Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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- POLICE POWER -
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that
MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community.
LAWS
GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
BALACUIT vs. CFI
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City
of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes any person group of
persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests or other performances to require children between seven
(7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said
ticket.
HELD:
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The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
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imposition.
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting
the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially
that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the
discount.
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FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable
the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic
separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent
immorality which might probably arise from the construction of
separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their
means of livelihood without due process of law.
22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It
authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish and
lobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of
the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayors
permit issued by their office.
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On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court
praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.8
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2.
EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents
in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare
of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled
with the legitimate exercise of police power.
201 SCRA 13
PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt
with in the consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated
on December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent court
promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the
Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court, etc.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely
wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title
of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of
Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely
entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can
be enforced against the petitioner.
But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands,
needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our
jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the
'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art.
1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above
all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever
necessary.
Petition granted.
GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004
PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA
FACTS:
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act
No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
2.
whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over
the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private
respondent;
3.
whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of
action against the private respondent for possession and
cultivation of the property in suit;
4.
whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case
No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitionersmembers of the PBFAI; and
5.
whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in
dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
HELD:
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long
before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had
already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to nonagricultural or residential land.
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified
as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and
appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the
petitioner PBFAI and its members.
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants
of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members
had no cause of action against the private respondent for
possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and
for damages.
When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven
(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate
deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the
portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after
receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money.
In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI
thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence,
they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the
same.
Petition denied.
It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the
issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation,
the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair,
discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus
in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for
them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more
specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property
and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions
and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the
fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted
freedom."
Petition dismissed.
119 SCRA 597, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT
FACTS:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxis;
refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region
having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT
circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued
Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the
Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular,
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance
therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year
1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators
of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace
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not
AO
AND
DO
123
ARE
HELD:
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The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll
ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that
their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the
petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detect
motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably,
prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the
"best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply
the toll ways.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle
in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to
move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll
way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled
vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A
to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll
way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which
petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll
way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
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Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123
of the DPWH and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board were declared void
AO 1 of the DOTC valid.
VS.
CIPRES STEVEDORING
FACTS:
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3.
2.
ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handling
operations at the Dumaguete Port.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo
handling operations because the continuance of their business
was due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may be
revoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits are
merely temporary subject to the policy and guidelines as may be
implemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are
imbued with public interest and subject to the states police power,
therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have acquired
must necessarily give way to valid exercise of police power. PPA,
being created for the purpose of promoting the growth of regional
port bodies, it is empowered to make port regulations. With this
mandate, the decision to bid out cargo holding services is
properly within the province and discretion of PPA. As for CISAIs
claim that PPA AO No. 03-2000 violated the constitutional
provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to state that all
contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, interests
of the greater number as the State may determine in the
legitimate exercise of its police power. Wherefore, Petition is
granted.
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE
FACTS:
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- EMINENT DOMAIN -
Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that the govt. of the Phil
islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any
municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation
having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec.
242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented;
that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be
condemned together with the interest of each defendant
separately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon
trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall
then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when
the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain
upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or
private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right
of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights,
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for
an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it
is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case,
even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St.
through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will
answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then,
still being under care and maintenance of the living should be
spared from such expropriation where there are other lands
offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the
same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed.
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
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The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use
must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,
has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must
be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
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Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial
court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer
of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997,
the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports
and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a
recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot
be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In
this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity
for public use.
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On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary
to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The
ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for
politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute.
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and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a
reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in
pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible
and called for by the circumstances.
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality
(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take
possession of the subject property.
FACTS:
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the
property. On plaintiffs motion, the RTC issued a writ of
possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus
Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI)
which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff
constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters;
the road was called Damayan Street.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-ofway, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point
least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no
adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that
The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and
not elsewhere.
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and
were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D.
Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5
September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen
(17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding
initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed
as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the
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Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendantappellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the
related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and
receipt thereof by the property owners.
Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the
time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the
recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of
Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. The record of
the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes
and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or
interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of
the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall
be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the
province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land
and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain,
was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failure
to register it.
2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.
Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are
to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of
just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the States sovereign
power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public
purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of
governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over
private rights.
OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS:
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PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by
the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the
Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would
result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the
preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the
complaint and the counterclaims.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties
cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the
contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
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For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.
ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD:
REQUISITES OF TAKING
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
RP vs. CASTELVI
FACTS:
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The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
"taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the
filing of the complaint in this case.
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FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-ownedand-controlled corporation created to undertake the development
of hydro-electric generation of power and the production of
electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the
construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants,
auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission
lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the
purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek,
spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power
to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as
amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property
provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any
actual damage caused thereby.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued
at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then
processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only
P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m
for the agricultural portion.
On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their
report,# recommending as payment for just compensation
P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for
the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered
judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the
compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar
and Engr. Cruz.
The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as
follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural
portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565
sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did not
blindly accept the recommendation of majority of the
commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and
P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court
took into account the evidence of the parties, in tandem with the
findings and recommendation of the majority of the
commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the
evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb the
same.
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The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds
today that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property by
repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land
at a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise from
these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickens
to be killed
ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.
HELD:
FACTS:
or
not
Comelec
Resolution
No.
2772
is
HELD:
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The second issue is whether the subject property is the only real
property of respondents for them to comply with the second
requisite for small property owners which Antonio Aguilar testified
that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the
subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila.
Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the
lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the
ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands
are owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not
present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's
testimony. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
real property and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of
Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore do
not own any other real property in Metro Manila.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the
possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants
of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong.
Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17,
1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other
occupants from the land in question.
ISSUES:
1.
W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and
are thus exempt from expropriation under RA no. 7972.
2.
W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents
for them to comply with the second requisite for small property
owners.
HELD:
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privatelyowned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition.
However, the law also provides that lands within the declared
APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government are
fourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since the
subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that
the lots be given priority in acquisition.
These means that the types of lands that may be acquired in the
order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes
authorized under Section 10.
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PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some
282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD
564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value.
The court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City
of Manila complied with Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279. Under
Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the
public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4)
lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD),
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and
Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5)
BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned
lands.
PUBLIC USE
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES
FACTS:
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The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to nonagricultural land.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied.
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HELD:
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting
a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of
the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public
use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has
long been discarded.
More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order
dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA
to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B).
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of
the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be
rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
immediately final and executory.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the
approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between
the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial
court approved the compromise agreement.
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties and
directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to
the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court,
respondent PEZA moved13 for its reconsideration. The same
proved futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its
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In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this
case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the
expropriation proceedings on the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the
petitioner.
HELD:
This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation
Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by
petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private
respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993.
Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to
receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B.
When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434,
petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of
the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of
Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court.
FACTS:
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To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use
and disposition of property and its increments."
GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL
GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003
NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City,
an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against respondents.
It alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the
claimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City; that defendant
Engracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same
area; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of
lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in the
urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized
housing project.
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The
first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. The second is
concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
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compensation.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC,
which declared the lawful right to expropriate the properties hence
the Order became final.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resortsubdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort
Subdivision.
First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one
year eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in
1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against
Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On
1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon
NPCs payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations and
construction of steam wells. While the first case was pending,
NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by
NPC with Pobre. It altered the topography o the Property. No
action was done on Pobres complaints, dumping continued.
Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed its second
expropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the construction
and maintenance of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited
P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by
the second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon
the trial courts issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was
denied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the
trial courts decision and denied NPCs motion for reconsideration.
Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property as
a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the
property that it made it uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision.
Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for
review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it did
not take Pobres 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assuming
that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it had
successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been
excluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC
had damaged.
In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resortsubdivision. The Property is worthless is now only useful to
NPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the
second expropriation on the ground that it had found an
alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC
abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had
already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent
domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizens
property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements.
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Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFI
decided in favor of CAA. No appeal was made.
ISSUES:
1.
WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS
THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT.
2.
WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF
LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS.
HELD:
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
GENUINE NECESSITY
G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM
FACTS:
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons
successors-in-interest,
Francisca
Galeos-Valdehueza
and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of
the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and
939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the
phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value.
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vs.
INTERMEDIATE
FACTS:
The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property
as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as
court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the
just compensation for the property.
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This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in the petition
why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was
offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's
attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the plan to make the extension of EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made?
