UPDATES IN PROPERTY REGISTRATION, MORTGAGES,

CONDOMINIUMS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

(August 2014)
(Based on Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws
(Land Titles and Deeds), 2011 ed., and Reviewer in Property Registration
(With Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers)1
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili2
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. 3
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.4 Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.5
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, 6 embodies the principle of
State ownership of lands and all other natural resources as provided in Section 2, Art. XII,
to wit:
1

Published by Rex Book Store. See also: Law on Natural Resources, and Reviewer in Property
Registration and Related Laws (with MCQs and Suggested Answers).
2
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in
Management at the Asian Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and Research Section,
Bureau of Lands, he was appointed Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and Assistant
Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was
Chairman of the 13th Division upon his retirement from the court. Justice Agcaoili is a Professor of the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and Professorial Lecturer of the UP Institute for the Administration
of Justice (UP-IAJ). He teaches law at UST and UP. He is an Appellate Court Mediator and Voluntary
Maritime Arbitrator. A delegate/participant in several international conferences, he wrote a paper entitled
Environmental Protection: The Convergence of Law and Policy which he read during the 20th Biennial
Conference on the Law of the World held in Dublin, Ireland in October 2001. Described by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno as isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa lupa (one of our experts on land rights),
Justice Agcaoili is the author of three books: Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles
and Deeds), Law on Natural Resources and Environmental Law Developments, and Reviewer in
Property Registration and Related Proceedings. (Tel.: 922-0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail:
oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com)
3
Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Secretary of the DENR v. Yap, GR
No. 172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v. Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept. 17, 2008; Alcantara v. DENR, GR No.
161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy
Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21,
2002; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.
4
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102.
5
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.
6
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora
and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND

ANCESTRAL LANDS
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,7 petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural
resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural
Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the basis of native title. After due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme
Court voted as follows: seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7)
others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56
of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed
upheld.
Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian theory
does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,
adverting to the landmark case of Cario v. Insular Government,8 where the United
States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in two modes: (a) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and
Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.
THE TORRENS SYSTEM
OF REGISTRATION
The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should
not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will
7

Supra.
212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.

3
not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the
system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that
land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9
The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an
official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the
owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.10 The objective is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens
system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the
covered land.11
PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, as expressed in Legarda v.
Saleeby,12 a 1915 decision, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. The Torrens system aims to decree
land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable, 13 and to relieve the land of the
burden of known as well as unknown claims.14
However, the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for fraud, 15 nor permit one
to enrich himself at the expense of others,16 otherwise its acceptability is impaired.17
REGISTRATION NOT A MODE
OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to
9

Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550.
10
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424; citing Noblejas, Land Titles
and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 32.
11
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874.
12
GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590, 31 Phil. 590; see also Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731,
Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9; National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68741,
Jan. 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 388.
13
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No. 14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996.
14
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra.
15
Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
125585, June 8, 2005.
16
Ibid.
17
Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291.

4
establish evidence of title over realty.18 It is a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. A certificate of title is not a source of right. It
merely confirms or records a title already existing and vested. 19 The mere possession
thereof does not make one the true owner of the property.20
Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.21
DISTINCTION BETWEEN TITLE
AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
Title may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on
the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.22
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON
REGISTRATION
Registration in a public registry works as constructive notice to the whole world.
Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
provides:
SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive
notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.

REGISTRATION OF LANDS:
GOVERNING LAW
PD No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD) in relation to Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by
Section 4 of PD No. 1073, specifies those who are qualified to apply for registration of
land.
PD No. 1529 issued on June 11, 1978 covers both ordinary and cadastral
registration proceedings, and supersedes Act No. 496 or the Land Registration Act which
18

Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 630;
Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, GR No. 161136, Nov. 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 94.
19
Tiro v. Phil Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008 563 SCRA 309.
20
Borromeo v. Descallar, supra.
21
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
22
Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258.

5
took effect on February 1, 1903. Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral Act, governs cadastral
proceedings.
JURISDICTION
Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land registration proceedings
and over all petitions filed after original registration of titles. 23 But first level courts may
be delegated to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases (a) covering lots
without controversy or opposition, or (b) contested lots where the value does not exceed
P100,000.00.24
The registration court may now hear both contentious and non-contentious
cases. All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.26
25

REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529

IS A PROCEEDING IN REM
Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication, posting and
service of notice.27 The purpose of the publication is to (a) confer jurisdiction upon the
court over the res, and (b) apprise the whole world of the pending registration case so that
they may assert their rights or interests in the land applied for.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
Lands of the public domain are classified into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,
(3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated.28 Public land that has not been classified as
alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is
essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land.
Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of
public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a
presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be
included or excluded from the public domain. The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a
land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable.29
23

Sec. 2, PD No. 1529.

Sec. 34 BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691. See also SC Circular No. 6-93, dated November 15, 1995.
25
Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 459; Ligon v. Court of appeals, GR No.
10771, June 1, 1995, 244 SCRA693.
26
Secs. 2 and 108, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836,
Aug. 2, 1995, 247 SCRA 9.
27
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258
SCRA 223.
28
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
29
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
24

Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable

public agricultural land. Possession of inalienable public lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the
public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the
use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for town-sites and for public and quasi-public uses. (CA No.
141 or the Public Land Act).

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible
of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of
owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.30
Specifically, the following are not capable of alienation or disposition for titling
purposes:
Lands intended for public use and for public service
Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.31 Art. 420 of the
Civil Code provides that the following are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.32

Rivers, lakes and lagoons

30

Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.

