Vivarium

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26
1988

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CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXVI (1988)

L.M. De Rijk

as a KeyNotionin
'Categorization'
Ancientand MedievalSemantics

JobVan Eck

Another
Interpretation
ofAristotle's
De Interpretatione
IX A support
forthe
so-calledsecondoldestor 'mediaeval'
19
interpretation

L.A. Kennedy

TheSentencesofThomasRingstead,
39
o.p

JohnP. Doyle

Suarez on BeingsofReasonand
Truth(2)

L.M. De Rijk

Semanticsand Metaphysics
in Gilbert
73
ofPoitiers

Gad Freudenthal

Maimonides'GuideofthePerplexed
and theTransmission
ofthe
Mathematical
Tract"On Two
Lines"in theArabic, Latin
Asymptotic
and HebrewMedievalTraditions
113

E.J.Ashworth

ReviewArticle

51

141

WorksCited

151

Reviews

152

BooksReceived

158

12:36:09 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 1 (1988)
'

9
Categorizationas a Key Notion in Ancientand Medieval Semantics
L. M. DE RIJ

The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for
Aristotlethe verb 'katgorein' does not as such stand forstatemental
predication, let alone of the well-known'S is P' type, and (b) 'nonstatementalpredication' or 'categorization' plays an importantrole in
Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure.
in Aristotle
1 Katgorein
and katgoria
Aristotlewas the firstto use the word 'category' ( katgoria
) as a
to
is
technicaltermin logic and philosophy. It commonlytaken mean
'highestpredicate' and explained in termsof statement-making.From
the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential
predicates'.1 It may be useful to have a closer look at the claims
involved in this widespread view.
use ofsymplok
1.1 Aristotle's
Immediately in the opening lines of his short treatise entitled
Categories
(2, 1al 6-17) Aristotlesays thathe intendsto deal with 'things
thatare said withoutcombination'. At firstglance the term 'combination' {symplok
literallymeans 'inter-weaving') seems to indicate the
of
an
onoma and a rhema by means of the copula (esti,'is')
conjoining
and also as the
which thus acts as the very instrumentof the symplok
This
of
its
assertion
the
however, calls
interpretation,
by
speaker.
sign
for a critical examination.
Certainly, for there to be a statement (assertion) some kind of
is required. Yet, in recognizing this condition
symplok
(or synthesis)
makes up
two thingsshould not be overlooked: (1) not everysymplok
1 See L. M. de Rijk,TheCategories
as Classes
andMedieval
ofNames
( = OnAncient
Semantics
, 18 (1980),1-62,esp. 4-7.
3), in: Vivarium
1

12:36:14 PM

a statement and (2) some serious doubts may be raised about the
assumption that, for Aristotle,it is the copula that accomplishes the
symplok
by means of which the statementcomes into being.2
{synthesis)
Aristotlemakes it perfectlyclear that not every meaningfulcombination of words (in the general sense of English 'phrase') makes up
an expression 'involving combination' ( katasymplokn
) in the technical
sense as set out at Categ. 2,lal6ff. In point of fact, Aristotletreats
(l,2al) phrases such as 'in the Lyceum' and 'in the marketplace' as
What he reallyunderstandsby
'lacking combination' ( aneusymploks).
said
which
involve
combination'
'things
may be gathered from
4
of
the Categories.
Here he clearlyimplies that every expresChapter
sion lacking combination signifiesan item in some onecategory.In the
same chapterAristotleremarks(2a4ff.) thatnone of the 'uncombine
items can make up an affirmation( kataphasis
) just by itselfand thatan
affirmationis the resultof a combination of itemstaken fromdifferent
categories. However, the word 'affirmation'{kataphasis)should not
lead us to believe thatsymplok
is concerned with statement-makingas
to
opposed merelycalling up thingsfordiscussion (that is, using single
or complex expressions merely on the onomazeinlevel). So Ackrill
rightlyargues (1963:73) that an expression such as 'white man' ( leukos
which is the result of a combination of two items fromtwo
anthrpos),
differentcategories, is an expression 'involving combination' (kata
symplokn).
Of course, many commentatorslink up Aristotle'suse ofsymplok
as
a technical termwith Plato's use of the same termin Sophist262 A-B,
where it obviously stands for the 'inter-weaving' of words (onomata
and rhemata). As I have argued elsewhere,3this inter-weavingis an
indispensable requirementfor statement-making.It is not, however,
a sufficientcondition for producing a statement-makingexpression.
For there to be a statementthe assertion
of the 'interwoven combination' is required. In other words the logos has to become a logos
eirmenos.
So far, this much can be said for sure:4 if there being a symplok
is
2 Forthissubject,
see also L. M. de Rijk,TheAnatomy
: Logosand
oftheProposition
in PlatoandAristotle
of
, in: LogosandPragma
, Essayson the Philosophy
Pragma
GabrielNuchelmans,
editedbyH. A. G. Braakhuis
LanguageinHonourofProfessor
and L. M. de Rijk(= Artistarium.
A SeriesofTextson MedievalLogic,Grammar
and Semantics
C. H. Kneepkens
and L. M.
(eds. E. P. Bos,H. A. G. Braakhuis,
de Rijk),Supplem.Ill), Nijmegen1987,(26-61).
3 Plato'sSophist,
A Philosophical
Amsterdam
etc.1986,282ff.
; 313ff.
Commentary,
4 The rather
rolesplayedbysymplok
andsynthesis
in thedomainof
complicated
2

12:36:14 PM

not, as such, the only thingrequired forstatement-making,thatis, for

the use of an expression involving combination on the legeinlevel,
there is no longer any reason to define the Aristotelian categories
in
(which are the constitutiveparts of expressions involvingsymploke)
terms of statement-makingas highest predicates'. It is better to
examine this key notion of Aristoteliansemantics without any such
presupposition.
1.2 Are thekatgoriai
thehighest'predicates'?
I have argued elsewhere (1980: passim) that, although Aristotle
himself,forobvious reasons, frequentlytakes the categories as potential elements for statement-making,the words katgoria
and katgorein
should neverthelessbe taken as meaning 'name' and 4to name' rather
than 'predicate' and 'to predicate'. Accordingly,the phrase 'lacking
combination' (aneusymploks)
should be interpretedas not only ruling
out any actual combination of words forthe purpose of making up a
statement,but also as disqualifyingany composite name (meaning) as
found in phrases which range over more than one category, such as
'white man'. The question of the precise meaning of katgoria
can be
solved best if we startout on this line of thought.
Modern interpretersusually associate the Aristotelian categories
with some kind of statemental predication since the Greek term is
generallytaken to stand for 'predicate'. Ackrill, too, holds that the
normal meaning of the Greek word transliterated 'category' is
'predication' or 'predicate' and he accordinglytakes the categories as
'the ultimate predicates'.
However, thereare some stumbling-blockson the way to this interpretation.The firstcategory, which undoubtedly is the cardinal element of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories has, as its primary
members, individual substances {prtaiousiai) precisely those things
thatare the properinhabitantsof the domain of things.Well, Aristotle
explicitlydefinesindividual substance as 'that which is neitherpresent
'
in a subject norsaid ofanysubject
( Categ. 2,lb3-4; cf. 5,2a34ff.) Thus
the members par excellenceof the most basic category ( ousia) are
anythingbut predicates: theyare explicitlydefinedas 'not said of any
subject'.
are morefully
discussed
in L. M. de Rijk,op.cit.,(abovep. 2,
statement-making
n.2),.
3

12:36:14 PM

There are many more passages in Aristotle'sworkswhere the word

katgoriamust have the sense of 'name' rather than (statemental)
'predicate' (or 'predication'). E.g. TopicsVI3, 140b27ff.;Soph. Elench.
3 1, 181b26f.; Phys. II. 1, 192 7; Metaph. Zl,1028a27f. Especially the
last passage is of interestfor our discussion. If we take the section
1028al0-30 as a whole it is perfectlyclear that Aristotlehere analyses
namesand sentencepredicates takenas names.It is the significativeforce
of words such as 'walking' and 'sitting' thatis under discussion in this
passage (a20ff.), quite irrespective of their being assigned to, or
predicated of, or used merely denotatively to stand for, subjects
endowed withthe properties(accidental modes of being) signified;see
De Rijk (1980), 23-61.
In Metaph. Z 4-6 (and Anal. Post. 14) Aristotle is likewise
investigating the names ('appellations') given to whether we say
here
or
irrelevant
to'
of
is
things.Metaphys.Z
'predicated
'assigned
4-6 is particularlyillustrativeon this score: here Aristotletackles the
metaphysical problems at issue precisely by scrutinizingour several
ways of name-giving or 'categorization'.
1.3 Name giving(' categorization
}) as the keytool in the searchfor 'true
'
substance
What Aristotleactually intends in his metaphysical discussions in
the central books of his Metaphysics
(Z - Th) is to discover the proper
candidate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle,the primary
kind of 'being' or 'being as such' {to on hi on) can only be found in
'being-ness' ( ousia; see esp. Metaph. 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however,
Aristotleis sure to find'being as such' in the domain of thingsbelonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to
grasp the things' proper nature qua beings. In the search foran answer
name-givingplays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists
in findingthe most appropriate('essential') name so as to bringeveryday being into the discourse in such a way that preciselyits 'beingness' is focussed upon.
When dealing with the problems surroundingthe relationsbetween
substance and essence Aristotleasks whethercertain names designate
the essence ('being-ness') of the thingsthey signify.For example, in
1030 a3-175 the author discusses the special problems involved in our
5 Fora moredetaileddiscussion
ofthispassage,seeL. M. de Rijk,op.cit.(above
p.l, n.l), 28f.
4

12:36:14 PM

practice of name-giving. Of course, names of the type 'white man'

do not designate a thing's essence because an essence
( leukosanthrpos)
is its hoperti (1030a4), i.e. precisely 'what a thing is', not any of its
accidental modes of being. Any name-designation such as 'white
man', in which an attributewhich is formallydistinctfromthe subject
is assigned to the subject (in Aristotle'swords: "when of a thingsomething is said which is < categorially> differentfrom it"), is not
designativeof what a particular is, since its being preciselythis particular thing is not the same as its being of a certain quality
('whiteness'):
1030a3-6:The essenceis precisely
whatsomething
is. Butwhenan attribute
is
asserted
of a subjectotherthanitself6
it <i.e. thecomplexname> is not7
whattheparticular
precisely
thingis,since'this-ness"
(totode)
belongsonlyto
substances.
This passage clearly proves that the author is dealing with names
('designations') or rather with things qua named so and so. He is
definitelynot dealing with thingsas such. It is quite unlikelythat he
should speak of 'white man' merely to designate a subsistentthing,
"
since, in thatcase, he could not possibly say that 'white man' is not
'
'
preciselywhat the particular thing is, since this-nessbelongsonlyto
substances
". Moreover, if'white man' were to be taken as merelysignia
fying particularthing,it could rightlybe objected that 'white man'
qua particularman unquestionablyis a substance. One has to assume,
therefore,that the phrase ho leukosanthrpos
(at 1030a4-5) stands fora
particular thing, namely some man, onlyinasmuchas it is named (or
called up) by the phrase 'white man'.
Chapter 6 still deals with the problem of the essence of (what is
signifiedby) compound names such as 'white man'. In this chapter
Aristotle makes an important distinction. On the one hand, compound nouns such as 'white man' are designated as "things that are
kata
named according to an incidental mode of being' ' ( tnlegomenn
lai
The
'white
, 103
man', therefore,does
symbebkos
designation
9).
not concern the white man's essence (viz. his 'manhood'). On the
other hand, there are "things that are named according to their
substantial being" {tonkath' hautalegomenn
; 1031a28). These things
"are identicalwiththeiressences". At 1031bl3-14 the author repeats
thisdistinctionwhich is of the utmostimportance in the metaphysical
6 i.e. belonging
to a different
ofbeing.
category
7 'is not' = 'doesnotindicate'.
5

12:36:14 PM

search for the 'true ousia': all things that are not named (in a kata
way of naming them) aftersomethingdifferentfromtheir
symbebkos
own nature ( hosa m kat} allo legetai
), but afterthemselves (i.e. after
theirown nature) and primarily( kath' hautakaiprotei)are identicalwith
their essences. Thus Aristotleobviously means to say that whenever
we introduce something into the discourse by using its substantial
name, it is eo ipso signified according to its essential (substantial)
nature.
On thisinterpretationthe semanticelementis a crucial factorin the
search for ousia. When things are introduced into the discourse it is
always theircategorization that determineswhat preciselywill be the
speaker's (or hearer's) focus of interest.Namingthings and thingsas
namedsuch and such are under discussion, not things by themselves
irrespectiveof the way in which they are designated.
In Aristotle's view all 'things' (that is, all concrete 'things') are
materiallyidentical with their essence (every essence being an immanenteidos; cf. Metaph., Z6, 10318-22). Thus, from the ontological
point of view name-giving is unproblematical. Problems, however,
may arise as soon as, by giving all sorts of names to things, i.e. by
using diverse ways of categorization, we mark offall sorts offormal
aspects in things(Cf. Metaph. 1031b22-28). As long as the names we
use cover the whole thing (for instance, if we call allias 'a or this
man') or one or more of its essential constituents(if we call Callias
animalor rationalor rationalanimal)therewill be no difficulty,
since by
thus naming or categorizing a thing we bring it before our (and the
hearer's) mind according to its essential nature. Problems do arise,
however, if a thing is designated in what Aristotle calls a kat} alio
fashion, that is if it is named according to a category that is not
appropriate to name it as preciselywhatit is ( hoperti). To be sure, a
'thing's' most appropriate categoryis not necessarilythe categoryof
substance. So in the case of 'white' the most appropriate category is
a non-substantial one (viz. the quality, when taken as merely the
quality 'whiteness' or 'being white'). Thus, in Aristotle's words,
'white' is identical with the 'essence of white' (see 1031b27). If, how'
ever, the man, Callias, is named (or categorized) as thewhite one' ( to
the name does not stand for
leukon)or 'white man' ( leukosanthrpos),
the essence of the thingnamed but it is assigned to the compound (viz.
'
Callias) kat allo, that is, it is named after something different(viz.
'whiteness') fromthe proper nature (viz. 'manhood') of the complex
thing 'white man'.
6

12:36:14 PM

In this connectionit mightbe useful to look in some more detail at

. 8 Ross renders the phrase ta
the labels kath} hautoand kata symbebkos
kath'hautalegomenaas 'the so-called self-subsistentthings', Tricot as
les tres appels tres par soi'. A more correctrendering,however,
would be 'things qua named aftertheir substantial being'. Likewise,
the rendering of the formula to kata symbebkos
legomenon
( 103 122)
should be 'thing qua named afteran incidental mode of being' rather
than 'an accidental term' (Ross) or 'l'tre dit par accident' (Tricot).
Aristotleneitherspeaks about 'terms' (Ross) nor about 'being' or 'a
being' (Tricot), but about beingsas signified
(( named3)in an (essentialor
From
the
grammatical point of view the phrases kathy
incidental)
way.
hautoand katasymbebkos
modifythe participle 'being said' ( legomenon
):
the legesthai
is claimed to be of a certain type, either aftera thing's
'
proper nature ( kath hauto) or after (one of) its incidental modes of
being {kata symbebkos).
What is under discussion in all these texts is a matter of logicosemantics ('naming', 'designation' or 'categorisation') rather than
ontologyor a thing'sbeing. Of course, when the man Callias is named
'the white thing' (to leukon)what is actually designated is a selfsubsistententity(viz. the man Callias), but- and this is the point at
issue- when the self-subsistententity Callias is designated by the
'
phrase 'the white < thing> (to leukon)he is given a designation after
an accidental mode of being, viz. afterhis whiteness.9
1.4 Conclusionof thissection
(and 'name' for
Ignoring the basic sense 'naming' for katgorein
has quite oftenled to misinterpretationsand to far fetched
katgoria)
explanations of the formulasused by Aristotle.10It will sufficeto give
a few examples.
8 See also L. M. de Rijk,op.cit.(above,p.l, n.l), 29-31.
9 Anal.Post.I 4 (esp.73b5-10)shouldbe interpreted
alongthesamelines.See L.
at reinterpreting
M. de Rijk(ibid.),31-33.An attempt
chs. 1-5alongthe
Categories
viewof'things
outlines
aboveis madeibid.,33-48.ThusAristotle's
presented
being
namedas relative
as well;see ibid.
, ch. 7) maybe clarified
, 49-60.
things'
(Categ.
10In hisstillinteresting
views
studyon Ockham'slogicErnestA. Moodyrightly
theAristotelian
as "termstakenas incomplex
modesofsignifying
categories
things,
ofthetruth
or falsity
ofpropositions"
distinguishable
independently
(1935:68 n.l)
andthebookofCategories
as an "analysisofmodesofsignification"
(ibid.37). Howofsignification
hequiteerroneously
Ockham'stheory
ever,whendiscussing
explains
itinterms
ofstatemental
analysis
(ibid.113-26);seeL. M. de Rijk,LogicandOntology
inOckham.
Some
Notes
onhisView
andtheNature
ofitsBasicPrinoftheCategories
ofBeing
7

12:36:14 PM

At PosteriorAnalyticsI 4,73bl6-18 Jonathan Barnes firstgives a

rathercomplicated paraphrase of the text. Then he adds the following
remark (p. 119): "A far less awkward paraphrase is possible if tois
is translated not as 'the predicates' but as 'the things
katgoroumenois
are 4the thingspredicated'; and since 'to
predicated'. (Ta katgoroumena
predicate' occasionally means 'to apply a predicate to'..., the 'things
predicated' may be the subjects of predication)." Ross's comment(ad
loc., p. 522) runs along the same lines: " katgoroumenon
, generallyused
of the predicate, is occasionally, as here, used of the subject 'accused',
i.e. predicated about." There is no need, however, to resortto this
to mean 'to name' or
type of solution. If we simply take katgorein
a
name'
the
or
certain
syntacticposition'categorize'
'designate by
whethersubject or predicate position- of the term is of no interestat
all.11
Aristotle's exposition concerning the use of quantifiers provides
another nice example of misinterpretation.When rejectingstatements
of the form 'every man is every animal' he says:
7,17bl2-16: epi de tou katgoroumenou
De interpr.
katholouto katholou
katholou
oukestinalthes;oudemiagarkataphasis
estaien hitou
katgorein
katholouto katholou< katholou
> katgorthsetai,
hoion
katgoroumenou
'estipas anthrpos
pan zion'.
in: Ockham
andOckhamists
, ed. byE. P. Bos and H. A. Krop(= Artistarium
ripies,
Supplem.IV), Nijmegen1987(25-39),27, n.14. Fortherest,I am afraidMoody
rather
failure
todistinguish
between
unfortunately
speaks(ibid.70) of"Porphyry's
orbetween
andattribution,
andfacts".Moodywasmisled
meaning
bythefact
things
wasprinted
that'praedicatur'
intheMigneedition
ofa passagefrom
theIsag.(transi.
Boethii:'solumautemspeciesde omnibus
individuis
individuum
autem
[sc.dicitur],
inthecritical
deunosoloparticulari)
where'praedicatur'
is missing
edition
praedicatur
to 'dicitur'andas onlyconand,ifitis read,shouldbe takenas entirely
equivalent
theuseofan individual
term('Socrates')tostandforsomeparticular
thing,
cerning
ratherthanstatemental
See below,p. 9ff.
predication.
11Forotherexamples,
see L. M. de Rijk,op.cit.(above,p.l, n.l) passim.Some
morepassagesareDe Interpr.
7, 17a40;forthispassage,seebelow,p.10;Anal.Post.
= 'appellaII 13,96(wherekatgoria
I 22, 82b37ff.
I 19,81b24-82a3;
; 83a24ff.;
all thosepassageswheretranslating
'name'and
, notto mention
tion')and96b30ff.
and'predicating'.
See e.g. II 13,whereAristo'naming'willdo as wellas 'predicate'
ofuseful
definitions
the
tlesetsouttoprovide
recipesforthediscovery
bydescribing
- Jeroenvan Rijen has givenan
correctprocessof 'huntingessentialattributes'
ofAristotle's
viewofnecessity
as setforth
in Posterior
I, 4-6in
Analytics
explanation
viewofcategorization
whichthissemantic
role.The adequacyofthe
playsa centrale
thesiswasconfirmed
present
bythefactthata satisfactory
categorization
interpretawhichhad alwaysbeen rejectedas
tion of Aristotle's
apodeicticsyllogistics,
ModalLogic(chs.
couldbebasedonit.SeeJ.vanRijen,Aspects
incoherent,
ofAristotle's
in Synthese
Historical
. Textsand Studiesin theHistory
8 and 9) forthcoming
Library
Dordrecht
ofLogicand Philosophy,
etc.
8

12:36:14 PM

ofa universal
univera universal
It is notcorrect
topredicate
takenuniversally
is
in whicha universaltakenuniversally
sallyapplied,foran affirmation
thatis universally
ofa universal
applied,e.g. 'Everyman
universally
predicated
is everyanimal',doesnotmakesense.
with 'of a subject'. This translaAckrilltwicetranslateskatgoroumenou
tion is materiallycorrect,but ratherdifficultto explain grammatically.
To my mind, the famous question concerning the so-called 'formmatterpredication', which is supposedly involved in some intricate
problems of matterand substance in Aristotle,12is far less intriguing
once we apply the golden semantic rule that every material thing,
including 'matter itself, may be 'named' ('designated') afterany of
the formsinheringin it. If this rule is applied the six passages in the
where 'form-matterpredication' is allegedly involved (see
Metaphysics
cit.
, 58) need no longer puzzle us. There is no reason at all,
Page, op.
therefore,to join Page (58, n.2) in reproachingRoss forthe factthat
"any remarkon the locution is conspicuously absent" fromhis comments ad loc.
' in Boethius
2 The use of 'praedicare
ti katatinosis usually rendered in Latin
The Greek phrase katgorein
The
Latin formula primarilymeans 'to
de
as praedicare
aliquid aliquo.
of
else'
say something something
(more precisely 'of somebody'). Of
course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate
somethingof somethingelse in making a statementof the formS = P'.
,
, just as its Greek counterpartkatgorein
However, the verb praedicare
is used more than once merelyin the sense of 'naming' or 'designating
by means of a certainname', regardlessof the syntacticrole thatname
stands forthe act of
performsin a statement.In such cases praedicare
a
name
under
certain
calling up something
(designation), a procedure
as 'to desthatwe have labelled 'categorization'. This use ofpraedicare
cribe as', 'to designate as' etc. is already found in Latin authors of the
preclassic period (Pautus, Terentius) as well as later on in Cicero,
Sallust, Petronius and Plinius.13
Boethius' use ofpraedicare
is quite in line withwhat is found in other
authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental
12See especially
inAristotle's
in:
CarlPage,Predicating
Forms
ofMatter
Metaphysics,
39 (1985),57-82and thestudiesmentioned
ReviewofMetaphysics,
byPageon p.
Owens,JoanKung,RussellDancy,MichaelLoux).
58,n.2(R.J. Blackwell,
Joseph
13See theOxford
LatinDictionary
editedbyP. W. G. Glare,Oxford1982,s.v.,sub
3 (p.1428).
9

12:36:14 PM

predication, Boethius also frequentlyuses praedicarein the sense of

'naming' or 'designating somethingunder a certain name' whereby
the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes
even explicitly,ruled out.
In his Commentary on Porphyry'sIsagogeBoethius sometimesuses
praedicarein the (syntacticallyneutral) sense of dicere('to call', 'to
name' etc.). For instance at 102,5-6 ed. Brandt: ...id accidens merito
praedicatur ("this rightlyis called 'accidens' "). In Boethius' comments on the well-knownlemma Eorumquaepraedicantur
( = dicuntur)
is
often
'dicere'
to
'praedicare'
equivalent
(see 183,7-188,8). A nice
of
this
can
be found at 208,16: quod corporeum
example
equivalence
est, substantia dicituret item quod incorporeum est substantia
praedicatur
{Ci. 243,14 and 21). The use of 'item' makes it clear beyond
that 'dicitur' and 'praedicatur' have the same meaning
doubt
any
here. It should be remembered that the author is extremelyfond of
14
variatio.
Several passages from Boethius' Peri Hermeneiascommentarycan
also be adduced in support of this use of 'praedicare'. When
commenting upon Aristotle's De Interpretationen
cap. 7(17a38ff.)
Boethius sets out to explain the differentuses of the termsfound in a
proposition,especially the subject terms.These uses correspondto the
different
ways in which a speaker introducesa thinginto the discourse.
The meaning of a proposition precisely depends on the notion that
introduces the subject matter {In Periherm.
II, 136,1-12). One of the
propertiesof a propositionis its quantitywhich depends on the extension of the subject term. In this connection the phrase 'omnis homo'
is called 'praedicatio', regardlessof its use in subject or predicateposition, and 'quidam homo' is called 'particulars praedicatio'. It is
absolutely clear fromthe contextthat Boethius here deals with namegivingand not withstatementalpredication. In factBoethius instances
such phrases in sentences in which theyevidentlyact as subjectterms:
- 138,28:Cumautemaudit[sc.thehearer]'hominem',
ad pluresquos137,16
contineri
novit.
que intellectum
[sc. fitut] refert
quoscumquehumanitate
et omnibushominibus
communis
est et in
Atqueideo quoniamhumanitas
singulistotaest (...) - , quoniamigiturhaec ita sunt,idcircohomoquidem
dicitur
universale
et Platoparticulare.
His ergo
quiddam,ipsaveroPlatonitas
itapositis:quoniamuniversalis
iliaqualitasetin omnibus
potestet in singulis
est et dubitaripotestutrumde
, cum dicimus'homo',ambiguum
praedicari
' Works
14See also L. M. de Rijk,OntheChronology
onLogic
, in this
ofBoethius
2
llf.
Journal (1964),
10

12:36:14 PM

sit an de aliquo particulari.

specialidictum
(...) Nam cumdicimus'homo',
indefinitum
est utrumomnesdicamusan unum;sin vero additumfuerit
'omnishomo'vel'quidam',tuncfitdistributio
etdeter'omnis',utsitpraedicatio
minanouniversalitatis
(...). Quocircasi 'omnis',...ad 'hominem'
adiungatur,
res universalis
secundumid quod
quae est homo,universaliter
praedicatur
definitio
ei adicitur
estpraedicatio
quantitatis.
(...) Sed quoniamparticularis
rursuspraedicatio
'Platonis'(de uno enimdicitur
'quidamhomo'particularis
'quidamhomo'etdeunodicitur
'Plato'),noneodemmodoutraeque
particulares
essedicuntur.
A similar non-statementaluse of 'praedicatio' is also found elsewhere in this commentary,where Boethius discusses the quantification ofpropositions.Again, 'to be predicated' is said of termsin subject
position:
II 142,7-19:
Undefitutsingularitas
veroali, universalitas
simpliciter
praedicetur
ut 'omnis
homo
animalest': homoresuniversalis
univeruniversaliter,
quotiens
saliter
est.(...). Rursusestutuniversalitas
praedicata
particulariter
praedicetur,
utcumdico'quidam
homo
ambulai':'quidam'particulare
sediuncdeterminai,
tumad 'hominem'
universalem
substantiam
fecit.Est
particulariter
praedicari
non-universaliter
univer, quotienssineadiectione
quoqueuniversale
praedicare
salitatis
vel particularitatis
nomenuniversale
ut est: 'homo
simpliciter
ponitur,
animaiest'.
Another piece of evidence is found at II, 32 1,8ff., where the differencebetween definiteand indefinitepropositionsis said to consist
solely in the fact that the former 'predicate' universal terms by
indicatinguniversality,the latter do so without any such indication.
In thispassage Boethius discusses sentencessuch as 'currithomo' and
'curritomnis homo', and he uses the phrase 'praedicare hominem' to
indicate the use of the name (designation, categorization) 'homo' in
subjectposition. Remarkably enough, Boethius speaks of universal
predicationin termsof the universal extensionof the universal occurring in subjectposition rather than qua universal application of the
predicate term ('animal').15 In the followingpassage Boethius comments upon the well-knownsaying of Aristotle{De Interpr.10,20a910): "<the quantifier> 'all' does not signifya universal, but <it
indicates> that the universal term is used universally":
differunt
321,8-15:Hoc solum enim definitaeab indefinitis
quod cum
indefinitae
universalia
universalitatis
deterdeterminationem,
praedicant
praeter
minatae
etdefinitae
idemilludpraedicant
universale
cumadiectione
et significa15Boethius'
in thisas wellas intheprevious
explanation
passageis actually
quite
inlinewithwhatAristotle
hasatcap. 7, 17a38ff.
is usedtostand
, wherekathgoreisthai
fora common
name'snaturalcapability
ofuniversally
to morethanone
applying
ofthesyntactic
of thetermusedto designate
it in the
object,regardless
position
sentence.
11

12:36:14 PM

tionequoniamuniversaliter
Nihiligituraliud'omnis'vel 'nullus'
praedicatur.
nisiquoniamid quod universale
dicitur
universaliter
.16
significat
praedicatur
3 Somenoteson themedievaluse of <praedicare>
Ernest Moody, who was quite rightin taking{op. cit., 67-71) Aristotle's Categoriesas providing an analysis of the differentmodes of
signification,energeticallyrejects Porphyry's idea of using the five
predicables (genus, species, differentia,propriumand accident) as an
introduction to Aristotle's Categoriesas unsound. He insists 4'that
Aristotle's analysis of the ten possible modes of significationcan only
be understood in the lightof an analysis of the way in which one term
can be related to another in predication." (ibid., 67). Moody failed to
see, however, that by thus dealing with 'predication'17Porphyrycertainlydid not confinehimselfto statementalpredication,but used the
term in a general sense for 'using as a designation', irrespectiveof a
name's function as subject or predicate. Moody's also accused
Porphyry of having led later logicians (Avicenna and Abelard) to
distinguishthe individual as a sixthpredicable.This accusation is by no
means warranted. Moody erroneously takes 'predicable' as well in
termsof statementalpredication. In fact,when asserting( Isag. , 20-1,
transi. Boethii) that "individuum < dicitur> de uno solo particulari"
Porphyry apparently means that an individual term (instanced by
'Socrates' or 'this white <thing>' or 'this <thing> coming this
way' or 'the son of Sophroniscus' if Socrates is Sophroniscus' unique
son) is used to designate one particular thing, whereas statemental
predication as such is not under consideration. Rather one should
thinkof propositionssuch as 'hoc album est Socrates' or 'hie veniens'
(or 'Sophronisci filius') fuitmagister Piatonis'.
Thus there is no reason at all to charge Porphyrywith failing to
make a distinctionbetween predication (statementalpredication,that
16Cf. Boethius'
comment
assertion
aboutthemeaning
of'all' as
uponAristotle's
found
inhisfirst
onAristotle's
work(I 141,27- 142,8):'omnis'
(shorter)
commentary
enimnonuniversale
sedquoniamuniversaliter:
significat
ipsumenimnonestuniversalisterminus
necomninoterminus
sed universali
praedicato
(!) additumfacitillud
universaliter
enuntiari.Cum enim dicimus: 'currit homo', 'non currit
homo'...universalia
sed nonuniverquidemsubiectasuntin his propositionibus,
saliter
..etc.
praedicantur.
17It shouldbe noticedthat
Moodysometimes
(op. cit. 113; 126) thinksthat
Ockhamtakes'praedicatio'
for'statemental
wherethelatterseemsto
predication'
haveonly'name-assignment'
inmind.See L. M. de Rijk,op.cit.(above,p.10,n.10),
p.27, n.14. See alsobelow,p.18, n.28.
12

12:36:14 PM

is) and signification.Nor is there any reason to agree with Gordon

Leff18who takes up on Moody's point here and suggeststhatPorphyry
helped to 'neoplatonise' Aristotle's categories. In point of fact, Porkata (the Latin 'dici de') in the purely
phyryuses the phrase legesthai
semantic sense of 4to be said of, say A', 'to be used to designate A'
ratherthan in the syntacticsense of 'being predicated of A in a statement'. For thisreason thereis no point eitherin Leffs assertion{ibid.)
to the effectthat "it is Ockham who made predication depend upon
signification."Ockham certainlydid so, but he did not disagree with
others on this account.
To my mind, Porphyryis quite in line withAristotlein thathe uses
katgorein
(along with legeiri)in such a way as to lead his translators
(Marius Victorinus and Boethius) to indiscriminatelyrender these
termswith 'dicere', 'appellare' or 'praedicare' in the neutral sense of
'to say of, 'to use as a designation of. See, for instance, 7,2-5 ed.
Minio-Paluello: "Eorum enim quae praedicantur
alia quidem de uno
dicuntur
solo, sicut individua (sicut 'Socrates' et 'hic' et 'hoc'), alia
vero de pluribus, quemadmodum genera et species..." and compare
this with Aristotle,De Interpr.,cap. 7,17a38-bl: "Now, since of the
pragmata some are universal, others singular, I call universal that
which by its nature is said of a number of things and singular that
which is not; 'man', forinstance, belongs to the universal pragmata,
'Callias' to the singular ones."
Now, it is remarkable that especially Medieval authors standing
in the neo-Platonic tradition sometimes use 'praedicare' and
'praedicatio' in the sense of 'using as a name (designation etc.)'. A
strikingexample can be found in Gilbert of Poitiers. When discussing
the proper nature of 'prime matter' ( hyleor silva) and the hylemorphic
structureof material being {De Trin. I 2,47ff.,ed. Haering)19 Gilbert
comments upon the lemma taken fromhis Boethius text of De sancta
Trinitate II: TERRA
IPSA NON SECUNDUM
QUOQUE
INFORMEM MATERIAM katatonylenDICITUR...SED
SECUNDUM PROPRIAM FORMAM. Following Boethius Gilbert argues
that earth is not called 'terra' afterprime matter, but in accordance
with its proper form. The use of the words (dicitur' 'predicate
forme'
and 'appellatio' deserves special attention:
18WilliamofOckham,The
Discourse
, Manchester
1975,
Metamorphosis
ofScholastic
149.
19TheCommentaries
onBoethius
editedbyNikolausM. Haering,
byGilbert
ofPoitiers
Toronto1966(StudiesandTexts13).
13

12:36:14 PM

aitquodnon
op.cit.,I 51,p. 89,ed. Haering:De hac[se.primematter]
igitur
terrased secundumeas que suntformeipsius
secundumearnterradicitur
..Exhisigitur
terre.
manifestum
estquodnichil
omnino
secundum
materiam
que
- dictione
- essedicitur
forme
subest
sedtantum
predicate
qua illaforma
exponitur
secundum
earnex qua reiproposita
estappellatio,
reiipsiuspropriam
formam.
Of course, what is at issue here is not the trivialobservation that we
may frame the statement 'terra est terra' (or 'lapis est lapis' etc.)
because of theirrespectiveformae, but that something(x) is 'named'
or 'designated as' 'earth' (or 'stone') because of its having the proper
formassigned to it {predicata
forma).20
In the Ordinatioand the Lectura(the thirdand eighthdistinctiones
of
Book I) and also in the Parisian Reportatio
Duns
Scotus
extenJohn
sively discusses all the ins ands outs of the univocal concept of being
(conceptus
entis).21Scotus' thesisof the univocityofbeing should be seen
in the frameworkof his concept of the proper object of the human
intellect.Scotus developed his thesiswhen criticizingHenry of Ghent.
At firstglance both Henry and Scotus seem to deal withthe concept
of 'being' in a statementalcontext, since theyofteninstance propositions in order to make themselves clear. On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that what the two authors understand by
'praedicatio' of the term 'ens' (e.g. in speaking of God and creatures
or of substance and accident) is our use of the noun ( nomen
) 'ens',
irrespectiveof its position (subject or predicate) in a statement.The
passage in which Henry of Ghent defends his view of the analogy of
being can serve as an example:
f.124rF:Etideoabsolute
Summa
ordinariarum
dicendum
estquodesse
quaestionum
realein quo Deus communicet
nonestaliquidcommune
cumcreaturis,
et ita
de Deo etcreaturis,
siensautessepraedicatur
hocestsolanominis
communitate,
nullarei. Et ita non univoceperdefinitionem
nec tamenpure
univocorum,
20Onemaycompare
a passageofAbelard
's Perihermeneias
commentary
(Log.Ingred.
Boethius'exposition
ofthematter)
contrasts
464,5-7)wheretheauthor(following
- and callsthemperpraedica'homo'with'omnishomo'- bothsubjectexpressions
tionem
opposita:"Et attendequod cum 'omnishomo'et 'homo'omninosibiper
nominat
praedicationem
oppositasint,indetamensibisociantur
quod 'homo'singulos
et 'omnis'singillatim
et dividueomnescolligit."
21Forthisintricate
seeEfrem
DunsScotus.
TheBasicPrinciples
Bettoni,
problem,
translated
ofhisPhilosophy,
and editedbyBernadine
D.C.
Bonansea,Washington
inthePhilosophy
1946,33-46;C. L. Shircel,TheUnivocity
oftheConcept
ofBeing
ofJohn
DunsScotus
D.C. 1942andthemagistral
, Washington
studyofLudgerHonnefelder,
Ens inquantum
ens. Der Begriff
des Seiendenals solchenals Gegenstand
der
DunsScotus,(= Beitrge
nachderLehredesJohannes
zurGeschichte
Metaphysik
der Philosophie
und Theologiedes Mittelalters.
Neue Folge,Band 6), Mnster
theauthoroften
Westfalen
where
1979,268-343.Unfortunately
speaksofPrdikation
has theneutral
dicere
de.
Scotusmerely
14

12:36:14 PM

casu, sed mediomodout

aequivocesecundumdefinitionern
aequivocorum
analogice.
dictumprimosignificai
Deum, secundario
124rJ:...'ens' communissime
creaturam.
For Scotus the univocityof the concept 'ens' amounts to the strict
unity of its meaning (and use). Again, at firstsight his definitionof
univocitymay seem to be given in a statementalcontextas he speaks
of affirming,denying and contradiction:
. I dist.3, pars1, q.1-2,n.26 (ed. Vat. Ill, 18): Et ne fiatcontentio
Ord
de
nomineunivocationis:
univocum
dico qui ita est unusquod eius
conceptum
unitassufficit
ad contradictionem,
etnegandoipsumde eodem;sufaffirmando
ficit
etiampromediosyllogistico
utextrema
unitainmediosicunosinefallacia
concludantur
interse uniri.
aequivocationis
However, Scotus' second remarkabout the middle termof a syllogism
makes it quite clear that he thinksof the noun 'ens' as designating
something,regardless of its syntacticposition, since in most of the
syllogisticargumentsthe middle term is once subject term and once
predicate term(firstfigure). Similarly,in the eighthdistinction{Ord.
I d.8, pars 1, q 3, p. 178-79) the key notion is (grammatical and
logical) meaningof terms in general, i.e. theirdiverse modisignificandi
and modiconcipiendi
as opposed to the univocityof being. Scotus' view
of concepts (more precisely conceptual contents) as 'formal objects'
points in the same direction; here, too, the author is interestedin the
terms' significaterather than in the predicative relations between
them (Ibid., p. 182). The same thing may be gathered fromScotus'
use of the 'apprehension' of conceptual contents(ibid., p. 184). 22
Therefore, the phrase dici de should be taken to mean 'being said
of, 'being used to designate'.23 This can also be inferredfrom the
passage in which Scotus deals with the problem of the use of the concept 'ens' and its applicabilityto the ultimatedifferentiaeand the passiones entis.24In this discussion he goes into the distinctionbetween
the quidditative and the denominative use of the term 'ens'.
'Ens' signifiesa thing (whetheror not subsistent) according to its
quidditativeratio(i.e. preciselythatwhich thatthingis qua being) and,
fromthe formalpoint of view, precisely that constitutiveelement in
22Fortheotherworks
ofDunsScotusinwhichtheunivocado
is discussed,
entis
see
Honnefelder,
op.cit.270.
' Honnefelder
23Despitehisspeaking
of'univoke
therelevant
Prdikation
explains
cit.
quite
passages
correctly
(op.
283ff.).
24See Honnefelder,
.
op.cit.333ff
15

12:36:14 PM

a thingwhich is undeterminedby itselfand stillin need of determination (<determinabile

determination,however, comes
).25 A thing's ultimate
from its differentiaultima (e.g. 'rationale' in the case of a human
being):
Ord.I dist.3, pars1,q.3 n.133(ed. Vat.Ill 82-83):Sicutenscompositum
comex actuet potentia
in re,ita conceptus
compositus
perse unuscomponitur
et actuali,siveex conceptudeterminabili
et
poniturex conceptupotentiali
omnemconceptum
determinante...;
oportetin conceptibus
non-simpliciter
inconceptum
ettarnen
determinabilem
etdetersimplicem
perse unumresolvi
stet...
ad conceptum
itaquodresolutio
determinabilem
tantum
minantem,
(ita
et ad conceptum
determinantem
tantum,
quodnihildeterminane
includat)
qui
Illeconceptus
determinabilem.
tantum
nonincludat
deteraliquemconceptum
minabilis
estconceptus
entiset determinane
tantum
estconceptus
ultimae
differentiae.
alterius.
Ergoistieruntprimodiversiitaquodunumnihilincludet
Now, the question may arise in what way, in spite of the primordial
diversity{primodivers)between the 'tantum determinabile' (viz. 'ens')
and the 'determinans tantum', the formercan be said of the ultimate
differences.This is where the notion of 'denominado' comes in.
Scotus argues that the non-subsistentultimate differences(and the
passiones entis, 'verum', 'bonum', 'unum' etc.likewise) are entitled
to the name (designation) 'being', since theyinhere in the same subsistentthingthat is itself'per modum essentiae' and, accordingly,the
proper bearer of the name 'ens'. The way of attribution('predication'), then, thatis used in the case of the ultimatedifferencesand the
and
passiones entis is the denominative one (praedicatiodenominativa)
the concept of 'ens' is then denominatively applied ( denominative
dictum).
In defendinghis thesis of the univocityof being Scotus was forced
denominativa
does not detractanythingfrom
to prove thatthepraedicatio
the univocityof being. On the contrary,Scotus rejects the argument
that a denominative concept is not univocal since in the case of its
denominative use the ratiosubiectidiffersfromthe ratiopraedicatias an
objection typical of beginners ( instantia
puerilis).He points out that it
are different,since
is irrelevantto (correctly)state that the two rationes
what reallymattersis not theirbeing the same but the intrinsicunity
of the formal notion of 'what precisely is predicated', regardless of
whetherthis formalnotion is that of the subject involved or is merely
25See ibid.333-335and 342, whereHonnefelder
says: "In bezug auf alles
naherBestimmende
istdieratio,vonderher'ens'dasSubjekt
washeitlich
bezeichnet,
tantum'
unddeshalbaufdas 'hocens'hininseiner
noch
ein'determinabile
Bedeutung
leer''(italicsmine).
gleichsam
16

12:36:14 PM

denominativeof the subject. Given that there is such intrinsicunity,

the univocityof the term remains:
Ibid,dist.8,pars1, q.3, n.89(ed. Vat. IV, 195):Si etiamaliomodoproterviat
denominativus
nonestunivocus
non
aliquisquodconceptus
quia ratiosubiecti
- haecvidetur
estratiopraedicati
instantia
puerilis,
quiaunomodopraedicatum
denominativum
estmediuminterpraedicatum
univocum
et aequivocum,
alio
modoaequivocum
etunivocum
suntimmediata
verum
apudlogicm.Primm
estaccipiendo
univocum':'quod univocepraedicatur',
hoc est
'praedicatum
ratioeiussitratiosubiecti,
et istomododenominativum
nonest
quodscilicet
univocum.Secundumverumest intelligendo
de unitaterationiseius quod
sicunivocum
est:cuiusratioestinse una,siveiliaratiositsubiecti
praedicatur;
sivedenominet
subiectum
(siveperaccidensdicaturde subiecto);aequivocum
autem:cuiusratioestalia,quomodocumque
iliaratiose habeatad subiectum.
To my mind, the whole passage can best be understood by taking
'praedicatum' as 'name', 'appellation', 'designation', 'attribute', etc.
ratherthan 'statementalpredicate'; 'subiectum' should be understood
as 'thingqualified by thatname' ratherthan 'subject of a statement'.26
It may also be gatheredfromthis passage that Scotus calls every concept a univocal concept as long as it is taken abstractivelyas a formal
notion and, accordingly,is 'one' and withoutany relationwith a concretum. Thus, when taken as an abstract noun 'ens' signifiesonly
to finitudeand
beingnessqua beingness (or the ratioessendi),indifferent
of
or
form
In
in
this
concreteness.
sense 'ens' is
fact,
infinity any
merely the formal opposite of 'not-being' ('non-ens'). On the other
hand, when taken as a concrete noun it signifies
quite the same as the
abstractnoun (and forthatreason it is a univocal concept), but on top
of that it connotes
its suppositum,27and this may (but need not) imply
(in the case, namely, of attributionin quale) a non-univocal use of the
term:
Ord. III dist. 7, q.l, n.5 (ed. Vivs XIV, 336): Aliud est 'univocum
enim
aliudest'univocepraedicari',
stricte
praedicatum',
loquendo.Univocum
dicitur
cuiusconceptus
estinse unus;ethocmodo'album'dictum
praedicatum
de lignoet de lapideestpraedicatum
univocum.
Univoceautempraedicatur
illudcuiusratioestitaunaut{?procum)praedicatur
quodratioeiusincluditur
in rationesubiecti;et hoc mododenominativum
non praedicatur
univoce,
in Praedicamentis
. 1, lai 2-15).
quomodoloquitur
Philosophus
( Categ
26It maybe remarked
thatwhenusingthelabel'praedicatio
denominativa'
inhis
discussion
of thedenominativa
in theAntepraedicamenta
Praedicamentorum
(In librum
Aristotelis
, cap. 3; Opera
II, p. 146,45ff.
, ed. GedeonGi) andinSumma
philos.
logicae
I cap. 13(ed. Boehner-Gl-Brown)
rather
than
Ockhamdiscusses
'name-assignment'
'statemental
predication'.
27See alsothethorough
inHonnefelder,
discussion
ofthismatter
op.cit., 336-339
(and 216-17).
17

12:36:14 PM

What counts, therefore, is not the way in which the concept

(whether quidditative or denominative) is attributed,but rather the
univocityof its formalcontent. In otherwords, when Scotus speaks of
'praedicatum univocum' any relationshipbetween what is predicated
(attributed)and the thingof which it is said (subject, substrate)is left
out of consideration,whereas as soon as such relationshipsareinvolved
the possibilityof 'non-univoce praedicari' comes in.
Hence it may be clear that what in such contexts is called
'praedicare' (this verb is used only occasionally, to be sure, since the
neutral 'dicere de' is found far more often) merely means, as far as
the phrase 'praedicatum univocum' is concerned, 'to name', 'to use
as a designation', etc. and that whenever the phrase 'univoce
praedicari' occurs the syntacticalposition of the univocal term(i.e. its
use as predicate term in a statement)is irrelevant.28
It is not difficultto provide other examples fromMedieval authors
in supportof my thesis. All of them use 'praedicatio denominativa' in
the sense of 'denominative designation'. To be sure, they oftentake
'praedicatio' and 'praedicare' in that sense in the wake of Aristotle
when commentingupon him. However, theiragreementwithAristotle in this respect points to doctrinalkinshipratherthan slavish imitation of traditional usage.29
Papenweg 17
6261 NE Mheer
The Netherlands
28It is true,thenotionof'categorization'
predication)
(as opposedtostatemental
In thisconnection
as faras thetranscendent
term'ens' is concerned.
is misleading
shouldbe takenvaguelyas coveringeverykindof designation
categorization
(appellation).
29ForOckham'suseof'praedicare'
inthesenseof'toname','todesignate'
or'to
His Useof
see L. M. de Rijk,Ockham's
useas a designation',
Theory
ofDemonstration:
in: Ockham's
Presence.
Actsofthe
Aristotle's
kath'holouandkath'hautoRequirements'
The
onOckham,
Conference
Munich20-25March1988(forthcoming).
International
aboutthemedium
demonstrationis
well-known
yetanother
provides
example
controversy
See L. M. de Rijk,
thesisseemstobe involved.
ofa topicinwhichthecategorization
Missverstndnisses?
demonstrationis:
dieFrucht
eines
ber
dasmedium
DerStreit
, in:Acts
inBr.
on MedievalLogicandSemantics
ofthe8thEuropeanSymposium
(Freiburg
21-27May 1988),forthcoming.

