Chapter 003 - p30 - LEGAL FICTION - Persona Designata

Chapter 003 LEGAL FICTION - persona designata
* Gary, I like this, Chapter as you are basically saying to people they are not living in the REAL
world but in a FICTIONAL world, is that it?
**#** INSPECTOR-RIKATI®, that is right. Australians really haven’t got a clue what they are as
nationals and are easily led by the nose, so to say. Not particularly a good example!
As I stated in “A LETTER TO YOU” DOCUMENT;
It should be kept in mind that the High Court of Australia in Sue v Hill was not sitting as a
Court of law, but rather sitting, acting as personae designatae, as a Court of Disputed
Returns on behalf of the Federal Parliament, and as such its Sue v Hill ruling was bias, and in
my view absolutely worthless!
Here we have High Court of Australia judges dealing with a case for and on behalf of the Federal
Parliament making declarations which somehow binds the High Court of Australia as a Court of
law where any such kind of declaration would have been considered utter and sheer nonsense. Sue v
Hill, was not a normal case litigated before a Court of law and should never as such have been
given any credibility. It basically was a political case and judges of the High Court of Australia
would have done better to avoid such controversy as I view a gross abuse of their positions. I view,
that if they had claimed the same in sitting as a Court of law, and so to say, they might well have
made themselves the laughing stock.
Australian Agricultural Co Ltd. v F.E.D.F.A of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261 and 278
“The oath of a justice of this court is ' to do right to all manner of people according to law' Our sworn
duty is to the law itself and to the organic nature of the constitution first of all. If, then, we find the law to
be plainly in conflict with what we or an y of our predecessors errornously thought it to be, we have, as I
conceive no right to choose between giving effect to the law, and maintaining an incorrect interpretation,
It is not, in my opinion, better that the court should be persistently wrong than that it should be ultimately right.
In Preston Ice and Cool Stores Pty Ltd. v. Hawkings (1955) V.L.R. 89; (1955) Austin Digest 337.
“It was held that where there is a review/appeal the party having sought such review/appeal is not bound by the
grounds used in the original hearing but may refer to other grounds even so, such grounds had not been upon
which the original order was based.”
The High Court of Australia rather then to accept, as was admitted by the Australian government
Solicitors, that a Section 75(v) of the Constitution application for a Mandamus/Prohibition was
appealable directly to the High Court of Australia blatantly disregard this. By this making a
mockery of the appeal rights provided for by the Framers of the Constitution. By this the judges
having taken upon themselves to be above the Constitution!
8. That as to your issue that the injunction no longer would have any validity I urge the
court to consider the following of the 2 November 2001 transcript at pages 8 and 9;
MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA; “I’m not necessarily, at the moment, disputing the election. I’m disputing the
writs.”
HIS HONOUR; I understand.
MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA: So that’s different, sir. At least nobody say I’m crying sour grapes for not winning
whatever an election ---
HIS HONOUR; Because you haven’t lost yet.
MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA; That’s right. I haven’t lost yet. I’m doing before it.
As such, the issue before the Court was one that I contested the validity of the writs, which
obviously had the flow on that I disputed the validity of the purported election to be held.
Page 1 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 1

A book about the validity of the High Courts 14-11-2006 decision
ISBN 978-0 -9751760-6-1 (Book-CD), 978-0-9751760-7-8 (Book-B&W), 978-0-9751760-8-5 (Book-Colour)
PLEASE NOTE: You may order, any of the published books, by facsimile 0011-61-3-94577209 E-mail
inspector_rikati@yahoo.com.au
The criteria of the challenge of the Writs is not defeated by purported elections held as if the writs
are defective and of no effect then any of the purported elections held are as if they never occurred.
As the ADDRESS TO THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA stated;
13. That for example, to show how the delay in publication effect not only the Proclamations relating to the
election, but generally undermines the publications of the Courts, the Notices required by law with
Statutory requirements of a minimum days and Acts to come into force the following is referred to:
(a) The Government Notices Gazette GN41 dated 17 October but published on 18 October 2001 or
later, includes a document numbered 9620598 that is of the Governor-General of a 8 October
2001 signed Proclamation to commence on 17 October 2001 “under subsection 2(1) of the
Parliamentary Service Amendment Act 2001, fix 17 October 200 as the day on which that Act
commences.” As such, it is to commence 1 day before it is actually published in the State of
Victoria (or other States up to 6 days before it was published, Tasmania publication was on 22
October 2001 and).
(b) The Government Notices Gazette GN41 dated 17 October 2001 but published on 18 October
2001 includes a document 9620601 which provides “NB: The prescribed time for lodgement of
objection is 28 days.”. Clearly, the later publication results that citizens are denied the 28 days
statutory lodgement period. Meaning that in Tasmania they were robbed of 5 days in view that
the publication was 5 days later.
(c) The Government Notice Gazette GN41 dated 17 October 2001 but published on 18 October 2001
(Victoria) includes a document 9620606 revoking under subsection 6(1) of the Australian
Protective Service Act 1987 certain matters from 17 October 2001 even so it wasn’t published in
Victoria until 18 October 2001. Again, In Tasmania it wasn’t published until 22 October 2001
and as such again 5 days of people kept unaware of it.
The matters regarding Gazettes are very serious indeed, affecting many people their rights and
invalidating many rules, regulations and laws, yet the High Court of Australia displayed a total
disregard to all this.
McKenzie v. The Commonwealth of Australia and Others 59 ALJR 191 Gibbs CJ:
I am by no means satisfied that s. 353(1) of the Act, which provides that the validity of any election or
return may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court of Disputed Returns and not otherwise, would
prevent this Court from interfering by injunction if a challenge were successfully made to the provisions of
the Act on constitutional grounds.
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 (28 April 1998)
Dawson J pointed out in Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville when discussing the statutory provision in that case:
"substantial compliance with the relevant statutory requirement was not possible. Either there was
compliance or there was not."
Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-There is no doubt whatever if the possibility which Sir Edward Braddon
has indicated could arise, it would be a very grave blunder, and it would be a mischief which we ought at
all hazards to avoid; but that would not be the position. If such a case as he put were to arise, it would not be
necessary for the person who was aggrieved or considered himself aggrieved by the federal officer to proceed in
the Federal High Court. He could proceed in any federal court or in any court invested with federal jurisdiction.

Mr. SYMON.-I was going to say that it does not confer any right. It is a safeguard, because it will prevent any
application for mandamus or prohibition, both of which are prerogative rights, being made in any court except
the courts invested with federal jurisdiction. The provision says that if you apply as against an officer of the
Commonwealth-
Sir JOHN FORREST.-It might be against the Governor-General of the Commonwealth.
Mr. SYMON.-No, but supposing it is? I will take that position, and say that it does not give any right to get
mandamus or prohibition.
Sir JOHN FORREST.-It is optional.
Mr. SYMON.-It is not optional. It merely gives a jurisdiction in certain applications.
And
Mr. SYMON.-My honorable friend (Sir John Forrest) will see that the proposal before the Convention would
not interfere in any way with the proceedings he has mentioned. Whatever [start page 1879] jurisdiction the state
courts have now in regard to writs of mandamus and to prohibitions against officers of the state will remain. All
the provision says is that writs of mandamus and prohibitions against officers of the Commonwealth shall
be within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The point that my honorable friend. (Dr. Quick) has referred

to is one worthy of the attention he has given to it. The distinction is that writs of mandamus and
prohibitions are prerogative rights, and these other cases are not.
Dr QUICK.-Is not habeas corpus a prerogative right?
Mr. SYMON.-It is not a prerogative right.
And
Mr. BARTON.-The object of this clause is a very clear one, if I may mention it without interrupting the
honorable member. In certain cases the Supreme Court would have original jurisdiction, in others appellate. If
you do not specially mention this, then in cases of mandamus, prohibition, and injunction, it can only have
the ordinary appellate jurisdiction, but if you mention it specially as within the judicial power, and
provide for it as an original jurisdiction, then a case may be taken straight to the court instead of having
to filter through another court.
And
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-There is no doubt whatever if the possibility which Sir Edward Braddon has
indicated could arise, it would be a very grave blunder, and it would be a mischief which we ought at all hazards
to avoid; but that would not be the position. If such a case as he put were to arise, it would not be necessary
for the person who was aggrieved or considered himself aggrieved by the federal officer to proceed in the
Federal High Court. He could proceed in any federal court or in any court invested with federal
jurisdiction.
And
Mr. BARTON.-I think it would apply to any case in which, under the common law, or under any statute
made for the furtherance of the duties imposed by it, you could obtain, we will say, a writ of mandamus.
And
Mr. BARTON.-
The object of it is to make sure that where a person has a right to ask for any of these writs he shall be enabled to
go at once to the High Court, instead of having his process filtered through two or more courts.
And
Mr. WISE.-I would not limit the right of appeal any more than it is limited at present, although I quite admit
there may be a certain absolute right of appeal to the High Court conferred by this Constitution which does not
exist in the case of the Privy Council. I am prepared to run that risk rather than run the greater risk of saying that
the right of appeal to the High Court should be dependent upon a chance majority in Parliament.
Mr. HIGGINS.-How does Mr. Barton's amendment cure the case?
Mr. WISE.-By striking out the word "exceptions."
Mr. HIGGINS.-But by imposing conditions you can practically prohibit a man getting into the court.
Mr. WISE.-I don't think so, because any such Act would be held to be ultra vires. The honorable
member knows that the power to impose conditions is granted, but it does not allow you to impose such
conditions as would render the right impossible.
Mr. ISAACS.-But giving the right to Parliament is totally different.
Mr. WISE.-Any condition which would prevent the right of appeal would be held to be ultra vires. There is
one slight alteration which might meet the difficulty of the honorable member. We might put in the words
"condition as to amount" but at the same time that might limit it too much. I think Mr. Barton's suggestion is the
right one.
Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I hope the amendment will not be carried. I quite admit that Mr. Glynn has done
good service in calling attention to the question, but we have to accept one of two risks. We have either to
prescribe that every application or order, no matter how trumpery, is to involve a right of appeal to the High
Court, or else we shall have to trust the Federal Parliament that it will not do injustice.
And
Mr. ISAACS.-I have no objection, provided there is a limit. We must recollect that Parliament is powerless to
pass an appropriation until the Ministry think fit to bring down a message from the Governor-General.

Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-I think that the clause as it stands is a necessary safeguard to the individual
liberty of the subject in every state. It does not interfere with the right of every state to alter its laws and to
deprive its citizens of their liberty of being tried by a jury of their fellow countrymen, but it does say that the
Federal Parliament shall be compelled to submit any person accused of a breach of the federal laws to
trial before a body of his own fellow citizens, in the state to which he belongs. If this clause were not here
offenders under the Federal Parliament might be removed under an executive act from one part of the
Commonwealth to another, to be tried by resident magistrates, and the Federal Executive would be given
authority which might permit them to tyrannously interfere with the liberties of every subject in the
community.
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-The only argument I have heard in support of the argument of my honorable
friend (Mr. Glynn) was that which O'Connell used in the House of Commons. He said that he was concerned in a
case in which a prisoner was being tried for murder. The case was tried in Ireland. The one witness who was
called for the defence was the murdered man. There was no doubt as to his identity, but the jury found the
prisoner guilty.
Mr. HIGGINS (Victoria).-I feel very strongly that, no matter how much we may value trial by jury as a piece
of machinery, it is not a matter for this Constitution at all.
The above quotations makes clear that the Commonwealth of Australia cannot interfere with the
right of appeal from a Federal Court to the High Court of Australia, where the High Court of
Australia has original jurisdiction. As such the High Court of Australia was wrong to, so to say,
isolate the s383 CEA1918 section but should have accepted that S75(v) of the Constitution gave a
direct right to the High Court of Australia, original refused by the registrar on 30 October 2001,
who then made known that instead the application should be made to the Federal Court of Australia.
Mr. BARTON.-
The object of it is to make sure that where a person has a right to ask for any of these writs he shall be
enabled to go at once to the High Court, instead of having his process filtered through two or more courts.
There can be no question that the writs were defective and unconstitutional ball those issued by the
Governor-General as well as those issued by the Governors.
Mr. SOLOMON .- HANSARD Constitutional Convention 31 January 1898 [page 302]
We have all had a great deal to say about this Federal Court. Most of us, when we were candidates for election to
the Federal Convention, placed great stress upon it as affording a means of bringing justice within easy
reach of the poor man.
Well, the High Court of Australia manipulated its powers to first refuse me to file with the Court in
October 2001 the Section 75(v) writs, despite it having jurisdiction, making clear that I had to apply
to the Federal Court of Australia, and then on 7 November 2001 Marshall J holding that he had no
jurisdiction as it was a matter for the Court of Disputed Returns. It becomes beyond the financial
ability for the POOR MAN to obtain justice where judges are manipulating in this manner their
position.
PAVLEKOVIC-SMITH v AEC (1993) 115 ALR 641, Dawson J;
If a challenge on justiciable grounds can be mounted to the validity of a general election – a question that I
need not consider – such a challenge cannot be entertained by the Court of disputed Returns. It may be
that the High Court has such a jurisdiction but that has not been decided; see the dicta of Gibbs CJ in
McKenzie v Commonwealth .
The Court of Disputed Returns acting as personae designatae (for the Parliament) wouldn’t be
the appropriate Court venue to deal with all matters, as a Court of law, I had placed before
the Federal Court of Australia. For example I disputed the validity of all writs, and the Court of
Disputed Returns can only deal with one disputed writ! The Court of Disputed Returns neither has
jurisdiction to deal with a Section 75(v) application for mandamus/Prohibition which was on 7
November 2001 before Marshall J. therefore, I can only conclude that the High Court of Australia
became the constitutional terrorist rather then being the GUARDIAN OF THE
CONSTITUTION and as set out also it struck out my NOTICE OF APPEAL regardless that no
orders were made to formally invoke jurisdiction as my numerous objections made were not
dismissed. I for one made sure that in the ADDRESS TO THE COURT the many objections were
placed and Gummow J himself referred to the ADDRESS TO THE COURT and as such he knew
or should have known what was before the Court. As the Hansard records of the Constitution
Convention Debates made clear the Framers of the Constitution did not want the Commonwealth of
Australia to have any legislative powers with the right of any citizen to pursue an appeal to the High
Court of Australia with re refuses by a federal court to issue a Mandamus/Prohibition. Then what
were the judges on about on 3 October 2001 one should ask?
The issue is that well before the purported election was Held I followed the legal processes against
the “validity of the writs” (not the election itself as it was not held then) and as such it was not a
matter for the Court of disputed Return as parliament had never any judicial powers to decide
constitutional and other legal matters, I pursued as a Court of law.

