemnity
and no costs."6

Petitioner comes before us and raises the following issues:

"(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner was violated when the police officers
searched his vehicle and seized the wires found therein without a search warrant and when
samples of the wires and references to them were admitted in evidence as basis for his
conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in rejecting petitioner's defense that he was engaged
in an entrapment operation and in indulging in speculation and conjecture in rejecting said
defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt and thus failed to overcome the constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."
The conviction or acquittal of petitioner hinges primarily on the validity of the warrantless search and
seizure made by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
In holding that the warrantless search and seizure is valid, the trial court ruled that:
"As his last straw of argument, the accused questions the constitutionality of the search and
validity of his arrest on the ground that no warrant was issued to that effect. The Court cannot
again sustain such view. In the case of People v. Lo Ho [Wing], G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
1991, it has been held that 'considering that before a warrant can be obtained, the place, things
and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge - a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity, a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on grounds of practicability.' The doctrine is
not of recent vintage. In the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, May 24, 1990
(Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, September 29, 1989), it was ruled that 'automobiles
because of their mobility may be searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying
warrantless search of a resident or office. x x x To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be
arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to
leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances' (Ibid.). In Umil v. Ramos, 187
SCRA 311, and People vs. Ortiz, 191 SCRA 836, the Supreme Court held that a search may be
made even without a warrant where the accused is caught in flagrante. Under the circumstances,
the police officers are not only authorized but are also under obligation to arrest the accused
even without a warrant."7
Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol,
merely on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as
adopted by the appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the
vehicle. Perforce, any evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and
seizure shall be deemed inadmissible.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof,
which reads:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized."
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right.
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;8 (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search;11 (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.13
In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a
valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place
or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.14
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the case at bar was
not authorized by a search warrant. The main issue is whether the evidence taken from the warrantless
search is admissible against the appellant. Without said evidence, the prosecution cannot prove the guilt
of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.1wphi1.nt
I. Search of moving vehicle
Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.15 Thus, the rules governing search and
seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the
search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a
requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving
vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.16 Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or

'constructive borders' like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.17
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the
absence of probable cause.18 Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject
to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.19 The required probable cause that will
justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according
to the facts of each case.20
One such form of search of moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without warrant at military or
police checkpoints which has been declared to be not illegal per se,21 for as long as it is warranted by
the exigencies of public order22 and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.23 A checkpoint may
either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search.
The search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds;24 (2) simply looks into a vehicle;25 (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;26
(4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;27 (5) where the inspection of the
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection;28 and (6) where the routine check is
conducted in a fixed area.29
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely
conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle. They had to reach inside the
vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires.
It cannot be considered a simple routine check.
In the case of United States vs. Pierre,30 the Court held that the physical intrusion of a part of the body
of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to wit:
"The Agent . . . stuck his head through the driver's side window. The agent thus effected a
physical intrusion into the vehicle. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that an officer did not
conduct a search when he physically intruded part of his body into a space in which the suspect
had a reasonable expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . . physical intrusion allowed him to
see and to smell things he could not see or smell from outside the vehicle. . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the vehicle which may be viewed from outside the
vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers, and into the area protected by
the Fourth amendment, just as much as if he had stuck his head inside the open window of a
home."

On the other hand, when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable
or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.31
This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an extensive
search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive
smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine National Police
("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would
be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers
when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana;32 (5) the
accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the
moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine
reports by a deep penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the
country.33
In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
Pat. Alex de Castro recounted the incident as follows:
"ATTY. SANTOS
Q
Now on said date and time do you remember of any unusual incident while you were
performing your duty?
A
Yes, sir, at that time and date myself and Police Sgt. Noceja were conducting patrol in the
said place when we spotted a suspicious jeepney so we stopped the jeepney and searched the
load of the jeepney and we found out (sic) these conductor wires.
Q
You mentioned about the fact that when you saw the jeepney you became suspicious, why
did you become suspicious?
A

Because the cargo was covered with leaves and branches, sir.