2.
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take
immediate possession of the properties sought to be
expropriated?
HELD:
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The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule
at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her
prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
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ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5,
RULE 7 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A
HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION
SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR
FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM
MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.
HELD:
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In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban,
Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the
verification and certification against forum-shopping were signed
by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real
party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without
being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the
corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales
could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying
the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition
should be dismissed.
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the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the
passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just
compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to
rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should
be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not
the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was
respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was
also the property owner who brought the action for compensation
against the government after 25 years since the taking of his
property for the construction of a road.
[I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not
even have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused
on the improvements/crops within the appellees property. This,
apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned from the
disbursement voucher in the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the
Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on September 17,
1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from the Office of the
Solicitor General recommending the giving of "financial
assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
better price. On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the property and
its improvements to Amerex Electronics Phils. Corporation for P1,
800,000.00. On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for the
Department of Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint against
Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 99190). The complaint
stated that the property was needed by the government as a
permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente High School. The fair
market value of the property had been declared by Amerex as P2,
435,000, and the assessor determined the market value as P2,
432,042. The assessed amount for taxation purposes is P1,
303,470 and was deposited with the PNB on September 30,
1975. The Government was able to take actual possession of the
property on October 13, 1975. Amerex then filed a motion to
dismiss citing the issue on just compensation to be fixed at P2,
432,042, the market value of the property determined by the
assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration. The
motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff saying that they
can present evidence of a much lower market value. Amerex then
filed a motion to withdraw the deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB
without the plaintiff opposing provided that an order of
condemnation be issued to allow plaintiff to present evidence on
the matter of just compensation. On March 12, 1976, the plaintiff
filed a motion for leave of court to amend its complaint stating that
after it had filed the same, P.D. No. 464was amended by P.D. No.
794 and that the amended complaint would state that the fair
market value of the property could not be in excess of
P1,800,000, the amount for which defendant's predecessor-ininterest had offered to sell said properties to the Division of Public
Schools of Manila and which amount was also the purchase price
paid by Amerex to Avegon Inc. This was denied by the lower
court, but after the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, the
lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27, 1976.
Audited financial statements were submitted by Amerex and the
statements yielded the amount of P2, 258,018.48 as the total
value of the property. On October 18, 1976, the plaintiff filed a
motion to disqualify Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner
on the ground that he could not be expected to be unbiased
inasmuch as in the three appraisal reports submitted by Amerex.
Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify Aquino as
commissioner, and the court, in its order of November 5, 1976,
denied it. The commissioner then filed his appraisal for the fair
market value of the property which is P2, 258,018.57 for purposes
of determining just compensation payable to defendant AMEREX.
The plaintiff objected the report and reiterated that the value
should be only P1, 800, 00.00. Basing it on the evidence, the
court ruled to fix the market value at of P2,258.018.57 for just
compensation, hence the plaintiff elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying
Commissioner Aurelio B. Aquino from membership in the
Committee of Appraisal.
2.
Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally disregarding
petitioner's evidence showing that the award of just compensation
should be only P1, 800,000.00.
HELD:
1.
No, the court did not err in not disqualifying Commissioner
Aquino. The report of the commissioners is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character as far as the court is concerned.
The court may choose to take action or to set aside the report or
appoint new commissioners, hence it really does not matter if the
commissioner had a pre conceived and biased valuation of the
property. The determination of just compensation for a
condemned property is basically a judicial function and not bound
by its Commissioners.
2.
No, the Court did not err in disregarding 's evidence showing that
the award of just compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the property is worth
lower than P1, 800,000 basing it on the value when it was first
offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila. The appraisal
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ISSUE:
Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs
the expropriation proceedings in this case
HELD:
Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
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HELD:
Legal Basis:
Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides:
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. it included
four parcel of land registered in the name of private individual.
The petitioner, therefore offered to purchase the parcels of land
from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in
section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the parcel of land in pursuant to P.D.