HANSARD records the following Constitutional Convention 22 April 1897 [page 1150]
Mr. BARTON: I have to propose a new clause to follow clause 48 in this form:
Until the Parliament otherwise provides all questions of disputed elections arising in the Senate or House
of Representatives shall be determined by a Court exercising federal jurisdiction.
We have not said "the High Court" here, because there is power in the Constitution to invest any court
with federal jurisdiction, so that this clause will work in this convenient way that the Court of a State
invested with federal jurisdiction may determine such a matter in any States
HANSARD records the following Constitutional Convention 22 April 1897 [page 1150]
Until the Parliament otherwise provides all questions of disputed elections arising in the Senate or House
of Representatives shall be determined by a Court exercising federal jurisdiction.
We have not said "the High Court" here, because there is power in the Constitution to invest any court
with federal jurisdiction, so that this clause will work in this convenient way that the Court of a State
invested with federal jurisdiction may determine such a matter in any States
The Hon. N.J. BROWN (Tasmania)[10.27 stated, HANSARD Constitutional Convention 13

September 1897 [pages 464-466]
A certain interval must elapse before the federal court is established to deal with a disputed election, and
the only object of this provision is that the House itself shall deal with the matter until the federal court is
established.
As such, “and not otherwise” was clearly referring to the period after a federal court was
established and there after no longer the Parliament would deal with disputed elections. The dispute
about the writs, albeit resulting to elections, doesn’t appear to be the issue as where the writs are
unconstitutional then they are null and void and so any purported election held without the need to
challenge each and every result of such unconstitutional held election by way of petition before the
Court of disputed returns. Indeed, the Court of Disputed Returns lacks the powers to hear and
determine such defects of a general election being held constitutional valid.
Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30 (23 June 1999) :
These provisions are now reflected in Div 1 of the present legislation, particularly in sub-ss (1) and (2) of s 354,
but with additional provision in respect of the Federal Court and Territory Supreme Courts. Further, s 192 of the
1902 Act still persists as s 353(1) of the Act. This states:
"The validity of any election or return may be disputed by petition addressed to the Court of
Disputed Returns and not otherwise." (emphasis added)
The phrase "and not otherwise" implements the policy stated by Sir William Lyne in 1902 to remove the dealing
with election petitions from the control of the Committees of Elections and Qualifications to which such matters
were then referred, and to direct the petitions for trial in the Court of Disputed Returns.
As such, the validity of any election is not limited to be heard before the High Court sitting as a
Court of Disputed Returns but can be heard also before any competent Federal Court. Indeed my
very argument against Marshall J judgment was that I pursued a constitutional issue challenging the
validity of the general election that was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns. It
appears to me that judges of the High Court of Australia, not being able to use their evolution
theory in a Court of law, then launch it in their political Court of Disputed Returns session instead.
Again, I can but repeat it that the High Court of Australia sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns is
acting for the Members of Parliament to make decisions on their behalf and as such is bias and I
view abused its powers to purport to give a decision that should not have been and neither was
within the jurisdictional competence of the High Court of Australia sitting as a Court of Disputed
Returns but was only within the jurisdictional competence of the High Court of Australia sitting as
a Court of law within Chapter III of the Constitution. When it sits as a Court of Disputed Returns it
is not bound by the same principles as a Court of law and for this a petitioner can be found to have
had a valid claim but the Court can nevertheless dismiss the case upon the argument they do not
think that there would have been any great difference in the lection outcome, if this person had not
been a candidate, which might have stood wrongly. Where as in a Court of law this is not relevant,
as the Court must consider what is legally appropriate and so irrespective of the consequences.
Indeed, declaring a legislation unconstitutional can have severe consequences but the Court cannot
avoid to declare the law as it truly is merely because of some adverse consequences in doing so.
After all, ultimately not the Court but the Parliamentarians have passed the legislation and allowed
it to be enacted, not the Court, and as such if there are consequences then this false back to the
parliamentarians for having allowed such unconstitutional legislation in the first place to be enacted.
The Court of disputed returns however has no legal jurisdiction to determine such matters of
constitutional validity of legislation as any issue arising about constitutional validity must then be
submitted to the High Court of Australia sitting as a Court of law, where, even if involving the same
judges, their judgment must be upon legal basis and constitutionally sound. In Sue v Hill, this
procedure appears to me never have been followed, where the judges, sitting on behalf of the
parliament simply made judicial decision outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns.
Indeed, we had that Gummow J in the Ned Kelly case sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns argued
that the was no need to publish a Gazette, but as I successfully argued in the criminal trial, the
framers of the Constitution specifically stated that one could not act upon a Proclamation unless it
was first published in the Gazette. Gummow J, so to say, basically was fantasizing his own versions
as after all he was sitting on behalf of the Parliament, a political body, and so hardly was going to
make a ruling against those he represented! This, whereas in a criminal trial his arguments simply
was totally defeated. It is very dangerous for judges sitting as a Court of Disputed Returns to
purport to make judicial decision which are beyond their powers. The moment we accept that the
High Court of Australia sitting as judges on behalf of the Parliament, acting as personae designatae,
in Sue v Hill could use and exercise judicial powers of a Court of law we have transgressed the
separation of judicial and legislative powers because the judges themselves have become the evil-
doers to give the Parliament their judicial powers. Hence, we can do nothing less but disregard the
Sue v Hill judgment as one belonging to their fantasy, and not unless we have a Court of law
considering all relevant matters, including the Framers of the Constitution stating that it was
“beyond the Constitution” to make the Commonwealth of Australia” somehow an independent
nation, then, I view, how judges may fancy themselves to declare otherwise might at the very least
question their competence to adjudicate on constitutional matters. Chapter 082B Nic Faulkner
also high light certain issues albeit I do not fully agree with his line of argument. In particularly
quoting someone which may or may no longer be relevant as such a clear example would be Lionel
Price CBE QC, who I understand no longer would pursue what he stated previously because of
further disclosure of details I provided him with. Then again this would more then likely have been
unknown to Nic Faulkner, in view it is of recent events. The evolutionary theory is a very
dangerous theory to apply and in my view the judges of the High Court of Australia sitting on
behalf of the parliament to make a “political” decision may have been entitled to make all kind of
claims regardless what a constitutional nonsense it is, however they should have made this clear in
the judgment and neither subsequently as a Court of law relied upon Sue v Hill decision. In my
view, it is this where they were wrong. In my view, it would be better to keep the Court of Disputed
Returns all together separate from the High Court of Australia to ever again prevent the same
terrible errors to be occurring. The moment anyone attributes the Court of disputed Returns as
having judicial powers to determine constitutional matters, as the Sue v Hill judgment purported to
do, then we have handed to the Parliament JUDICIAL POWERS, as again the judges were sitting
there representing the parliament and not exercising their judicial powers within Chapter III of the
Constitution. In my view, having judges appointed by recommendation of the Government of the
Day rather then upon recommendation of some judicial body attracts the stacking of the High Court
of Australia suspicion, and then having those judges using or abusing their powers representing
those politicians as a Court of disputed Returns makes it a very dangerous game, so to say, where
the integrity and credibility of the High Court of Australia is placed or seems to be placed in
disrepute by the very conduct of the judges themselves. It ought to be obvious that where the
politicians had a personal interest to enlarge their powers by having accepted that they were no
longer a constitutional Parliament but placed themselves above the Constitution they needed the
very judges they had recommended to be appointed and now were acting on their behalf to make a
decision that favoured them to the maximum. As such, I view, the High Court of Australia judges
were political stooges for the Parliament, doing, so to say, their dirty work. Here we have that a
Court of Disputed Returns not having any constitutional jurisdiction to determine constitutional
issues but only can determine election issues upon what is constitutional applicable set it self up to
give parliamentarians (for whom they acted) JUDICIAL POWERS to determine constitutional
issues. The issue should be considered if the Parliament itself in stead of the High Court of
Australia sitting as a Court of disputed Returns, was to have heard the petition of the Sue v Hill
case, could it have then made the decisions the Court of Disputed Returns handed down on its
behalf? In my view only a fool could have accepted the Parliament to make decisions as to
constitutional matters and have this judicially applicable to any court of law operating within
Chapter III of the Constitution. It is an irony that the very judges who are the GUARDIAN OF
THE CONSTITUTION then turn out to be the terrorist of the Constitution by their conduct to
hand over JUDICIAL POWERS, in the manner they did, to the Parliament.
After all, nothing stops the Federal Parliament to abolish the Court of Disputed Returns and then
build upon what the Court of Disputed Returns has established that in future the parliamentarians
themselves can use the Sue v Hill judgment to indicate they now have also JUDICIAL POWERS
to make decisions in regard of constitutional issues. In my view, every judge sitting in a Court of
Disputed returns should ask himself/herself can the Parliament which I represent make such
decision or would this transgress the judicial powers into legislative powers? Perhaps, the judges of
the High Court of Australia lack appropriate training and experiences to determine the difference
between representing political motivated politicians to make decisions on their behalf in a Court of
Disputed Returns and that of sitting as a judge in a Court of law where they must remain impartial
and bound to follow the true intentions of the Framers of the Constitution. In my view, the judges
may not be aware of their utter ridiculous and absurd judgments they made as judges sitting as a
Court of Disputed Returns (personae designatae) in the Sue v Hill case, and this makes it even
worse as they will follow their own ill-conceived judgment and by this ongoing deny the people of
a Court of law that determines matters on judicial basis what is truly constitutionally applicable. I
view therefore it is a LEGAL FICTION that the High Court of Australia is the GUARDIAN OF
THE CONSTITUTION, rather I view, such as what is stated in this book and other books
published that the High Court of Australia is rather a constitutional terrorist.
It is often a LEGAL FICTION that justice is provided, where the lawyers of the Federal
Government (the CDPP) are not just threatening but in fact swindling the Court to make orders for
legal cost for the Commonwealth of Australia, which the Magistrate on 17 November 2006 only
allowed for in a limited way, even so the documents served refer only to “court cost” and does not
provide for “legal cost”. Indeed, if it were to do so it would deny a fair and legal election to occur as
no one could fairly challenge election matters. It would be left only to the rich and powerful to
challenge electoral matters, no matter how right they might be. Many people therefore cave in under
threats and while lawyers may boost they won the case, reality is they swindled the Court and in the
process the Defendant in their criminal conduct. I take it very serious when lawyers are
manipulating the legal processes in a way to place undue pressure upon a Defendant to win a case.
To me that is not what justice is about. With elections the rights of any elector should never be
compromised by highly paid lawyers who regardless how wrong they might be themselves never
loosing as they make money out of litigating, then threatens a law abiding elector in to caving in to
plea guilty as to threaten with pursuing cost, despite the documents served (summons) not providing
for this. Yet, even the High Court of Australia manipulates this matter to make orders for cost, in
regard of a challenge to electoral matters and so rob the ordinary average elector of any reasonable
opportunity to challenge the validity of electoral laws, therefore it is a ILLUSION that we have
FAIR and PROPER elections where anyone challenging the validity of elections is faced with
huge legal cost. I view, that no fair minded Court could accept any legal cost being ordered where it
relates to electoral matters as ultimately it denied the ability of providing FAIR and PROPER
elections, as the appeal process is part of the election process. Unless an election process is within
the financial means for any elector, that includes any challenge to its validity, as the appeal process
is part of an election, there can be no FAIR, and PROPER elections, and threats and threats should
never be part of this process. In my view the lawyers themselves are the real criminals! Yet, appear
to me sanctioned by the Court to pursue this criminal conduct. Then JUSTICE is a LEGAL
FICTION.
As the orders of the HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA makes clear “The notice of appeal be
struck out.” Now, how on earth can it be that a Section 75(v) application of the Constitution for a
mandamus/prohibition is struck out without being heard upon its MERITS is beyond me, and as
previous published books set out extensively the Framers of the Constitution made clear that where
there is a claim of ULTRA VIRES, as I did in support of the applications that the election to be
held were unconstitutional, etc, it ought to be heard.
TAYLOR v. TAYLOR [1979] HCA 38; (1979) 143 CLR 1 (22 August 1979) (Folder 1)
Similarly in Commissioner of Police v. Tanos (1958) 98 CLR 383, at p 395, Dixon C.J. and Webb J. said that "it
is a deep-rooted principle of the law that before anyone can be punished or prejudiced in his person or property
by any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding he must be afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard."
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Mr. GORDON.-