18

12:36:14 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 1 (1988)
IX
AnotherInterpretation
of Aristotle'sDe Interpretatione
A supportfor theso-called secondoldestor 'mediaeval' interpretation
JOB VAN ECK

Controversiesregarding propositionsabout the future,occasioned

IX have occurred throughout the
by Aristotle's De Interpretatione
of
from
to
history logic
Antiquity the 20th century,especially in the
Middle Ages.
The question under discussion is: must some such propositionsbe
denied a truthvalue in order to escape determinism?Or does the law
of bivalence also hold forfuturecontingencypropositions?And what
is Aristotle's position in De Interpretatione
IX? Does he say that
bivalence implies determinismand thus abandons universal bivalence
(this is called the oldest, or traditional, interpretation),or does he
reconcilebivalence withindeterminism(the so-called second oldest interpretation).
Boethius, in his two commentaries on De Interpretatione
, shows
himselfa representantiveof the second oldest interpretation.His main
thesis is that according to Aristotleit is necessary for a futurecontingencyproposition and its negation that one is true and the other
false. In a recentarticle Profalse, but not definitely
true, nor definitely
fessorNorman Kretzmann stressedthe influencethis point of view of
Boethius has had on the subsequent discussion1.
The second oldest interpretationbecame so prominent among
mediaeval philosophersthat some call it the mediaeval interpretation.
In modern times most authors reject this interpretation, partly
because the phrase ' 4definitelytrue", which is at the heart of it, is
ratherobscure and its Greek analogue althesaphorismens
does not ocIX at all. Therefore it is worthwhileto return
cur in De Interpretatione
here to the original Aristoteliantext itself,not only because of its importance for the hot issue of future contingency propositions in
1 NormanKretzmann,
seabattle
Boethius
andthetruth
abouttomorrow's
, in: Logosand
of languagein honourof professor
Gabriel
Essayson the philosophy
Pragma.
ed. byL. M. de RijkandH. A. G. Braakhuis,
Nuchelmans,
1987,63-97.
Nijmegen
19

12:36:20 PM

mediaeval philosophy in general, but also, and more particularly,

because of the question whetherthe second oldest interpretationcan
be warranted. I thinkit can be ifwe take the phrase "definitelytrue"
as an equivalent of the "already true" of 19a36, thus connecting it
with a temporal notion of necessity,or historicalnecessity.
Most authors on De Interpretatione
IX nowadays agree that a notion
of historicalnecessityplays a certainpart in the chapter. However this
has not yet been exploited to the full,because eitherone does not appreciate the way this concept of necessitymay be used (and in fact is
used by Aristotle)in order to make a strongcase fordeterminism,or,
even ifone sees the deterministicargumentas "an argumentfromthe
past truth", one does not seem to realise the crucial rle thisnecessity
of the past plays in the chapter as a whole. The strongimplicationsof
its logic, that haunt the chapter from the very beginning, are easily
overlooked; as a result the two currentfamiliesof interpretationthat
have been advocated in the course of time have remained unsatisfactory.
In the followingI will offeran alternativeinterpretation,but first
I shall give a translationof the most importantparts of the chapter in
three sections, each followed by a preliminarycomment2.
Translationof the crucialparts of De Interpretatione
IX and preliminary
comments
The chapter opens as follows3
I 18a28-34 Withregard
towhatis andwhathasbeenitisnecessary
fortheaffirmationor thenegationto be trueor false.And withuniversais
taken
itis alwaysnecessary
foronetobe trueandtheotherfalse,
universally
andwithparticulars
notspoken
too,as wehavesaid;butwithuniversais
ofuniversally
itis notnecessary,
butwithparticulars
thataregoingto
be notin thesameway4.
2 Foran extended
on thesubjectofDe Interpretatione
IX see D. Frede,
bibliography
A Defence
TheSeaBattle
Reconsidered:
, OxfordStudiesin
oftheTraditional
Interpretation
Ancient
III (1985),31-87.
Philosophy,
3 ForthemostpartI willuseAckrill's
inAristotle's
translation
andDe InterCategories
withnotesbyJ. L. Ackrill,
Oxford1963.I willindicate
in foot' tranlated
pretatione
noteswhereI deviatefrom
it.Preferring
variants
thatareclosertotheGreektextmay
seempedantic,
themoresobecausetheresult
isnearly
alwaysmoredistorted
English,
butI findweneedthemfora better
in (sub)sections
The division
is
understanding.
mine.TheGreektextI useisAristotelis
etLiber
deInterpretatione
, ed. L. MinioCategoriae
Paluello,Oxford1949.
4 ouchhomois
"it is different".
; Ackrill,
20

12:36:20 PM

Most commentatorsfeel forcedto choose between two interpretations

of the principle denied to statementsabout futureevents
1. the Principle of Bivalence (PB): for every affirmationor negation
p, it is necessarythat p is true or false, (the traditionalinterpretation; it is the prevailing one)
2. the Principle of modal determinacy:forevery affirmationor negation p, p is necessarilytrue or p is necessarily false5.
However, both kinds of interpretationhave serious shortcomingsin
view of the sequel of the chapter6.Later on I will argue thatwe do not
need to make this choice. The point is that Aristotledoes not flatly
deny the principleat issue. This insightopens up the possibilityof a
differentinterpretation.
II 18a34-19a22
A 18a34-38Forifeveryaffirmation
or negation
is trueor falseit is necessary
for
either
tobe thecaseornottobe thecase.Forifoneperson
everything
willbe and another
deniesthissamething,it is
saysthatsomething
- ifeveryafforoneofthemtobe saying
whatis true
clearly
necessary
firmation
is trueor false;...
Afterarguingagainst the suggestionthat both mightbe true,Aristotle
continues
18b5-9 It follows
or willbe or willnot
thatnothing
eitheris or is happening,
ofnecessity
and not
be, bychanceoras chancehasit,buteverything
as chancehasit(sinceeither
what
hewhosaysorhewhodeniesissaying
istrue).Forotherwise
itmight
equallywellhappenornothappen,since
whatis as chancehas itis no morethusthannotthus,norwillit be.
18b9-16 Again,ifitiswhitenowitwastruetosayearlierthatitwouldbewhite;
so thatitwasalwaystrueto sayofanything
thathashappened
thatit
wouldbe so. Butifitwasalwaystrueto saythatitwasso, or would
be so,itcouldnotnotbe so,ornotbe goingtobe so. Butifsomething
cannot
nothappenitisimpossible
foritnottohappen;andifitisimpossibleforsomething
notto happenit is necessary
forit to happen.
thatwillbe, therefore,
wil
So nothing
Everything
happensnecessarily.
comeaboutas chancehas it or by chance;forifby chance,notof
necessity.
5 Thesocalled' 'universais
notspokenofuniversally",
indefinite
statements
like"(a)
manis white"arementioned
andnegation
apartbecausetheiraffirmation
("man is
white"and "man is notwhite")maybothbe true(cf. 17b29-33).Aristotle
treats
themas logically
to I and statements
like"somemanis white"and
equivalent
"somemanis notwhite".See Ackrill
op. cit.p. 129-130and p. 134.
6 Fora survey
ofthedifficulties
see Ackrill,
op. cit.p. 139-142,andp. 111-112of
Leiden1986,toappearin
, dissertation,
J. . M. vanRijen,Aristotle's
logic
ofnecessity
Historical
See alsoR. Sorabji,Necessity
Synthese,
, CauseandBlame,
Library.
Perspectives
onAristotle's
, NewYork1980,94-96.
theory
21

12:36:20 PM

In 187-25 he rejectsthe idea thatperhaps both of two contradictory

statementsmay be false, and in 18b26-33 he statesthatan absurd consequence of the foregoingis thatdeliberationand takingtroublewould
be pointless, for
18b33-19a6
thereis nothing
toprevent
someone's
havingsaidtenthousand
years
beforehand
thatthiswouldbe thecase,andanother's
havingdenied
ofthetwowastruetosaythenwillbe thecase
it; so thatwhichever
ofnecessity.
whether
Nor,ofcourse,doesitmakeanydifference
any
statements
or not.Forclearly
thisis
peoplemadethecontradictory
howtheactualthings
areevenifsomeone
didnotaffirm
itandanother
ordenying
thatitwill
denyit. Foritis notbecauseoftheaffirming
be or willnotbe thecase,noris ita questionoftenthousand
years
beforehand
19a1-6
rather
thananyothertime.Hence,ifinthewholeoftimeitwassuch
thatoneortheothercouldbe truly
forthisto
said7,itwasnecessary
thathappens
happen,andforeverything
alwaystobe suchthatithapForwhatanyonehastruly
saidwouldbe thecase
pensofnecessity8.
cannotnothappen;andofwhathappens
itwasalwaystruetosaythat
itwouldbe thecase.
In 19a7-22 Aristotleends up this part rejectingthe deterministicconclusion, because sometimes "what will be has an origin both in
deliberation and in action", so "not everythingis or happens of
necessity".
Whatever disputes there may be about De int. IX, it is evident that in
18a34-b9 and 18b9-16 a deterministicargument is presented. In
18b33-19al, this argument is reinforced,and in 19al-6 (Hence...)
brieflysummarized. This part of the chapter is characterized by the
transitionfromthe truthof a statementthat somethingwill happen to
the necessitythatit will happen, semiformally(a) Tp- (If it is true
that p then it is necessary that p). Commentators worry about the
reasoning that should justifythis step fromtruthto necessity.Ackrill
thought it a "highly dubious inference'' "It is debatable whether
Aristotleanywhere makes clear the flowin this argument..."9. Some
suspect a sillyfallacyhere, due to a confusionof a necessitas
consequential
with a necessitas
, viz. (Tp - p) and Tp-Dp10.
consequents
7 houts
eichen
hoste
toheteron
"thestateofthings
wassuchthatone
altheuesthai'
Ackrill,
or theotherwas true",see alsobelowAd II C.
8 kaihekaston
aeihouts
exananks
echein
hste
tngenomenn
"and for
Ackrill,
genesthai'
the stateof thingsalwaysto be such thateverything
thathappenshappensof
necessity".
9 Ackrill,
cit.p. 137.
10E.g. S. op.
1974.
, Cambridge
Haack,Deviant
Logic
22

12:36:20 PM

Others thinkthat(a) owes its seemingvaliditymerelyto the factthat

"(it is true that) it will be..." is oftenan utteranceloaded with some
kind of implication,be it a causal, intentional,cognitive,fatalisticor
yet differentone. That is why, for instance, Strang11argues that (a)
seems a sound principle: it is because of "the apparent inconsistency
of sayingboth 'It will be' and 'It is possible that it won't be';...". But
he admits that he cannot see that Aristotlehas exposed the fallacyof
the deterministicargument. Frede12makes a point thatis akin but she
reaches the opposite conclusion, that (a) is a sound principle. She
remarksthatit is senselessto say "There will be a seabattle, it is true,
but theremay not be a seabattle". The reason is that thereis a 'bind'
in case someone makes a prediction. The person assumes a definite
truth value and thereby has made a 'semantic' commitment to a
definitefact. A position similar to that of Strang has recentlybeen
taken by Van Rijen13. In fact he distinguishestwo kinds of future
tense in "it will be the case that...": a strongfuturetense in the sense
of "whatever may be the course of futureevents, it will be the case
that...", and a weak futuretense in the sense of "in the course of
"
futureeventsas theywill actuallytake place, it will be the case that.. . .
According to him the deterministicargumentembodied by (a) hinges
on this ambiguityof the futuretense.
In my opinion this does not do justice to the argument, there is
more to it. I will point out that a really trickyreasoning is involved
here that does not owe its cogency to a strongor loaded meaning or
a "bind"; I will defend that it is the temporalizingof the truthvalue
and thatit is thisfallacythatAristothatimpliesa historicalnecessity14
tle rejects in the end. But firstlet us go on to section III.
Ill 19a23-19b4
is not,
19a23-27 Whatis, necessarily
is, whenitis; andwhatis not,necessarily
thatis, necessarily
whenit is not. But not everything
is; and not
thatisnot,necessarily
is not.Fortosaythateverything
that
everything
thatit
whenitis, is notthesameas sayingsimply15
is,is ofnecessity,
withwhatis not.
is ofnecessity.
Similarly
11C. Strane,Aristotle
andtheSeaBattle
, in: Mind,LXIX (1960),447-65.
12D. Fredeop.cit.p. 56-57and p. 60-61.See also p. 9-10.
13Van Rijen,op.cit.,chapter
6.
14Another
whostresses
theimportance
ofthiskindofnecessity
is Sorabji,op.
author
cit.Chapter5, "Tomorrow's
Sea Battle:an argument
fromthepasttruth."Howinfavour
ofthetraditional
andheis oftheopinion
ever,heis slightly
interpretation
thatwhatheseesas Aristotle's
solution
is notdesirable.
See alsoChapter6, "Other
from
theNecessity
ofthePast."
Arguments
15hapls'
To be surethisis themeaning
ofhapls
Ackrill,
, but
"unconditionally".
translation.
"simply"is a morelittral
23

12:36:20 PM

19a27-32 Andthesameaccountholdsforcontradictories:
everything
necessarily
is oris not,andwillbe ornot16;
butonecannotdivideandsaythatone
I mean,forexample:itis necessary
forthere
ortheotheris necessary.
butit is notnecessary
fora
to be or notto be a sea-battle
tomorrow;
norforonenottotakeplace-though
totakeplacetomorrow,
sea-battle
forone to takeplaceor notto takeplace.
it is necessary
aretrueinthesamewaythestatesofaffairs
19a32-19b4So, sincestatements
are17,
as chance
thesearesuchas toallowofcontraries
itisclearthatwherever
holdsforthecontradictories
also.Thishaphasit,thesamenecessarily
thatarenotalwaysso or arenotalwaysnotso. With
penswiththings
tobe true
theseitis necessary
foroneortheotherofthecontradictories
thisorthat18,
butas chancehasit;orforoneto
or false-not,
however,
be truerather
thantheother,yetnotalready
trueor false.
andopposite
thatofeveryaffirmation
Clearly,then,itis notnecessary
oneshouldbe trueandtheotherfalse.Forthewayitis with
negation
thatare,so itis notalsowiththethings
thatarenot,butmay
thethings
be or notbe, butas is said19.
possibly
In this section III Aristotle gives his answer to the deterministic
claims. I agree with those commentatorswho thinkthat in the first
lines of III of a temporallyrelative,historicalnecessityis at issue. The
logic of this notion of necessitydiffersin importantrespectsfromthe
logic of 'absolute' necessity20.I thinkthat is why its rle in De int.IX
as a whole has not yetbeen clearlyrecognized, even by those who have
pointed it out in 19a23-27, or in 18b9-19a6.
Intuitivelya state of affairsor event is historicallynecessaryifit has
been made irrevocable by the past. Trivially everythingthathas happened in the past is now necessary,simplybecause we cannot alterthe
past; as soon as somethingis the case it has become necessary.We can
representthis semiformallyas follows. Let time t be earlier than time
; then, if p is the case at time t, it is necessary at time that p is
the case at time t: (b) (pt- >Dt.pt); similarlyin the negative case (not
16Aristotle's
''and willbe or willnotbe" (The
italics:kaiesesthai
ge m'Ackrill,
to esesthai.
italicsare meantto rendertheemphasis
imparts
ge
17epeihomois
aretrueactapragmata'
"sincestatements
hoilogoi
altheis
Ackrill,
hsper
a suggestion
ofDe Rijkhere.See L.
are". I follow
tohowtheactualthings
cording
inPlatoandAristotle
M. de Rijk,TheAnatomy
, in:
LogosandPragma
oftheProposition:
ofprofessor
Gabriel
oflanguageinhonour
andPragma.
Essaysonthephilosophy
Logos
ed. byL. M. de RijkandH. A. G. Braakhuis,
1987,27-61,
Nuchelmans,
Nijmegen
40 and note32.
especially
p.
18tode
to "true
"thisoneor thatone". I readthephraseas referring
tode'Ackrill,
ofthesection.
is ofno accountfortheinterpretation
or false",butthedifference
19ougarhsper
deeinai meinai
echei
kaiepitnmontn,
dunatn
houts
, all'
epitnontn
that
thataredoesnotholdforthings
"Forwhatholdsforthings
eirtai.
Ackrill,
hsper
be or notbe; withtheseit is as we havesaid".
are notbutmaypossibly
20SeeJ. A. vanEck,A system
andits
relative
modal
anddeontic
predicate
logic
oftemporally
in:
et
1981.
Published
Dissertation,
Logique
Groningen
philosophical
applications.
Analyse99 and 100(1982),249-290and 339-381.
24

12:36:20 PM

p): () ( Pt- D - Pt). This is what Aristotlestatesin 19a23-24 and he

immediatelywarns us thatnot everythingis necessary; that something
is necessary when it is (Dt. pt) is differentfrom simply being
necessary (dpt) viz. withoutany time dpendance. So principles(b)
and (c) do not hold simply, i.e. regardlessof the relation of time between the fact and its necessity: (pt- Dpt) and ( - pt- Dpt) are not
valid.
It is sometimesclearer to talk in termsof possible worlds, or in the
case of historicalmodalities in termsof world-courses,ways in which
the world may develop from a certain moment on. That it is now
(already) necessary that I will die before 2100 AD means, Whatever
may happen fromnow on, I will die before 2100 AD, i.e. whatever
course the world may take fromnow on, I will die before 2100 AD.
Thus we get the followinginterpretationof formulesof the formDtq>;
tq>is true in (e.g. our) world w if is the case in all those possible
worlds that at t are stillaccessible to w. Some worlds are accessible at
timet to our world, viz those worldswhose courses- untilt- are identical withthe course of our world- until- t. These are the worlds that
at time t have the same past as our world. From time t on they may
have differentcourses.
Thus it is a trivial truth that if p lies in the past then it is now
necessary that p, because p is the case in each world whose past is
identical to the past of our world. But also events in the futuremay
be historicallynecessary, those events for which there is a sufficient
condition in the past. If at time t p lies in the past and at time t p is
a sufficientcondition for q (which lies in the future), then Dtp and
t (p-*q), and thereforeDtq. An example: if someone has himself
sterilizedin 1978, it is already in 1980 impossible for him to beget a
son in 1984 (if it is supposed that the measure is irreversible).We see
that the necessityof the past may be transferredto futurestates of affaires.
Realizing the strange character of the logic of temporallyrelative
modal concepts turns out to be of vital importance in analysing and
evaluating arguments in which they occur21,to startwith Aristotle's
De Int. IX.
21It appearsthatclassicalmodaldistinctions
suchas necessitas
versus
consequentiae
necessitas
dedicto
versusmodality
deandothers,
aresometimes
consequents,
modality
relative
andas a result
areillusory
insomecontexts.
Forsomecasestudies
temporally
see vanEck,op. cit.ChapterTI.
25

12:36:20 PM

Commentary
First I will comment on section II and C, then on III and finally
on I and II A. I thinkthis order of treatmentis the most favourable
one forrenderingclear the details of the chapter's structure,as I see
it. Particularlyhow Aristotle's analyses of section III bear upon the
parts of I and II wil gradually appear in this way.
Ad II B. Some commentatorsargue that it is the ambiguityof the
futuretense that generates the problem with which De int. IX deals.
The principle of bivalence is valid also for sentences about future
events, but if we substitutesuch a sentence in the weak futuretense,
in (a) Tp- ' Dp we get a falsity:"If it is truethatin the course of future
events as theywill actually take place, it will be the case that..., it is
"
necessarythat.. . . The only futuretense sentencesforwhich(a) holds
are strong
ones, but this is not enough to reach a deterministicconclusion, because forsentences in the strongfuturetense Fp- - p is not
valid as is easily seen fromthe meaning of the strongfuturetense. I
thinkthe distinctionweak- strongfuturetense is unimportanthere,
because the deterministicargumentcan be representedin a language
in which one can talk about futurecontingencieswithoutmaking use
of sentences with a futuretense. (A case in point is Dutch, in which
I can say, "Volgende week woensdag om 3 uur vindt er een zeeslag
*
plaats": Wednesday next week at 3 p.m. a seabattle takesplace*).
And not only with this kind of sentence, but also withsentencesof the
type "X will happen" in the weaksense we get the deterministicconsequence. An example. Suppose I say now, "On November 13, 1997,
at 4 p.m. a seabattle will take place". According to the PB this
sentence is true or false. If (1) it is true, then I am right,(2) I spoke
the truth. But now my utteringthis true assertion lies already in the
past and thus (3) has become a historicalnecessity. It is now an irrevocable fact,and therebynecessary,that I just now spoke the truth.
But (4) it is also necessary that if I was right,then on November 13,
1997 at 4 p.m. a seabattle will actuallytake place (it is not possible that
the statementis true and neverthelessno seabattle will take place at
that time). So (5) it is (now already) necessary that on November 13,
1997 at 4 p.m. a seabattle will take place. If on the other hand the
sentence is false (or negated) we similarlyreach the conclusion that it
is (now already) impossible that
Of course, substituting"takes
place" for "will take place" in the above sentence we would get the
26

12:36:20 PM

same argument.- For some readers the argument will perhaps

become clearer if I restateit (semi-) formally.Here it is. Let t and
be two momentsof time, later than t; let S^p mean: at time t it is
trulysaid that p, and if f is any proposition Dt. <pmeans: at it is
necessary that 9. Now (1) Tp (2) S^p (3) Dt. S^p (4) (S^p^p)22

p.
(5)
Thus we see thateven with a sentence in a "weak" futuretense or
witha sentencewithno futuretense at all a deterministicconsequence
can be reached. So the defectof the argument is not due to a failure
to distinguishtwo futuretenses. But then the question arises what is
wrongwiththe reasoning?In my opinion the argumentis made possible by temporalizingtruthvalues, i.e. locating truthvalues in time.
As soon as one does so the principle of historical necessity is applicable, yielding,with temporallydefinitesentences, a deterministic
consequence. If at a certaintime t (say 10 October 1987) it is true that
p (say, that on November 13, 1997 at 4 p.m. a seabattle will take
place), then the truthat that time t of p lies fromthat time t on in the
past and thus is fromt on part of the world, whatever course it may
take afterthat. Thus in all courses the world may take fromt on p is
already true (at t) and therefore(because in any world it obtains that
p is the case ifit is true thatp) in all world courses thatare stillaccessible fromt on p will be the case; in other words it is necessary from
t on that p will be the case. The historicalnecessityof a truthin the
past can, throughthe necessityof the truthprinciple "Tp if and only
if p", be transferredto a futureevent.
It appears that placing truthvalues in time is crucial in the deterministicargumentfromTp to p. In thisconnection it is significant
that wherever Aristotle renders the argument, in 18a34-18b9;
18b9-16; 18b33-19al and the summary 19al-6, he introducesone or
two speakerswho respectivelystate and deny that somethingwill happen. Then he says about one of the two contradictorystatementsthat
"it was true to say earlier
..." (180), "it was alwaystrue to say..."
"
(181), "which of the two was true to say then (18b35-36), "it was
true to say always" (19a6). The use of these phrases suggests a temporalizingof truth.Now, indeed, "truly saying" (cf. althseipe, 19a4)
that p will happen seems to imply that it is now (already) true that p
22In (4) thenecessity-operator
doesnothavea timeindex.(4) means:in all posible
worldsin whichs^p is thecase,p is thecase too. Butwhatholdsforall possible
worlds
alsoholdsforallthosepossible
worlds
thatareatstillaccessible.
Thus
trivially
with(4) implies(5).
(4) implies(4')
(Ss^p- p) and (3), together
27

12:36:20 PM

wil happen. In the passages quoted above Aristotlemakes use of the

impression that if somebody is speaking the truthnow if he says that
a certain event will happen, it is in fact true now that that event will
happen. But then, of course, the necessityof the event would be an
immediate consequence.
In order to preclude the deterministic consequence we must
distinguish two principles, a sound one and an unsound one, that
resemble each other:
1. It is always possible to assign a truth value to propositions (including futurecontingencypropositions). This is the Principle of
Bivalence.
2. Propositions (including future contingency propositions) always
have (already) a truthvalue, in the historicalsense of being at any
moment of time (already) true or false.
Thus in our example, although my utteringthe true(resp. false) assertion: "On November 13, 1997, at 4 p.m. a seabattle will take place"
already lies in the past and has become a historicalnecessity,nevertheless it is not now necessary that I just now spoke the truth(respectively an untruth).What is necessarynow is thatI utteredthe assertion
some minutesago. However that the statementis true has not become
necessary, because its truth is not located in the time of the
utterance23.The step in our formalizationfrom(2) S^p to (3) Dt, S^p
is not warranted,because S^p has the formof a conjunction(StpATp)
and we cannot get t,(StpATp), forthe formulaTp does not have a
time index. At the utmost we get (C StpATp).
Some commentatorsare against this solution of timelesstruth.For
instance D. Frede, who advocates the traditionalinterpretation,arguing that principle (a)Tp- >Dp is sound (because of the dpendance of
the fact from the truth, that would be responsible for a "relative
semantic necessity", see also above), and that Aristotleaccordingly
restrictsthe PB in order to avoid determinisme. "The attempt to
avoid the problem of futurecontingencyby changing to timelesspropositions and timeless truth ... is all too easy because it eliminates
meaningfulpredictionsand promises alongside with a genuinelyopen
future", op. cit. p. 56-57. Afterreferringto such an approach of Von
undZeitlichkeit
Wahrheit
, Studia Leibnitiana,
Wright in Determinismus,
VI (1961), she continues: "Is this a solution Aristotlecould have envisaged? Von Wrightthinksthat it is possible thatAristotlemay have
23Thatthisis Aristotle's
solution
willbe arguedbelowAd III.
28

12:36:20 PM

been confused since he did not see the distinctionbetween temporal

and atemporal truth. My suspicion is that even though that may be
true, Aristotlewas quite aware of the petitiobut thought the deterministic implications inevitable- for genuine singular prospositions
about the future.For it is senseless
to make such predictionsand to call
them true or false if one does not commit oneself to what one says.
What sense does it make ifI make a predictionabout a contingentfact
in the futuresuch as 'There will be a sea-battle in the Persian Gulf
tomorrow ajid this is true in the plain sense but it is quite open and
theremay not be a sea-battle?' Without wantingto turnAristotleinto
an ordinary-languagephilosopher, I assume that forhim we have to
choose between a commitmentor 'idle talk'." (Frede, op. cit. p. 60).
In my opinion this is bad ordinary-language philosophy, based
upon muddling togetherconsiderationsof semantics and pragmatics.
To be sure, it is incorrectto claim in a conversation the truthof a
propositionp and at the same time leave open the possibilitythat p
will not be the case. You 'canno say "It is true that p, but possibly
not p", just as you cannot say "p is the case, but I do not believe
that". But thisis no reason to claim the validityof 44ifp then I believe
that p" and thus of "if p then it is believed that p". Nor must the
pragmatic incorrectnessof saying "It is true that p, but possibly not
p" seduce you into ascribingdeterministicimplicationsto truthor accepting(a) Tp - Dp as valid. It seems thatyou are only allowed to say
at a time t that p is true, i.e. can only correctlydo so, if you have at
time t sufficientreason to believe that p, that is if there is a sufficient
conditionfor(the truthof) p, which would implynecessityindeed. But
thisdoes not mean thatthe truthitselfof p implies necessity.The commitmentFrede is talkingabout is not semantic at all, it does not hang
on the meaningof Tp. It is a pragmatic commitmentthat is due to rethat Tp, and this has nothing to do
contending
quirements of correctly
with the logical status of (a). I don't see any evidence in De Int. IX
that Aristotlemade this mistake, nor is there any reason to suppose
that he was confused at any point in the subject of future contingencies.
Ad IIC. In 18b33-19a6 Aristotlecompletes the deterministicargumentby gettingrid of the speakers who were firstintroducedin order
to place the statementsin time "...it is not because of the affirming
or denying that it will be or will not be the case, nor is it a question
of ten thousand years beforehandratherthan any othertime". There29

12:36:20 PM

fore "it does not make any differencewhetherany people made the
contradictorystatementsor not". The fact that "of what happens it
was always true to say that it would be the case" is enough for
reaching the deterministicresult,whetheranyone did in factutterthe
statementor not. Thus concluding this section Aristotlesummarizes
the argument in 19al-6.
It is expedient to remind the reader here that my translation"such
that one or the other could be trulysaid" of hostetoheteron
altheuesthai
in 19a2 is differentfromAckrill's which reads "such that one or the
other was true". Some commentatorsuse his translationto give it an
ontological interpretation:in the whole of time the situation was
already such that the prediction was then already true, its truth
already guaranteed by the presentsituation. Van Rijen needs this interpretationin order to get an extra premiss that is required to make
the deterministicargument as he interpretsit, valid. It would justify
the replacement of the weak futuretense by the strong futuretense.
There are some reasons to opt for our interpretationagainst the
as "was true" togetherwith the loaded ontranslationof altheuesthai
1
.
Each
time altheuein
occurs in De Int. IX it is used
tological reading.
in the sense of "speaking the truth", rather than "being true" cf.
ton heteron
autn "one of them to be saying what is
18a37 altheuein
hoapophas"since eitherhe who says
true", 18b7 gar hophas altheuei
or he who denies is saying what is true". (For that matter, "being
true" is usually expressed by the actice voice, altheueinwhereas
cf. De Int.
"being false" is expressed by the middle voice pseudesthai
16al0; 16b3; 17a2). 2. The reason Aristotlegives in 19a4-6 for the
validityof the transitionin the implicationin 19al-4 suggests"be truThe protasisof the implication
ly said" as the meaning of altheuesthai.
"
"if in the whole of time it was such that one or the otheraltheuesthai
is followedby a twofoldapodosis, a "it was necessaryforthis to happen" b "and everythingthat happens always to be such that it happens of necessity". He thenjustifiesthisimplicationby two statements
in which he speaks not of truthor "being true" simpliciter,but of
"truly saying" ( althseipe, 19a4) and "being true to say always"
(althesn eipeinaei, 19a5-6). What is justifiedhere is the transitionto
necessity not from "was true" but from "could be trulyasserted".
Ad III. This section too may be divided intro three parts. We
already commented on the firstone, 19a23-27, in which Aristotle
distinguishesbetween "being of necessitywhen it is" and "simply
30

12:36:20 PM

being of necessity". The second part, 19a27-33 startswith a distinction between,It is necessaryforeverythingto be or not to be, formally
(p v - p), and, It is necessary to be or it is necessary not to be,
(p v - p).
Now, thisdiscrimininationis introducedby the sentence "And the
same account {ho autoslogos)holds forcontradictories;. ..", indicating
a logical relationshipwith the formerdistinctionof historicalversus
here24:the fallacyin an insimple necessity.Ackrillnotes a difficulty
ferencefromD(p v - p) to (Dp v - p) is not the same as thatfrom
a historicalnecessityto a simple one. Hence he suggeststhatAristotle
may have been confusedand made a mistake. I disagree withhim and
I thinkthata considerationofthe logic ofhistoricalnecessitywill make
clear what Aristotlehad in mind and why he so expresslyconnected
the two distinctions.
First he pointed out that the historicalnecessityof everythingthat
is should not lead one to accept the necessitytoutcourtof everything;
we have (where t is not later than )25 d (pt- Dt. pt) and ( - pt- Ot,
pt),but note (pt- Dpt) and ( pt- pt). But fromd immediately
follows (Dt. pt v (. - pt), and for that matter
(pt v - pt) is
equivalent to (Dt'Pt v D
pt): with referenceto the past one is allowed to take the necessity of a disjunction distributively( dielonta
).
But, keeping the distinctionbetween d and e in mind, we are notallowed to conclude, fromf (p( v - pt), g: (Gpt v - p(), i.e. we cannot read the simple necessityof a disjunction distributively.That is
why the second distinction,between f and g, is based upon the same
logosas the firstone, between d and e: we may take the necessityto
be distributedif it regards the past, if it is a historicalnecessity,that
is, ifthe "when it is" conditionis fulfilled,not ifit is a simple, unconditional necessity26.In this connection, it is significantthat the warn24Ackrill,
op.cit.,p. 138.
25It isa matter
ofchoiceinwhatpartofthedivision
thepresent
past/future
belongs.
I think
there
is somereasonnottoviewthepresent
as historically
necessary,
justlike
thepast(seevanEckop. cit.p. 283),butI don'tthinkthepointis veryimportant.
thepresent
inthesamewayas thepasthereandI willfollow
Aristotle
treats
himfrom
nowon.
26I do notagreewithD. FredewhoclaimsthatAristotle
is notreallyconcerned
with
a distribution
mistake
shedoes"notdenythatAristotle
warnsus notto
(although
makethatkindofmistake.
.. "). "We, rather,
havetomaketheapplication
ofthedifin step(1) (i.e. between
ferentiation
absoluteandconditional
necessity,
v.E.) in the
causeof an antithesis
ourselves!
That is to say,we mustnotregardone of the
members
(theonewetaketobe orbecomereal)as absolutely
necessary
(anditsopwhenitis onlyconditionally
positeas impossible)
necessary"
(op. cit.p. 74). butas
31

12:36:20 PM

ing not to divide, 19a29, occurs afterthe phrase about the future,"...
and willbe or not", and is furtherexplained in an example concerning
a futureevent, the famous seabattle tomorrow.
In 19a32-39 Aristotledraws his conclusions concerning statements
about things"that are not always so or are not always not so", which
are "such as to allow of contrariesas chance has it", thatis contingencies: "the same necessarilyholds forthecontradictoriesalso", because
"statements are true in the same way ( homois
) the states of affairsare
Thus
these
the
ta
"with
above mentionedcon)".
(i.e.
( hsper pragmatd
is
for
one
or
the
other
the contradictoriesto
it
of
necessary
tingencies)
be true or false,not however thisor that27,but as chance has it." That
is to say, of two contradictoriesit is necessary that the one is true or
false (as well as the other). However it is not necessarily this (truth
value) nor necessarilythat (truthvalue), but as chance has it. Again
we are warned not to divide and say, because a sentence(and its negation) is necessarily true or false, it is necessarily true or necessarily
false28.However, we must bear in mind, and this is of the utmostimportance, that Aristotleis only speaking about contingencypropositions ( toutngar, 19a36). For propositions about the present and the
theabove,thereis a muchstronger
between
thetwo
appearsfrom
logicalconnection
linkedbythewordshoautoslogosthanonlyan application
ofthedifference
sections
between
an absoluteand conditional
to thetwomembers
ofan antithesis
necessity
Itconcerns
thedistinction
between
seperately!
(d) and(e) ontheonehandand(f)and
thesameroot.AndI dothink
thatAristotle
is really
concerned
having
(g) ontheother
witha distribution
witha simplenecessity,
mistake
a historical
justbecausedividing
allthemore
whichmakessucha mistake
necessity
(thatis: ofpastevents)isjustified,
credible
to be madeand a cautionnotundue.
27See note18.
28D. Fredeis oftheopinionthat"statements
aretrueaccording
tohowthings
are",
19a33(thisis Ackrill's
see note17),can be understood
in twoways.It
translation,
thetruth
itself
is modified
in accordance
with
mayexpressa strong
correspondence,
themodeoftheevent,or a weakercorrespondence
in thesensethatifthefactsare
thetruth
valuesaredefinite
too.Shearguesthattheweaker
version
is much
definite,
moreprobable,
becausethestronger
onewouldlack"thefinalconfirmation
tobe exwhether
the'already'is to be understood
tempectedin line19a38-39,
(regardless
inline36 simply
ornot)the'necessary'
cannotbe extended
insucha waythat
porally
inline38-39wecouldread'orforonetobe truerather
thantheother,
yetnotalready
true
ornecessarily
withthisargumentation
andoptforthe
false". I disagree
necessarily
thatdoesgetitsconfirmation
at 19a37-38:"notthisorthatbutas
version,
stronger
is governed
chancehasit", whichsentence
in 19a36.The opposibythe'necessary'
thatwe readit as: "notnecessarily
in thissentence
tionsuggested
thisor
requires
thisand notnecessarily
that",in otherwords:"notnecessarily
that,butas chance
of19a36cannotbe extended
hasit". Thatthe'necessary'
so thatwe couldreadin
19a38-39'yetnotalreadynecessarily
trueor false'is irrelevant:
"alreadytrueor
as appearsfromthedeterministic
false"implies
a (historical)
necessity
argument.
32

12:36:20 PM

past distributionis allowed. The statement"It is necessarily true or

false that yesterdaya seabattle took place" is equivalent to the statement "It is necessarily true that a seabattle took place or it is
necessarilyfalsethata seabattle took place". A scope distinctionof the
modal phrase is pointless in these cases. For this reason it is all the
more important to stress its relevance for future contingency propositions!
At 19a38 Aristotlecontinues, "and for one to be true ratherthan
the other, yet not already true or false"29. Here we have Aristotle's
preclusion of the deterministicargument of section II: although it is
necessarythat a statementis true or false (19a36-37) and accordingly
we can nowsay thatit is true(resp. false)- or, to use Aristotle'swords,
it is true to say now- that a seabattle will occur tomorrow,we cannot
say thatit is already truenow, forthatwould indeed yield the fatalistic
conclusions of II: as soon as somethingis true it is necessarily true.
This is not a limitationor modificationof the PB to the effectthat a
futurecontingencypropositionlacks a truthvalue but acquires one in
the course of time, i.e. when the event about which it is has become
a fact and the propositionhas ceased to be so to speak a futurecontingencyone. The PB is stated for futurecontingenciesin 19a36-37.
Now, in a metaphorical sense one can say that propositionsabout
the past and presentare already true (or false), because the factsthey
represent are already (part of) reality. In that sense one can say
analogously that futurecontingencypropositionsare not already true
or false because theyare not yet realized eitherpositivelyor negatively. But this should not be taken to mean that they lack "at any time
or other" a truthvalue, that theyare not yet true or false. They have
a (timeless) truthvalue but they differfrom propositions about the
past and presentin that the latter in additionare realized already and
thusmay be said to be already true(or already faisrespectively).What
is limitatedin 19a39 is a strengthenedversion of the PB thatdoes hold
forpropositionsabout the past and present:everystatementnecessarily is already true or (already) false, which implies and is implied by:
everystatementis historicallynecessarilytrueor historicallynecessarily false,whichin its turnis equivalent to: everystatementis historically necessarily true or false. And it is in this sense that we must
29TheGreekwordfor"already"(d)doesnotalwayshavea temporal
force.Some
4'butthatdoesnot meantrueorfalse",instead
of"yet
herethetranslation
prefer
yet
useofLatiniam,
notalreadytrueorfalse",seeAckrill
op.cit., p. 141.Fora similar
see L. M. De Rijk,in thisJournal,
23 (1985),92 f.
33

12:36:20 PM

interpretthe conclusion that now immediately follows 19a39-19b2.

"Clearly then, it is not necessary that of every affirmationand op'
posite negation one should be true and the otherfalse;' It is the denial
of the necessitythat of every pair of contradictoriesone is definitely
true and the otherdefinitelyfalse in the sense of already true and false
respectively.That is to say, the historicalnecessityof "this one true
and that one false'' is denied, i.e. it is not necessary that this one is
true and that one false in thewayit is necessary
foraccomplished
facts; "for
the way it is ( hsper
with
the
that
so
it
are,
)
things
{houts) is not also
with the thingsthat are not, but may possibly be or not be, but as is
said." (19b2-4). Thus we see what is the principle that has to be
denied in order to avoid determinism.
Ad I. Returning to the beginning of the chapter we read that with
regard to the presentand past it is necessary (a) that the affirmation
or the negation is true or false; and thatwith universal and particular
sentencesit is necessarythat(b) always one is true and the otherfalse.
Now it is most significanthow the denial of this is phrased in the next
sentence. Aristotledoes not say, forexample, For futurecontingencies
this does not hold, or, this is not necessary (as he in fact does with
"universais not spoken of universally")30; no, he says, "but withparticulars that are going to be notin thesameway". From our discussion
of section III it appears that we have to read this as: it is not in the
same way necessary that (a), nor that (b). It is a denial not of the PB
toutcourtbut of the PB in the way it holds forthe past and the present.
It is importantto notice thatthe subsequent deterministicargument
would indeed be valid under the suppositionthatthe strengthenedversion of the PB would hold indeed forall propositions,includingthose
about the future.In fact the argument illustratesthe mistake we can
make with the PB if we do not distinguishbetween statementsabout
the past and presenton the one hand, and those about the futureon
the other hand. Let us turn to its firstpart.
Ad II A. It starts with a conditional in 18a34-35. Here "it is
necessary" ( ananke)is placed in frontof the phrase "either to be the
case or not to be the case", and at firstsightthereis no reason to read
it distributively.The next sentence, which adduces the argument in
support of this statement,contains an ambiguity, viz. "it is clearly
30Forthemeaning
ofthisphrasesee note5.
34

12:36:20 PM

necessary forone of them to be saying what is true", which may be

read distributively,and is indeed followedby a deterministicconclusion in 18b5.
Now, a reader who would not accept the conclusion, only because
he reads the two occurrences of 4'necessary" here non-distributively
does not realize the impact of the rle of the speakers in the argument.
By puttingthem on the stage Aristotlegets contradictorystatements
about the futurethat are expressed in the course of time. But at the
moment of the utterance one of them is speaking the truthand his
statementabout the futureis ' 4trueto say then", at thatverymoment.
The two speakers are introduced in 18a35-36, and in the conclusion
Aristotleexplicitlyremindsus of themwhen he gives once again as the
ultimate reason for the deterministicoutcome that "since either he
who says or he who denies is saying what is true." (18b7-8). But then
in the second part of the argument(B) he presses thispoint to the full,
sayingthatifsomethingis the case now "it was true to say earlier that
it would be...; so it was always true to say of anythingthat has happened thatit would be so." (18b 10-12). And this suggeststemporalizing of the truthvalue. But, as we have seen, such a placing in time
of truthvalues has immediate deterministicconsequences: as soonas a
statement(p) is true,it is (i.e. has become) necessarythatit (p) is true,
and as soonas its negation ( - p) is true it is necessarythat thisnegation
( p) is true. So as soon as p is true or - p is true it is necessary that
p is true or necessarythat - p is true. Thus a distributivereading of
"necessary" in II A is justifiedbecause the necessityat issue here is
a historicalnecessity31.And that is why a differencein fact does not
- and distributive uses are
matter here; the non distributive
the
vexed
which
So
equivalent.
questions
reading is the rightone turns
out to be beside the point afterall: eitherpossibilityhas a deterministic
consequence.
Now a notoriousdifficulty
of any interpretationto the effectthat it
is not the PB thatis at stake in De Int. IX is thatthedeterministicargument starts with the PB. According to this kind of interpretation,
Aristotledoes not dispute this startingpoint at the end. But then it
31Remember
alsothat,whenAristotle
comments
on thequestion
ofdistribution
in
19a29hiswarning
thatweshouldnotdistribute
is baseduponthesamelogos
as is his
nottoconfuse
when
itis withnecessity
tout
court
warning
necessity
(see p. 11-12);the
in II A, thusowingitsseamingvalidity
to thesuggestion
ofa historical
reasoning
losesitsplausibility
as soonas itisestablished
thatthisnotionis outofplace
necessity
here.
35

12:36:20 PM

seems that in III he neither attacks the determinista inferencefrom

truthto necessity,he only makes some distinctionsand the question
is how "the confusionsAristotleis here exposing... motivate that inference"32.From the foregoingit will be clear what my answer is. The
two kinds of fallacy Aristotlepoints out in section III, viz. (p- -Dp)
and (pv - p) - (Dpv - p)resp. D(Tp vT - p) - (DTpv DT - p)
are no fallacies at all if we read as a historicalnecessity("when it
is") instead of a simple one: (pt- Dt. pt) and
(pt v - p,)- (Dt. pt v
t. - pt), resp. t.(TPt v T- pt)- (Dj.Tp, v nt.T- pt) are valid if
t< i.e. if at p is a statementabout the past or present. Thus we
must distinguishstatementsabout the past or presentfromthose about
the future.A thirderror is akin: "every propositionis true or false"
does not imply determinism,where as "every proposition is already
true or false" does; (T(p v Ftp) implies (Dt. Ttp v Dt, Ftp). In the
same way (Ttp v T, - p) implies (,. Ttp v
p). And it is at this
in
III
that
section
meets
Aristotle
the
deterministic
point
argument:
every statement is true or false, but not alreadytrue or false. Here
Aristotlehits the core of the whole deterministicargument. It showed
how the PB may lead us to say about statementsconcerningthe future
that they are already true or false at the moment of utterance. Now
metaphoricallywe can say about statementsconcerning the present
and past that theyare already true or false, but ifwe talk in the same
way about propositionsconcerning the future,neglectingthe distinction between the two kinds of proposition,we treat them in a similar
manner, i.e. as propositionsabout the past and we have in factchanged over to a strengthenedPB which in fact implies determinism.
We come to our conclusion.
Conclusion
Summarizing our interpretationwe may say that the message of De
Int. IX is thatwe must distinguishbetween the past and presenton the
one hand, and the futureon the otherhand, so thatthe way the Principle of Bivalence holds forstatementsabout the past and presentis differentfrom the way it holds for futurecontingencystatements.Not
observing this distinctionleads to determinism.Mind you, Aristotle
does not qualify the PB in the sense of restrictingits validity.The PB
does hold indiscriminatelyfor all propositions,including futurecon32See Sorabji,op.cit.,p. 96. See also Ackrill,
op.cit.,p. 139-140.
36

12:36:20 PM

tingencypropositionsifwe understandthe necessitythat governs it as

a simple necessity( hapls), but it is not applicable to futurecontingency propositionsifwe read itsnecessityas a historicalone, as a necessity
ofthepast, whichonly obtains ifthe "when it is" condition is fulfilled.
In fact this reading results in a strengthenedversion of the PB.
But how on earth could we be tempted into treating statements
about the futuresimilarlyas those about the present and past, applying the strenghtenedPB? The deterministicargument shows how
making thismistakeis renderedeasy by the occurrence of an affirmation or negation by a speaker about a futureevent. As we have seen,
the enriched PB is applicable to future contingency propositions
throughfaultyplacement in time of truthvalues of the positive and
negative statementsthat are utteredin time.
The structureof the chapter is as follows.
In 18a28-34 Aristotlestates that the PB holds for statementsabout
"what is and has been", but that it does not hold in the same way
{ouchhomois
) for statementsabout "what is goint to be". The next
contains the so called deterministicargument. It
18a34-19a23
section,
contains the reason why we must make this difference,showing how
the PB may induce us to treatstatementsabout the futurein the same
way as thoseabout the past and present,witha deterministicoutcome.
With thispurpose two speakers are introducedwho respectivelyaffirm
and deny at a certainmoment of time that somethingwill be the case.
Now, according to the PB, one of them is right,utteringa true statementat thatmoment,and what he says is trueto say then. But as soon
as a statementis true, it is necessarily true and what it states will
necessarilybe the case. However Aristotle rejects the deterministic
consequence. It is importantto notice thatAristotlesuggests,through
phrases like "was true to say then", a placing in time of truthvalues
and it is throughthis temporalizationof truthvalues that he reaches
the deterministicresult. In the last section, 19a23-19b4, Aristotle
makes some distinctionsin the use of the term "necessary", and on
the basis of these makes clear how it is thatthe PB holds forthe future
"not in the same way" as forthe past and present; finallyhe indicates
how, as a consequence, one must preclude the deterministicargument. First, in 19a23-27, he says that everythingthat is necessarilyis
when it is, but thatthisdoes not mean thatit is simply,unconditionally necessary. Thus somethingis necessaryunder the condition that it
is already the case, i.e. past or present. If so, it is historically
necessary. So "if p then necessarilyp" holds when p satisfiesthe con37

12:36:20 PM

dition, but not ifit does not, ifp is about the future.Then, 19a27-32,
he says that according to the same logos, it is necessarythat p or not-p
is the case, but one cannot distribute( dielonta
) the necessityand say
that it is necessary that p or necessarythatnot-p. (It is the same logos
because ' 'necessarily (p or not-p)" may be read distributively
'
'necessarily p or necessarilynot-p" ifp satisfiesthe above condition,
i.e. is about the present or past- in that case the distributiveand the
non-distributivereadings are equivalent- , but not if it is about the
future.In other words, if the necessityis a historicalnecessitywe are
allowed to distribute,not ifit is a simple necessity).Aristotleconcludes
that ' 'since statementsare truein the same way the actual thingsare",
everyfuturecontingencystatementis necessarilytrueor false,but not
necessarilytrue nor necessarily false, and not alreadytrue or false.
Here we see in what sense we must take the words "not in the same
way" ( ouchhomois)in the introductionof the chapter. The difference
is that forstatementsabout the past and presentthe PB "Every statement is necessarilytrue or false" holds with a historicalnecessity:the
"when it is" conditionis fulfilled.In factthisis a strengthenedversion
of the PB that is so forcefulas to admit of a distributionand is in fact
equivalent to "every statement is necessarily true or necessarily
false". However witha statementabout the futurethe conditionis not
fulfilled;for such a statement,then, the PB does not imply that it is
necessarilytrue or necessarilyfalse. But thenwe cannot say eitherthat
propositions about the futureare already true or (already) false, for
then a "when it is" condition is fulfilledand we have an enriched PB
afterall, "p is already true or already false" implies "p is necessarily
true or necessarilyfalse" with a historicalnecessityagain. In thisway
the deterministicargument is met. The PB holds unrestrictedlyfor
futurecontingency propositions but we are not allowed to speak of
these as if theywere already true of false,because thenwe would treat
the futurein the same way as the past, the verythingAristotlewarned
against just before (19a23-27 and 19a27-32). In the deterministic
argumentwe are seduced into thisway of speaking, by an application
of the PB to statementsabout the futurethat leads to a transitionto
the strengthenedversion of it, thereby blurring the distinctionbetween the way it holds forfuturecontingencystatementsand the way
it holds for statementsabout the present and past.
Universityof Groningen
Department
of Philosophy
38

12:36:20 PM

The Sentencesof Thomas Ringstead, o.p.

L.A. KENNEDY, C.S.B.