Art. 419, Civil Code.
32
Art. 420, ibid.
31

7
Art. 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds; x x x

All other property of the State, which is not of the character mentioned above, is
patrimonial property.33 Property of public dominion, when no longer needed for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.34
If land sought to be registered forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek
or river, the decree or title to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any
right or title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the
Torrens system.35 In Cachopero v. Celestial,36 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is
property of public dominion.37
Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds are likewise
inalienable.38 Under Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, "the natural bed or basin of
lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth."39
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are
subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is
necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind.40
In the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the
banks of a stream, shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement
under PD No. 1216. Open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational
use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."41
33

Art. 421, ibid.

Art. 422, ibid.
35
Republic v. Sioson, GR No. L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963.
36
GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003).
37
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
38
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio, GR No. L-43105, Aug. 31, 1984.
39
Ibid.
40
Art. 51, ibid.
41
Pilar Development Corporation v. Dumadag, GR No. 194336, March 11, 2013.
34

Forest lands
Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property. Courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands
within the forest zone.42 The subsequent release of forest lands as A and D lands does not
validate a previous grant.43
Mineral lands
Mineral land means any area where mineral resources are found.44 Mineral
resources, on the other hand, means any concentration of mineral/rocks with potential
economic value.45 The ownership of mineral resources is provided in RA No. 7942,
known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa,46 the Court, through Justice Cruz,
held that (t)he Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be
found in the bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private.
Possession of mineral land, no matter how long, does not confer possessory
rights.47 Thus, a certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain
classified as mineral lands. Any title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the hands of
alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.48
Foreshore and reclaimed lands
The term foreshore land has been invariably defined as that strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered by the ordinary flow of the tides.49The Philippine Fisheries Code defines
foreshore land as a string of land margining a body of water; the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.50
Foreshore lands are inalienable unless reclaimed by the government and classified
as agricultural lands of the public domain.51 In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic
42

Collado v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002; Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
75672, April 19, 1989.
43
Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296.
44
Sec. 3(ac), RANo. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
45
Sec. 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, as amended.
46
GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.
47
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 88883, Jan. 18, 1991. 193 SCRA 71.
48
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumyung, GR No. L-31666, April 20, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.
49
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate Corporation, GR Nos. 103882 and 105276, Nov.
25, 1998, 299 SCRA 199.
50
Sec. 4(46), RA No. 8550.
51
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, Nov. 11, 2003.

9
Real Estate Corporation,52the Court held that foreshore lands or that strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides - belong to the public domain
intended for public use. The controversy in this case involved lots which are now part of
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP). On March 5, 1962, the government through
the Solicitor General sought to nullify the reclamation agreement between Pasay City and
Republic Real Estate Corporation on grounds that there were no foreshore lands in
Pasay City which could only be the subject of lawful reclamation under the then
prevailing law, RA No. 1899; that the area was already reserved as a national park, hence
beyond the commerce of men; and that the agreement was executed without any public
bidding. The Supreme Court, in a decision penned by Justice Purisima, sustained the
governments action and nullified the reclamation agreement as being ultra vires and
contrary to law. It held that the reclamation involved submerged areas or all sea and
not "foreshore lands" as allowed by said law. The land is now occupied by the Cultural
Center of the Philippines.
Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means are
inalienable. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,53 the Court held that only when
actually reclaimed from the sea can submerged areas be classified as public agricultural
lands. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government
may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.
Mangroves swamps
Mangrove swamps or manglares are forestal and not alienable agricultural land. 54
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,55 it was held that the
Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
This was reaffirmed in Director of Forestry v. Villareal56 where the Court categorically
declared that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests and, therefore, not subject
to disposition until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land. The Fisheries Code makes it unlawful for any person to
convert mangroves into fishponds or for any other purposes.
Watersheds

52

GR No. 103882, Nov. 25, 1998.

GR No. 133250, May 6, 2003.
54
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, GR No. L-32266, Feb. 27, 1989, 170 SCRA 598.
55
GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 151 SCRA 88; see also Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No.
74957, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 679.
56
Supra.
53

10
Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds."
Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man. 57 The Constitution expressly
mandates the conservation and proper utilization of natural resources, which includes the
countrys watershed.
In Tan v. Director of Forestry,58 the Supreme Court reiterated the basic policy of
conserving the national patrimony, as exemplified by the governments withdrawal from
entry, sale or settlement of forest reserves for watershed, soil protection and timber
production purposes.
Military or naval reservation
Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot be registered.59 To segregate
portions of the public domain as a military reservation, there is need of a presidential
proclamation to that effect. In Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,60 it
was held that a military reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, or any
part thereof is not open to private appropriation or disposition unless it is first reclassified
and declared as disposable and alienable public land, even if incidentally it is devoted for
a purpose other than as a military camp or for defense.
Protected areas
RA No. 7586 provides for the establishment and management of a national
integrated protected areas system referred to as the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992). NIPAS is the classification and administration of all designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to
preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The illegal possession or
sale of rights of portions thereof is prohibited under the NIPAS Act.
Pursuant to Section 19 of RA No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1955,
mining operations are not allowed in old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed
forest reserves, wilderness area, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks,
provincial/municipal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as
defined by law in areas expressly prohibited under the NIPAS and other laws.
National park refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness
character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of
exploitation.61 National parks,62 protected areas and nature reserves63 are inalienable.
57

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001.
GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302.
59
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006.
60
GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006.
61
RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
62
Palomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997.
63
RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
58

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WHO MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION

Under Section 14, PD No. 1529, the following may apply for registration:
(1)

Those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2)

Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under

the provisions of existing laws.
Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or acquired under existing laws;

(3)
(4)

Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
for by law.