If he joins a plea of ultra vires with a plea of conflict of law, that ought to be heard.
Despite that I challenged the validity of the writs, the Proclamation, the legislation and this versus
constitutional provisions and limitations the High Court of Australia having first fraternized with
the first Defendant Governor-General then railroaded the case by having it struck out. Writs issued
by the Governor-General before the Proclamation being published are invalid and without legal
force. But, the way to High Court of Australia pears to me to operate is as a KANGAROO
COURT and STAR CHAMBER COURT and that to me is a very serious matter.
Hansard 11-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Dr. QUICK.-
The Federal High Court is empowered to-declare a law passed by both Houses and assented to by the
Crown ultra vires, not because the Legislature has exceeded its jurisdiction, but because of some fault of
procedure.
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-The High Court is the protector of the Constitution. What we provide is that "the law"
shall not be so-and-so. My honorable friend wants to provide that "the proposed law" shall not be so-and-so.
Does he mean to say that the High Court would have no power there? We are to take care that the Constitution is
preserved, and that the relative rights of the two Houses are not violated.
While the High Court of Australia on 3 October 2003 was dealing with the Appeal upon a basis of
what the Commonwealth of Australia had legislated, the Framers of the Constitution made clear
that if a federal court refused to issue an order for mandamus/Prohibition then an applies lies to the
High Court of Australia and the Commonwealth of Australia could not interfere with this right by
way of legislation.
To me it is therefore in that regard a LEGAL FICTION to pursue JUSTICE in the High Court of
Australia, and also proved that there are no FAIR and PROPER elections where the validity of
elections comes down to where the judges fraternized with the first Defendant Governor-General
contrary to legal principles and then strike out an appeal constitutional entitled to be made to the
High Court of Australia as the Framers of the Constitution themselves made clear. If judges don’t
even understand they should not fraternize with one of the parties in a litigation before their court
then what else can they be deemed to understand, I ask?
It is a LEGAL FICTION that the High Court of Australia cannot have a “jury”, as the Framers of
the Constitution clearly anticipated a “state jury” to be used in certain cases before the High Court
of Australia.
Hansard 25-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Sir GEORGE TURNER.-
The wording, as I have read it, would leave it absolutely open to this course of proceeding: New South Wales
might have made a rate which was objected to by Victoria; the Federal Parliament, after full discussion, after
hearing all that can be said, after making inquiries, either by a select committee or by an Inter-State Commission,
to get the fullest information, might have declared that it was not necessary for the development of its territory,
and that therefore it was a bad rate. But there would be nothing to prevent an appeal from that decision to
the High Court. The High Court would have a perfect right, it seems to me, under the wording of his
amendment, to re-investigate the whole matter, perhaps by a jury-a jury it may be from the state
interested, or before the Judges alone, as inquiring into a matter of fact.
There is another LEGAL FICTION that somehow JUSTICE is provided for people accused of
TERRORISM, where the Federal Attorney-General somehow determines matters and lawyers
somehow have to be screened and qualified by the Commonwealth of Australia to be acceptable to
defend a accused. It is plain stupidity to even consider that such a system can be in place let alone
actually do so. Any accused in breach of Commonwealth law simply is to be dealt with before a
State Court and the State Court is governed by State legislation, and the Commonwealth of
Australia has no constitutional powers to interfere with this.
Hansard 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
Mr. HIGGINS.-I did not say that it took place under this clause, and the honorable member is quite right in
saying that it took place under the next clause; but I am trying to point out that laws would be valid if they
had one motive, while they would be invalid if they had another motive.
Hansard 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention) Mr. GLYNN.-
We ought not to create the evil of making the Judges not merely interpreters, but the extenders of the
Constitution, and we ought to give the Constitution such a degree of elasticity as will render it capable of being
moulded to the changed conditions as time goes on, and prevent the dangerous alternative of judicial
expansion.
And
Mr. ISAACS.-How could it?
Mr. HIGGINS.-It could not. The dead-lock clauses only apply to laws passed by the Parliament.
Mr. DOBSON.-But some honorable members argue that they would apply to a proposal to amend the
Constitution.
Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention) Mr. SOLOMON.-
We shall not only look to the Federal Judiciary for the protection of our interests, but also for the just
interpretation of the Constitution:
Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. BARTON.-
No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime to the Commonwealth ,
HANSARD 8-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention)
Mr. OCONNOR .-The amendment will insure proper administration of the laws, and afford their protection to
every citizen.
Mr. SYMON.-That is insured already.
Mr. OCONNOR .-In what way?
Mr. SYMON.-Under the various state Constitutions.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes. We are now dealing with the prohibition against the alteration of these
Constitutions. We are dealing with a provision which will prevent the alteration of these Constitutions in
the direction of depriving any citizen of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Because if
this provision in the Constitution is carried it will not be in the power of any state to pass a law to amend its
Constitution to do that. It is a declaration of liberty and freedom in our dealing with citizens of the
Commonwealth. Not only can there be no harm in placing it in the Constitution, but it is also necessary for
the protection of the liberty of everybody who lives within the limits of any State.
Hansard 11-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National
Australasian Convention) Mr. CLARK:
What we want is a separate federal judiciary, allowing the state judiciaries to remain
under their own governments.
It should therefore be very clear that any person accused of terrorism is denied a FAIR and
PROPER trial if the Commonwealth of Australia in anyway at all interferes with the accused right
to have legal representation to his/her choice, and nothing the Commonwealth of Australia can do
as to deny any lawyer to represent a accused, regardless the lawyer not being approved by the
Commonwealth of Australia as proceedings remains to be subject to State court legislative
provisions and any lawyer being the member of the Bar of the State Supreme Court then can
practice to represent an accused as to deny this would infringe the right of a lawyer to do so, as well
as the accused to be somehow restricted to select a lawyer that the Commonwealth of Australia may
prefer. Therefore, any idea as to have a special “TERRORIST” court might be nice to consider to
determine the guilt of who I consider the greatest terrorist John Howard, but even he is entitled
upon the rights as like any other person provided for within the Constitution. No special
“TERRORIST” courts therefore could be deemed constitutionally valid as again;
Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. BARTON.-
No; because you do not give any power with regard to punishing crime to the Commonwealth ,
QUOTE 19-7-2006 ADDRESS TO THE COURT

LEGAL FICTION
Sue v Hill Authority;
GRADUAL INDEPENDENCE, that is what the High Court of Australia argued in the Sue v Hill
case to oust her, despite being a subject of the British Crown from the Senate. Quite frankly, at that
time, I had myself argued that in 1919 by the signing of the Treaty of Versailles the
Commonwealth of Australia had become in effect an INDEPENDENT nation and by this the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) was no more valid then any other
colonial legislation.
The Family Court of Australia even published this in its judgment!
But, while I had this great kind of argument as to why the Commonwealth of Australia was an
INDEPENDENT nation, I later discovered that constitutionally this could not be so. If, the
Commonwealth of Australia somehow became an INDEPENDENT nation then at some point of
time legislation enacted in the commonwealth of Australia and in any of the states would be
defective as they would no longer be what the respective Constitutions required.
The commonwealth of Australia exist as a part POLITICAL UNION between the States, and it
would be sheer impossible for the Commonwealth of Australia to somehow then dictate the States if
it remained to be colonial entities or become independent. No such constitutional powers were ever
provided for in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) and the Framers of
the Constitution clearly opposed such possibility without a Section 128 referendum! Indeed, they
made clear that the Commonwealth of Australia could not, so to say, throw off the Imperial
connection under this Constitution.
The signing of the Treaty of Versailles could not have somehow invoked the Commonwealth of
Australia to become INDEPENDENT and neither can there be something like a gradual becoming
of INDEPENDENT as to even contemplate this on constitutional grounds would mean that having a
Constitution is of no avail as no one will know when things are purportedly changed over time as it
be the judges who may declare what they view by hindsight.
The POLITICAL UNION between the Colonies (now States) to form a political alliance, albeit
partly, was a contract that was binding among them. However, can we accept that somehow a
contracts between them on partial political issues somehow then can change everything?

Would this mean that if tenants of a building are making an alliance then somehow they can
become the owners of the building merely because they claim that over time they became the
owners by what they did?
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear, “external affairs” gave the Commonwealth of
Australia powers to make treaties but only for so far it already was within its constitutional powers.
It could not use it to acquire somehow powers it didn’t possess in the first place. As such, while the
Commonwealth of Australia, for example, may make a treaty with any other foreign nation that
their citizens drivers licences will be accepted as valid without needing a international driving
licence, the truth of the matter is that there is no constitutional powers for the Commonwealth of
Australia to do so in the first place, as only the States have the legislative powers in that regard.
If it were to be allowed for the Commonwealth of Australia to make any kind of treaty in regard of
matters the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) specifically withheld any
legislative powers for, then the whole notion of having a Constitution that can only be amended by
way of Section 128 referendum no longer is applicable as the Commonwealth of Australia can
simply circumvent any constitutional limitation by making treaties in regard of matters it didn’t
have constitutional powers for.
The Constitution is “constant” and can only be amended by Section 128 referendum. CoAG
(Council of Australian Governments) is an unconstitutional entity and cannot therefore somehow
circumvent Section 128 provisions either.
When I contested the legal validity of the application of the Cross Vesting Act, in 1994, I was, so to
say, thrown out by the Courts, yet in 1999 the High Court of Australia in the Wakim case then
formally declared the purported Cross vesting act to be unconstitutional.
In my 28 October 2002 correspondence, to Mr Justice Michael Kirby, I contested the validity of the
Australian Act, and on 17 June 2003 His Honour in the MIMA case then made clear the Australian
Act had no legal enforcement against the Constitution.
It doesn’t matter if the States therefore somehow agreed to the enacting of the “Australian Act” as
it was beyond the powers of Subsection 51(xxxvii) to allow for this in that this subsection only
allows for matters to be referred that is in dispute between two or more States but not all States. The
“Australian Act” could not be held to have been a matter of dispute between two or more States
such as the Murray River can be!
There never was any constitutional powers given to the High Court of Australia to declare the
Commonwealth of Australia to be some alleged INDEPENDENT nation as its constitutional
powers are bounded by the limits of the Constitution.
Are we next going to have that essentially we have become part of the Republic of Indonesia
because we now are enacting legislation dealing with refugees to please the Indonesian
Government?
As Author of various books about certain constitutional issues under the INSPECTOR-RIKATI®
label I have extensively canvassed those constitutional issues, and rely upon my past published
books also in support of this argument that Australians are Australians because they are living in the
Continent of Australia and that they are British nationals and this is EMBEDDED in the
Constitution to remain so. No one can point out that there is a country named Australia where it
makes laws regarding, say, driving licences, council rates, etc for the whole of the nation. The
Commonwealth of Australia doesn’t even have legislative powers over local governments in the
States.
It is simply a LEGAL FICTION that the Commonwealth of Australia is an INDEPENDENT
nation, and so also that somehow the Commonwealth of Australia has a “Queen of Australia”.
Would it not encompass that judicial officers who made an oath of alliance to the British Monarch
and since remained judges of the Courts but never did make a new alliance to the pretended “Queen