66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
courts discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
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FACTS:
REPUBLIC VS CA
*no case digest submitted*
206 SCRA 196
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PINEDA
*no case digest submitted*
263 SCAR 758
DAR VS. CA
*no case digest submitted*
G. R. No. L-57524 January 8, 1986
REPUBLIC VS.,SANTOS
FACTS:
The case is an expropriation case which involved the 66,096 square
meters of land claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque and
Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for the widening
of, and construction of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion
Road. The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at forty
pesos (P40) per square meter, or an amount of P2, 641,190. The
Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who
deposited it in the Philippine National Bank but some of the
respondents withdrew including Maura Santos. The Court of First
Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19, 1969 granted the
fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2, 641,190. Fourteen
(14) claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. As
to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial
court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed
three commissioners to determine the just compensation: Benjamin
Morales for the court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provincial
assessor, for the Republic, and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants.
The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970
recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100
a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of
25,909 square meters. The trial court in its decision dated May 13,
1972 modified that recommendation. It fixed P100 a square meter as
the uniform price to be paid to the claimants. The Court of Appeals in
its decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision
and adopted the commissioners' report and it added 6% legal rate of
interest.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the just compensation to be paid by the
Government is 40 or 100, as recommended by the
commissioners.
2.
Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not holding that the
commissioners should not have relied on the price of P100 for the
land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in November, 1969 and on
other irrelevant evidence.
3.
Whether or not Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that
14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at
P40 a square meter.
HELD:
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation was
not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. As pointed out by the
Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a square meter
for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the
filing of the instant expropriation case. In Presidential Decree No.
1533 provides that just compensation should be the value of the
land "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property." In the case, it should
be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of
the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters.
She was already paid P1, 036,360 for her expropriated land.
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The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Rpublic v. Larae, is that;
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enchanced
by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the
property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it
is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual whose property is
taken but, to the public, which is to pay for it.
NPCs Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desired
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The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property
using the 1984 tax declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the
decision of the supreme court)
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD
1.
2.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the
date the filing of the complaint.
2.
Whether or not the basis of the just compensation is the value on
the actual date the filing of the complaint considering the
agreement entered into by the parties.
HELD:
1.
It asserts that it should be which in this case should be 17
September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually
taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."
2.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in that case
that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general
rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the
value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint,
the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value
of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
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In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his
property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA
6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash"
or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke
LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing
regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking
down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
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The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
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For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are
DENIED; for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the
orders of December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 is also
DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the
assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation
proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
HELD:
Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred
to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections
to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court
may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the
same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept
the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order
or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation,
and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first
is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An order
of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
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Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land,
comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
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However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the
reports.
On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the
amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the
taking of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per
square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from
September 11, 1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of
the land, plus attorneys fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the
value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the
selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the
We, however, rule that petitioner is under its charter exempt from
payment of costs of the proceedings.
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HELD:
It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth. Court is mandated to only
consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless called for by
extraordinary circumstances. petitioner raises the issue of denial of
due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to
present its evidence on the just compensation of properties it wanted
to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the
trial courts Order on the matter of just compensation. because this
case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public
purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration and brush aside this technicality in favor of
resolving this case. Petitioner was deprived of due process when it
was not given the opportunity to present evidence before the
commissioners. It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford
the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor and
petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the
commissioners report, and that petitioner was also not given any
opportunity to file its objections to the said report. the fact that no trial
or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to
present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners findings. The legal basis for the
determination of just compensation was insufficient. it is not disputed
that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be
pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. For compensation, to be
just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. it is clear
that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just
compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of the
properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners report.
Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in
this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial
courts ruling in this respect should be set aside. Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some
portions of their properties. Attached to the complaint is was Resolution
No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong, which was
created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the
construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted their
report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market value
of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.:
P50,000 per sq.m., the Commissioners took into consideration the
following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data,
community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and
reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the
gross negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel.
2.
Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming
the amount fixed by the trial court based on the report of the
board of commissioners.
HELD:
There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to
reconsider the assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the
reglementary period. These procedural devices (reconsideration and
appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted plain,
speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in
the CA Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60 days. In the present
case, the Petition was filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel
of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. The
request was predicated on the conclusion that the "compensation costs
as recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in the
above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that
the "move will hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the
proceedings and stop the running of interest. The more critical issue is
the determination of the amount of just compensation for the
expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers that
JUST COMPENSATION:
EXPROPRIATION CASES
LEGAL
INTEREST
FOR
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the
case.
2.
Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the
plaintiff.
