Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995

SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M. MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION

MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on Bar Discipline,
National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Sally
Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija, members of the Philippine Bar, with
unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to
frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Criminal
Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She also filed, a separate
civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a writ of preliminary attachment and
by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the
Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps.
Abuel in the aforesaid criminal and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for collection of a
sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional Trial Court, against the Sps.
Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the
Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure to file the necessary responsive pleading and
evidence ex-parte was received against them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of
Gregorio Lantin. A writ of execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously
attached by complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases, Atty. Pablito
Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR and the same IBP receipt
number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411
dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was merely a part of
the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money judgment which complainant
might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings and
recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and attached to the
records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta and the respondents

admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original. And it clearly appears under the
Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of
Bongalonta and her husband was registered and annotated in said title of February 7,
1989, whereas, that in favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state,
the notice of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing conflicting
interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a judgment
which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain against the Abuel spouses) has no leg
to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their appearances
and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated 1-12-88", respondent Atty.
Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED for using, apparently thru his
negligence, the IBP official receipt number of respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
According to the records of the IBP National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his
delinquent and current membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No.
2900538, after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester Fraginal who
alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her fault in placing the IBP
official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M. Martija in the appearance and
pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay in due time the IBP membership dues of her
employer, deserves scant consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of
every lawyer to see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially
when he practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo be
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for using the IBP
Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. (pp. 2-4,
Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress again that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to
expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A
lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is
required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood in violation
of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a warning that commission of the
same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of
the Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005]

MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and
nonpayment of debts.
The complaint,[1] dated 25 September 1972, was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno on two
causes of action. The first cause of action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 issued by the
Land Registration Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as
president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177. The complaint
alleged that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Aranetas nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000.
Moreno alleged that sometime in October 1972, Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly to
show to his associates, with the assurance that he would return the said amount within the shortest
possible time. Again in May 1972, Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose and with the same
assurance. Thereafter, since he failed to make good on both promises, Moreno sought repayment in
the aggregate amount of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank of America checks in her favor, the first
dated 30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15 July 1972 for P5,000. However, when
Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same were dishonored and returned to her marked Account
Closed. She referred the matter to a lawyer, who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta, however,
ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from him. To
accommodate her, he allegedly endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in question, worthP2,177,
which he received from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorneys fees, and gave her an additional P323 in
cash.
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the two
undated checks in her favor, but maintains that he had no intention of negotiating them. He avers
that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly upon her request, only so she could show the bank where
she was working that she had money coming to her. Araneta further claims that he warned her that
the checks belonged to the unused portion of a closed account and could not be encashed. To
protect himself, he asked the complainant to issue a check in the amount of P11,000 to offset the two
borrowed checks. The respondent offered this check in evidence.
Moreno, however, contended[2] that this check for P11,000 belonged to the Philippine Leasing
Corporation, which she managed when her father passed away. She claimed she signed the check
in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was then helping
her in the management of the corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely filled up the check in
a desperate bid to turn the tables on her.[3]
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.[4]
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January 1973 at nine oclock in the morning, when the
complainant and her counsel appeared. Araneta was absent despite due notice. Upon motion,
however, of Moreno, and to give the respondent a chance to defend himself, the hearing was reset to
23 and 24 January 1973, both at nine oclock in the morning. Service of the notice for the new dates
of hearing were effected to the respondent through a certain Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973. [5]
On 23 January 1973, Araneta once more did not appear, so the case was called again the following
day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-parte hearing was conducted on 24 January 1973
with the complainant, Moreno, taking the stand.[6] On 27 February 1973, Araneta appeared for the
scheduled hearing, only to ask for a postponement to prepare his defense.[7] No further hearings
appear to have been conducted thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been scheduled on 28 May
1973, however, on said date, Araneta filed a joint motion for postponement with the conform of
Morenos lawyer, as he, Araneta, was earnestly pursuing a possible clarification of complainants
basic grievance.
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the
case were forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court. Two days later, the Commission notified [8] both parties of a hearing to be held on 2 November
1988, on which date neither of the parties nor the complainants counsel appeared despite due
notice. It appears that notice could not be served on Araneta, as he no longer resided in his indicated
address, and his whereabouts were unknown. An inquiry[9] made at his IBP chapter yielded negative
results. The Commission reset the hearing to 18 November 1988 at two oclock in the afternoon.
[10]
Again on this date, none of the parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the evidence so far
adduced, the case was submitted for resolution on such date. [11]

On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner Concepcion Buencamino submitted her Report,

which reads in part:
The evidence of the complainant was not formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may, it is
worthwhile considering. The stop payment of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an act of Lira,
Inc. and not that of the respondent. There was a subpoena issued for the appearance of Lilia
Echaus, alleged President of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged Secretary/Treasurer of
Lira, Inc. to explain about why the stop payment of the treasury warrant was done but neither
witness appeared (as evidenced by the records) before the Office of the Solicitor General to testify.
At the dorsal portion of Exh. B, the photocopy of the Treasury Warrant is a signature which
complainant claims to be that of the respondent beneath which is the word President and above the
signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an ocular examination of said signature in relation to the
signature on the checks Exhibits G and H do not show definitely that they were the signatures of
one and the same person, so there is no basis to form the conclusion that the respondent did sign the
treasury warrant as president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the complainant was merely that [the]
same treasury warrant was given to her by Atty. Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account. There
is no evidence to prove that she saw him sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the complainant informing the respondent about the stop payment
or even any written demand by the complainant to the respondent that the payment of the treasury
warrant having been stopped he should reimburse her with what he received as consideration for
this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits having issued the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the
other for P6,000.00 to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her
way, when in fact he is presumed to have been aware when he issued said checks that his account
with the bank against which [these] checks were drawn was already closed, as was discovered from
the fact that the checks were dishonored for said reason.
Even disregarding the complainants evidence and considering the answer of the respondent, the act
of the respondent in issuing the two checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 which he
gave to the complainant for her to show to her creditors that money was coming her way, when there
was none and the respondent knew such fact was an act of connivance of the respondent with the
complainant to make use of these useless commercial documents to deceive the public. However
beneficial it may have been to the complainant, this act of the respondent as a lawyer is abhorrent
and against the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar the like of which was, as in this case, committed by
the respondent, belittles the confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and
morality. In the Bar, moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which the respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully recommended that as a lesson the respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for three (3) months arising from his irresponsible conduct as a member of
the bar to take effect upon notice by him of the decision of suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted [13] the above report, but increased its recommended period
of suspension from three months to six months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez,
transmitted[14] the records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the
Rules of Court.[15] On 8 July 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report [16] regarding various
aspects of the case. The Report further made mention of a Resolution [17] from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document. The Resolution, which was attached to the report, states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.) Considering that the motion of petitioner
Ernesto S. Araneta for reconsideration of the resolution of September 16, 1977 which denied the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the said petitioner of the crime
of estafa thru falsification of commercial document, was denied in the resolution dated October 17,
1977 of the Second Division of this Court for lack of merit, which denial is final, the Court Resolved:
(a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to require the said
petitioner to SHOW CAUSE within ten days from notice why he should not be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar Confidant revealed that the above case had been
archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time between herein respondents last filed pleading
dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a postponement of the scheduled hearing on this case to settle
matters amicably between himself and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been found guilty and
convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude, and indefinitely suspended.
[12]

We find no reason to disturb the findings of Commissioner Buencamino. However, we disagree

with the penalty sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is
irrelevant, because by his own admission, the respondent issued two checks in favor of Moreno
knowing fully well that the same were drawn against a closed account. And though Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 had not yet been passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this act abhorrent and against
the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar, which belittles the
confidence of the public in him and reflects upon his integrity and morality.
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,[18] as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's
definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes
his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.[19]
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.[20]
In Co v. Bernardino[21] and Lao v. Medel,[22] we held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six
months upon partial payment of the obligation.[23]
In the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been
found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving
moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[24] It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [25]
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held[26] that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,[27] [t]he review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon
us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.[28]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ.,concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 7332