of Australia” then are disqualified from sitting as judicial officers at the bench of the Queens
Courts?
Surely, no one could accept that lawyers who swore an oath of alliance to the British Monarch
somehow could continue to be members of the Bar and be judicial officers when we somehow now
hold that the British Monarch and its subjects are all “foreigners” and ousted from not only voting
but also from being Members of Parliament, as Heather Hill was?
When I applied to naturalize it was in the perception that I would become a British national with the
British Crown as head of the Empire. It is not, in my view, for the High Court of Australia then to
somehow imply later with the Sue v Hill case that somehow I never gained any alliance to the
British Crown, neither became a subject of the British crown but somehow became a subject to a
non existing Queen of Australia of a fictional country.
In my 30 September 2003 published book titled;
INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on CITIZENSHIP
A book on CD about Australians unduly harmed.
ISBN 0-9580569-6-X
I canvassed the issue then about the case of Pauline Hanson and David Ettridge as to what I
considered to be their wrongful conviction. I pointed out that it was immaterial what was stated on
the flip side of the membership card as what was relevant was that the membership Card showed
that the person was a Member of Pauline Hanson One nation and as such were full members for
purpose of legislation. On 8 October 2003 the Queensland Attorney-General and Minister of Justice
then wrote to me that in fact legal issues I had raised had not been canvassed by any of the parties in
any of the proceedings. Yet, subsequently the Court of Appeal about word for word used the very
legal argument I had used in my book as to overturn the convictions.
What was clear is that those who joined Pauline Hanson One Nation for all purposes were
“Members” regardless of what may have been stated otherwise to try to interfere with this on the
flip side of the membership card. Likewise, I naturalized to become an British national referred to
as “Australian” because of being resident in the Commonwealth of Australia, and do not accept that
somehow years later the High Court of Australia, and notably beyond its constitutional powers (as it
did with the MABO case, as the colonies joining Federation did not accept there was a native title
issue in Australian colonies existing) can then interfere with my constitutional rights being a British
national. It is not relevant for this if the British Parliament did or did not legislate as to Australians
being “foreigners” as it would be ULTRA VIRES, as it has no legislative powers to deny
Australians their British nationality that is embedded in the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK).
Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. DEAKIN.-
In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,
Because no judge can be an adjudicator in his own cause, it must be clear that in effect not a single
judge could purport to have a position to decide this matter if his/her own position depends upon the
outcome of this matter to be decided.
It would be judicial bias for any judicial officer to decide a matter in which his very own survival of
being a judicial officer depends upon the outcome of the matter.
The first principles of British law incompetence, propter affectum to sit upon the trial must be considered.
In my view a Jury of men in the language of omni exceptions majores could without difficulty
consider the matters and if it is tenable for a High Court of Australia to somehow create on its own
some kind of a LEGAL FICTION that does not exist but affects by this the very constitutional
rights enshrined in the Constitution!

Now, still assuming them to be a Jury, and of course invested with all the attributes of Jurors at the Common
Law, this challenge propter affectum certainly ought to hold good for even were the statute construed as bearing
out a different signification, still an established right was not to be overturned by any supposed negative clause,
but by a direct and express affirmation. It was an immutable law of justice of Great Britain, in fact of every
civilised country on the face of the globe, and well laid down had that doctrine been from time immemorial, so
far had the doctrine been carried too, that Blackstone, book i p. 91. Christian's edition, conceives it impossible so
monstrous and absurd an injustice should ever exist any where, as that any man should be constituted a judge in
his own cause.
And
Mr. Wentworth gave a very lucid explanation of what in law sedition meant, and how it could most properly be
applied, considering it a Scotticism. Mr. Chief Justice Forbes rather thought the word had its origin from the
Latin tongue, and his Honor, with much classic taste, proceeding to elucidate his idea used an apt quotation from
the Mantuan Bard -- from the Æneid of Virgil 1 Book, lines 152, 3, 4, as follows:--
"Ac veluti magno in populo, cum soepe coorta est SEDITIO, soevitque animis ignobile vulgus,
Iamque faces, et saxa volant -- furor arma ministrat."
After a most elaborate, eloquent, and argumentative appeal as to the justice and the facts applicable to his client's
case Mr. Wentworth again sat down.
Forbes C.J., Stephen and Dowling JJ, 20 June 1829
Source: Sydney Gazette, 23 June 1829
As already set out above that Australians (British nationals) are governed by Constitutional law and
British law! It is impossible for the High Court of Australia to somehow throw of the Imperial
powers while still maintaining that the Imperial legislation such as the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) remains in force albeit upon conditions what they
themselves consider is relevant. Some kind of, so to say, “cherry picking” tactic.
The mere fact that the people of the Commonwealth of Australia rejected a referendum to become a
REPUBLIC in itself underlines that Australians never accepted that the Commonwealth of Australia
is an INDEPENDENT nation but rather that it remains under the British Crown.
Indeed, the monarchist argued that the British monarchy had been good to us and the Republican
were having their say why to keep this kind of pompous royalty if we can do without. The mere fact
that such kind of arguments were going on in itself indicates that the people of Australia didn’t
accept to become an INDEPENDENT nation and neither regarded to be so. While for political
purposes members of parliament and indeed those in seat of power of Government may elect
wanting to wield unlimited powers, it is not the function of the High Court of Australia to look after
their power hungry desires but to declare constitutional provisions as intended by the Framers of the
Constitution aligned with what was amended by successful referendums.
David Hick, as I view it, was therefore a British national by birth, irrespective if his mother was
born in the UK!
My children and grandchildren born in the Commonwealth of Australia are all British nationals, as
this is their birthright that was embedded in the Constitution!
For the record, it ought to be understood that my naturalization never involved any State official, as
it was done at 55 Kings Street, Melbourne at the then offices of the Immigration Department, and as
such unlike most other people my naturalization was purely conducted by Commonwealth of
Australia officers, who obviously lacked any constitutional powers to provide me with “franchise”
as that was a State matter. It can therefore neither be argued that somehow the state of Victoria did
provide me with “franchise” as it never did. It erroneously relied upon the ULTRA VIRES
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 as to somehow take it that I was granted “franchise” where clearly
this never could be so.
In the Moller v Board of Examiners for Legal Practitioners case it is clear that some “oath of
alliance” was required. Now, if there was some change of “oath of alliance” because of purportedly
the Commonwealth of Australia having become INDEPENDENT then at what time was the “oath
of alliance” taken by lawyers to practice at the Victorian Bar valid? And, when did lawyers already
have taken this “oath of alliance” to the British Monarch then make a new “oath of alliance” to the
purported “Queen of Australia”? Or is it that we have lawyers (including judicial officers) where

some have sworn an “oath of alliance” to the LEGAL FICTION of Queen of Australia while others
to the British monarch?
I take the position that it is not relevant what the High Court of Australia may purport to make out
of matters in the Sue v Hill case, as ultimately it is ULTRA VIRES where they are making
decisions that are in conflict to the intentions of the Framers (and so amended by the successful
referendums) as expressed in the Constitution.
I view it is beyond constitutional powers for the High Court of Australia to interfere with
constitutional provisions and as such we are and remain to be British nationals and ultimately it will
be up to the people to decide otherwise.
Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. DEAKIN.-
What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the liberty
and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire . A charter of liberty is
enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good government for
the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-I wish to say one word or two before we part. I do not intend to enter into any
detailed examination of, or any elaborate apology for, the Constitution which we have been engaged in framing.
But, sir, no man can remain unmoved upon this momentous occasion. We who are assembled in this
Convention are about to commit to the people of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are
about to commit this new Magna Charta for their acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of
nothing of greater magnitude in the whole history of the peoples of the world than this question upon
which we are about to invite the peoples of Australia to vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons
of England from a reluctant king. This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
Again;
This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
My view is that, “We, the people” have the only power to amend the Constitution and political
appointed judges who may lack any proper perception of what is constitutionally appropriate have
no powers whatsoever to rob us of our constitutional rights.
Again, if the High Court of Australia ruling in Sue v Hill that British nationals are not entitled to
franchise and sit in the parliament then this means every Australian by this is in effect excluded
from participating in any election, because of the embedded constitutional provision that we are and
remain British nationals by birth or by naturalization!
And, as the British Parliament did provide for what the Framers of the Constitution intended that
any person subjected to a race legislation by this is having a disability that denies the person to have
citizenship and so franchise (obviously as to avoid persons subjected to race legislation to overturn
the legislation) then by the unconstitutional Racial Discrimination Act each and every Australian is
by this disqualified to have citizenship and so also franchise and to be in the Parliament.
Unlike what I did, I found it remarkable that the High Court of Australia never appropriately quoted
the Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates such as in the Sue v Hill, Sykes v
Cleary, the MABO, Pochi, and other cases. Indeed, in the Sykes v Cleary it incorrectly referred to
the Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates, taking it out of context, as I have
already extensively canvassed in previous published books. Hence, likely those decision will be
overturned in time to come as having been erroneously made.
Therefore, on this basis also, the Court could not invoke legal jurisdiction as to federal
jurisdiction because if Australians are all disqualified to have citizenship and so to be electors,
by whatever reason set out above, then the Court cannot entertain any alleged breaches of
electoral laws.
It might also be asked if the Commonwealth tor of Public Prosecutors lawyers made an “oath of
alliance” to the FICTIONAL “Queen of Australia” or made an “oath of alliance” to the British
Monarch. After all, we cannot uphold British constitutional law, as the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) is by officers who have sworn an “oath of alliance’ to a
foreigner and by this are, so to say, perhaps bend to pursue their own cause regardless how
inappropriate and indeed unconstitutional this might be??
In my view, one can only have a “Queen of Australia” if there is such a country as Australia where
the government of that country has all powers over its subjects by its constitution. Clearly, no such
country exist, as like the European Union, the Commonwealth of Australia is a LIMITED
POLITICAL UNION where there can be no kind of monarchy existing.
The only reason that Australians have the Monarchy is not because the Commonwealth of Australia
is a Monarchy, but because it is created by a LIMITED POLITICAL UNION of the Colonies
(now States) who were and remain dominions of the British Empire. Hence, if the States were to
become independent then automatically the Commonwealth of Australia would by this become
INDEPENDENT provided such INDEPENDENCE was reflected by the people of Australia to
amend the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) that Australians no longer
would be British nationals, etc.
Again;
This new charter is to be given by the people of Australia to themselves.
In my view, it would be sedition for any judge of the High Court of Australia, having made an “oath
of alliance” to the British Monarch then to make a ruling against the Monarch that would
undermine the very intentions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) that
succession of the British Crown will be the monarchy, as for example by the Bill of Rights it is well
recognised that all judicial officers as well as Parliamentarians are to respect the Monarchy and its
position.
Also, as I pursued naturalization after about 23 years having resided in the State of Victoria, and as
such did not quickly get naturalized but indeed took my time to understand what seemed to be
applicable and for all purposed Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the second was the rightful Monarch
to the British throne, and being the British Monarch who was for all purposes was and remained the
Queen under which Australian State and Federal laws are enacted, then a later fictitious Queen of
Australia for an INDEPENDENT Australia cannot be deemed to override constitutional
foundations.
By marriage, I had a name change, from “Schorel” to “Schorel-Hlavka”, to but for all purposes
remain the same person. As such, regardless if for title purposes there was some alleged name
change the person was and remained the British Monarch, the rightful Monarch in regard of the
Commonwealth of Australia.
As I understand it the British Monarch cannot obtain an other titles as Queen of Australia where no
such Monarchy exist. In my view, it is an insult to name the British Monarch “Queen of Australia”
as being a Queen without a country.
As the British Parliament enacted Section 51(xix) that the Commonwealth of Australia could
naturalize “aliens” to become British subjects, then neither the Commonwealth of Australia and for
this matter the High Court of Australia can turn this into naturalization of “aliens” to become, say,
Chinese, Japanese, Australian, Indonesian or whatever other kind of nationality. The British
Parliament had itself no legislative power but to provide for the Commonwealth of Australia to
naturalize “aliens” to become British nationals, being subjects of the British Crown.
Indeed, if the British Parliament were to have contemplated to provide for Subsection 51(xix) for
naturalization for “aliens” to somehow obtain nationality of anything other then British nationality
then its may itself have been guilty of sedition, as it could not undermine the British Crown and
rights to its subjects.
In my view, the later Sue v Hill judgment, after I had already naturalized in 1994, cannot affect my
constitutional rights to be a British national, and neither that of my children and grand children born
in the Commonwealth of Australia, or for that matter other born or naturalized in the
Commonwealth of Australia.