Q
When you became suspicious upon seeing those leaves on top of the load what did you do
next, if any?
A

We stopped the jeepney and searched the contents thereof, sir."34

The testimony of Victorino Noceja did not fare any better:

"ATTY SANTOS
Q

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being drawn by Caballes was covered by kakawati
leaves, I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged
him, sir."35
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be
covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a
search without a warrant.
In People vs. Chua Ho San,36 we held that the fact that the watercraft used by the accused was
different in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas
coupled with the suspicious behavior of the accused when he attempted to flee from the police
authorities do not sufficiently establish probable cause. Thus:
"In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the following details are suggestive of
probable cause - persistent reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, CHUA's watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines x x x, CHUA's
suspicious behavior, i.e., he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the
apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with immediate
dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None of the telltale
clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug,
confidential report and/or positive identification by informers of courier of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor or
behavior, and suspicious bulge in the waist - accepted by this Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no classified information that a foreigner would
disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was
not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. x x x." (emphasis
supplied)
In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have
sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become
a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.37 Unfortunately, none exists in
this case.
II. Plain view doctrine

It cannot likewise be said that the cable wires found in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making
its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether
by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.38
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately
apparent to the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and
branches. As a matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case,
it has been held that the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the
articles without further search.40
III. Consented search
Petitioner contends that the statement of Sgt. Victorino Noceja that he checked the vehicle "with the
consent of the accused" is too vague to prove that petitioner consented to the search. He claims that
there is no specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific
words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." At most, there was only an implied
acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no "consent" at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention
and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion.41 Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence.42 The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.43 Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;44 (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found;45 (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting.46 It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.47
In the case at bar, Sgt. Victorino Noceja testified on the manner in which the search was conducted in
this wise:
"WITNESS

On June 28, 1989, where were you?

We were conducting patrol at the poblacion and some barangays, sir.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
After conducting the patrol operation, do you remember of any unusual incident on said
date and time?
A

Yes, sir.

What is that incident?

A
While I was conducting my patrol at barangay Sampalucan, I saw Rudy Caballes driving
a vehicle and the vehicle contained aluminum wires, sir.
xxx
Q

xxx

xxx

When you saw the accused driving the said vehicle, what did you do?

A
Because I saw that the vehicle being driven by Caballes was covered by kakawati leaves,
I became suspicious since such vehicle should not be covered by those and I flagged him, sir.
Q

Did the vehicle stop?

A
Yes, sir, and after said vehicle stop[ped], I removed the cover of said vehicle and by
so doing, I saw the aluminum wires.
Q

Before you saw the aluminum wires, did you talk to the accused?

Yes, sir, I asked him what his load was.

What was the answer of Caballes?

A
He did not answer and I observed him to be pale, "nagpapamutla" (sic), so I told
him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive.
Q

And after you saw for yourself the aluminum wires loaded on the jeep, what did you do?

A
I asked him where those wires came from and he answered those came from the Cavinti
area, sir."48
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and
seizure. But in these cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated
to the accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what
was requested. In some instance, the accused even verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he
also understood the nature and consequences of such request.49

In Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals,50 the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner to
search the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner therein himself freely gave his consent to said
search. In People vs. Lacerna,51 the appellants who were riding in a taxi were stopped by two
policemen who asked permission to search the vehicle and the appellants readily agreed. In upholding
the validity of the consented search, the Court held that appellant himself who was "urbanized in
mannerism and speech" expressly said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing
to hide and had done nothing wrong. In People vs. Cuizon,52 the accused admitted that they signed a
written permission stating that they freely consented to the search of their luggage by the NBI agents to
determine if they were carrying shabu. In People vs. Montilla,53 it was held that the accused
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced
or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right. In
People vs. Omaweng,54 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag
to which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." Then the policemen
asked if they could open and see it, and accused answered "you can see it." The Court said there was a
valid consented search.1wphi1.nt
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.55
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner's vehicle was
flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the
police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of
petitioner. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that
they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no
consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld
the validity of consented search, it will be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein petitioner, the statements of the police
officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him that they will look inside his
vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and granted because when
Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of petitioner
stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was only
after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice
in his direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that
they searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the
search.56
Neither can petitioner's passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People vs. Barros,57 appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where
two policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When
asked who owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The