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), it is provided as follows:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto may apply for the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title.

NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

SEC. 14(1), PD NO. 1529 AND SEC. 48(b), CA NO. 141
There is no substantial difference between Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec.
48(b) of CA No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that (1) the land is alienable and
disposable (A and D) public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in open, continuous
exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.64 Both refer to original registration proceedings, are
against the whole world, and the decree of registration for both is conclusive and final.
REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION
UNDER SEC. 14(1), PRD IN RELATION
TO SEC. 48(B), PLA
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073. Under Section14(1) of PD No. 1529, applicants for registration of title
must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
64

Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No. 170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic,
GR No. 141924, Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, GR No. 146527, Jan. 31, 2005, 450 SCRA
247.

12
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.65
Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted
and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.66
In Malabanan v. Republic,67 the Court en banc reiterated that the law does not
require that the land subject of registration should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, or since June 12, 1945. It is sufficient that the land
is already declared as alienable and disposable land at the time the application for
registration is filed so as to entitle the possessor to registration.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for the possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1984. This was superseded by
RA No. 1942 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The law, however, has been
amended by PD No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, but became effective on May
9, 1997,68 which now requires possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.69
But PD No. 1073 cannot impair vested rights of applicants who had complied
with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942. In Republic v. Remnan
Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014, the Court held that an applicant who,
by himself or his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for 30 years prior to the effectivity of PD No.
1073 on May 9, 1999, or at least since May 8, 1947, may apply for judicial confirmation
of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE
65

Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Republic v. Cortez, GR No.
186639, Feb. 5, 2014;.Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No.
179673, June 8, 2011; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 413 (2005).
66
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing.
Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
67
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172; see also Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067,
June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438; also Republic v. Rizalvo, GR No. 172011, March 7, 2011.
68
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
69
Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap, GR No. 173775, Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v. Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March 13, 2007;
Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183; Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA
359. See also RA No. 6940, dated March 28, 1990.

13
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
On the basis of their capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the
following may acquire private lands:
(1) Filipino citizens;
(2) Filipino corporations and association as defined in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution; and, by exception,
(3) Aliens but only be hereditary succession; and
(4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship can both
acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the limitation being up to a maximum of
5,000 square meters if urban land, or 3 hectares if rural land.70
Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60%
of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or
holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition
was made by a former natural-born citizen.71 Aliens, however, may lease private lands.72
The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine
land and not to the improvements built thereon. Land cannot sold to an alien and is
allowed to recover the money spent for the purchase thereof. The provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.73
Pursuant to Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law. This means that pursuant to Section 10 of
RA No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179 dated March 28, 1996, implementing Section
8, Article XII of the Constitution, any natural born citizen who has the legal capacity to
enter into a contract may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of five
thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land, or three (3) hectares in the
case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes.
But where a Filipino citizen naturalized as a citizen in a foreign country has
reacquired his Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No. 9225, dated August
29, 2003, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003, the area limitation under RA No. 7042 may no longer apply since the law
70

Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000 ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA
No. 7042, as amended by RA No. 8179.
71
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009.
72
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461;
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.
73
Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing cases.

14
expressly grants him, as any Filipino citizen, the same right to enjoy full civil and
political rights upon the re-acquisition of his Filipino citizenship.
CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND IS
DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF ITS
ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION
The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the
right to own it is acquired. Thus, a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a
natural-born Filipino, acquired land from a vendor who had already complied with the
requirements of registration prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land
even if at the time of the filing of his application he was already an alien. 74 He already
had a vested right to the land.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina,75 it was held that a
foreign national may validly apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines from a vendor who has
complied with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA No. 141).
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND
BY PRESCRIPTION
In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,76 Section 14(2)
must be considered in relation to the rule on prescription under the Civil Code as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. Possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public
domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for
public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription. 77 Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law.78 The period of possession preceding the classification of the
property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the
prescriptive period.79
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse

74

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapia, 235 SCRA 567.

GR No. 108998, Aug. 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567.
76
GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.
77
Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.
78
Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012
79
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, supra.
75

15
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.80
Open, continuous and exclusive possession of land classified as A and D land for
at least thirty years segregates the land from the public domain and ipso jure converts the
same to private property.81 The conversion works to summon in operation Sec. 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree which authorizes the acquisition of private lands
through ordinary prescription of ten years or extraordinary prescription of thirty years. 82
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND
BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR
ACCRETION
Under Article 420, paragraph 183 and Article 502, paragraph 184 of the Civil Code,
rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion.
River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost.85 However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects of the current of the water belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the
banks of rivers where it forms.86 The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. 87 In Celestial v.
Cachopero,88 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.89
Article 457 of the Civil Code requires that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.90
However, the
accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which
80

Id.
Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 56;
See Arts. 1127 and 1134, Civil Code.
82
Lincoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, GR No. 167652, July 10, 2007.
83
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; . . . .
84
Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:
1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . .
85
Art. 461, Civil Code.
86
Art. 457, id.
87
Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012.
88
459 Phil. 903 (2003).
89
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
90
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
81