As such, I am an Australian resident with British nationality since naturalization and failing there
being any State legislation as to define/declare “citizenship” it effectively means that no one is a
“State citizen” and hence neither “Commonwealth citizen” (Australian citizen).
For some years now I have promoted that there should be an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN, a
constitutional council, that advises the Government, the People, the Government and the Courts as
to the application and limitations of constitutional powers. Because there appear to be no such
constitutional council and judges appointed to the High Court of Australia lack to be
constitutionalist we are ending up having ill conceived judgements handed down that causes
uncalled problems. Then and only then will all people get the same kind of extensive information
and then judges can consider this kind of extensive information rather then unprepared and often
taking out of context or not considering at all Hansard records of the Constitution Convention
Debates.
“Naturalization” was never intended to include any legislative power to define/declare citizenship
and the Framers made clear that the States would retain their legislative powers to define/declare
citizenship. Hence, it is beyond constitutional powers of the High Court of Australia to somehow
include “citizenship” into “naturalization” as it would be ULTRA VIRES.
My stepdaughter, (now 45) herself having obtained several law degrees at Monash University, such
as in International Law, never realised then that she was in fact allegedly not naturalized at the time
her parents were, even so my wife insist even to today that to her perception she was included in the
naturalization.
It appears to me that the Commonwealth of Australia basically did a con-job to name the legislation
Australian Citizenship Act 1948, where it knew or ought to have known that the framers of the
Constitution referred to “Australian citizenship” in the same manner as being “Commonwealth
citizenship” and being only obtainable by obtaining “State citizenship”.
As the Framers made clear, to hand over to the Commonwealth of Australia to declare/define
“citizenship” would be to allow it to undermine al, provisions otherwise provided for in the
Constitution.
After all, if the Commonwealth of Australia could define/declare “citizenship” then by this it could
decide who shall or shall not have a right to vote in State elections, or indeed if any state elections
were to be allowed. It could turn the Federation into a confederation by abolishing the States by not
allowing any State elections to be held. My published books already have canvassed these matters
more extensively and therefore no need to set this out in hundreds of pages for this court, as I refer
to my various books published under the INSPECTOR-RIKATI® label.
If this Court were to go along with the fact that “British nationals” are “foreigners” and excluded
from being a Member of Parliament, as Sue v Hill purports, albeit wrongly, then not a single
Australian could be entitled to be in the Parliament and not a single Member of Parliament for this
could be rightful hold a seat in the Parliament.
If the unconstitutional Racial Discrimination Act is deemed to be valid, then again it is a
“disability” against every Australian, British national or not, and then this disability automatically
disqualifies every Australian from having “citizenship” and so “franchise” in both State and Federal
elections.
As was also placed before the Magistrates Court of Victoria the evidence in the ADDRESS TO
THE COURT that the Attorney-General in November 2002 advised me that the State of Victoria
has no legislation to provide State citizenship!
Mr. SYMON.-
As a citizen of a state I claim the right to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want to place in the
hands of the Commonwealth Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it, the right of
depriving me of citizenship.
And

Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this Constitution
on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the
Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those
rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as
aliens, and so on.
Therefore, regardless if the Commonwealth of Australia purports to call “nationality” citizenship it
still does not encompass a right to declare/define “CITIZENSHIP” that includes state citizenship
and State franchise. Section 41 of the Constitution is very clear that the right to vote, and it is a
right not an obligation, is based upon being a State lector. If therefore, the state or States do not
have any State citizenship, then there neither can be a State franchise right, and so section 41 of the
Constitution does not come in play either.
It might be clear that the magistrate on 4-12-2002 upon submission of the Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions held it better that these matters be determined by the High Court of Australia
before any further proceedings were to be dealt with, if at all.
As the onus of proving jurisdiction was upon the Commonwealth director of Public Prosecution
then it had the obligation to have a ruling by the High Court of Australia upon these matters.
The fact that it failed to pursue the matters before the High Court of Australia in my view
was tantamount to abandoning its prosecution against me.
Any notion that somehow I had to pursue the matters before the High Court of Australia is absurd,
as I am not the one who instituted proceedings in the Magistrates Court of Victoria!
END QUOTE 19-7-2006 ADDRESS TO THE COURT
Take “Australian citizenship” as defined/declared in the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, it is a

“LEGAL FICTION” as constitutionally the Commonwealth of Australia has no legislative powers
to define/declare citizenship. This is a legislative powers for the states. What the Commonwealth
did however was to alter the “Naturalization Act” into an Australian Citizenship Act 1948 and by
this seeking to, so to say, hijack the States legislative powers in regard of “citizenship”.
Another legal fiction is the appointment of a Governor-General by the Prime Minister allegedly by
order of the Queen. A Governor-General can constitutionally only be appointed by the Queen upon
recommendation of the Home Office at 10 Downing Street. Any other kind of appointment is
unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES. The Governor-General is to represent the British Crown,
not the Australian political party that is in power. Indeed, the Delegates to the Constitution
Convention made clear that it was highly undesirable to have some Australian Government being
involved in the appointment of a Governor-General as then the Governor-General would no longer
represent the interest of the Queen, and would be more like some political watchdog of some prime
minister.
Another “POLITICAL FICTION” is that people are picked up from the streets, so to say, and
placed in detention and then deported as if it is legal while it is in fact unconstitutional as no person
can be arrested let alone deported in regard of alleged breaches of Commonwealth law but by order
of a State Court by a judicial determination!
Another “LEGAL FICTION” is to place a person on a GOOD BEHAVIOUR BOND, after the
person already committed a crime. The purpose of a GOOD BEHAVIOUR BOND was to keep a
person from possibly committing a crime! Not for in the future committing other crimes
QUOTE
A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE
SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
1856

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine, BY
JOHN BOUVIER, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
GOOD BEHAVIOUR. Conduct authorized by law. Surety of good behaviour may be demanded
from any person who is justly suspected, upon sufficient grounds, of intending to commit a crime or
misdemeanor. Surety for good behaviour is somewhat similar to surety of the peace, but the
recognizance is more easily forfeited, and it ought to be demanded with greater caution. 1 Binn. 98,
n.; 2 Yeates, 437; 14 Vin. Ab. 21; Dane's Ab. Index, h. t. As to what is a breach of good behaviour,
see 2 Mart. N. S. 683; Hawk. b. 1, c. 61, s. 6; Chit. Pr. 676. Vide Surety of the peace.
END QUOTE
And other is how we purportedly have a democratic election but in reality is a con-job. The AEC
(Australian Electoral Commission) is a law onto itself closing offices during the period (shall not be
less than” and putting State election time tables as Federal time tables, and using the Courts to
deceive judges to what really applicable. Because it is supervising itself there is no true supervision.
Below is a correspondence to the Attorney-General in 2001 and despite that and 50-years of
litigation in which ultimately I succeeded on all constitutional grounds nothing was done to correct
any wrongdoings. As such we have a LEGAL FICTION of democracy which in real terms does
not exist. If I had lost the case on 19 July 2006 you could, so to say, bet your last penny that they
would have plastered it all over the Internet and would have used it in their material. But, now that
they lost, you will find it will be left hidden as after all, they are not there to provide FAIR and
PROPER elections but to swindle the people in this LEGAL FICTION of democratic elections
which do not exist.
Anyhow read the correspondence quoted below and then seek to discover that in view of that I
succeeded in the appeals on 19 July 2006 UNCHALLENGED on all constitutional grounds, what
then was correct!
QUOTE 11-12-2001 CORRESPONDENCE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Attorney General Mr Daryl Williams 11-12-2001
Suite MF 19
Parliament house
Canberra, ACT
Ph; 02 6277 7300
Fax 02 6273 4102 URGENT AND VERY IMPORTANT
Sir,
Hereby, I enclose copies of the following documents:
1. Notice of Appeal M114 of 2001 Filed in the High Court of Australia
2. Form 4 Application filed 2 Nov 2001 Federal Court of Australia
3. Form 4 Amended Application filed 5 November 2001 Federal Court of Australia
4. Affidavit Sworn on 2 Nov 2001 by GERRIT HENDRIK SCHOREL-HLAVKA
7. Orders Marshall J 7 Nov 2001 Federal court of Australia
8. Judgment Marshall J 7 November 2001.
9. Letter from G. H. Schorel-Hlavka dated 11 Dec 2001 to Australian Government Solicitors.
10. DRAFT Petition for Court of Disputed Returns.
The appellant intend to file also a Section 78B document in regard of Constitutional matters.
I have prepared an extensive s78B but seeking to modify it, I will provide one at a later time.
The issues are multiple, but some, not stated in any order of importance are;
I, G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA, having married this year and moved to the area of Jagajaga,
found that the Divisional Electoral Officer advised me that nominations for Senate and House of
Representatives (Victoria) would close on 18 October 2001. I had to obtain 50 signatures of eligible
voters for nominations.
On about 20 October 2001, I detected that despite the legal provisions of Sections 155, 156 and
157 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, the Australian Electoral Commission failed to
adhere to those provisions.
I forwarded E-mails to the Prime Minister, Kim Beazley, Bob Brown, Natasha Stott Despoja etc., I
got an automatic response from the Prime Minister, and further only Natasha’s office responded
advising to make a formal complaint to the Australian Electoral Commission. This I did and I got a
response back from Kathy Mitchell, Director Government and Legal Section in her letter dated 25
October 2001 sting “applying for an injunction in the Federal Court of Australia” to prevent the
election being held.
This, I did, only then for the Australian Electoral Commission to oppose legal jurisdiction of the
Federal Court of Australia. And claiming before the Court;
The researches of counsel have been unable to find provisions using
similar language (“not less that” or “at least” a number of days) where
the language is as clear and specific as found in ss156(1) and 157.
Yet, South Australia, Western Australia, Victoria and Tasmania each have “shall not be less than
11 days” in electoral laws for the Senate and NSW has “shall not be less than 10 days” as such it
was sheer nonsense what the AEC placed before the Court.
Further, I sought ALL writs to be declared void and of no effect and this clearly was outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Disputed Returns. Also, I complained about the conduct of the
Australian Electoral Commission publishing false and misleading material/information to the
public, the Government and the Commonwealth prior to elections being held and as such, that to
was within Section 383(1) and outside Section 353(1). Also, “and not otherwise” in Sue v Hill
[1999] HCA 30 (23 June 1999) proved to relate to the Parliament’s committee, and nothing to do
with the Federal Court.
It must be clear that unless the AEC acts within the powers of Section 7 of the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918, it has no position in holding any election, regardless if writs were issued
otherwise.
The writs do not give any legal powers to the Australian Electoral Commission beyond what is
provided for within Section 7 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918.
What I found was, that the minimum number of clear days between the issue of the writs and the
holding of the poll must be 34 days! Not 32 days as often was applied. And, the minim days with a
Senate election can be the same provided with certain States the closure of the nominations is one
day later then the House of Representatives. The closure of Nominations is a day by Section 36 of
the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 being an additional day.
The writs were issued on 8 October 2001 but the Proclamation of the prorogue of the Parliament
and the dissolution of the House of Representatives in Special Gazette S421 was not actually
published in the State of Victoria until 10 October 2001. Clearly, this was in breach of the
provisions of Section 32 of the Commonwealth Constitution, which required that first the
Proclamation is published before the writs are issued.
Because the AEC was publishing false and misleading details they misled the Federal Executive
Council, the Governor-General and the Governors about how legislative provisions applied, and so
the writs were issues by the Governor-General and all Governors incorrectly, albeit, each writ had
the wording “according to law”, and it was clear that each writ was to be according to law, and
not intended to breach any legislated provisions.