Little is known of Thomas Ringstead (or Ryngston, etc.). According to Emden,1 Quetif-Echard,2 Smalley,3 and the Dictionary of
National Biography,4he was a Dominican by 1348, and by then had
at Cambridge Universityand obtained his doctorate
read the Sentences
in theologythere. He was professorof theology (MagisterRegens)at
Cambridge between 1347 and 1353. He was named bishop of Bangor
in 1357 and died in 1366.
Two worksof Thomas are extantin manuscript,PostillasuperProverThis latterwork exists in
on theSentences.
bia Salomonisand Commentary
only one manuscript: Erfurt,WissenschaftlicheAllgemeinbibliothek,
ms. Amplon. 4o 110, ff. 1-20. It deals only with questions fromthe
first two books of Peter Lombard's Sentences.Thomas wrote his
Sentencesprobably well before 1347. The Erfurt copy was made
between 1357 and 1366 since, at the end of the manuscript, Thomas
is referredto by the scribe as being a bishop at the time. This note is
also evidence that the Erfurtmanuscript is a copy, not the original.
Very few fourteenth-centuryEnglish Dominicans have been
studied. And hardly any fourteenth-century
Cambridge professors
have been studied. An account, then, of Ringstead' s thoughtshould
break freshground in both these areas.
Thomas deals with only five questions in his Commentary.
in creaturis
naturalis
1. Utrumordobonitatis
peneseorumaccessumad summum
debeatseu cognosci
attendi
(ff.Iraff.).
2. UtrumDeus situnus(4raff.).
3. UtrumDeus sitinfnitus
(6rbff.).
Filiia Patresiteterna(llvb ff.).
4. Utrumgeneracio
causa(14rbff.).
ab eternoDeus fuerit
entispossibilis
5. Utrumcuiuslibet
1A. B. Emden,A Biographical
to1500, CamofCambridge
oftheUniversity
Register
bridge1963,underRyngstede.
2 Scriptores
Praedicatorum
Ordinis
I, Paris,1719,652-653.
3B. Smalley,
Fourteenth
intheearly
Friars
andAntiquity
, Oxford1960,
Century
English
211-220.
4 XVI, 1196-97.
39

12:36:27 PM

It is proposed here to analyze the fifthquestion. It is extremelylong

(23 1/2columns of 72 lines each, in tinyscript)and also complicated.
It would be difficultto get the whole question published. The manuscriptis quite legible and contains relativelyfew mistakesor puzzling
words. To facilitatereferenceto it, it has been subdivided into its nineteen sections as follows:
f. 14rb
ofthequestion,
A Statement
foran affirmative
Fivearguments
answer,14rb-va
fora negative
One argument
answer,14va
D The planofattack,14va
14va
E Foursuppositions,
fromthem,14va-15va
F Nineconclusions
15va-16rb
fortheninthconclusion,
G Nineteen
arguments
16rb
H Fourarguments
conclusion,
againstthefirst
16rb-va
I Fourteen
againstthesecondconclusion,
arguments
16va-17ra
conclusion,
againstthefifth
J Twentyarguments
17ra-rb
to arguments
Answers
conclusion,
againstthefirst
17rb-18ra
to arguments
L Answers
againstthesecondconclusion,
18ra-vb
to arguments
M Answers
conclusion,
againstthefifth
18vb-19rb
N Arguments
conclusion,
againstand forthefifth
19rb-20ra
God's creative
Eighteen
activity,
concerning
arguments
20ra
P Answerto theoriginal
question,
20ra-rb
fortheaffirmative,
twooriginal
arguments
Q Answerto thefirst
20rb
forthenegative,
R Answerto theoriginal
argument
S Ending,20rb
The subdivisionsof these sectionsare marked in the manuscript.As
an example, let us take the referenceM 6. This is a referenceto the
sixth argument against the fifthconclusion. It is found in column
18ra-vb. If one turnsto thissectionof the manuscripthe will note that
this sixthargumentis indicatedjust above the middle of column 18va.
Thomas contends that God has produced two worlds, an eternal,
necessary world and a non-eternal,contingentone. Let us call these
worlds, throughoutthis paper, the eternal world and the temporal
world.
esse cuiuslibet
creature,
...quamvisab eternoet necessarioDeus produxit
est
ettantum
creaturam
esse
tamen
contingens
temporale
productam
quamlibet
(F 4).
These worlds contain the same beings, which possess in them differentkinds of existence.
Nec rpugnteandemrem simulet semelsecundumdiversahabereesse
et contingens
necessarium
(M 5).
This fifthquestion of Thomas maintains two paradoxes. The firstis
involved in the doctrinethat God produced every possible being from
40

12:36:27 PM

eternity.Let us see the characteristicsof this eternal world before

examining Thomas's reasons for positing it:
1. It is produced by God's intellect,not by His will, and thereforeis
produced necessarily,not freely:
estcausarerum
utsic.Sedconstat
Dei incomplexus
...solusintellectus
quodilla
velie(G 18).
a sua causalitate
et nonimpeditur
estnaturalis
propter
operatio,
velieitaquodtanquoda causaprimasepararetur
...positoperymaginationem
causaret.
Sednuncnonestminusquam
tuncnecessario
tummaneatintelligere,
et ab eterno(G 15).
tunc.Ergonuncnecessario
agit,deductavoluntaria
Ergo primacausa est tale agensquod necessario
accione,et nonminuscumillanaturaliter
agitquamsine(G 16).
voluntas
deductavolntate,
...si creareessetactusDei alterius
igitur
potentie,
nonpotestsiveimpedire
Dei superaddita
(G 16).
ipsamsuperare
2. The eternal world is known by God by simple apprehension, not
44
by a judgement this exists (in the temporal world)." It is therefore
called esseincomplexum.
sitcausaefficiens,
etquodpossitcausareA,
Si dicatur
quodintellectus
[divinus]
. ..puraapprehensio
aututestpuraapprehensio.
queroergoaututestcomplexus
A et
ipsumA. Sed hocfacitDeus respectu
ipsiusA estcrearevel producere
et ab eternofuitnecessario
creature
(F 2, 3o).
cuiuscumque
possibilis,
creet
creature
cuiuslibet
perpuramapprehensionem
QuamvisDeus necessario
essesuumincomplexum...
(F 2, secundapars).
Sortis
...creatio
autemactivanonestvelieSoressevelforesedpuraapprehensio
secundum
essesuumincomplexum
(L 6).
3. The eternal world is a world of ideas, ideas representingevery
possible being.
sitidea,dicoquodsic- Et
huiusmodi
...cumqueritur
incomplexum
numquid
reiin mentedivina...(M 15).
cuilibet
vocantur
notequedamproprie
The ideas are distinctboth fromGod and fromwhat they represent.
sedmediomodo
utsicnecestDeus neeAntichristus,
CreareenimAntichristi
esseestesseydeale...eius5cuius
cuiuslibet
se habens.Undeesseincomplexum
estydeasingularis
(M 1).
4. By these ideas God knows all things,not just the ideas themselves.
And the ideas representall singularbeings, notjust universal entities.
PlusvidetDeus de Sortequamessecognitum
(M 1).
5. The ideas are midway between God and the temporal world. What
theyrepresenteternallyis created in time, but theythemselvesare not
created, thoughThomas oftenuses thatword in regard to them. They
5 . Ms.
41

12:36:27 PM

are fromGod, theyflow fromHim, but He is not theirefficientcause,

nor, indeed, their cause in any way.
nonydea...(M 15).
Illudenimcuiusestydeacreatur,
nullius
creando,produxit
infinita,
...quamvisDeus ab eternoet necessario,
tarnen
fuitcausa.Probatur:
sicstantsimulDeumab eternoquamlibet
illorum
et nullamcreaturam
creaturam
ab eo fuisseproductam
produxisse
(F 9).
...esse incomplexum
esta Deo, et tamennecsicudab efficiente,
nec sicuda
causaformali
aut materiali,
nequefinali(J 16).
...hec est creatiocuiuslibetrei activaet eterna:facerequod suum esse
a Deo fluat.Nonenimdicitur
Deus creareincomplexum
incomplexum
proprie
sedilludcuiusestesseincomplexum...
(M 3).
...esseincomplexum
esta Deo ut sic,quamvisnonpermodumeffectus,
quia
nullomodose habetut effectus
(M 2).
Thomas representsGod, the eternal world, and the temporal world,
as three stages in the procession of creatures: the principle, creatures
as proceeding forth,and creatures in themselves.
rerumtripliciter
consideratur:
vel proutestcomProcessio,
inquit[Albertus],
autproutestinviaegrediendi,
autproutestsuscepparataad unumprincipium,
tumin ipsisrebusparticipantibus
(M l).6
The eternal world is thus the generatingof the temporal world. It is
the ' 'being generated'' of the temporal world, half-waybetween an
action and a result (the temporal world, now related to its Creator).
Conceditur
aliconclusio
quod aliquidestab alioet tamennonestsecundum
sicutgenerari
ettamennullomodo
esta generare
quodgenuscause.Exemplum:
estipsiuseffectus
utsicquia mediomodose habetinteractionem
etrelationem
(M 16).
Thomas makes much of the subtle point (so subtle as to be but a
linguisticfallacy)that correlativescan not have a cause-effectrelationship because a relationshiprequires two terms; an effecthas to exist
before it can be related to a cause and thus cannot be caused by its
cause.
...omnisterminus
utsic7estequeprimopredicabilis
de aliquo,etnon
relativus
de alico(E 1).
quamsuumcorrelativum
priusnequeposterius
Et ideo,datoquod,quamvisomnecausatumsita Deo, nontamenestab eo
id est,nonestab eo ut causatum
est(K 1).
causatum,
Thus God cannot create the eternal world and also be its cause.
cumsuoeffectu;
nonstantsimul
igitur
Quia omniscausautcausaestequeprimo
crearealiquidet esse8causaeiusdem(Fl).
6See St.Albert
Nominibus
indeDivinis
theGreat,Commentarium
, cap.5, sect.3 (ed.
P. Simon,Cologne1972),322.
7 S. Ms.
8 . Ms.
42

12:36:27 PM

Anotherway of puttingthisis sayingthat,ifa fathergeneratesa child,

he does not generate the generating(generan
) of the child, and hence,
cannot
be said that God
it
from
God,
though the eternal world is
'
creates the eternal world's 'being created"; hence it is not an effect
of God.
causatura Deo, nonplus
...quamvisesseydeavelydeesita Deo, nontarnen
quamgenerari
generatur
(M 15).
fuita Deo, nonplussequitur
...quamvis
crearimeiab eterno
quodDeuscausavit
me
"Patermeusgeneravit
velquodcrearisiteffectus
Dei, quamsequitur
creari,
meus
ab
mei
est
secundum
pater
generavit
generari
ipso;igitur
quodgenerari
mei" (M 1).
esseetnecesseesseest
essecuiuslibet
creature
...eternum
quodestincomplexum
illudquodesta Deo, et ab eternofuita Deo, quamvisDeus numquamfuerit
ab ilio.Exemplum
suacausaeo quodnonestilludesseab alioetessecreatum
de generare9
et generari
(Q 2).
Thomas blames our misunderstandingof these points on the inadequacy of our language, which misrepresentsthe way things are.
sedtantum
utcausatanteIgiturcausautcausanoncausataliquemeffectum
modusloquendi,
quamsitcausa. Et istemodus,quamvisappareatinvolutus
facitnosutiactiviset passivis
tamennecessarius
est.Sed penuriaterminorum
etcausasinerelatione,
etparticipiis
eorundem
proipsisrelationibus
proeffectu
superadditis
(F 1).
6. The eternal world is not God. Thomas says that some mightthink
that it is God, but that he disagrees.
si quis
sicprotest
dici,10
essentialiter,
Et,si queratur
quidsitilludessemedium
veliettenereunitatem
essentiein rebus,quod est essentialiter
ipse Deus,
quamvisilludnonteneam(M 1).
This world, however, is also not a creature.
Cumqueritur
sitcreatum
essevelincreatum,
utrum
huiusmodi11
esseAntichristi
dicitur
Et,cumarguitur
"IgituresseAntichristi
incomplexum
quodincreatum.
utsicestDeus
estDeus," potest
negariconsequentia,
quianonomneincreatum
(M 1).
Thomas triesto 4'distance" the eternalworld fromGod by saying that
God produced it "before" it existed, and that God knows it " before"
it is known by Him, even though its being produced and its being
known are both eternal.
... dicoquodDeus naturaliter
omnemremquamressitin esse
priusproduxit
cognito
(M 18).
Et ideopriusnaturaliter
quamaliquidestab eo cognitum
(M 18).
cognoscit
9 Generari
Ms.
10Sic potest
si
Ms.
11HuiusMs.dici] potest
43

12:36:27 PM

It is so closely connected with God, however, that Thomas elsewhere

says that it is God.
- illudestabsolutum
essequodnequepotestnonessein instanti
vel
temporis
naturequia hoctantum
estDeus, et nullumaliudnecesseesse(M 6).
7. The eternalworld is much higherthan the temporalworld. A being
in the eternalworld which never exists in the temporalworld is higher
than any being in the temporal world.
Sextaconclusio:
essecreature12
eruntque
quodinfinite
possent
que numquam
tarnenperfectius
haberent
esse quam sit aliquodesse creatumcuiuscumque
existentis
creature
ut sic (F 6).
Sed quodlibet
necessario
esseestmeliusessequamcontingenter
esseutsic.Igiturquodlibet
melius
potensesse,et nonin essecreato umquamfuturum,
habetessequamsitessecreatum
meivelcuiuscumque
creature13
ut sic(F 6).
This is true even if it is the being of somethingthat is the archetype
of all evil: Antichrist.
...secundum
rectamrationem
essethabereesse Antichristi
eligibilius
quod14
esseut sic (F 7).
numquamerit...quamessecreatum
cuiuscumque
An ass in the eternal world is preferableto a human being in the temporal world, no matter how good that human being might be.
essethabereesse asiniquod15habuitantequamessetcreatus...
...eligibilius
alicuiushominis
ut sic
quamhabereessecreatum
quantumcumque
compositi,
(F 8).
Having seen the characteristicsof the eternalworld, let us examine
Thomas's reasons for positing it.
1. Being the most perfectbeing, and thereforehaving the most perfect
action, God produced frometernityas much as He could.
Si ab eterno
fuisset
actum,velcuiusesse
aliquodquodhabuisset
perfectissimum
fuisset
eiusessefuisset
tantum
perfectum,
perfectum
agere.Primacausa...igitur
movetme(N).
produxit
quantumproducere
potuit....Et istudargumentum
2. The firstcause can have only one act and, since it has it eternally,
it produced all its effectsin eternity.
Sed sicestde primoagentequodunumhabetactumtantum,
ethaberepotest,
ut actusest. Igitur,si istumactumhabuitab eternout actusest,illudagere
habuitab eternout agereest,et sic semperunumagere(N).
12In essecreatoadd.Ms.
13CauseMs.
14
Ms.
15Quam
QuamMs.
44

12:36:27 PM

Thomas attributesthis doctrine to St. Albert the Great. In his commentaryon On theDivineNames, Alberthad writtenthat God does not
have accidents; hence His very essence is activity.Thomas interprets
this to mean that God's action is eternal. It may be free,but it is not
freefromthe necessityof being eternal.
Confirmatur
totumilludquoad omneseiusparticulares
perAlbertm,
Super
De DivinisNominibus,
ubi,pertractans
quartum
quodprimacausaestagens
suam,arguiisic: "Si," inquit,"primacausaessetagensperaliperessentiam
ineiusessentiam,
illudperficeret
eius16
actum,etperconsequodsuperveniens
eumad actum,etexconsequentia
esseteo divinius.
quenseduceret
Ergooportet
omnibus
modis,sicutdicitAristoteles,
ymaginari
quodipseestagenssecundum
essentiam
Et infinesic
essetluxseparata
ab omnisubstantia."
quemadmodum
concluditi
"Concedimus,"inquit,"ex ordinesue bonitatisper libertatem
tarnen17
necessitatem
voluntatis,
persuamessentiam,
quamvisnonsecundum
essentie,secundumquod necessitasimperatcoactionemad actum,sed
necessitate
finispropter
immobilitatem
in ipsoactu." Et veronotoquia hic
a Deo tantumnecessitatem
excludit
sed nonnecessitatem
coactionis
finis,eo
quod necesseest18eumsemperageresicutlux semperageretsi semperesset
separataetc.(N).19
3. The eternalworld must precede the temporal world because being
must precede non-being. Eternal, necessary being must precede noneternal, contingentbeing.
...si non-essepotuitpriusesse quam esse,aut ergoprioritte
aut
temporis
nature.Priuspotuit
non-esse
fuisse
non,quiahoc
prioritte
quamessetemporis
estaliquodesse.Nec prioritte
naturequia hocprimum
simpliciter
quo mentamessequodlibet
suratur
quamnon-esse
( 3).
4. The possibility of being (which possibility is necessary) must
precede the actuality of the temporal world (which is contingent).
Thus the eternal world must necessarilyexist first.
resqueestcreatapriusnecessario
habuitposseessecreatum.
Sedposse
Quelibet
essecreatum
cuiuslibet
creature
ab eternofuitnecesseesse,etessecreatum
est
ettemporale
esse.Igiturpriusnecesseessecuiuslibet
creature
contingens
quam
esse(F 5).
contingens
We thus see that, forThomas, God, in eternity,created a necessary,
"incomplex," world of ideas by which He knows all things,and that
this world is distinctfromboth God and what it represents. It is not
God, but is vastlysuperiorto the temporalworld. The paradox is that
16EumMs.
17Fr. add. Ms.
18. Ms.
19St. Albert,Commentarium
in De DivinisNominibus
, cap. 4, sect.9 (P. Simon,
Cologne1972),116.
45

12:36:27 PM

God is not its efficientcause, or its cause in any way. The reason that
God produced this world in eternityis that He is perfectand simple
and thus can have only one, eternal, action, which fulfillsall His
causality, and that in creation the necessary must precede the contingent,and the possible the actual.
We shall now see the other half of Thomas's thesis, another
paradox: that God is not the cause of what happens in the temporal
world.
Nullumessecomplexum
potesta Deo essecreatum
(F 3).
cumsuoeffectu;
nonstantsimul
Quia omniscausautcausaestequeprimo
igitur
crearealiquidet esse20causaeiusdem(F 1).
haberepotest(J 2).
Deus nullamefficienciam
contingentis,
Igitur,respectu
The reasons for this teaching are as follows:
1. As we have already seen, God's causality is eternal and unchanging. It is in no way tied up with the temporal.
Ergo,a simili,cumDeus ipsesitactuspurus,...nonpotest...ex aliquadeter umquampotuit( 5).
sui facerede nonagenteagentem,
minatione
eademmensura,
...ubiactioetpassio(velpassumesse)mensuratur
impossibile
estactionem
nisitarnen
natura....Sed
passionem
(sivepassumesse)precedere
necessario
sit,etpassiointempore,
ideo,sicutmenquia actioDei ineternitate
sureistepossunt
seiungi,sicet illa separari
possunt
(L 1).
eternaet partimtem...quia tunenonessettotaactioDei eterna,sed partim
poralis(G 7).
Deus nullamefficientiam
haberepotest(J 2).
contingentis,
Igitur,respectu
2 . This rules out forThomas the possibilityof God decreeing in eternity what will happen in time. If God were to defer something He
wanted done, there would have to be a change in Him when it was
done. Besides, God could not have a reason fordeferringHis plans.
iliaerronea
estque dicitDeumaliquidvelieettarnen
illuddiffer
Sic responsio
in futurum,
in Deo. Nec enimsapiensdiffer
quodvult
quia sicessetmutatio
nisiex causa,sed istanonpotestessein Deo (G 14).
God is always ready to act on His part, but the temporal world is not
always properlydisposed, as the sun always sheds its lifegivingrays
but not all thingsare able to be vivifiedby it, as, forexample, stones.
ettarnen
sicud
illuminata
ab eo vivificantur,
nonomniailluminata
...solvivificai
habent
necessaria
ad suscipiendum
[advitam]
lapidesquianullamproportionem
(G 10).
que peractumsolisinferuntur
3. Thomas thinksthat,ifGod delayed His plans forHis creatures,He
would be dependent on them, which is unthinkable.
20. Ms.
46

12:36:27 PM

...hecfuturitio
nonpotesta Deo determinan
est,
antequamsit,neepostquam
causavoluntatis
futuritio
divinequame contra.Ex
quia tuncpotiusdiceretur
a Deo ut siteffectus
divine
determinatur
istispatetquod nulliusreifuturitio
autintellectus
voluntatis
(F 2).
est22absoluta,
VoluntasDei esthuiusmodi21
quod mensuraipsiussimpliciter
fieri
de nonagenteagens.
ab aliquoextrinseco
totapresens.
Ergoilianonpotest
nichilfacitad hoc(O 11).
voluntatis
Ergodeterminatio
4. There is no reason forGod not to do at once all that He wills. He
is omnipotent,and all the instrumentsof His action are as pliable in
His hands as the works He wishes to accomplish. Thus there is no
chance that what happens in time is caused by God.
illuddiffert
iliaerronea
estque dicitDeumaliquidvelieettarnen
Sic responsio
in Deo. Nec enimsapiensdiffert
in futurum,
quodvult
quia sicessetmutatio
nisiex causa,sedistanonpotestessein Deo (G 14).
reetratione,
voluntas
se habetuniformiter
...ubinonrequiritur
instrumentum,
quodestin Deo. Igiturnullomodopotestfacerede nonagenteagens(O 16).
statim
aliquidpotestperse et sineinstrumento,
Ergo,eo ipsoquodvoluntas
esthoc
illud.Ethocinnobisestmaxime
verum;ergoa multofortiori
operatur
verumin Deo (O 17).
estquinipsum
essein actu,impossibile
Ergo,cumesseDei sitperfectissimum
semper
agat(O 17).
5. No being is added absolutelywhen thingshappen in the temporal
world; only relations are caused. Thus there is no need for divine
causality.
sicse habetnuncprecisesicudab
...actusDei peromnia,tamrequamratione,
hocsoloexcepto
eterno,
predicabilis
que priusnonfuit
quodnuncestunarelatio
(N)a causis
estquodcausetur
Ethocsolumrelatio
est.Et,sicausamhabeat,necesse
vocaviegocontingens
etnullomodoa causaprima.Hancrelationem
secundis
esse(L 1).
inesseproductus,
...datoquodnuncsitAntichristus
quareDeus
querocausam23
dicitur
nuncmagiscreareAntichristum
quandoestquampriusquandononfuit.
ex parteagentis,quia
Secundum
nullam.Similiter
oppositam
responsionem,
relatio.Sedillarelatio
nichil
antefuitnisiforte
estibialiudrevelratione
quam24
est(G 19).
nonestnisiquia Antichristus
6. Thomas thinksthateveryfreeact of the divine will to have an event
happen in time requires a prior act of the will decreeing that the will
will let the event happen at the rightmoment. Thus there would be
an infiniteregress in will-acts. This can be prevented by limiting
God's causality to an eternal action.
21HuiusMs.
22Et Ms.
23Causam]que causaMs.
24QuodMs.
47

12:36:27 PM

estquodtotaactivitas
voluntatis
inDeo sixexdeterminatone
volunImpossibile
tatissue quia, si sic, aut ergoestprocessus
in infinitum
in huiusdeterminationibus
voluntatis
itaquodultraomnemactivitatem
estalia activitas,
autest
standum
ad determinationem
activa,ettamenillanonestactiva
queestvoluntas
ex determinatione
voluntatis
sed naturaliter
( 3).
7. As the eternal world is said to have esseincomplexum
, the temporal
world is said to have essecomplexum.
God cannot be the cause of esse
for the same reason that He cannot be the cause of esse
complexum
: the ' "cause" in a cause-effectrelationshipcannot cause
incomplexum
the effect,as we have seen.
Si Deus possetcreareunam futuritionem,
crearetinfinitas
futuritiones
distinctas.
estquodessefilium
Sed impossibile
sita patresecundum
quodfilius
est. Ergoimpossibile
estquod esse Antichristi
vel effectum
sit a
productum
Et semper
velesse
primacausatamquamab efficiente.
loquorde esseeffectum
utequivalethuic,"Antichristus
Antichristi
est" vel"estcreatus,"
productum
utsithecintentio
conclusionis:
quamvisDeus necessario
perpuramapprehencreature
sionemcuiuslibet
creetessesuumincomplexum,
esttamen
impossibile
ad essealicuiuscreature
quod aliquamhabeatefficientiam
complexum
(F 2).
God has causality in regard to the temporalworld, of course, to the
extent that its esse incomplexum
is fromGod. Everythinghas to come
fromthe firstefficientcause in someway.
...si alicubividebardicerequodDeus potestefficere
esseincomplexum,
semper
sic25intelligatur
creaquod unumpossitesseab alio,vel sic quod quamlibet
tionemfecitsecundum
esta Deo. Omneenim
quod essesuumincomplexum
sit ab efficiente
quod efficitur,
oportetquod secundumaliquamrationem
primo26
(N).
God also keeps the temporal world in existence by conservation.
Thomas calls this re-creation,and says that it is no more unfittingfor
God to re-createthingsalready created than forHim to create (in the
eternal world) things which He will never create (in the temporal
world).

Necmagisestinconveniens
ab eo
ipsumab eternocreasseresque nonfuerunt
createquamsempercrearerespriuscreatas...( 18).
nonminusagitDeus antequamressintactequamagiteorumesse
Preterea,
huiusmodi27
esseestactum.Sed secundum
facit.Ergoprimm.
Nec
postquam
magisestunuminconveniens
quamaliud( 18).
facere
Sedplusrpugnt
quodnonestfactum
quamfacere
quodab olimfactum
est.Et secundum
facit.Ergoet primum
et ab eternopotuit,
potest,
quod fuit
probandum
(O 18).
25Bispos.Ms.
26Primum
Ms.
27HuiusMs.
48

12:36:27 PM

A firstcorollaryof Thomas's doctrineis that, if God is not the first

cause ofwhat goes on in thetemporalworld, thereis an infiniteregress
in secondary causes or that there is a firstcause other than God.
in causis
in infinitum
cumdiciturquod tuncessetprocessus
Ad secundum,
essenonesta Deo necab
velstandum
estad aliquamcuiuscausatum
secundis
conclusio
(L 1).
aliquacausasecundaut sic,conceditur
Thomas does not want eitherof these, and opts forthingshappening
withoutcauses. This, he says, is not more unfittingthan possibility
existingwithouta cause of it.
mihi
causatum
ut sicestsinecausa. Nec magisinconveniens
Igiturquodlibet
causante
videtur
posseessealiquidinessecreatoutsicsinecausatalisrelationis
vel possibilitatem
et efficiente
aliquamesseque a nulla
quam possefuturum
causaessepossit.Nec magisestunuminconveniens
quamaliud(L 1).
A second corollary is that "God does not save human beings.
Predestinationhas no cause.
esseutsicnullomodoteneorDeo
Potesttamenconcediquodpropredestinato
nisimeforealiquandosalvatum,
veritatem
quia hocnichilaliudestsecundum
futuritio
nullampotesthaberecausam(L 9).
et huiusmodi
Sed contra:adhucsaltemsequiturquod Deus nonsitcausa predestinationis
Conclusionem
necessepredestinati.
alicuiuspredestinati
concedo,accipiendo
esse ut complexiones
sive predestinatum
sunt,quod nullo
predestinationem
modopossunt
a Deo esseperse (L 6).
God is not providential,thoughHe does provide forthe eternalworld,
with which the temporal world has some relations.
...ita quod passiosempersit cum actionequoad esse suumessentialevel
passionisquod estpassumvel esse
incomplexum,
quamvisnonad terminm
causatum.Et hoc solumrelatioest. Et, si causamhabeat,necesseestquod
vocavi
a causissecundis
etnullomodoa causaprima.Hancrelationem
causetur
esse(L 1).
egocontingens
God does, however, create grace and also eternal beatitude.
in menumquam
...nisiDeus crearet
conservare,
possemearnfinaliter
gratiam
meforealiquandoinessepredestinato
formaliter
excuiusconservatione
sequitur
.. (L 9).
quoadbeatitudinem.
secundum
hocestpredestinatio
illambeatitudinem,
...quia enimDeus creavit
passivaa Deo (L 6).
Thomas's teaching,then,regardingthe temporalworld, is thatGod
is not its cause except in so far as He is the cause of the eternal world
with which the temporal world has an importantrelationship,and of
course God's causality of thatworld is problematic. God's providence
thus is greatlylessened, including His role in man's salvation, though
49

12:36:27 PM

He does create both grace and glory.The paradox is thatthe temporal

world becomes a-causal.
Though Thomas oftenmentionsAristotle,St. Augustine, Boethius,
and St. Thomas Aquinas, it is clear thatthe most significantinfluence
on him was St. Albertthe Great's commentarieson Dionysius' s On the
Divine Names and On theCelestialHierarchy
, which Thomas also mentions. Thomas's desire to safeguard the divine simplicity and
immutabilityled him to doctrineswhich separated God significantly
fromHis knowledge and lessened His causality in the temporalworld.
Thomas's views seem quite similar to Plato's, with a world of ideas
between ultimaterealityand the temporalworld, and with something
in the temporal world which should not be there, producing contingency and escaping the control of the ultimate reality. But
Thomas's system is insufficientlyarticulated and insufficiently
defended, with the problems leftsimply as problems.
Houston, Texas
Studies
Center
for Thomistic

50

12:36:27 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 1 (1988)
Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth(2)*
JOHN P. DOYLE

SectionIV -

Truejudgments
and statements
regarding
beingsofreason

First what is obvious: negative judgments, or the propositions

which express them, may be true.158Such judgments may be either
necessaryor contingent.Thus it is necessarilytrue, and expressive of
what is in realityindependent of the mind, to say "a man is not a
hore'', 159"a man is not a lion",160or "a horse is not a lion".161 Or it
is contingentlytrue to say "the man is not white" (if, e.g., he is
black).162With respect to privations, one can be judged reallyand
* Part is foundin this
xxv(1987),47-75.
(1)
Journal,
158Cf. "... propositio
vocalisnegativa
tamsimpliciter
proprie
veraest,sicutaftarnveraestsicutcompositio."
DM
firmativa;
ergodivisio,
quaeinmenterespondet,
8, 6, n. 2 (XXV, p. 294);alsosee DM 8, 7, n. 37 (p. 307).
159Cf. "Unde haecdenominatio
verietiamnonentibusconventi;
sicenimverum
esseensfictum,
essedicimus,
etchymaeram
ethominem
nonesseequum."DM 8, 8,
n. 10(XXV, pp. 310-311);"... dumintellectus
nonesse
hominem
concipit
praecise
quodin reest,..." DM 54,5, n. 2 (XXVI, p. 1031).On
equum,illudvereconcipit
thenecessity
in such
involved
cf.notes84 and85, above.
i6Qf "Quando enimmensnegations,
hominem
nonesseleonem,implicite
etiam
concipit
habet,nonconvenire
leoni,... ." DM 8, 6, 2
conceptum,
cognoscit
quamde homine
a proposition,
mention
fromthe
(XXV, p. 295).Whilethistextdoesnotexplicitly
tosuch
immediately
preceding
paragraph
(n. 2, textinnote158,above)theinference
is easytodraw.
161Cf.DM 54,4, n. 10,textin note142above.
162Cf.DM 54,3, n. 2, textinnote64 above.Alsocf.:"... dicimus,
Homoestcaecus
,
illustrates
vel,estnonalbus
, ..." DM 54,5, n. 6 (XXVI, p. 1032).Thislasttext,which
thewayin whicha negation
can be known"per modumcompositionis
et affirmareads:"manis not-white"
estnonalbus).On thedifference
tionis",actually
(i.e. homo
between
thisand"manis notwhite"(i.e. homo
nonestalbus),seeAristotle
on infinite
Anal.Por.I, c. 46, 51b2ff.FortheScholastic
distinction
hereofa " negatio
terms,
"
"
dialect.
," cf.P. Fonseca,Instit.
VIII, c. 32 D (II, p.
negansanda negatio
infinitans
For
Suarez'
a contextregarding
statements
about a
712).
recognition
(within
"
"
ofthedifference
a " negatio
between
, cf.
chimaera)
negansand a negatio
infinitans"
DM 54,5, n. 14(XXVI, p. 1035).Alsocf.DM 54,5, n. 16(p. 1036),sometextin
note90,above.It maybe further
thanbeingintheadverb"non",
notedthat,rather
before
thecopulaorbefore
another
attributed
term,somenegations
placedeither
(as
wellas privations)
canbe in theattributed
termitself;
cf."... sicenimdicimusrem
51

12:36:35 PM

'
truly distinct from another; e.g. it is true to say 'darkness is not
4
blindness,"163or 'blindness is not deafness". 164As I see it, forSuarez
such predications would be necessary and, in a firstinstance, rooted
in the reality of the privationsinvolved.165If we were furtherto fictionalize such privations, making them strictbeings of reason,166it
would still seem that these propositionswould be necessarilytrue.167
They would be of the same kind, forexample, as this: "a chimaera is
not a goat-stag", which Suarez regards as true168and which involves
two impossible beings of reason. Or they would not be too different
from this: " imaginary space is not something successive",169which
(allowing for what we have seen above170) seems to involve an impossible subject and a possible predicate; or from this: "a golden
mountain is not a chimaera",171which involves forSuarez a possible
subject172and an impossiblepredicate.173In all of thesecases, whether
essemalum,hominem
essecaecumetsimilia..."
actummoralem
esseindivisibilem,
DM 3, 1, n. 7 (XXV, p. 105).
163Qf < vej s utrumque
ut tenebrae
et caecitas,quia ita
sitens privativum,
interse, ..." DM 7, 1,n. 2 (XXV, p. 250);ibid.n. 7 (p.
ac distinguuntur
separantur
herecan easilybe expressedin the negativeproposition
252). The distinction
"Darknessis notblindness".
164Cf. "... caecitasenimet surditas,
etiamquatenusapprehenduntur
permodum
..." DM 54, 5, n. 25 (XXVI, p. 1038).Once
ut diversaapprehenduntur,
entium,
a proposition
here,todo so is easyenough.
more,whileSuarezhasnotexpressed
165Cf.DM 54,3, n. 2, textinnote64 above;alsocf.note84 and85,above,forthe
twoprivations.
ThepointI am
which
herefallsbetween
ofthenegation
itself,
necessity
is thatoneprivation
"by itsverynature"is notanother.
making
166Cf.notes75 and76 above.
167Onceagain,thepointis thatthenegation
herewouldfallbetween
twobeingsof
reasonin sucha waythatone "by itsverynature"wouldnotbe theother;cf.notes
84 and85 above;fora better
ofthis,seebelow,Section
V, Number
3,
understanding
of a distinction
betweentwobeingsof
last twoparagraphs.
Also,on thereality
cf.note110,above.
reason,<<
168Qf
nonesse hyrcocervus,
et spatiumimsic enimconcipitur
chymaeram
DM 54, 5, n. 16(XXVI, p. 1036).
nonessequidsuccessivum."
aginarium
169Ibid.
170Cf. notes139-144.
171Cf. "... imaginatio
humana,quae interdum
fingit
quaedamentia,quae revera
illaex hisentibus
nusquamsunt,veletiamessenonpossunt,
quae sub
componendo
montem
eodem
sensumcadunt,utcumfingit
aureum,
quinonest,licetsitpossibilis;
DM 54, 2, n. 18
tamenmodofingere
ut chymaeram."
potestremimpossibilem,
is
here,butitsformulation
proposition
(XXVI, p 1023).Again,thereis no explicit
obvious.
172Cf.textinnote171,justpreceding;
alsocf.DM 8, 4, n. 7 (XXV, p. 291).There
abouttheultimate
is inthisa question
ofa goldenmountain.
status
Strictly
speaking,
forSuarez,it is nota purebeingof reason.Rather,it shouldbe realand mindis such).Perhapshereis a placewhere
independent
(to thedegreethatanypossible
itis comingclosetoa distinction
Suarezwithout
amongbeingsofreasonas
stating
52

12:36:35 PM

we are speaking of real beings (actual or possible174)or strictbeings of

reason, thereis truthinasmuch as what we judge or say is not, in fact
is not. Thus, our true negative judgments correspond to the way
thingsare. As opposed to this, false negativejudgments, even about
real beings, e.g., "a man is not an animal", are pure fictions,
themselves beings of reason, or at an even more recessed level,
"negations of reason".175
Coming now to the crux case - on the affirmativeside (per modum
velaffirmationis
compositionis
), it is contingentlytrue to say "the man is
blind" or "there is blindness in the man",176or "there is blindness in
an eye"177 or, simply, "blindness exists".178 Again, we can contingentlysay "darkness is in the air"179 or "the air is dark".180
Again, we can contingentlysay, "there is evil in human actions".181
In similar ways, we can speak with truthabout such privations as
silence,182death, and limping.183Indeed, some such truths,which acofthemind?Fora viewin some
withor without
foundation
in reality
independent
tothatofSuarez,cf.A. Meinong,OntheTheory
, tr.Levi,Terwayssimilar
ofObjects
is conrell,andChisholm
(N.Y., 1960),p. 82, wherethepossible
goldenmountain
withtheimpossible
roundsquare.
trasted
173Cf.againthetextin note171.
174ForSuarezonpossibility
ontheReality
as real,cf.J.P. Doyle,Suarez
,
ofthePossibles
in: The ModernSchoolman,
XLV (1967),pp. 29-48.
175"... si negatio
sitfalsa,utsi quisconcipiat
hominem,
qui nonsitanimal,tuncilia
est mereconficta
solumque
negatioetiamsub rationenegationis
per intellectum,
..."
habetesseobjective
in ilio,et ideoestensrationis,
velpotiusnegatiorationis,
/ 54,5, n. 2 (XXVI, p. 1031).On "negatiorationis",
cf.DM 45, 1,n. 2 (p. 738);
ibid.9, 1, n. 17(XXV, pp. 318-319).
176"... ens interdum
dicitur... quod per modumentisverepraedicari
potest,
homoessecaecus,vel caecitasessein homine."DM 10, 3, n. 3
quomododicitur
(XXV, p. 347);ibid.31, 1, n. 2 textin note201,below;ibid.54, 5, 6, textin note
in
involved
162,above.Alsocf.DM 3, 1,n. 7, textinnote162.On thecontingency
suchpredications,
cf.notes86, 87, and95, above.
177"... dicimus
caecitatem
esseinoculo,..." DM 11,3, n. 8 (XXV, p. 366);DM 54,
3, n. 3, textin note64 above;DM 31, 1, n. 2, textin note201below.
178DM 31, 1, n. 2, textin note201below.
179"... dicimus,
verbigratia,
Tenebraesuntinaere,..." DM 54,5, n. 6 (XXVI, p.
1033);cf.alsoDM 54, 3, n. 3, textin note64 above.
180"... aeresttenebrosus
..." DM 54, 3, n. 2 (XXVI, p. 1016);ibid.5, n. 6 (p.
1033).
181Cf.DM 54, 3, n. 3, textm note64 above.
182Cf.De Anima
III, . 2, . 28 (III, p. 623).
183On death,cf.DM 11,3, n. 11
ibid.. 14; . 23 (p.
(XXV, p. 367);onlimping,
treatment
is accorded
toitemssuchas coldandrest,which,
371).Notethatdifferent
within
thecontext
arepositive
ofAristotelian
cf.e.g. DM 54,5, n.
realities;
physics,
22 (XXVI, p. 1037).Thereare otherquestions
aboutscientific
which
constructs,
someinthetradition
rationis
as entia
; cf.e.g. the
dependent
uponSuarezwouldregard
R. Goclenius:"Epicyclus
in Astronomia
id estin coelo
estens rationis,
Calviniste,
53

12:36:35 PM

tually involve a negation or a removal of something(and which to that

extent correspondwith mind-independentreality)but which, as they
are expressed affirmatively,involve conceiving purely negative or
privative things in a positive way,184are guaranteed by Scripture:
e.g., "There was Darkness on the face of the deep" and "the man
was blind frombirth".185
Still other affirmativetruthsregarding privationsoccur when, for
example, (in necessary propositions) we say "blindness is a
186
privation", that shadow is a lack of light187or, as Aristotleteaches,
that privationis a principleof natural generation.188Similarly,we can
enunciate necessaryaffirmativetruthsabout strictlyimpossiblebeings
of reason. Thus, (as it were, defining)we can say "a chimaera is a
fictitiousmonster",189or (in a tautologous sentence) "a chimaera is a
chimaera".190 Again, imaginary privations, at a level with non..."
ut fictitia
sed hominum
locatusestnonnaturaeConsilio,
arbitrio,
hypothesis,
' 'Deindealiud
.
1
and
.
.
in
Primam
...
1,
Timpler:
(p.
15),
Philosophiam,
Isagoge
haberein ipsisrebus,utsuntorbesetcircuii
fundamentum
imaginarii
[ensrationis]
etc."Metaphys.
indoctrina
aliudveronon,utsuntcerberus,
I, .
chimera,
sphaerica:
letus notethatforTimplera mathematical
3, prob. (p. 36). In thisconnection,
pointis a beingofreason;cf.ibid.V, c. 2, prob.7 (p. 505). Suarez,in contrast,
cf.DM 50,
as havingrealphysical
ofthemathematicians
thepoints
existence;
regards
4, nn. 1-68(XXVI, 551-571),esp. see nn. 29-32(pp. 559-560).ForSuarezon the
cf.e.g.DM 10,3, nn.19-21
ofmathematical
realcharacter
oftheobjects
abstraction,
(XXV, pp. 352-353).I have not foundany place whereSuarezdiscussesthe
Butwhathe has saidabout
constructs
suchas epicycles.
ofmathematical
character
itself(cf.notes109 and 112 above)does
of measurement
character
thesubjective
seemrelevant.
184Cf. "... haec non solumconcipiantur
sed etiamper
a nobispurenegative,
habentrationem
subqua consideratione
modumentispositivi;
entis,nonrei,sedracontionis,..." DM 54,3, . 4 (XXVI, p. 1027);"... idquodinreestsolacarentia,
..." ibid.;andibid.2, n. 17
utaliquidin ilioexistens;
etattribuitur
subjecto,
cipitur
(p. 1023).
185"... hujusmodilocutionesomninoverae sunt; unde et in Scripturasacra
a
et Joan.9: Eratcaecus
erant
Genes.1: Et tenebrae
abyssi,
super
Jaciem
reperiuntur,
nativitate
. " DM 54, 3, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 1027).Suarez'sfirst
exampleis alsofoundin
an objection
to theeffect
whereitis usedtosupport
thetextoftheConimbricenses,
tofashion
themsomebeingsofreason
intellects
therewere(created)
thatevenbefore
. PrimaParsInpraej.Porphy.
cf.Conimb.,In univ.Dialect
q. 6, a. 1 (p. 143).
existed;
186Cf. "... sicenimestverumcaecitatem
etchymaeram
esseconessepnvationem,
..." DM3', 2, n. 11(XXVI, p. 232).
monstrum
fictum
187Cf. "... umbranihilaliudestquamcarentia
veldiminutio
..." DM 5,8,
luminis,
n. 12 (XXV, p. 193).
188Cf.DM 54, 3, n. 3, textin note64 above.
189Cf. DM 31, 2, n. 11,textin note186,above;cf.also: "... sicenimverumesse
nonesseequum."DM 8, 8, n. 10
ethominem
esseensfictum,
dicimus
etchymaeram
(XXV, p. 311).
190"... haec est vera,Chymaeraest chymaera,
vel similis."DM 31, 12, . 45
(XXVI, p. 297).
54

12:36:35 PM

existingimpossibleficta, can be affirmed(contingently)with truthof

suchficta: e.g., ifsomeone imagines a blind chimaera or conceives an
imaginaryspace as dark.191Or we can have a conditional affirmative
truthregardingan impossible being: e.g., "If a stone is an animal, it
levels with
is sensible'' 192Again, thereare various truthson different
foundations
the
different
and
reason
of
to
different
beings
respect
which they have. Thus, we can have various levels of universality
(with attendantlevels of true affirmativepredication) among beings of
And lastlyhere, we can have true
reason, even among pure fictions.193
affirmativepredicationsof privativetermswhich are based on a level
more universal than the subject receiving them. Thus a mole (on a
191"... possunt
in fictis
enet confctae
esseetiamaliquaeprivationes
imaginariae
caecamfngit,aut imaginarium
spatiumconcipit
tibus,ut si quis chymaeram
entifictoin ordine
attribu
enimprivatio
velsimile;hujusmodi
tenebrosum,
poterit
DM 54, 5, n. 16
tale esse ficturn."
seu ampliantem
ad copulamabstrahentem
Suarez
is
last
this
In
sentence,
"ampliation"
extending
evidently
(XXVI, p. 1036).
as
ofhowsuchterms
in hisunderstanding
time.Thiswillbe involved
toimaginary
withthis,also cf.:
"chimaera"willstandfor{supponete)
"things".In connection
latiusampliare
dicuntensimaginabile
"Unde etiamdialectici
quamenspossibile."
in thetimeof
of"ampliation"
DM 54, 2, n. 18 (XXVI, p. 1023).On thedoctrine
dialect.
VIII, . 37 (, pp. 726-728),whorejects
Suarez,cf. P. Fonseca,Institut,
ofwhatis involved
Forsometreatment
adimaginabilia.
here,cf.V. Muoz
ampliation
1510-1530
de
Salamanca
la
universidad
en
La
nominalista
), Madrid1964,
(
Delgado, Lgica
..., esp.pp. 72-7.
andImaginary
Chimeras
Objects
esp.238-243;andE. Ashworth,
192E.g. "... veraesthaecconditionalis,
estsensibilis
Si lapisestanimal,
, ... DM 31,
12,n. 45 (XXVI, p. 297).
193Cf. "... inipsisentibus
utab hisetiam
eo progredi,
intellectus
... potest
rationis,
etiamin rebus
conficiat
et universale
et communes,
universales
abstrahat
rationes
fictis,
quae veraentianonsunt,..." DM 6, 7, n. 2 (XXV, p. 229);cf.DM 54,6, n.
etin eis
rationis
etiamentibus
11(p. 1041);also: "... hi respectus
attribu;
possunt
ut ex dialctica
ex genereet differentia,
suppono.Et in
cogitari
potestcompositio
utin suoordineconitaabstrahi,
entisrationis
etiampotestilleconceptus
praesenti
DM
extrasui rationem."
et habensdifferentias
tanquamquidcompletum,
cipiatur
toens
54,3, n. 9 (XXVI, p. 1028).NotethatinthislasttextSuarezallowsmoreunity
as a genus[cf.DM 2, 5, n.
toregard
rationis
thanhedoestoensreale
(whichherefuses
10(XXV, p. 96);DM 28,3, n. 20(XXVI, p. 20); DM 30,4, n. 32(p. 85);DM 32,2,
. Just
suirationem"
extra
n. 15 (p. 322)]).Thisraisesquestionaboutthe" differentiae
whatare they?Beingsof reason?Hardly.Real beings?Not likely.Extrinsic
therealidenominations?
Perhaps.Butthen,inviewofwhatwehaveseenregarding
on thepointofa
it is notdirectly
Although
tyofsuch,thequestionis reinstated.
et
cf.:"Quamvisenimensrationis
common
possitdiciunumnumero,
unity,
generic
in ipsisentibusrationis,
sicdistinguantur
a dialecticis
genera,specieset individua
tamenilludest quasi aequivoceper solamextrinsecam
denominationem;
proprie
unumnumeroest,ens realeest;
tamenet in rigore
loquendo,quicquidsimpliciter
ofan opinion
..." DM 4, 9, n. 12 (XXV, p. 144).Thislastoccursinconfirmation
But
onthepoint
which
Suarez
numerical
and
transcendental
rejects.
unity)
(equating
silent.
he remains
ofconfirmation
55

12:36:35 PM

specificlevel) can be called blind because as an animal (generic level)

it seeminglyshould be capable of vision.194
SectionV - Suarezon thetruthofstatements
regarding
beingsofreason
1. GeneralExplanationofsuch Truth
As we have seen, despite their being objects of true statements,
Suarez has denied any transcendentaltruthto beings of reason. To be
sure, he can on occasion referto the "true" concept of a chimaera or a
hippocentaur.195Caution, however, is in order here. For he seems to
be thinkingof the transcendentaltruthof the concept as such- thatis,
the formalconcept rather than the objective concept.196In this connection, it is noteworthythat even a simple vocal sign has transcendental truth.But, fortruthin signifyingas such, as in the case of
cognitionaltruth,a complex sign is required.197Here also, however,a
proposition has two truths,i.e. in being and in signifying.198
Again,
194E.g. cf."... et hocmododicipotestprivatio,
ratione
in consaltern
capacitatis
ad eummodumquo talpacaecusdicitur,
ceptocommuni,
quia utanimaiestcapax
visus,quamvisnonuttaleanimai."DM 4, 1,n. 19(XXV, p. 120);andDM 54,5, n.
8 (XXVI, p. 1033).
195Qf << conceptos
velhippocentauri,
dicipossitfalsusconcepetiamsi
chymerae
tosveriautpossibilis
tamenrespectu
authippocentauri
estverus
animalis,
chymerae
an argument
conceptos
ejus." DM 8, 3, n. 3 (XXV, p. 284). Thisoccurswithin
whichis ultimately
in support
ofthecommon
ofcognition
is not
opinionthattruth
foundinsimpleapprehension.
Whileinthelastwordsofthistextthere
maybe a hint
ofsomesemantic
reference
andevenofsomeinchoative
for
truth,
"correspondence"
Suarez'viewthatthetruthwhichis foundin suchsimpleapprehension
is in fact
cf.DM 8, 3, n. 7, textin note196immediately
transcendental
also
truth,
following;
cf.ibid.n. 19,textin note197,following.
196"... hiconceptos
mentis
suntresquaedam,seuqualitates;
si ergoinaliisrebusest
... etiamin hisconceptibus
veritatem
essenecesseest;unde,sicutdicitur
Veritas,
habetaurinaturam,
itadicetur
verusauriconceptos,
verumaurum,quodpropriam
commensuratam
veroauroin repraesentando
...
intentionaliter,
qui habetentitatem
mentis
quae vel qualissithaecVeritas,
quae in simplici
Atquehincetiamconstat
notitia
nihilenimaliudestquamVeritas
hisentibus
reperitur;
ipsatranscendentalis,
DM 8, 3, n. 7 (XXV, p. 285).
accomodata."
197Cf. "... eademproportione
essede vocibusloquendum
nam
qua de conceptibus;
voceestVeritas
insimplici
etincomplexa
illamad modum
signitanquaminhabente
seu in essendo;namhaecvox,homo
veritatis
verum
transcendentalis,
, et significai
et potestdiciverumsignumhominis;tamenin vocesimplici
nonest
hominem,
veritastanquamin significante
veritatem,
quomodoestin enunciatione
composita,
hocesseillud,significai
etquasiin actuexercito,
consequenter,
quae dumsignificai
..." DM 8, 3, n. 19 (XXV, p. 289);ibid.n. 2 (p. 283).
conformitatem
etveritatem,
198Cf. "... haecenimenunciatio,
Omnishomoestalbus,velalia similis,
si in ea
ad rem quam significat,
non habet veritatem,
consideresconformitatem
sed
56

12:36:35 PM

althoughtruthin its principal meaning, as the truthof cognition,can

extrinsicallydenominate real beings and beings of reason Cajetan
not
for
this
is
transcendenenough, says Suarez,
notwithstanding,199
tal truth.200
But even if their objects have no transcendental truth, the
statementsthemselves,as we saw in the just preceding section, have
truthin signifyingand the judgments they express have cognitional
truth.201
Indeed, with Aristotle,Suarez maintains that both the true
and the false are properly in cognition, and specifically in judgment.202Judgment, which in various contexts he can equate with
proposition, enunciation, composition, complexion, or even sentence,203is that act by which the intellectknows that one extreme,or
term,belongs to another. It is not distinct,he says, from "the composition of the intellectwhich is cognoscitiveof the connection of extremes,'204 Indeed, its object is that very connection of the
... si veroin ea consideres
definitionem
seu essentiam
et
falsitatem,
propositionis,
conformitatem
seucumideapropositionis,
artisdialecticae,
quamhabetcumregulis
haberesuamveritatem
secundum
intelligitur
quasi transcendentalem,
quam dici
esseverapropositio,
..." DM 8, 8, n. 8 (p. 310).
potest
"
199E.g. "... veraeautemdicuntur
tantum
denominatone.
extrnseca
CajetanIn
ST I, q. 16,a 6, n. 7 (ed. LeoninaIV, p. 214).
200"Secundocenseo,rescognitas
posseab hacventatecognitionis
perextrinsecam
ac denominationem
diciveras,nontarnen
secundum
hancrationem
aut
analogiam
sumiverum,
cumdicitur
essepassioends."DM 8, 8, . 10(XXV,
denominationem
p. 310). ForSuarezrejecting
Cajetan'sopinion,cf.ibid.7, nn. 19-23,34-36(pp.
301-303,
306-307).
201Cf. "Esse autemveritatis
ex se nonestesserealeet intrinsecum,
propositionis,
in intellectu
undeconvenit
etiam
sed estesse quoddamobjectivum
componente,
Sicenimdicimus,
caecitatem
essecaecum,utlatius
esse,velhominem
privationibus.
Arist.,5 Metaph.,capiteseptimo."DM 31, 1, . 2 (XXVI, p. 225); ibid.12,n. 45
cf.Metaphysics
V, c. 7, 1017a
(p. 297);DM 8, 2, n. 16(XXV, p. 282).ForAristotle,
31-34.
202Cf. "... [Aristoteles]
affirmai
veritatem
esse in compositione,
et negatesse in
etdeclarat
nonessein qualibetmentis
rebus,sedin mente,
operatione,
quia nonin
incompositione."
DM Index
VI,
simplici
qua cognoscitur
quidest,sedtantum
locup.
c. 2, q. 2 (XXV, xxviiiV
Cf.Aristotle,
Metahvsics
VI, . 4, 1027b18-33.
203Thusreferring
toAristotle
hecansay:"Et haecestsententia
Aristotelis
I Perih.,
incompositione
consistit
auteminjudicio:ergo
consistere,
cap. 1,dumaitveritatem
etc.... Sententiam
vocatenuntiationem,
sententia
autemetjudiciumidemsunt...
estipsaenuntiatio
et compositio
..." De Anima
III, . 6, . 5 (III, p.
ergojudicium
cf.Perihermeneias
textin note11 above.
638);forAristotle,
, . 1, 16a,lOff,
204"Judicium
unumconvenire
alteri,
ergoilleactusest,quo intellectus
cognoscit
a compositione
intellectus
quapropter
judiciumnon est actusrealiterdistinctus
connexionis
extremorum.
Undejudicareest componere
cognoscitiva
cognoscendo
..." De Anima
connexionem,
III, . 6, . 4 (III, p. 638); cf."... judicarenihilaliud
estquamcognoscere
hocessevelnonessetale."DeAngelis
II, . 32,. 16(II, . 320).
57

12:36:35 PM

extremes.205Hence to know this connection is to judge,206or to judge

is "to compose by knowing this connection/'207
More in detail, he tells us that the affirmative
judgment or enunciation is both a composing of simple "objective concepts'' and a
knowing of their conjunction, union, conformity,or (let us note it)
It involves a comparing or a "bringing together" (collatio
identity.208
)
of such concepts.209As in the case of impossible fictions,Suarez does
allow fora simple apprehension of the compositionwithoutassent.210
Also as in the case of fictions,he says such compositionswithoutassent are normally( regulariter
) fashioned by puttingwords ratherthan
things together.211Again, this kind of composition is "not ultimate' '212 It is in this a sortof simple apprehensionof a possible object
of enunciation,213but the judgment as such is definitelycomplex.214
Truth is equally found in both affirmative and negative
judgments.215In each it involves a conformityof thejudgment to the
205"... periliumaliquidintelligi:
atnonnisiqualisconnexio
sitextremorum:
..." De
Anima
DeiI, . 4, . 6 CXI,p. 307).
III, . 6, . 4 (III, p. 638); cf.De Scientia
206"... ergocognoscere
connexionem
illamipsumestjudicare."De Anima
III, c. 6,
n. 4 (III, p. 638).
207Ibid.cf.note204,above.
208Cf. "... itautcompositio
sitquasicollatio
simplicium
conceptuum
objectivorum,
etcognitio
conformitas
rei
conjunctionis
quaminse habent;ergo... noncognoscitur
inesseobjectivo,
ad seipsaminre,sedconformitas,
velidentitas,
veluniointer
unam
etalteram
DM 8, 3, n. 17(XXV, p. 288);
rem,proututraqueestinenteobjectivo."
"... quandointellectus
dicithominem
essealbum,formaliter
etdirecte
componendo
vel conjunctionem
identitatem,
cognoscit
quam albumhabetcumhomine;simul
tamenin actuexercito
albialiquomodocontinere
subse
ipsocognoscit
conceptum
etrepraesentare
esseillialiquomodoconformem."
hominem,
illum,etconsequenter
ibid.3, n. 18.Although
theconcept
in thislasttextis theformal
mentioned
concept,
theinference
is easyenoughtoitsobjective
whichmaybe either
a real
counterpart,
thingora beingofreason;cf.DM 2, 1, n. 1 (p. 65).
"
"
209Cf. DM 8, 3, n. 17,textin note208,
to
justabove.For collatioas equivalent
"
cf.
DM
';
23, 7, . 10(XXV, p. 877).
comparatio
210Cf.DM 8, 4, . 5, textinnote131,above.Withthiscompare
DeAngelis
II, . 32,
. 5-19(, 317-321)whereSuarezdistinguishes
between
(1) a simpleapprehension
ofsubjectandpredicate,
and(2) thejudgment
ofassent.
211DM 8, 4, n. 8, textin note138,above.
212Ibid.Hereletus notethatthetruth
instatements
involved
aboutbeingsofreason
is truth
ofsignification.
Forrecognition
ofthis,cf.T. Compton
Carleton,
S.J.,Phil,
univ.Log.d. 13,6, n. 3 (p. 70).
213Cf. "Imo equeestapprehensiva modum
... sedpermodum
per
compositionis
illiuspossibilis
enunciad,..." DM 8, 4, n. 8
cujusdamsimplicis
apprehensionis
(XXV, p. 292).
214"... nonpossumus
actupropositionem,
... ergode illa
apprehendere
simplici
veldifformitatem
ad subjectum
nisi
judicare,equevidereconformitatem,
praedicati
actucomplexo."De Anima
III, . 6, . 5 (III, p. 638).
215DM 8, 7, . 37, textin note218,below.
58