16
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. There must be a separate action for
the registration thereof.91
Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and is not open
to acquisition by adverse possession, unless subsequently declared as no longer needed
for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries.92
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED
FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS
A private corporation may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.93 The rule does not apply where at the time the
corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was
possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the
latter to registration.94
If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in possession of the
land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully apply for
confirmation of title to the land.95 In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court
and Acme,96 it was held that a private corporation may apply for judicial confirmation of
the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-ininterest first.97
PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING
Within five days from the filing of the application for registration, the court shall
issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
45 days nor later than 90 days from date of the order. 98 The public is given notice of the
initial hearing by (a) publication once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation; (b) mailing of the notice to persons named in the application for
registration and also to relevant government officials, and (c) posting of the notice on a
conspicuous place on the land itself and on the bulletin board of the city or municipality
where the land is situated.99 Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.100 However, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation
remains an indispensable requirement consistent with procedural due process.101
91

Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524.

Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335.
93
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
94
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509.
95
Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438.
96
GR No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 590.
97
Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., supra.
98
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529.
99
Id.
100
Sec. 24, PD No. 1529.
101
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27
SCRA 276.
92

17
If amendment of the application is made to include additional area, a new
publication of the amended application must be made, but not when the amendment
consists in the exclusion of a portion form the area originally applied for.102
OPPOSITION
Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file and
opposition, based on right of dominion or some other real right, to the application for
registration.103 But the absence of opposition does not justify outright registration. Since
the presumption is that all lands belong to the State, the applicant has the burden of
proving his imperfect right or fee simple title to the land applied for.104 The failure of the
government to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right
to appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private property.105
IDENTITY OF THE LAND
As required by Section 17 of PD No. 1529, the application for registration must
be accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands
(now Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau), together with the
applicants muniments of title. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands.
In Director of Lands v. Reyes,106 the Supreme Court declared that the submission of the
tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. But in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,107 the Court considered the submission
of a white print copy of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The Court was more
categorical in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Espartinez 108 when
it stated that the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required x x x may now be
dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not been
overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.
EVIDENCE OF CLASSIFICATION OF
LAND AS A AND D
In Republic v. Bantigue,109, the Court reiterated that an application for original
registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO 48 Certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
102

Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.

Sec. 27 PD No. 1529.
104
Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227.
105
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
106
GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
107
GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586.
108
GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98.
109
GR No. 162322, March 14, 2012. See also Gaerlan v. Republic, GR No. 192717, March 12, 2014;
Republic v. Joson, GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014; Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013;
Republic v. Dela Paz, GR No. 171631, Nov. 5, 2010; Republic v. T.A.N, 555 SCRA 477)
103

18
copy by the legal custodian of the official records. The applicant must establish the the
classification of the land as A and D through a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or statute.110
Note, however, that in DENR Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, the
DENR clarified that issuance of the certification and the certified copy of the approved
LC Map to prove that the area applied for is indeed classified as A and D is within the
competence and jurisdiction of the CENRO.
In Llanes v. Republic,111 the Court allowed consideration of a CENRO
Certification though it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent
unfairness. In Victoria v. Republic,112 the subject property was covered by a cadastral
survey of Taguig conducted by the government. The Court held: Such surveys are
carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands
covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey
that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a public forest.
This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.
That there are building structures, residential houses and even government
buildings existing and standing on the area does not prove that the land is no longer
considered and classified as forest land.113
EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION
Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, the
reckoning point of possession is June 12, 1945.114 It is only necessary that the land is
already classified as A and D land at the time of the filing of the application for
registration.115
Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.116 Acts of a possessory character by
virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient. 117
Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without
substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute exclusive and
notorious possession under claim of ownership118
110

Ibid.
G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.
112
GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
113
Chang v. Republic, GR No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011.
114
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188..
115
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
116
Sec. 14(1), PD No. 1529; Sec. 48(b), CA No. 141, as amended; Tan v. Republic, GR
No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459
SCRA 183
117
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No. L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32.
118
Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734; Director of lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
111

19

TAX DECLARATIONS AND

TAX RECEIPTS
Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof of ownership but
have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of actual possession or
supported by other effective proof.119 Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting it
every once in a while do not constitutes acts of possession.120 Tax declarations are not
evidence of the right of possession unless supported by the other effective proof. But
they constitute proof that the holder has claim of the title over the property.121
Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax
purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner.122 Hence, payment in one a lump sum to cover all past taxes is
irregular and affects the validity of the applicants claim of ownership. 123 But mere
failure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that there was
abandonment of the property.124
SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER
VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
Spanish titles are no longer admissible as proof of ownership. The so-called
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is inexistent.125 In a case, TCT No. 451423-A was traced
back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate Estate of the late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already declared null and void,
and from which no rights could therefore be derived.126
JUDGMENT; DECREE OF REGISTRATION
Within 15 days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration and certificate of
title.127 There is no period within which to issue the decree.128
While the judgment becomes final 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment
(as to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from receipt of the decision by
119

Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id.
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214.
121
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820; Masagana v. Argamora, 109
SCRA 53; Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
122
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
123
Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140.
124
Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.
125
PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; Quezon
Province v. Marte, GR No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of
Appeals, 265 SCRA 733; Director of Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329.
126
De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011.
127
Sec. 30, PD No. 1529)
128
Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012.
120

20
the Solicitor General who represents the government in all registration proceedings), 129
the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case until after the expiration of one
year from the issuance of the decree of registration; 130 hence, the case may still be
reopened and the decision set aside when granted.131
Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and
the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. A Torrens title issued on the basis of
a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Property Registration Decree which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the
decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.132
A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land
already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void.133
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,134 the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48135 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable.136
WRIT OF POSSESSION
The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration
case but also against any one adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to
the issuance of the decree.137 The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land
129

Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.

Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.
131
Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348.
132
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases.
133
Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada v.
Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 333, 343-344, citing
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558, November 17,
1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.
134
G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L47847, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.
135
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
136
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011
137
Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491.
130

21
after the issuance of the decree and who was not a party in the case. He can only be
proceeded against in a separate action for ejectment or reivindicatory action. 138 The writ
is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession 139
and may be issued by a special order of the court. Mandamus is a proper remedy to
compel the issuance of a writ of possession.140
JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS
Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 confers exclusive jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts
(1) in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; and (2) in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved
exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, Section 33 of BP Blg. 29 provides that Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs.
An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, hence, exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action pertains to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in which instance
the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction.
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the
complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby
sought.141
When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year,
one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of
138

Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.

Gawaran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 154; Lucero v. Leot, 25 SCRA
687.
140
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
141
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico
Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.
139

22
possession. While an accion reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment
case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana. 142
REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO
FRAUDULENT OR IRREGULAR
REGISTRATION
The aggrieved party has a number of remedies to question the validity of the
decision. These include the remedies of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or appeal to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 33, PD No. 1529.
Under the property Registration Decree, the remedies consequent to fraudulent or
irregular registration are: review of decree under Section 32; reconveyance under Secs.
53 and 96; damages under Sec. 32; claim against the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95;
reversion under Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title; quieting of title; annulment
of judgment under Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and
other special laws.

Petition for review of decree. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,143 the Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili,
Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), stressed that
courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an
application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of
the decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored
solely on actual fraud.
It has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of
the courts decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,144 there can be no possible reason
for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging
his claim of fraud.
The rule on the incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one
year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to titles acquired
through homestead or free patents.145 It has been held that the date of issuance of the
patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases.
Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from the issuance of the final decree and is generally conclusive
evidence of the ownership.146 The rule on the inconvertibility and indefeasibility of a
142

Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases.

GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.
144
GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836.
145
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
146
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992)
143

23
Torrens title after one year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to
title acquired through homestead or free patents.147 Only extrinsic or collateral, as
distinguished form intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.
To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) he must show actual fraud in the
procurement of the decree of registration; (c) the petition must be filed within one (1)
year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and (d) the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.148
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party
in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case. The
fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No. 1529)
An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another,
to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.149
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It is
filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the action in court.150
As held in Medizabel v. Apao,151 the essence of an action for reconveyance is that
the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
147

Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.

148

149

Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011.

Muoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing cases.
151
G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608. See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030,
Sept. 14, 2011
150

24
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.152
Reconveyance does not aim to reopen proceedings but only to transfer or
reconvey the land from registered owner to the rightful owner.153 Reconveyance is
available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a
constructive trust between the parties.154
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur:
(a)

the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or

dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(b)

the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured
through fraud or other illegal means;

(c)

the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and

(d)

the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud, 155 or
not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.156

A petition for review and action for reconveyance are no longer available if the
property has already been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.157
There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the
aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered
owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.158
152

Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003), citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354
Phil. 556, 561-562 (1998).
153
Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008; Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July
28, 2008; Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356.
154
Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13, 1994.
155
Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, which held that: An action for
reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which
requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
156
New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citing Walstrom
v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut, GR No. 147379, Feb. 27,
2002, 378 SCRA 206.
157
Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262
(2005).
158
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R.
No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.

25
Action for reconveyance may
be barred by prescription
(1)

Action based on fraud - four years

(2)

Action based on implied trust - ten years

(3)
(4)

Action based on a void contract imprescriptible

Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession imprescriptible

An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in

ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, or the instrument
affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the
land and operates constructive notice to the world. Repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 159
The 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on
fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession
of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does not apply to an action to
nullify a contract which is void ab initio. Article 1410 of the Civil Code categorically
states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.160
But prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the
disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.161
Laches may bar recovery
Where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights
of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable
powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. 162 This is the basic
principle of laches which may bar recovery for ones neglect or inaction.
Cancellation of title
In contrast to an action for reversion which is filed by the government, through
the Solicitor general, an action for cancellation initiated by a private party usually in a
case where there two titles issued to different persons for the same lot. When one of two
titles is held to be superior over the other, one should be declared null and void and
ordered cancelled. Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons for the
159

Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641, 653
(2004).
160
Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011.
161
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
162
Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277.