June 18, 2013

EDUARDO A. ABELLA, Complainant,

vs.
RICARDO G. BARRIOS, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Far the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Eduardo A. Abella
(complainant) against Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. (respondent) based on the latter's violation of Rules 1.01
and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.Q2, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The Facts
On January 21, 1999, complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation (PT&T) before the Cebu City Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as RAB-VII-01-0128-99. Finding merit in the
complaint, Labor Arbiter (LA) Ernesto F. Carreon, through a Decision dated May 13, 1999, 2 ordered
PT&T to pay complainant P113,100.00 as separation pay and P73,608.00 as backwages.
Dissatisfied, PT&T appealed the LAs Decision to the NLRC. In a Decision dated September 12,
2001,3 the NLRC set aside LA Carreons ruling and instead ordered PT&T to reinstate complainant to
his former position and pay him backwages, as well as 13th month pay and service incentive leave
pay, including moral damages and attorneys fees. On reconsideration, it modified the amounts of the
aforesaid monetary awards but still maintained that complainant was illegally
dismissed.4 Consequently, PT&T filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
In a Decision dated September 18, 2003 (CA Decision), 5 the CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling with
modification, ordering PT&T to pay complainant separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Complainant
moved for partial reconsideration, claiming that all his years of service were not taken into account in
the computation of his separation pay and backwages. The CA granted the motion and thus,
remanded the case to the LA for the same purpose.6 On July 19, 2004, the CA Decision became final
and executory.7
Complainant alleged that he filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the Cebu City
RAB on October 25, 2004. At this point, the case had already been assigned to the new LA, herein
respondent. After the lapse of five (5) months, complainants motion remained unacted, prompting
him to file a Second Motion for Execution on March 3, 2005. Eight (8) months thereafter, still, there
was no action on complainants motion. Thus, on November 4, 2005, complainant proceeded to
respondents office to personally follow-up the matter. In the process, complainant and respondent
exchanged notes on how much the formers monetary awards should be; however, their computations
differed. To complainants surprise, respondent told him that the matter could be "easily fixed" and
thereafter, asked "how much is mine?" Despite his shock, complainant offered the amount
ofP20,000.00, but respondent replied: "make it P30,000.00." By force of circumstance, complainant
acceded on the condition that respondent would have to wait until he had already collected from
PT&T. Before complainant could leave, respondent asked him for some cash, compelling him to give
the latter P1,500.00.8
On November 7, 2005, respondent issued a writ of execution,9 directing the sheriff to proceed to the
premises of PT&T and collect the amount of P1,470,082.60, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
PT&T moved to quash10the said writ which was, however, denied through an Order dated November
22, 2005.11 Unfazed, PT&T filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash dated December 2, 2005, 12 the
contents of which were virtually identical to the one respondent earlier denied. During the hearing of
the said supplemental motion on December 9, 2005, respondent rendered an Order 13 in open court,
recalling the first writ of execution he issued on November 7, 2005. He confirmed the December 9,
2005 Order through a Certification dated December 14, 2005 14 and eventually, issued a new writ of

execution15 wherein complainants monetary awards were reduced from P1,470,082.60

toP114,585.00, inclusive of execution and deposit fees.
Aggrieved, complainant filed on December 16, 2005 a Petition for Injunction before the NLRC. In a
Resolution dated March 14, 2006,16 the NLRC annulled respondents December 9, 2005 Order,
stating that respondent had no authority to modify the CA Decision which was already final and
executory.17
Aside from instituting a criminal case before the Office of the Ombudsman, 18 complainant filed the
instant disbarment complaint19 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), averring that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility for (a) soliciting money from complainant
in exchange for a favorable resolution; and (b) issuing a wrong decision to give benefit and advantage
to PT&T.
In his Comment,20 respondent denied the abovementioned accusations, maintaining that he merely
implemented the CA Decision which did not provide for the payment of backwages. He also claimed
that he never demanded a single centavo from complainant as it was in fact the latter who offered him
the amount of P50,000.00.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 2008, 21 Investigating Commissioner Rico A.
Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco) found that respondent tried to twist the meaning of the CA
Decision out of all logical, reasonable and grammatical context in order to favor PT&T.22 He further
observed that the confluence of events in this case shows that respondent deliberately left
complainants efforts to execute the CA Decision unacted upon until the latter agreed to give him a
portion of the monetary award thereof. Notwithstanding their agreement, immoral and illegal as it was,
respondent later went as far as turning the proceedings into some bidding war which eventually
resulted into a resolution in favor of PT&T. In this regard, respondent was found to be guilty of gross
immorality and therefore, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that he be disbarred.23
On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-345 (IBP
Resolution),24 adopting and approving Commissioner Limpingcos recommendation, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondents violation of the provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Atty. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby DISBARRED.25
Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of gross immorality for his violation of
Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco as adopted by
the IBP Board of Governors.
The pertinent provisions of the Code provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any mans cause.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE

DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
xxxx
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above-cited rules, which are contained under Chapter 1 of the Code, delineate the lawyers
responsibility to society: Rule 1.01 engraves the overriding prohibition against lawyers from engaging
in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct; Rule 1.03 proscribes lawyers from
encouraging any suit or proceeding or delaying any mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest;
meanwhile, Rule 6.02 is particularly directed to lawyers in government service, enjoining them from
using ones public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow
private interests to interfere with public duties.26 It is well to note that a lawyer who holds a
government office may be disciplined as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.27
In this light, a lawyers compliance with and observance of the above-mentioned rules should be
taken into consideration in determining his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law.
To note, "the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession."28 This
proceeds from the lawyers duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the
Bars integrity.29 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public
or private activities, which tends to show deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or disbarment.30

In this case, records show that respondent was merely tasked to recompute the monetary awards
due to the complainant who sought to execute the CA Decision which had already been final and
executory. When complainant moved for execution twice at that respondent slept on the same for
more than a year. It was only when complainant paid respondent a personal visit on November 4,
2005 that the latter speedily issued a writ of execution three (3) days after, or on November 7, 2005.
Based on these incidents, the Court observes that the sudden dispatch in respondents action soon
after the aforesaid visit casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of his denial, i.e., that he did not extort
money from the complainant.
The incredulity of respondents claims is further bolstered by his complete turnaround on the quashal
of the November 7, 2005 writ of execution.
To elucidate, records disclose that respondent denied PT&Ts initial motion to quash through an
Order dated November 22, 2005 but later reversed such order in open court on the basis of PT&Ts
supplemental motion to quash which was a mere rehash of the first motion that was earlier denied. As

a result, respondent recalled his earlier orders and issued a new writ of execution, reducing
complainants monetary awards from P1,470,082.60 toP114,585.00, inclusive of execution and
deposit fees.
To justify the same, respondent contends that he was merely implementing the CA Decision which did
not provide for the payment of backwages. A plain and cursory reading, however, of the said decision
belies the truthfulness of the foregoing assertion. On point, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated September 12, 2001 and October 8,
2002 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION, ordering petitioner PT&T to pay private
respondent Eduardo A. Abella separation pay (as computed by the Labor Arbiter) in lieu of
reinstatement.31
Noticeably, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRCs rulings dated September 12, 2001 and
October 8, 2002 which both explicitly awarded backwages and other unpaid monetary benefits to
complainant.32 The only modification was with respect to the order of reinstatement as pronounced in
both NLRCs rulings which was changed by the CA to separation pay in view of the strained relations
between the parties as well as the supervening removal of complainants previous position. 33 In other
words, the portion of the NLRCs rulings which awarded backwages and other monetary benefits
subsisted and the modification pertained only to the CAs award of separation pay in lieu of the
NLRCs previous order of reinstatement. This conclusion, palpable as it is, can be easily deduced
from the records.
Lamentably, respondent tried to distort the findings of the CA by quoting portions of its decision,
propounding that the CAs award of separation pay denied complainants entitlement to any
backwages and other consequential benefits altogether. In his Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
the IBP Resolution,34 respondent stated:
From the above quoted final conclusions, the Court is very clear and categorical in directing PT&T to
pay complainant his separation pay ONLY in lieu of reinstatement. Clearly, the Court did not direct the
PT&T to pay him his backwages, and other consequential benefits that were directed by the NLRC
because he could no longer be reinstated to his previous position on the ground of strained
relationship and his previous position had already gone, and no equivalent position that the PT&T
could offer. x x x.
Fundamental in the realm of labor law is the rule that backwages are separate and distinct from
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and are awarded conjunctively to an employee who has been
illegally dismissed.35 There is nothing in the records that could confound the finding that complainant
was illegally dismissed as LA Carreon, the NLRC, and the CA were all unanimous in decreeing the
same. Being a labor arbiter, it is hardly believable that respondent could overlook the fact that
complainant was entitled to backwages in view of the standing pronouncement of illegal
dismissal.1wphi1 In this regard, respondents defense deserves scant consideration.
Therefore, absent any cogent basis to rule otherwise, the Court gives credence and upholds
Commissioner Limpingcos and the IBP Board of Governors pronouncement of respondents gross
immorality. Likewise, the Court observes that his infractions constitute gross misconduct.
Jurisprudence illumines that immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.36 It treads the line of grossness when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.37 On the other hand, gross
misconduct constitutes "improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and

definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment." 38
In this relation, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that when a lawyer is found guilty of
gross immoral conduct or gross misconduct, he may be suspended or disbarred:
SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, as respondents violations clearly constitute gross immoral conduct and gross misconduct, his
disbarment should come as a matter of course.1wphi1 However, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that he had already been disbarred in a previous administrative case, entitled Sps. Rafols, Jr.
v. Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr.,39 which therefore precludes the Court from duplicitously decreeing the
same. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it proper to, instead, impose a fine in the amount
of P40,000.0040 in order to penalize respondents transgressions as discussed herein and to equally
deter the commission of the same or similar acts in the future.
As a final word, the Court staunchly reiterates the principle that the practice of law is a
privilege41 accorded only to those who continue to meet its exacting qualifications. Verily, for all the
prestige and opportunity which the profession brings lies the greater responsibility to uphold its
integrity and honor. Towards this purpose, it is quintessential that its members continuously and
unwaveringly exhibit, preserve and protect moral uprightness in their activities, both in their legal
practice as well as in their personal lives. Truth be told, the Bar holds no place for the deceitful,
immoral and corrupt.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ricardo G. Barrios, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct
and gross misconduct in violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.03, Canon 1, and Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of P40,000.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Nonquota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC,
INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in
his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly
decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required
the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine

Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The
said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered
by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in
either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein
complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of
establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court
to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field
of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to
the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is

respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly,
the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the
present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of
a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would have it.
The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary
to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man
and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relation during the marriage within the limits provided
by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being
conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in
accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage,"
if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers
do not constitute legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to
law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar
thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should be prohibited from further performing
or offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering
such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be
stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by nonmembers of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession
will deny the profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological development
in the profession may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention
of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its

services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which
service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under Philippine
law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should
be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the
trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in
paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement
which announces a certainAtty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its
pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then
take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such
limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is

an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1,
Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the
Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the
lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting
for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein,
are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic
and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical,
misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages
2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related
problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other
related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the
legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and
which activities call for legal training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be
given to the protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the
meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its
services. The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It
gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
as there are doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The
Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and
against the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in
this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a
valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are
solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency
for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from
qualified practitioners legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an

illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a
secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on
divorce, where in this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by
our Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of
this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice of
law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective
service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must
be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use
of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A
good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building
and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage
a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the building code
and the like, then an architect who performed this function would probably
be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of the lay
personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and business agents of the
labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for
their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and without regard to
legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendants
have the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession
for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading universities. The
court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, wellestablished method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain function
have no right to do so, or that the technical education given by our schools
cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind
of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar,
he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer
in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining, with or
without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however,
there may be an exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But
if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-way and the
principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may
be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy
between an employer and his men grows from differing interpretations of a

contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle

it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of
the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to
appear in person, or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a
licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase
of his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows,
even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800,
cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where
the customer buys materials on the subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of

a legal text which purports to say what the law is amount to legal practice.
And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not
affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that
is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL
OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF
A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not
purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a particular situation
in their publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper
basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the
purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of
the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation
of the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and
counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder,
348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, nonadvisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice
or counselling," such would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious
disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or
perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that

only "paralegal services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have
laid down general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render
any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types
of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess
power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business
to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice
for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of
a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles
and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before
any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their

clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages
in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895,
340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am.
Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the
work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on
the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices
[Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of

documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence

gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government or nongovernment agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other
countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that
they can avail of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that
do not involve representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or administering
legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not
suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and
lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than
real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it
strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That
is what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in
court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue
of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given
by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field
toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing
the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so
on. That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment.
These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a
simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this
were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a
while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang maconfine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would
be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative
is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in
taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows how
to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the
case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules
specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar
who have complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those
persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification
for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of
the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise
little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are
none in the Philippines.28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major
standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for
the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to
certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice
law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services,
but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for
professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was
held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid

agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to

advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts
the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced
but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a
way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate
it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which
they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are
expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced;
date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees
and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal
and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being
invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such
an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in
Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what
is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder
and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will
be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative
parameters of the present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since,
under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical
advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of
the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due
ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in
light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor
General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which

is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code
of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo,
Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6622

July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of
fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while respondents first
marriage was subsisting.1
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to file
a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005. 3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt
of the record.4
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice 5 setting
the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference,
complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted for resolution
three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees
to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. 6
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers. Respondent
filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01 August
2005.8
Complainants Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous petitions for
corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they had a verbal
agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the
corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also claimed that he was
entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work
with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant
appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of Section
27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to
advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to
his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, 10 letter-proposals to clients signed by
respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients. 12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two counts of
bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He submitted a
Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics
Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first,
on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28
September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of Manila; and the third on 07 September
1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
Respondents Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was not an
employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office 14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant
was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the
latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court cases. 16 Respondent also
alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the payment of fees and the
sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that his
law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle the
legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to the financial
aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement dated
10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-President for Operations of
the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William Genesis, a
dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had
been retracted by the affiant himself. 20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts. 21 To the
said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and

names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three
marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took
place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980. 23 The
second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion, and it took place at
the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987. 24 The third Marriage
Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7
September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed
against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent further
informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract
with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract
with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. 28 In both
petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in the
records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano
on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory
hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not
attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of
the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he discovered to be bearing
his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of two (2)
Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was
for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane
Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still subsisting. 34 Each of the Informations
recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal
cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same proceeding,
the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions
for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the
administrative case against him be submitted for resolution. 36
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent. 37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to
prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal

services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation. It
failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated. 39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for violating
Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that
respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latters first marriage was
subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the Commission recommended that he be
disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. 41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01 August
2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to disbar him
was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the
marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other women. He
further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish that the latter committed
bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the
annulment of Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and affirmed
their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment. 44
The Courts Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with the
rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers share in the
fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02 45 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees
for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that complainant
solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove the
existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share
the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants allegations in this case had
not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by

respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in the
report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 47 of the Code, which
prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises,
though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent
with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the business is one
that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled by a
lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane Management,
Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent
as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex
"C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The letter
clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would render
legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered
objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi
& Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to
the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the attorney-client
relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if
it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice by
respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08
of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To substantiate this
allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by
respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the introduction of these documents,
claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution,
thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them. 52 We are not persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification and
fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the
case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by
the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.