Court there struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be
presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the
ruling in the case of People vs. Burgos,58 to wit:
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law."
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
petitioner's conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and seizure.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE,
respondents.
Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following
resolutions of the Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being
unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23
April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.
The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11
May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No.
2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying
and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on
bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. 1 Subsequently, on 26 December 1991
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates

engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and
establishing spot checkpoints. 2
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting
the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised
of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex
some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance. About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning
the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched
the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the
car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to
get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of
Representatives.
Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The
referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January
1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation
meritorious. 4
On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances
mentioned in Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to
exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was
petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. 5
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against
petitioner be also dismissed. 6
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of
Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec.
32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for
an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35 of
R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881. 8
On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative
proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court. 9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and
regulations of an administrative body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election
Code provides for the disqualification of any person/candidate from running for or holding a public
office, i.e., any person who has either been declared by competent authority as insane or incompetent

or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude; that gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the provisions of the Code; that the
resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain offenses;
that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office in
situations (a) where the criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case,
and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted, all contrary to the requisite quantum of proof
for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the Omnibus Election Code, i.e.,
proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the
fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.
But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the
11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in
the elections that ensued. Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge
against him on his qualification to run for public office.
However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives
the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrantless search of
his car.
Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According to
him, without a warrant and without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen
searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano
but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Thus, the
search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3,
par. (2), Art. III, of the Constitution. 11
Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary
investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently,
making him a respondent in the criminal information would violate his constitutional right to due
process.
Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for
public office during the election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of
security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly, Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard
but a civilian employee assigned to him as driver by the House of Representatives. Specifically,
petitioner further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in
fact violated. 12
On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the
petition 13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC
and prayed instead to be excused from filing the required comment. 14
COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263,
of B.P. Blg. 881 which provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the
Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for election offenses." It points out that it was upon
petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside petitioner's residence,
submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to

explain the circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn
written explanation about the incident. Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15
Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No.
2327 since this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate
authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, 17 as
well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se,
and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search. 18
Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and
that they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly,
COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not show that the manner by which the package
was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention either of any
report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was
stopped and searched. Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP
could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional
injunction.
An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender
or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the
vehicle to be searched. 19 The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless search is
determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in
situations where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where
the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee. 21
We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of
prior confidential information which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g.,
where a confidential report that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route
where the search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante delicto transporting drugs at
the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23
where the information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was
strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and his suspicious failure to produce
his passport and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted the
description given in the confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the
accused carrying a bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about
its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug courier was already established by police authorities
who received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused on board one of the
vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27
In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to
the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description

furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special
strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of
Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying
circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be
valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security
of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in
violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure
of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be
determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under
Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock
in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It
was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the
reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal
checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As a result,
motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have
any choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent
would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist and to conduct
an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, 29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was
any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent"
given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty.
Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a
preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner
that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires
that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. 30
COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to
enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that
petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident. This does not satisfy
the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the
observance of both substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals, 33 we held

that
While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of
due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone
save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a
preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
process.
Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate
the latter's explanation. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the
case, so that his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not
petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a
respondent when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.
Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC
cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The
motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as
soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up even after COMELEC's denial
of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition against carrying
firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years
without probation and with disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to
suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly did not waive his right to a preliminary
investigation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine
National Police on 13 January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless
search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC
Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the Constitution is SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in
the case of Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:
The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints
it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland
declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores
the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State
even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches
and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the
suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
xxx xxx xxx
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on
checkpoints and finally dismantle them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.
VITUG, J., concurring:
The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to
accept and subordinate themselves to authority.
When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to
the contrary, reserved for themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.
One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded
proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be
sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when warrantless
searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court
in Valmonte vs. De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the
Court clearly has based its decision on the existence at the time of what has been so described as an
"abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did not have the intention to have its
ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than previously obtaining.
The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one
hand, and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be

held to prevail? There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the
first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are they
necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength of
the other.
There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of
constitutional mandates or an abuse on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might pay
to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our
rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the
Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."
It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the
Court has expressed:
This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized
even during the days of the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On
this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the
humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from
intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.
The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is
"heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the
constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for they
could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.
While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
in his ponencia, I would express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional
aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect
to petitioner Aniag, Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not
because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not actually
charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.
With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner
in the present recourse, the nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and
redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that the majority opinion thereby reinstate the
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I concur in that
result.
However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale
submitted therefor, that is, that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The
pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent on the part of
Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage compartment where
the firearms were discovered. As held in People vs. Excela, et al., 1 consent to a search may be given
expressly or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui, 2 the settled rule is that a search may be

validly conducted without a warrant if the person searched consented thereto.