12:36:35 PM

thingknown "as it is in itself'.216More exactly, in a true negative

judgment, (reading backwards, as it were) firstthereis known a "difformity" of objective concepts and then a difformitybetween the
formalconcepts of those objects, while at the same time there is virtually ( virtute
) known the conformityof each formal concept with its
own object.217In a true negativejudgment thereis no fiction;what is
separated in it is separated in reality.In one which is false, e.g. "man
is not an animar', as indicated above,218we are dealing with a pure
being of reason. In such a false negative judgment (or in any false
between the judgment and the thing
judgment) there is a difformity
known
or
supposedly
representedby it.219
The being which is required for truthis that which is signifiedby
the judgment (<complexio
).220 More in line with Suarez' s normal teras
remarked
above,221it is that which is represented
minology,
by the
and
the
This
judgment
signified
by
proposition.
"being true", as it
were, is itself"objective being".222 It is in the composing intellect
(although not as in a subject of inhesion223),whence it can belong to
beings of reason (whose whole being is objective being).224Again, the
being which is in the truthof the judgment as signifiedby the pro2,6"... existimoque
veritatem
seu compositionis
et divicomplexaecognitionis,
sionis,seujudicii,quojudicamus
aliquidessehocautillud,velnonesse esseconformitatem
judiciiad remcognitam
proutinse est,..." DM 8, 1, n. 3 (XXV, 276).
217Cf. "... in divisione
difformitas
seu disconvenientia
eorumobjeccognoscitur
tivorum
in actuexeret consequenter
conceptuum,
quorumunusde alteronegatur
citocognoscitur
interformales
difformitas
illorum
et virtute
conceptus
objectorum,
etiamcognoscitur
eorumconceptuum
habetcum
conformitas,
quam unusquisque
suoobjecto.DM, 8, 6, n. 2 (p. 294).
218cf.note175above.
219"... cognoscitur
id quodestdifforme
etfalsum,
hocesseillud,quodinre
scilicet,
nonest,autnonessequodest." DM 9, 1, n. 17(XXV, p. 319).
220"... [veritas]per se non
requiritreale esse, sed quale per complexionem
r." DM 8, 7, n. 37 (XXV, p. 307);cf.ibid.Index
significatu
locup.IX, c. 4, q. 2 (p.
xlix).
221Cf.note28,above.
222DM 31, 1, n. 2, textin note201,above;also:"Hoc enimesseverum,... solum
estesseobjectivum
in compositione
mentis
veravel falsa,quod solumestesseraseuperdenominationem
extrinsecam
ab opererationis."ibid.Index
tionis,
V,
locup.
c. 7, q. 3 (XXV, xxi).
223Cf.note33,above.
224Cf. "Potestenimvocariesse
illudesse quod cognoscitur,
cognitum,
quodque
estobjective
inintellectu;
..." DM 54,2, n. 13(XXVI, 1021);also:"... esse
proprie
inveritate
nonsolumhabetlocuminessentiis
sedetiaminenrealibus,
propositions
tibusrationis
etfictitiis;
..." DM 31, 2, n. 11(p. 232);ibid.1, n. 2, textin note201
preceding.
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12:36:35 PM

position, inasmuch as it is mind-dependent,exists only when it is being known.225

2 . Different
in Suarez's Works
TypesofPropositions
Suarez has not left us a treatise on logic. There are in his works
numerous places in which he has mentioned logic as such and has
contrastedit with metaphysicsand with psychology.226
There are also
in
which
he
has
to
referred
his
own
places
explicitly
logical writings.227
Most probably these were lectures which were given early in his
teaching career and which were extant among his students.228Unfortunately, these lectures were never published and if we are now to
understand Suarez' s logical doctrinewe have to piece it togetherfrom
fragmentsscatteredabout his otherwritings.To this general rule, his
teaching on propositionsis no exception. Their different
typeshave to
be gleaned from a few widely dispersed places in which he either
mentions or uses them.
Suarez would, firstof all, divide propositionsinto those which are
categorical and those which are hypothetical.229
Categorical propositions are those in which one thing is simply affirmed(or denied) of
another.230Hypothetical propositions would, beyond this, include
225Cf. "... et eo modoquo in illispropositionibus
actualisVeritas,
ilintelligi
potest
lam nonhabent,nisiproutsuntactuin aliquointellectu,
..." DM 47, 16, n. 11
(XXVI, p. 850).
226Cf. e.g. DM 1, 4, n. 13(XXV, p. 29); ibid.nn.29-32(pp. 35-36);DM 39,prol.,
n. 1 (XXVI, pp. 504-505);DM 44, 12,n. 54 (p. 737);DeAnima
IV, . 3, . 22 (III,
p. 729);ibid.. 9, . 14(. 749).
227Cf. e.g. De Anima
in generaltohis
IV, . 3, . 23 (III, p. 729),wherehe refers
is madetoa chapter
in logic"on
logic;ibid., c. 2, n. 7 (p. 576),wherereference
to hiscommentary
on thePosterior
relation";ibid.n. 10 (p. 576), wherehe refers
tohiscommentary
onthe
; andibid.Ill, c. 10,. 1 (p. 651),whereherefers
Analytics
bookofthePerihermeneias
.
first
228On theselectures,
cf.R. De Scorraille,
dela Compagnie
Suarez
deJsus
,
S.J.,Franois
412-416.
II, Paris
1913,
pp.
229Cf. " Ancategoricae
sintan hypotheticae
haepropositiones.
... constat
senpraedictum
sumposseaffirmativa
locutione
siveeam quis vocetcategoricam,
sive
significan,
De Scientia
Dei II, . 5, . 10(XI, p. 358).Although
thequestion
in
hypotheticam."
thistextprecisely
concerns
future
theoveralldivision
ofpropositions
conditionals,
intocategorical
and hypothetical
was commonamongtheScholastics;
cf.e.g. D.
dialect.
Soto,Summulae
, II, c. 6, . 1 (p. 27); and P. Fonseca,Instit.
Ill, c. 3 (I, p.
to call them"simple"and "conjunct",respectively).
Alsosee
136),whoprefers
Suarez,De Gratia:
II, c. 7, n. 21 (VII, p. 94).
Prolegom.
230Cf. "... propositionibus
in quibusunumsimpliciter
de alio affircategoricis,
Dei, , c. 5, n. 10(XI, p. 358).
matur;..." De Scientia
60

12:36:35 PM

some further supposition or " hypothesis".231 While hypothetical

propositionsmightbe of differentkinds (e.g. conditional, copulative,
or disjunctive), the most obvious type would be made up of conditional propositions.232
Categorical propositionswould in their turn be divided into propositions of inherence (de inesse)and modal propositions.233Propositions of inherence(in which a predicate is attributedwithoutany further mode to a subject234)would be either necessary or contingent.
Absolutely necessary propositions of inherence would be those in
which the predicate would have an intrinsicconnection with the subject.235But, besides such, there are propositionswhich are necessary
only to a certain extent.236Examples of these would be propositions
expressingcontingentevents. These propositionswould be themselves
contingent,but, inasmuch as when theywould be true theynecessarily would be true, theywould to some extentbe necessary.237
231Cf. "... nonabsolute
..." ibid;4'Addo
aliquidfore,sedex hypothesi,
significant
... illamessehypotheticam,
ex
tantum
..."
affirmai, ibid.
quia hypothesi
232Consider,
thedistinction
whichSuarezimplies
between
whichareto
hypotheses
be positedin reality
and hypotheses
whichare notto be so posited,whichlatter
areconditional:
"... etquia iliahypothesis
nonsignificatur
utponendain
especially
et modumconditionalis,
et itanosde illaloquimur;
..." De
re,ideohabetformam
Scientia
Dei II, c. 5, n. 10 (XI, p. 358). The burdenofthis,as I see it,wouldbe to
make "hypothetical"
wider than "conditional".On the Scholasticuse of
toembrace
butalso"copulative"
and"disjunctive",
"conditional",
"hypothetical"
cf.P. Fonseca,Instit.
dialect.
alsocf.D. Soto(Summulae
Ill, c. 14(I, pp. 194-196);
III,
. 7, . 3 [. 81.]),whotracesthistoPeterofSpain.
233Cf.DM 3, 3, n. 11,textin note241;DM 54,5, n. 15,textsin notes93 and92,
DeiI, c. 2, n. 12(XI, p. 300);ibid.II, c. 5, n. 6 (p. 357);DeAngelis
above;De Scientia
II, . 23,. 22 (II, . 329).
234Cf. textin note230, above,which,whileit
relatesto categorical
immediately
in general,
seemsespecially
to thosewhicharedeinesse.
On
propositions
applicable
de inesseestpropositio
de simplici
inhaerentia
this,cf.:"Et propositio
verbi,quae
nullodeterminatur
modo:..." D. Soto,Summulae
III, . 6, . 2 (p. 72v);"Enunciado
absoluta
estea, quae absolute
significai
aliquidinesse,autnoninessealicui:..." P.
dialect.
Fonseca,Instit.
III, . 3, D (I, p. 138).
235Cf. "illa sola propositio
est simpliciter
connecessaria,
quae ex terminorum
nexione
intrinseca
habetnecessitatem;
..." De Scientia
Dei c. 9, n. 11(XI, p. 335);
ibid.n. 12(p. 336).
236Cf.De Scientia
DeiI, c. 9, nn. 11and 12(XI, pp. 335-336);seesometextinnote
237immediately
following.
237Cf. e.g. "... iliaautemde praesenti
nonestsimpliciter
necessaria,
quia resconet libera,etiamquandoest,contingenter
est simpliciter,
licetnecessario
tingens
secundum
esse
quid." ibid.n. 11(p. 336); "Nam proeo tempore
proquo resfutura
utproeodemtempore
est,semelfactasuppositione
supponitur,
veritatis,
impossibile
falsa fiat,propterillam compositionem
de praesenti
quae in propositionibus
tamen,postquamilia
reperitur,
quia quandoest, necesseest esse. Nihilominus
Veritas
de futuro
est,quando,scilicet,
impleta
jam resfactaest,jam ex tuncincipit
61

12:36:35 PM

Modal propositions(in which besides the attributionof a predicate

to a subject, a modificationof the copula would be expressed) would
be either"possible" (de possibili)238
or "impossible" ( de impossibili).239
Possible propositions would then be either necessary, if the subject
must receive the predicate (in which case we can truthfully
say thatthe
is
able
to
receive
or
if
the
is
subject
contingent,
subject capable of
it)
eitherreceivingor not receivingthe predicate.240
While all necessary propositionsof inherence (as well as all modal
propositions, which presuppose propositions of inherence241)would
be freefromany particulartime, contingentpropositionsof inherence
would be bound to some present(or future)time.242Such propositions
would be existentialratherthan essential.243Frequentlytheywould be
two termpropositions(de secundoadjacente
).244Quasi-convertibly,with
the exception of "Deus est", all existential two term propositions
would be contingent propositions of inherence.245However, conesse falsa,sicutet propositio
de futuro
de praesenti
propositio
incipitesse falsa,
rei:at veropropositio
mutataexistentia
de praeterito,
semelvera,nunquampotest
iterum
falsaesse,etideodicitur
necessaria
de futuro,
magisabsolute
quampropositio
"
licetin utraquesitaliquanecessitas
compositions.ibid.n. 14(p. 337).
238Cf.DM 54,5, n. 15,textinnote92,above;alsocf.DM Index
, IX, c. 4, q. 2
locup.
(XXV, p. xlix).
239Cf. "... illudde impossibili
..." DM 3, 3, n. 5 (XXV, p. 113).
240Cf. "Recteautemadvertit
D. Thomashieessesermonem
de possibili
in coma necessario
velcontingenti,
..." DM Indexlocup.IX, c. 4, q. 2
muni,ut abstrahit
moreloquendonecessarium
(XXV, p. xlix);"Proprieenimet dialctico
opponitur
tamimpossibili
nonesse[i.e. contingenti],
..." DM 19, 2, n. 8 (p.
quampossibili
cf. P. Fonseca:"Possibile(quod
of thisto propositions,
694). For theextension
et contingenti
commune
necessario,
est,quod potestesse,sivenonpossit
habetur)
nonesse,sivepossit."Instit.
dialect.
Ill, c. 9, (I, pp. 156-158).
241Cf. "... propositio
de inesse."DM 3, 3, . 11
modalis,quae supponit
priorem
IX, c. 4, q. 2 (XXV, p. xlix).Fora proposition
(XXV, p. 114);cf.DM Index
locup.,
witha modeofprobability
deinesse
a proposition
DeiII,
, cf.De Scientia
presupposing
. 5, . 9 (XI, . 358); alsoseeDe Angelis
II, . 23,. 22 (II, p. 327
242Cf.De Scientia
Dei I, . 9, . 12,textin note237,above,wherehe distinguishes
and future
as morecontingent
thanpastpropositions
forthe
propositions
present
reasonthatwhatis pastcannotbe undone.Alsocf.ibid.nn. 18-19(pp. 339-340).
243Cf.DM 54, 5, n. 15,textin note91. above.
244Forthisterminology,
cf.DM 31, 4, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 236);DM 2, 4, n. 3, textin
ofa
note263,below;DeDiv.Subst.
I, . 1,. 9, textinnote259.Foranother
example
cf."... hancde inesse,Adamest
ofinherence;
twotermproposition
, ..." De Scientia
Dei II, . 9, . 11(XI, p. 336).
245Cf. "... quamvisens,utactualem
etsignificatur
dicitexistentiam,
perparticipium
nisiin soloDeo. ... Quantumvero
nonsitpraedicatum
essentiale,
essendi,absolute
... existere
nonessede essentia
... nuncsupponamus,
ad creaturas,
creaturae,
spectat
nonpraedicari
ensparticipialiter
dicitur
... hac ergoratione
sumptum,
quidditative
..." DM 2, 4, n. 13(XXV, p. 91); on theconnection
de creaturis,
seuessentialiter
desecundo
anda proposition
herebetween
ensutparticipium
, cf.ibid.. 3 (p.
adjacente
62

12:36:35 PM

tingentpropositionsof inherence,i.e. existentialpropositions,do not

all have to be de secundoadjacente.Some might be three term {de tertio
adjacente
).246 At the same time, some three term attributivepropositions can abstract fromexistence, in which case they might be both
true and necessary.247To complicate things (or perhaps, better, to
simplifythem), Suarez seems inclined to reduce existentialproposiadtions de secundoadjacenteto equally existentialpropositionsde tertio
to
Thus
the
two
term
proposition relating present existence,
jacente.
"Homo est", would be equal to the three term, "Homo est
existens."248
as Relatingto Beingsof
3. Conditions
Propositions
for theTruthofDifferent
Reason
Turning firstto conditional propositions, let us say that in them
nothingis affirmedexcept that one thing followsfromanother. Accordingly,fortheirtruthin signifyingnothingis required save a good
consequence.249Thus, for the truth of the proposition mentioned
above,250"If a stone is an animal, it is sensible", there is no need to
posit in any way an impossible animated stone. Similarly, any comparable conditional propositions, relating to chimaerae, etc., would
also not require any positing of impossible things. As for other
hypotheticalpropositions,in the absence of any explicit text, let us
just say that, since copulative propositionsfortruthrequire the truth
a necessity
at47 (XXVI, p. 298),whereSuarezrejects
88). Alsocf.DM 31, 12,n.
" Homo
.
existit"
totheproposition
taching
246Gf.e.g.DM 31, 12,n. 44,textinnote265,below.Although
I canrecallnoplace
usedtheexpression
"detertio
whereSuarezhasexplicitly
", itdoesgobackto
adjacente
and Suarez would have been most familiarwithit; cf. Aristotle,
Aristotle
Perihermeneias
, c. 10, 19b20ff.
247Cf.DM 31, 12,n. 45, textbelowin note267.
248Cf. "... sequitur
est, seuexistit
hancetiamconnexionem
essenecessariam,
homo
,
autestexistens
, ..." DM 31, 12,n. 47 (XXVI, p. 298).Whilethisoccursinan objectionto Suarez'doctrine,
from
hisansweritseemsclearthathe wouldnotrejectthe
whichitexpresses.
equivalence
249Cf."... inconditionali
nihilaffirmatur,
nisiunumexaliosequi;ergosi nonbene
estfalsa;et ideoestvulgareapudDialcticos,
veritatem
conconditionalis
sequitur,
inbonitate
etquia consequentia,
ditionalconsistere
illationis,
quae semelestbona,
ut ipsietiamdicunt,semperest bona, ideo asserunt
conditionalem
veram,esse
DeiII, c. 5, n. 5 (XI, pp. 356-357);also:De Gratia:
Pro..." De Scientia
necessariam;
cf.
II, c. 6, n. 4 (VII, p. 80)andibid.n. 13(p. 83).Amongthe"dialecticians",
legom.
D. SotoSummulae
dialect.
III, . 15,
III, . 8, lect.1 (82r.);alsoseeP. Fonseca,Instit.
(I, . 198).
250Cf.note192.
63

12:36:35 PM

of all of their simple conjuncts and disjunctive propositions require

the truth of at least one of their simple disjuncts,251any questions
about what theyposit will ultimatelybe the same as those raised about
simple categorical propositions.
Moving then to categorical propositionsand under them to modal
propositions,let us remarkthat preciselyas such these merelyadd an
expression of modalityto propositionsof inherence.252In the case of a
, the modalityis negative,253and the resulting
propositionde impossibili
modal proposition is a negative statement,to which the comments
made above254would seem applicable. In the case of a propositionde
possibili(with its subdivisions of necessary and contingent),the result
would be an affirmativestatement,which could be true even if the
presupposed proposition of inherence were false. Thus, as we have
seen,255even though no actual man would be blind, and even though
no non-actual man would be blind, it would be truly possible that
some man mightbe blind. But as we also saw,256such a truthwould
not require any fictitiousrealityof blindness, but only a positive and
intrinsiccapacity which could mutatismutandisbe attributedto either
an actual or a possible man.
If we extend the question here to strictbeings of reason, such as
chimaerae and goat-stags, it is evident that they can be spoken of in
true modal propositionsde impossibili.For example, it is true to say
that it is impossible fora chimaera to exist.257With respectto modal
statementsde possibili, the question becomes more abstruse. I cannot
thinkof any textin which Suarez has explicitlyaddressed it. But I do
251Forthiscf.Fonseca:(1) on copulative
"Huius generis
enunciatio
propositions:
sintverae."Institut,
ex quibusconstat,
veraessenonpotest,nisiomnessimplices,
4'Ut autemdisiunctiva
sitvera,juxta
dialect.
Ill, c. 16(I, p. 202),(2) ondisjunctives:
tamen
una tantum
eiusparsveraessedebet:... . Recentiores
veterum
sententiam
esseveram,si veluna,velpluresuna,autetiamomnespartes,
dicuntdisiunctivam
sintverae:..." ibid.c. 17(p. 204).
252See De Scientia
theaddithistextconcerns
DeiII, c. 5, n. 9 (XI, p. 358);although
modesof
itspointwouldseemvalidalso regarding
tionof a modeofprobability,
etc.
possibility,
impossibility,
253Cf. theremarks
esse
estidem
simul
whichis: Impossibile
deimpossibili
onthepropositio
..." DM 3, 3, n. 1
illudesseprimum
etnonesse
: "... nonvidetur
quiaestnegativum;
..." ibid.n. 10
quamvisnegativum,
(XXV, p. Ill), and "... perilludprincipium,
(p. 114).
254Cf. SectionIV, Paragraph
One, above.
255Cf. notes91 and92, above.
256Ibid.
257See anyoftheplacesabovein note124,whereSuarezhasreferred
to "impossideimpossibili
seemseasyenough.
ofrelatedpropositions
ble" things.
The formation
64

12:36:35 PM

believe he would allow that true propositions de possibilican be formulated about chimaerae, at least to the extentthat they can firstbe
spoken of in true propositionsof inherence. In line with that, let us
now take up the case of such propositions.
For the truthin signifyingof an affirmativetwo term existential
proposition (and for the cognitional truth of the judgment it
expresses), there is required an actually existing union of what is
signifiedby the subject and by the predicate.258To know the truthof
such a proposition means to know that the predicate "is", which
signifiesactual existence,does in factbelong to the subject259and that
this belonging does correspond to the way things actually are in
themselves.260
If the subject then does not "stand for" somethingactually existing,the propositionwould appear to be false.261
There are two addendato this. First, the propositions in question
need not always be expressive of intuitivejudgments; instead these
may be abstractiveor mediated.262Second, although Suarez does not
258"... est
nonabsolvitur
a tempore,
sedsignificai
actuessein
, de secundo
adjacente,
rerum
nomine
seuperesseexistentiae."
natura,
existentiae,
quodomnesintelligimus
DM 31,4, n. 4 (XXVI, p. 236);cf.ibid.12,. 44(p. 296);DM 2, 4, . 3, textinnote
263,below;andDe Div. Subst.
I, . 1, . 9, textin note259,immediately
following.
259Cf. Suarez'sremarks
on theproposition,
"Deus est": De Div. Subst.I, . 1, nn.
7-9(I, pp. 2-3),esp.: "Ut ergoabsoluteet in actuexercito
illudsubjecsignificetur
tumexistere,
de secundoadjacente
ut aliundesupponatur
id de
(ut aiunt)oportet,
"
necessario
habereexistentiam
actualem."ibid.. 9 (3). The " aliunde
quoestsermo,
referred
tointhistextis especially
ana posteriori
demonstration
ofGod'sexistence,
or,
a demonstration
ofthetruth
oftheproposition,
"God exists."
better,
perhaps
260Cf. "Dum autemintellectus
componit,
comparairemut simpliciter
conceptam
unomodo,ad esseipsiusrei,et cognoscit
conformitatem
quaminterse habent,et
ideononsolamrem,sedetiamveritatem
DM 8, 3, n. 12(XXV, p. 286).
cognoscit."
261In thissense,Suarezwouldacceptthe
axiomoftheScholastic
dialecticians
tothe
effect
thatan affirmative
whosesubjectstandsfornothing
thatexistsis
proposition
etin rigore
falsalocutiointermino
false;cf."Namhocmodoessetimpropria,
prolade subjectonon supponente;
..." De
tionis;essetenimaffirmativa
propositio
Eucharistia
d. 50,2, n. 2 (XXII, p. 325). ForotherplacesinwhichSuarezhasmentionedthisaxiom,cf.:De Scientia
Dei II, c. 5, n. 12 (XI, p. 359):DM 31, 12,n. 44
lastplacehehasconnected
(XXVI, p. 296);andDM 54,5, n. 14(p. 1035),inwhich
itobliquely
tostatements
aboutchimaerae.
262Cf. "Respondenautempotest,nonsatisessead cognitionem
intuitivam,
quod
resutexistens,
namde re absentepossumus
evidenter
earn
cognoscitur
cognoscere
..." De Div.Subst.II, . 18,. 5 (I, p. 114).Two points:(1) although
this
existere,
occursas partofa viewwhichSuarezrejects,
hisrejection
is notbasedon a denialof
ourability
toknowtheexistence
ofan absentthing,
butrather
upona denialthatwe
wouldknowit "evidently";
and(2) forevident
intuitive
thereis required
cognition,
- hence,knowledge
theactualpresence
oftheobjectas wellas itsexistence
ofitsexistence
As an exampleofa mediated
and
maywellbe non-intuitive
(i.e. abstractive).
abstractive
desecundo
, cf."God exists",in textcitedat note259,
judgment
adjacente
above.
65

12:36:35 PM

anywherethat I have seen say it explicitly,theremay be a sense of de

secundoadjacentewhich is applicable to beings of reason. For, rather
obviously, we can speak of theirmere existencein objective being and
Suarez himself has done so.263 But we must be careful here to
distinguishbetween theiressewhich is cogitariand the essewhich is to
the point here, i.e. the imagined esse which would belong to them
preciselyas they are being known.264
With respect to affirmativeattributivepropositions, {de tertioadjacente
), it may be the actual existence of what is signifiedby the comIn this
position of subject and predicate which is required fortruth.265
case, once more, propositions relatingto pure beings of reason (e.g.
4'The chimaera is
blind,,2e6) would appear to be contingentlytrue
with
to
respect objective being. But thenagain, it may be thatthe
only
predicate of a three term proposition necessarilybelongs to the subject, irrespectiveof whetherthese exist or not.267This last case may
itselfadmit of two instances.
First, it may be that both subject and predicate togetherare really
possible, and, second, it may be that theyare pure beings of reason.
In the firstinstance, the truthof statementswill depend upon the total
adequate possibilityof what is involved. This will include intrinsic
non-repugnance on the part of what is signified by the terms
themselves,which non-repugnance is the aptitude forexistence men263ForSuarezspeaking
oftheexistence
as suchofbeingsofreason,cf.textsreferred
theexistence
ofsuchbeingsonly
to in note48, above.Thesetexts,whichhighlight
fitin wellwiththecontingent
character
ofa
whentheyare actually
beingthought,
as neverbeingfreefromtime;cf. "... undeetiam
desecundo
adjacente
proposition
de secundoadjacente,
verbum
estnunquam
absolvia
dicuntinpropositione
dialectici
DM 2, 4, n. 3 (XXV, p. 88); cf.DM 31,4, n. 4, textinnote258,above.
tempore."
264Cf.DM 50, 1, n. 1, textin note50, above.
265Cf. "Haec verocontroversia
... totaconsistit
invariasignification
illiuscopulae,
in hisenuntiationibus.
Duobusenimmodisacextrema
est
, perquamconjunguntur
etrealemconjunctionem
in re
actualem
extremorum
cipipotest.Primo,utsignificet
itaut,cumdicitur,
estanimal
homo
, significetur
reipsaitaesse.... In
ipsaexistentem,
sensuVeritas
extremorum,
propositionum
pendeisinedubioab existentia
quia
priori
a tempore,
verbumest, nonabsolvitur
seu (quod idem
juxtaillamsignificationem
realemet actualem
exdurationem,
quae nullaest,ablataexistentia
est),significat
..." DM 31, 12,n. 44 (XXVI, p. 296).
tremorum,
266Cf.DM 54, 5, n. 16,textin note191,above.
267"Secundo,solumsignificet,
essede rationesubjecti,
siveextrema
praedicatum
sivenon." DM 31, 12,n. 44 (XXVI, p. 296); "At veroin aliosensuproexistant,
nonexistant;
extrema
et in eodemsuntnecessariae

positionssuntverae,etiamsi
, in dictosensunonsignificet
veritatis,
existentiam,
quia cumcopulaest
perpetuae
in seipsis,
etideoad suamveritatem
realitatem
non
extremis
actualem
nonattribuii
actualem."ibid.n. 45 (p. 297).
seurealitatem
existentiam,
requirit
66

12:36:35 PM

tioned above.268 But it will also include the existence of a cause

In the second instance, the
capable of producing what is signified.269
beings of reason involved cannot be intrinsicallynon-repugnant(i.e.
they will be intrinsicallyrepugnant) and they cannot have any productive cause.270 In this case, then, an affirmativeattributiveproposition will be true simply from the fact that the predicate is
necessarilyconnected with the subject. This connection is completely
to any prowithoutregard to any possibilityof existing(and a fortiori
ductive cause); it is simplyin relationto the imagination or to the fictionalizingactivityof the mind.271
There are at least two remarksstill to be made. First,as we noted
above,272the connection of the extremes(in every instance) involves
some identityof wht is signifiedby the subject and the predicate. This
identityis what is signifiedby the copula.273More specifically,he tells
us, in everytrue affirmativepropositionthe subject and the predicate
termsmust both stand for( supportant
) the same thing and they must
Here
both eitherexplicitlyor implicitlyhave the same signification.274
268Cf.note152above.
269"Et inhoceodemsensu... veritatem
excausaefharumenuntiationum
pendere
extremorum."
DM 31, 12,n. 44 (XXVI, p. 296).
a qua pendetexistentia
ficiente,
270Cf. Suarez'exclusion
theveryambitofbeingand(in
from
ofwhatis impossible
ofGod:DM 30,n. 17,
from
thescopeoftheomnipotent
thesamecontext)
causality
n. 10,partial
textinnote157,above;alsoseeDe Div.Subst.
III, . 9, . 1 (I, p. 224).
271"At veroin entibus
necessariae
sinehabitudine
connexiones
solumfiunt
fictitiis,
seu ficad imaginationem
sedsolumperordinem
etiamde possibili
ad existendum,
mentis."DM 31, 12,n. 45 (XXVI, p. 297).
tionem
272Cf. note209,above.
273Cf. "... tuncenimnecesseestuttalismodusidentitatis
in reipsa
correspondeat
" DM Index
. , IX, c. 12, q. 2
interextrema,
locup
qualispercopulamsignificatur.
fundatur
in aliqua
affirmativae
propositionis
(XXV, liii);and "OmnisenimVeritas
velunitate,
..." DM 31, 12,nn.46 (XXVI, p. 297);Cf.DM
identitte
extremorum
6, 4, n. 4, in note274following.
274"... propositio
identitatem
affirmans
hocesseillud,utverasit,requirit
aliquam
et quod
estut proeodemsupponant,
et subjectum,
interpraedicatum
quia necesse
" DM
velimplicite
idemsignificent.
velexplicite
6, 4, . 4 (XXV, p. 217).On "exorjudgment
of
vs. "implicitly"
here,letus saythatin a simpletautology
plicitly"
wouldhavethesameexplicit
thesubject
andpredicate
(e.g. "A
signification
identity
the
wouldbe implicitly
thesignification
is A"). In othertrueaffirmative
judgments,
wouldbe "confused"or lessdeteras thesubjector thepredicate
sameinasmuch
non
orthesubject;cf.e.g. "... utpropositio
minate
thepredicate
than,respectively,
demonstran
sitidentica,
satisest,remeamdemmagisconfuse
quam
persubjectum,
of
De Eucharistia
, d. 58, 7, n. 5 (XXII, p. 333). The possibility
perpraedicatum."
cf.
ofobjective
is founded
sucha distinction
concepts;
upontheSuareziandoctrine
estidentica;haecautemminime:
"... haecpraedicatio:
estsubstantia,
Substantia
in nominibus,
sedetiamin rationibus
Substantia
estens;nonergodifferunt
tantum
"
quae praedicantur.DM 2, 2, n. 13 (XXV, p. 74); cf.ibid.6, nn. 7-10
objectivis,
67

12:36:35 PM

let us say that in the case of God (which is perhaps a "pure case" of
what is generallytrue), the termscan stand forthe same thingand yet
not signifythe same. Accordingly,we can say with truththat God's
Wisdom is not the same as God's Justice, although in the simple
realityof God they are the same.275The point is that even when the
subject and predicate termsstand forreal things,and even when they
stand for the same real thing, an affirmativeproposition is not true
unless theyalso signify,eitherexplicitlyor implicitly,the same objective concept. Or better, it is not true unless there is an identity(exby the formal concept
plicit or implicit) between what is represented
which gives rise to the subject and what is representedby the formal
concept which gives rise to the predicate, or an identitybetween what
is signifiedby the subject term and what is signifiedby the predicate
term.
If the termsstand foractually existingthingsthe identities(supposed
and either
or implicitly
must be in actual existence outexplicitly
signified)
side the mind; if the terms stand for potentiallyexisting things the
identitiesmust be in possible existence; if the terms stand forfictions
the identitiesmust also be fictive,or consequent upon the fiction.So
he tells us a universal can be predicated of many things, for it is in
it is in
themby some identity.276
(It is in real thingsby real identity;277
fictitiousthings by a purely fictitiousidentity.) For truth in either
knowing or in signifyingthen, the real existence of the object is not
required but only that the object "be" as it is representedorjudged to
be.278(Thus, the proposition, "a goat-stagis a fiction", is true- but
ofbeing
wherehedealswiththemoreorlessdeterminate
conceptions
(pp. 100-102),
toitsinferiors.
as itdescends
275Cf. "... sicutsapientia
ut
divinaeademestinre,quaemente
concipitur,
quamvis
includere
menteconcepta,
non intelligatur
quamin re ipsa essentialiter
justitiam,
..." DM 2, 3, n. 13 (XXV, p. 86).
includit,
276"... ideoenimde multis
aliquam,
praedicari
potest,
quiaineisestperidentitatem
cf.DM 6, 2, n. 13,textinnote
..." DM 6, 8, n. 2 (XXV, p. 232).On thisidentity,
between
as
distinction
118,above.NotethatSuarezat timesmakesan explicit
things
as they"standunder"concepts,
andthings
e.g. "...
precisely
theyareinthemselves
rebusutinsesunt,sedsolumutsubstant
ilianonpotest
esseindivisio
quaeconveniat
mentis;..." DM6 , 2, n. 15 (p. 211);cf.ibid.3, n. 12(p. 216).
conceptibus
277Such"real" identity
seeDM 6, 2, n. 13,textin note
reducesto realsimilarity;
III, . 2, . 24 (III, pp. 621-622).
118,above,andDe Anima
278"... quianondicimus
realemexistentiam
inconceptu
sed
veritatis,
objectiincludi
seujudicatur;seu
solumquod ita se habeat,sicutpercognitionem
repraesentatur
estexistentiae,
sed
quodhabeattaleesse,qualecognoscitur.
Quod essenonsemper
..." DM 8, 2, n. 16(XXV, p. 282);cf.ibid
.
ad veritatem
enunciationis,
qualesufficit
7, . 37, textin note220,above.
68

12:36:35 PM

"a goat-stagactually exists'' is not true, except in the limited sense of

a goat-stag's having objective being. In the firstcase, the fact is that
- in the second it is not
the goat-stagis such as the propositionaffirms
such.) The "is" in the propositiondoes not (necessarily) signifyactual
existence but rather only the intrinsicconnection of the extremes
which may be (but need not be - at least immediately)founded upon
actual or potential being.279
Looked at again, identityitselfis a relation.280More accurately,
Suarez tells us it is a relation of reason.281As such, it should be
founded upon a "rel" unity.282(Here it is well to note that unity
itselfis somethingnegative, namely, the lack of division.283)But the
objective identitywhich is representedby thejudgment and signified
by the propositionis founded upon an actual unity,a potential unity,
or a mere conceptual (or verbal) unity.284In every case, we know ob279"... illudesse non significai
actaleesse et reale,sed solamconnexionem
intrinsecam
talium
..." DM 31,2, n. 8 (XXVI, p. 231);although
Suarez
extremorum;
is heretalking
aboutso-called
veritates
aetemae
as regards
realpossible
thesenthings,
timent
is applicable
alsotopurely
expressed
mind-dependent
beings(cf.DM 31, 12,
n. 45 [p. 297]);alsocf.DM 54, 1, nn.4 and 7 (pp. 1016-1017).
Eventheword"in" seems
trinsecam
ifwe focusuponthesignificative
character
ofthenonapplicable,
ultimate
whichareusedin forming
concepts
beingsofreason;cf.notes22 and 130
above.
280"... identitas
estrelatio..." DM 3, 2, n. 8 (XXV, p. 109).
281"... constatnon oportere
addereinterpassionesentisidentitatem
vel diverformaliter
dicererelationes
nonpertinent
ad
sitatem,
rationis,
quia ut haecpossunt
si intelligitur
de
entis,..." DM 3, 2, n. 14(p. Ill); "... relatio
passiones
identitatis,
identitte
numerica
seu reali,cumsitrelatiorationis,
..." DM 4, 1, n. 27 (p. 122);
alsocf.DM 54, 6, n. 5, textinnote110above.
282"... esseunumet esseidem,sunt
valdediversa;et primum
estsuo
praedicata
modorealepraedicatum
conveniens
entisinefictione
secundum
veroest
intellectus;
rationis
conveniens
estfunundeprimum
praedicatum
intellectus;
peroperationem
damentm
eo modoquo relatio
inrehaberefundamentum."
rationis
secundi,
potest
DM 4, 1, n. 7 (XXV, p. 117).
283Cf.
DM 4, 1, n. 12 (XXV, p. 118).
284Cf.e.g.
"Omnis enimVeritaspropositionis
affirmativae
fundatur
in aliqua extremorum
identitte
velunitate,
etpermodumconjunctionis
cumsubjecpraedicati
reientitatem.
Identitas
autemcumsit
to, tamenin re nihilestpraeteripsammet
entis(namidemetdiversum
ad unitatem
utsupradiximus),
proprietas
reducuntur,
in omnientecumproportione
Undesicuthomoexistens
et animaiin re
reperitur.
idemsunt,ita homopossibilis,
seu qui potestobjicipotestscientiae
aut exempli
identitatem
habetcumanimaliproportionaliter
hominis,
sumpto;..." DM 31, 12,n.
46 (XVI, p. 298).It doesnottaketoomuchofan inference
toextendtheproportion
heretocoverpurebeingsofreason.In everytrueaffirmative
proposition
regarding
either
a realpossibleor a purebeingofreasonthereis proportionately
an identity,
evenan "intrinsically
between
The difnecessary"
identity
subjectand predicate.
ference
is thatin thecaseofa realpossiblethereis a further
relation
to actualexistence.
thetruth
ofpropositions
suchpossibles
is in thelast
Accordingly,
respecting
69

12:36:35 PM

jective identity in our composing which is expressed by our word

"is".285 This is to say, we know the objective identityof the extremes
of our proposition through the composing of the mind, which composing itselfwe signifyby "is".286 Identityis in all cases the (objective) counterpart to our (formal) composing and such identityis
founded proportionatelyin differentways in actual things, possible
things,and mere beings of reason.287
Second
, and last: forthe identityof subject and predicate in true affirmative propositions about pure beings of reason, absent any
essence and any productive cause apart fromthe imagination or the
fictionalizingmind, the connection is obviously dictated by the intrinsic character of the terms themselves. That is to say, the terms
dictate it precisely inasmuch as of themselvesthey are significative.
Nonsense termswould have no such connection. Taken with material
supposition, "Blytiri" is not the same as "scyndapsus" and thiscould
easily be formulatedin a negative proposition.288But such a formulation would not be comparable to the negative propositionwhich says,
"A chimaera is not a goat-stag".289Likewise, taken with material
supposition, "Blytiri" is the same as "Blytiri". This too can be stated
in a proposition, but its statementwould not be comparable to the
true affirmativeproposition, "A chimaera is a chimaera."290 Again,
even thoughboth involve an identityof the same thingwith itself,the
tautologous proposition, "A chimaera is a chimaera" is not exactly
the same as the non-tautologous one, "A chimaera is a fictitious
monster."291
butalsoupon"a
notjuston theirintrinsically
identity,
necessary
dependent
analysis
oftheextremes"
theexistence
causewhichis abletoeffect
(cf.note269,above).In
a purebeingof reason,the
thecase of a trueaffirmative
regarding
proposition
to
doesnotentaila relation
connection
oridentity
ofsubjectandpredicate
necessary
suchexanddoesnottherefore
actualexistence
requirea causecapableofeffecting
or tothefictive
is a relation
to theimagination
istence.Instead,all thatis required
powerofthemind(see note271,above).
285Cf. "... quamidentitatem
nosautempercomposiDeus simplicissime
cognoscit,
est
verbum
, ... DM 31, 2, n. 8 (XXVI, p. 231).
tionem,
quamsignificai
286Cf. ibid.;alsocf.notes201,202,203,204and208,above.
287Cf. "Identitas
entis... inomneente,seuinomnistatu
autem,cumsitproprietas
this
DM 31, 12,n. 46 (XXVI, p. 297).Although
entiscumproportione
reperitur."
mutandis
it is
concerns
textimmediately
onlyactualand possiblerealbeings,mutatis
alsotobeingsofreason.
applicable
288Herewe areborrowing
as citedabovein
a bitfrom
GasparCardilloVillalpando,
note130.
289Cf. note168,above.
290Cf. note190,above.
291Cf. note186,above.
70

12:36:35 PM

This second remark links up with what was said above about the
non-ultimateconception of impossible beings of reason.292As was
noted a number of times,293according to Suarez the non-ultimate
concept is at least minimallysemantic. Not just the concept of a bare
word,294it somehow partakes of the deliberate significationof the
word. For thisreason, in place of an essence with propertiesdictating
the truthof a necessarystatement,what we have in the case of a pure
being of reason is this significativecast of the word dictatingthe truth
of some statementsand the falsityof others. Such of course is a very
thinbasis fortruthor falsity,but then who would ever be temptedto
say that beings of reason themselveswere robust?
Conclusion
Against a background of the traditionalview of truthas a function
of being, in this essay I have considered Suarez's response to the
question of truth where there is no real being independent of the
mind. Essentially, that response turns upon the significativecast of
the words involved in the expression of beings of reason, especially
so-called impossible beings. Because such words, unlike mere
nonsense syllables, have signification,there is in theirregard, and in
regard to the beings of reason they express, the possibilityof some
statementsbeing true even as others are false.
Furtherramificationsare manifold,if not always manifest.Within
the text of Suarez, there are other questions which might be asked
about relationsof reason and specificallythe relation of identity.We
mightask also about the precise connectionsamong differentkinds of
relations, extrinsic denominations, and beings of reason. Outside
Suarez's text, there are issues coming from the circumambient
Scholasticism of his time. I can think immediately of non-ultimate
concepts,a total understandingof which would be useful forresolving
some of the problems besettingmodern semioticians. There are other
interestingitems to be found in Suarez's Jesuit successors and
disciples, as well as in 17th centuryProtestantthinkersinfluencedby
him. Thus, an intriguingtopic would be the controversyamong them
over God's Knowledge of beings of reason. Another would be their
292Cf. note131,above.
293Cf.notes22,26, 130,137,etc.,above.
294Cf. note138,above.
71

12:36:35 PM

treatments of space and time and the scientificconstructs of the

astronomers.295 A third would be the concept of a "super'
transcendentar , as setting a stage for Kantian developments.296
There are, in fact,anent the historyof this subject myriadsof logical,
epistemological, psychological, physical, and metaphysicalquestions
which can be raised. These range not just back to ancient figureslike
Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle but forward through modern
philosophy after Suarez, all the way to persons like Meinong and
Russell, as well as Kripke and Putnam.
St. Louis, Missouri
St. Louis University
295Cf. notes109,112,139-144,
and 183,above.
296Cf. note51,above.

72

12:36:35 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 2 (1988)
Semanticsand Metaphysicsin Gilbertof Poitiers*
A Chapter of Twelfth Century Platonism (1)
L.M. DE RIJK

Introduction
In his elaborate study on Gilbert Porreta's thought and the
theologicalexpositionsof the doctrineof Incarnation featuringin the
twelfthcentury1the Danish scholar Lauge Olof Nielsen has quite
rightlydrawn (p. 15) our attentionto two of the obstacles that have to
be surmountedin any reading of Gilbert's work. First, his language
has an extremely technical character and, second, he frequently
exploitsthe Latin constructionsto theirvery limit. In fact, it is often
almost impossible to satisfactorilyconvey in modern languages what
Gilbert apparentlytries to say. Moreover, although they knew their
Latin well enough, even Gilbert's contemporarieswere vexed by his
writingsand more than once blamed him for his alleged 'obscurity'.
In fact, Gilbert was often misunderstood and even charged with
heresyby some of his confused opponents.
The situationis bound to disheartenGilbert's modern interpreter.
However, thereis a ray of hope. We are told byJohn of Salisbury that
freshmentook Gilbert for an obscure teacher but that among the
advanced studentshe was famousforhis profoundness.We may safely
* I havetriedtotranslate
Latinas litterally
as possible
andthisis whythe
Gilbert's
ofhislanguageas wellas hissometimes
awkward
constructions
remainin
obscurity
in some cases the clumsiness
is also due to the
my rendering.
Incidentally,
Mediaevals'habitofincorporating
from
theauthor
intotheirglossesquotations
they
glossupon.No doubt,thenativespeakerwillbe moreaffronted
bymyrenderings
- Hringwhoseexcellent
author.
thanthepresent
edition
isusedforthisstudy
prints
thequotations
incapitalletters
onBoethius
from
Boethius
byGilbert
( TheCommentaries
Institute
ofMediaevalStudies,
, editedbyNikolausM. Hring.Pontifical
ofPoitiers
Toronto-Canada.
StudiesandTexts13,1966).- Unfortunately,
I havenothadthe
toconsult
on Gilbert
ofPoitiers
in
JohnMarenbon's
opportunity
important
chapter
A History
Western
, ed. by PeterDronke,Cambridge
of Twelfth-Century
Philosophy
etc.1987(Ch. 12,pp. 328-57).
Press,Cambridge
University
1 LaugeOlafNielsen,Theology
A StudyofGilbert
andPhilosophy
intheTwelfth
Century.
andtheTheological
oftheIncarnation
Porreta's
oftheDoctrine
Thinking
Expositions
Leiden1982.
duringthePeriod1130-1180,
73

12:33:00 PM

assume, therefore,that our author was farfrombeing a muddle-head

or an inaccessible mysticist. On the contrary, in tackling some
extremelydifficultmatterswhich were eagerly debated in his days he
appears to have exploited all possibilitiesof the Latin language and,
accordingly, made great demands upon the interpreter'sability and
readiness to followhim in his train of thought.2
The firstthing to be done, then, is to scrutinize some of the key
notions of Gilbert's ontology.
1 The OnticConstituents
of NaturalBodies
There is one distinctionthat is of paramount importance in order
for us to understand Gilbert's ontology, viz. the Boethian contradistinctionof id quodand id quo. We have to startwith this pair of key
notions.
'id quod' and 'id quo'
1.1 Preliminary:
According to Gilbert, our world consists of a number of individual
'things'. This world and its inhabitantsappear to have the following
characteristics:
(a) each and every 'thing' is in fact to be considered as one selfcontained entity,(a 'subsistens') whose identityand ontological unity
are due to the singularity of what is proper to it {sue proprietatis
; Eut. 30, 88; Trin. 144, 58-62),
singularitas
(b) however, every 'subsistent' (henceforthmy rendering of Latin
'subsistens') itselfconsists of a pluralityof forms; in addition, there
are 'circumstantialfeatures' (rather than 'forms' properlyspeaking)
thatdetermineits actual stateor condition('status'); Trin. 137, 55; cf.
Nielsen, 56-8 and below, our nrs 1.2 and 1.72.
In fact, Gilbert's ontology is one continuous attempt to establish
two basic relationships,one between a natural thing and its Creator
and the other between the thing's diverse actual constituents,which
fromeach other3grantit its intrinsicunity
while being totallydifferent
at the same time.
2 I am afraidNielsen(p. 15) is somewhat
on thisscorein assuming
toopessimistic
couldnotevenremotely
thatmodernforms
ofexpression
conveytheLatinoriginal,
orlateruseofsimilar
from
Gilbert's
andin isolating
contemporary
usagetoostrictly
terms.
3 See Heb., 143,48ff.;cf. Trin.94,37.
74

12:33:00 PM

It is withinthe frameworkof these considerations that the id quod

and id quo notions come on the scene. The id quod estformula stands
for the object itself,taken as the self-containedwhole I have mentioned before,whereas id quo estrefersto that which causes the object
to be and is, in fact, its esse.Of course, Gilbert's main expositions on
the subject are found in his commentaryon De hebdomadibus
, where he
turns out to be a faithfuladherent to Boethius' Metaphysics of
being'.4
Nielsen (47) seems to be wrong in opposing id quod estto id quo est
as ' whattheobjectis' (italics mine) to 'that wherebyit is what it is'. His
erroneoustranslationof the formerexpressionis quite understandable
really,since one mightbe inclined to startoffwith the id quo formula,
meaning 'that by which' somethingis and subsequently take id quod
for'that which (or 'what') somethingis'. However, the phrase id quod
is the subject of est, ratherthan the predicate. This can be evidenced
as follows.First,the contextin which the two expressionsoccur (both
in Boethius' and Gilbert's work as well as thatof others) suggeststhat
one has to startoffwiththe id quodformula,not the otherway round.
Obviously the id quodestis always taken as the subject of the verb est
occurring in the counterpartformula id quo est, such that id quo est
would mean: 'that in virtueof which the thing(id quodest) is*. Second,
the two expressions id quod est and it quo est have a Greek, that is
Neoplatonic origin. In point of fact,the phrase id quodestis meant to
render the Greek to on and actually paraphrases the Latin participle
ens. Well, just as currens,
the Latin translationof to trechon
, equals id
which
where
id
currit
cannot
quod
('that
runs'),
quod
possibly be taken
in
otherwisethan as the subject of currit
the
same
,
way id quodin id quod
estis definitelynot to be taken as a predicate term.
Let us now turn to Gilbert's view of the ontic structureof the
natural bodies of our world.
1.2 The Basic Constituents
ofNaturalBodies
The world of natural bodies presented itself to Gilbert (as to
Boethius and otheradherentsof Platonism) as an aggregate of certain
4 Theremaybe onepossible
inGilbert's
sixthTheorem
exception
glossofBoethius'
an exposition
onBoethius'
treatise
(seebelow,ournr.3.1,adHeb.199,7-16).- For
' Notion
De hebdomadibus
A Chapter
, see L. M. de Rijk,OnBoethius
ofBeing:
ofBoethian
Semantics
andReference
inMedieval
, in: NormanKretzmann
(ed.), Meaning
Philosophy.
Historical
etc.1988,1-29.
vol. 32 Dordrecht
Synthese
Library,
75

12:33:00 PM

sets of participata of the divine Forms. In this world each inhabitant

is a set of participata, which, unlike the world itself,makes up a
natural compound ratherthan a mere aggregate. The unit is called an
id quod, of which each of the constituents,as an id quo, is a participatum of some Form and, accordingly,an immanent forminhering in the id quod.
It should be noticed, now, that forGilbert, id quo or essemay stand
for any of its constitutiveelements ( ea quibus)5 as well as for its complete nature {id quo):
illiuscuiusdicitur
Trin.92,94-5:Quidquidestalicuiusesse,autesttotasubstantia
esse,aut parseiusquodesttotasubstantia.
substance
is either
ofthatofwhich
'All thatwhichis something's
thecomplete
being
substance.
it is saidor partofthatwhichis itscomplete
The complete esse( id quo) is a thing's speciesor totaforma'its partial
constituentsare its genera and differentiae(ibid. 92,96-8). Well, the
complete collection of the constituents as well as each of them
The id quod is called 'subseparately bear the name of subsistentia.
Gilbert defines
sistens' In his commentary on De hebdomadibus
id
as
subsistentia
in
subsistente
and
a
esse
est
que
(or quo)
(194,90-2) thing's
in
est
subsistentia.
est
as
The
subsistens quo
subsistentia is
the id quod
and humanitasand the subsistentby corpus
exemplified by corporalitas
and homo, respectively.Elsewhere (Trin. 88,77) Gilbert says that in
natural bodies everyesseof a subsistentis due to some form(omnesubesseexformaest; cf. 89,5-6: . .naturalibus
sistentium
quorumomniumesseex
formaest).
I think, we should refrainfromrenderingthe Latin 'subsistentia'
by the English 'subsistency'; 'subsistentia' refersto the causeof some
thing's being subsistent,rather than just its condition of being subsistent.
The most prominentcharacteristicof Gilbert's metaphysics(more
precisely his ontology of the individual entities of this world) is the
= id quo) and id quod est
predominant diversityof esse (= subsistentia
His
main
concern
is
to
clearlyestablishthe proper rela(= subsistens).
tionships between these two, which for the greater part amounts to
elucidating the true nature of participationand composition. In this
study we shall tryto follow him on his arduous road.
5 Gilson(.History
intheMiddle
, 142-4)doesnotseemtobe
Philosophy
Ages
ofChristian
constitutive
ofa
is usedto standforeachoftheforms
awarethattheidquoformula
thing'sbeingas wellas itstotalform.
76