HELD:
Lot 1-C
One of the lots to be expropriated
Consists of 343.10 square meters / 7 = produced 49 square
meters for each person
Covered by TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869
This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon her death, said lot
was transferred to Alberto De Guia and then to Edgardo de
Guia heir of Alberto, after the formers death.
The said lot was again transferred to Lee Kuan Hui-TCT No.
217018 and subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia TCT No.
226048.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the property is proper in
relation to R.A. 7279.
HELD:
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1.
2.
HELD:
Rule 67 stated:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
SEWERAGE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for
depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and
just compensation
2.
Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continue
paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of
25% of its internal revenue allotments to Zamboanga del Norte.
HELD:
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It is SO ORDERED.
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- DUE PROCESS -
2.
PURPOSE OF GUARANTY
110 US 516, 1884
HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA
*no case digest submitted*
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not
fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
to be punished.
HELD:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two
vital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of
Congress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenrys protected zone
of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for
being overbreadth?
HELD:
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Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for
vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms and combination and series in
the key phrase a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts found in Section 1 par. d, and the word pattern in Section
4.
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HELD:
1.
No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the
public officer or employee who has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst the
application of the law is such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ong
stands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her the
right, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to a
preliminary investigation.
2.
No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsman
has the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper
action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth.
3.
No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked constitutional
assurance against self incrimination because such right is a
prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications to the accused. In this case, petitioners
are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting
the presumption established by law. They may present
documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market
placements and other fund sources in their defense.
HELD:
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Herein
petitioner,
Philippine
Communications
Satellite
Corporation, is engaged in providing for services involving
telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates
procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing and that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable
and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.
HELD:
On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio Suntay took Alicia Nubla from
St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her
somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and
was then able to have carnal knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla is a
minor of 16 years. Alicias father, Dr. Antonio Nubla, filed a
verified complaint against accused in the Office of the City
Attorney of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed for lack of
merit.
On January 10, 1955, the petitioner applied for and was granted a
passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He left the
Philippines for San Francisco, where he enrolled in school.
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2.
passport is illegal.
WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can exercise his discretion
of cancelling the passport without hearing.
HELD:
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for
the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a
charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of
his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held
to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of
a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate
the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed
whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with
the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the
said clause.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As
Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law,
has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government
is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law,
as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise
since they rest upon different principles. . . . In certain
proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be
stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987
where the parties agreed to submit their respective position
papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision.
Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ
of execution was served. On November 23,1987, petitioners,
through new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution' on the ground that the decision had not been received
by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.
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2.
FACTS:
3.
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4.
Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by
it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the
report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission
based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an
opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of
its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and
controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the said
Commission handed down a decision, wherein Meralco is
required to reduce its present authorized rates effective January
1, 1958 based on the authorized rates.
Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June 22, 1956. On said
date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta,
Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of
the Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence
of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal
hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements
of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we
ISSUE: Whether or Not there was a violation of due process, thus the
decision of the court is considered void.
HELD: The record shows that no hearing was held.
The record further shows that after the "preliminary hearing" held
on June 22, 1956, no other hearing was held; the cases were
never set for hearing; and Meralco was not given an opportunity
to present evidence to rebut the audit report
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The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finality
given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative
tribunals is correct as a general principle. However, it is
subject to well established exceptions. Factual findings of
trial courts are disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is a
finding grounded on speculations, surmises, and
conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts; and (5)
the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
the parties or the evidence presented.
The claim that there was no due process because the private
respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any
notice of the proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon, who at
the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact,
in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be
expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the
gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the
December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was
asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or
parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious
matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and
did not inform them about his case was not the fault of the
petitioner university.
ISSUE/S:
1.
WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of
law
2.
WON respondents complaint for recovery of damages was
premature because administrative remedies have not yet been
exhausted
3.
WON private respondents are entitled to damages
HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed.
1.
No, he was accorded due process.
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2.
3.
There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the
college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive
decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the
disciplinary process was get up to protect the privacy of the
student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the
Ateneo de Manila University in this case.
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Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with
regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the
school when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction to
accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an
investigating body.
Judge Dames decision considering these facts said that what the
students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for
re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the
school.
The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students
and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other,
ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school
authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.
2.
Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to reenroll because they participated in student mass actions against
their school the preceding sem
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The court held that the students were denied due process in that
there was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from the
pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because
of failing grades was a mere afterthought.
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- TAXATION -
PURPOSE
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE
FACTS:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC)
appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land,
factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale,
Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this
commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP,
P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of
P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959.
Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted
upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue
had to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed a
petition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable.
HELD:
TAX EXEMPTIONS
33 PHIL 217, 1916
YMCA VS. CIR
*no case digest submitted*
51 PHIL 352, 1927
BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD
*no case digest submitted*
14 SCRA 292, 1965
LLADOC VS CIR
*no case digest submitted*
FACTS:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the
judge would not have made such a grave mistake if he had only
made a clear distinction between the present provisions of the
constitution to the provisions of the 1935 constitution regarding
tax exemptions on land, buildings and improvements. The main
difference is that in order for a land, building, or improvement to
be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct use
of the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also a
rule that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if
granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,
hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi
juris
The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for the
protection of due process to clearly show if the respondents really
did not violate any constitutional provisions in regards to tax
exemption but instead, what respondent judge did was directly
ruled on the case of declaratory relief on the basis that it was
exclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the parish
priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop as
compared to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack of
jurisdiction since the validity of a tax assessment may be
questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and
not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of
action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not
proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of
government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It
clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to
petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in
favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by
the constitutional command of procedural due process.
162 SCRA 106, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO
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FACTS:
After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of the
case and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered the
respondent treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction sale.
Finally the parties involved entered into a Stipulation of Facts
administered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure and
notice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the
back taxes of the school upon the payment of the auction price.
Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that the
school was recognized by the government offering Primary High
School and College courses and has a population of more than
100,000 students all in all; that the school was situated right in the
heart of town of Bangued, Abra a few meters from the plaza and
about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; that
the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across
the street; that the high school and college students are housed in
the main building; that the Director with his family is in the second
floor of the main building; and that the annual gross income of the
school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. In light
of the evidences it was left after the courts to determine whether
the said school was exclusively for educational purposes.
The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor
by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He
thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from
August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal petitioner
instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition
was filed on August 17, 1974. In the resolution dated August 16,
1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition
Respondents were required to answer said petition. The
petitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. made
an error in sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lot
and building used for educational purpose 2. Made an error in
declaring that the college was not exclusively for educational
purposes merely because the college president resides in it 3.
made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt from
property taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as
realty taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation of the
P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by petitioner as payment of
the P5,140.31 realty taxes.
ISSUE: Whether Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax exemption as
stated in the constitution that a school should be exclusively for
educational purpose despite the proof that there are other purpose
attached to the lot and building such as a residence of the College
president?
HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph
3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes ... Relative thereto,
Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as
amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the
Assessment Law, provides that churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
or educational purposes
While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case
at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, they
may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purposeeducational, the
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is
built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes,
but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned
to the school involved.
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question the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees
were being collected which was done on the same date by filing
the complaint that gave rise to this action. The plaintiff prays that
judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364
illegal and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by the
defendant of the payments made and the legal costs. The
defendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said ordinances
were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by
virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2)
of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18,
1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409,
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying
that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This
answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the
unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances
Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to the
Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court where
the petitioner argued these points 1. In holding that Ordinances
Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not
unconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444
of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos.
2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section
18 of Republic Act No. 409; 3. In not holding that an ordinance
providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to
be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be
approved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holding
that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed
commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of
said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.
DOUBLE TAXATION
95 PHIL 46, 1954
PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
*no case digest submitted*
LICENSE FEES
GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957
PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD
*no case digest submitted*
In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to
plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila,
as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendantappellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff
Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
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- EQUAL PROTECTION -
SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION
Petition dismissed.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
99 PHIL, 1856
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the
trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with
Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to
Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas
died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed.
His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to
deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.
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The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound
when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209
and other cases).
Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two
other companions managed to ran away.
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the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition
ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
respondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health
Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging
herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian
Bayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in
the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan
accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary
differential and magna carta benefits.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded
the equal protection of laws.
HELD:
PUBLIC POLICY
[G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.
FACTS:
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Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws
amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the
charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions
(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial
distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the
rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as
an outlaw.
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2.
HELD:
1.