I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was
acting in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the
instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was himself acting upon and in compliance with
Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of
the House of Representatives.
The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be
given suppletory effect to special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the
same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A.
No. 7166, nor is there any legal impossibility for such suppletory application whether by express
provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as
illegal, Arellano acted thereon in good faith 3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his
exculpation is ineludibly dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.
It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no
error was committed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto
Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well founded belief that a crime had been
committed and that he was probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with grave abuse
of discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 920829.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.
Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority
opinion, are whether (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is
unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999,
dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific disposition
declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13
January 1992, (b) inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless
search, and (c) unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.
1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first
paragraph, page 10, Ponencia), this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot
checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And whether the warrantless search conducted
by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been, provided there
existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either
procedurally premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the
obvious paucity of the facts before it. The most the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no
evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them
to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to
earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more could be expected at this stage since the records of the
proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the COMELEC are not before this

Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in evidence of the
firearms seized would thus be premature.
It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms
involved were licensed and were duly issued to the petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for
the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory
authority to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections (Section 52,
Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is required to enforce
and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to paragraph (q), Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the residence or
place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or transporting
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle,
or public conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election
period, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC.
In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeantat-Arms of the House of Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13
January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's)
house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day was already within
the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In
The Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local
Officials on May 11, 1992), promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for
which he was to be charged was for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in view of his aforesaid admissions,
renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling
on the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of
unconstitutionality. It simply directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for
the violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No.
7166, and directed the petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of
R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is
concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing more
than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint
against him. As against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was
later heard on his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary
investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod
ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
[1992]).
The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner
despite the fact that he was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was
only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him. The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.

I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph
(q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.
Melo, J., concurs.

# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in
the case of Valmonte v. De Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:
The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints
it would sustain and fraught with serious threats to individual liberty. The bland
declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores
the fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State
even if asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that the searches
and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that
they are aimed at "establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and
order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may
be stopped and searched at random and at any time simply because he excites the
suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.
xxx xxx xxx
Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the
truncheon and the barbed wire, with the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance
and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.
I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on
checkpoints and finally dismantle them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.
VITUG, J., concurring:
The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to
accept and subordinate themselves to authority.
When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to
the contrary, reserved for themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.

One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded
proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be
sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when warrantless
searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court
in Valmonte vs. De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the
Court clearly has based its decision on the existence at the time of what has been so described as an
"abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did not have the intention to have its
ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than previously obtaining.
The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one
hand, and the constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be
held to prevail? There is no choice to my mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the
first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not incompatible; neither are they
necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength of
the other.
There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of
constitutional mandates or an abuse on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might pay
to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our
rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the
Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."
It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the
Court has expressed:
This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized
even during the days of the absolute monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On
this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but the
humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from
intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as the kingly prerogatives.
The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who
appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is
"heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the
constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone the omission for they
could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.
While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo,
in his ponencia, I would express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional
aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect
to petitioner Aniag, Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not
because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but by reason of the fact that he was not actually
charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.

With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner
in the present recourse, the nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and
redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that the majority opinion thereby reinstate the
resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I concur in that
result.
However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale
submitted therefor, that is, that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The
pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the conclusion that there was consent on the part of
Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage compartment where
the firearms were discovered. As held in People vs. Excela, et al., 1 consent to a search may be given
expressly or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui, 2 the settled rule is that a search may be
validly conducted without a warrant if the person searched consented thereto.
I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was
acting in obedience to what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the
instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was himself acting upon and in compliance with
Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the Sergeant-at-Arms of
the House of Representatives.
The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be
given suppletory effect to special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the
same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A.
No. 7166, nor is there any legal impossibility for such suppletory application whether by express
provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as
illegal, Arellano acted thereon in good faith 3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his
exculpation is ineludibly dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.
It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no
error was committed by the Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto
Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well founded belief that a crime had been
committed and that he was probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with grave abuse
of discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 920829.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.
Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority
opinion, are whether (a) COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is
unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999,
dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific disposition
declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13
January 1992, (b) inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless
search, and (c) unconstitutional COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.