12:33:00 PM

1.3 SomeRemarksConcerning
Individuality
Unlike the divine Form or Divine Substance (see Trin. 89,5-15) the
unity of a natural thing is not caused by the simplicityof its own
estunum.To be sure,
nature: naturalium
... nullumsue naturesimplicitate
too
some
kind
natural things
of unity,but theydo not owe this
enjoy
to any natural simplicity,(which they in fact do not even possess).
This raises the question of what is the proper cause of a thing's
individuality. The answer should be: a thing's individuality (or
numerical diversity)is due to its total form, since no total form is
similar to any other total form. Each and every total formproperly
belongs to just one concrete being. A total formis also called collecta
proprietas:
Eut.274,75-92:
UndePiatonis
exomnibus
collecta
nulli
queilliconveniunt
proprietas
est;necPlatoperillam.Albedoveroipsiuset
equeactuequenaturaconformis
naturaintelligitur
eiusautnaturaetactuautsaltern
esse
quecumque
parsproprietatis
conformis.
cuiuslibetcreaturenaturaliter
est
Ideoque nulla pars proprietatis
'individua'
Illaverocuiuslibet
individua,
quamvisratione
singularitatis
sepevocetur.
dissimilitudine
ab omnibus
fuerunt
vel
proprietas
que naturali
que actuvelpotestate
suntvel futurasuntdiffert,
non modo 'singularis'aut 'particularis'
sed etiam
'individua'vereet vocaturet est. Nam 'individua'dicuntur
huiusmodi,
quoniam
eorumex talibus
consistit
unumquodque
proprietatibus
quarumomnium
cogitatione
factacollectio
in alio quolibetalterutrius
numeroparticularium
naturali
numquam
conformitate
eademerit. igiturrationePlatonistotaforma,nullinequeactu
vereestindividua.
Omnisveroparseiussingularis
nequenaturaconformis,
quidem
estsaltemnaturaconformis.
est,nonautemvereindividua,
quoniammultis
Itaque
animaeius, cuiustotaformapars est formePlatonis,non veronominedicitur
'individua'.
HencethesumofPlato'spropernatureconsisting
ofwhatever
befits
him,doesnot
conform
toanyotherone,neither
norbynature,
actually
justas Platodoesnotconform
toanother
hiswhiteness
andwhatever
characbyit.However,
partofhisproper
terare recognized
as conforming
eitherbothbynatureand actually
or at leastby
nature.Therefore
no partof thepropercharacter
of any creature
whatsoever
is
individual
by nature,althoughit is oftencalled'individual'on accountof its
Butthatproper
character
ofwhomsoever
difwhich,byitsdissimilarity,
singularity.
fersfrom
allthosewho,either
havebeenorareorwillbe,truly
orpotentially,
actually
is andis callednotonly'singular'or 'particular'
butalso 'individual'.
Forthings
of
thatsortarecalled'individuals'
becauseeachofthemconsists
ofproperties
suchthat
thecollection
ofallofthemmadebythought
areneverthesamebynatural
conformity
inwhichever
otherparticular
whichis altogether
different6
< from
thatindividual
>.
Fromthisviewpoint,
Plato'stotalform,
neither
norbynaturein
therefore,
actually
withany< otherform>as itis,is truly
individual.
eachofits
However,
conformity
butnottruly
individual,
since,bynatureatleast,itconforms
partsis surely
singular,
tomany.Andso Plato'ssoul,thetotalform
ofwhichis partofhisform,
is nottruly
called'individual'.
6 'alius alteriusnumero'= 'numerically
'alius alterutrius
numero'=
different';
different'.
See Trin.145,89-94.
'altogether
77

12:33:00 PM

So the collection of properties (<collectaproprietas)makes a thing

fromany otherthingsince it always containsone
numericallydifferent
or more partial propertiesby which the thing differsfromeach and
every other one.
The notion of 'individuality' is in fact closely related to those of
'singularity' and 'unity'. For Gilbert, everythingwhich is is singular
but not every singular is an individual. There are two types of
'singulars' (singularia).Some of themmay be said to be similarto other
'
singularsthrough <the conformityor singularityof> theircomplete
proper nature' ( totaproprietate
sua). It is in virtue of their conformity
that when taken jointly {simulomnia) they may be called a divisible
unity( unumdividuum).Gilbert makes clear what he triesto convey by
the following example: however differentthe diverse qualities of
diverse bodies are, fromthe viewpoint of theircomplete species they
are said to be equal ( equates
; Haering's quales must be a misprint):
Eut.270,73-7:Quicquidenimest,singulare
est.Sed non:quidquidest,individuum
suainter
est.Singularium
sesimilia.Que simul
namquealiaaliissunttotaproprietate
huiusrationedicuntur
'unumdividuum',
omniaconformitatis
ut diversorum
cortotasui specieequales.
porumdiversequalitates
butnoteverything
whichisis singular,
whichisis an individual.
Indeed,
Everything
are mutually
similarto othersin virtueofthewholeoftheir
someofthesingulars
Now,whentakenall together
propernatures.
theyarecalleda 'divisible
respective
ofthisconformity.
ofdiverse
one' ontheaccount
bodiesare
E.g. thediverse
qualities
nature.
equal,due to thewholeoftheirspecific
I think Nielsen is right to assume (61, n. 104) than Gilbert, when
asserting that not everythingsingular is individual, presumably has
formsin mind. More precisely,Gilbertmustbe referringto the immanent formsinhering in individuals.
So much forthe firsttypeof singulars. To the second group all those
singulars belong, which, 'through some part of theirproper nature',
are dissimilar fromall other singulars. In virtue of this dissimilarity,
these singulars should be identified {que sola et omnia) with 'individuals':
Aliaveroab aliisomnibus
Ibid.,270,78-80:
aliquasueproprietatis
partedissimilia.
rationeindividua,
ut hiclapis,hoc
Que sola et omniasunthuiusdissimilitudinis
hicequus,hiehomo.
lignum,
fromall others
are dissimilar
somepartoftheir
Othersingulars
however,
through
on accountofthisdissimilarity.
E.g.
propernature.Theyaloneare all individuals
'thisstone','thispieceofwood','thishorse','thisman'.
In another passage, Gilbert is more explicit about the notion of
'individuality'. In this context he determinesthe numerical diversity
78

12:33:00 PM

of Plato and Cicero as resultingfromthe factthat none of the constituents by which one of them is is constitutiveof the other's being.
Similarlythereis nothingat all whose being is due to the same collection of constituentsby which Plato, or Cicero, is:
alterquibus
Trin.146,14-6:
Platoveroa Ciceroneitaestaliusquodetnulloillorum
hisquibusuterqueest.
alterest.Et omninonichilestquod sitomnibus
Platodiffers
from
Ciceroinsucha waythat(1) neither
ofthemisbyanyoftheconstituents
theotherisand(2) thereis nothing
at allwhichowesitsbeingtothe
bywhich
ofthesetwo.
ofconstituents
collections
respective
As had been said before,'unity' is anotherkey notion closelyrelated
to individuality.Recalling the expression unumdividuum
, ('a divisible
) is characterized
unity'), one may statethatany individual ( individuum
by its indivisible or incommunicable unity. After identifyingindividuumwithpersona(in the large sense of the word also coveringtreesand
stones etc.), Gilbert correlates this kind of unity to individualityas
follows:
Ibid., 146,24-28:
Etinnaturalibus
res'persona'
quidemsicestperseunaquecumque
una sit et
vocatur,ut scilicetet cuiuslibetillorumquibus est singularitate
dissimilitudine
illiusquo nullia se aliipotest
etnulloillorum
uniri,individua,
quibus
iliasitque in naturalium
ipsaestaliquidsimuletsingulariter,
genereab eademest
alia.
In thedomainofnaturalthings
m
whichis called'persona'is onebyitself
everything
sucha waythat<one mayfindthefollowing
threecharacteristics
> : (1) itis 'one'
due to thesingularity
ofeachofitsconstituents;
the
(2) it is 'individual'
through
ofthatconstituent
withanyotherthing,
whichmakesitincommunicable
dissimilarity
and(3) that< otherthing
> which,
inthedomainofnaturalthings,
differs
from
the
inquestion,
doesnotoweitsbeingtoanyoftheconstituents
duetowhich,
taken
thing
as wellas onebyone,thelatteris a 'something'.
together
The unityunder discussion is the unityof the total form( totaforma
totius);in the case of one single animad it is defined as the formwhich
consists of all the subsistentiaeof its soul and body (Trin. 167,15-7).
God the Creator, who is himselfa Simple Being, is the Cause that
unites all immanent formsconstitutingan individual entityinto one
total form:
Heb.219,49-52:
etillorum
equeveroin unotantamultitudo
quibussit, etillorum
sit, essepossetnisiUnumPrincipium
hecin ilioiunxisset.
Sicutenim
quibusaliquid
a genuinonativum,
ab eternotemporale,
ab uno alterum,
sic a simpliciauctore
esseoportet.
quodlibet
compositum
therecouldnotin onesinglethingbe sucha multitude
ofelements
conHowever,
stitutive
ofitsbeing
orbeing-aiftherewerenotonePrinciple
to unitethem
something
allwithin
thisthing.
from
an original
Indeed,justas a natural
proceeds
thing
entity,
an eternal
andfrom
onenessotherness,
in thesame
one,andfrom
thinga temporal
takesitsoriginfrom
an agenswhois simple.
wayeverycompound
thingnecessarily
79

12:33:00 PM

That Gilbert here alludes to the generation (creation) of each

individual entityappears fromEut. 305,12-24 as well as Trin. 84,68-9
where he speaks of a thing's immanent form{formaconiuncta
) which is
united with prime matter throughconcretionSee below, our nrs 1.6
and 2.1.
The unity each and every thing possesses is opposed to the
multiplicityof its forms, that is, its 'subsistential' and accidental
forms.
In the second part of this study (below, sub. 3.2) 'unity' and
'individuality' will be discussed in more detail. First, some remarks
about Gilbert's use of terms 'subsistentia', 'subsistens' and 'substantia'.
'
(
'
1.4 ' Substantia*
, subsistens
, subsistentia'
'Substantia' is an equivocal term in Gilbert's usage. Of course he
is aware of its usual meaning 'substance', in which case substantiais
equivalent to id quodest.However, since Boethius it had been also used
to stand forid quo est.At Trin. Ill, 83ff.Gilbertdeals withpeople who
,
apparently were not acquainted with the multiple use of 'substantia*
at least in connection with natural things,and who were not aware of
its signifyingnot only thatwhichis but also thatbywhichit is. Again,
some pages furtheron our author attacksand rectifiesotheropponents
who evidentlyassumed that the term 'substance' should onlyreferto
a thing's ontic constituents(i.e. the subsistentiae
):
a
seda
non generenaturalium
Hoc nomenquod est'substantia',
Trin
. 116,36-41:
illis
est
non
solum
inditum
sunt
esse
omnium
ratione
communi
subsistentium,
que
que
subsedetiamillisquorumipsesuntesse,idestomnibus
suntesse
, idestsubsistentiis,
subet incorporalium,
sistentibus.
Quoniamtamenomnium,idestet corporalium
sistentium
whichmakeup theesse
notonlytothoseelements
is assigned
The name'substance'
are
ofwhichthelatter
thatis,butalsotothosethings
thesubsistentiae
ofsubsistents,
character
is notbasedonthegeneral
andthatassignment
theesse
, viz.allsubsistents;
whichmakeup theesse
ofall thosethings
structure
butthecommon
ofnatural
things
andthe
i.e. boththecorporeal
ofallthosesubsistents,
ofsubsistents.
Since,however,
onesincorporeal
So 'substantia' is not only used to stand forthe subsistentthingitself
('subsistens' or 'id quod') but it also refersto the subsistentmode of
or id quo or esse)
being by which that thing is a subsistent{subsistentia
and, thus, ranges over immaterial as well as material things. Cf. also
Trin. 111,98-101 quoted above.
80

12:33:00 PM

turns out to be what is also called a

This substantia= subsistentia
in
virtue
of which the thingis what it is. The
substantialis
thing'sforma
same use of 'substantia' also occurs in De Trinitate
, where Gilbert
opposes the three Divine Persons against three human individuals:
essehomo
illorum
Trin.135,92-4:
,
quilibet[viz.Plato,Cicero,Trypho]
Quoddicitur
et istorum
, REFERTUR AD
Sanctus]essedeus
quilibet[viz.Pater,Filius,Spiritus
sedad subSUBSTANTIAM,nonque estsedQUA EST, idestnonad subsistentem
sistentiam.
threeis saidtobemanand eachofthelatterthree
The factthateachoftheformer
> substance
is saidtobeGod, appliesto < their
< s > , not< theone> thatis butthe
onebywhich<each ofthem> is; in otherwords:nottothesubsistent
personbut
to thesubsistential
form.
Cf. Trin. 112,10 and:
ET
Heb. 194,90-2:
DIVERSUM EST ESSE, idestsubsistentia
que estinsubsistente,
et corpus,
ID QUOD EST, idestsubsistens
in quo estsubsistentia;
ut corporalitas
humanitas
et homo.
from
'that
ina subsistent,
differs
form
whichis present
'Being',i.e. thesubsistential
which
inwhich
thesubsistential
form
is present;
is', i.e. thesubsistent
e.g. corporality
fromman.
frombodyand manhood
and the subsistentia
Thus both thesubsistens
may be designated by the
word 'substantia', since both of them underly accidents7 ( substat
accidentibus),
althougheach in diverse respects. Thereforethe subsistens
is that substance that 'is-a-something' or 'is-such-and-such-a-being'
(estaliquid), ratherthan the 'substance' by which some object (aliqua
'
is a substance,
rerum)is-a-something'.On the other hand, subsistentia
but not the substance on which some entity (quid) rests as on its
substrate, but rather the substance by which the subsistent 'is-asomething', e.g. 'is-man' or 'is-God':
Non enimsubsistens
Ibid. 135,95-101:
tantumsed etiamsubsistentia
appellatur
diversis
substant.
Sub'substantia'
tamenrationibus,
eoquodutraqueaccidentibus,
- nichilenimsubsistente
sistens
estsubstantia,
nonqua aliquarerum
estaliquid
igitur
- , sedestiliasubstantia
estaliquid
veroestsubstantia,
que estaliquid.Subsistentia
noncui quid nitatur
estALIQUID,
quo ipsaaliquidsit, sed quo solumsubsistens
IDEST estHOMO VEL estDEUS. ..
sincebothofthem
butalsoa subsistentia
is called'substance'
Notonlya subsistent
eachindiverserespects.
is a substantia,
So a subsistent
accidents,
underly
although
butnottheonethrough
whichsomethingis a 'such-and-such-a-being'
(ofcourse,
but <1 mean> that<kind of>
'is a so-and-so'due to a subsistent8),
nothing
7 Forthespecialmeaning
ofquanof'accidens'(whichonlystandsforthecategories
or quality)see below,p. 101.
tity
8 Cf.Eut.262,44:"subsistens
ofaliquid
notions
nichilinformat".
Fortheimportant
andessealiquid
, see below,p. 88 ff.
81

12:33:00 PM

whichis something.
substantia
On theotherhand,a subsistentia
is a substantia,
but
notthekindofsubstantia
restsin orderto be a something,
uponwhichsomething
> duetowhichonlya subsistent
nay<1 meanthatkindofsubstantia
is-a-something,
i.e. is-a-man
or is-God....
So the term 'subsistentia' has a twofoldconnotation: firsta relational sense, viz. that of underlying {substare)accidental modes of
being, and second an absolute sense which concerns the nature of its
own being.
Gilbert discusses the notion of substarewhen dealing with what is
called the ratio subiectionis'see below, p. 85. As to the absolute
sense, subsistentiamay be described as any mode of being in virtue
of which an object is an aliquid ('a something'). Thus subsistentiais
oftencalled a thing's esseor id quo or the cause of its essealiquid('beinga-something'):
Trin.99,92-5:Quoniamvero... subsistentia
causaestutid quodperearnestaliquid
,
suis propriissit subiectum,
eisdem'subiecta'
ipsa quoque per denominationem
et eorundem
dicitur
'materia'.
isthecausesuchthatthatwhich
itisa something
Since,then,thesubsistentia
through
thelatter,
is also
properties,
subjecttoits[i.e. ofthesubsistential]
bydenomination,
calledthe'subject'and the'matter'ofthose< accidents,
[seeibid.99,90]>.
which makes the
The subsistentiais also called the naturasubsistentis
latteran aliquid. In fact,the term 4natura' covers both the subsistential
as well as the accidental forms,quality and quantity:
estqua ipsumsubsistens
est.He vero
Eut.319,59-62:
Naturaenimsubsistentis
aliquid
et interformeet que illisin ipsosubsistente
adsuntqualitates
suntsubstantiales
vallaresmensure.
itself
A subsistent's
isthatbywhichthesubsistent
nature
Well,such
'is-a-something'.
whicharepresent
forms
andthequalitiesandspatialdimensions
arethesubstantial
in thesubsistent
as theircompanions
[i.e. ofthesubstantial
forms].
A passage of the De Trinitatecommentarymay be parallelled:
Trin.118,1-7:Et dicimusquod subsistentie
et eorumquorumsuntesse
, dicuntur
illud
estillorum
scilicet
omnium
estsubstantia,
substantie:
corporum
(utcorporalitas
estaliquid)et eorumque, cumnonsintaliquorum
essequo unumquodque
ipsorum
substantia
colorum
uteademcorporalitas
est,
esse,tamenid quodestessesecuntur,
illorum
sitaliquid
nonscilicet
, sedquod
quo quilibet
eoquodipsasitilludessecolorum
nisiperearnnulluscolordicide corporepossit.
of
are calledthe'substances'
We assertthatthesubsistentiae
(1) ofthoseentities
ofall bodies,thatis tosay,
is the'substance'
whichtheyaretheesse(e.g. corporality
and(2) ofthoseentities
itisthatesseinthembywhicheachofthem'is-a-something'),
theesse.
nevertheless
follow
which,although
theydo notmakeup theesseofthings,
> colours,
whichdoes,howof <a thing's
is alsothe'substance'
So thecorporality
ever,notmeanthatitwouldmakeup thatesseofthecoloursbywhicheachofthem
82

12:33:00 PM

be saidofa body
wouldbe-a-something,
butinthesensethatnocolourcanpossibly
unlessviacorporality.
When commenting upon the famous axiom in De hebdomadibus
(Diversumestesseetid quodest)Gilbert discusses a group of philosophers
who make a distinctionbetween the cause of an object's esseand that
of its essealiquid:
etesse
Heb.194,71-73:
Aliiverodividunt
etea que subsistunt
dicuntessesubsistentiis
scilicetmensuriset
intervallaribus
comitantur,
aliquidhis que subsistentias
qualitatibus.
which
insaying
thatthoseentities
Thereareothers,
whomakea distinction
however,
subsistaredue to < their
due to thatwhich
> subsistentiae
and 'are-a-something'
and thequalities.
thelatter,
accompanies
namelythespatialdimensions
Apparently,Gilbert accepts such a distinction:
etspiritu
sibiconiunctis
Eut.292,24-8:
unusest,suntesse
Uthomini,
qui ex corpore
omnescorporis
subsistentie
etaliequedamque inipsoex eorumfiunt
atquespiritus
et mensuris
concursu:
idemverohomoex hisque subsistentiis
adsuntqualitatibus
intervallaribus
est.
aliquid
ofbodyandmind,his
E.g. inthecaseofa man,whois 'one' duetotheconjunction
esseismadeupofallthesubsistentiae
ofhisbodyandmindas wellas other
oneswhich
theconcurrence
ofbodyandsoul;whereas
ariseinhimthrough
thesameman'is-adue to thequalitiesand spatialdimensions
whichaccompany
thesubsomething'
sistentiae.
Several subsistentiae
are to be found in any object, which are as many
, speciales
, or differentiales
formaeessendi.They are called generales
(or just
are
and
and
,
,
accompanied
genus species
specificarespectively)
differentia
by the accidental formsquality and quantity:
Trin.61,7-9:... uniussubsistentis
diversis
subsistentiis
diversaaddictasunt,utunius
hominis
discretio.
color,sensibilitati
corporalitati
passio,rationalitati
Diverse< accidents
> areattached
to thediversesubsistentiae
ofonesinglesubsistent.E.g. ofonesingleman,a colourtohiscorporality,
an affection
tohissensibility
anddiscernement
to hisrationality.
Gilbert elucidates this diversityby contrastingit with the nature of
God's Being:
Eut.261,36-262,42:
aliam
Auctor
Deus etsia theologicis
secundum
quoqueomnium
rationem
universorum
a se creatorum
'natura'et rectedegentis
creature
rationalis
'forma'dicatur,nequaquamtamensecundum
illamrationem
qua subsistentium
'formas'
suntgenerales
autspeciales
autdiflogicivocantipsaseorumquibusaliquid
ferentiales
etiamquasdam
subsistentias,
aut,secundum
quartumgenusqualitatis,
accidentales,
Ipseestforma.
from
another
calltheMakerofeverything,
Although,
pointofview,thetheologians
God, 'thenature'ofall thatwhichhas beencreatedby Him and the'form'ofa
rational
creature
Ke isbynomeansa 'form'intheway
nevertheless
livingrightfully,
83

12:33:00 PM

inwhichthelogicians
callthegeneric,
ordifferential
subsistentiae
ofthesubspecific
their'forms',or, according
sistente
to the
by whichthelatter'are-a-something',
kindofquality[cf.Arist.,Categ.8,1Oal1], certain
fourth
accidental
ones.
Thus all kinds of subsistentia
are as many modes of being thatmake up
a subsistens:
Trin.117,78-83:
'substantia'
dicitur.
esse,eorundem
Quicquidenimestsubsistentium
subsistentium
subsistentie
etomnesexquibushe
Quodutiquesunt9omnium
speciales
eorundem
subsistentium
sunt
sunt,scilicet
composite
perquas ipsasibiconformia
suntdiffereniiales
.
, et omnesperquas ipsadissimilia
generales
Forwhatever
makesup theesseofthesubsistente
is calledtheir'substance'.
Suchare
thespecific
subsistentiae
ofall subsistents,
and all thoseofwhichtheyare
definitely
onesofthosesubsistents
in virtueofwhichtheyconnamelythegeneric
composed,
to oneanother,
as wellas all thedifferential
form
onesin virtue
ofwhichtheydiffer
fromone another.
One may compare a passage of ContraEutychen:
Eut.312,5-9:...substantia
esteorumque per
'subsistentia',
que alionominedicitur
natura.Genusveronichilaliudputandum
earnsubsistunt
estnisisubsistentiarum
secundum
totamearumproprietatem
ex rebussecundum
speciessuasdifferentibus
similitudine
collectio.
comparata
The substance
is thenatureofthoseentities
thatis alternatively
called'subsistentia'
ofthis< nature
The genusshouldbe considered
whichin virtue
>, subsist.
nothing
otherthana collection
whichin virtueofthecomplete
ofsubsistentiae
naturethey
makeup is brought
outofthethings
whicharespecifically
<and
different,
together
< ofthosesubsistentiae
>.
that> becauseofthesimilarity
Later on we shall go into the differentrelationshipsbetween the constitutiveelements of a natura(below, nrs 1.8 and 3.1), when dealing
with the notion of participatif).
Of course, a specialissubsistentia
(or species) cannot be of a simple
nature:
tamenattendendum
estquod,quoniamspecifica
differentia
Eut.263,75-7:Diligenter
cum genereconstituit
speciem,cuiuslibet
specialissubsistentia
simplexesse non
potest.
observed
difference
witha genus
It shouldbe carefully
that,sincea specific
together
cannotbe simple.
makesup a species,thesubsistentia
ofeachspecific
entity
So much for the subsistentia as a mode of being constitutingan
object's esseor essealiquid. Next we must consider what I have called
" where
9 "Quod utiquesunt... etc.
actsas
quod(viz.theesseofthe'subsistents')
exquibus
etc.arethecompound
andomnes
subsistentie
whereas
term,
speciales
predicate
tosaying:thisesseofan objectconsists
statement
amounts
So Gilbert's
subjectterms.
constitutive
ofa specialsubsistentia
parts,viz.genusand
(= species)andthelatter's
difference.
specific
84

12:33:00 PM

(above, p. 82) the relational characteristic of subsistentiawhich

concernsits acting as a substratumof other forms(whethersubsistenand
tial or accidental ones). We should recall, first,that subsistentia
substantiaare closely related (cf. above, p. 81). That is why we are
entitledto use the term 'substantia' to designate the former:
etincorporalium,
idestetcorporalium
subTrin.116,40-5:
omnium,
Quoniamtarnen
sistentium
subsistentia
communi
esset,nomennon
generalissimm
quodab illorum
ubi ait
habetur,sepe Latinihoc pro eo ponunt.Unde et in Ysagogis
Porphirius
"et ipsaestgenus".Quem istesecutuspro
"substantia
et quiddam".10
supponiti
ait: 'substantia'.
omnium
subsistentium
generalissimo
thereis no propernameforthatwhichofall thosesubsistents
i.e.
Since,however,
boththecorporeal
and theincorporeal
oneswouldbe themostgeneric< nature
>
in theircommon
oftenuse theword'substance'to
theLatinauthors
subsistentia,
where
hesays"substance
anda certain
standforit.HencealsointheYsagoge
thing"
adds: "and it [substance]
himBoethiususes
is a genus".In following
Porphyry
to indicate
themostgeneric< nature
> ofdisubsistents.
'substance'
That Substantia' has the connotation of 'substare' when used in the
case of natural bodies is clearly confirmedby Gilbert. This becomes
most obvious in a passage where he denies such a connotation of
'substantia' when said of God:
nonestsubiectionis
nominamus
Trin.120,70-3:Quod igiturin Ilio 'substantiam'
est subiectaSUBrationequod dicitur.SED ULTRA omnemque accidentibus
accidereomninosolitaria.
STANTIAMestessentiaabsqueomnibus
que possunt
whatwecall'substance'
inHimis notcalledthusbecauseofitsbeingany
Therefore,
of
substrate.
Rather,beyondall < kindsof> substancewhichis thesubstrate
He is an Essencewhichis completely
withoutany possible
accidents,
solitary,
accidents.
Cf. ibid. 120,56-8; 121,86-7. However, as far as natural bodies are
concerned this ratiosubiectionis
(= 'substrate-character') is found in
subsistentiaeas well as in substances. To be sure, the modusquo is different,as appears fromthe discussion usually made between inesseand
adesseon this score; see below, nr 1.71. Gilbert stresses the fact that
both fromthe ontological and the logical points of view (our author
etdictionum
causas; 279,35) 'subsistentia' and
says iuxtarerum
proprietates
'substantia' are interchangeablelabels and illustratesthis by means of
theirGreek equivalents (279,34-40) He comments upon the Boethian
text as follows:
10Apparently
ofourmanuscripts)
instead
Gilbert
readsetquiddam
(withthemajority
estquidem.
ofthecorrect
ed. Minio-Paluello,
in Aristoteles
latinus
See Isagoge
Porphyrii
I 6, p. 9, 19.
85

12:33:00 PM

Eut. 280,41-53:Et quare vel illud'subsistentiam'

vel id 'substantiam'
dicamus
SUBSISTIT ENIM illudet quadamrationeestperse QUOD
rationem
subiungit:
NON INDIGET ACCIDENTIBUS UT ESSE POSSIT. Immoaccidentia
eoquod
etperse essedicitur,
subsistere
adeoindigent
hacratione
nulli
quod,nisiilli11assint,
inessepossunt.
Omneetenim
accidens
alicuiussubsistentie
addictum
estpotestati.
Et
ideo 'accidens'vocaturquoniamilliadestcumalicuisubsistentium
inest;ut color
adestcorporalitati
ut insitcorpori.
And <Boethius> adds thereasonwhywe call one 'subsistentia'
and theother
'substantia':
fortheformer
subsists
andis,insomerespect,
sinceitdoesnot
byitself
needaccidents
in orderto be capableofbeing.Rather,theaccidents
requirethat
andbebyitself,
tosucha greatextent
whichisthussaidtosubsist
thatthey
areunable
in anything
to be present
unlessbywayofaccompanying
it. Foreachaccident
is
ofsomesubsistentia.
Anditbearsthenameof'accident'for
tothepotency
attached
this[thesubsistentia]
whenitis present
insomesubthereasonthatitaccompanies
to be present
in a body.
sistent;
corporality
e.g. a colouraccompanies
A subsistentia
acts as an intermediatebetween the subsistens
(or id quod)
and its propertiessuch that the formeris the substrateforthe properties via the correspondingsubsistentialform;see Trin. 99,92-5, quoted
above p. 82. So every subsistentia has a certain kind of 'being in
itself' or some kind of being proper to it. The accidents do not possess
such a being and, in order to actually be, theyrequire some subsistentia
of substances difto which theybelong. Of course the ratiosubiectionis
fers fromthat of subsistentialforms:
ITA SUSCIPIT ACCIDENTIA sicuthomo
Trin.99,83-9:Non enimhumanitas
;
ab aliquasubsistentia
scilicet
quaminse habeat,aliquid
EOQUOD IPSA humanitas
eiusin se habeatproprietate
EST iuxtacuiusprincipalitatem
quadamaccommoda
SUBIECTA (et pereandem
accidentia:SED EOQUOD EI, scilicethumanitati,
datadesse
MATERIAexipsaEST aliquid,utqueilliproprietate
illorum
nuncupata)
cumipspossitsuscipere.
concretio,
accidents
inthesamewasas 'man'does;towit,<it
For'manhood'doesnotreceive
thefactthatmanhood'is-a-something'
> through
due to
doesnotreceiveaccidents
withwhoseprimary
it has,
in it, in conformity
somesubsistentia
position
present
rather<it receives
accidents;
owingto thelatter'spropernature,someapropriate
substrate
toit,viz. manhood
thefactthatthematter
them> through
(whichviathe
owesits'being-a-something'
oftheaccidents),
to thesublatteris calledthematter
withthesubsistentia,
so thatit is capableof receiving,
those
sistentia
together
it [thesubsistential]
viathe
allowstoaccompany
> whichtheconcretion
< accidents
< latter's
> property.
11Hringfollows
themajority
oftheMSS, readingilia.I wouldprefer
toreadwith
314andtheParisianmanuscript
someMSS (Bologna
1509,Klosterneuburg
345,Zwettl
toHring,"remarkably
12120(thetextofwhich
is,according
accurate")thesingular
areinneedofthatwhich
infactsaysthattheaccidents
dativecaseilli.Gilbert
(eoquod)
unlessthey
tosuchanextent
that{adeoquod),
andbeonitself,
issaidtosubsist
appertain
inhere
in anything.
to theeoquod),theycannotpossibily
to it (Uli,whichrefers
86

12:33:00 PM

Neverthelessthe truesubstare
is the privilegeof the id quod; and in order
that there actually be substantial forms and that accidents actually
exist an id quodis required as theirsubstratum.If the latteris missing
no real inessecan be the case. However, forthere to be accidents the
is no less indispensable:
intermediaryrole of the subsistentiae
Eut. 258,28-34:
... quespecialibus
subsistentiis
dicuntur
nontamipsisquam
accidere,
addicuntur:
aliquibus
ipsarum
partibus
(immoideoipsisquoniamipsarum
partibus)
ut cumspecialisubsistentie
in nobiscolor,
qua hominessumus,adessedicuntur
ideoutiquehecdicuntur
sanitasatquescientia,
quoniameiuspartibus
proprietatis
- colorscilicet
- conratione
sanitassensibilitati,
scientia
rationalitati
corporalitati,
veniunt.
whicharecalledtheaccidents
Thosethings
ofspecific
areattached
subsistentiae
not
so muchtothelatter
themselves
as tocertain
partsofthem(orrather,
[subsistentiae]
as suchprecisely
to thesubsistentiae
because<theyareattached
> to theirparts).
healthandknowledge
inusaresaidtoaccompany
thespecific
subE.g. whencolour,
sistentia
wearemen,theyarethuscalledforthereason,nodoubt,thatthey
bywhich
befitthepartsofit [thesubsistentia]
to theirpropercharacter,
viz.colour
according
befits
healthbeingsensible[= an animal],and knowledge
corporality,
rationality.
Sometimes this adesseis called comitari:
Trin.119,22-3:
cumde subsistentibus
tameneorumsubsistentias
comitandicantur,
tur.Cf.Eut.247,25-6,
quotedbelow,nr1.6.
are saidofthesubsistents,
nevertheless
they[theaccidents]
Although
theyare the
ofthelatters'subsistentiae.
companions
Heb. 194,72-3:... hisque subsistentias
intervallaribus
scilicet
mensuris
comitantur,
et qualitatibus.
... thoseentities
whichaccompany
thesubsistentiae,
namelythespatialdimensions
and thequalities.
Elsewhere (viz. in ContraEutychen
where Gilbert is in need of a strong
and subsistentia)
he makes the most of the
oppositionbetweensubstantia
and
differences
between
the
two:
ontological
logical
Eut.243,25-8:Hic diligenter
estattendendum
cumsubsistentia
vel
quodsubsistens
accidentibus
nulloprorsus
convenit.
Nametsisubsistens
et subgenereseu ratione
sistentia
dicuntur
'substantie'
vel 'subiecta',alia tamenatquealia ratione.
Hereyoushouldcarefully
observethata subsistent
doesnotagreewith
absolutely
< its> subsistentia
or accidents
naturenorconceptually.
Foralthough
quageneric
boththesubsistent
and the subsistentia
are called'substances'or 'subjects'[=
it is notin thesamesense.
substrates],
1.5 Esse and essealiquid
As we have already see (above, p. 81), the subsistentiae
are the
modes of being that grant an object its 'being-a-something' (esse
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aliquid), or, if you wish, determine(in an ontological as well as in a

logical sense) its being (e.g. 'being-stone', 'being-man', and so on).
cause an object to be 'a something'; see the texts
The subsistentiae
quoted above.
In conformitywith what is said at Trin. 135,95 ff. (see above,
p. 81), Gilbert says that it is the generic and specific subsistentiae
that give an object its essealiquid:
Trin
. 81,73-5:Ad generales
in
quoqueet specialessubsistentias
que subsistentium
eiusdem
nominis
conferunt,
quibussunt'esse'dicuntur
eoquodeisutsint
aliquid
(idcst
'materie')alia fitdenominatio.
Stillanotherdenominative
use of the same nounviz. 'matter'occurs<when
andspecific
subsistentiae;
theyarecalledtheesseofthesubapplied> tothegeneric
becausetheygrantthemto 'be-a-something'
sistents
in whichtheyare present
in quo estet
Ibid.81,80-4:Verbigratia:quoniamcorporalitas,
que estessecorporis
idestcorpus,eidemconfert
ut figurarum
et
qua ipsumestaliquidnaturaliter,
aliorum
eteiusaddictapotestati
huiusmodi
cumeademinse
que causacorporalitatis
'materia'dicitur.
habet,sitmateria,
ipsaquoqueeorundem
Forinstance,
sincecorporality,
whichis theesseofthebodyinwhichitis present
and
viz. a body,grants
itto be the
bywhichit [thebody],bynature,'is-a-something',
and as being
matter
ofitsshapesand all thelikewhich,becauseofitscorporality
in itself
it possesses
to thepotency
ofthis[corporality],
withthis
attached
together
> it [thesubsistentia],
toois itself
calledtheir'matter'.
< therefore
[corporality],
in the sense of id quod
We are already familiarwith the termsubsistens
est. It is also called an aliquid {Eut. 319,59: ipsum subsistens aliquid
est). However, formallyspeaking the expressions id quod and aliquid
are by no means equivalent. I intend to demonstrate this first,by
means of a scrutinous reading of Gilbert's discussion of the famous
distinctionbetweenesseand essealiquidin his commentaryon Boethius'
and secondly, by closely studyingall passages in his
De hebdomadibus
other works in which he explicitly opposes esse aliquid against esse
Thus the precise meaning of aliquid may be best set out.
simpliciter.
Preliminary to his exposition of Boethius' second Theorem in De
hebdomadibus
(" Diversumestesseetid quodest") Gilbert draws our attention to the equivocal use of the termsesseand essealiquid. The several
distinctionsdo not only run parallel to the formaldifferencesbetween
the diverse disciplines, theology and philosophy, but are also found
within the domain of philosophy itself.
The view of the theologians is discussed first.Gilbert explains it by
referringto the logico-grammaticaluse of the termsesseand est.Essentially speaking, these termsapply to God only; theymay be used for
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creaturesonly in the weakest formof metaphor, the so-called 'extrinsic denomination':

in
videtur
Heb.193,51-8:Hic commemorandum
philosophorum
quod diversorum
Nam
dicuntur.
usudiverso'esse' et 'essealiquid'multipliciter
diversis
facultatibus
cumdicimus'Deus est',
divinaessentia,
in theologica,
quamde Deo predicamus
esse.Cum enimdicimus:'corpusest'vel 'homoest' vel
omnium
creatorum
dicitur
denominatione
hocessedictum
huiusmodi,
quadamextrnseca
intelligunt
theologici
ab essentia
sui Principii.
thedifferent
it seems,that,through
Hereit shouldbe recalled,
usagesofdifferent
are
> 'being'and'being-a-something'
indifferent
< theterms
disciplines,
philosophers
of
theDivineEssence(whichwe predicate
usedmultifariously.
Indeedin theology,
Forwhenwe say'a body
God in saying'God is') is saidtotheesseofall creatures.
understand
thisto be saidbysome
is' or 'a manis' and thelike,thetheologians
fromtheessenceoftheirPrinciple.
extrinsic
denomination
deriving
This is furtherexplained: the subsistentia
, corporalitas only grants a
body its eing-a-something,ratherthan its 'being' as such:
,
Ibid., 193,59-62:Non enimdicuntcorporalitate
corpusessesed essealiquid
essenEtsimiliter
subsistens
hominem
essesedessealiquid.
humanitate
unumquodque
nonessealiquid
sedesse,iliaveroque inipsocreataestsubtiasuiPrincipii
predicant
nonessesedessealiquid.
sistentia
northat
a bodyis,butrather
. Fortheydo notsaythatbycorporality
'is-a-something',
subsisAndsimilarly,
a manis,but'is-a-something'.
theyassertofevery
bymanhood
andbythe
itisrather
than'is-a-something';
tentthat,bytheessenceofitsPrinciple,
rather
thanis.
whichhasbeencreatedin it 'is-a-something'
subsistentia
Thus it is not an object's nature that causes it to be, but it is God who
make it be-such-and-such
bestows esseupon it, whereas the subsistentiae
(esse aliquid) or make it partake in some way or another in Perfect
Being (Esse).
Next the philosopherscome up fordiscussion. Firstthese people are
characterizedas those who only accept as the kinds of being (genera)
proper to theirdiscipline those entitieswhich derive theirbeing (esse)
fromthe Principle of All, God. They are divided into two subgroups.
The firsthold that one and the same constitutiveelement is responsible for the 'being' and the 'being-a-something' (esse aliquid) of the
thingsthey talk about. Thus the verb 'est' is equivocally predicated
of all entities:
Illorum
verophilosophorum
Ibid., 193,66-70:
generasuntsola
quibussuefacultatis
idest
aliiquelibet
suarumthemata,
esseceperunt,
iliaorationum
iliaqueexPrincipio
Unde
eodemquo dicunt
esse
de quibusloquuntur,
, dicuntetiamessealiquid.
materias,
etiamhocverbum'est' dicuntde omnibus
cquivocepredicari.
whichhavereceived
theirbeing
to whomonlythoseentities
Of thosephilosophers
someassertthat,
fromthe Principle
are thegenerastudiedin theirdiscipline,
thesubjects
oftheirstatements,
whatever
they'are-a-something'
bythesamecause
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as theyassertthemtobe. Hencetheysaythattheverb'r'is predicated

ofall things
equivocally.
Of course, this ontological view is genuinelyAristotelian("forma dat
esse,,). The second group of philosophersdistinguishes,first,between
those cases in which the three major Aristotelian categories
(substance, quantity,quality) are involvedand the area covered by the
seven other categories ('relation', 'where', when', 'being-in-a-position', 'having', 'doing' and 'being affected'; see Aristotle,Categories
'
'
4,1b 25 ff.). In their view the 'esse' vs. essealiquid distinctionbears
only on the domain of substance, quantityand quality, such that an
object's esse(or 'being') is due to its subsistentiae(which are in fact
the generic and specificformsin the categoryof substance), whereas
it owes its essealiquid(or 'being-a-something'ratherthat 'being something') to the quantities and qualities which accompany the subsistentiae; see ibid. 194,72 f, quoted above, p. 83.
Whereverthe seven othercategoriesare involved thesephilosophers
(including Gilbert) do not speak of essenor of essealiquid, since those
categories only apply to an object's status or condition, as will appear
later on (below, p. 104 ff.):
Ibid.194,74-5:Ceterisveroseptemgenerum
eademsubsistentia
nec
predicamentis
essenecaliquidesseconcedunt.
theaforesaid12
subsistents
Theyassertthat,by theremaining
genericcategories,
neither
arenor'are-a-something'.
Ibid.197,52-5:Sicutprediximus,
ea que subsistunt,
dicunt
quidamphilosophorum
esse13solissubsistentiis
etessealiquid
videlicet
quibusdam
quealiasunta subsistentiis,
solisaccidentibus14.
Secundum
huncusumhoclocosolumsubsistens
solisaccidentibusessealiquiddicitur.
As wehavesaidbefore,
oftheentities
whichsubsist,
somephilosophers
saythatthey
aredue to thesubsistentiae
due to certainelements
alone,and 'are-a-something'
whichdiffer
from
thesubsistentiae,
theaccidents
alone.It is according
tothis
namely
12It seemstobe usefulto recallthat,as in classicalLatin,in MediaevalLatin,too
is usedtorepeata subjectorobjectterminordertoadd another
idem
predicate:
e.g.
'Platoambulatet idem(homo)disputt'(Cf. e.g. Trin.95,81:"est et idemhomo
subsistentia
recallstheforegong
ea quesubsistunt
; hencemy
spiritus").So hereeadem
To be complete,
'aforesaid'.
theadverbitem
has thereverse
function:
it
rendering:
ismaintained
andanother
isusedwhenthepredicate
is introduced;
subject
e.g. 'Plato
ambulatet itemSocrates'('and so doesSocrates').
**seemsto
13Hring'spresentation
ofthetextdicunt
"esse"et"essealiquid
that
suggest
he takesdicunt
to mean"theycall(insteadofthecorrect
rendering,
"theysaythat"'
as editorheusesinverted
commasinsuchcases;seee.g. 119,29;195,2-4).Ofcourse
one has to understand:
entities
areetc." The correct
"theysay thatthesubsistent
ofGilbert'stextin a similar
case is foundat Trin.136,13.
presentation
14Byaccidentia
are meant;see below,p. 101.
and qualitas
onlyquantitas
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aloneis saidto 'be-a-something'

usagethat,in thispassage,thesubsistent
onlyby
itsaccidents.
In fact, philosophers belonging to this group also refrain from
distinguishingesseand essealiquidwhen theydeal with thingsas taken
according to the so-called mathematical abstraction. This type of
abstractionconsidersembodied forms( inabstracta
) apart fromthe matter theyinhere in as immanent ontic principles.15Thus the whiteness
( albedo
) inhering in some white thing {album) is as such part of an
object's esse aliquid, yet when taken apart from its substratum by
mathematicalabstractionit is no longer characterizedas essealiquidor
esse:
Ibid.194,75-7:Similiter
et nullumillorumque abstractio
mathematica
ab his de
velessevelaliquid
esseconsentiunt.17
dividit,
quibuspredicantur16
thatnothing
ofthatwhich
mathematical
abstraction
Similarly,
theyareoftheopinion
fromthethings
ofwhichtheyarepredicated,
is or 'is-a-something'.
distinguishes
We should keep in mind that elsewhere, our author subscribes to the
second philosophical view mentioned above, p. 83 (although the
strictopposition between esseand essealiquid is not continually maintained; see below, p. 92 ff.):
Trin.136,12-16:
Hec ergosunt,idestsubsistentie
qualitates
quantitates
spatiorum,
essealiquid
NAM IN CETERIS, idestceterorum,
quibussolissubsistens
predicatur.
PREDICATIONIBUS NICHIL TALE EST, idestnulloaliorum(hocestneque
illisquibusnichilestmagnum
quantitatibus
nequealiorum
generum
predicamentis)
subsistens
estaliquid.
These (i.e. thesubsistentiae,
the qualitiesand thespatialquantities)are those
elements
is predicated
to 'be-a-something'.
Forin the
bywhichalonea subsistent
kindsofpredication
thereis
remaining
(i.e. in thoseoftheremaining
categories)
ofthesort,thatis tosay,itis bynoneoftheotherelements
nothing
(i.e. neither
by
thosequantities
is greatnorby any of theothercategories
by whichanything
modesofbeing'])thata subsistens
[= 'categorial
'is-a-something'.
Eut.319,59-320,74:
Forthistext,see below,p. 104.
Cf. Eut. 292, 24-32 (firstpart quoted above, p. 83) and Eut. 260,8790, quoted below, p. 110.
15The theological
considers
theformae
i.e. theforms
whose
speculation
separatae,
natureit is to be without
embodiment.
For thesekindsof speculatio,
see Trin.
abstrahunt
mathematici.
See also
79,42- 89,3;Eut.216,59:etsicquideminabstracta
4.
below,oursection
16In writing
dequibus
Gilbert
usesa logicalexpression,
whichin thisconpredicantur
textequalstheontological
formula:
'inquibus
sun.
17As is easilyseenthe
no lessthanthe(Platonic)philosophers
ofthe
theologians
secondgrouphaveno problem
at all withthecontradistinction
ofesseand idquodest
as defended
See Gilbert's
remarks
at Heb.194,79-85.
byBoethius.
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So much forthe distinctionbetween esseand essealiquidfeaturingin

De hebdomadibus.
Now, let us tryto determinepreciselywhat it is that
Gilbert understandsby (esse)aliquidin his otherworks. To begin with,
the strictopposition between esse(simpliciter)
and essealiquid which is
such a basic distinction in the discussion of De hebdomadibus
(esp.
Theorem II), is seldom found elsewhere. As forGilbert, it is of paramount importanceto realise thathis essealiquidalways stands forsome
determinate mode of being to be distinguishedfrom God's Perfect
Being on the one hand and the inferior,transitoryappurtenances of
natural bodies covered by the term 'status' on the other (see also
below, p. 104).
Three kinds of contexts in which essealiquid occurs may be distinguished:
a those in which essealiquidis said to be caused by the accidental forms
(as in the exposition found in Heb. , Theorem II = Heb. 193,51-195,7).
Eut.292,24-8,quotedabovep. 83.
enimestetpluribus
Heb.200,46- 201,47:Pluribus
aliquidest.Ipseveroeodemquo
est
est,aliquid
and 'is-such-and-such'
> is by a plurality
of elements
<A creature
by another
is and 'is-such-and-such'
God,however,
bythesame<nature>.
plurality.
Trin.87,55-9,quotedbelow.
b those in which essealiquid is said to be caused by the subsistential
forms:
Trin.81,73-84,quotedabove,p. 88.
sit.
incssefacitutcuiinest,ab ea aliquid
Trin.84,54-5:Creationamquesubsistentiam
in something
suchthatthatinwhich
toinhere
Creationindeedcausesa subsistentia
due to it.
it inheres'is-a-something'
Trin.99,-5,quotedabove,p. 82.
Trin.84, 67-9,quotedbelow,p. 94.
Trin.135,95-101,
quotedabove,p. 81.
Eut.261,36-262,42,
quotedabove,p. 83.
subsistentia.
Eut.263,80:NonestergoDeus aliquidvel specialivelspecifica
due to anyspecialor specific
subsistentia.
Therefore
God is not'a-something'
those in which essealiquid is said to be caused by the whole of subsistentialformsplus accidents, which collection is also called natura:
ex diversissubsistentibus
comTrin.97,53- 98,59: Nec modo subsistentium
etiamsimplicium
anima,que
(utesthominis
positorum
(utesthomovellapis)verum
vel affecsubsistens
ex nullissubsistentibus
constat)et omniumsubsistentiarum
utnonsintPrinetdeniqueomnium
tionum
accidentalium
que sicsuntex Principio
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Acper
estaliquid.
est,multasuntexquibusunumquodque
qualiter
cipium,
predictum
hocveraratione
nullumeorumestidquodest.
ofdifferent
subsistentiae
Notonlyin thecaseofsubsistents
composed
(suchas man
orstone)butalsoin thatofsimplesubsistents
(suchas man'ssoul,whichsubsistens
or accidental
as wellas all subsistentiae
doesnotconsistofanyothersubsistents)
in such
from
thePrinciple
all thoseentities
whichoriginate
and,inshort,
properties
there
a principle;
a waythattheyarenotthemselves
well,as has beensaidbefore,
Andthatis whytruly
are manyelements
bywhicheachofthem'is-a-something'.
noneofthemis an idquodest[= subsistent
thing].
Trin.136,12-6,
quotedabove,p. 91.
subsistentium
Trin.89,10-11:quodunumquodque
aliquidest,estex propriaforma
que inestmaterie.
is due to itsproperforminhering
in matter.
Thateachsubsistent
'is-a-something'
est.Et
Trin.144,58-81:
In naturalibus
enimquicquidest,alioquamipsumsitaliquid
est.
, singulare
, singulare
est,id quoquequodeo estaliquid
quoniamid quoestaliquid
sinenumero
sicutunosingulari
itaunum
Nampluranumero
nonsunt
aliquid
aliquid,
estetiamid quod eo
eiusquo est,singulare
essenonpossunt.Itaquesingularitate
est.... Attendendum
veroquodea quibusid quodestestaliquid
, autSimplicia
aliquid
addenautcomposita
... His itase habentibus
sunt(utrationalitas)
(uthumanitas).
et
idestgeneriset differentie
multorum
dumestquodomnesubsistens
quibusest,
concretione
subsistit.
Ac perhocalioest18alioqueestaliquid.
accidentis,
In thedomainofnatural
is'is-a-something'
otherthan
whatever
bysomething
things,
is singular,thatwhich'is-aitself.And sincethatby whichit 'is-a-something'
duetothis,is singular.
arenotsuchForas numerically
different
entities
something'
or-such
duetoonesingular
likewise
element,
theycannotbejustonesinglething19.
oftheelement
Therefore,
bythesingularity
bywhichit is, thatwhich,bythisele... Itshouldbeobserved,
thatthose
isalsosingular.
ment,'is-a-something',
however,
elements
thatwhich
is'is-a-something'
areeither
bywhich
simple
(suchas rationality)
in
or compound
(suchas manhood).... Thisbeingthecase,it shouldbe remarked
addition
thateverysubsistent
subsists
due
to
the
concretion
of
the
multitude
of
thing
theconstituents
whichitis. Hence
andaccidens)through
(namely
genus,differentia
to another.
it owesitsbeing
and itsbeing-a-something
to oneconstituent
Eut.319,59-62,
quotedbelow,p. 104.
Eut.247,20-23,
quotedbelow,p. 94.
Eut.261,38-262
,42, quotedabove,p. 83.
1.6 Esse aliquid and the notions of creation and concretion
It may be gathered fromall this evidence that essealiquid has three
characteristics:
18I readalioest(withtheMSS kNOv)'Hringfollows
theother
MSS inreading
aliquo.
19Some manuscripts
have insertedthe following
gloss: "ut hominesduo una
humanitate
unushomosingularitate
essentie
("suchas twomen<maybe> oneman
oftheiressential
bythesingularity
nature")".
93