26
same land, the earlier in date must prevail, and in case of successive registration, the
person holding under prior certificate is entitled to the land as against the person who
relies on the second certificate.
While an action for cancellation of title is usually brought by the aggrieved
private party, the government, although it may have no proprietary interest in the
property, is also vested with personality to bring actions for the cancellation of
erroneously issued titles to protect public interest, preserve the integrity of the Torrens
system, and safeguard the Assurance Fund as well.
Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment
of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which
must be proved.163

Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

An action for reconveyance is not feasible where the property has already passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. But the interested party is not without
remedy he can file an action for damages against the person responsible for depriving
him of his right or interest in the property. This action may be filed against the applicant
or person responsible for the fraud where.164 The action should be brought within 10 years
from the date of the issuance of the questioned certificate of title pursuant to Article 1144
of the Civil Code.165

Action for compensation from the Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No. 1529)
The requisites for recovery are: (a) a person sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived by any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of the bringing of land under the
Torrens system; (c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the
certificate of entry in the registration book; (d) without negligence on his part, and (e) is
barred from bringing an action for recovery of the land.166
The action must be brought within 6 years from the time the right to bring the
action first occurred.167

Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)

The action is instituted by the government, through the Solicitor General, in all
cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the Constitution 168 or were
163

Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011

Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9)
165
Castillo v. Madrigal, GR No. 62650, June 27, 1991.
166
Sec. 95, PD No. 1529.
167
Sec. 102, PD No. 1529.
168
Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292.
164

27
fraudulently obtained.169 Where, for instance, land within the forest zone was the subject
of a sales patent issued to defendant through fraud and misrepresentation, the Office of
the Solicitor General may file an action for reversion and cancellation of title in the
proper court in order that the land may be restored to the mass of the public domain.
The RTC may properly take cognizance of reversion suits which do not call for an
annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a land registration court. Actions for
cancellation of title and reversion, like the present case, belong to the class of cases that
"involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the
assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.170
Annulment of Judgment. (Rule 47, Rules of Court)
A petition for annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders of
Regional Trial Court for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. are no
longer available must be based on (a) extrinsic fraud, (b) lack of jurisdiction 171 and (c)
lack of due process.172 A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.173
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.174
Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic
fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void. 175
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment
may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or
implemented.176
In Yujuico v. Republic,177 the Court ruled that the action of the government for
reversion on the ground that the land was part of the Manila Bay was improperly filed
with the RTC as the action should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governing annulment of judgments of RTCs.

169

Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007.

Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012.
171
Rule 47. Rules of Court.
172
Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013.
173
Section 3, id.; Galicia v. Manliquez, GR No. 155785, April 13, 2007.
174
Alcazar v. Arante, GR No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012.
175
RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 7; Bulawan v. Aquende, GR No. 182819, June 22, 2011.
176
Bulawan v. Aquende, supra.
177
GR No. 168861, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws.
170

28
But in Republic v. Ronman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,178 the Court upheld
the propriety of the OSGs filing of a complaint for cancellation of title and reversion
with the RTC since the land claimed by respondent was not the subject of an adjudication
by the court in a registration case, hence Rule 47 on annulment of judgments is not
applicable.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates
of title is not the same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be
nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land.
On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and
certificate of title would require allegations of the plaintiff's ownership of the contested
lot prior to the issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well as the
defendant's fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining title over the land claimed by
plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the
fact that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The
real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who alleges a pre-existing right of
ownership over the land in question.179
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH
Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that in no case shall such (petition for
review) be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons
claim.180
A person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely
on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are
annotated on the title, for registration is the operative act that binds the property.181 But a
purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard
and still claim that he acted in good faith.182
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title
of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure.
178

Supra.
Galang v. Reyes, GR No. 184746, Aug. 15, 2012.
180
Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264.
181
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710.
182
Yared v. Tiongco, supra.
179

29
Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that, as regards immovable property,
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded the sale
in the Registry of Property.
In Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, the adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979,
respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by
respondent only on March 14, 1980. The Court stated that the prior registration of a lien
created a preference. Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will not
diminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens and the adverse claim.
The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is
preferred in right) is followed in land registration. 183 Thus, it has been held in a case that
Mahinays notice of lis pendens having been registered ahead of Sorensen's real estate
mortgage, the notice of lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate mortgage. The
claim of Sorensen that the owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverse
annotation at the time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the
nature of involuntary registration, the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the
original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind
third parties. It affects the whole world even if the owner's copy does not contain the
same annotation.184
The phrase innocent purchaser for value in Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.185 But unlike private individuals, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence in their dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract.186
In St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,187 the Court, held
that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings
and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the
subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the
mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith.
In Mahinay v. Gako,188 the Court ruled that when a mortgagee relies upon what
appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the basis of the
title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title was
183

Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358, 365 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685
(1942).
184
Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-903
(1995).
185
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, supra.
186
PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011.
187
GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577.
188
Supra.

30
defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the
land mortgaged must be respected and protected.189
In Blanco v. Esquierdo,190 it was held that the right or lien of an innocent
mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if
the mortgagor obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case, upon a complaint filed by
the legal heirs of Maximiano, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-6582
for having been secured through fraud, and also the cancellation of DBPs mortgage. The
only question is whether the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The Court answered
in the affirmative. The bank was not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title was in the
name of Fructuosa at the time of the mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely on
what appeared in the certificate and was under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate. The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action may
be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in
good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens
system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) then,
the first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.191 Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine
ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the
buyer; specifically, to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of
Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith. 192 As against the registered owners and the
holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.193

189

Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands
v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494 (1960).
190
GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.
191
Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544.
192
Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011
193
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.