1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution

No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first
paragraph, page 10, Ponencia), this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot
checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And whether the warrantless search conducted
by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been, provided there
existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either
procedurally premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the
obvious paucity of the facts before it. The most the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no
evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them
to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were
engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to
earlier, was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more could be expected at this stage since the records of the
proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the COMELEC are not before this
Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in evidence of the
firearms seized would thus be premature.
It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms, which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms
involved were licensed and were duly issued to the petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for
the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory
authority to have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections (Section 52,
Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations implementing
the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is required to enforce
and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to paragraph (q), Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the residence or
place of business during the election period unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or transporting
firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle,
or public conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election
period, unless authorized in writing by the COMELEC.
In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeantat-Arms of the House of Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13
January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's)
house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day was already within
the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In
The Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local
Officials on May 11, 1992), promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for
which he was to be charged was for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus
Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in view of his aforesaid admissions,
renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling
on the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of
unconstitutionality. It simply directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for
the violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No.

7166, and directed the petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an
elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of
R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is
concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing more
than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint
against him. As against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was
later heard on his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary
investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory (Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod
ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92
[1992]).
The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner
despite the fact that he was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was
only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him. The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.
I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph
(q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.
Melo, J., concurs.

viii

[G.R. Nos. 129756-58. January 28, 2000]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. JULIAN DEEN ESCAO, VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY
CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused.
VIRGILIO TOME USANA and JERRY CASABAAN LOPEZ, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellants Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escao, were charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 95-936 with violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,[1] as amended. Escao and Usana were also charged
in Criminal Case No. 95-937 and No. 95-938 with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 95-936 reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and transport 3.3143 kilograms of
"HASHISH", a prohibited drug, in violation of the above-cited law.[2]
The charge against accused Julian D. Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937 reads as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
direct custody and control one (1) pc. of cal. .45 pistol, government model with Serial
No. 990255, with magazine containing 7 live ammos and two (2) more magazines for
cal. .45 pistol containing 7 live ammos each, without first securing the necessary license
or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearm and ammunitions
he carried outside of his residence.[3]
The accusatory portion of the information against Virgilio Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of April, 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
direct custody and control One (1) pc. of rifle carbine with Serial No. 7176644 with a
banana type magazine loaded with 28 live ammunitions without first securing the

necessary license or permit from the proper government authorities and which firearms
and ammunitions he carried outside of his residence.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
In its Decision of 30 May 1997,[5] which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court convicted
Escao and herein appellants in Criminal Case No. 95-936, Escao in Criminal Case No. 95-937, and
appellant Usana in Criminal Case No. 95-938.
Escao filed on 19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a Manifestation and
Withdrawal of Appeal,[6] which was granted by the trial court in its Order of 17 July 1997.[7]
Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 June 1997,[8] manifesting therein that they were
appealing to this Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties imposed, the decision in
Criminal Case No. 95-936 was appealed to this Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of
the appeal from Criminal Case No. 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997,[9] the trial court gave due
course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal Case No. 95-936 to this Court
and the record of Criminal Case No. 95-938 to the Court of Appeals.
Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-936 that is now before
this Court.
Due to the differing versions of the parties, there is a need to narrate each of the testimonies of the key
players in this case.
The prosecution has this version of the events: On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun
ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato,
SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico,[10] were manning a checkpoint at the corner of
Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).[11] They were checking the cars
going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the
others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493.[12] PO3 Suba saw
a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio
Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm,
an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat
Ave., the other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm
which they seized from Escao.[13]
The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by
PO3 Nonato.[14] Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since
SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk.[15] Escao
readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key.[16] They noticed a blue bag inside it,[17]
which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape,[18] which, upon
examination by National Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found
positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms.[19]
A certification was issued by the Firearms and Explosive Office of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) to the effect that Escao was not a licensed/registered firearms holder of any kind and