12:33:00 PM

(1) qua merelya mode of being essealiquidis somewhat restrictedand

inferiorto PerfectBeing. Therefore God is not an aliquid:
sunt
Eut.246,17- 247,28:Et nativaquidemeorumquibusaliquid
, fictaveroeorum
Genuinavero,que sunt
amminiculis
concipiuntur.
quibusaliquidessefinguntur
etprimordialis
nativorum
materia)
longealiter.Nonenimsunt
(Deusscilicet
principia
velqualitatibus
subsistentiis
velquantitatibus
huiusmodi
quibusvelnativavere
aliquid
sintfinguntur.
Deus
velque equesunt
sunt
, tamquam
nequesunt
aliquid
aliquid
aliquid
Acperhoc
necessealiquid
creatsubsistenti.
nonestaliquid
enimestessentia:
fingitur
inilioessepotest.Itaqueetsimagnus
nichileorumque subsistentias
est,
comitantur,
etsiqualisest,nontarnen
hocestquantitate;
nontarnen
qualitate;etsidurat,non
tarnen
tempore.
20through
whichthey
tothoseconstituents
ofaccording
areconceived
Naturalthings
ofaccording
tothoseconstiwhereas
fictitious
areconceived
things
'are-a-something',
Astothegenuine
to'be-a-something'.
whichtheyarefeigned
tuents
entities,
through
ofthenaturalthings
whichare theprinciple
however,
(to witGod and primordial
due toany
Indeedtheyarenot'a-something'
matter.
itis quitea different
matter)
'are-aorquantities
orqualities
suchsubsistenti
things
truly
owingtowhichnatural
areimagined
as
whichnottruly
arenor'are-a-something'
andthethings
something'
norimagined
ForGodis Beingandis not'a-something'
iftheywere'a-something'.
ofthat
due to anycreatedsubsistenti
to be 'a-something'
and,therefore,
nothing
He is great,
canbe foundin Him.Hencealthough
subsistentiae
whichaccompanies
He is qualitative,
He is notthus
ofmagnitude;
although
yetHe is notthusinvirtue
he endures,
He doesnotin virtueoftemporality.
in virtueofqualityandalthough
diminuens
This passage is reminiscentof the scholastic determinatio
(as
limitafound e.g. in Thomas Aquinas, De pot.9,5, obi.2) or determinatio
tionis(= limitative determination), e.g. in Thomas Aquinas, Quodl.
VII, 3,6c. Cf. the later adage: 'omnis determinatioest negatio'
(2) on the other hand, essealiquid is determinative,i.e. as a notion it
removes indefinitenessand vagueness and as modeofbeingit provides
an object with some kind of actuality (which is not the same as 'facticity', to be sure). Therefore aliquid is not predicated of primordial
matter (or hyle)either:
esseunde
Trin.84,67-9:HABETQUE MOTUM non illa que est subsistentium
sedque illiMATERIE ineisdemsubestprimamateria
eorumaliquid
unumquodque
estFORMA CONIUNCTA; cf. Trin.82,8-9.
concretione
sistentibus
out
ofthesubsistent
whichis theonticprinciple
matter
Notthatprimordial
things
theform
doeswhich
hasmobility,
butrather
ofwhicheachofthem'is-a-something'
in thosesubsistent
withthatmatter
is connected
things.
byconcretion
'silvam'
Plato
...
Eut. 335,24-5: ylen,quam
nominat,que quidemsecundum
estsed nonestaliquid....
philosophos
20litt,'withthesupport
clearthat
makesitpretty
. ' Gilbert
etc
ofthoseconstituents
their
andspokenofreflects
orderinwhichtheyareconceived
thelogico-grammatical
structure.
ontological
94

12:33:00 PM

... hyle,
tothephilosophers,
is,butnot'is-aaccording
(called'silva'byPlato)which,
something'.
Here, we are reminded of the functionof 'otherness' ('aliud quid')
in Plato's later metaphysics;especiallyin the Sophistthe proper nature
of theOther' (or 'Otherness') is identifiedwith that of 'what is not',
where the latter is indeed equivalent to 'what is other than/'.21
(3) on top of thatessealiquidis a mode of being which belongs to somethingsingularor individual.It is always associated with the notions of
creation and concretion,as well as with primordialmatteras already
involved are the causes of some esse
being informed.The subsistentiae
and
are
said
to
be
aliquid
always linked up with matter; that is why
they are named 'inabstracte' (= 'not dissociated frommatter'):
Trin.84,54-8:Creationamquesubsistentiam
sit.
inessefacitutcuiinestab ea aliquid
Concretio
veroeidemsubsistentie
rationis
ut cui
naturasposterions
accommodai,
cumillainsunt,
nisisicsubsistentibus
nonsit.Que quoniamessenonpossunt
simplex
'
insintuteorundum
dicuntur.
subsistentiis
assint,inabstracte'
Creationmakesa subsistential
forminhere<in matter
> so thatthatin whichit
inheres
duetoit.Concretion,
ontheotherhand,attaches
somecon'is-a-something'
comitant
natural
tothatsubsistentia,
so thatthatinwhichtheyarepresent
properties
withthesubsistentia,
lackssimplicity.
Well,sincetheycanonlybebyinhertogether
in sucha waythattheyaccompany
thesubsistentiae
of those
ing in subsistents
< subsistents
> , theyarecalled'materialized'.
Cf. ibid. 84,67-9, quoted above, p. 94 and 87,57-9: (... et alia que in
subsistentibuscreatione seu concretione fiunt,quibus id cui insunt,
aut aliquidestaut aliquidessedoctrineordine demonstratur).Also ibid.
144,58-62, quoted above, p. 93. Especially Trin., 144-5 is quite
explicit on this score (esp. 145,88-96: Sed econverso...):
Trin. 144,79-145,96:
His ita se habentibus
addendumest quod omnesubsistens
multorum
et accidentis,
concretione
subsistit.
et differentie
, idestgeneris
quibusest
Ac perhocalioestalioqueestaliquid.Nequenecesseestremillamque sicaliquid
est
,
ideoaliamessequoniamnontantum
aliquoaliquidestsedetiamalioaliudetitemalio
aliudaliquidest.Ut animaPlatonis
nonmodogenerespiritus
est(quodesteamesse
etiamalio,idestrationalitate,
aliudest,idestrationalis;
aliquid),verum
atquemultis
aliisaliudetaliudest.Nontamenidcirco
aliaest.Namaliisatquealiisaliudestatque
aliudipsa.
Sed econverso
aliicollata,
dicipotestquodquecumqueressubsistens,
generaliter
ab ea estalterutrius
numero
estaliquid
alia,nulloillorum
quorumquolibetillaa qua
est alia, aliquidest.Nam etsiutrequesubsistunt
aliquibusad se invicemeisdem
tameneisdemessentie
Resenima renumquam
similitudine,
nunquam
singularitate.
dicitur
alterutrius
numeroalia nisiomnibus
quibusestsitab ea diversa.
21See L. M. de Rijk,Plato'sSophist
, A Philosophical
Commentary
(Koninklijke
Nederlandse
Akademie
vanWetenschappen.
Letterkunde.
Verhandelingen
Afdeling
NieuweReeks,Deel 133.Amsterdam,
NewYork1986),esp.sections
11.3
Oxford,
and 11.4.
95

12:33:00 PM

thateverysubsistent
in addition
subsists
Thisbeingthecase,itshouldbe remarked
oftheconstituents
ofthemultitude
due totheconcretion
genus,differentia
(namely
to oneconstituent
and its
whichit is. Henceitowesitsbeing
and accidens)through
in thisway,is not
A thing,then,that'is-a-something'
to another.
something
being-a'aa different
therefore
thing,sinceit is not onlyby someform22
necessarily
butalsobysomeotherforms
else,andso on. E.g. Plato'ssoul
something
something'
> thatit 'is-anaturea spirit(wichamounts<to saying
is notonlybyitsgeneric
itis something
else
butalsobysomeother<form> (viz.itsrationality)
something')
andso,bya multitude
ofother< forms
> quitea lotofotherthings.
(viz.rational);
Forhowever
multifarious
itdoesnot,becauseofthat,loseitsidentity.
by
However,
itself.
> it is, it stillremains
all thesedifferent
< forms
subsistent
itmaygenerally
be saidthateachandevery
On theother
hand,however,
and owesits
fromthelatteraltogether23,
whencomparedto anotherone, differs
whatsoever
towhichthatotherthingowes
tononeoftheforms
'being-a-something'
eachoneofthemis subsistent
Foralthough
its'being-a-something'.
bysomeforms
nonetheless
thesamethrough
whicharemutually
theyareneverthusby
similarity,
from
is neversaidtodiffer
oftheir
thesingularity
altogether
being.Indeed,onething
fromit byall itsonticconstituents.
another
unlessit is different
These threecharacteristicsseem to be confirmedby Gilbert's extensive discussion ofthe meaning of 'nichil', which is taken as the semantic counterpart24of 'aliquid'.
Gilbert deals with the notion of 'nichil' in his commentary on
Boethius' ContraEutychen
(249,2 - 251 ,40). He startsfromthe idea that
to
conceive
of entitieswhich are not.As for 'nichil', the
it is possible
reason why we are able to conceive of it is that as far as the substantia
nominisis concerned {prosubstantia
) thisinfinitetermsignifiesaliquidsed.
nonnturm.
Before we go any furtherwe must recall what the Mediaeval grammarians understood by substantiaand qualitas nominis.This is easily
explained with the help of the Mediaeval interpretationof words such
as 'homo' ('man') and 'album' ('white thing'). Every noun, whether
a substantive noun or substantivatedadjectival noun, signifiessome
'thing' (an id quod) togetherwith (some of) its qualification(s). E.g.
'homo' designates some concrete entity,yet not totally unqualified
(being called just 'thing') but ratherqualified in some way or another.
'
'
Thus, when using the word homo something is introduced, so to
speak, into our 'universe of discourse' as qualified by the form
). So in fact, a noun denotes an id
( qualitas) of 'humanity' ( humanitas
22Gilbert
is meant.
has theneuter{litt:bysome'thing').In factsomeform
23Cf. above,p. 75, n. 4.
24See H. C. vanElswijk,
sa pensee,Louvain1,
ba vie,sonoeuvre,
Porreta,
Gilbert
143f.

96

12:33:00 PM

quodand, by the same token, it connotes some one of its forms(some

id quo)25.
Well, the (qualitative) connotationconveyed by the word 'nichil' is
such that it may be used both to stand for some 'nature' and some
'thing' devoid of any 'nature'.26 So 'nichil' is significativeof the same
'qualitas' as the infinitenoun 'aliquid'. In otherwords, both of these
termsconnote 'a something' whetheror not it actually is:
Eut.249,2-8:Nam... iliaetiamque nonsunt,intellectu
capipossunt,
QUONIAM
SIGNIFICAT ALINICHIL prosubstantia
ETIAM hocIPSUM nomeninfinitum
dicimusquoniamproqualitate
QUID, SED NON NATURAM."Pro substantia"
enimeandem
et quod est naturaet quod non est natura.Significat
significat
"aliquid".Cuiussinedubioqualitasestetque
quamhocnomeninfinitum
qualitatem
estet que nonest.
sinceeventheinfinite
For... eventhatwhichis not,maybe grasped
bytheintellect,
notsome
something,although
noun'nothing'itself,forits substance,
signifies
bothwhat
nature.I say'foritssubstance'
because,as foritsquality,itdoessignify
thesamequalityas doesthe
is a 'nature'andwhatis notas well.Indeed,itsignifies
infinite
noun'something'.
Well,thelatter's
bythe
quality[i.e. thequalitysignified
is notonlysomeone[viz.quality]whichis,butalsosomeone
undoubtedly
latter]27
whichis not.
Gilbert explains the significationjust presented as follows: the
'qualitas' of the two words is the same, whereas their respective
'substantiae' are entirelydifferent.Their common quality is that of
'be-ing', even though in the case of 'nichil' this quality is just a fictitiousone. Their respectivesubstantiae
, however, are quite differentin
that 'aliquid' signifieseither
somethingwhich actually is ( id quodest) or
i.e.
of actual being, whereas 'nichil'
devoid
something fictitious,
always signifiessomethingwhich is fictitiousand misses all actuality:
eandemomnino
Ibid. 250,9-15:Sensus:28'aliquid' et 'nichil'apud gramaticos
substantiam
veroomninononeandem.Est enimutriusque
qualitatem
significant,
25See forGilbert's
Eut.297,57 ff.(andbelow,
ofthe'incomposite
semantics
term',
' also
'substantia
- qualitas
nominis
thedistinction
Asis wellknown,
Part4 ofthisstudy).
L.
of
See
in
Abailard's
solution
to
the
universais.
a
vital
role
e.g. M.
question
plays '
Views
intheLight
de Rijk, Abailard's
Semantic
, in: English
Logic
ofLaterDevelopments'
andBurleigh
tothetimeofOckham
andSemantics
theendofthetwelfth
(ed.
century
from
L.M. de Rijk).Artistarium.
. H. Kneepkens,
H. A.G. Braakhuis,
I,
Supplementa
Nijmegen
1981),[1-58],esp. 1-9.
26Forthedifferent
of'natura',see below,p. 108.
meaning
27The Mediaevalgrammarians
and logiciansunderstand
by a noun's quality
thequality(substance)
ofthethingsignified
bythenoun;theyevensay
(substance)
'nomensignificat
rather
than'nomenhabet
qualitatem'.
qualitatem',
28HereGilbert
literaltext('littera').He
ofBoethius'
togivethesignificatio
proceeds
textreads:"QuoniamhocipsumlnichiV
hasgoodreasonfordoingso as theBoethian
andsensus
, see HughofSt. Victor,
significat
aliquid
(!), sednonnaturam".Forlittera
III 9.
Didascalion
97

12:33:00 PM

nominishuiusqualitas:quicquideorumque suntest;et quicquideorumque non

est:etidquod
sunt,fingitur
quodest'aliquid',substantia
qualitas.Sedhuiusnominis
sednonest.Huiusveroquodest'nichil':idsolumquodfingitur
estetidquodfingitur
et nequaquamaliquidest.
and
thesenseofwhatBoethius
To elucidate
says:withthegrammarians,
'something'
is quite
thesamequality,
theysignify
yetthesubstance
completely
'nothing'
signify
Forthequalitysignified
different.
bybothofthesenounsis all kindsofbeing(ness)
tonon-actual
foundinthatwhichis as wellas anyquality
things.
fictitiously
assigned
is boththatwhichactually
ofthenoun'something'
On theother
hand,thesubstance
thesubstance
ofthenoun'nothing'
andis not
is andthatwhichis fictitious
, whereas
is noneotherthanthatwhichis fictitious
and in no waya 'something'.
Our author next triesto elucidate whythe 'substance' of nichilis only
a fictitiousentityby means of the notions natura(= 'nature', 'sum of
a thing's inherentqualities, the substantialones in particular and all
ofthemtakenas actual') and 'efficientia'('natural efficientpower'). For
example, hyle(primordial matter) is such a nichilin that it misses the
naturaand efficientia
required in order to be a 'some thing' {aliquid):
see 250,13]:si tamennonest
Ibid.250,16-20:Nam etsisit[viz.id quod fingitur;
estsed
nichilest.Utyle,que secundum
philosophos
aliquidautnaturaautefficientia
nequaquamaliquidest, quoniameque naturaest aliquid(ut albumest quale
(ut albedoestqualitaseoquodfacitquale).
qualitate)nequeefficientia
> is [i.e. has somekindof 'being'],neverFor although<that whichis fictitious
orbyan efficient
either
ifitis not'a something'
itisnothing
theless
power.
bynature
tothephilosophers,
is,butis
which,according
matter,
As, forinstance,
primordial
becauseit is neither
nota-something,
(in theway
bynaturea something
definitely
29by quality)norby an efficient
in whicha whitethingis a quale
power(suchas
is a qualitybecauseit bringssomequaleintobeing)30.
whiteness
Thus having clarified the full sense of the opposition between
'something' and 'nothing' as far as their(different!)'substances' are
concerned, Gilbert next sets out to sharpen that opposition by adding
restrictionsconcerning their common quality. Granted they signify
the same quality, he argues, the wayin whichtheysignifythiscommon
is different.The linguisticnature
qualitatem)
quality ( modussignificandi
of the term 'aliquid' is such as to make it assign some quality (either
a true or a fictitiousone) to some (either true of fictitious)subsistent
thing as belonging to what is, or is feigned to be some subsistential
form('subsistentia'). The word 'nichil', on theotherhand, removesall
quality (either true or fictitious)froma fictitioussubstance:
29a qualeis 'something
in
qualified'.Hence Gilbertseemsto be less fortunate
thatGod is 'qualis'; seeEut.247,27(quotedabove,p. 94).
asserting
30rather
For
rather
than'facticity'.
isinvolved,
since'actuality'
than'intoexistence',
thisdistinction,
see L. M. de Rijk,op.cit.(above,n. 25), 38-40.
98

12:33:00 PM

eandemhecnominadifferunt.
: In modoetiamsignificandi
Ibid.250,21-31
qualitatem
veramvelficNam'aliquid'unamalicuiuseorumque suntvelfinguntur
qualitatem
substantie
'Nichil'vero
suesimiliter
confer.
tamdictionali
verevelfite
significatione
veramfictamve
removet
ab ea que nonestverasedestfictasubstantia,
quamlibet
efficientie
nullanequeverenequeficte
dicitur,
qualitate
qualitatem.
Quodenimnichil
est.Idcircorectehocinfinito
affici
id quodfingitur
Nullumenimfictum
significatur.
abessesubstanquodest'nichil',etiamfictaqualitasab eiusdemnominis
abnegativo
tiasignificatur.
thesamequality.For,
as tothewayinwhichtheysignify
Besides,thesenounsdiffer
invirtue
trueor fictitious)
theword'aliquid'assignssome(either
ofitssignification
thatare, or are feigned,
to its
to someof thesubsistentiae
quality(as) belonging
whichis equallya trueor a fictitious
one. 'Nichil',on theotherhand,
substance,
removes
from
inqueseachandeveryquality(either
trueorfictitious)
thesubstance
tionthatis < itself
> a fictitious
one,nota trueone. Indeed,<by that> whatis
efficalled'nothing',
is signified
as notbeingaffected
trueoffictitious)
byany(either
cientquality.No fictitious
in fact,< actually
> is thatwhichis feigned.
That
entity,
iswhyitiswithgoodreasonthattheinfinite
nounnihil
whichisusedtoremove
some
from
a subject31,
the
thatevenallfictitious
from
attributes
indicates
qualityislacking
substance
signified
bythesamenoun.
Gilbertwinds up this discussion by commentingon Boethius' final
remark concerning the opposition of 'nichil' and 'natura' ("Neque
enim significaiquod aliquid sit sed potius non esse; omnis vero natura
est"):
Ibid.250,32-251,40:Unde supponit:
NEQUE ENIM SIGNIFICAT hoc nomen
'nichil'QUOD ALIQUID, idestsubstantia
SIT aliquideiusdemnominis
nominis,
SED POTIUS significai
substantiam
suamNON ESSE aliquidea a qua
qualitate.
nomenestqualitate.
OMNIS VERO etc.Quasi: hocnomen'nichil'significai
nonesse.OMNIS VERO NATURAEST. Deberetconcludere
ita:"nonest
sillogismum
nichil".Sed quoniamhisque dictasunt
ergonaturaquodprosubstantia
significai
estheccertaconclusio,
tacet.
premissis
Therefore
Boethius
doesnotsignify
thatsomething
goeson32:forthenoun'nothing'
ofthenounis meant)'is-a-something'
dueto thequalitysignified
(thesubstance
by
thesamenoun.< Rather
> itsignifies
thatitssubstance
isnota-something
duetothe
qualityfromwhichthenounderives.As to thelemmaOMNIS VERO etc., it
amounts
tosaying33:
thenoun'nichil'signifies
Well,everynatureis. So
non-being.
Boethius
shouldhavemadethefollowing
what
conclusion:
"therefore:
syllogistic
foritssubstance
'nichil'signifies
is notanynature".However,sinceaftertheforethisconclusion
is indisputable,
he doesnotexpressit.
goingdiscussion
31myparaphrasis
ofabnegativo'
is notjust'to saythat... not'butrather
'to
abnegare
'
deny','to refuse',
(or) 'totake
away(e.g. somenotionwhichonereallymight
have).
32'supponit',
litt,'he adds'. In thefollowing
textI shallgiveGilbert'scomment
within
brackets.
33'Xquasi
formula
oretymologies)
doesnot
y*usedas aninterpretative
(inexpositions
mean'x is something
likey' butrather
itequalsy tox (litt,'it is as though
y were
readin caseof*'); hencemyrendering:
'it amountsto saying'.
99

12:33:00 PM

From the previous opposition of 'aliquid' against 'nichil' one may

draw a conclusion a contrario
. On the one hand, the noun 'nichil' pro
indicates
the
absence
of all quality and thus involves indefiqualitate
niteness and indeterminateness,and, on the otherhand, prosubstantia
refers to some fictitiousentity, which is not found in actuality.
Similarly, 'aliquid' is significativeof somethingdefinite,determinate
and actual, whetherbeing the case or only feigned.
For the sake of completeness a few words about the term 'res'
('thing'). Its meaning is much larger than that of 'aliqui and also
covers God and primordialmatter. In fact,the word 'res' may stand
foranythingthat can be grasped by the intellect.Gilbert calls 'res' an
equivocal word {Eut. 288,22-3) and ascribes a multiple meaning to it
{Eut. 244,62). Its wide range appears froma passage of his commen:
tary upon Boethius' ContraEutychen
Eut.243,20-4:'Res' autcmquequocumque
modoessedicuntur,
etsubsistentes
etsubsistentias
et eis accidentes,
Deum quoque et ylenintelligit
ut ex
[sc. Boethius],
ad bancdivisequentibus
patet.Ceteravero,que velcthicevellogicesuntfacultatis,
sionemminime
videntur.
pcrtinere
Boethius
understands
by 'res' all thatwhichis saidto bein whatever
way,whether
orsubsistentiac
orentities
subsistents
God
thataretheformers'
accidents,
including
andprimordial
as isobviousfrom
whatfollows.
Astothewholerest,however,
matter,
whichconcerns
eitherthelogicalor ethicaldomains,thisdivision
doesnotseemto
bearon itat all.
The finalsentencestronglysuggeststhat, in Gilbert's opinion at least,
the term 'res' could also reasonably be used to stand for'things' in the
ethical or logical domain.
1.7 On 'Accidens' and 'Status'
No doubt, the basic ontological ingredients,so to speak, of Porretan
metaphysicsare covered by the well-knownpair of concepts, substantia
(or id quod) and subsistentia
(or id quo), since each and every natural
an
which
owes
is
id
its actually being a subsistentthingto
quod
body
a set of subsistentialforms,each of which is named subsistentia.
However, this ontological picture is far frombeing complete; it requires
two additional elements, which in Gilbert's view, are of a lower rank
than the aforementioned,but at the same time indispensable to any
natural body in our world. The technicaltermsforthese elementsare
'accidens' and 'status'.

100

12:33:00 PM

1.71 On Gilbert's concept of 'accidens'

In our precedingdiscussions the term 'accident' has occurred more
than once, especially in connection with the terms 'substantia' and
'subsistentia'.
One will not be surprised to find that Gilbert, when speaking of
Aristotle's ten categories of being, discusses 'accident' in contradistinctionwithsubstance (and subsistentia).Quite orthodoxicallyso far,
he seems to take the term 'accidens' to stand for each of the nine
Aristoteliancategories other than 'substance':
Trin.118,8-11:
Accidentia
verode illisquidemsubstantiis
que ex essesuntaliquid,
sivein eis creatasiveextrinsecus
affxa
dicuntur,
sint,sedeis tantum
que essesunt
accidunt.
sedadesse
dicuntur.
Quare[quiaMSS] illisrectenoninesse
are said of thosesubstances
It is true,accidents
which'are-a-something'
due to
> esse[i.e. theirsubsistentiae],
< their
whether
theyare createdin them[i.e. the
orjustattached
tothemfrom
buttheyareaccidental
tothesubwithout;
substances]
sistentiae
alone.Therefore,
said to accompany
themratherthan
theyare rightly
inherein them.
At firstglance, Gilbert seems to have all kinds of accidents in mind
including the ontologicallyinferiorones which are commonly called
extrinsecus
affixaand which, in fact, do not bestow any beingupon a
substance but merelya status(see below, p. 105). As is obvious from
the passage quoted above our author associates the terms 'accidens'
and 'accidere' withadesse, i.e. 'to accompany' (as opposed to 'inesse'
= 'to inhere'). Well, he explicitly claims that among the nine
Aristotelianaccidents there are only two that may be said to truly
'adesse', viz. quantity and quality. The seven remaining categories
are rather mere 'attachments' or 'accessories' (in Gilbert's words
'extrinsecusaffixa', litt, 'what is affixed(fastened, attached) <to the
subsistentiae> fromwithout').
For Gilbert, the main division of all that is into substance and the
nine accidentsas found in Aristotleis an ontological one. Accordingly
he refers{Trin. 118,12) to the two parts of this division by the phrase
'omnium predicamentorumnaturalium loci', in which 'locus' has the
technical sense of 'topic', 'general collection', viz. of the main ways
of attributing(predicating).
It strikes the reader that Gilbert tacitly restrictsthe notion of
'accidens' to what he considersthe two genuine 'accidents': only these
two are theones thatmay be said to 'accompany' the subsistentiaeand
101

12:33:00 PM

thus be 'predicable of' ('attributable to') the subsistentthingsthemselves:

. 119,21-5:PARS veropredicamentorum
Trin
loco rationisEST IN NUMERO
ACCIDENTIUM, scilicet
cumde subsistentibus
tarnen
eorumsubsistendicantur,
Et sic quidemin naturalium
tias comitantur.
generequecumquepredicantur,
rationibus
'substantie'
vel 'accidentia'
naturalium
nominantur.
propriis
Some of thecategories,
of logic,34
countedas
however,
are, fromtheviewpoint
thatis to say,although
accidents,
theyaresaidofsubsistents,
theyarenevertheless
thecompanions
ofthelatters'subsistentiae.
Anditis in thiswaythat,whatever
in
thedomainofthenaturalthings
is said(predicated)
< ofotherthings
> , is named
or'accident'according
totheproper
'substance'
modesofbeingof< those
> natural
bodies.
had been said to constitute,togetherwith the
Earlier on, the accidentia
and
of rationalitas
subsistentiae,
object's essealiquid. The differentia
(in
fact a subsistentiadifferential; see 117,82) and the quality 'albedo*
were used as examples:
Trin.91,56-65:Et eius[sc.nature]
concretum
est
quelibetparsautquodpartitotive
accidensquodlibet,
cummultis
etdissimiliter
a multis,
ab efficiendo
(etcommuniter
aut dissimiliter)
essealiquiddicitur.Ut rationalitas
similiter
alicuiuset generaliter
'rationalitas'
facit(sicutet
dicitur,
'qualitas'et specialiter
quoniamet eumqualem
ea inquibussunt,faciunt
quelibetaliequalitates
qualia)etrationalem
(sicutetcetere
rationalitates
eosinquibussuntfaciunt
Albedoquoquealicuiusetqualem
rationales).
etcoloratum
etalbum(sicutomnesalie
(sicutomnesqualitates)
(sicutomnescolores)
euminque est,facit.Et ideogeneraliter
cumqualitatibus
albedines)
'qualitas',cum
et cumsolisalbedinibus
soliscoloribus
'color'dicitur
albedo.
specialiter
Whichever
accidentalformthathas
partof <a man's> natureor whichever
coalescedby concretion
to thewholenatureor somepartof it, is said to 'be-awithmanyotherfeatures
or in dissimilarity
to other
something'
(and thattogether
effective
ones,as a resultof somesimilaror dissimilar
power,respectively).
E.g.
rationality
somebody's
qua genusis calleda 'quality'andquaspecies'rationality',
sinceitmakeshimboth'ofsomequality'(as likewise
whichever
otherqualities
make
thethings
in whichtheyarepresent
'ofsomequality'),as wellas 'rational',
(as also
ofrationality
theotherinstantiations
makethosein whomtheyarepresent
rational
makeshimin whomitis present
whiteness
both'of
somebody's
beings).Similarly,
somequality'(as do all qualities)and coloured
(as do all colours)andwhite(as do
ofwhiteness).
Thatiswhyquagenusit[viz.whiteness]
allotherinstantiations
iscalled
with< other
> qualities)and a 'colour'onlytogether
a 'quality'(together
with
> colours,
andquaspecies'whiteness'
< other
with< other
> instantiaonlytogether
tionsofwhiteness.
34Ofcourse,suchan expression
as locorationis
doesnotmeansomething
like'instead
refers
rationalis
ofreason'butrather
, ibid.120,45,orlocus
(justlikelocirationum
{Heb.
suchas topica
ratio
, {Heb.
210,12),as wellas formulas
{Eut.272,37)orgeneralis
topice
ratio
, {Trin.118,97;191,4)tosomekindof
191,6;192,31andEut.243,32)andlogica
'logicalinvention'.
102

12:33:00 PM

At Heb. 209,86 ff. Gilbert discusses what Latin authors usually

understandby accidentia.
They apparentlymean the accidents quantity
and quality which are elsewhere (e.g. Trin. 194,71-3; see above
p. 83) said to 'accompany' one or more other subsistentiae of an
object. In fact, his examples are all qualities (which probably has
, viz. God's
somethingto do withthe subject-matterofDe hebdomadibus
essential Goodness):
- 210,95:Sed preterhas [sc. generales
et specialessubsistentias]
Heb.209,86
alia
scientiamathematicorum
attendit,que logici grece
quedam esse disciplinalis
vocant.Que scilicet
nonmodogcnerum
latineaccidentia
(sicutdifferentie)
symbebkota
et specierum
addictasunt species
sedetiamdifferentiarum
potestati
proprietate
specierum
subsistentium
subsistentium
partesessepossunt.
Ideoquenullomodo
etab ipsorum
omniesse...
essesunt,sedab ipsistamomnigenerequamproprietate
diversasunt.
thatconsiders
materialthingsas separatedfrommatter
However,thediscipline
notonlytothegeneral
andspecialsubsistentiae,
butalsotothoseelements
attends,
callsymbebkota
inGreekandaccidentia
thelogicians
in Latin.Thatis to say(likethe
to thepotencies
to theirpropernature,
attached
of
theyare,according
differentiae)
and speciesas wellas ofthegeneraand cannot< themselves
> be
thedifferentiae
norpartsofthespecies.Hencetheyaredefinitely
notthe
speciesofthesubsistents
buttheyaredifferent
from
andby
them,bothgenerically
'being'ofthesubsistents,
entiremodeofbeing.
theirpropernature,and also fromtheformers'
Ibid.210,4-5:ET DE CETERIS que illiquodestesseaccidunt
QUALITATIBUS
est.
EODEM MODO intelligendum
The sameshouldbe understood
as regardstheotherqualitieswhichbefall<a
> 'being'.
thing's
These two genuine accidents are usually set apart fromthe seven other
Aristotelianaccidents, as will become clear from our discussion of
what Gilbertcalls status.Moreover, thisdistinctionalso comes forward
in all those passages in which the constitutiveelements of an object's
esse aliquid are under consideration (see above, pp. 90-1). SomeIn
times, however, 'accidens' covers all the Aristoteliansymbebkota.
Eut. 260,91-7 (quoted below, p. 110), for example Gilbert explains
that the term 'natura' is not well suited to stand for 'accidents' since
they do not make up a subsistentthing's esseand their approach or
withdrawaldoes not cause generationor corruption,respectively.The
same view is found at Trin. 149,7 ff. where Gilbert suggests that
, whereas the
generationor corruptionprimarilyconcernsthe subsistens
accidentsare only secondarilyinvolved in the process. In fact,generain substantiam.
tion is defined as ingressus
103

12:33:00 PM

'
1.72 Gilbert on ' status
The notion of 'status' is discussed in Gilbert's commentary on
ContraEutychen.'Status' is clearly opposed to 'nature' and is defined
as an object's transitorycondition, which is well distinguishedfrom
the so-called 'accidents', (i.e. quantity and quality) and, of course,
above all things, the subsistentiae. First, he defines 'natura':
videtur
Eut.319,57-62:
Hic breviter
quodin ultimohuiuslibricapitulo
tangendum
subsistentis
cuiuslibet
de humanenaturestatuclariusintelligi
poterit
quodvidelicet
estqua ipsumsubsistens
aliudest natura,aliudstatus.Naturaenimsubsistentis
adsunt
forme
et que illisin ipsosubsistente
. He verosuntsubstantiales
aliquidest
et intervallares
mensure.
qualitates
ofthisbookone
itseems,thatin thelastchapter
Herewe haveto mention
briefly,
ofhumannature,
totheeffect,
willacquireclearer
intothecondition
namely,
insight
thenatureis something
different
from
itscondiwhatsoever
thatofeverysubsistent
infact,
itself
tion.Itsnature,
indeed,isthatbywhichthesubsistent
'is-a-something';
andspatialdimensions
inthesubforms
andthequalities
itis thesubsistential
which,
theseforms.
sistent
accompany
thingitself,
Of course, in this sense, 'natura' is equivalent to what elsewhere is
called: 'tota forma'. See e.g. Trin. 90,45; 167,15.
:
Next he comes to a definitionof status
Ibid.319,63-6:Ceteraveroomnia35
dicuntur,
quidameius
que de ipsonaturaliter
has quibusaliquid
est
statusvocantur
eoquodnuncsic nuncveroaliter- retinens
- statuatur.
et qualitates
et maximesubsistentias
mensuras
tothenatural
Alltheotherthings
order,aresaidofthesubsistent
which,according
andqualities
themeasures
statuses'
ofitbecause,maintaining
arecalled'certain
and,
which
itis-a-something
isconditioned
aboveallthesubsistencies
, thesubsistent
through
thisway,thenthatway.
first
:
The author goes on to explain the ins and outs of status
coloreettrim
velquatuorvelquotlibet
Ibid.319,67- 320,74:Nam- sepemanente
- homonunc
manentibus
autemverinominis
subsistentiis
cubitorum
lineis,semper
veltempore
velactionevelpassione
hocnunciliosituvellocovelhabituvelrelatione
sibiaccidentia
secundum
extrinsecus
variatur.
statuitur
et, idempermanens,
ofthree,
fourorhowever
a man'scolourandhislength
Indeed,whereas
manycubits
whichdeservethatname, <even> always
oftenremain,and his subsistentiae
thenbythat;andthesameholds
nowbythisposition,
themanisconditioned
remain,
ortimeor'doing'or 'beingaffected'
and,
goodforhisplace,or 'having'orrelation
as towhatbefalls
> he is different
thesame< person,nevertheless
whileremaining
himfromwithout36.
35Hringseemsto be wrongin omitting
whichis foundin somegoodMSS
omnia
(.BkNO).
is a
sibiaccidentia
writes
extrinsecus
thatGilbert
36Itshouldbe noticed
, whereaccidentia
thedativecase,sibi.
as appearsfrom
participle,
yetstilla verbalform
(substantivated)
them
as hedoesnotregard
accidentia
He doesnotsayextrnseca
accidents'),
('extrinsic
104

12:33:00 PM

Next Gilbert gives some examples of all these seven (inferior)

:
categories which grant somebody his status
Ibid.320,72-4:Idemenimesthomosedendoquod stando,et extradomumquod
intra,et inermis
quod armatuset dominusquod servus,et manequod vespereet
quodagendo37.
quiescendo
outsidethehouse
whether
or standing,
thesamewhether
Fora manremains
sitting
in the
whether
masteror servant,
or armed,whether
unarmed
or inside,whether
active.
or
whether
at
or
resting
morning night,
There is a parallel passage in chapter 8 of the same commentary:
subsistentis
Ibid.357,19-358,24:Superiusdictumfuisserecordor
quod cuiuslibet
estaliquid.
aliudestnatura,aliudstatus;et quod naturasitidquoipsumsubsistens
vocantur
eiusdemstatus
illiaffixadicuntur,
Ceteravero,38
que de ipsoextrinsecus
ea quibusestaliquid
, etmaxime
perpetuas
eoquodnuncsicnuncveroaliter,retinens
statuatur.
divinavolntate
subsistentias,
whatsoever
itsnature
that(1) ofeverysubsistent
I remember,
Ithasbeensaidbefore,
thesubsisisthatbywhich
and(2) thenature
itscondition
from
different
issomething
whicharesaidofitas being
tentitself
however,
'is-a-something';
(3) theotherthings,
arecalledits'status'['condition'],
attached
toitfrom
because,bythedivine
without,
> by
those< constituents
whilemaintaining
will,itis nowthisway,thenotherwise,
morethananything
subsistentiae
and < its> perpetual
whichit 'is-a-something',
else.
If we compare these two textswithwhat is said in the commentaryon
we can see that in the view adhered to by Gilbert (see
De hebdomadibus
above, p. 90), the seven categories other than substance, quantity
and quality are the ones which make up an object's status:

etesse
essesubsistentiis
dicunt[sc.illiphilosophi]
Etea que subsistunt
Heb.194,71-5:
scilicetmensuriset
comitantur:
intervallaribus
aliquidhis que subsistentias
necesse
eademsubsistentia
Ceterisveroseptem
predicamentis
generum
qualitatibus.
esseconcedunt.
necaliquid
owetheir'being'to thesubsaythatthesubsistents
They[viz.somephilosophers]
whichaccompany
thesubtothoseelements
andtheir'being-a-something'
sistentiae
and thequalities.However,theyholdthat
to witthespatialdimensions
sistentiae,
to theremaining
do notoweany'being'or 'being-a-something'
thosesubsistents
sevencategories.
accidenCf. Eut.279,26-8:"Quod veroaliquidsubstare
as true'accidents'.
dicitur,
in
habendoaccidentia
sibiextrinsecus
tibusdebet.In se namquevelaffixa
[i.e. 'even
illissubstat."
comingfromwithout]
havingthemonlyas accessories
37As theenumeration
ofthereading
therearereasonsto be suspicious
is complete
In fact,it(rather
intheMSS (all MSS?) after
whichis found
etIetus
agendo.
quodtristis
It is a scribe'ssigh?
addsanother
exampleof'beingaffected'.
superfluously)
38Theomission
ofnaturaliter
tothesubstitution
ofomnia
herecorresponds
byextrinsecus
illiajjixa'see 319,63.
105

12:33:00 PM

The concept of 'status' will be considered again later when we come

round to the notion of participation(see the second part of thisstudy).
1.8 Natura and nativain Gilbert's usage
Gilbert implicitly
In his commentaryon Boethius' De hebdomadibus
he
of
what
understands
by 'natura'; it is that pargives a definition
ticipatednature to which a subsistentthingowes its 'being' or 'beinga-something':
inse aliquidutnturm
Heb.208,65- 209,67:Cumenimsubsistens
qua sitvelaliquid
sithabet,dicitur
quod ipsumea naturaparticipai.
whichit is or is-ahas in itself
as thenaturethrough
Whena subsistent
something
in thatnature.
, we saythatthesubsistent
partakes
something
Next 'natura' is divided into two sorts. The firstis the most general
subsistentia inhering in each and every subsistent. It is, in fact, so
primary that it is preceded only by primordial matter:
dicitur
ab eo participan,
Ibid.209,67-70:
Naturaveroque,quoniaminestsubsistenti,
habeatcausam;
nisiprimordialem
alia itaprimaestutnullamprese quamsequatur
subsistentia.
ut ea que omnisubsistenti
inest,generalissima
is saidtobe participated
in thesubsistent
The naturewhich,sinceitinheres
bythe
thatitis preceded
> . One is primary
tosuchan extent
latter< is oftwokinds
only
ineachsubsubsistentia
thatinheres
cause,e.g. thatmostgeneric
bytheprimordial
sistent.
The second type is of the differentiaeand subalternai genera which
specialis
) which, in turncontogetherconstitutethe species ( subsistentia
stitutesthe individual natural body:
comesestet, postcausamprimorIbid.209,71-8:Alia huiusprimequodammodo
et
eius ipsa pertineat
dialem,illamquoque ita causamhabetut ad potentiam39
Tales suntomnesdifferentie
ille
qua sineea essenonpossit,adhereat.
proprietate,
proxime,cum ipso quedam contractions
quecumque,vel huic generalissimo
constituunt
similitudinis
que ab ipsissunt[estMSS]
genera(que a logicissubnaturali
similiter
adhren'subalterna'
subsistentium
vel,subalternis
vocantur),
appellatone,
sub ipsissubsistentiam
tes,quamlibet
componunt.
specialem
andhas,after
Thenature
ofthesecondkindis,so tospeak,theprimary's
companion
to
natureas itscause,suchthatitpertains
theprimordial
cause,alsothatprimary
it[viz.theprimary
which
toitbyitsproper
andisattached
itspotency
being,without
theonesclosest
which,especially
nature]cannotexist.Suchareall thedifferentiae
lessextensive
certain
withthelatters
constitute
to themostgeneric
genus,together
'
'
39i.e. thepotency
tobe contracted
eachgenuspossesses
(whichis called contractio
*
Hencethegenusis alsocalled
or concretio
infima.
') intoa lowergenusor thespecies
materia.
{Trin.81,73-84;see below,p. 88).
106

12:33:00 PM

call'thesubaltern
ones',usingthenatural
designation
genera40
(whichthelogicians
- or, likewiseattaching
to the
whichowe theirbeingto them)
of thesubsistents
underthem.
whichever
subaltern
specialsubsistentia
genera,constitute
Next the accidentia are mentioned as a thirdclass, but theyare not
said to be a third type of 'natura'. For the text, see above, p. 103
("Sed preterhas alia quedam ... etc.").
Of course the notion of 'natura' plays a prominentrole in Boethius'
de duabusnaturis(sc. etunapersonaChristi).Gilbert
work ContraEutychen
comments
extensively
(242 ff.)upon the opening words of this work:
' 4Natura
aut
solis
de
corporibusdici potest aut de solis substanigitur
idest
aut
tiis,
corporeis
incorporeis, aut de omnibus rebus que
quocumque modo essedicuntur".
As to natural bodies, the philosophersmaintain that their'natures'
are theirbeing
:
naturesuntesse.
omnium... secundum
Eut.242,3-5:...naturalium
philosophos
bodiesis its'being'.
tothephilosophers,
thenatureofeachofthenatural
According
Nature is the basic element in them, since, qua being (esse) it is
naturallyprior to the object itself(id quod est):
Ibid.242,5-6:Omneveroesseeo quodest,naturaliter
priusest.
Every<mode of> beingis naturally
priorto thatwhichis.
The word 'nature' is ambiguous in that philosophers and other
specialistsnot only use it in differentways but also in many different
senses:
Ibid.243,10-3:'Natura'enimmultiplex
nomenest adeo quod nonsolummultis
etiam
de rebusdiversorum
in diversis
modisverumetiammultissignificationibus
et ethiciet logiciet theologici
usu
Namet philosophi
facultatibus
dicitur.
generum
plurimo
ponunthocnomen.
For 'nature'is an ambiguous
name,to suchan extentindeedthatit is said of
inthediverse
notonlyin many< different
>
different
disciplines,
generically
things
oftracts
> senses.Forphilosophers
andwriters
waysbutevenwithmany< different
on moralsas wellas logicians
and theologians
use thistermmultifariously.
In its widest sense 'natura' is used to referto all thingsthereare ("res
omnes que sunt"; 244,40-1); this is explained by Boethius as heresque
cumsint,quoquomodointellectu
capi possunt.When commenting upon
Boethius' words Gilbert says (245,68-9) that the 'things' to be grasped
40litt,'certain
heretheideaof'contraction'
similarity';
generaofa morecontracted
refers
thatof'similarity'
bearsuponthericher
intension
ofthelowergenerawhereas
to thesamenaturesharedin byall thespeciescoveredbya genus.
107

12:33:00 PM

, tamsubsistentes
by the intellectare the accidentiaet substantie
{in quibus
accidentia
sunt)quamsubsistentie
), in other words all those
( quibusadsunt
entities covered by the firstthree Aristoteliancategories: substance,
quantityand quality. However 'nature' applies to the real thingsonly
(which are called nativa), not the fictitiousones. Generally speaking
' is not a 4nature' al
whatever is notor 'is nota something
all either:
Eut.248,60-1:Quod quoniamncqueestnequealiquidest
naturaest.
, nullomodo
Since[viz. something
is noris-a-something
neither
, it is by no meansa
fictitious]
'nature'.
Ibid.249,99-100:
...utdivideremus
ab hisque nonsunt...
'naturarci'
...in orderto distinguish
'nature'fromwhatis not.
This large definitionof 'natura' makes it apply to all substances and
accidents (in our author's sense of the word) and to God and primordial matteras well. See ibid. 251,41 ff.quoted below.
Next Gilbert gives a definitionof 'natura' which restrictsits extension to subsistentiae
(such that the 'accidentia' are excluded):
Ibid. 251,41-8:ET SI DE OMNIBUS QUIDEM REBUS, idestsubstantiis
et
accidentibus
et etiamde Deo et materia,NATURAMDICI PLACET, SIT
NATURE DIFFINITIO, QUAM videlicet
SUPERIUS PROPOSUIMUS. SIN
VERO, proutquibusdamvisumest,nonde omnibusrebussed DE SOLIS SUBSTANTIIS (subsistentibus
NATURA DICITUR: QUONIAM OMNES
intellige)
SUBSTANTIE subsistentes
AUT CORPOREE SUNT AUT INCORPOREE,
DABIMUS DIFFINITIONEM 'NATURE' SIGNIFICANTE SUBSTANTIAS,
idestsecundum
illamsignifcationem
huiusnominis
qua ressubsistentes
significare
dicitur.
Ifonewishestousetheterm'nature'forall things
andaccidents
as
(viz.substances
wellas ofGodandmatter),
letitsdefinition
be theonethatwehaveproposed
above.
'nature'is saidnotofall things
If,however,
(whatsomepeoplebelievetobe correct)
butofsubstances
substances
alone,<then> , sinceallsubsistent
(read:subsistentiae)
areeither
orincorporeal,
weshallgivethedefinition
of'nature'as meaning
corporeal
i.e. according
tothatsenseofthetermbywhichitis saidtorefer
tosubsubstance,
sistents.
The definitionruns as follows: "natura est vel quod facerevel quod
pati possit". This Boethian definitionis genuinelyPlatonic; cf. Plato,
, 247E, where a thing's nature (Plato speaks of a '(natural)
Sophist
mark; horos
) is identifiedwith some 'dynamis' ('power') "either to
affectsomethingin any way, or to be affected"41.Gilbert comments
upon this definitionby saying that 'natura' taken in this way seems
to be synonymouswith 'substantia'. Yet this only holds good for its
41See L. M. de Rijk,Plato'sSophist,
(quotedabove,n. 21),
108

12:33:00 PM

extensionsuch thatthe class of 'substances' (including 'subsistentiae')

coincides withthatof 'natures'. However, thereis a formaldifference
between the two: theirintentionsare diverse, or, to put it in Gilbert's
42
nominisis the same while theirqualitasnominis
words, theirsubstantia
is not:
naturediffinitione
Ibid.254,24-37:Diligenter
attendequod ait [sc. Boethius]
diffinitam
essesubstantiam
... Quod vereet sinealiquadubitatione
fatendum
esset,si
nominain eiusdemsubstantie
'nature'atque'substantie'
appellataneet ab eadem
eadem
Quod minimesunt.Nam etsihormnominum
qualitateessentmultivoca.
secundum
substantia,
numquamtameneademqualitas.Aliud
aliquosintelligatur
enimestessenturm
, aliudessesubstantiam
, sicutaliudestessehominem
, aliudesserisible
,
et homositet risibilis.
Sicutergononeademdiffinition
quamviseademsubstantia
esthominis
essenonpotest.
eademdiffinitio
, sicnature
atquerisibilis
atquesubstantie
is
You shouldcarefully
to thefactthatBoethius
payattention
saysthatsubstance
defined
ofnature.... Thiswouldbe admitted
as undoubtedly
true
bythedefinition
if theterms'nature'and 'substance'wereequivocalbothas to thedesignated
substance
andtheconnoted
'qualitas'.Thatis notthecase.Foralthough
according
tosomepeople,thesubstance
ofthesenounsisunderstood
tobethesame,nonetheless
thisneverappliestotheir'qualitas'.Indeed,'beinga nature'is something
quitedifferent
from'beinga substance',
> from'being
justas 'beinga man' <is different
abletolaugh',although
a manandan entity
whichis abletolaughareoneandthe
samesubstance.
Well,justas 'man'and'beingabletolaugh'do nothavethesame
likewise
thedefinitions
cannotbe thesame.
of'nature'and 'substance'
definition,
A third sense excludes the incorporeal substances and follows the
Peripateticians,who definenature as 'the principleof motion in itself
and not incidentally'( naturaestmotusprincipium
perse etnonperaccidens'
255,68-9; cf. Aristotle,PhysicsII 1, 192b21-23).
After summing up these three senses of 'natura' (259,76-9; in
invertedorder) Gilbertgoes on to discuss a fourthone put forwardby
Boethius. He introducesthis definitionby presentingan interesting
examination of the basic meaning of the word. A natura
, Gilbert
remarks, is far from being an uncreated principle43. For 'natura'
(derived fromtheverb nascor)basically refersto a mode of being which
is obtained by birthor any otherkind of natural origin; 'a natu natura
vocatur', Gilbert says ('nature is called 'natura' after'being-born").
Thus naturais bound to be something'snature:
Ibid.260,80-6:Sed attendendum
nativitate
quod a principiis,
que nullacreationis
ab aliquo,huiusnominis
estomninoremota.Nativis44
autem
procedunt
appellatio
42Forthesenotions,
see above,p. 96.
43viz. God and Primordial
- 261,34;cf.
Matter(see Eut.243,28- 248,76;260,80
Trin.84,54ff.,and87,57-63)or the'threeprinciples
assumedbythePhilosophers'
aremeant:ousia
, ideaandhyle'see Trin.128,80-1.
44Forthisterm,see below,
p. 111.
109

12:33:00 PM

denominationis
secundum
qua nomenab aliquadictione
proprietatem,
gramatice
non sine rei significate
assumitur,
magisaccedit.Et a natunatura
participatione
nativishocnomenrecteconvenire
vocatur,
intelligatur.
quamvisnonomnibus45
is
remote
from
'nature' entirely
thatthedesignation
One has to observe,
however,
outofsomething
of'creational'
without
theprinciples
birth,
which,
proceed
anyform
denomination
withthepropergrammatical
in ccordance
else.However,
(bywhich
inthething
some'dictio',notwithout
borrows
itsnamefrom
it[viz.nature]
sharing
befitsthe'nativa'(naturalbodies).And
> rather
by thelatter)< nature
signified
onerecognizes
thatthisterm
'natus'['beingborn']although
natureiscalledthusafter
doesnotbefitall naturalbodiesproperly.
So 'natura' is an object's constitutiveelement, ratherthan the object
itself:
alicuiusesse
Ibid.260,85-90:Videturenim[proautem?]id quod 'natura'dicitur,
natura.Undeiliaqueveresunt
, hocest
que aliisquamipsasint,veresubsistant,
aliquid
naturesedeorumpotiusaliquasuntnature.Nonenimcorpus
nonsuntaliquorum
aut spiritus
sed magiscorporis
aut spiritus
aliquasuntnature.
aliquorum,
issomething's
nature.Hencethosethings
iscalled'nature'apparently
Well,thatwhich
different
from
subsist
duetosomething
'area something'
whichtruly
truly
(i.e. which
rather
theotherwayround.For
are notthenaturesofcertainthings,
themselves)
arethenatures
rather
thelatter
ofcertain
things;
bodyandmindarenotthenatures
oftheformer.
Well, according to Gilbert's personal opinion 'natura' in this sense of
the word befitsthe subsistentiaeratherthan theiraccidents. The latter
term is used here by Gilbert to stand for all Aristotelianaccidents,
qffixa,which do not make up a subincluding the so-called extrinsecus
sistent thing's 'being' (esse). To be sure, the accidents meet the
requirements to be 'nativa' for they always belong to certain things
and thisbelongingto somethingindeed is the characteristicof a nature
(cf. 260,86). Nevertheless, they are seldom designated by the term
'nature'.
Ibid.260,91-7:Et putoquodhocnomeneorumsubsistentiis
quamsubsistentiarum
et nativasintet
convenit.
accommodatius
accidentibus
Quamvisenimaccidentia
vel quolibetmodo
aliquorumsint(eorumvidelicetquibus insuntvel adsunt46
- quiatamennonsuntsubsistentium

esseetideoillorum
extrinsecus
affiguntur),
vocanrarousulogicesubtilioris
fieri
abscessucorruptio
accessugeneratio
potest,
turnature.
In myviewtheterm'nature'moresuitably
belongstotheir[viz.ofthesubsistente]
ofthelatter.It is true,indeed,thataccidents
thantheaccidents
rather
subsistentiae
andare'ofsomething'
tooarenatural
theyinhere
(thatistosay,ofthosethings
things
' is also ued to standforinanimated
' nascor
45Although
it stillhas a much
things,
whichmaystandforanynaturalbodywhatsoever.
narrower
rangethanlnativum'
46Accidents
aresaidto'inhere(insunt
( substances
) and accompany
) insubsistents
See above,p. 101.
thelatter'ssubsistentiae.
{adsunt)
110