31
In Remalante v. Tibe,194 the Court ruled that the civil law provision on double sale
is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found
to be fraudulent.
Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v. Valerio,195 where the same parcel of land was
purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed
of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where
said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail.196 The rule that where two certificates purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting
the process of registration.197 On the other hand, while the execution of a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, it only gives
rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the
vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.198
Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not
have nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. In a number of cases, an action for reconveyance has been treated as an action to
quiet title.199
PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL
OWNERSHIP
In Dewara v. Lamela,200 the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage, before the enactment of the Family Code. The issue is
whether the property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject to levy
and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal
case for serious physical injuries. Held:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 201
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.202 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without
judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal
nature.203 23 Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal
194

GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.

GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.
196
Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 350.
197
Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988, 295 SCRA 556.
198
Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.
199
Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases cited therein.
200
GR No. 179010, April 11, 2011.
201
CIVIL CODE, Art. 160; Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 197, 203.
202
Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).
203
CIVIL CODE, Art. 178; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, at 202.
195

32
funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, it does
not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to
answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before
debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be
shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have
redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary
indemnities imposed upon the husband or the wife, as a rule, may not be charged to
the partnership. However, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if the property should be insufficient, the fines and indemnities may be
enforced upon the partnership assets only after the responsibilities enumerated in
Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.

In Ros v. PNB,204 the subject property was acquired in 1968 during Ros and
Aguete's marriage. Ros mortgaged the property in 1974. Is the debt chargeable to the
conjugal partnership? Held:
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract
is voidable.205 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros'
encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee
that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we
follow the conclusion of the appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to
Ros' encumbrance of the subject property. Debts contracted by the husband for and in
the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support of
the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. For this reason,
we rule that Ros' loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

FORGED DEED MAY BE THE ROOT

OF A VALID TITLE
Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. 206 But a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.207
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

204

GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.

Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 534 citing Heirs of Ignacia AguilarReyes v. Spouses Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, 28 August 2000, 410 SCRA 97.
206
Sec. 53, PD No. 1529.
207
Muoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011; Solivel v. Francisco, GR No. 51450, Feb. 10, 1989, 170
SCRA 218; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-64159, Sept. 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489;
Director of Lands v. Addison, GR No. 23148, March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 19.
205

33
A certificate of title is conclusive of ownership. It enjoys the presumption of
validity. Registration does not vest title: It is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 208 It
does not give any person any better title than what he lawfully has. 209 Registration is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands.210 A certificate of title is an indefeasible
title and is conclusive as to the ownership of the registrant, 211 the identity of the land,212
and its location.213As against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed
of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.214
While certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.215
If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates
of title were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, the
transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any
anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.216
An original certificate of title issued by virtue of administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the
indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.217
One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. 218 He is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.219
208

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172; Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339; Avila v.
Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148.
209
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590. Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No.
140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
210
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366.
211
Tan v. Bantegui, GR No. 154027, Oct. 24, 2005.
212
Demasiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105.
213
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626.
214
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
215
Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig, GR No. 166838, June 15, 2011, citing De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, 492 Phil. 643 (2005).
216
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing Degollacion v.
Register of Deeds of Cavite, G.R. No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 108, 115 and Mathay v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 115788, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 556.
217
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.
218
Sec. 44, PD 1529; Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011;
Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710; Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78178, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 738; Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 487 (1935); Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil.
901, 906 (1924).
219
Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310, September
3, 1992, 213 SCRA 563; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, supra.

34

CONVEYANCE AND OTHER DEALINGS

BY REGISTERED OWNER
The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth in Section 51 of P.D.
No. 1529:
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the same
in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases
or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease,
or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered
land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the
registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.

No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the

owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in the law (PD 1529) or upon order of the court, for cause shown.220
From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens
system remains, for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is
registered, notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the
corresponding deed is registered.221 Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding
only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.222
DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY
AND INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION
As a rule, the order of entries in the Primary Entry Book determines the priority in
registration.223
In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of
registration fees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day book of the deed of
sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such
as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day
book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.224
220

Sec. 53, PD 1529.

Narciso Pea, supra note 38, at 189.
222
Bulaong v. Gonzales, GR No. 156318, Sept. 5, 2011.
223
Id.
224
Bulaong v Gonzales, supra.
221

35

AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION
OF CERTIFICATES
The proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a)
when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate;
(d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the
registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when
a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for
the amendment or alteration of title.225
While Section 108, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the
court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any
memorandum appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that proceedings thereunder are
summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only
clerical but certainly not controversial issues.226 Relief under the said legal provision can
only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.227
The court has no authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and
that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other
interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and
assigns without his or their written consent.228
REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT
TO PRESCRIPTION
No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.229 Thus, the right to recover possession of
registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.230 Prescription is unavailing not only against the titled owner but also against

225

226

Paz v. Republic, GR No. 157367, Nov. 23, 2011.

Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 463 Phil. 417, 431-432 (2003).

Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, GR No. 163530, March 9, 2011;Tagaytay-Taal Tourist
Development Corporation v. CA, 339 Phil. 377, 389 (1997).
228
Id.
229
Sec. 47, PD No. 1529.
230
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011, citing Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 107 (1985).
227

36
his heirs.231 But ownership may be lost through laches 232 which is failure or neglect to
assert a right for an unreasonable length of time.233
CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT
TO COLLATERAL ATTACK
A certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding.234 Thus, in a complaint for recovery
of possession, defendant cannot raise in the action the validity of plaintiffs title. 235 There
must be a direct attack on the title via a separate action; but a direct attack may be made
in a counterclaim or third-party complaint.236
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself.237 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. 238 The prohibition against collateral
attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy
indefeasibility.239
REPLACEMENT OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE
Section 109, PD No. 1529, governs the procedure for the replacement of a lost or
destroyed owners duplicate certificate of title. Where the owners duplicate copy is not
in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is unwarranted as the court has no
jurisdiction over the petition.240
RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred.241 The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in
231

Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251; Guinoo v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235.
Fernando v. Acuna, supra, citing cases. See also Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277.
233
Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339.
234
Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Tapuroc v. Loquellano, GR No. 152007, Jan. 22, 2007.
235
Gaiterio v. Almeria, GR No. 181812, June 8, 2011; Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA
743.
236
Leyson v. Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005; Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18,
2011.
237
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.
238
Lacbayan v. Samoy, GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011.
239
(Oliveros v. San Miguel Corporation, GR No. 173531, Feb. 1, 2012.
240
Camitan vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128099, Dec. 20, 2006.
241
Republic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 614.
232

37
the custody of the Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is
replaced with a new one the reconstituted title that basically reproduces the
original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted
title.242
Reconstitution denotes restoration of the certificate of title allegedly lost or
destroyed in its original form and conditions: it does not pass upon the question of
ownership.243 For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following elements must be
present:
(1) the certificate of title has been lost or destroyed;
(2) the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest therein; and
(3) the certificate of title is in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.244
Reconstitution is governed by RA No. 26 in relation to Section 110 of PD No.
1529. Administrative reconstitution is also governed by RA No, 26, as amended by RA
No. 6732, dated July 17, 1989. Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 describes the requirements for
a petition for reconstitution while Section 13 prescribes the requirements for a notice of
hearing of the petition. Non-compliance with the requirements deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.245
The requirements of Sections 2 and 3, RA No. 26 are almost identical. The
enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. The phrase any other
document in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to documents similar to those
enumerated.246
As held in Castillo v. Republic,247 liberal construction of the Rules of Court does
not apply to land registration cases.248 Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory
character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land
registration cases.249 In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred
by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the
mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding
will be utterly void.250

242

Republic v. Vergel de Dios, GR No. 170459, Feb. 9, 2011.

Republic v. Santua, GR No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008; Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development
Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008; Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12.
244
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008.
245
Castillo v. Republic, GR No. 182980, June 22, 2011.
246
Republic v. Lagramada, GR No. 150741, June 12, 2008; Republic v. Santua, supra.;
247
Supra.
248
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
249
Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
250
Caltex Filipino Managers & Supervisors Ass'n. v. CIR, 131 Phil. 1022, 1030 (1968).
243

38
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in
the names of their duly registered owners.251
The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling
significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents, hence, the Republic is not barred from assailing the decision granting
the petition for reconstitution if the same has no merit.252
ADVERSE CLAIM
An adverse claim is registered by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn
petition starting the basis of the right claimed.253 The duty of the Register of Deeds to
record the same on the title of ministerial. 254 The notice of adverse claim is to apprise
third person that there is controversy over the ownership of the land, such that any
transaction regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.255 The annotation
of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 256
requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. The existence of an easement of
subjacent and lateral support need not be annotated at the back of the title of the servient
estate.257

251

Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.

252

Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012.

253

Sec. 70, PD No. 1529.

Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79.
255
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279; Duque-Rosario v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
256
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides:
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation,
no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of
First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may
be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered
was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse
claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
257
Castro v. Monsod, GR No. 183719, Feb. 2, 2011.
254

39
An adverse claim is not ipso facto cancelled upon the lapse of the thirty days from
its registration. There must be a petition for the purpose to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard.258
Parties with liens annotated on the certificate of title are entitled to notice in an
action for cancellation of their liens.259
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over the said property.260 The title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no
special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot
acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest. 261 Thus, one who buys land
where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in
good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in
interest.262
A notice of lis pendens should contain (1) a statement of the institution of the
action or proceeding; (2) the court where the same is pending; (3) the date of its
institution; (4) a reference to the number of the certificate of title; and (5) an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered owner.263 The notice is not a lien or
encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those
dealing with the property that it is under litigation. 264 The litigation must involve the title
to, or the use or occupation of, a specific property. It does not apply where the object of
the suit is money judgment, or proceedings for the probate of will or administration of the
estate of a deceased person, levy on execution or preliminary attachments. 265 A notice of
lis pendens subjects the interest of the transferee to the results of the pending suit.
CONSULTA
It is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register documents presented
to him for registration. (Sec. 10, PD No. 1529). If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to
the registrability of the document, the remedy is to elevate the matter to the LRA via en
258

Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals, supra; see also Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011
259
260

Crisologo v. Omelio, GR No. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, Oct. 3, 2012.

Dela Merced v. GSIS, GR No. 167140, Nov. 23, 2011.

Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-902 (1995).
262
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing
Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232.
263
Sec. 76, PD No. 1529.
264
Republic v. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, Aug. 6, 2008.
265
Biglang-awa vs. Constantino, 109 Phil. 168.
261

40
consulta. The same procedure may be availed of by the interested party.266 Appeal from
the LRA decision may be taken to the Court of Appeals.267

JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI

Philippine Judicial Academy
Supreme Court
552-9636, 922-0232, 0920-9506384
Email: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com

266

Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152.

Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88.

267