caliber. Usana, however, according to the same certification is a licensed/registered holder of a pistol
Colt .45 caliber with license issued on 14 October 1994 and to expire on April 1996. Usana also has an
application for a pistol Uzi Cal. 9mm. Neither of the two guns seized were licensed/registered with the
NAPOLCOM.[20]
For his part, Escao (or Jovy) testified that on the 4th of April 1995, between 11:00 and 11:30 in the
morning, he was at the lobby of Legend Hotel, at Pioneer St., Mandaluyong City, to meet with his
business partners, including Usana and Lopez. He saw his friend and erstwhile co-employee at
Philippine Airlines, Ramon Cabrera, who had borrowed his wifes car. Since it was his wifes birthday
the following day, he asked Cabrera if he could get back the car. Cabrera readily gave him the keys of
the car.[21]
He left the hotel at around 11:45 in the evening with Usana and Lopez. Using his wifes car, they
cruised southward along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and turned right at Sen. Gil Puyat
Avenue. They stopped before crossing SLEX because the traffic light turned red. From the other side of
SLEX, he could see a group of policemen. Upon crossing SLEX, they were flagged down by one of the
policemen, so he slowed down and stopped. PO3 Nonato asked him to roll down the window and
demanded to see his license. He asked if he had committed any violation, but PO3 Nonato accused him
of being drunk, which he denied. The policemen persisted in asking for his license, but he did not
budge and instead reiterated that there was no reason for him to surrender his license for he had not
committed any violation. A verbal tussle ensued resulting in the drawing of firearms by the policemen
which prompted Usana to suggest that they go to the police station because the policemen were
carrying guns and they have not done anything wrong.[22]
He stated further that he was the one who drove to the police station along Dian St. with his
companions. He parked the car then they were brought to the office of the Deputy Station Commander,
Lieutenant Eco.[23] The policemen asked if they could search his car. He then inquired if he was not
entitled to a lawyer and why they needed to conduct a search when they had not even told him what he
had violated. Apparently, he thought they were there only for verification purposes. Lt. Eco explained
that that was the reason why they were going to search his car, to see if he had done anything illegal.
Although the police were insistent in asking for the keys to his car, he continuously refused. Lt. Eco
asked his men to usher the trio into the detention cell.[24]
After two hours, he was brought back to Lt. Ecos office. Lt. Eco pointed to a bag, a rifle, a pistol and a
package wrapped in masking tape or packing tape on his desk, and said these items constituted
evidence of illegal possession of firearms and transporting of drugs. He was surprised that they found
those items from his car because his key had been with him all the time. He was handcuffed, brought to
his car, and again was surprised to see its trunk open.[25]
On the other hand, Lopez had a different story. He claimed he was the mechanic of Usana and they
lived in the same subdivision.[26] On 4 April 1995, he was working on Usanas pick-up truck at the
latters house when Escao dropped by at around 4:30 in the afternoon looking for Usana who was then
working in Forbes Park.[27] At around 5:30 p.m., they left Usanas house in Escaos metallic gray Kia
Pride. Inside the car, he saw a .45 caliber pistol and two spare magazines tucked in the right side and
left side of Escaos waist. He also saw a carbine under the right passenger seat. When he inquired
about the guns, Escao replied that such did not pose any problem since they were licensed. Before
going to Usana, they went to Pasay City to see a certain Jerry.[28] They met Usana at the Sen. Gil Puyat