No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by
a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b)
germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same
class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the
Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under
PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government
is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while
in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source
of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members Nowhere in PD 269 does it
require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an
electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00
membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment
the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from
the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative
Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the
accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer
elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the
authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paidup share capital be less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD
269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were
primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be
repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA
6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local
Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The
Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of
Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative
intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units
and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing
conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
2.
No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional
prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does
not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport
to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract,
including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the
tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements
to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the
withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and
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Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and
was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated
by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood
banks and blood processing laboratories.
Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
is complete in itself.
On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge
Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting
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On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued
Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
facilities (toll ways).
ISSUES:
1.
Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA
2000
2.
Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional
HELD:
HELD:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state
of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension
and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his
requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to
three.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion.
The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of
the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus.
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HELD:
The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.#
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by
the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
facts of each case.
A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
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Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
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EMERGENCY POWERS
93 PHIL 68, 1953
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
*no case digest submitted*
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance,
specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the
passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01?
2.
Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot
in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus
barred from questioning the conditions of said deed
HELD:
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
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pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the
prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the
ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No.
21.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome
vs. Gotico where the court ruled that the leased of the building
naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the
building to the lot. Under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a
building or house not only suggests or implies the tenancy or
possession in fact on the land on which they are constructed. In
the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that petitioner in leasing her
apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed
which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has
violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25
which enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, among
which is the subleasing of residential units without the written
consent of the owner/lessor.
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ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution and of PD No. 551.
HELD:
In the recent case the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of all
taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local
Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such
exemptions, privileges, and that upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein
can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the
local tax. In fine, the Court has viewed its previous rulings as
laying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law
whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not
rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without violating the
Constitution, the tax exemption or not.
Petition is dismissed.
Article 1827 of the Civil Code declares that the liability of a surety
is not to be extended, by implication, beyond the terms of his
contract. Well-recognized rule of jurisprudence, that if any
material alteration or change in the obligation of the principal
obligator is effected by the immediate parties to the contract,
without the asset of the surety, the latter is discharged. In order to
effect a release of the surety, the change in the contract must, as
a general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contract.
Indeed, no valid or effective change in the contract can, generally
speaking, be made by any other person than the actual parties
thereto. A recognized exception more apparent than real is
found in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held to
be released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature in
the duration of the official term or in the duties of the officer whose
fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. The law is
particularly watchful over the rights of sureties. To permit parties
to alter and modify their contracts as they please, and to hold the
sureties answerable for the performance of such parts as were
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Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are coowners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug,
Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main
respondents herein have for years worked on said land under the
share tenancy system. Before the beginning of the agricultural
year 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity
with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change their tenancy
contract from said system to leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorios
having refused to agree thereto, said respondents and three
other tenants whose claims were dismissed by the Court of
Agrarian Relations instituted this proceedings, in said court, on
November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners
herein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, is
unconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hence
this appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provision
is unconstitutional; and (2) that the lower court had acted
arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them from
respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the
agricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is
absolute.
2.
Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional.
Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR
74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding
Judge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR
75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are cases involving
prosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidated
herein as the parties (defendants) thereto question the
constitutionality of the statute, BP 22.
HELD:
1.
NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against
impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such
provisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, or
some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in
a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to
public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers
of the State, and involving the public right and public welfare of
the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper
exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts
may thereby be affected; for such matter cannot be placed by
contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them.
2.
YES. Republic Act 1199m including Section 14 thereof, which
permits the tenants to change the nature of their relation with their
landlord from tenancy system to leasehold
tenancy, is
constitutional. It is a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to
the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is
a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy law enacted by our
law-making body, was passed by Congress in compliance with
the constitutional mandate that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the
State shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant ...
in agriculture ... ." (Art. XIV, see. 6).
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
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Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial
court's decision.
the cost of all subdivision lots in the project site; 4) that 76 landowners
have already withdrawn the corresponding compensation for their
respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72 landowners including
the petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed the
compensation for their respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5)
that all titles to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma,
which is undergoing reconstitution, have already been transferred to
respondent NHA pursuant to the provision of P.D. No. 1808.
ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1808.
HELD:
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the
obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty
of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and
subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For
the same reason, petitioners can not complain that they are being
deprived of their property without due process of law.
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