First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter
of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
and satisfactory proof.54In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that
respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions
tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but
denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had
filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the
second and the third Marriage Contracts null and void. 55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women aside from his wife.
For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which renders
him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the
official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death of a person.
Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary
weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any
competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed civil
actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and found
that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary
agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements
indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on
what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while
his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, 56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of misconduct
which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and
reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly
be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other
relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of
the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the
bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of
committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. 58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral
conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 2012
February 10, 2009
PROPOSED RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE FOR PRACTICING LAWYERS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Memorandum dated January 27, 2009 of Justice Renato C. Corona re: Comment of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on our Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule of Mandatory
Legal Aid Service for Practicing Lawyers, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on July 1, 2009 following publication of the said Rule and its
implementing regulations in at least two (2) newpapers of general circulation.
February 10, 2009
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

RULE ON MANDATORY LEGAL AID SERVICE

SECTION 1. Title. - This Rule shall be known as "The Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service."
SECTION 2. Purpose. - This Rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to society as agents of
social change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by the less
privileged members of society and expedite the resolution of cases involving them. Mandatory free
legal service by members of the bar and their active support thereof will aid the efficient and effective
administration of justice especially in cases involving indigent and pauper litigants.
SECTION 3. Scope. - This Rule shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to
render free legal aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent
and pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern the duty of other
members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Rule:
(a) Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies, including but not limited to the National
Labor Relations Commission, National Conciliation and Mediation Board, Department of Labor
and Employment Regional Offices, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and
National Commission for Indigenous Peoples. The term "practicing lawyers" shall exclude:
(i) Government employees and incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to
practice;
(ii) Lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court;
(iii) Supervising lawyers of students enrolled in law student practice in duly accredited
legal clinics of law schools and lawyers of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
peoples organizations (POs) like the Free Legal Assistance Group who by the nature of
their work already render free legal aid to indigent and pauper litigants and
(iv) Lawyers not covered under subparagraphs (i) to (iii) including those who are
employed in the private sector but do not appear for and in behalf of parties in courts of
law and quasi-judicial agencies.
(b) Indigent and pauper litigants are those defined under Rule 141, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court andAlgura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga (G.R. No.150135, 30
October 2006, 506 SCRA 81);
(c) Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants need legal
representation;
(d) Free legal aid services refer to appearance in court or quasi-judicial body for and in behalf
of an indigent or pauper litigant and the preparation of pleadings or motions. It shall also cover
assistance by a practicing lawyer to indigent or poor litigants in court-annexed mediation and in
other modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Services rendered when a practicing
lawyer is appointed counsel de oficio shall also be considered as free legal aid services and
credited as compliance under this Rule;
(e) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is the official national organization of lawyers in the
country;
(f) National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically
tasked with handling legal aid cases;
(g) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) is the committee of the IBP which is specifically tasked
with disciplining members of the Bar;
(h) IBP Chapters are those chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines located in the
different geographical areas of the country as defined in Rule 139-A and
(i) Clerk of Court is the Clerk of Court of the court where the practicing lawyer rendered free
legal aid services. In the case of quasi-judicial bodies, it refers to an officer holding an
equivalent or similar position.
The term shall also include an officer holding a similar position in agencies exercising quasijudicial functions, or a responsible officer of an accredited PO or NGO, or an accredited
mediator who conducted the court-annexed mediation proceeding.
SECTION 5. Requirements. (a) Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of sixty (60) hours of free legal aid
services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within a period of twelve
(12) months, with a minimum of five (5) hours of free legal aid services each month. However,
where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid service for more than five (5)
hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the said lawyer for the succeeding
periods.
For this purpose, a practicing lawyer shall coordinate with the Clerk of Court for cases where
he may render free legal aid service. He may also coordinate with the IBP Legal Aid

Chairperson of the IBP Chapter to inquire about cases where he may render free legal aid
service. In this connection, the IBP Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter shall regularly
and actively coordinate with the Clerk of Court.
The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within ten (10) days of the
last month of each quarter of the year.
(b) A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the Clerk of
Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid services in a case.
The certificate shall contain the following information:
(i) The case or cases where the legal aid service was rendered, the party or parties in
the said case(s) for whom the service was rendered, the docket number of the said
case(s) and the date(s) the service was rendered.
(ii) The number of hours actually spent attending a hearing or conducting trial on a
particular case in the court or quasi-judicial body.
(iii) The number of hours actually spent attending mediation, conciliation or any other
mode of ADR on a particular case.
(iv) A motion (except a motion for extension of time to file a pleading or for
postponement of hearing or conference) or pleading filed on a particular case shall be
considered as one (1) hour of service.
The Clerk of Court shall issue the certificate in triplicate, one (1) copy to be retained by
the practicing lawyer, one (1) copy to be retained by the Clerk of Court and one (1) copy
to be attached to the lawyer's compliance report.
(c) Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP Chapter
within the courts jurisdiction. The Legal Aid Chairperson shall then be tasked with immediately
verifying the contents of the certificate with the issuing Clerk of Court by comparing the copy of
the certificate attached to the compliance report with the copy retained by the Clerk of Court.
(d) The IBP Chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the concerned
lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit the compliance reports to the IBPs NCLA for
recording and documentation. The submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after
the mandatory submission of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers.
(e) Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the immediately
preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
(f) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(i)
and (ii), shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are
employed with the government or incumbent elective officials not allowed by law to practice or
lawyers who by law are not allowed to appear in court.
The form shall be sworn to and submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together
with the payment of an annual contribution of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000). Said contribution
shall accrue to a special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(g) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iii)
shall secure a certification from the director of the legal clinic or of the concerned NGO or PO
to the effect that, during that year, they have served as supervising lawyers in a legal clinic or
actively participated in the NGOs or POs free legal aid activities. The certification shall be
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office.
(h) Before the end of a particular year, lawyers covered by the category under Section 4(a)(iv)
shall fill up a form prepared by the NCLA which states that, during that year, they are neither
practicing lawyers nor covered by Section (4)(a)(i) to (iii). The form shall be sworn to and
submitted to the IBP Chapter or IBP National Office together with the payment of an annual
contribution of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) by way of support for the efforts of practicing
lawyers who render mandatory free legal aid services. Said contribution shall accrue to a
special fund of the IBP for the support of its legal aid program.
(i) Failure to pay the annual contribution shall subject the lawyer to a penalty of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000) for that year which amount shall also accrue to the special fund for the legal
aid program of the IBP.
SECTION 6. NCLA. (a) The NCLA shall coordinate with the various legal aid committees of the IBP local chapters
for the proper handling and accounting of legal aid cases which practicing lawyers can
represent.
(b) The NCLA shall monitor the activities of the Chapter of the Legal Aid Office with respect to
the coordination with Clerks of Court on legal aid cases and the collation of certificates
submitted by practicing lawyers.