Station of the LRT at around 9:00 p.m. He gave his seat to Usana but was unaware if the latter noticed
the rifle beneath the seat.[29]
They went home via Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue but were stopped at a checkpoint after crossing SLEX. The
policemen directed their flashlights at them and one opened the front passenger door.[30] The latter saw
the rifle under Usanas seat. Usana and Escao were ordered to get out of the car. PO3 Nonato
immediately saw the gun tucked in Escaos waist and asked if he was a policeman. Escao replied that
everything would be explained at the police station. He was also asked to step out. No firearm was,
however, found in his possession.[31]
When confronted about the guns, Escao tried to intercede for his two companions and said that "...
these two dont know anything about it, I just took them for a drive." They subsequently went to police
station Block 5. A certain Toto, a policeman, drove the Kia Pride to Block 5.[32]
Upon reaching the police station, Escao was immediately brought to the office of Lt. Eco while he and
Usana were asked to sit on the bench. After a few minutes, PO3 de los Santos came out of the office of
Lt. Eco to talk to him. He told him that all he knew about Escao is that he was a wealthy flight
attendant with military connections. After returning to Lt. Ecos office, PO3 de los Santos went out of
the police station with Lt. Eco and Escao. The three came back with a blue bag which he had never
seen before. The bag was opened before the three suspects. Escao reiterated that his two companions
had nothing to do with the bag.[33]
He and Usana stayed overnight in their cell and only saw Escao in the morning of April 5. At around
4:00 p.m., they were transferred to the CID and stayed in the office of a certain Inspector Sipin. Escao
admitted he owned the bag/case.[34]
For his part, Usana testified that he was a duly licensed architect who was gainfully employed by
Rolando de Asis and Taytay Management Corporation.[35] He admitted owning a licensed .45 caliber
pistol.[36] In March 1995, he hired as mechanic Lopez, who lives in Bernabe Subdivision Phase II
where he also lives. Escao on the other hand, was introduced to him by a certain Roberto Samparado,
a neighbor of Lopez. Escao, an international flight attendant of Philippine Airlines and a businessman
who owns Verge Enterprises, also supplied materials to the Philippine Army and planned to engage in a
construction business.[37]
On 4 April 1995, at around 7:30 p.m., he paged Escao to talk about the materials for the five prototype
gunship helicopters they were supposed to supply. They talked on the phone, agreeing to meet between
8:30 and 9:00 p.m. at the Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Station of the Light Rail Transit,[38] and met at around a
quarter past nine. Escao was on board a metallic Kia Pride with Lopez on the passenger seat. Lopez
vacated the seat for him. They went to Magallanes Village to meet a certain Norman Garcia and talk
about the documents[39] relating to the helicopter gunship of the Air Force. They arrived there at 11:30
p.m. While they were talking with Garcia, he noticed a gun and magazines tucked in Escaos waist.
Upon inquiry, Escao said it was not a problem and only for his protection.[40] On their way to Roxas
Boulevard, they were stopped at a checkpoint along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave. Policemen knocked on the car
windows so he and Escao rolled down their windows. A person in civilian clothes suddenly opened
the right door, took something from the side of his seat and shouted, "Theres a gun." He was surprised
because he did not carry anything when he boarded the car; neither did he see anything inside the car
because it was dark and he was not wearing his eyeglasses.[41] The person who took the gun asked if he

was a policeman, and he said he was an architect. He was then asked to alight from the car, then
frisked. Escao was also asked to alight from a car. They saw a gun tucked in his waist, so they asked if
he was a policeman, and Escao answered in the negative. Lopez was then ordered to get out of the car
by the person in civilian clothes and was also searched. They rode the Anfra service vehicle of the
police. One of the policemen asked Lopez to handcuff him and Escao. The policeman who asked
Escao to get out of the car drove the Anfra van to Block 5 where they arrived at 1:30 in the morning of
5 April.[42]
He and Lopez waited outside the office of Lt. Eco while Escao was inside with the arresting officers.
Lt. Eco came out of his office and urged Lopez to tell the truth. He heard Lopez say that they were both
just with Escao and that they knew nothing about the guns; neither do they own any. SPO4 de los
Santos entered the office of Lt. Eco and came out five minutes later with Escao, Lt. Eco, and the other
arresting officers, Nonato, Suba and Erwin Eco, the person in civilian clothes. All six went out to the
parking area and returned after about five minutes. Lt. Eco was carrying a bag which he placed on top
his desk. Lopez and Escao were asked about the contents of the bag. The two replied it was the first
time they saw that bag. Lt. Eco opened the bag before them. They all saw something in brown paper.
He and Lopez simultaneously exclaimed that they knew nothing about the contents of the bag, and they
implored Escao to tell the police that they had nothing to do with it.[43]
The trial court found the prosecutions version more credible than that of any one of the accused, and
ruled that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused as charged. It
decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 95-936, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN, VIRGILIO
USANA y TOME and JERRY LOPEZ y CASABAAN are GUILTY as charged and are
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board the
3.314 kilograms of Hashish (marijuana) for its appropriate disposition in accordance
with law; and
2. In criminal Cases Nos. 95-937 and 95-938, accused JULIAN ESCAO y DEEN and
VIRGILIO USANA y TOME are GUILTY as charged in the two separate informations
respectively filed against them and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term
from TEN (10) YEARS of PRISION MAYOR maximum, as minimum to SEVENTEEN
(17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
maximum as maximum.[44]
The firearms and ammunitions subject matter of these cases which are still with the City
Prosecutors Office are forfeited in favor of the Government are directed to be turned
over to the Firearms and Explosive Unit, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for its
appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED. [45]