The AEC having been the culprit to mislead everyone, hardly then can rely upon incorrect writs
issued, as an excuse to proceed with unlawful elections.
Apart of the election issue, it must also be considered that every Notice or Act published in any
Gazette that was to commence from the date of publication might now be found to be NULL AND
VOID where the Gazette was published 1 or more days later. For example the Notifications by the
Reserve Bank. It appears, from what I discovered, that this has been going on for many years and so
numerous Notices and Acts might be invalid. This is a very serious matter.
WATSON v_ LEE (1979) 144 CLR 374, Full Court of the High Court of Australia;
To bind the citizen by a law, the terms of which he has no means
of knowing, would be a mark of tyranny.
Clearly, publication of Notices or Act’s After they already are commenced is not proper and place
their validity at question.
All I sought was simply that elections were being held according to the legal provisions!
What I discovered was that the AEC and the Australian Government Solicitors misled the Court in
various ways as to ensure that this purported election could proceed regardless what the
consequences were and to cause me to be ordered to pay cost for the hearing before the Federal
Court of Australia.
Now that I filed the Notice of appeal, the Australian Government Solicitors made clear they will
oppose the case upon lack of legal jurisdiction, even so of the fact that there are orders for cost
which in itself entitled me to appeal.
It must be clear, they are playing a sickening game rather then to have argued the case upon its
MERITS.
The Governor-General clearly can’t exceed his powers, and is limited to issue writs within and in
compliance with Australian Law and the Commonwealth Constitution.
It ought to be clear, that had the AEC acted on 22 October 2001 to request the Governor-General
and the Governor’s to withdraw their writs, and to issue writs, in accordance with legislated
provisions, then if those writs were issued quickly only a few weeks delay would have occurred.
I have checked extensively (after downloading it all) the HANSARD of the Constitutional
Convention of 1891, 1897 and 1898 and it is clear that the framers of the Commonwealth
Constitution Bill were in the mind that the States rights to determine certain matters in regard of
elections of Senators must be protected.
The Commonwealth, so the AEC, therefore has no powers to ignore State electoral legislation.
As I pointed out, the AEC or its officers were refusing would-be candidates to nominate, because of
being 10 minutes or so to late from the hour of 12 midday on Thursday 18 October 2001. Yet, with
the House of Representatives, in law (Section 156) there was still 24 hours to go and for the Senate
in most States there was still 48 hours to go!
It must be clear, that the Court of Disputed Returns within Section 353(1) can’t entertain any
petition in regard of all writs and as such my application before the Federal Court was appropriate.
Lawyers warned me, of the record, prior to the hearing before the Federal Court, that my case
would, so to say, be RAILROADED as there was no way the court would hear my case regardless
of what the MERITS of my case was about!
I take it very serious that a judge of the Federal Court of Australia dismissed my application upon
the basis of there being no legal jurisdiction where clearly my material was giving sufficient
grounds to have the matter heard before the Federal Court.
As I expected the case to be RAILROADED, I had even included what had gone on with the
Deputy Registrar of the High Court prior to filing my application in the Federal Court as to make
sure that the Court could be aware of my actions.
The fact that the Australian Government Solicitors took it upon themselves, as I view it, to grossly
misled the Court, in my view, is something that demands a ROYAL COMMISSION as clearly
their material was not just inaccurate but withholding from the court relevant material and also
misconstruing material where the authorities referred to clearly pointed out what the decisions were
about.
I am due to set up a website (I own 7) which will publish all material as I intend to provide to the
General Public all details so they for themselves can conclude it the AEC and the Australian
Government Solicitors and the Federal Court acted appropriately in all the circumstances.
It is my position that the Australian Government Solicitors ought to seek “leave to appeal out of
time” (to which I consent) and appeal the 7 November 2001 Marshall J decision, upon the ground
that the Court had been grossly misled by the 3rd Respondent and the lawyers involved.
I do not know if the Australian Government Solicitors have a normal conduct of perverting the
course of justice and causing miscarriage of justice, but certainly, I view, a ROYAL
COMMISSION ought to investigate this, as well as the conduct of Marshall J.
As a litigant I am entitled to a fair and proper hearing, and I view I was robbed of this, not because
the trial judge made a decision upon the basis of the MERITS OF THE CASE and the material
filed before the Court, but because of a blatant disregard of it. Now faced with huge cost to file a
petition and publish it in the Gazette’s etc all totally uncalled for that the AEC and its legal
representatives not perverted the course of JUSTICE.
I question now also, how many other cases the Australian Government Solicitors might be involved
in where the Notices and Acts might be invalid but they are withholding this from the Courts?
It also ought to be questioned, that if the writs indeed were void and of no effect, if then the AEC
and the Australian Government Solicitors should be held personally accountable for the cost of the
purported elections and the cost of litigation, where they, so to say, “SCREWED” the public to
have purported elections held, they knew or ought to have known were illegal.
In the mean time, I view all Attorney Generals ought to be warned that Notices and Acts published
too late in their State/Territory might be invalid in certain circumstances and they better notify all
those who placed notices and are unaware of it. Obviously, the extent of the delay in publishing
Gazette’s must also be checked, as to how long this has been going on.
I enclose hereby a copy of the Special Gazette S421 which next to the wording AusInfo shows the
date of “publication” to be 10/10/01.
I enclose also Government Notices Gazette GN41 which next to the wording AusInfo has the date
of “publication” being 18/10/01.
For example; The Australian Industrial Relations Commission in GN 41 published a Notice
numbered 9620601 which contains the wording;
“NB: the prescribed time for lodgement of objections is 28 days.”
With the Notice dated 17 October 2001 but published in Victoria there is only 27 days and likely
invalidated the Notice.
ASSOCIATED DOMINIONS ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY. LTD. v. BALMFORD (1950)
81 CLR 161
As the authority stated:
The notice actually served did not "specify" such a period: it "specified" a period which
was too short by one day, and the Acts Interpretation Act does not affect this position.
I view, that the Australian Government Solicitors and AEC ought to rectify their conduct before the
Federal Court, as much as possible and to have the dismissal of 7 November 2001 set aside, and the
matter be transferred to the High Court of Australia.
I, for one, couldn’t trust the Federal Court after this caper!

Awaiting your response and cooperation, G. H. SCHOREL
(Mr. G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA)
Note; I have the understanding that Attorney-Generals are having considerable experiences in
legal matters and so expect they will take matters serious and act appropriately in the circumstances
to ensure that State rights also are protected and JUSTICE PREVAILS.
END QUOTE 11-12-2001 CORRESPONDENCE
To prove a lot was wrong also is shown with the computer records obtained under FOI proving the
writs were issued prior to there being any vacancies existing for the House of Representatives, and
as such none of those writs and those for the Territories for the Senate had any legal force, this as
unless the Proclamation is actually Gazetted and the Gazette published there is no Proclamation to
act upon, as has been elsewhere set out extensively in this book.
IN RE WOOD (1988) 167 CLR 145 F.C. 88/018
END QUOTE
"The election is either valid or invalid. If invalid, the reason of the invalidity is not material so far as regards
its cons equences. We think it follows that, upon the avoidance of the election itself by the Court of Disputed
Returns, the case is to be treated for all purposes, so far as regards the mode of filling the vacancy, as if the first
election had never been completed, unless there is something in the Constitution to lead to a contrary
conclusion."
END QUOTE
The following details were shown on the FREEDOM OF INFORMATION released computer
records of the Commonwealth of Australia as to copies of the Gazette having been transferred, after
printing.
11/03/02 GO BOI 53/2 GAZETTES Wr-Off 20 0.20 MGIRVAN
11/10/01 GO SGAZ421 . Subs Issue Adj Dist -6 -0.06 HEMSAN
9/10/01 GO CAS0153391 Trf to CA Transfr -2 -0.02 CA ZZ BMO5IAI
9/10/01 GO ICN0910ADL ICN to AD Transfr -1 -0.01 AD ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN1076CAN ICN to CA Transfr -3 -0.03 CA ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0907MEL ICN to ME Transfr -1 -0.01 ME ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0886PER ICN to PE Transfr -1 -0.01 PE ZZ DCRANE
9/10/01 GO ICN0881TOV ICN to TH Transfr -1 -0.01 TN ZZ DCRANE
8/10/01 GO FGS0153363 CANPRINT PO-Fins 35 0.35 GHANNA
8/10/01 GO FGS0153363 CANPRINT Receipt 35 0.35 GHANNA
While 35 copies of the Special Gazette S421 was requested to be printed and the computer records
show they were on 8 October 2001, it also shows that not until 9 October 2001 first 2 copies and
later a further 3 copies had been transferred to Canberra (CA) As such the Proclamation was not
published until at the earliest 9 October 2001, and therefore in regard of all writs governing the
House of Representatives and the Senate sets for the territories there were no vacancies when the
writs were issued on 8 October 2001.
Despite a request by the Defendant in his 19 September 2002 correspondence, for example, to the
Australian Electoral Commission as to provide certain details to prove the validity of the elections
basically little had been forthcoming and no evidence at all as to the Proclamation in fact having
been published on 8 October 2001! To the contrary, evidence provided proves that not until 9
October 2001 the proclamation was published in Canberra and on later dates in States and
Territories. As such, where the writs were for this also defective then none of the members of the
House of Representatives were validly elected and neither the Senators for Territories.
IN RE WOOD (1988) 167 CLR 145 F.C. 88/018
QUOTE
The return does not meet the exigency of the writ (Drinkwater v. Deakin, at p 638) because Senator Wood was
incapable of filling the 12th place. That is not to say that, putting to one side "a mere abuse of the right of
nomination or an obvious unreality" (Harford v. Linskey (1899) 1 QB 852, at p 862 and cf. Pritchard v. Mayor,
&c. of Bangor (1888) 13 App Cas
241 ), the Electoral Officer who makes a return has authority himself to