(c) The NCLA shall act as the national repository of records in compliance with this Rule.
(d) The NCLA shall prepare the following forms: certificate to be issued by the Clerk of Court
and forms mentioned in Section 5(e) and (g).
(e) The NCLA shall hold in trust, manage and utilize the contributions and penalties that will be
paid by lawyers pursuant to this Rule to effectively carry out the provisions of this Rule. For this
purpose, it shall annually submit an accounting to the IBP Board of Governors.
The accounting shall be included by the IBP in its report to the Supreme Court in connection
with its request for the release of the subsidy for its legal aid program.
SECTION 7. Penalties. (a) At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the minimum
prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the IBP, through the
NCLA, to explain why he was unable to render the minimum prescribed number of hours. If no
explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall
make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors that the erring lawyer be
declared a member of the IBP who is not in good standing. Upon approval of the NCLAs
recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall declare the erring lawyer as a member not
in good standing. Notice thereof shall be furnished the erring lawyer and the IBP Chapter
which submitted the lawyers compliance report or the IBP Chapter where the lawyer is
registered, in case he did not submit a compliance report. The notice to the lawyer shall
include a directive to pay Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000) penalty which shall accrue to the
special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
(b) The "not in good standing" declaration shall be effective for a period of three (3) months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors. During the
said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial body as counsel. Provided,
however, that the "not in good standing" status shall subsist even after the lapse of the threemonth period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
(c) Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least three (3)
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted motu
proprio by the CBD. The said proceedings shall afford the erring lawyer due process in
accordance with the rules of the CBD and Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. If found
administratively liable, the penalty of suspension in the practice of law for one (1) year shall be
imposed upon him.
(d) Any lawyer who falsifies a certificate or any form required to be submitted under this Rule
or any contents thereof shall be administratively charged with falsification and dishonesty and
shall be subject to disciplinary action by the CBD. This is without prejudice to the filing of
criminal charges against the lawyer.
(e) The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or
by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO or PO shall be a ground for an
administrative case against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to
the filing of the criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor.
SECTION 8. Credit for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE). - A lawyer who renders
mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for the three year-period
covered by a compliance period under the Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: two (2)
credit units for legal ethics, two (2) credit units for trial and pretrial skills, two (2) credit units for
alternative dispute resolution, four (4) credit units for legal writing and oral advocacy, four (4) credit
units for substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence and six (6) credit units for such subjects
as may be prescribed by the MCLE Committee under Section 2(9), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
A lawyer who renders mandatory legal aid service for the required number of hours in a year for at
least two consecutive years within the three year-period covered by a compliance period under the
Rules on MCLE shall be credited the following: one (1) credit unit for legal ethics, one (1) credit unit
for trial and pretrial skills, one (1) credit unit for alternative dispute resolution, two (2) credit units for
legal writing and oral advocacy, two (2) credit units for substantive and procedural laws and
jurisprudence and three (3) credit units for such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee under Section 2(g), Rule 2 of the Rules on MCLE.
SECTION 9. Implementing Rules. - The IBP, through the NCLA, is hereby given authority to
recommend implementing regulations in determining who are "practicing lawyers," what constitute
"legal aid cases" and what administrative procedures and financial safeguards which may be
necessary and proper in the implementation of this rule may be prescribed. It shall coordinate with the
various legal chapters in the crafting of the proposed implementing regulations and, upon approval by
the IBP Board of Governors, the said implementing regulations shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final approval.

SECTION 10. Effectivity. - This Rule and its implementing rules shall take effect on July 1,2009 after
they have been published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000
issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme
Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke
to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling
annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will
not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband
charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other
half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office
revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila
Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator
and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. [3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that
advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public
order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from
the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. [7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was denied by
the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002 [9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty.
Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr.,
Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was
consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. [10] Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. [14] The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15] The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1.
A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2.
A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3.
A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4.
A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that
he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August
14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same
advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent
are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the
stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary
climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment
may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case, [19] he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their
marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in
a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. [20] Thus, the use
of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields
of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are
permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable. [21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical
and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which
are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the

opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being
for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics
supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of
violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.

[1]

Rollo, p. 13.
Id., pp. 14-15.
[3]
Id., p. 9.
[4]
Id., pp. 21-57.
[5]
Id., p. 60.
[6]
Id., p. 62.
[7]
Id., p. 72.
[8]
Id., p. 75.
[9]
Id., p. 73.
[10]
Id., p. 109.
[11]
Id., p. 110.
[12]
Cantiller v. Potenciano, A.C. No. 3195, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 246, 253.
[13]
Canlas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77691, 8 August 1988, 164 SCRA 160, 174.
[14]
Agpalo R., LEGAL ETHICS, p. 12 [1997].
[15]
Burbe v. Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, 10 June 2002.
[16]
Agpalo, supra, at pp. 13-14, citing In re Sycip, 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1, 10; Pineda E.L. LEGAL
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, p. 58 [1999].
[17]
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 41.
[18]
Id., p. 110.
[19]
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 3.
[20]
Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics, supra, at p. 61.
[21]
Id., p. 65.
[22]
Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378, 407.
BAR MATTER NO. 850
[October 02, 2001]
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
RESOLUTION
ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by theIBP, endorsed by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal
Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following Revised Rules
for proper implementation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE 1
PURPOSE
SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE. Continuing legal education is required of members of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.chan robles virtual law library
RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE. - Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules
by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and shall commence
[2]

the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance
with these Rules.cralaw
SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE. Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall
complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.
(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skillsequivalent to four (4) credit
units.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolutionequivalent to five (5)
credit
units.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence equivalent
to
nine
(9)
credit
units.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacyequivalent to four (4)
credit
units.
(f) At least two (2)
conventions equivalent

hours

shall
to

be

devoted
two

to

international
(2)

law and
credit

international
units.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the
MCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.
RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
SECTION 1. Initial compliance period. - The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three
(3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period for members
admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for
thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.chan
robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. - Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE requirement shall be
divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Compliance group 1. - Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila are
assigned
to
Compliance
Group
1.
(b) Compliance group 2. - Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group 2.
(c) Compliance group 3. - Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance Group 3.
Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may be
available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.
SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program.
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be assigned
to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the date of admission
or readmission.cralaw
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month
of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.cralaw
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial
compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing
legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which
the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours
of education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.
RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Guidelines. CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS.CREDIT UNITS
measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based on the category of
the lawyers participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the guidelines for computing

credit

units

and

the

supporting

documents

PROGRAMS/A CREDIT SUPPORTING

CTIVITY
UNITS
DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS,
CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS,
DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED
PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES
1.
1 CU
CERTIFICATE
PARTICIPANT/ PER
OF
ATTENDEE
HOUR OF ATTENDANCE
ATTENDA WITH NUMBER
NCE
OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER FULL CU PHOTOCOPY OF
RESOURCE
FOR THE PLAQUE OR
SPEAKER
SUBJECT SPONSORS
PER
CERTIFICATION
COMPLIA
NCE
PERIOD
1.3
OF CU CERTIFICATION
PANELIST/REA FOR THE FROM
CTOR
SUBJECT SPONSORING
COMMENTATO PER
ORGANIZATION
R/
COMPLIA
MODERATOR/ NCE
COORDINATO PERIOD
R/
FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 LAW BOOK FULL CU PUBLISHED
OF NOT LESS FOR THE BOOK
THAN 100
SUBJECT
PAGES
PER
COMPLIA
NCE
PERIOD
2.2 BOOK
OF
PUBLISHED
EDITOR
THE CU BOOK WITH
OF
PROOF AS
AUTHOR EDITOR
SHIP
CATEGO
RY
2.3 RESEARCH OF CU DULY
PAPER
FOR THE CERTIFIED/PUB
INNOVATIVE SUBJECT LISHED
PROGRAM/
PER
TECHNICAL
CREATIVE
COMPLIA REPORT/PAPER
PROJECT
NCE
PERIOD
2.4 LEGAL
OF CU PUBLISHED
ARTICLE OF
FOR THE ARTICLE
AT LEAST TEN SUBJECT
(10) PAGES
PER
COMPLIA
NCE
PERIOD
2.5 LEGAL
1 CU
PUBLISHED

required

therefor:

NEWSLETTER/ PER
NEWSLETTER/J
LAW JOURNAL ISSUE
OURNAL
EDITOR
2.6
FULL CU CERTIFICATION
PROFESSORIA FOR THE OF LAW DEAN
L CHAIR/
SUBJECT OR BAR REVIEW
BAR REVIEW PER
DIRECTOR
LECTURE
COMPLIA
LAW
NCE
TEACHING/
PERIOD
RULE 5
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS
SECTION 1. Classes of credit units . -Credit units are either participatory or non-participatory.cralaw
SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units . - Participatory credit units may be claimed
for:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia, inhouse
education
programs,
workshops,
dialogues
or
round
table
discussion.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities. chan robles virtual law library
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units . - Non-participatory credit unitsmay be claimed per
compliance period for:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g.,
in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS
SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. - Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in
an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.cralaw
RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS
SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following members of the Bar are exempt from
the MCLE requirement:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries
of
Executive
Departments;
(b)

Senators

and

Members

of

the

House

of

Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members
of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
(e)

The

Solicitor

General

and

the

Assistant

Solicitors

General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
(g)

The

Chairmen

and

Members

of

the

Constitutional

Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor
of
the
Office
of
the
Ombudsman;
(i)