Accused-appellants Usana and Lopez anchor their appeal on the following arguments:
1. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the hashish seized without search
warrant when the police officers already had the opportunity to secure a search warrant
before searching the bag found at the baggage compartment at the back of the car;
2. Assuming that the hashish is admissible in evidence, the trial court erred in finding
appellants to have conspired with Escao in transporting the hashish when the evidence
clearly shows that the hashish was owned and possessed solely by Escao;
3. The trial court erred in convicting appellants of illegal possession of hashish despite
the fact that they were neither in actual nor constructive possession of the illegal drug;
and
4. The trial court erred in not considering the exculpatory testimony of Julian Escao in
favor of appellants.
Before going any further, some words are in order regarding the establishment of checkpoints.
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was conducted. They
contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been announced.
They also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
We take judicial notice of the existence of the COMELEC resolution[46] imposing a gun ban during the
election period issued pursuant to Section 52(c) in relation to Section 26(q) of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). The national and local elections in 1995 were held on 8 May, the
second Monday of the month. The incident, which happened on 5 April 1995, was well within the
election period.
This Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies
of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed.[47] For, admittedly,
routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during
which the vehicles occupants are required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individuals right
against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less
intrusive.[48]
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC. The
COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual
search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who
intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily
perpetrate their malicious designs.
The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed

suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were
carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop,
without opening the cars doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search. There is nothing
discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.
We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not only would it be
impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy
of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and the regularized manner in which they
are operated.[49]
Usana and Lopez also question the validity of the search. The trial court, in convicting the three
accused for violation of R.A. No. 6425, accepted as aboveboard the search done by the Makati Police
of the trunk of the car. Jurisprudence recognizes six generally accepted exceptions to the warrant
requirement: (1) search incidental to an arrest; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) evidence in plain
view; (4) customs searches; (5) consented warrantless search;[50] and (6) stop-and-frisk situations.[51]
Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of
the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escao was consented to by him.
Both Lopez and Usana testified that Escao was with the police officers when they searched the car.[52]
There was no apparent objection made by Escao as he seemed to have freely accompanied the police
officers to the car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escao readily agreed to open the
trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos.[53] But according to Escao, he refused the request of the
police officers to search his car.[54] We must give credence to the testimony of PO3 Suba. Not only is it
buttressed by the testimony of Usana and Lopez that Escao freely accompanied the police officers to
the car, it is also deemed admitted by Escao in failing to appeal the decision. The findings of fact of
the trial court are thus deemed final as against him.
Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car
belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the
accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was
stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without
the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the
cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to
link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the
latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and
without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing,
or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the
presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, that portion of the challenged decision of 30 May 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court, Makati, Branch 64, insofar as Criminal Case No. 95-936 is concerned with regard to accusedappellants VIRGILIO T. USANA and JERRY C. LOPEZ, holding them guilty of violation of Section 4,
Article II of R.A. No 6425, as amended, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING them therein on ground of reasonable doubt and ORDERING their immediate
release from confinement at the New Bilibid Prison, unless their further detention is justified for any
lawful ground. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to report to the Court the

release of said accused-appellants within five (5) days from notice of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.2/18/00 8

ix

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Condrado ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.

413 U.S. 266 (93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596)
Condrado ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES.
No. 716278.
Argued: March 19, 28, 1973.
Decided: June 21, 1973.

opinion, STEWART [HTML]

concurrence, POWELL [HTML]

dissent, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, THE CHIEF JUSTICE [HTML]

Syllabus

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit, challenges the constitutionality of the
Border Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles north of the Mexican border. The
search, made without probable cause or consent, uncovered marihuana, which was used to convict
petitioner of a federal crime. The Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of 287(a)(3) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless searches of automobiles and other
conveyances 'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,' as
authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The Attorney General's
regulation defines 'reasonable distance' as 'within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the
United States.' The Court of Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation. Held:
The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without probable cause or consent, violated the
Fourth Amendment. Pp. 269275.
(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to automobile searches, as
probable cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by analogy with administrative inspections, as the
officers had no warrant or reason to believe that petitioner had crossed the border or committed an
offense, and there was no consent by petitioner. Pp. 269272.
(b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof. Pp. 272275.
452 F.2d 459, reversed.
John J. Cleary, San Diego, Cal., for petitioner.
Philip A. Lacovara, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
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