determine the qualifications of a candidate (who declares and maintains that he is duly qualified: s.170(1a)(ii) the
Act or to refuse to return the name of an otherwise successful candidate whose qualifications are in issue: see
s.172 the Act and Evans v. Thomas (1962) 2 QB 350. But the performance by the Electoral Officer of his
ministerial functions in these respects does not determine the validity of the return or the efficacy of the election
of an unqualified person to a vacant place in the Senate.
END QUOTE
Clearly, the declaration by the Commonwealth Electoral Commission itself did not purportedly
validate the election and neither any candidate declared elected where there was no valid election.
Where then Mr John Howard was not elected in 2001, so neither others, then he neither could have
been Prime Minister for any longer then 3 Months, as Section 64 limits the appointment of a non
elected person to no longer then a period of three months.
Hence, Mr John Howard was neither then Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General for a
general election in 2004! Indeed, neither was Mr John Howard in any legal position to be involved
in the appointment of the Governor-General Michael Jeffrey and as such that also the appointment
also is unconstitutional and invalid (without legal force- ULTRA VIRES).
This document has not canvassed extensively the defects in appointments regarding a Governor-
General but my previous published books have already done so. It also would take up a lot of pages
to set it all out again and I will for this refrain from doing so merely to state that it is
constitutionally embedded that a governor-General can only be validly appointed where it is a
person who is born in the United Kingdom and upon the recommendation of the Home Office is
appointed by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II (while she is the current governing Monarch) and any
purported appointment otherwise is constitutionally invalid and has no legal force. Hence, judges
appointed by a purported Governor-General neither can be deemed to be appropriately appointed,
hence neither can claim legal jurisdiction to adjudicate on matters.
While the Framers of the Constitution inserted subsection 51(xxvi) into the Constitution as to
protect the wages of Australians and to avoid cheap labour to flood the market we now find that the
Federal Government does precisely the opposite. I have no doubt, so to say, that the Framers of the
Constitution would be turning in their graves in horror if they knew how now the Federal
Government misuses subsection 51(xxvi) for ulterior purposes and how to the contrary to the
intentions of the Framers of the Constitution the Federal Government now has cheap labour
flooding the market and also itself outsource work to deny Australians their rightful entitlements.
http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=5487
QUOTE
Our Attorney-General is missing in action
By Natasha Cica - posted Monday, 12 February 2007
Bring David Hicks Home has become a mainstream slogan, screamed out in loud Gitmo orange.
This week, activist movement GetUp has cranked up a multimedia advertising campaign featuring an image of
Hicks as an innocent child with voiceovers from his father, Terry. Even radio shock jocks now loudly reckon
Hicks' plight is un-Australian, the same blurred, muddy smear so readily flung against him by hawkish political
players when Hicks first hit our news radar.
This shift is an encouraging sign that due process and basic decency are not the exclusive concern of our so-
called elites. At the same time, something vital is still missing.
Today it is implausible to deny that much of Hicks' treatment in detention has offended common core principles
of Western law and justice, Australian values, universal human rights and Judeo-Christian morality, regardless of
what Hicks did before his capture. Yet deny it Attorney-General Philip Ruddock persistently does.
Recall his bloodless statements just last week that some people don't handle detention well (so who's up for a
few years at Guantanamo Bay? It's not the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre) and that we have been advised that Hicks
has been treated humanely and in accordance with international standards for interrogations (by exactly whom,
backed up by what evidence, and where does the Geneva Convention sit?).
Further, according to Ruddock, sleep deprivation alone does not amount to torture (not according to its past
victims, including former Israeli prime minister Menachim Begin) and holding Hicks in a single-occupancy cell
does not amount to isolation, including because he is allowed out for reading (in that library with no books? Or
maybe for a squizzy at that Saddam Hussein execution poster?) and other recreational purposes (Hicks' lawyers
say he has seen direct sunlight just three times in the past month).
This raft of claims has received relatively scant critical attention, remarkable at a time when Prime Minister John
Howard's ministerial reshuffle left Ruddock firmly in the legal driver's seat. Is that because Australians, even
those so-called elites, have become used to the practice of plausible deniability in government, in the long wake
of apparently short-lived scandals such as children overboard and the Cornelia Rau and AWB affairs?
Ruddock's latest assertions demand scrutiny. They are extremely provocative, both legally and morally -
especially coming from the Attorney-General rather than, say, some garden-variety law professor, senior counsel
or retired judge.
The office of the attorney -general is properly elite, one of special status and responsibility, because any
government operating under the rule of law needs to pass legislation to implement its policy agenda.
Accordingly, the attorney-general has been generally granted more trust and latitude than many other politicians.
The argument can and should be made that Ruddock's carriage of the Hicks case, and other aspects of the so-
called war on terror, has radically undermined the convention of respect for this office and that he should be
called to full account.
So who'll run with that heftier brief as we open legal year 2007? Where is our Christopher Hitchens to deliver
our version of the trial of Henry Kissinger, moving beyond slogans to systematic and scrupulous dissection?
Last December all state and territory attorneys-general, together with federal Labor's new shadow attorney-
general, Kelvin Thomson, started paving a bolder way by formally responding to Hicks' plight with the
Fremantle Declaration.
This document has received strong support from members of the legal profession. It affirms commitment to
fundamental norms of the Australian legal system, which are also protected at international law, including the
right to a fair trial, the principle of habeas corpus, the prohibition on indefinite detention without trial, the
prohibition on torture and access to rights under the Geneva Convention.
And last November the New York-based Centre for Constitutional Rights joined other groups in requesting the
German federal prosecutor to investigate criminal responsibility for high-ranking US officials - including former
defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and current Attorney-General Alberto Gonzales - for authorising war crimes
in relation to prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib.
Germany was the chosen legal theatre because it can prosecute foreign violations of international law under its
2002 universal jurisdictio n law. And also presumably for punchy symbolic effect, as Germany is the home of
Nuremberg in more ways than one.
You don't need to be a warrior intellectual or even a lawyer to join those dots in Australia's domestic context.
Where there's a will there's a way. As Ruddock well knows.
First published in The Age on February 7, 2007.
END QUOTE
Seems to me like we have an Attorney General who might be more interested in fund rasing, as I
understand it with Lebanese wanting to naturalize, then having legal matters and so constitutional
matters appropriately attended to.
Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention Depates
Mr. OCONNOR (New South Wales).-There is no necessity for that, because clause 69 expressly charges
the Commonwealth with the control of departments.
What this makes clear also is that the break up of Australia Post in Australia Post and Telecom
(later Telstra) and the sale therefore is unconstitutional, as I have claimed in this book and previous
published books, Section 69 does not allow the sale of the Department. Hence, Telstra sale is and
remains to be unconstitutional! Those who purportedly purchased shares of Telstra own nothing as
it was unconstitutional to sell any Telstra shares. It must be clear once again it is a LEGAL
FICTION that the High Court of Australia is a GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION and
who really, other then the super rich, could afford to challenge unconstitutional conduct if the
judges, as I view it, are, so to say, aiding and abetting the politicians to make it extremely difficult if
not impossible for a citizen to pursue their Section 75(v) of the constitutional rights. For this, as I
view it, lacking any properly trained and competent judges at the High Court of Australia we need
badly an OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN, so finally JUSTICE MAY PREVAIL. The mere fact
that the constitutional issues the High Court of Australia time and again refused to allowed to be
heard and determined upon their MERITS subsequently were upheld in my appeals. To me that
indicates, so to say, that the judges are having egg on their faces. Sure their conduct ensured that
John Howard could continue to be parading as a Prime Minister, regardless how unconstitutional
the election was but as I succeeded in my case to prove I was right, I view, so to say, that the
judges have blood on their hands of the Iraqi people killed and injured as result of Australia’s
unconstitutional invasion by having refused to deal with my applications to pursue a Section 75(v)
Mandamus/Prohibition against the unconstitutional invasion. Perhaps they might have assumed that
once the war was done and over with I might be proven wrong, but that is not how constitutional
issues are being dealt with, regardless that Gummow J argued about it having been about 22 months
since the election was held. If judges, as I view it, are totally incompetent to understand that the
passing of time does not overcome unconstitutional/illegal conduct then what hope does anyone
have in this kind of Court, I may ask?
http://www.radio.cz/en/article/11324 Judge in 1951 trial to be charged
[23-08-2000] By Olga Szantova
A long-retired judge, 86-year-old Pavel Vitek, is to be charged with murder for a verdict he passed 49
years ago. At the time, eleven people were sentenced to death and executed to serve as a warning to
all who still resisted the communist domination of Czechoslovakia after the coup in 1948. Olga
Szantova has the story.
The trial, in the summer of 1951, was one of the first and one of the biggest in a series of politically motivated
trials in the early fifties. Their aim: to show that the class enemy was sabotaging the otherwise peaceful and
successful construction of a socialist society and that harder measures were needed to protect the working class
from the evils of capitalism. The communists faced serious problems in the countryside, where the more
successful farmers were resisting the founding of cooperatives, and wanted to hold on to their farms. Southern
Moravia, one of the most fertile areas in the country, was a particularly troublesome region and a village in that
area, called Babice, was chosen as the site where the evils of the class enemy were to be demonstrated.
As the communist-led village council was meeting one day, a group of armed terrorists broke in, shooting three
of the council's members dead. A number of villagers were soon arrested and charged with the shooting, among
them the richest local farmer, Jan Plichta. Eleven of them were sentenced to death, including Jan Plichta. The
case was widely publicized and served as an excuse for the harsh measures used in introducing socialism in the
countryside.
One of the judges in the Babice trial was the now 86-year-old Pavel Vitek. Like other judges in other political
trials of the '50s, he was instrumental in preparing the planned result of the investigation. He, like others, was
given precise instructions as to how the trial should be conducted and what the verdict was to be. As a result, 11
innocent people were sentenced to death for the Babice shooting, and judge Pavel Vitek is now being charged
with their murder.
His is to be the first trial of its kind. More than ten years after the fall of communist rule in this country, the legal
system still hasn't found a way of dealing with these cases. A number of times investigations were started but
discontinued before any actual charges could be made. In the Babice case, the minister of justice had to intervene
before the Supreme Court ruled that the case should be brought to trial. It remains to be seen whether it will set a
precedent.
It may be asked, I view, if the judges of the Courts who have acted in the way they did, as like in
the Czech case ought to be held accountable for the death of so many where they may be deemed to
have acted in clear defiance to their judicial obligations to determine matters before the Court upon
their MERITS, rather then, so to say, having railroaded cases.
http://www.clubtroppo.com.au/category/law-civil-liberties/page/2/
Reporting on the final anti-terrorism bill
Posted by Ken Parish on Friday, November 4, 2005
The Howard Anti-Terrorism Bill (No. 2) 2005 (no. 1 being the one rushed through both
Houses yesterday with bipartisan support) is a considerable improvement on the original draft
leaked by ACT Chief Minister John Stanhope. But it still has major problems in my view.
http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/attorneygeneralHome.nsf/Page/Speeches_2000_Speeches_Judici
al_Power_and_Good_Government
Archive for Daryl Williams Attorney-General for Australia 1996 - 2003
17. Despite the strict separation of federal judicial power, it is accepted that non-judicial functions can be
conferred on federal judges as personae designatae. The judge concerned must have consented to the
conferral, and the non -judicial functions must not be incompatible with the designated person's judicial
office.

18. It is this principle which has allowed governments to appoint judicial office holders to conduct Royal
Commissions, and to undertake other roles which, although non-judicial, nevertheless call for the skills and
qualities which a judge can offer.
19. A majority of the High Court considered that the function to be performed by Justice Mathews was too
closely connected with the executive branch of government. They described it as an 'integral part' of the
minister's exercise of power, and insufficiently independent of the executive. In essence, the majority took the
view that Justice Mathews' performance of the role would diminish public confidence in her integrity as a judge,
or in the integrity of the judiciary as an institution . The function was thus held to be incompatible with judicial
office.
20. The lone dissenter, Justice Kirby, accepted the constitutional imperative that prevents a judge acting as
persona designata undertaking non-judicial functions incompatible with judicial office.
21. However, Justice Kirby paid great regard to the value of federal judges being available to perform certain
non-judicial tasks, arguing that this was 'incontestably to the benefit of good government' . Justice Kirby noted
the long tradition in Australia of federal and State judges carrying out often 'very controversial and partisan'
governmental inquiries.
22. He commented that 'Australia's relatively small population, scarce governmental resources and limited
numbers of trained personnel argue strongly against the imposition of a new and rigid constitutional rule which
history, past practice and constitutional understandings to date would deny'.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persona_designata
Persona designata
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
Persona designata
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
The persona designata doctrine is a doctrine in Australian constitutional law which states that,
although it is generally impermissible for a federal judge to exercise non-judicial power, it is
permissible for a judge to do so if the power has been conferred on the judge personally, as opposed
to powers having been conferred on the court. The doctrine is considered to be an exception to the
Boilermakers' doctrine of separation of powers, which holds that conferral of non-judicial power on
a Chapter III court (a federal court) is unconstitutional.[1]
Contents
 1 Background
 2 Development of the doctrine
 3 Limits
o 3.1 Incompatibility
 4 See also
 5 References
[edit] Background
While the Australian system of government is parliamentary, with a "fusion of powers" between the
executive and the legislature, the separation of powers with respect to the judiciary has long been
accepted as an important aspect of the Constitution of Australia.[2] The importance of the principle
is traditionally said to have reached its high point in 1956 with the Boilermakers' case,[2] in which
the High Court of Australia held that non-judicial power could not be conferred on a court
established under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.[3] However, Australia also has a long
history of judges being appointed to non-judicial positions.[2]
The following extracts may underline that not judges of the High Court of Australia but any federal
court judge could be appointed as "Persona designata", however, as the Framers of the Constitution
warned that care should be taken that no conflict arises between the funtion of a judge to act as a
Persona designata and that of his judicial office. As such, the Court of Disputed Returns, where
judges are acting in the capacity of representing parliamentarians, such as in Sue v Hill could not
make judicial decisions of a Court of law. But, this it precisely purported to do with the Australia
Act 1986 as to seek to validate this. Likewise, the issue of any warrant by a judge in the capacity of
Persona designata ought to be resisted, as it would portray a judge to act in a capacity to enforce or
purportedly enforce a law of the relevant government and subsequently this judge may be faced
having to hear the case in the first instance or upon appeal as to the validity of the warrant issued.
This the Framers of the Constitution debated being a problem where a judge, for example, was
exercising the temporary position of a governor, who might have given royal assent to legislation
and then subsequently as judge of the Court having to give judgment of the validity of the very
legislation that this judge in the capacity of (temporary) Governor had enacted. While Daryl
Williams Attorney-General for Australia 1996 – 2003 in his document “Judicial Power and Good
Government” stated; “7. Only courts mentioned in section 71 of the Constitution may exercise that
power. Federal courts cannot, generally speaking, undertake non-judicial functions.” This clearly is
not supported by what the Framers of the Constitution themselves stated in regard of judges of any
federal court to act in the capacity of Persona designata such as on behalf of the Parliament as a
Court of Disputed Returns. HANSARD records the following Constitutional Convention 22 April
1897 [page 1150]
Until the Parliament otherwise provides all questions of disputed elections arising in the Senate or House of
Representatives shall be determined by a Court exercising federal jurisdiction.
We have not said "the High Court" here, because there is power in the Constitution to invest any court with
federal jurisdiction, so that this clause will work in this convenient way that the Court of a State invested with
federal jurisdiction may determine such a matter in any States
The Hon. N.J. BROWN (Tasmania)[10.27 stated, HANSARD Constitutional Convention 13