Heads

of

government

agencies

exercising

quasi-judicial

functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least

ten

(10)

years

in

accredited

law

schools; chan

robles

virtual

law

library

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial
Lecturers
of
the
Philippine
Judicial
Academy;
and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE. - The following Members of the Bar are likewise
exempt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
Those
who
are
not
in
law
practice,
private
or
public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.
SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement - A member may file a verified
request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate
study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the
requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be
established by the MCLE Committee.
SEC. 4. Change of status. - The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which
a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day
as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.cralaw
SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. - Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE
requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.cralaw
RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. - Subject to the implementing regulations that may be
adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be granted approval in
either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and certifies that the
activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is specifically mandated by
law to provide continuing legal education.cralaw
SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. - All continuing legal education activities must meet the
following standards:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chan robles virtual law library
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the
legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that
enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.
RULE 9
ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS
SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. - Accreditation of providers shall be done by the MCLE
Committee.cralaw
SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. - Any person or group may be accredited as a
provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of
continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to
be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a)
Be
submitted
on
a
form
provided
by
the
MCLE
Committee;
(b)

Contain

all

information

requested

in

the

form;

(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. - All approved accredited providers shall agree to the
following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at
least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official

record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the
activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of
Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education
activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(b) The provider shall certify that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the amount of _______ hours of
which _____ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules
and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE COMMITTEE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location,
subject
matter
and
length
of
the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity
by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of the
Committee and IBP Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to
each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a copy
of
THE
MCLE
COMMITTEE-approved
Education
Activity
Evaluation
Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not
less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE. chan robles virtual
law
library
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a
spurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation . - The accreditation of a provider may be renewed
every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of
these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation . - The accreditation of any provider referred to in
Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for
good cause.cralaw
RULE 10
FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER
SECTION 1. Payment of fees. - Application for approval of an education activity or accreditation as a
provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of MCLE Fees.cralaw
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. Compliance card. - Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance
Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that
he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the
exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the Committee not later than the day after
the end of the member's compliance period.cralaw
SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. - Each member shall maintain sufficient record of
compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided
to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 9 should be a sufficient record of
attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activity shall also be maintained by
the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.cralaw
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. - The following shall constitute noncompliance:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;
(b)

Failure

to

provide

attestation

of

compliance

or

exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within
the
prescribed
period; chan
robles
virtual
law
library
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty

(60)
(e)

days
Failure

from
to

pay

receipt
non-compliance

of
fee

non-compliance
within

the

prescribed

notice;
period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.
SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. - Members failing to comply
will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or otherwise showing
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following language near the
beginning of the notice in capital letters:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE LISTED
AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attain
the adequate number of credit units for compliance. Creditunits earned during this period may only
be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excess of
the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement. chan robles virtual law library
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. - A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the
end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.cralaw
SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. - A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the
sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The investigation of a member for noncompliance shall be conducted by the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the
MCLE Committee.cralaw
SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. - Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the active rate
against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.cralaw
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
SECTION 1. Process. - The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the
member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of noncompliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement for the
period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These creditunits may
not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit units
earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior
compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. - The termination of listing as a
delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE Committee.cralaw
RULE 15
COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
SECTION 1. Composition. - The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely, a
retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members respectively nominated by
the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and
associations of law schools and/or law professors.cralaw
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by
the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be
determined by the Court.cralaw
SEC. 2. Duty of committee. - The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing
rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with
the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme
Court. chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. - Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, the MCLE
Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing,
reporting, approval and other necessary functions.cralaw

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. - The MCLE Committee shall submit to the Supreme Court for
approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain the MCLE
Program. chan robles virtual law library
This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.cralaw
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001
.cralaw
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
B.M. No. 1922
June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION REQUIRED IN
ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 3,
2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsels MCLE Certificate
of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated
May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the
members of the Bar in the MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education
and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave. (adv216a)
Very truly yours,
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA(sgd)
Clerk of Court
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 191837

September 19, 2012

MARIA CONSOLACION RIVERA-PASCUAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES MARILYN LIM and GEORGE LIM and the REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA
CITY,Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated October 15, 2009 1 and March
11, 20102of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265.
The facts leading to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

Subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4.4 hectares and
located at Bignay, Valenzuela City. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
V-73892, registered in the names of George and Marilyn Lim (Spouses Lim).
On September 8, 2004, Maria Consolacion Rivera-Pascual (Consolacion) filed before the Office of
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV-A a petition to be recognized as a
tenant of a property located at Bignay, Valenzuela City against Danilo Deato (Deato). At that time, the
property, which has an approximate area of 4.4 hectares, was covered by TCT No. 24759 under
Deatos name. During the pendency of the petition, Deato sold the property to Spouses Lim. The sale
was registered on December 21, 2004 leading to the issuance of TCT No. V-73892 in favor of
Spouses Lim. Considering this development, Consolacion filed a motion on March 3, 2005 to implead
Spouses Lim as respondents.3
The petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-0012-04, was granted byRegional
Adjudicator Conchita C. Mias (RA Mias) in a Decision 4 dated December 2, 2005, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring that petitioner is the tenant of the subject landholding by succession from her deceased
father;
2) Declaring respondents spouses George and Marilyn Lim to have subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligation of spouses Danilo and Divina Deato;
3) Ordering the respondents and all persons claiming rights under them to maintain petitioner in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the agricultural land subject hereof;
4) Declaring petitioner to have the right to exercise the right of redemption of the subject parcel of
agricultural land pursuant to Section 12 of RA 3844 as amended; and
5) Dismissing the petition against Louie Cruz, Fire Force Agency and Danny Boy Rivera for having no
proximate tenurial relationship with the petitioner hence beyond the jurisdictional ambit of this Office.
SO ORDERED.5
On July 7, 2006, the foregoing decision became final. 6
Upon Consolacions motion for execution filed on January 7, 2008, RA Mias issued a writ of
execution on January 8, 2008.7
On January 21, 2008, Consolacion filed a petition against Spouses Lim and the Registrar of Deeds of
Valenzuela City praying for the issuance of an order directing Spouses Lim to accept the amount
of P 10,000,000.00 which she undertook to tender during the initial hearing, declaring the property
redeemed, and cancelling TCT No. V-73892.8 Consolacion consigned with the RARAD the amount
of P 10,000,000.00 on March 3, 2008. 9
Consolacions petition, which was docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0400-001-08, was given due
course by RA Mias in a Decision10 dated June 2, 2008, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. As prayed for, declaring that the landholding subject of the petition as lawfully redeemed;
2. Ordering respondent spouses to accept and withdraw the amount of the redemption price
consigned with this Office which was deposited for safekeeping indicated in Managers Check

No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or
DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of ten (10) million pesos;
3. Upon acceptance and the withdrawal of the redemption price as ordered in paragraph 2
hereof, ordering respondent spouses to execute a Deed of Redemption in favor of petitioner;
4. In case of refusal and/or failure of respondent spouses to execute the Deed of Redemption
as ordered above, the Regional Clerk of the Board is hereby ordered to execute a Deed of
Redemption in the name of the petitioner; and
5. Directing the Register of Deeds for Valenzuela City to cause the cancellation of TCT No. V73892 registered in the name of respondent spouses Marilyn and George Lim and a new one
issued in the name of petitioner upon presentment of the Deed of Redemption.
SO ORDERED.11
On appeal, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a Decision 12 on
February 18, 2009 reversing RA Mias Decision dated June 2, 2008. Specifically:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision dated 02 June 2008 is
herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the landholding to be not lawfully redeemed;
2. DECLARING petitioner-appellee not a bona fide tenant of the subject landholding;
3. DECLARING that petitioner-appellee cannot redeem the subject parcel registered in the
names of the respondents-appellants;
4. ORDERING the respondents-appellants to be maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject landholding; and
5. DIRECTING the Clerk of the Board of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Region
IV-A to return the Managers Check No. 0000004518 issued by Allied Bank in the name of
Spouses Marilyn and George Lim and/or DAR Adjudication Board Region IV-A in the amount of
Ten Million pesos to herein petitioner-appellee.
SO ORDERED.13
On April 13, 2009, Consolacion moved for reconsideration, 14 which the DARAB denied in a
Resolution15 dated June 8, 2009 for being filed out of time.
SECTION 12 Rule X of the 2003 DARAB Rules provides that a Motion for Reconsideration shall be
filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution, or decision of the Board or
Adjudicator. Records show that both the petitioner-appellee and her counsel received a copy of the
Decision dated 18 February 2009 on 27 February 2009 and that Legal Officer Nancy Geocada, the
alleged new counsel of the herein petitioner-appellee, filed the Motion for Reconsideration only on 13
April 2009, clearly the Motion for Reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen (15) days (sic)
reglementary period thus the herein Decision has already become final and executory. x x x. 16
On June 25, 2009, Consolacion filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the
CA.17
On July 1, 2009, the CA resolved to require Consolacions counsel to submit within five (5) days from
notice his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance or Exemption
and an amended Verification and Certification Against Non-Forum-Shopping. 18 Apparently,