12:33:00 PM

attached
or <even> arein anywayexternally
inoraccompany
to);yet,sincethey
cannottake
theesseofthesubsistent
do notform
and,accordingly,
generation
things
itisseldomthatthey,
ontheir
norcancorruption
withdrawal,
approach
placeontheir
in a subtlelogicalusage,arecalled'natures'.
However, sometimesGilbert does speak of natureaccidentes
(E.g. Eut.
266,67- 267,68; "Naturarum autem alie sunt substantie, alie
accidentes"; See also Eut. 319,59-62, quoted above, p. 104). A
similar inclusion of accidents in the domain of 'natura' seems to be
(implicitly)found at Trin. 84,55-8 (quoted above, p. 95) and 89,189. However, in all thesepassages Gilbert reallyseems to consider only
the accidents quantity and quality.
As we have already seen (above, p. 110) the natural bodies, which
owe theirbeing to theirinherentnature, are called nativaaccordingly.
They are intrinsicallyconnected with matterand as such opposed to
the transcendentForms. Their corporealness(designated by the term
is oftenstressed by our author:
inabstractus)
considrt.
et inabstracta,
Trin.83,44:...nativasicutsunt,idestconcreta
and material
thenaturalbodiessuchas theyare(as concrete
...heconsiders
things,
thatis; cf.ibid.84,70-3and 85,97-8.
inqua nativaomniaab Opificefactasunt...
Eut.247,38-9
materiam,
...primordialem
in whichall naturalbodiesaremadebytheMaker[Creator].
matter,
...primordial
Latinesilva),inqua
MATERIA(que grecedicitur^/,
Ibid.248,74-6:...primordialis
..
ab Opificeuniversa
creatadicuntphilosophi.
matter(called 'yle' in Greekand 'silva' in Latin) in whichthe
...primordial
and260,80-6,
arecreated
philosophers
sayallthings
bytheMaker;Cf.ibid.256,80-1
quotedabove,p. 109.
Their singularity(each 'nature' being the nature of some actual particular) also comes to the fore in that their mode of being is closely
associated with essealiquid; see Eut. 247, 20-3, quoted above, p. 94.
At Eut. 319,59-60 Gilbert is quite explicit on that account: 4'Natura
enim subsistentisest qua ipsum aliquid est.' '
1.9 Summary
Each inhabitantof our world Gilbert calls (followingBoethius) an
id quodestor subsistens.
Its main constituentsare the subsistentiae
(or the
subsistens id quo which is sometimestaken collectivelyto stand forea
quibus) and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and
quality. The subsistentowes its status (or transitorycondition) to a
111

12:33:00 PM

collection of inferiormembers of the Aristotelianclass of accidents,

which to Gilbert's mind are rather'accessories' or 'attachmentsfrom
without' ( extrinsecus
affixa).
The term 'substantia' is used both to stand for substance and
substantial form( subsistentia
), i.e., that by which somethingis subsistent (or 'is a substance').
The collectionof subsistentiae
(substantial forms)or theformatotiusis
called natura
. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for eitherjust
one subsistentia
or all the formsfound in a subsistens
even including its
'accidental' forms(quantity and quality). The inclusion of all kinds of
accidents (including those inferiorones that make up a thing's status)
is seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'.
One of the key notions featuringin Gilbert's ontologyis essealiquid.
'To be a-something'has a threefoldimport.First,it means 'to be only
something', and to miss perfection.Second, it has the positive sense
of 'being a something1
, i.e. 'being determinateand well-delineated',not
indefinite,not formlessthatis. Third, 'to be a something'impliesconcreteness, corporealness and singularity.
Papenweg 17
6261 NE Mheer
The Netherlands

To be continued

112

12:33:00 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 2 (1988)
9
Maimonides Guide of the Perplexed
and the Transmissionof theMathematical Tract (<0n Two Asymptotic
'
Lines' in theArabic, Latin and Hebrew Medieval Traditions
GAD FREUDENTHAL*

0. Introduction
In a draftwrittenin Latin about 1692-3 as part of a planned revision of the Principia
, Newton soughtto establishthat "by reason of the
'
eternityand infinityof his space' and "from the eternal succession
and infinitenumber of his works" God "will be rendered the most
'
perfectbeing.' Newton was acutely aware, however, that an actual
infiniteis a most problematical notion. To bypass the difficultyhe
argued:
toconceive,
andis therefore
number
ofthings
is difficult
I admitthatan infinite
but thereare manythingsconcerning
takenby manypeopleas impossible:
willappear
whichtomennotlearnedinmathematics
numbers
andmagnitudes
bodies[cortrue.Asthat[...] twoneighbouring
andyetareentirely
paradoxical,
oneanother
andyetnevertoucheachother.
pora
] arealwaysableto approach
and
between
knowthat[...] thedistance
hyperbolae
[...] Formathematicians
whentheyare produced,
theirasymptotes,
alwaysbecomessmallerbutnever
1.
vanishes
No one will doubt that Newton was a mathematicianand a philosopher fine enough to be perfectlycapable of inventingthis reasoning
himself.Yet it happens to be the case that Newton was only repeating
* Centrenational
13rue
Institut
d'histoire
dessciences,
de la recherche
scientifique,
du Four,75006,Paris.France.
lineis(cf.
I owe myacquaintance
withthe Tractatus
deduabus
Acknowledgements:
VIIIParis
Dr.
de
to
of
Universit
Mathematics,
Tony
Lvy
(Department
below)
tometheexistence
ofa Latintractbythisname,
SaintDenis):hadhenotmentioned
Forhelpful
discussions
I amgrateful
toProf.
thispaperwouldnothavebeenwritten.
ofPittsburgh),
to Dr. Lvyand to Dr. Y. T. LangerB.R. Goldstein
(University
mann(TheHebrewUniversity,
Research
onHebrewmanuscripts
notin
Jerusalem).
in theJewish
Pariswasdoneat theInstitute
ofMicrofilmed
HebrewManuscripts
to whoseassistanceI am much
Nationaland University
Library,Jerusalem,
indebted.
1J. E. McGuire,Newton
: An Unpublished
Source
on Place,Time
, in:
, and God
fortheHistory
ofScience,11 (1978),114-29,at p. 119(McGuire's
British
Journal
I am indebted
me
toB. R. Goldstein
andtoJ. E. McGuireforguiding
translation).
to thistext.
113

12:33:18 PM

a century-oldargument whose most influentialstatementis that of

Moses Maimonides, in his Guideof thePerplexed
, writtenin Arabic in
1190. In the course of his criticism of kalm epistemology,
Maimonides seeks to establish the thesis that uma n is not distinguished by having imaginaiion," and that "the act of imagination is
not the act of the intellectbut ratherthe contrary." In supportof this
claim he says:
thata man,ifhe considers
themwithhisimaginaKnowthattherearethings
inanyrespect,
thatitisas imposbutfinds
tohimself
tion,isunabletorepresent
fortwocontraries
to agree.
sibleto imaginethemas itis impossible
[...] It hasbeenmadeclearin thesecondbookofthe"ConicSections"that
at theoutset,
distance
twolinesbetween
whichthereis a certain
maygo forth
diminishes
and theycome
in sucha waythatthefarther
theygo,thisdistance
forthemto meeteven
nearertooneanother,
butwithout
iteverbeingpossible
and eventhoughtheycomenearerto one
iftheyare drawnforth
to infinity
andcan inno wayenter
thefarther
another
theygo. Thiscannotbe imagined
and theother
within
thenetofimagination.
Of thesetwolines,oneis straight
work2.
curved,as has beenmadecleartherein theabove-mentioned
The argument was not original to Maimonides either: as we will
presentlysee, it had already been stated in essentiallythe same form
by Geminus, some twelve centuriesearlier. Our main concern in this
paper, however, will not be the historyof the epistemological argument itself,but ratherthe historyof a small tractwhich establishesthe
mathematical fact on which the argument rests. Indeed, although
Maimonides was well acquainted withApollonius of Perga's ConicSectionsto which he refershere and may even have writtena commentary
on it, in point of factin the above passage he does not directlydraw
on thatwork3. Instead, Maimonides is quoting the firstsentenceof an
2 Maimonides,
GuideofthePerplexed
I, 73; quotedafterthetranslation
by Shlomo
Pines(Chicago1963),I, 210.
3 ThatMaimonides
fromthe
is evident
withtheConicSections
waswellacquainted
thefactthatMaimonides
chose
allusiontoitintheabove-quoted
passage.Therefore,
theorem
formulation
oftherelevant
nottousetheApollonian
(2.14:"The asymptotes
nearer
oneanother
andcomewithin
ifproduced
toinfinity,
andthesection,
approach
T. L. Heath,Apollonius
a distance
lessthananygivendistance",
ofPerga,
quotedafter
tobe explained
Treatise
ontheConicsections
1896),p. clxiv),is probably
(Cambridge
work.
in a philosophical
formulation
as due to hiswishto avoidsucha technical
in: The Jewish
Y. Tzvi Langermann
Writings
ofMaimonides,
( TheMathematical
F. Sezgin's
to confirm
Review,75 (1984),57-65)has recently
attempted
Quarterly
des arabischen
statement
V, Leiden 1974, p. 141) that
Schrifttums,
( Geschichte
Conic
Sections
on Apollonius'
is theauthorofa commentary
Maimonides
, preserved
itto "al-ra5isIbncImrnMus bincUbaydAllah
in an Arabmanuscript
ascribing
is mainly
infavor
ofthisascription
al-3Isra3l
argument
Langermann's
al-Qurtub".
tobe capableof
wasindeedknowledgeable
thatMaimonides
enoughin mathematics
in
indication:
further
sucha commentary.
(We mayadd herethefollowing
writing
114

12:33:18 PM

anonymous mathematicaltreatisewhose Arabic original now seems to

be lost, but whose medieval Latin translationhas been unearthed and
published by Professor Marshall Clagett in 1954 and again, with
much additional material, in 1980. This is the De duabuslineissemper
sibi invicemet numquamconcurrentibus4
. This treatise,
approximantibus
ProfessorClagett wrote, is of particular interestsince (as far as the
Latin traditionis concerned) it is "the only medieval treatiseon conic
sectionswithoutan optical context"5. In fact,as ProfessorClagett has
shown6,withinthe Latin traditioninterestin the treatisederived from
the epistemological argument as stated by Maimonides; much the
same, we will see, holds of the Hebrew tradition. Thus the principal
subject of thispaper is the transmissionof On Two Linesin its relationship with Maimonides' Guide.
In what follows,I will proceed in threesteps. I. I will show that the
epistemologicalargumentadduced by Maimonides had already been
an analysisofthenotionof"commentary",
Maimonides
comquotesal-Nairz's
on Euclid'sElements
as an exampleofa workthatis not,in truth,
a "commentary
onthe
, Hebrewtranslamentary"
(cf.Maimonides,
Commentary
Aphorisms
ofHippocrates
tionbyR. MosheibnTibbon,ed. bySuessmann
Muntner,
1961,p. 3);
Jerusalem
Maimonides'
briefremark
makesitperfectly
clearthathe knewandunderstood
alNairzverywell.)Thereare,however,
thisascription.
reasonsforstrongly
doubting
ofMaimonides
as the
Langermann
{op.cit.,p. 58) arguesthatthe"theidentification
author
ofourtextis madecertain"bythefactthatMaimonides'
name,intheArabic
form
notedabove,appearsbothatthebeginning
andinthecolophon
ofthetext.Yet,
onemaybringup thefactthata Princeton
Arabicmanuscript
againstthisargument
MS 1070),containing
from
Aristotle's
so-called
BookofAnimals,
also
excerpts
(Garrett
Ms
ofMaimonides
name(namely:
givesas thenameoftheauthoran Arabicform
b. cUbaidAllhal-Qurtubal-^Isra^l),
but the textis quite certainly
notby
Maimonides.
as it seemsto me,bythe
(Thishas beenargued,veryconvincingly
editorofthetreatise:
cf.J. N. Mattock
QalFusl
(ed. andtrans.),MaqlaTashtamil
minKitbal-Hayawn
li-Arist
to Dr.
, Cambridge1966,pp. x-xii;I am grateful
forhavingbrought
thisbooktomyattention.)
Letus alsonotethatthe
Langermann
ofbothtreatises
haveincommon
thefactthattheycontain
Moslemformanuscripts
ifonepostulates
thatMaimonides
is theauthor,
mustinbothinstances
mulas,which,
be ascribed
tothescribes.
as Langermann
himself
hasnoted,nomedieval
Moreover,
orMoslem,listsa treatise
on theConies
oneconsource,
Jewish
(nor,forthatmatter,
of TheBookofAnimals)
Therefore,
tainingexcerpts
amongMaimonides'writings.
untilfurther
on thetreatise
comesup withnewandconvincresearch,
itself,
notably
theascription
to Maimonides,
thatascription
must,I
ingarguments
confirming
as verydoubtful.
believe,be regarded
4 Marshall
A Medieval
LatinTranslation
Arabic
Tract
ontheHyperbola
,
Clagett,
ofa Short
in:Osiris,11(1954),359-85.idem,
Archimedes
intheMiddle
, Vol. Four:A SuppleAges
ment
onthe
Medieval
LatinTraditions
Sections
1980,pp.
ofConic
(1150-1566),Philadelphia
33-61,335-57.
5 Ibid.,p. 34.
6 Ibid., p. 335 ff.
115

12:33:18 PM

used by Geminus in the first century B.C. and was known to

mathematicians writingin Arabic in the 10th and 11th centuries. II.
I will next turnto the Latin traditionof the treatise.First I will supply
some informationconcerningthe translatorand his circle at Frederick
IPs court and then will address the question, why the treatise was
rendered into Latin at all. The reason forthis, I will suggest, is that
Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexedwas translated into Latin at
Frederick's court in the 1230's and that De duabuslineisbecame relevant as a result. Further,I will discuss the social, political and intellectual conditions to which, I believe, the Latin translationof the Guide
and, with it, the De duabuslineisowe theirexistence: these two translations were part and parcel of an intense translationenterprisefrom
Arabic into Latin, including notably Averroes' commentaries, an
enterprisepromoted by the emperor as a means in the fiercestruggle
between him and the papacy. III. Lastly, I will reportthe existence
of a Hebrew version of On Two Lines, which gave rise to a number of
mathematical treatises bearing on the notion of asymptotes. This
Hebrew tradition,which, like the Latin one, is clearlyassociated with
Maimonides' Guide, throwsclarifyinglighton the tra^ aission of On
Two Lines within the Latin traditiontoo.
FromGeminusto
I. GreekintoArabic: Imagination
, Reasonand Asymptotes
Maimonides
It has not yetbeen noticed, as faras I am aware, that Maimonides'
argument on the possible discrepancy between reason and imagination, far frombeing original with him, had already been formulated
by Geminus no less than twelve centuries earlier.
Two relevant passages fromhis lost work on mathematicsare preon theFirst Book of Euclid}s Elements.
served in Proclus' Commentary
'
struckfromthe
Arguing that Euclid's parallel postulate 'ought to 'be
4
who
some
to
refers
Proclus
mistakenly
might
postulates altogether",
thinkthat thispropositiondeserves to be ranked among the postulates
on the ground that the angles' being less than two rightangles makes
us at once believe in the convergence and intersectionof the straight
lines". "To them", he says,
Geminushasgiventheproperanswerwhenhe saidthatwe havelearnedfrom
in
toplausible
ofthissciencenottopayattention
theveryfounders
imaginings
likewise
Aristotle
ingeometry.
aretobe accepted
whatpropositions
determining
islikedemanding
from
a geometer
proofs
reasoning
saysthattoacceptprobable
is madebyPlatotosay,'I amawarethatthose
AndSimmias
a rhetorician.
from
116

12:33:18 PM

whomakeproofs
outofprobabilities
areimposters.'
So here,although
thestatementthatthestraight
linesconverge
whentheright
istrue
anglesarediminished
andnecessary,
thatbecausetheyconverge
moreas theyare
yettheconclusion
farther
extended
butnotnecessary,
in
theywillmeetat sometimeis plausible,
theabsenceofan argument
thatthisis trueofstraight
lines.Thatthere
proving
arelinesthatapproach
eachotherindefinitely
butnevermeetseemsimplausible
andparadoxical,
trueand has beenascertained
forother
yetit is nevertheless
linesas forthose
speciesoflines.May notthis,then,be possibleforstraight
otherlines?Untilwe havefirmly
thattheymeet,whatis said
demonstrated
aboutotherlinesstripsourimagination
of itsplausibility.
Andalthough
the
theintersection
oftheselinesmaycontain
muchthatsurprises
arguments
against
toadmitintoourtradition
thisunreasoned
us,shouldwenotallthemorerefuse
7
appealto probability?
We learn more of Geminus' notions of lines that " approach each
otherdefinitelybut never meet" in anothercontext: in order to show
that "absence of intersectiondoes not always make lines parallel,' '
Proclus reportsGeminus' classificationof lines. Among the asymptoticlines that lie in one plane, are those which 4'are always equidistant fromone another," and others which are
thedistance
between
themselves
andtheirstraight
lines,
constantly
diminishing
likethehyperbola
andtheconchoid.
thedistance
between
theselines
Although
decreases,
and,though
constantly
theyremain
asymptotes
converging
uponone
This is one of the mostparadoxical
another,neverconvergecompletely.
theorems
in geometry,
provingas it does thatsome linesexhibita nonconvergent
convergence8.
Clearly then,by Geminus' timeApollonius' conic sectionsand their
asymptoteshad already been invoked to establish the epistemological
notion that imagination and mathematical demonstration are two
distinctthingswhich must be kept apart. Maimonides is but a distant
link in a very long chain of transmissionof this argument.
The detailed history of this argument throughout the centuries
separatingGeminus fromMaimonides will not be attemptedhere. Let
us only note that the epistemologicalargument may be related to the
compositionof On Two Lines. In fact,Geminus' mathematicaltreatise
may well have been available in Arabic9. In any event, the argument
7 Proclus,
In Primum
Euclidis
elementorum
librum
commentarii
ed. G. Friedlein,
Leipzig
ontheFirstBookofEuclid'sElements
1873,192;quotedafterProclus,A Commentary
,
Translated
withIntroduction
andNotesbyGlennR. Morrow,
Princeton
1970,15051. The references
are identified
Nichomachean
Ethics1.2,
by Morrowas Aristotle,
1094b 26 f.and Plato,Phaedo
92 d.
8 Proclus,
Inprimum
A Commentary
, 177;quotedafter
, 139.On Geminus'classificationsoflines,cf.Sir ThomasL. Heath,Euclid
New York1956,I,
, TheElements,
160-161.
9 F. Sezgin,Geschichte
desarabischen
, V, pp. 157-58.
Schrifttums
117

12:33:18 PM

concerning the impossibility of imagining the asymptotes whose

existence is yet proven to reason seems to have been known to
mathematicians writing in Arabic during the two centuries before
Maimonides and in all likelihood it contributedto theirinterestin the
subject of asymptotes.Thus, as already noted by Clagett, Ab Sacd
Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn cAbd al-Jall al-Sijz, a renowned
astronomer, astrologer, and mathematicianof the second half of the
'
tenth century, wrote a 'Treatise on how to imagine the two lines
which approach one anotherbut do not mee' whose incipitreads: I
have pondered the matterof the two lines, one of which is a straight
line and the other the perimeterof a hyperbolicsection [and concerning whichit is affirmed]thattheyalways approach each otheron being
extended indefinitelyand that yet it is impossible that one meets the
other'40. Similarly, a younger contemporaryof al-Sijz, Muhammad
b. Ahmad b. Muhammad al Qumm, wrote a "Treatise on the
possibilityof the existenceof the two lines which always approach one
another but do not meet'41. The fact that al-Sijz explicitlyrefersto
the problemof imaginingthe asymptotessuggeststhathe, at least, was
aware of, and interestedin, the epistemologicalconsequences thatcan
be drawn from the mathematical treatmentof asymptotes12.
Other mathematicians, it seems, were drawn to the subject of
asymptotesforpurely mathematicalreasons. Thus the greatAb cAli
10Clagett,
Archimedes
, 4, 34. Cf.YvonneDold-Samplonius,
of
"Al-Sijz",Dictionary
hisdatesaregivenas c.945, vol.12,NewYork1976,431-2,where
Biography
Scientific
works
cf.FuatSezgin,Geschichte
C.1020.On al-SijzT's
, V, 329-34;VI, 224-6;andVII,
Cod.
Bibl.derRijksuniversiteit,
is thatoftheLeidenmanuscript
177-82.The incipit
itas giveninP. deJongandM. J. de Goeje,
Or 14(6),ff.226-31.I havetranslated
academiae
bibliothecae
Orientalium
Codicum
batavae,
III, Leiden1865,56.
Lugduno
Catalogus
thatwhat
havebeenexamined
Therelevant
byG. J. Toomerwhofound
manuscripts
On
areinfactbuta singleone;cf.hisDiocles,
treatises
wereheldtobe threedifferent
of
of
the
notion
the
30.
etc.
On
Berlin
Mirrors
1976,
,
meanings
variegated
Burning
cf.W. A. Wolfson,
The
hereinvoked,
, translating
phantasia)
(tasawwur
imagination
Texts
andHebrew
inLatin
Senses
Internal
, in: HarvardTheological
, Arabic,
Philosophical
and
intheHistory
in idem,
Studies
ofPhilosophy
Review,28 (1935),69-133;reprinted
Mass. 1973,
andG. H. Williams,
Cambridge,
, vol. 1, editedbyI. Twersky
Religion
and
hasnowbeenedited,translated
pp. 250-314.[Addedinproof:Al-Sijz'streatise
etphilosophiCommentaire
etMamonide:
in: R. Rashed,Al-Sijz
mathmatique
interpreted
11-14desConiquesd'Apollonius
, in: Archivesinternationales
quede la proposition
37 (1987),263-96.1
des sciences,
d'histoire
11Sezein,Geschichte
, V, 336.
12Thisideawaselaborated
givenon21March1986
byM. RoshdiRashedina lecture
arabes"ofthe
etde la philosophie
ofthegroup"Histoiredessciences
at a meeting
hasnow
C.N.R.S. in Paris.(Cf. alsonote15below.)[Addedin proof:Thislecture
in note10.]
in thearticleindicated
beenpublished
118

12:33:18 PM

al-Hasan b. al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham (945-C.1040) wrote a tractwith

the title: "A treatiserefutingthe proofto the effectthat the hyperbola
and the two lines which do not meet it [i.e. its asymptotes]continually
approach [each other] but do not meet''13 his concern, this title
seems to me to suggest, was the validity of a proof rather than
epistemologicalmatters.This suggestionis confirmedby a quotation
froman unnamed Arab mathematician,embedded in one of the first
Hebrew commentarieson Maimonides' Guide, writtenin 1280 by R.
Shem Tov b. Joseph Falaqera (c. 1225-1295). In the course of his commentaryon Maimonides' asymptotesargument, Falaqera draws on
(and quotes from)the Arab textof On Two Lines (cf. below, p. 131-2)
and then goes on to say:
I found
thatoneofthegeometers
haswritten
on this.He said: 'concerning
the
fourtheorems
he[i.e. theauthor
ofOnTwoLines
] hasadduced,theyarebeyond
whathe affirmed
evencommitting
hissoul
anydoubt.However,
[inthefifth],
thepossibility
toconstruct
ofa conetwolines,
to it,concerning
on thesurface
a straight
in itsbeginning,
hassomedistance
to
one,anda curvedonewhich,
thestraight
linefacing
on thesurface
it,butthefurther
theyarebothprotracted
ofthecone,themoreitapproaches
linefacingit,without
thestraight
yetever
iteveniftheyareprotracted
on thesurface
ofthe
meeting
indefinitely
together
cone- thisis nonsense
andhasno truth
to it.' [...] The writer
wentintogreat
thismatter,
butI didnotseefittoquotetherestofhiswords,
lengths
concerning
forI wouldhavehadtowrite
downthetheorems
too.Concern[and/or:
figures]
it is fitto relyon whatourMaster[Maimonides]
ofblessed
ingthismatter,
in geometry,
haswritten,
forhe wasveryknowledgeable
and ifthere
memory
wereanyerrorin it,he wouldnothavewritten
it14.
Falaqera here explicitlysays thathe is quoting a (presumably) Arabic
treatise(Ibn al-Haitham's?) which addressed itselfto, and took to task
On Two Lines. This mathematicalcontroversy,let us note in passing,
was obviouslybeyond Falaqera's reach, forhe preferredto leave aside
the arguments, entrusting himself to Maimonides' competent
judgment.
Our cursoryglance15at the Arabic traditionhas shown that during
the second halfof the 10thcenturyand the firsthalf of the 11th,there
was some interest among Arabic-writing mathematicians in the
asymptotesof a hyperbola: some of them, it seems, had mathematical
concerns only, while others were interested in the epistemological
13Sezgin,Geschichte
, V, 373.
14Falaqera,Moreh
ha-Moreh
, ed. byM. L. Bisliches,
1837,61.
Pressburg
13Withwhichwe can content
all theeasiersince,as 1 understand,
ourselves
M.
RoshdiRashed(Paris)is preparing
editions
and detailedstudiesofall thetreatises
mentioned
above.
119

12:33:18 PM

implicationstoo. This is presumablythe contextwhich gave rise to On

Two Lines.
II. The Latin Tradition:The Guide and theEmperoragainstthePope
The Latin translation of On Two Lines, the colophon of the
manuscript tells us, was made fromthe Arabic and is due to John of
Palermo. Whatever little we know about him, has already been
discovered by Michele Amari, the historian of Muslim Sicily, more
than a hundred years ago:16 like Michael Scot between 1220 and his
death (c.1236) and Master Theodore thereafter,Master John of
'
4
Palermo bore the officialtitleof 'court philosopher' to FrederickII.
Two referencesto the notaryJohn of Palermo, dating from1221 and
1240, are generally believed to refer to our Master John17, for
Frederick's courtiersusually held officialpositions as notaries,judges
or falconers,so that, as C. H. Haskins wrote, "we are not surprised
to findFrederick's astrologer,Theodore, engaged in the same year in
castinghoroscopes, going on missions,makingconfectionary,drafting
letters,and translatingan Arabic workon falconry"18.In 1225 Master
John is mentioned by Leonard of Pisa as having accompanied him to
the emperor's presence where he proposed to him mathematical
questions19. Thus, the only informationwe possess ofJohn concerns
his knowledge of Arabic, his mathematics,and his officialposition at
Frederick's court between c.1220 and c.1240.
This scantyknowledge ofJohn himselfis happily supplementedby
what we know of the intellectualcontext withinwhich he worked at
Frederick's court20. Frederick II, as is well known, combined an
insatiable intellectual curiositywith a particular acquaintance with,
16Cf.MicheleAmari,Storia
diSicilia
deiMusulmani
, Voi. 3, Firenze1868,pp. 692-5.
17Ibid.; CharlesHomerHaskins,Studies
Science
intheHistory
, 2ndedition,
ofMedieval
Mass. 1927,p. 248.
Cambridge,
18Haskins,Studies
, p. 245; cf.also p. 247.
19Amari,Storia
n.
Archimedes
, ?, p.
, p. 249;Clagett,
, J,p. 692; Haskins,Studies
LatinTranslation
, pp. 359-60.
, A Medieval
1; idem
20For whatfollows
amHofeKaiser
Lebens
desgeistigen
cf.Hans Niese,ZurGeschichte
108(1912),473-540;C. H. Haskins,Science
Friedrichs
Zeitschrift,
//,in: Historische
Kaiser
Frederick
at theCourt
, 242-71;ErnstKantorowicz,
//,in: Studies
oftheEmperor
Berlin1931,313-30andErgnzungsband,
Friedrich
derZweite,
149-55;M. Grabmann,
undarabischen
zuraristotelischen
II undseinVerhltnis
KaiserFriedrich
, in his
Philosophie
Die
Geistesleben
Mittelalterliches
, 2, Mnchen1936, 103-37;HeinrichSchipperges,
Archiv
Mittelalter
das lateinische
durch
Medizin
derarabischen
Assimilation
(= Sudhoffs
Beiheft
3), Wiesbaden1964,164-85.
120

12:33:18 PM

and interestin Arabic culture. He knew Arabic fromhis youth, and

furtherstrengthenedhis links withthe Arab world during the crusade
which brought him to Jerusalem (1228-9). Throughout his life he
remained in contactwithArab rulers,particularlythe Sultan of Egypt
and the ruler of Tunis, who occasionally sent him precious giftsof
scientificinterestsuch as animals unknown in the West or (in 1231)
On several occasions Frederick composed
a sophisticatedplanetarium.
a questionnaireon scientificor philosophical matterswhich he sent to
Arab rulers who had it answered by prominent scholars. The bestknownof theseare the so-called "Sicilian questions'' answered by Ibn
Sabcin (sometime between 1237 and 1242) 21. The emperor had very
wide-ranging interests, including philosophy and its theological
implications,zoology (particularlyfalconry,the subject of Frederick's
own book), mathematics,optics and astronomy.Concerning thelatter
disciplines which are particularly relevant here let us note that
optics and mathematicswere the subject of some of Frederick's questionnaires,thathe was particularlyinterestedin the problem of optical
illusions, that on at least one occasion a particularly competent
mathematician-astronomerwas sent to Frederick by the Sultan of
Egypt, and that he took pains to meet great mathematicians personally, the most famous of whom was Leonard of Pisa (1226)22.
With Leonard we come to the active side of Frederick's interestin
4
science and philosophy.Far frombeing a mere 'consumer" of knowledge, Frederickpatronized scholars, facilitatingthe pursuit of their
work. Leonardo Fibonacci may have been one of them, for he
dedicated many of his workseitherto Frederickhimselfor to Michael
Scot, Frederick's court astrologer and philosopher. Scot was indeed
the central intellectualfigureat Frederick's court. As is well known,
21Forthefulltextcf.Ibn Satrn,Correspondance
Frederick
avecI Empereur
philosophique
Textearabe publipar erefettin
II de Hohenstaufen.
par
Yaltkaya,avant-propos
aux
adresses
philosophiques
HenryCorbin,Paris1943;see also M. Amari,Questions
Frdrick
savants
musulmans
II, in:Journal
asiatique,5thser.,1 (1853),
parl'empereur
240-74.
22Cf.Haskins,
ausdemGebiet
Studies
, 249,253,259,265,316;E. Wiedemann,
Fragen
vonFriedrich
derNaturwissenschaften
, in: Archivfr
II, demHohenstaufen
, gestellt
Kaiser
zu denBeziehungen
11/4(1914), 483-5;H. Suter,Beitrge
Kulturgeschichte,
der
zur Geschichte
in: Abhandlungen
II. zu zeitgenssischen
Friedrichs
Gelehrten...,
Die
undderMedizin,4 (1922),1-8.Cf.alsoM. Steinschneider,
Naturwissenschaften
alsDolmetscher
unddieJuden
desMittelalters
hebraeischen
, Berlin1893,rpd.
bersetzungen
Frederick
between
overmathematical
Graz1956,p. 3,onthecorrespondence
questions
and theeighteen
II (and hiscourtphilosopher)
Judahb.
yearsoldJewishscholar
ibnMatqahofToledo(about1237).
Salomonha-Kohen
121

12:33:18 PM

the introductionof Averroes' writingsinto the West, particularlyinto

the Universityof Paris, took place in the wake of theirtranslationby
Michael Scot. According to R. A. Gauthier's recent findings,Scot
enteredFrederick's servicealready in 1220 and thus it is under Frederick's patronage that he produced his most important works: the
abbreviation of Avicenna' s De animalibusand the translationsof Averroes' commentaries on Metaphysics
,
, De celo, De anima and Physics
IV
and
et
on
De
also
those
,
Meteorologica
corruptione
generatione
probably
Parva naturalia
, as well as of A verroes' own De substantiaorbisfrom
Arabic into Latin, making Sicily a highlyimportantcenterof translation, second, ifat all, only to Toledo23. Indeed, as R. de Vaux wittily
wrote, although the storyaccording to which Averroes' sons stayed at
Frederick's court is certainly a legend, Averroes' writings were
definitelythere24.Nor was Scot a lone translatorat the court: Master
Theodore of Antioch, probably Scot's successor as court astrologerphilosopher,translateda work on falconryfromArabic. According to
Roger Bacon's unfavorablecomment,Scot's knowledgeof Arabic was
so thatforhis translationshe was dependent on help from
insufficient,
scholars more knowledgeable in Arabic. Such scholars were usually
Jews (possibly also convertedJews) and it is thereforenot surprizing
to find Frederick patronizing also Jakob b. Abba Mari Anatoli, a
Jewish philosopher-translatorwho was employed by Frederick as a
physician at Naples and of whom we know that he collaborated with
Scot and thathe translatedseveral worksof Averroes fromArabic into
Hebrew25. Emperor FrederickII, in short,made his courtinto an outstanding intellectualcenter in which learning was intenselypursued,
with much of the activitydirected toward translatingphilosophical
and scientificliteraturefromArabic into Latin and Hebrew. This is
also the contextin which Master John of Palermo produced the Latin
version of De duabuslineis.
23Cf. R. de Vaux,La premire
chezlesLatins
entre
d'Averros
, in: Revuedes sciences
KaiserFriedrich
22 (1933), 193-245;M. Grabmann,
et thologiques,
philosophiques
au XIIIesicle
La Philosophie
II... ; Fernandvan Steenberghen,
1966,
, Louvain-Paris
dupremier
'averrosme
Notes
surlesdbuts
' in:
(1225-1240)
p. 110-15;R. A. Gauthier,
66 (1982),321-74.
et thologiques,
Revuedes sciencesphilosophiques
24R. de Vaux,La premire
entre
, p. 202.
25RogerBaconin factmentions
a converted
JewnamedAndrewas havingbeen
Andrew
hasbeenidentified
Scot'scollaborator.
, p. xv)as Master
byHaskins(Studies
canonofPalencia(Castile).ThismeansthatScotwas helpedbyAndrew
Andrew,
at Frederick's
translations
so thatinordertoproduce
hisSpanishperiod,
onlyduring
inArabic.
therewithotherscholars
courthe musthavecollaborated
knowledgeable
in: Encyclopedia
Cf. alsoAnatoli
, Jerusalem
1971,Vol. 2, 927-9.
Judaica
122

12:33:18 PM

Yet, even ifwe are now aware thatJohn was not workingin a void
and that, quite to the contrary,his translationwas an integralpart of
a large organized enterprise promoted by the emperor, a puzzle
remains: Why On Two Lines? Afterall, in the 1220's or 1230's the
translationof philosophicaland scientificworkshad not gone veryfar;
the translationof Averroes' works was just beginning to get under
way. Why, then, of all things, translate On Two Lines, a probably
anonymous, shorttreatisewhich stands quite apart frommainstream
mathematics?What indeed could one do with De duabuslineis?
The answer I suggest to this question is that De duabuslineiscame
in the wake of the translationinto Latin of Maimonides' Guideof the
at Frederick's court: the Latin version of our treatiseowes its
Perplexed
existence to the fact that it bears upon an interestingpassage of the
Guide, one which was particularlyintriguingto a rulerwith a bent for
mathematics.Looking at the matterin some detail will prove rewarding, I believe, because it sheds lighton the social and political context
and on the motivesunderlyingthe translationinto Latin of the Guide
and, therefore,of On Two Lines too.
It was Moritz Steinschneider, that incomparable historian of
Hebrew, Arabic and Latin medieval literatures,who, in 1863-4, was
the firstto come up with the hypothesis that the medieval Latin
translationof Maimonides' Guide was done at Frederick's court26.
This suggestion was furtherelaborated by J. Perles in 187527. The
evidence adduced by these two scholars is essentially the following:
1. The emperor Frederick himselfdisplayed an early acquaintance
with, and interestin, the Guide28. 2. Various Hebrew sources report
on a meeting,or at least a correspondence,between Frederickand alHarizi, fromwhose Hebrew renderingof the Guidethe translationinto
Latin was made. 3. Writing in Southern Italy as early as the 1240's,
Moses ben Salomon of Salerno, a student of Jacob Anatoli and the
veryfirstcommentatoron the Guide, was already acquainted with the
Latin translationwhichhe quotes fivetimes29.All this,Steinschneider
26Cf. Hebrische
, Vol. 6 (1863),no. 31, 31, note2; Vol. 7 (1864),no.
Bibliographie
Diehebraeischen
39,DD.62-66,136.Also:M. Steinschneider.
bersetzungen,
dd.432-4.
27J. Perles,Dieineiner
Mnchener
erste
lateinische
Ueber
des
Handschrift
aufgefundene
setzung
'Fhrersin: Monatsschrift
Maimonidischen
frGeschichte
und Wissenschaft
des
'
24 (1875),9-24,67-86,99-110,149-159,
209-218,261-268;alsoprinted
Judentums
Breslau1875.
separately,
28ThishadalreadybeennotedbyAmari;cf.Storia
, 3, 705 ff.
29ThatMoseswaswriting
in Southern
at Naples,can be inferred
Italy,probably
fromthefactthathe studiedwithJacobAnatoliand fromhis acquaintance
with
123

12:33:18 PM

and Perles argued, suggests that the Guidewas translatedinto Latin

at Frederick's instigation.Obviously, the fact that during the 1230's
Frederick'scourtwas the place at which Scot translatedworksofAverroes lends furthercredence to Steinschneiders and Perles' thesis.
More recently,however,W. Kluxen has challenged thisview30.His
principal argument is that the extant manuscripts of the medieval
Latin translationof the Guidepoint to southernFrance as the place at
which the translationwas undertaken. In addition, it is unlikely,he
maintains, that the Latin translator,who worked from al-Harizi's
Hebrew version of the Guide, should do so at Frederick's court,where
Jacob Anatoli, the son-in-law of Shemuel ibn Tibbon, the other
translatorof the Guideinto Hebrew, was present. Lastly, among the
firstquotations fromthe Latin versionof the Guideare those thatoccur
a littleafter 1240 in works writtenin Paris (Albertus Magnus, Alexander of Hales) and this, Kluxen argues, points more to the south of
France than to Italy. Kluxen suggests that the fierceand spectacular
dispute inside the Jewish community of southern France over the
legitimacyof studyingthe Guide, a dispute in which the ecclesiastical
authorities, in particular the Dominicans, intervened (cf. below),
attractedthe latter's attentionto thiswork: followingits public burning at Montpellier in 1233, they had the Guidetranslatedso as to be
able to get acquainted with it.
Kluxen's thesis must be rejected, however31. To begin with, the
vicissitudes of survival of manuscripts can never provide conclusive
evidence. The fact that at Frederick's court the Latin translation
should be made fromal-Harizi's Hebrew version can fairlyeasily be
accounted forifwe accept the reportsaccording to which the emperor
was in personal contact, or even met, al-Harizi. Further, simultaneously with Albertus Magnus, we find,as Kluxen himselfnotes, the
ThomasAquinas'teacher
oftheartes
liberales
Petrus
de Hibernia
(i.e. PeterofIreland,
as his
of Naples between1239 and 1243). Moses mentions
at the University
Uberset"associate"Nicolodi Giovenazzo,identified
by Steinschneider
{Hebrische
On the
NicoloPagliada Giovinazzo
, p. 433) as theDominican
(1197-1255).
zungen
Giovinazo
on
cf.J. Sermoneta,
Mosesb. Solomon
Salerno
andNicholas
of
of
commentary
'TheGuide the
'
Maimonides'
of Perplexed
(in Hebrew),in: Iyyun,20 (1969),212-40.
30W. Kluxen,Literaturgeschichtliches
zumlateinischen
MosesMaimonides
, in: Recherches
des
de thologieancienneet mdivale,21 (1954), 23-50; idem
, Die Geschichte
als Beispiel
einer
in:
Abendland
Maimonides
imlateinischen
christlich-jdischen
Begegnung,
Mediaevalia
Miscellanea
, 4 (Berlin1960),146-166.
31As ithasalready
UnGlossario
ebraico-italiano
beenin:GiuseppeSermoneta,
filosofico
Rome1969,p. 31-42.Myconclusions
delXIII secolo,
overlapthoseofProfessor
partly
Sermoneta.
124

12:33:18 PM

Dominican inquisitor-philosopherMoneta of Cremona quoting from

the Latin Guidein northernItaly, a region not in particularlyclose
contact with southern France, but (as we will presentlysee) one in
which Frederickwanted the literaryproductionsof his court to make
theirimpact32.In fact,the main weakness of Kluxen' s view is that it
completelydisregardsthe social and political contextof the time which
makes it virtuallyimpossible to thinkthat the Guidewas translatedin
southernFrance, but which, inversely,makes veryplausible the thesis
that it was translatedat Frederick IPs instigation,along with Averroes' writings.
The Guide, so much is clear, was translatedduring the mid or later
1230's33. Now 1229 is the year during which the crusade against the
Albigensians ended withthe latter's total defeatand withthe capitulation in disgrace of theirprotector,Count Raymond VII of Toulouse.
From thenon, the uprootingof heresywas in the hands of the Inquisition, an officewith which the Dominicans are formallyentrustedin
1233. During the followingfifteenyears, repressionwas systematic,
thoroughand ruthless.Thus Roland of Cremona, the firstDominican
holder of the chair of philosophyat the Universityof Paris and head
ofthe Dominicans at Toulouse from1230 to 1233 (when otherInquisitional charges called him to northernItaly), held that "opus dei est
impugnare heraticos et infideles". Roland in fact did not shy away
from undertaking the necessary measures to accomplish this opus:
when, for instance, it became known that a man who was buried as
a Christian had in fact been a heretic, he had his body dug up,
dragged throughthe town and burnt34.At that time the burning of
hereticson the stake, virtuallyunknown until the end of the 12thcentury,became more and more widespread.
Repression by sword and fire was accompanied by measures to
eradicate hereticalideas fromthe minds: "pravos extirptet doctor et
32Kluxenindeedremarks
thatitis ' 4strange"thatMonetawasacquainted
withthe
Guide
so earlyinnorthern
, p. 33). He triestoaccountfor
Italy(Literaturgeschichtliches
thisuncomfortable
factbynoting
thatMonetawaswriting
whichhis
againstheresies
orderwas fighting
in southern
France(Geschichte
desMaimonides
, p. 157). Moneta
himself
heresies
innorthern
to
was,however,
fighting
Italyandthereis no evidence
connect
himwithsouthern
France.
33Cf. Kluxen,Literaturgeschichtliches
, p. 33 and below,p. 127.
34EphremFilthaut,
Roland
vonCremona
unddieAnfnge
derScholastik
imPredigerorden
,
Vechta1936,p. 21 f., 23-25.Roland'spracticewas notoriginalto him.For a
accountof therepression
France
of theheresyin Southern
detailed,distressing,
between1229and 1244cf.. Schmidt,
Histoire
etdoctrine
dela secte
descathares
ou
, Paris-Genve
1849,7, 293-327.
albigeois
125

12:33:18 PM

ignis et ensis", wrote John of Garland who, all imbued with missionary zeal, came from Paris to Toulouse to be one of the first
masters of the new University there35.In fact, the aim of the very
foundationof the Universityof Toulouse in 1229- it was imposed on
Raymond VII among the conditionsof his capitulation was to combat heresy and establish orthodoxy36.The crucial importance Rome
accorded to this move can be inferredfromthe fact that the masters
of the Universityof Paris (1229and studentswho, during the dispersio
to
a
well-established
Toulouse
to
universityor to
1231) agreed prefer
were
accorded
plenary indulgence, equal to that
returning home,
granted to crusaders. Books being (then as now) the main agent
responsible for the spread of, and the contamination by heresy, the
possession of the Bible (the edifyingPsalms excepted) in the vernacular, was prohibited.
All these developments had an immediate impact on the Jewish
communities in southern France and, in particular, on the literary
The Jews' fateand well-beingwere
historyof the GuideofthePerplexed.
linked to those of the Albigensians. The Church suspected thatJews
stimulated heresy and some heretical sects indeed accorded great
importanceto the Old Testament. Cities whichwere the most affected
by the heresy, also had large Jewish populations. Rulers who favored
Albigensians were usually friendlytowards Jews, appointing both
Albigensians and Jews to functionsin the fiscal administration.No
wonder, therefore,that after 1229 the heretical Albigensians and the
Jewish unbelievers were usually the target for ecclesiastical
repression37.This set of circumstanceswas used by a number ofprom35QuotedafterEtienne
del'UniverLafondation
l'universit:
De la croisade
Delaruelle,
au XIIIesicle
duLanguedoc
sitde Toulouse
, in: Les Universits
(= Cahiersde Fanjeux,
5) Toulouse1970,19-34,on p. 34.
36Cf.Delaruelle,
deToulouse
l'universit
De la croisade
,
, andYvesDossat,L'Universit
58-91.
As is well
du
et
le
roi
in:
Les
Universits
VII
les
,
,
Languedoc
,
capitouls
Raymond
the
weretaughtin Toulousefromtheoutset:probably
known,Aristotle's
writings
had
of
the
who
was
the
Cardinal
Romano,
university,
protector
legate,
pontifical
thatChristian
inParis,believing
thought
might
"largerviews"thanthoseprevailing
La philosophie
auXIIIesicle,
Aristotelism
andcorrect,
wellassimilate,
(Steenberghen,
as e.g. Rolandof
p. 104).In fact,thosewhotaughtin ToulousewereDominicans
CremonaandJohnofGarland.
37H. Graetz,Geschichte
relader
, Bd. 7, Leipzig1873,p. 8. On theintellectual
Juden
TheAlbigensian
cf.JosephShatzmiller,
between
Jewsand Albigensians,
tionships
intheFestschrift
forH.
intheEyesofContemporary
Jews(inHebrew),forthcoming
Heresy
there.
indicated
and theliterature
H. Ben-Sasson,
126

12:33:18 PM

inent "conservative" rabbis who sought to uproot what in theireyes

was a widespread and dangerous heresy among their own correligionists:the study of philosophy, in particular of Maimonides'
Guide.
The essentialfactsare well-known:38opposition to the Guideamong
traditionalistsarose as soon as it was translated into Hebrew for the
firsttime (1204), and disputes between Maimonidians and antiMaimonidians must have been going on for a long time. Then, in
1232, thingsquickly moved toward a crisis: R. Salomon b. Abraham
of Montpellierand two of his student-followers
initiated a movement
of opposition to the study of the Guideand of philosophy in general,
a movement which resulted in a ban on that study. As H. Graetz
perspicaciouslyobserved39,the idea of banning the Guidewas probably conceived in imitationof Pope Gregory IX' s recent interdictions
(1228, 1231) of the study of Aristotle's works40.The ban was pronounced, it seems, by the majority of the rabbis of traditionalist
northern France. Then, however, some anti-Maimonidians were
themselves the object of a counter-ban issued by a number of
Maimonidian communities in southern France and in Aragon.
Thereupon the rabbis of northernFrance withdrewtheir ban on the
Maimonidians, leaving R. Abraham and his two studentsisolated. It
is then, in about December 1233, that some anti-Maimonidians
turnedto the Dominican inquisitorsand to the Cardinal (probably the
pontificallegate Romano, cardinal of Sant'Angelo) forhelp, denouncing the Guideas containinghereticalideas. Under the then prevailing
political conditions, the ecclesiastical authorities did not wait to be
asked twice: theyhad the accusers read and translateto them relevant,
allegedlyhereticalpassages, whereupon the Guide(or, at least, though
less probably, parts of it) was publicly burnt at Montpellier (end of
1233).
In 1233, then, the Guidehad not yet been translatedinto Latin for,
as Kluxen pointed out, the incriminatingpassages had to be translated
38Therearedifferences
ofopinion
overdetails,
butthesedo notconcern
ushere.For
whatfollows
cf.e.g. H. Graetz,Geschichte
derJuden
Faith
, 7, p. 31-64;J. Sarachek,
andReason.TheConflict
over
theRationalism
, Williamsport
1935,p. 73ofMaimonides
theFirstControversy
on theWritings
127; A. Shohat,Concerning
ofMaimonides
(in
Hebrew),in: Zion,36 (1971),27-60.
39H. Graetz,Geschichte
derJuden,
theFirstControversy,
7, p. 39; Shohat,Concerning
p. 35.
40Cf. F. vanSteenberghen,
La philosophie
au XIIIesicle
, p. 100,106ff.
127

12:33:18 PM

for the inquisitors41.It is very unlikely, I believe, that a Christian

residing in Southern France would choose to translatethe Guideinto
Latin just after it had been condemned and burnt there by the
ecclesiastical authorities;and it is almost absurd to believe, as Kluxen
does, thatthe Dominicans themselveswould translatea book theyhad
just put on the stake as heretical. Yet it is plausible to surmise with
Kluxen that thereis someconnectionbetween the burning of the Guide
and the appearance of a Latin translationof it a few years later. My
suggestion is that the burning of the Guideby the papal authorities
induced theirarchenemy,emperor FrederickII, to have it translated
into Latin with 4'subversive" purposes in mind.
The storyof the long continuous strugglewhich opposed Frederick
II to the popes need not be retold here. Let us only note some of its
consequences for intellectual history. Just at the University of
Toulouse was founded to fosterorthodoxyand the papal hold over
Languedoc, so also Frederickhad founded (in 1224) the Universityof
Naples: he needed trained public servants,but preferredthem to be
educated at a universityunder his directcontrolratherthan have them
go to universitiesin Northern Italy, in particular to that of Bologna
which depended on the pope. Indeed, as R. de Vaux wrote, just as
Frederick's saracen army faced the papal army, so also "the Naples
professorswould dress the Greek and Islamic science and philosophy
against the theological wisdom"42. In fact, in 1238 we find Master
Theodore of Frederick's court, who accompanied the emperor to the
siege of Brescia, engaging in a series of disputationswithDominicans:'
he won them all, but was finallydefeated by the formerprofessorof
philosophy, then inquisitor in northernItaly, Roland of Cremona43.
Above all, it is in this context of continuous philosophical and
theological strugglebetween Frederickand the popes that the former
prompted the translationof Averroes' works by Michael Scot: As R.
de Vaux has persuasively argued, Frederick encouraged the translations not out of pure love forscience alone, but also as an integralpart
41Thisconclusion
is confirmed
hitherto
unnoticed
fact.Writing
in
bythefollowing,
1234,duringand a littleafterhisstayat Toulouse,RolandofCremonamentions
Latinwriter
todo so. However,
Roland
twiceandheis,infact,thefirst
Maimonides
anddistorted
ofhim(cf.Filthaut,
Roland
von
suchan erroneous
knowledge
displays
from
oralcommunicahisinformation
Cremona
, p. 72),thatitis plainthathederived
tionand notfromreading.
42R. de Vaux, La premire
entre
d}Averros
chezlesLatins
, p. 200; cf.also Haskins,
Studies
, p. 250.
43E. Filthaut,
vonCremona
Roland
, p. 246 f.
, p. 27-8;Haskins,Studies
128

12:33:18 PM

of deliberate policy of destabilization (to use a trendyterm) directed

against the pope. In fact,in 1231 Frederickseems to have generously
presentedthe Universityof Bologna- a Dominican stronghold- with
Scot's new translationsof commentarieson the prohibitedAristotelian
writings,therebypursuing his war against the pope (with whom he
had just concluded another treaty)with other means; similarly,Scot
himselftook care to send his translationsto influentialscholars at the
Universityof Paris44. Thus, translatingMaimonides' Guideinto Latin
fits perfectlywell into Frederick's policy. Indeed, as Graetz has
'
pointed out, the Guide's 'biblically colored" philosophical style was
more accessible to Christians than the Arab philosophical works and
could, therefore,appear as more subversive45.In fact,the Latin Guide
surfacesforthe firsttime in northernItaly and in Paris- preciselythe
same places to which Scot's translationsof Averroes were directed.
To sum up: I have suggested that On Two Lines was translatedinto
Latin in the wake of the Guide.This hypothesis,I believe, affordsthe
only explanation as to why our tractwas translatedat all, forOn Two
Linesis hardlymeaningfulunless associated withthe Guide.Moreover,
independentevidence clearlypointsto FrederickII's court as the place
at whichthe Guidewas translatedinto Latin during thelate 1230's, i.e.
the very same place and time at which Master John of Palermo produced theretheDe duabuslineis.Therefore,the social and politicalcontextof the Guide's Latin translationis also the one which occasioned
that of On Two Lines. The Guide had been rendered into Latin at
FrederickII's instigationafterthat work had been declared heretical
and burntby the ecclesiasticalauthoritiesin 1233; the Latin De duabus
lineisis thereforean offshootof the long and mercilessstrugglebetween
the Hohenstaufen emperor and Rome.
III. The HebrewTradition
Written in Arabic about 1190, Maimonides' Guideof thePerplexed
immediately became very widely diffused, both in Arabic and in
Hebrew. In fact, a first Hebrew translation was completed by
44R. de Vaux,La
entre
letter
addressed
, p. 205-19.The famous
premire
purportedly
totheuniversity
ofBolognato announcehisgiftofbooks(and which
byFrederick
washeldto be authentic
a forgery;
cf.Gauthier,
Notes
,
byde Vaux) is apparently
excludethepossibility
ofthegiftitself,
nordoes
p. 322-30.Thisdoesnot,however,
itundermine
deVaux'sanalysis
inwhichthetranslations
ofthepolitical
context
were
made.
45H. Graetz,Geschichte
desJuden
, 7, p. 59.
129

12:33:18 PM

Shemuel ibn Tibbon beforeMaimonides' death in 1204; a second, less

precise, but stylisticallypurer translationwas prepared by the poet
Yehuda al-Harizi a few years later (1205-1213). Maimonides' enormous religious authoritylargely legitimatedand promoted the study
of the Guide against the anti-rationalistopposition. The Guide thus
became the object of much intensive study throughoutthe Middle
Ages and thereafter,and it has given rise to numerous long and short,
specificand general commentarieson it46.Among the commentaries
addressing themselvesto specificpassages of the Guidethereare some
which bear on Maimonides' asymptotesargument: they occasionally
bear the title ' 'Concerning the Statementof the Master on Two Lines
Which Do Not Meet"47. Many of these commentaries,dating from
the fourteenthcenturyonwards, derive from,and elaborate On Two
Lines, which, in fact, has been available in an excellent Hebrew
translation.
At present,no less than eightmanuscriptscontaininga Hebrew version of On Two Lines are known to me. Seven of them- belonging to
three distinct families- carry one and the same text; an eighth
manuscript contains what apparently is a differentrecension of the
same translation48.The Hebrew text correspondsin all details to the
Latin one published by Clagett49. Most manuscriptsalso carry four
figures conformingto those printed by Clagett50. Disappointingly,
none of the Hebrew manuscriptsindicates the author of the text, nor
the translator,nor even the fact that the text is a translation.
That On Two Lineswas translatedinto Hebrew because it elaborated
on Maimonides' argument can hardly be doubted. But who is the
translator?It is temptingto think of the translationas having been
made at the same time and place as the Latin translation, i.e. at
' desMaimonides
46Cf. MoritzSteinschneider,
zum'Fhrer
Die hebrischen
Commentare
,
zum
A.
in: A. Freimann
and M. Hildesheimer
Geburtstage
(eds.),Festschriftsiebzigsten
Berliner's
a/M 1903,345-63.
, Frankfurt
47Steinschneider
cf.alsohisMathematik
, p. 363)listsfivesuchcommentaries;
{ibid.
beiden
Hildesheim
, ed. byA. Goldberg,
1964,p. 144,218-220.Thelistis cerJuden
ofthetwolines(cf.
forinstance,
discussion
notcomplete:
Falaqera'sextensive
tainly
is notincluded.
below)
48Cf. theAppendix.
49Clagettin factpublished
as A and B, thesecondbeing
twoversions,
designated
theHebrew,havingbeen
As canbe expected,
ofthefirst.
"a scholastic
adaptation"
no
to versionA. Thereare virtually
madeon theArabic(cf.below),corresponds
variationsexceptfor the following
fairlytrivialone: at 5.16 Clagettadded
therein theHebrew.
notfoundin theLatintext;it is however
"indefinitely"
50
Archimedes
, 4, p. 476.
Clagett,
130

12:33:18 PM

Frederick ITs court during the 1230's. Indeed, as has already been
noted, Jewish scholars familiar with the Guide and interested in
mathematicswere presentat the court at thattime. The complete conformityof the Latin and the Hebrew textwould seem to confirmthis
hypothesis.
Two considerationsmilitateagainst thisview, however. The firstis
this: the firstHebrew commentaryon the Guidewas writtenin the
1240's at Naples by Moses b. Salomon of Salerno who, as noted
earlier,was a studentofJacob Anatoli, one of FrederickII's protgs.
It is plausible to thinkthat if On Two Lines had been translated into
Hebrew at Frederick'scourt, Moses would already be acquainted with
it and allude to it in his commentary,just as he mentionsthe Guide's
Latin translation(cf. above p. 123). An examination of the relevant
passage in Moses' commentary reveals, however, that the author
merelyparaphrases and abridges Maimonides' argument, even leaving unmentionedthe factthat one line is a curve, the other a straight
line:51 to be sure, Moses b. Salomon of Salerno was unaware that
Maimonides' argument can be the object of a lengthymathematical
commentary; in all probability he was unacquainted with On Two
Lines in either Hebrew or Latin.
A second considerationconfirmsthis conclusion and suggests that
On Two Lineswas not available in Hebrew beforethe beginningof the
14thcentury.Writingin 1280, R. Shem Tov b. Joseph Falaqera, also
among the early commentatorson the Guide, quotes the beginning of
On Two Lines, but in a translationwhich is his own and which differs
from the one found in our manuscripts52. In fact, Falaqera was
knowledgeable in Arabic and in his various works he quotes abundantly, withoutever naming his sources, fromArabic philosophical
51Bibliothque
nationale,Paris,hb. 687, f. 148r.Here is theentirerelevant
thatlines,between
passage:"It hasbeenmadeclearin a bookoftheConicSections
whichthereis a certain
distance
at theoutset,
oneanother
thefurther
mayapproach
evermeeting.
Thustheexistence
ofsomething
thatcannotbe
theygo,butwithout
and whichcannotenterwithinthenetofimagination
has beendemonimagined
strated."(Translation
adaptedfromthatofS. Pines;cf.abovenote2).
52Almost
all theverbsaredifferent
ofcourse,theyaresynonyms).
Most
(although,
theanonymous
translator
of On TwoLinesuses thestandardterm
interestingly:
"mhudadcagol"fora cone;FalaqerausestheArabicterm"makhrut"
towhichhe
nonetheless
adds"cagol".(Theprinted
editions
ofFalaqeraandat leastsomeofthe
withthisArabic
manuscripts
get"makhrut"
wrongas "mabrut",beingunfamiliar
term.)