September 1897 [pages 464-466]
A certain interval must elapse before the federal court is established to deal with a disputed election, and the only
object of this provision is that the House itself shall deal with the matter until the federal court is established.
The moment we accept that the High Court of Australia sitting as judges on behalf of the
Parliament, acting as personae designatae, in Sue v Hill could use and exercise judicial powers of a
Court of law we have transgressed the separation of judicial and legislative powers because the
judges themselves have become the evil-doers to give the Parliament their judicial powers. See also
for a more comprehensive set out “Chapter 003 LEGAL FICTION - persona designata” of the
book by Author Mr. G. H. Schorel-Hlavka (constitutionalist) “INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR
WorkChoices legislation”. It is my view that while the Framers of the Constitution themselves
clearly intended that not just the judges of the High Court of Australia but the Court itself, and any
Court exercising federal jurisdiction would be acting in capacity of “persona designata”, and for
this any Federal Court judge also, the problem is that, as I view it, judges are using their decisions
as being a judgment of the High Court of Australia, such as in Sue v Hill, and other cases like Sykes
v Cleary, where as they cannot be deemed let alone be relied upon as being decisions of a Court of
law. In my view the Court of Disputed Returns must not exercise any judicial powers as to do so
would interfere with both their position as “persona designata” and position as a judical officer, as it
would obliterate the seperation of legislative, executive and judicial powers.
The idea that some non-judicial functions can be conferred on judges in their personal capacity had
been present in Australian law for some time; some trace it to cases such as Medical Board of
Victoria v Meyer[4] in 1937,[1] while others regard the doctrine as settled law since at least 1906,[2]
and the case of Holmes v Angwin.[5]
[edit] Development of the doctrine
The first clear expression of the doctrine in the post-Boilermakers context was in the 1979 Federal
Court of Australia case of Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, which concerned a
challenge to the appointment of Justice John Davies, of the Federal Court, to the position of Deputy
President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In their joint judgment, Chief Justice Bowen and
Justice Deane said:
"There is nothing in the Constitution which precludes a justice [of a Chapter III court] from, in his personal
capacity, being appointed to an office involving the performance of administrative or executive functions
including functions which are quasi-judicial in their nature. Such an appointment does not involve any
impermissible attempt to confer upon a Chapter III court functions which are antithetical to the exercise of
[6]
judicial power. Indeed, it does not involve the conferring of any functions at all on such a court."
The doctrine was first clearly applied by the High Court of Australia in the 1985 case of Hilton v
Wells, which involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of certain telecommunications
legislation which permitted telephone tapping by way of a warrant, which had to be issued by "a
judge". [1] The word "judge" in that piece of legislation was defined to mean a judge of the Federal
Court or of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, or, in certain circumstances, a
judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory or any of the State Supreme Courts.[1] In their
majority judgment, Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Wilson and Dawson acknowledged the
difficulty of determining whether a function has been conferred on a court or on a judge of that
court, saying that:
"It is a question which involves fine distinctions, which some may regard as unsatisfactory... the question is one
of construction. Where the power is conferred on a court, there will ordinarily be a strong presumption that the
court as such is intended. Where the power is conferred on a judge, rather than on a court, it will be a question
whether the distinction was deliberate, and whether the reference to "judge" rather than to "court" indicates that
the power was intended to be invested in the judge as an individual who, because he is a judge, possesses the
[7]
necessary qualifications to exercise it."
The Justices continued, and considered the significance of the nature of the function being
conferred to the question of whether the function is to be exercised by the judge in their capacity as
a judge, or in their capacity as a regular person
"If the power is judicial, it is likely that it is intended to be exercisable by the judge by virtue of that character; if
it is purely administrative, and not incidental to the exercise of judicial power, it is likely that it is intended to be
[7]
exercised by the judge as a designated person."
The High Court rejected the challenge to the constitutional validity of the legislation in a three to
two decision.[1]
[edit] Limits
Two broad limits to the doctrine have been identified, which essentially act as preconditions to the
conferral of a non-judicial function:
1. the judge must agree to the conferral of the function, and
2. the function must not be incompatible with the judge's judicial functions
[edit] Incompatibility
The issue of incompatibility was expounded in the 1995 case of Grollo v Palmer, which concerned
new provisions in the same telecommunications legislation that had been considered in Hilton v
Wells. Following the decision in Hilton, the legislation had been amended to make it more explicit
that the function of granting warrants was being conferred on judges in their personal capacity, and
had made the judge's consent an eligibility requirement, but the changes had also introduced
protections and immunities for judge's exercising the function, like those afforded to Justices of the
High Court. [1] The court unanimously agreed that the function was being conferred on the judges as
personae designatae, but the question was whether the function was incompatible with their judicial
office.[1]
In a joint majority judgment, Chief Justice Brennan and Justices Deane, Dawson and Toohey,
discussed what situations might enliven the incompatibility condition:
"Incompatibility might consist in so permanent and complete a commitment to the performance of non-judicial
functions by a judge that the further performance of substantial judicial functions by that judge is not practicable.
It might consist in the performance of non-judicial functions of such a nature that the capacity of the judge to
perform his or her judicial functions with integrity is impaired. Or it might consist in the performance of non-
judicial functions of such a nature that public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary as an institution or in the
capacity of the individual judge to perform his or her judicial functions with integrity is diminished." [8]
The majority held that, although the function of issuing warrants was closely connected with the
purely executive process of law enforcement, it did not amount to judicial participation in a criminal
investigation (which would be incompatible) and that the participation of impartial, independent
judicial officers in the process would actually reinforce public confidence in the judiciary.[8] That is,
the majority recognised that the incompatibility exception existed, but found that it did not apply in
this situation.[1]
In 1996, the High Court applied the incompatibility condition in the case of Wilson v Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, which concerned the appointment of Justice Jane
Mathews of the Federal Court to prepare an Indigenous heritage report in relation to the Hindmarsh
Island bridge development. The court held that legislation authorising the appointment was invalid,
because the functions conferred, which included forming opinions and giving advice about areas
which should be protected under heritage legislation, were incompatible with judicial office. [1]
[edit] See also

 Separation of powers in Australia

[edit] References
1
2 ^ a b c d e f g h i Blackshield, Tony & Williams, George (2006). Australian Constitutional Law and Theory:
Commentary and Materials (4th ed). Sydney, New South Wales: Federation Press. ISBN 1-86287-586-3.
3 ^ a b c d Brown, A J (1992). "The Wig or the Sword? Separation of Powers and the Plight of the Australian
Judge". Federal Law Review 21 (1): 48-89. ISSN 0067-205X.
4 ^ R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254
5^ (1937) 58 CLR 62
6 ^ (1906) 4 CLR 297
7 ^ Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 2 ALD 60; (1979) 46 FLR 409
8 ^ a b Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57

9 ^ a b Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persona_designata"
Judges of the High Court of Australia, or for that matter any judge of a federal court or a Court
invested with federal jurisdiction, in my view, would compromise their judicial position if they lend
themselves as to issue warrants or conduct other functions on behalf of the Government which cast
doubt as to their judicial independence. As I view it the moment there is any doubt whatsoever as to
the judicial independence then the persona designata should be rejected. Not to do so may place the
Court in disrepute. After all when a judge of a Court issue a warrant as persona designata and not
as a judicial officer the danger is that it might be interpreted/understood by others that it was a
judicial decision because it was issued by a judge of the Court. Government may seek to manipulate
the position of a judge in such manner but the judges themselves should not allow themselves, so to
say, be drawn into the gutter by, as I view them to be, such gutter tactics. It ought to be clear that
the framers of the Constitution did not specifically refer to “judges” but to “court” and as such held
that the High Court of Australia could sit as a federal court exercising “persona designata” but
obviously it could not as such then decide matters it ordinary would as a Court of law, as to do so
would cause a class of the separation of powers. But, that appears to be happening in many
decisions! As such, I view, it is a LEGAL FICTION that the courts are independent tribunals.
WHICH IS THE REAL CONSTITUTION?
With the validity of the Westminster Act 1931, British National Act 1948, Australia Citizenship
Act 1948, Cocos (Keeling) Islands (Request and Consent) Act 1954 (Cth), Cocos Islands Act, 1955
(UK), Christmas Island (Request and Consent) Act 1957(Cth), Christmas Island Act, 1958 (UK),
Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985, the Australia Act 1986 (UK), and the Australia Act
1986 (Cth) they all appear to be ULTRA VIRES for so far they conflict with the Constitution as
contained in the Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900 (UK) as amended by successful
amendments. What those Acts have sought to do was to circumvent the constitutional constrains in
the Constitution of 1900 to somehow transfer the ownership of the Constitution from the People
(their “new Magna Charta” - Hansard 17-3-1898) to the Federal Parliament
I will therefore now set out matters with the reproduction of material of Nick Hobson, as well as
myself, as shown below. Albeit I do not agree with the writers assertion that either or both the
Westminster Act 1931 or the Australia Act 1986 have any legal validity towards the
Commonwealth of Australia for so far it conflicts with the principles embedded in the Constitution
of 1900. The following 04, 05, 06 and 07 Chapters will deal with “Is our Constitution safe”, “The
Constitution a PERPETUAL LEASE”, “The great Deception” and “Westminster Act ULTRA
VIRES.” A “LEGAL FICTION” is what is considered to be legally applicable even so in reality it
is not, for whatever reason. The CD version of this book has copies of the extensive FOI request
and so documents obtained, as well as the fraudulent dates shown. Including how John Howard,
without having prerogative powers, purportedly appointed the Governor-General! Then, one
may and should ask, what is constitutionally valid at all?
* Are you aware I asked just one question and you respond with about 30-page answer! And it
wasn’t even fully about what is ULTRA VIRES, as I understood this Chapter was going to be
about!
**#** Well it was regarding many issues but there is more, why not then go to the Chapter 008, but
best is first to read the next few Chapters first, and lest not forget to consider this utter and sheer
nonsense, as Tony Pitt pointed out (See Chapter 058);
QUOTE Chapter 058; Gummo&McHugh.doc
McHUGH J: ........ but Parliament ... can, in effect do what it likes. As it is said, some
authorities could legislate to have every blue-eyed baby killed if it wanted to. ...
Tony Pitt’s response;
This is not true. No federal or state parliament in Australia has ANY LEGISLATIVE
POWER AT ALL. They can’t legislate to even set a road speed let alone legislate to put
anyone to death. Our system of law evolved from the dim past when kings were mad dictators
and the politicians had desires for more mad power than that held by kings. Our politicians
can write what they like. If the House of Representatives writes legislation and passes the
legislation unanimously, and passes that legislation to the Senate which also passes the
legislation unanimously, that legislation is no more powerful than a second-hand bus ticket.
All legislation requires ROYAL ASSENT before it can be of any effect.
END QUOTE Chapter 058; Gummo&McHugh.doc
I ask are judges brain dead to come up with such utter and sheer nonsense? What about “CIVIL
RIGHTS”?


Chapter 003 - p30 - LEGAL FICTION - Persona Designata

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter 003 - p30 - LEGAL FICTION - Persona Designata

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chapter 003 LEGAL FICTION - persona designata

HIS HONOUR; I understand.

HIS HONOUR; Because you haven’t lost yet.

Page 1 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 1

Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 4-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Page 2 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 2

Hansard 31-1-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

Page 4 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 4

The Hon. N.J. BROWN (Tasmania)[10.27 stated, HANSARD Constitutional Convention 13

Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates; Mr. GORDON.-

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates Mr. BARTON.-

QUOTE 19-7-2006 ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Page 10 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 10

Page 11 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 11

In this Constitution, although much is written much remains unwritten,

Page 12 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 12

Page 13 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 13

Page 15 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 15

Page 16 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 16

Take “Australian citizenship” as defined/declared in the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, it is a

Page 17 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 17

Page 19 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 19

Page 21 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 21

Page 22 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 22

Page 25 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 25

 2 Development of the doctrine

The Hon. N.J. BROWN (Tasmania)[10.27 stated, HANSARD Constitutional Convention 13

[edit] See also

8 ^ a b Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persona_designata"

Page 30 of Chapter 003 INSPECTOR-RIKATI® on IR WorkChoices legislation Page 30

You might also like