Consolacions counsel failed to indicate in the petition his MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Exemption Number as required under Bar Matter No. 1922. Also, the jurat of Consolacions
verification and certification against non-forum-shopping failed to indicate any competent evidence of
Consolacions identity apart from her community tax certificate.
Considering the failure of Consolacion and her counsel to comply, the CA issued a Resolution 19 on
October 15, 2009 dismissing the petition.
On July 7, 2009, the counsel for the petitioner received the above-mentioned Resolution. However,
the counsel for the petitioner failed to comply with the said Resolution which was due on July 19,
2009.
For failure of the counsel for the petitioner to comply with the Resolution dated July 1, 2009, despite
receipt of the notice thereof, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.20
Consolacion moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the CA in a Resolution 21 dated March
11, 2010.
Consolacion is, before this Court, claiming that the CAs summary dismissal of her petition on
technical grounds is unwarranted.1wphi1 Consolacion invoked substantial justice against the CAs
strict application of the rule requiring her counsel to note his MCLE Compliance or Exemption
Certificate Number and the rule rendering the jurat of her verification and certification on non-forumshopping defective in the absence of the details of any one of her current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing her photograph and signature. That there was merit in her
petition and that she complied, albeit belatedly as her counsels MCLE Compliance Certificate
Number was indicated and a verification and certificate on non-forum-shopping with a proper jurat
was attached to her motion for reconsideration, should have sufficed for the CA to reverse the
dismissal of her petition and decide the same on its merits. Consolacion alleged that procedural rules
or technicalities are designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and their rigid application should be
avoided if this would frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
The Court finds no merit in the petition. The Court sees no reversible error committed by the CA in
dismissing Consolacions petition before it on the ground of petitioners unexplained failure to comply
with basic procedural requirements attendant to the filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. Notably, Consolacion and her counsel remained obstinate despite the opportunity
afforded to them by the CA to rectify their lapses. While there was compliance, this took place,
however, after the CA had ordered the dismissal of Consolacions petition and without reasonable
cause proffered to justify its belatedness. Consolacion and her counsel claimed inadvertence and
negligence but they did not explain the circumstances thereof. Absent valid and compelling reasons,
the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appears to be an
afterthought, hence, cannot be granted. The CA saw no compelling need meriting the relaxation of
the rules. Neither does this Court see any.
The Court is aware of the exceptional cases where technicalities were liberally construed. However,
in these cases, outright dismissal is rendered unjust by the presence of a satisfactory and persuasive
explanation. The parties therein who prayed for liberal interpretation were able to hurdle that heavy
burden of proving that they deserve an exceptional treatment. It was never the Courts intent "to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." 22
This Court will not condone a cavalier attitude towards procedural rules. It is the duty of every
member of the bar to comply with these rules. They are not at liberty to seek exceptions should they
fail to observe these rules and rationalize their omission by harking on liberal construction.

While it IS the negligence of Consolacion's counsel that led to this unfortunate result, she is bound by
such.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 15,
2009 and March 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 109265 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO
T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN
ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN),
FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE,
MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO,
CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY
CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA
BREWERY, INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS
HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP., NORTHERN
TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY.
ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand,
the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its
effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation
causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central Bank. [1] It was later found
by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to directors, officers, stockholders
and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as doubtful and P0.505
million as uncollectible.[2] As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK
which reached a total of P310 million.[3] Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from
its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring
GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the
general public, and ordering its liquidation.[4] A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was held
from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
[5]
Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court
of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANKs liquidation
as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and
his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against
respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua,
Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry
C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied
Banking Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic
Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing

Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development
Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan.[6] In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former President Marcos.
Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. [7] After the filing of
the parties comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et
al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then
resumed his private practice of law.
On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel
for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos.
0005[8] and 0096-0099.[9] The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General[10] and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK, which
was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.
Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et
al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Banks officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANKs liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank
in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 107812. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyersfrom accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
On April
22,
1991 the
Second
Division
of
the Sandiganbayan issued
a
[11]
resolution denying PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. It
found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent
Mendozas former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio
Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf
of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. [12] It further ruled that respondent Mendozas
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or
separation from public office.[13] The PCGG did not seek any reconsideration of the ruling. [14]
It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayans Second
Division to the Fifth Division.[15] In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.
[16]
It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April 22, 1991, and observed that the
arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil Case No. 0005. The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.[17]
Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and
December 5, 2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorariand
prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [18] The PCGG alleged that the Fifth
Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could not
waive the objection to respondent Mendozas appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the
resolution in Civil Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.[19]
The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the
import and impact of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and
the government, we shall cut our way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
I
Substantive Issue
The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza. Again, the prohibition states: A lawyer shall not, after leaving government

service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he

had intervened while in the said service.
I.A. The history of Rule 6.03
A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive
in England and other parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern
codes of conduct. They were not detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were
comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the standards was directed towards the litigation
conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness in litigation as superior to any
obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate, including
specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but
ultimately had broader application to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.
The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ
markedly from those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial
oversight, and procedural rules to govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the
pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation. The standards set in England varied over time, but
the variation in early America was far greater. The American regulation fluctuated within a single
colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of setting some standards
of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only three of
the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the
colonial and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable
fees.[20]
The nineteenth century has been termed the dark ages of legal ethics in the United States.
By mid-century, American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field,
the drafter of the highly influential New York Field Code, introduced a new set of uniform standards
of conduct for lawyers. This concise statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states
in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, legal educators, such as David
Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working to flesh out the broad outline
of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail and thus
brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws
and statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations
e.g., the do no falsehood oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural
law continued to directly, or indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of
agency recognized basic duties of competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence
law started to recognize with less equivocation the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory
of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely exception of service to the poor, had some
basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary periods, these standards were
isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The reformers, by
contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.[21]
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide
lawyers in their practice the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed
ethical standards formulated by lawyers for lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of
ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic discourses, the bar association
codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike the academic
lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes
and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them
as binding rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar
associations themselves. Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but
they disbanded by the early nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began
to form again, picking up where their colonial predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar
associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and the American Bar Association,
assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their members. [22]
In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics.
The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics was the model for several states codes, and it was the foundation
for the American Bar Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics. [23]
In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain
the full measure of public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the

Philippine Bar Association adopted as its own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics.[24]
As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons.
Among their concerns was the revolving door or the process by which lawyers and others
temporarily enter government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private
practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government
service.[25] These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest
conflicts. Adverse-interest conflicts exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. [26] On
the other hand, congruent-interest representation conflicts are unique to government lawyers
and apply primarily to former government lawyers. [27] For several years, the ABA attempted to correct
and update the canons through new canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In
1928, the ABA amended one canon and added thirteen new canons. [28] To deal with problems peculiar
to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which disqualified them both for adverseinterest conflicts and congruent-interest representation conflicts. [29] The rationale for disqualification
is rooted in a concern that the government lawyers largely discretionary actions would be influenced
by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. [30] Canon 36 provides, viz.:
36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he
has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after
his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or
passed upon while in such office or employ.
Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons
46 and 47 in 1933 and 1937, respectively.[31]
In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics.[32]
By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons
needed more meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the
creation of a committee to study the adequacy and effectiveness of the ABA Canons. The committee
recommended that the canons needed substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to
distinguish between the inspirational and the proscriptive and were thus unsuccessful in
enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise observed that Canon 36 of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of lawyers for negligible
participation in matters during their employment with the government.
The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.[33] The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional
Responsibility were supplemented by Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to
which the lawyer must adhere.[34] In the case of Canon 9, DR 9-101(b)[35] became the applicable
supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model
Code.[36]
Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and
indefinite standards set forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a
whole. Thus, in August 1983, the ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility. The Model Rules used the restatement format, where the conduct standards were
set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was intended to give better
guidance and clarity for enforcement because the only enforceable standards were the black letter
Rules. The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on
narrative discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the
content of the black letter rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements
particularly with regard to conflicts of interests. [37] In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9,
citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of impropriety on the subjective views of
anxious clients as well as the norms indefinite nature. [38]
In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a
proposed Code of Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for
approval. The Code was drafted to reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and
to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[39] Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility deals
particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph
2, Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phraseinvestigated
and passed upon with the word intervened. It is, therefore, properly applicable to
both adverse-interest conflicts and congruent-interest conflicts.
The case at bar does not involve the adverse interest aspect of Rule 6.03 . Respondent
Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of
whether there exists a congruent-interest conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza
from representing respondents Tan, et al.
I.B. The congruent interest aspect of Rule 6.03
The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in
the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government
lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as
any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law.
Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the matter which was the subject of intervention by
respondent Mendoza while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of
respondent Mendoza as constituting the matter where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:[40]
The PCGGs Case for Atty. Mendozas Disqualification
The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in
issuing the assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza,
as then Solicitor General, actively intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of Manila.
As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key
officials of the Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy
Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then
Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B.
Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.,
where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the Solicitor General (Atty.
Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The pertinent
portion of the said memorandum states:
Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that
the following procedure should be taken:
1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies
and evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31,
1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so
that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and
the general public.
2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the
bank and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.
4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the
liquidation of Genbank.
The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it
was shown that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in
order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the banks liquidation. The
pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:
The Board decided as follows:
...
E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated
March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1.

Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to

the Monetary Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current
situation of Genbank;
2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated
March 23, 1977;
3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to
the Monetary Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of
R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of insolvency of
Genbank, together with its attachments; and
4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General
for his use in then CFI-praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.
Beyond doubt, therefore, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General
involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. In fine, the Court
should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate
GENBANK is included within the concept of matter under Rule 6.03. The procedure of
liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:
The provision reads in part:
SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. Whenever, upon examination by the head of
the appropriate supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the
condition of any bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions,
it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of insolvency, or that its continuance
in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be the duty of
the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the
facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true,
forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the
Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to
immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and
gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the
powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and
foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions.
...
If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank
or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot
resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the
public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve
a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance
of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same
proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the
stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to
implement the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall
designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or
finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver previously appointed by
the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient speed,
convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing
quasi-banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to
creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may,
in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect and
recover accounts and assets of such institution.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary
Board under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final
and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the
action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction shall be
issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this
Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof
that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the
petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a

bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by
the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s)
check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that
it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as
they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the
issuance and dissolution of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.
Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or nonbank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall
due in the usual and ordinary course of business. Provided, however, That this shall not
include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.
The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a
receiver under this Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision
of any law, general or special, to the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72,
1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)
We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK
is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA
Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylight in stressing that the drafting, enforcing or
interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent
Mendoza falls within the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the
said act of respondent Mendoza which is the matter involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for
themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central
Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. The matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject matter of Sp.
Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject
matter in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the
stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are illgotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten
is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was
liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners
and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the
matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the intervention contemplated by Rule 6.03.
Intervene means, viz.:
1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or
come in between points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on
both sides of an intervening river . . .)[41]
On the other hand, intervention is defined as:
1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the
interests of others.[42]
There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word intervene. Under the first
interpretation, intervene includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant
or has no effect or little influence. [43] Under the second interpretation, intervene only includes an
act of a person who has the power to influence the subject proceedings. [44] We hold that this second
meaning is more appropriate to give to the word intervention under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not
exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x

drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing

abstract principles of law.
In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36
provided that a former government lawyer should not, after his retirement, accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ. As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the phrase which he has investigated or passed
upon resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers. The 1969 Code restricted its
latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in
the government service, had substantial responsibility. The 1983 Model Rules further constricted
the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that a lawyer shall not represent a private client in
connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee.
It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is
significant and substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is
aninitiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor
General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the
subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in slumberville for a long number of years. None of
the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks
the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type
of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the
Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the
Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of
government.
II
Balancing Policy Considerations
To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable
effort on the part of the IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As
aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts especially by the ABA which have not been without
difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.
In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Court took account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and
application to the case at bar will achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal
importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted to cause a chilling effect on government
recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for government to match
compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to reverse
that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to
recruit lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can
later be exchanged for higher income in private practice. [45] Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the
sacrifice of entering government service would be too great for most men to endure should ethical
rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which they devoted years in
acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to be disqualified. [46]Indeed, to
make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to enter. [47]
In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a litigation tactic to
harass opposing counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The
danger that the rule will be misused to bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the tactical use of motions to disqualify
counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of counsel of its choice, and harass
and embarrass the opponent, and observed that the tactic was so prevalent in large civil cases in
recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary. [48] Even the United States
Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals description of disqualification motions as
a dangerous game.[49] In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is
difficult to divine. The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was
resuscitated after the lapse of many years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the
hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar
was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the Sandiganbayan and docketed as
Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.[50] At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioners motive as highly suspect.
Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the
client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification
motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in

whom the client has confidence.[51] The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without
the benefit of the work done by the latter. [52] The effects of this prejudice to the right to choose an
effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the
rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof.
Morgan: An individual who has the security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon
leaving the government is free to work vigorously, challenge official positions when he or she believes
them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An employee who lacks this assurance of
private employment does not enjoy such freedom. [53] He adds: Any system that affects the right to
take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits official
independence.[54] The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once
occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor
General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that
allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives
him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of
the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law.
No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of
the freedom to exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a
former government lawyer may extend to all members of his law firm. [55] Former government lawyers
stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the legal profession.
It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence
in government. But as well observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly
speculative exercise at best[56] which can lead to untoward results. [57] No less than Judge Kaufman
doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government attorneys will have any detrimental
effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its attorneys which the
canons seek to protect.[58] Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected in
the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct [59] and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists,
and demand an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case,
and the public.[60]
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly
disfavors lawyers who switch sides. It is claimed that switching sides carries the danger that
former government employee may compromise confidential official information in the process.
But this concern does not cast a shadow in the case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent
Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different
matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the shares
of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential official
information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there areno inconsistent sides to
be bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents
Tan, et al., respondent Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary,
he is indirectly defending the validity of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling
it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central
Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense
of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two sides are involved.
It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid conflict of
loyalties, i.e., that a government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in
government service.[61] The example given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who
plans to work for the company that he or she is currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted
to prosecute less vigorously.[62] In the cautionary words of the Association of the Bar Committee in
1960: The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may well occur during the
period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies.[63] Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as probably excessive. [64] He opines x
x x it is hard to imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been
disloyal to his or her last client the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that
law firms want the best government lawyers the ones who were hardest to beat not the least
qualified or least vigorous advocates.[65] But again, this particular concern is a non factor in the
case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised Central Bank on how
to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank. Indeed,
he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above
cases.

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the excessive
influence of former officials or their clout.[66] Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this
concern too far. He explains the rationale for his warning, viz: Much of what appears to be an
employees influence may actually be the power or authority of his or her position, power that
evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x. [67] More, he contends that the concern
can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: x x x The idea that, present
officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in
federal officials that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials
will tend to disfavor their friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism. [68]
III
The question of fairness
Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest
prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive
period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza.
Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the
Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the
bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any
standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and
deserves to be initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5,
2001 of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.
Chico-Nazario, J., No part.