131

12:33:18 PM

literature53. In the relevant passage he is commenting on

Maimonides' asymptotesargument:
Astothesecondnotioninvoked
theoneconcernnamely
byhim[Maimonides],
- it has beeninvoked
oftwolines
too.Here
bythegeometers
ingthedrawing
is whattheysay.Theysaid:'We wishtodrawtwolinessuchthatinthebeginthereis somedistance
between
them,butthemorethey
ningoftheirextension
areprotracted,
thisdistance
diminishes
andtheclosertheyapproach
eachother,
thattheyevermeet,eveniftheyare extended
it beingimpossible,
however,
andtheotheris a curve.The curved
One oftheselinesis straight
indefinitely.
lineis drawnon theconedescribed
oftheeleventh
byEuclidin thebeginning
. Anditis knownthatthiscanbe correctly
book[oftheElements]'
only
imagined
whoattended
togeometry
andwhoknowsthefigure
calledconeas
bysomeone
thatthemorethecurveis protracted
wellas thefourtheorems
demonstrating
themoreitapproaches
[thestraight
line]54.
In this passage, the sentences in invertedcommas are obviously a
4
55
quotation fromOn Two Lines , to which also the mentionof the 'four
theorems" refers.It seems reasonable to conclude fromit thatby 1280
there still was no, or at least no widely diffused,Hebrew translation
of the treatiseand thatFalaqera feltcalled upon to communicate to his
readers ignorant of Arabic what 4'the geometers" had to say on
Maimonides' argument (and even, as noted above, to acquaint them
with the existence of a controversyover it). Indeed, half a century
later, Joseph Caspi (1279-1340), yet another early commentatoron
the Guide, contentshimselfto quote fromFalaqera the above passage
(with some omissions): he too still seems to have been unacquainted
with a Hebrew translationof the entire tract56.
, which are
Although Falaqera' s and Caspi' s testimoniesa silentio
confirmedby similar ones of some fourteenth-century
philosophers
(cf. below, p. 133), do not establish the claim conclusively,it would
appear that On Two Lines was not translatedinto Hebrew before the
beginningof the 14thcentury.In thatcase the conjecturemay be suggested that the anonymous translatorwas Kalonymos b. Kalonymos
of Aries, known to the Latins as Maestro Calo, whose productive
period covers the firsttwo decades of the 14thcentury.Indeed, among
53Cf. Falaquera
in: Encyclopedia
6, 1140-43.
Judaica,
54Falaqera,Moreh
corrccted
theprinted
textaccordha-Moreh
, 60-61.I haveslightly
Paris,hb.706,f.43r).The translation
nationale,
(Bibliothque
ingtoa manuscript
OnTwoLines(seefollowing
ofthepassagefrom
note)hasbeenadaptedfrom
Clagett,
withFalaqera's text.
Archimedes,
4, 49 in accordance
55Corresponding
lines1-6.
to Clagett,Archimedes
, 4, p. 44, Proemium,
56Cf.JosephKaspi,Maskiyot
, ed. byS.
, in his QAmudey
Keseju-Maskiyot
Kesej
Kesej
Frankfurt/M
1848,p. 80 f.
Werbluner,
132

12:33:18 PM

the medieval Hebrew translatorsof mathematics, Kalonymos is the

one who was most interestedin works not belonging to the Euclidean
tradition: he translated the anonymous treatise On Five Bodies, and
and On theMeasurement
Archimedes' On thesphereand theCylinder
ofthe
Circle01
. This surmisewould lead us to date the Hebrew translationof
On Two Lines to the firstquarter of the 14th century. Let me note,
however, that although the Hebrew version may postdate the Latin
one by almost a century,its syntaxand vocabulary make it clear that,
as practically all scientifictranslations of that period, it was done
directlyfromthe Arabic and not fromthe Latin.
Indeed, toward the end of the fourteenthcenturywe find definite
evidence of the impact of On Two Lines within the Hebrew tradition.
It comes fromProfiatDuran, also known as Efodi (d. c. 1414), one
of the Guide's best known commentatorsand the author of works in
astronomy,philosophy,and religiouspolemics58.Efodi's commentary
"
on the Guidecontains what Clagett has described as confused comments" on the asymptotesargument59,and in these no traces of our
treatise are discernible. However, Efodi also wrote an extended
mathematical commentary on On Two Lines, extant in two Paris
manuscripts60,which elaborates and explains its demonstrations.
Probably writtenin the last one or two decades of the fourteenthcentury, this commentaryplainly proves that by that time the Hebrew
version of On Two Lines has become the object of intensive study.
The tradition issuing from the Hebrew version of On Two Lines
thrivedformore than two centuries. Steinschneidergives a probably
inexhaustivelist of tractsdevoted to the problem of asymptoticlines61.
57Cf. M. Steinschneider,
beiderJuden
Mathematik
, p. 122-6.My conjecture
agrees
"AufJakobbenMachirundKalonymos
ofSteinschneider:
withthefollowing
remark
lteren
wennwireinigen,
wiralsohauptschlich
werden
allerdings
wenigen,
gefhrt,
aber
welchesichals bersetzungen
Schriften
hebrischen
kennzeichnen,
begegnen,
keinenNameneinesbersetzers
{ibid.,p. 121-2).JacobbenMachir's
kundgeben"
and this,it seems,ruleshim
periodis thelastthirdofthe13thcentury
productive
is apparently
OnFiveBodies
translator
ofOnTwoLines.The treatise
outas a possible
cf.
a GreektextofwhichonlytheHebrewtranslation
(doneon theArabic)is extant;
Hellenistic
Treatise
Unknown
onthe
A Hitherto
Y. T. Langermann
andJ. P. Hogendijk,
11(1984),325-6andY. T. Langermann,
in:Historia
Mathematica,
Polyhedra,
Regular
Text(in Hebrew),in: QiryatSefer,58 (1983),199.
Greek
Geometrical
An Unknown
58Cf. Encyclopedia
6, 299-301.
Judaica,
59Cf. Clagett,
Archimedes
, 4, p. 339 (endofnote46).
60Cf. theAppendix,
mssnos. 1 and 2.
61Cf.supra
havenowbeenstudiedbyT.
, note44. [Addedin proof:Thesetreatises
des sciences,1989.]
in: Revued'histoire
Levyin a paperforthcoming
133

12:33:18 PM

Of the greatesthistoricalsignificanceamong these tractsis the one by

Moses b. Abraham Provenal (1503-1575), published in Hebrew in
1549 and in Italian translation in 1550. Now Provenal already
belonged to the generationof Italian Renaissance Jewishscholarswho
could draw on sources in languages otherthan Hebrew (Latin and/or
Italian), and he indeed mentions Apollonius of Perga's name (in its
Italian form),although therenever was a Hebrew version of the Conic
Sections. Nonetheless, Provenal' s tract issued straight from the
Hebrew traditionof On Two Lines: its wording is identical with that
of the other Hebrew treatmentsof the problem, and he even explicitly
says that his aim is only "to expand the explanation concerningthis
problem which I have found in a veryshort[obviously Hebrew] commentary,fromwhich I have understood the truthof the matter; for
I have not invented it myself'62.
Through the Italian translationof Provenal' s tract, the Hebrew
tradition of the study of On Two Lines flowed into the Latin one.
Clagett has in factpointed out that Cardano drew on Provenal in his
1554 enlarged treatmentof the problem63,a workwhich in turninfluenced Jacques Peletier's poor treatmentof it64. This medieval and
Renaissance traditionculminates in Francesco Barozzi' s Admirandum
modisdemonstratum:
illud geometricum
Quod docetduas
problematredecim
etiamsi in
invicem
lineasin eodemplano designare,
coincidant,
nunquam
quae
tanto
sibiinvicem
:
et
,
proprotrahantur quantolongiusproducuntur
infinitum
prioresevaduntof 1586, which contains interalia a lengthy"complete
reworking" of Provenal' s treatmentof the problem65.Now six of the
thirteenproofs adduced by Barozzi, namely the first,second, tenth,
eleventh, twelfth,and thirteenth,derive from On Two Lines, and of
these, all except the firsthave their origin in the Hebrew tradition,
notably in Provenal or in those depending on him (Cardano,
Peletier)66.Only Barozzi' s firstproofcomes fromJohann Werner, the
elementis
conicis(Nuremberg,
author of the Libellussupervigintiduobus
in
Two
one of its Latin
Lines
knew
On
who
apparently
1522),
Two
Lines
on the Latin
of
On
that
the
This
means
versions67.
impact
62M. Provenal,
Be^urShney
, tobe foundat theendofcertain
copies
Qawim
Guide
editionofMaimonides'
ofthe1553Sabionetta
(unpaginated).
63Clagett,Archimedes,
4, pp. 345-51.
64Ibid., p. 351-2.
65Ibid., p. 356.
66Ibid., pp. 354-7.
67Ibid., pp. 256-7,354.
134

12:33:18 PM

traditionderives almost completelyfromthe Hebrew version of this

tract. We thus arrive at the somewhat unexpected and paradoxical
conclusion that the two Latin versions of De duabuslineisunearthed by
Clagett had almost no influenceon the subsequent inquiry into the
asymptotesproblem. By contrast,the Hebrew On Two Lines was the
fountainhead of a fairly lively research tradition among scholars
writingin Hebrew, a traditionwhich ultimatelyinfluencedthe Latin
one too, mainly via Moses b. Abraham Provenal' s treatise. In short,
the impactof On Two Linesin the West is due principallyto its Hebrew
version.
The Hebrew writingson the asymptotes problem, let us finally
note, continued to arouse interesteven in the seventeenthcentury.
Thus Joseph Salomon Delmedigo (1591-1655), replyingto a query on
that matterfromthe Karaite Zerah b. Natan writes:
of theinclined
linesofwhichtheMaster[i.e.
thematter
Concerning
(notim)
haswritten:
aboutit,andoneofthegreatmen
manyhavewritten
Maimonides]
hasgathered
ina specialbookwhichconofmycountry
[whathasbeenwritten]
tainsthirteen
modes[ofproof].I myself
haveseenadditional
onesin manuin thesacredtongue68.
scripts
Half a centurylater, a traditionalRabbi, Yair Hayyim b. Moses
Samson Bachrach (1638-1702) still mentions in one of his Responsa
a Hebrew treatiseof two folioson those curious lines which come ever
closer to one another but never meet69.
IV. Conclusion
This paper was concerned withthe literaryhistoryof On Two Lines.
I have suggested that this anonymous Arabic treatise, presumably
dating fromthe second halfof the 10thor the firsthalfof the 11thcentury, was written in the context of an ongoing debate among
mathematiciansover the propertiesof asymptotes. This debate was
probablynourishedby the idea, which goes back to Geminus, that the
notion of asymptotefostersthe epistemologica!argumentto the effect
68JosephSalomonDelmedigo,
Elim, Odessa 1867,
57, in: Sefer
Hatum,
Sefer
Macyan
Barozzi.Elsewhere
p. 424-6.The "greatman" in questionis ofcourseFrancesco
mentions
EfodiandProvenal
on thesubDelmedigo
amongthosewhohavewritten
Salomo
delMedigo's,
Berlin
ject.Cf.Abraham
Geiger,MeloChofnajim.
Biographie
JoseJ
innote
1840,Hebrewsection,
p. 18;translation:
p. 23 f.;cf.alsoGeiger'scomments
70, p. 68-9.
69Yair Hayyimb. MosesSamsonBachrach,
HawatYair
a/M. 1699,
, Frankfurt
no. 174,p. 165v.
responsum
135

12:33:18 PM

that there are things which can be demonstratedto reason although

theycannot be imagined. Maimonides, throughwhom this argument
came into prominence, undoubtedly was acquainted with On Two
Lines.
In the West, I have furthersuggested,the historyof the treatisewas
linked to that of Maimonides' GuideofthePerplexed.
John of Palermo
produced the Latin De duabuslineisat emperor FrederickII's court, in
all probabilityas a sort of appendage to the Latin translationof the
Guide. Therefore, the social historyof the Latin Guideis also that of
De duabuslineis, which thus owes its existenceto the concurrenceof the
following factors: (1) disputes between Maimonidians and antiMaimonidians inside the Jewish communities of southern France
attracted the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities to the Guide;
(2) the Guidewas judged heretical and burnt(1233), an action which
was an integralpart of the vast and thoroughrepressionof all dissident
and hereticalmovementsin southernFrance, followingthe end of the
Albigensian crusade (1229); (3) since the 1220's, FrederickII directed
against the pope a policy of "ideological subversion", consisting
mainly in having Averroes' commentaries latinized and diffused;
(4) therefore,a translation into Latin of the Guide appeared to the
emperor as only too congenial. All these contingenciesprovided the
context in which a Latin version of On Two Lines was prepared.
Lastly, On Two Lines was translatedinto Hebrew, apparentlyonly
in the beginning of the 14th century, because it elaborated on the
asymptotes argument adduced in Maimonides' Guide, the main
philosophical work in Hebrew. The Hebrew version of On Two Lines
gave rise to a number of mathematical treatiseson assymptotesbut,
it should be noted, apparently has not drawn the attention of
philosophers: in slightlyvaryingformsand fordifferentpurposes, the
epistemological argument is adduced by Isaac b. Abraham Ibn Latif
71
(C.1210-C.1280)70, Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides, 1288-1344) ,
70"The knowledge
ofcounting
bearsuponsensible
but[itsobject]stretches
reality,
toinfinity.
further
andfurther
So alsothescienceofgeometry,
al-handasah
inArabic,
whichstretches
further
untilitdisappears
andfurther
from
[bearsupon]thesensible
theeye,theendexisting
march.So alsoare
onlyintheintellect,
justas inan infinite
whichthereis a certain
distance
at theoutsetandwhichmaygo
twolinesbetween
forth
in sucha waythatthefurther
diminishes
andtheycome
theygo,thisdistance
forthemtomeetevenifthey
butwithout
iteverbeingpossible
nearertooneanother,
are drawnforthto infinity."Isaac Ibn Latif,SeferRab Pedlim,
ed. Samuel
1885,21r.
Schnblum,
Lemberg
71"Infinite
increase
isimpossible
inas muchas magnitude
is[takentobe]inabsolute
136

12:33:18 PM

Hasdai Cresas (1340- 1410)72 and presumably many more73, all of

whom simply quote or abridge Maimonides' formulationof it, with
no referenceto On Two Lines. To make the philosophical point, it
would seem, Maimonides' statementof the argument was sufficient
and one could tranquillyfollow Falaqera's advice to put his trustin
Maimonides' competentjudgment.
thistobe a natural
body
body.Forbody,whatever
body,evenifwedo notpostulate
within
thesizeoftheworld.Ibn Rushd[therefore]
itmaybe, is comprehended
says
whopostulates
thegeometer
from
lineisnotseparate
thatsinceinitsexistence
matter,
a linegreater
thantheworldpostulates
something
wrongand false.[...] AndIbn
sucha line,forthe
neednotat all postulate
Rushdfurther
saysthatthegeometer
to
on thelongandon theshortlineis one and thesame.According
proofbearing
sucha line.For
mustpostulate
thegeometer
however,
occasionally
myownopinion,
toeither
theparallellines,hesaysthatifprotracted
instance
when,defining
infinitely
do notmeetwhendrawntoan extent
sidethey
do notmeet.Indeed,lineswhich
equal
The same
to thesizeoftheworldare notnecessarily
parallel.Thisis self-evident.
holdsofwhatthegeometer
theygo,comecloser
saysoftwolineswhich,thefurther
Leviben
toinfinity."
eveniftheyaredrawnforth
is impossible,
butwhosemeeting
onAristooes']Intermediate
on[Averr
Gershom
Commentary
Supercommentary
(Gersonides),
andhb.
tle'sPhysics
Paris,mshb.964,f.54v-55r
nationale,
III, iii,5; Bibliothque
cf.also
to Y. T. Langermann;
too I am indebted
937, f. 18r.For thisreference
deGersomde
etthologique
Charles
, Paris1973,p. 224,note
Touati,La Pense
philosophique
cf.J. Z.
onEuclid's
alsoinhisNotes
theasymptotes
invokes
17.Gersonides
Elements;
zumvierzigjhrigen
, in: M. Stern(ed.),Festschrift
Carlebach,
ha-Ralbag
Liqutim
mi-Kitvey
inLbeck
Dr. Salomo
Carlebach
Rabbiners
desHerrn
, Berlin1910,Hebrew
Amtsjubilum
at p. 157.
Section,151-178,
72"That thepossibility
withbeingactually
increaseis notincompatible
ofinfinite
decrease.[...] It hasbeendemonstrated
thecaseofinfinite
limited
mayappearfrom
todecreaseand
fora distance
thatitis possible
inthebookon Conic
Sections
infinitely
twolines,
todisappear.It is possibleto assume,forinstance,
stillnevercompletely
arebrought
so muchnearertoeach
which,
theyareextended,
byhowmuchfarther
to infinity.
otherandstillwillnevermeet,eveniftheyare produced
If,in thecase
a
whichdoesnotdisappear,
ofdecrease,
thereis alwaysa certainresidualdistance
it shouldbe possiblefora distance,
in thecase ofincrease
thoughinfinitely
fortiori
' CritiCresas
limited."QuotedafterHarryA. Wolfson,
increased,
alwaystoremain
ofthe
"mathematics
Mass. 1929,p. 207. On Cresas'
queofAristotle,
Cambridge,
Unchapitre
chezHasdaiCresas:
del'infini
infinite"
seealsoTonyLvy,Mathmatiques
de
Ph.D thesis,
Universit
la Renaissance
del'histoire
del'infini
d Aristote
(unpublished
ofmathematics,
Paris-Nord,
1985).
Department
73Addedinproof:
halfofthethirteenth
Ase.g.Gershom
benShlomo(first
century?),
Roedelheim
in hisShacar
1801,76a; Warsaw1875,73a.AlsoAlfonso,
ha-Shamayim,
treatise
ofthephilosophical-mathematical
theauthor
by
cAqov
(ed. andtrans,
Meyasher
who
AbnerofBurgos(1270-1350),
Moscow1983),inalllikelihood
G. M. Gluskina,
de Valladolid,was
tookthenameofAlfonso
to Christianism
afterhisconversion
withit:he formulates
(p. 193;cf.alsop. 153f.)theproblem
acquainted
apparently
soluthatofOnTwoLines.Alfonso's
ina wording
ofconstructing
recalling
asymptotes
ofOn TwoLines
fromthosefoundin thetradition
is verydifferent
;
tion,however,
toY. T. Langermann,
ofa conchoid.
itisbasedontheconstruction
rather,
According
cenFinziin themiddleofthefifteenth
wasknown
to Mordekhai
solution
Alfonso's
TheScientific
Finzi,in:Italia,7/1
Writings
ofMordekhai
tury;cf.Y. TzviLangermann,
2 (1988),7-44,on pp. 33-9.
137

12:33:18 PM

As it happens, it was mainly the Hebrew version of On Two Lines,

ratherthan the Latin De duabuslineisitself,which influencedthe Latin
traditionto which that treatisegave rise in the second half of the sixteenthcentury.This traditionincluded Cardan, Peletier and Barozzi,
one of whom may have been Newton's source forthe epistemological
argument.
Maimonides and, seven hundred years later, Newton, used the
asymptotes argument in order to demonstratethe power of reason.
But the argument can also be enlisted on the other side in this battle
of ideas and some hundred years before Newton, the sceptic Michel
de Montaigne drew fromit quite opposite conclusions. In the second
book of the Essais (published 1580) he wrote:
Or ce sontdes chosesqui se choquentsouvent;et m'a l'on dit qu'en la
Geometrie
lessciences)
(qui penseavoirgaignle hautpointde certitude
parmy
il se trouvedes demonstrations
subvertissans
la vritde l'expeinevitables,
rience:comme
medisoitchezmoyqu'ilavoittrouv
deuxlignes
JaquesPeletier
s'acheminans
l'une versl'autrepourse joindrequ'il verifioit
toutefois
ne
arriver
se toucher74.
pouvoir
jamais,jusques l'infinit,

APPENDIX: THE HEBREW MANUSCRIPTSOF ON TWOLINES

The Hebrewtextof On TwoLinesis foundin thefollowing
manuscripts.
(In
brackets
I indicate,
incompliance
withtheregulation
oftheInstitute
ofMicrofilmed
intheJewish
NationalandUniversity
thenumber
Manuscripts
Library,
Jerusalem,
ofthemicrofilm
at theInstitute.)
1. Paris,Bibi.nat.,hb. 1021(15716),ff.67r-68v.
2. Paris,Bibl.nat.,hb. 1026(15025),ff.41r-44'.
3. Florence,
Bibl.Naz. Centrale
Ms. 25(111137)(11976),unpaginated,
inserted
after
Euclid'sElements.
4. Oxford,Bodl.Mich.835 (catalogue
number2006)(19291),ff.12v-14r.
5. Vienna,sterr.Nationalbibliothek,
Hebr. 194(1456),ff.87r-89r.
6. Naples,Bibl.Naz. Emanuelle
III, Ms. III F 12(11526),f. 185r-185v;theendis
on f. 173r(wrongly
numbered
143).
7. Madrid,Bibl. NacionalMs 5474 (7233),unpaginated,
inserted
afterEuclid's
and De speculis
ha-Marfim;cf. Steinschneider,
Optics(Hillufha-Mabbatim)
(Sefer
Hebrische
pp. 512-3).
bersetzungen,
8. Vienna,sterr.Nationalbibliothek,
Hebr.46 (1323),ff.203r-205v.
Nos. 3, 6, and7 oftheabove-mentioned
havebeenidentified
manuscripts
byDr.
Y. Tzvi Langermann
forhavingmadeavailableto me
to whomI am verygrateful
and allowedme to use theseunpublished
findings.
74Michelde Montaigne,
Essaised. byAlexandre
Micha,Paris1969,II, pp. 236-7.
I am grateful
to Franoisde Gandtforthisreference.
138

12:33:18 PM

Theseeightmanuscripts
fallintothefollowing
distinct
families.
I. Nos. 1 and 2 clearlybelongto a classapart:thetexttheybothsharevaries,
butsystematically,
fromthatoftheothermanuscripts.
in both
Moreover,
slightly
OnTwoLinesis accompanied
duetoEfodi(cf.above,
bya commentary
manuscripts,
is on themargin
ofOnTwoLines
, andin
p. 133):inhb.1021Efodi'scommentary
Hb 1021,letmeadd, is inferior,
it(ff.44r-49v).
hb. 1026itfollows
havingthree
lacunaeofa fewlinesin additionto a number
oflesssignificant
errors.
a classapart.Theysharethesametypical
II. Nos.3, 4, and5 alsoform
textvariainall three,OnTwoLinesis embedded
ina fixedsequenceof
tionsand,inaddition,
thefollowing
distinct
pieces:
ofquestions
answers
to,and(fairly
(a) A number
pedestrian)
byan unidentified
concern
thepossibility
to apprehend
"divine"scholar.
Thesequestions
thenotions
ofnumber
andofthepointbythesenses;Euclid'sparallel
theconstruction
postulate;
ofan isosceles
whosebaseanglesaretwicetheangleat theapex.(Ff.10M1v
triangle
in no. 4, ff.83r-85r
in no. 5.)
withthesentence:
"The following
arethe
(b) Nextcomesa shorttextbeginning
fromEuclidnecessary
forunderstanding
theorems
and verifying
thematterthat
II. 5, II.6 andVI.8 from
comesnext."Thenfollow,
without
the
proof,
propositions
Elements.
(F. llv in no. 4, f.85vin no. 5.)
withalmostthesamewordsas On TwoLines.
a textbeginning
(c) Therefollows
is a distinct
treatise
on thesamesubject,namelytheone attributed
This,however,
in no.
toSimeonMotot(cf.below);thisoccupiesff.11v-12v in no. 4 andff.85v-87r
5.
forthebeginning
ofa newtext,
anyindication
(d) Then,onthesameline,without
On TwoLines.
follows
ofthesubject-matter
toMototwiththat
Giventhesimilarity
ofthetractattributed
ofOnTwoLines
andfinally
; thefactthatbothtracts
beginandendalmostidentically;
- whichobviously
thefactthatin all threemanuscripts
derivefroma common
- thetwotreatises
arenotsetapart,itis understandable
ancestor
thattheauthors
of
haveusuallyfailedtodistinguish
between
therespective
thetwotreatises;
catalogues
infact,onlySchwarz's
oftheViennaNationalbibliothek
catalogue
(p. 223,no. 193.7)
makestheappropriate
distinction.
The firstof theabove-mentioned
has been publishedin French
twotreatises
etleproblme
desasymptotes
deSimeon
translation
Motot,
byG. Sacerdote
{Lelivre
d'Algebre
in:Revuedestudes
juives,28 (1894),228-46,onpp. 228-35;29 (1894),111-26,on
note46). Sacerdote
was
Archimedes
, 4yp. 338ff.,particularly
pp. 119-26;cf.Clagett,
is anonymous)
unaware
oftheabovethreemanuscripts
(becausein themthetreatise
in whichitis
thetextfromtheMunichmanuscript
andtranslated
36, ff.262r-263v
in factascribedto SimeonMotot,an authorotherwise
knownonlyfroma brief
The factthatthe
he wrote
on algebrain themiddleofthefifteenth
treatise
century.
to Motot,makesit very
Munichmanuscript
is theonlyone to ascribethetreatise
doubtful
whether
theascription
to mototcan be upheld.
III. The textofmanuscripts
nos.6 and7 is closetothatsharedbynos.3,4, and
ascribedto Motot,nor
5. It appears,however,
withneither
thetreatise
separately,
elements
appendedto it. Thesetwomanuscripts
anyoftheotherabove-mentioned
aretheonlyoneswhichexplicitly
Guide.No. 6
relateOn TwoLinesto Maimonides'
on a statement
adducedby the
bearsthetitle:"A commentary
(or: explanation)
Masterinhisvenerable
book";no. 7 hasno title,butaddsat theend:"Thismatter
73."
wasadducedbytheMasterin hisbook,PartI, chapter
theoneshared
a textquitedistinct
from
IV. Theeighth
carries
lastly,
manuscript,
andsometechnical
from
itinbothlocutions
sevenmanuscripts,
bytheother
differing
terms.
ithasharut
Thus,mostcospicuously,
(sic)fora cone,whereasthetextofthe
thistext
other
hasmehudad
ormehudad
Strangely,
though,
manuscripts
uniformly
cagol.
139

12:33:18 PM

Thisfeature,
ofmehudad
toohasoneoccurrence
butaboveall thefactthat,the
cagol.
andtechnical
thistextsharesmanylocutions
differences
terms
with
notwithstanding,
the*'standard"text,seemsto suggestthatwe haveherea different,
presumably
ofa singleHebrewtranslation.
earlier,recension
let us notein passing,is theold ViennaMs. 75 of which
This manuscript,
andendaresimilar
Steinschneider
hadalreadynotedthatitsbeginning
to thetract
thatthetwowererelated
attributed
toMototandsuspected
beiden
(cf.hisMathematik
affirms
it to
219 f.). Schwarz'scatalogue
Juden,
(p. 160,no. 150.3),lessprudently,
be identical
withthetreatise
attributed
to Motot.
Paris
Centrenationalde la recherche
scientifique

140

12:33:18 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 2 (1988)
Review Article
Alexander
Introduction
toMedieval
, Clarendon
Broadie,
Press,Oxford1987,vi +
Logic
150pages.
E.J. ASHWORTH

Alexander Broadie' s Introduction

toMedievalLogicwill probablyprove
popular with general readers who are ignorant of medieval logic.
Broadie is a trained philosopher and good Latinist who writes with
intelligence,enthusiasm and clarityabout his chosen subject. Nevertheless, this book raises importantand troublingquestions about the
whole enterpriseof the historyof philosophy,and about the duties of
a writerwho seeks to introduce others to a particular field of study.
How far is it incumbent on an author to acquaint himselfwith the
literatureon his subject beforehe launches into print?How farshould
an introductorytextprovide the tools forfurtherdiscoverythroughits
bibliographicaland otherscholarlyapparatus? How faris it legitimate
to wrench a series of doctrines from their context, to iron out all
disagreementsamong historical figures,and to present the result in
terms of modern interests?In the penultimate sentence of his book
Broadie writes(p. 140): "... across the whole range of medieval logic
there are to be found insightswhich can be put to work in contexts
provided by modern logic." This book captures his choice both of
insightsand of modern contexts.Yet it seems to me thatthisapproach
does poor service to the modern reader. It offersno way of understandingwhat the medieval author himselfintendedto do; and it rules
out the possibilityof discoveringthat afterall there are other ways of
seeing philosophical and logical problems than those espoused by the
late twentieth-century
English speaking world. In what follows,I shall
presenta criticalexamination of Broadie' s textin the lightof the questions I have raised.
I shall begin by giving a briefaccount of the actual contentsof the
book. Introduction
to MedievalLogic is a title which might promise the
reader anythingfrom Boethius or Abelard to John of St. Thomas,
from topics and fallacies to insolubles and obligations. But this is a
slim book. It contains 140 pages of actual textand another 10 devoted
to biographical data, a bibliography,and an index. Naturally, then,
141

12:33:25 PM

choices had to be made, and Broadie's firstchoice was to concentrate

on the fourteenthcentury. He writes (p. 2): "... the logicians upon
whom I shall be drawing most heavily are Walter Burley, William
Ockham, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, and Paul of Venice,
universal thinkersof the fourteenthcentury.'' He gives some backward glances to William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain, and a great
many forwardglances to a group of Scottishlogicians who worked at
the Universityof Paris in the early sixteenthcentury.Incidentally,he
nowhere acknowledges that these Scottish logicians were but part of
a larger group which grew out of the work of George of Brussels,
Thomas Bricot and Pierre Tartaret, and which included many
extremely important Spaniards, such as Jernimo Pardo, Antonio
Coronel, and Fernando de Enzinas. Nor, indeed, does Broadie tell us
anythingmuch about the fourteenth-century
logicians he has picked
out. That Burley's De PuntateArtisLogicaeTractatus
Longiorwas probain
s
written
to
Ockham'
Summa
Logicae, that Albert of
bly
response
Saxony owes a lot to his Master, Buridan, and that Paul of Venice
seems to have relied almost exclusively on the writingsof logicians
who immediatelypreceded him, are not mattersone will learn about
fromthis book. Nor will one learn the names of any other important
thinkers such as William Heytesbury, Thomas
fourteenth-century
Bradwardine and Roger Swyneshed, to mention but three.
Broadie's second choice is that of topic. His book is organized in
accordance with the standard division into terms, propositions, and
inferences.Under terms,he discusses signification,mental language,
categorematicand syncategorematicterms,and he touches on exponible terms. Under propositions, he takes up the truthconditions of
categorical propositions in some detail, drawing heavily on supposition theory;and he also discusses both tensed and modal propositions.
A chapter is devoted to the truthconditions of conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals. Under inferences,he firstmakes a distinction
between unanalyzed propositionsand analyzed propositions. He then
devotes one chapter to inferencesinvolving unanalyzed propositions
in which he lays out not only rules found in medieval texts but also
rules "sanctioned" (p. 71) by medieval texts. Finally, there are two
chapters devoted to inferencesinvolving analyzed propositions. The
firstof these discusses the square of opposition, equipollence and conversion; the second scampers through elementary syllogisticbefore
devoting detailed attention to syllogistictense logic.
142

12:33:25 PM

This choice of topics is not unintelligent.It makes for a sustained

discussion in whichone point leads into the next, and in which we are
provided with all the tools fora systematizationof valid inferences,a
topic which (according to Broadie) lies at the heart of formal logic.
However, the historianin me revolts. I want the reader to know that
Ockham' s SummaLogicaeincludes discussion of the predicables and the
categories,of obligations,insolubles and fallacies; that the eighttracts
of Buridan' s Summulae(not once mentioned by Broadie) included
tractson topics and fallacies and a new tract on definition,division,
and demonstration;thatall the fourteenth-century
authors selected by
Broadie wrote commentaries on parts of Aristotle's Organon; that
many other authors wrote treatises on specific topics, notably
sophismata,exponibles, proofsof terms,consequences, insolubles and
obligations. Only informationof this nature will enable the reader to
place Broadie' s chosen subject matterin its medieval context, a contextin which the main focuscould be argued to have been on philosophy of language and the solving of specificproblems and paradoxes,
ratherthan on formalinferenceas such.
I shall now turnto a more detailed examination of one of Broadie' s
main themes, the use of suppositional rules of descent in the analysis
of propositionsand in thejustificationof claims about the logical relationsbetween propositions.In his conclusion, Broadie writes(p. 139):
4'...the
very approach to the analysis of propositions should be of
interest.Particular mention must be made here, first,of the rules of
descentand ascent by which medieval logicians gave an account of the
significationof quantifiers,and secondly, of the rules concerning the
order in which descent is to be made..." In his presentationof these
topics, Broadie starts modestly (pp. 20-23) with an account of the
modes of common personal supposition in terms of descent, and he
correctlymentionsareas in which ascent is not possible. For instance,
'Every man is mortal' implies 'Man1 is mortaland man2 is mortaland
so on foreveryman', but one cannot argue from'Man1 is mortal' to
'Every man is mortal.' On p. 23 Broadie raises the problem of the
order of descent in relation to propositions whose terms display differentmodes of common personal supposition; and on the next page
he lists rules of priority:
determinate supposition has priority
over distributiveand merely confused supposition, and distributive
suppositionhas priorityover merelyconfused." He then proceeds to
use the data he has established in order to analyze differenttypes of
proposition,but withthe veryimportantproviso (e.g. p. 30) thatonly
143

12:33:25 PM

two individuals foreach term are to be taken into account. On p. 31,

Broadie uses descent to lay out the truth conditions for negative
'
propositions, and in chapter eight, 'Validity Conditions and Analyzed Propositions", he uses descent to explain the square of opposition and conversion. A typical example of his procedure is found on
pp. 91-93 where he show AaB and AeB to be contrariesby showing
that (A1 = BWB2) & (A2 = B!vB2) and (1 B1 & A1 B2) & (A2 =
B1 & 2 B2) are contraries. Finally, on pp. 100-109, he examines
the special quantifiersa, b, c, and d whichwere developed at the very
end of the fifteenth
century,and theirrelationshipto rules of descent.
Broadie makes it quite clear thatwhen he speaks ofthe special quantifiersa, b, c, and d, he is dealing with a late development in logic.
However, no caveats are presented in his earlier discussions. This
raises an importanthistorical question to do with the application of
Broadie' s account to the fourteenthcentury and, in particular, to
William Ockham. In the Cambridge
,
HistoryofLaterMedievalPhilosophy
Paul Spade writes (pp. 194-5): ' 'Although many scholars treat descent to singulars as a theoryof analysis or of truth-conditions,there
are reasons to doubt this. First, no medieval author seems to have
made such a claim. Second, some authors, as noted above, did have
an explicit theoryof truth-conditionsbased on supposition, and it is
quite different.Third, if descent to singulars was intended to provide
such a theory,it will not work...." In Volume 1 of her magisterial
book on William Ockham, Marilyn McCord Adams sums up the
recentsecondary literatureon this problem in Ockham (pp. 367-377)
and she writes (p. 375): "The biggest objection to supposing that
Ockham saw his divisions as a theoryof quantificationis thathe never
claims equivalence between A, I, E, and propositions,on the one
hand, and quantifier-freeexpansions of singulars, on the other." In
addition, she points out (p. 362) that medieval logicians in general do
not offer priority of analysis rules: "...they -to my knowledge
invariably- treat descent under each term separately and purport to
offerrules that are indifferentto the order of "analysis"." I do not
myselfhave an extensive knowledge of fourteenthcenturylogic, but
to the best of my belief,both the provision of priorityof analysis rules
and the extensiveuse of descent in the treatmentof opposition (a topic
on which early sixteenth-centuryParisian logicians wrote separate
treatises) is very much an early sixteenth-century
phenomenon, and
should not be hastily projected onto fourteenth-century
logicians.
Even ifI am wrong about this, it is a matterwhich can only be settled
144

12:33:25 PM

by carefulinspectionof the primarysources, and by detailed refutation of the prevailing scholarlyview. Broadie provides neitherargument nor evidence forhis account, taken as an account of fourteenthcenturylogic.
There is also an important theoretical question, one frequently
raised by early sixteenth-century
logicians. It concerns the ways in
which rules forsuppositional descent and ascent need to be modified
in orderto serve the purposes which Broadie attributesto them. There
are threeproblemsin particular:(1) how to phrase the rules forascent
and descentso thatgenuine logical equivalences are produced; (2) how
to provide extra premisses to ensure existentialimportforstatements
with demonstratives and proper names in those cases where the
statementswithquantifiedcommon termsdo have reference;(3) how
to deal with the possibilityof an infinityof referents.By explicitly
restrictingall his examples to cases where the termseach have exactly
two referents,Broadie manages to sweep all these theoreticalquestions
neatly under the carpet.
AnothermatterthatBroadie sweeps under the carpet is evidence for
disagreement among fourteenth-century
logicians. This is a great
the
because
of
pity,
presence disagreement, and the lively debate to
which it gives rise, is surelythe best sign of vitalityin any discipline.
The four main examples of debates that Broadie ignores have to do
withintentionalverbs, material consequences, the word-conceptrelation, and the fourthfigureof the syllogism. I shall consider each in
turn.
The problem of intentionalverbs was raised particularlyin relation
to the referenceof 'horse' in such contexts as "I promise you a
horse", and Broadie gives (pp. 26-27) an accurate reportof Albert of
Saxony's view of the matter. However, he does not mention that
Albert is followingWilliam Heytesbury; nor does he mention that
Ockham, Burleyand Buridan (along withotherssuch as John Wyclif)
tookpositionson the matterwhich were quite different
both fromeach
other and fromthat of Heytesbury.
With respectto material consequences, Broadie gives the definition
(p. 59): "A materiallyvalid inferenceis simplyan inferencewhich is
valid though not formallyso", and he takes it for granted that the
rules (p. 71): "From everyimpossiblepropositioneveryotherfollows,
and every necessary proposition follows from every other" are
paradigm cases of formallyvalid inferences.Yet there was an important group of British logicians (such as Richard Billingham) in the
145

12:33:25 PM

fourteenthcenturywho definedmateriallyvalid consequences as those

in which the antecedent was impossible or the consequent necessary,
and who argued thatfor formalvalidityit was necessarythat the consequent "be understoodin" the antecedent. Broadie does not mention
these dissentingviews, yet theyare of great interestin the lightof the
recent development of Relevance Logics.
Let us now consider words and concepts. Broadie quotes (p. 6) the
famous passage in which Aristotlesays "spoken sounds are symbols
of affectionsin the soul", and he mentions (p. 7) the interpretation
whereby "the utterance directlysignifiesnot a man but a thoughtof
a man." He then writes (loc. cit.) "This theory of the relation
between inscriptions, utterances, thoughts and things is plainly
nonsense, and a differentinterpretationof Aristotle's position was
given and generally accepted, namely that an inscription and an
utterance signifya thing no less immediatelythan does a thought."
Here it seems to me that Broadie is sidesteppingtwo issues whichwere
of great importance to medieval logicians. First, there is the issue of
whetherwords can be said to signifyconcepts at all. Ockham argued
and on the Perihermeneias
in his commentarieson the Sentences
(neither
of which are cited by Broadie) that words do not signifyconcepts but
are instead subordinatedto them, but many otherlogicians, including
Buridan, held a differentview. Second, ifwords can be said to signify
concepts, there is the issue of whetherthe concepts are in any sense
immediate or direct significates.Broadie takes it forgrantedthat any
such claim is nonsense, yet Buridan can be (and was) interpretedas
making it in Sophismata1.5. More to the point, Thomas Aquinas,
whom Broadie quotes on p. 6 as using Aristotle'sremarksin the Summa
, made the claim quite explicitly when he wrote {In
Theologiae
Perihermeneias
L.I, l.ii, 15) "Non enim potest esse quod <voces>
immediate
ipsas res ... ideo necesse fuitAristotelidicere
significent
voces
significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis
quod
mediantibus res." This notion of the concept as the immediate
significateof words is related to yet another issue raised by Broadie' s
book. In discussingthe relationshipbetween significationand supposition, Broadie claims (p. 17) "As regards the term 'man' as it occurs
in the proposition A man is reading', its supposition is the same as
its signification." This may be true forOckham, but it is certainlynot
true for any medieval logician who saw signification through
Thomistic eyes (to mention but one group). Moreover, the drawing
of a distinction between signification and supposition enabled
146

12:33:25 PM

'
medieval logicians to avoid Broadie's "plain nonsense' by saying that
although 'man' in "A man is reading" signifiesa concept, a universal, or a form(or some otherlocution) as well as external objects, the
truth
of the statementdepends on therebeing an actual physicalperson
who is reading.
And now, what of the fourthfigureof the syllogism?In chapternine
Broadie sets out "some of the elementary parts of the medieval
account" (p. 124) of syllogistic.He definesfourfiguresin termsof the
positionof the middle termin two ordered premisses(p. 125), and he
apparentlyemploysthe medieval definitionof major and minor terms
in relationto theirplace in the major (or first)premiss and the minor
(or second) premiss. No warning is given to the modern student of
logic that thisdefinitionis quite differentfromthat in vogue since the
sixteenthcentury,wherebythe major termis the predicate of the conclusion and the minor termis the subject of the conclusion. Nor is any
warning given about medieval debates concerning the legitimacyof
the fourthfigure. Ockham and Albert of Saxony both held that the
fourthfigurewas merelythe firstfigurewithpremissestransposedand
an indirectconclusion; Paul of Venice ( Logica Magna fol. 172 ra) says
that thereare just threefigures.Only Buridan in his Consequentiae
reca
fourth
as
has
Hubien
because,
established,
ognized genuine
figure
only Buridan took into account both the orderingof the premissesand
the ordering of the terms in the conclusion. The problem is best
explained by means of diagrams:
First
CB
AC
AB

IndirectFourth
AC
CB
AB

DirectFourth
AC
CB
BA

Using S and P forthe minor and major termsand M forthe middle

term, we get:
MP
SM
SP

PM
MS
PS

PM
MS
SP

A firstfiguresyllogismwith its premisses transposed and the conclusion leftunaltered is an indirectmode of the fourthfigure;but if one
takes into account the orderingof the termsin the conclusion one will
obtain four direct figures and four indirect figures. Moreover, the
147

12:33:25 PM

direct fourthfigurecannot be described as just the firstfigurewith

reversed premisses.
roadie' s tendency to overlook the presence of lively debate and
disagreement among fourteenth-century
logicians is closely linked to
a tendencyto oversimplifythe factsof the matter. I shall mentiontwo
furtherexamples. First,in his treatmentof simple suppositionBroadie
overlooks Burley's attack on Ockham's view in the De PuritateArtis
Logicae TractatusLongior'he overlooks the fact that Buridan was the
person who explicitlyconflatedsimple and material supposition; and
he tells the reader that "subsequent generations" (p. 19) recognized
only two kinds of supposition, material and personal. This is, of
course, a false generalization; and one of those logicians who did
retain three kinds of supposition is the Spaniard Domingo de Soto
whose work Broadie cites. Second, in his account of syncategorematic
terms Broadie lists the verb 'be' (p. 13) as a prime example. Yet as
Norman Kretzmann has pointed out ( Cambridge
, p. 212, n.5)
History
"The verb 'esse*is a special case. While it is not uncommon for
medieval logicians to distinguishcategorematicand syncategorematic
uses of a singleword, such uses are particularlyobvious and important
in the case of 'esse9..." In the early sixteenthcentury,at least some
logicians claimed that les taken existentiallyis categorematicby both
signification and function, and that 'es taken copulatively is
categorematic by virtue of its function (Ashworth, "Mental
Language", p. 61).
Generally speaking Broadie seems to lack what one might call a
sense of history. There are two cases in which this is particularly
evident. On p. 16 he discusses the number of propositional connectives, and notes that Paul of Venice said thatsome people listed seven.
Broadie writes: "He may have had in mind a textcalled ArsEmmerana
(c. 1200) which listsall the connectivesso farmentioned [conjunction,
disjunction, conditional, temporal, local, causal] plus the sign of
4
adjunction, that is in order that'." Leaving aside the immense
implausibilityof supposing that Paul of Venice had access to the Ars
Emmerana
, Broadie ignores both the well-known fact (see Cambridge
Historyp. 301 n. 3, AshworthLanguageand Logic p. 147) that many
medieval and post-medievallogicians, followingPriscian, included the
so-called rational connectives(ergo, igitur,itaque) as a seventh type;
and he also ignores Paul of Venice's own text. In the place cited
{Logica Magna, fol. 124va) Paul says explicitly that he is going to
subordinate the rational proposition to the conditional. On p. 88,
148

12:33:25 PM

Broadie gives the propositional rule -(P&Q), Q, therefore-P, and he

cites a seventeenth-century
logician, Andreas Kesler. Now, it is true
that Kesler does give that rule (as I pointed out, Languageand Logic p.
71), but it is also true that the rule was one of the five Stoic
"Indemonstrables" and as such, was popular fromthe early sixteenth
centuryonwards. To cite Kesler, and only Kesler, as the source, is
quite misleading. Yet the two references I have discussed are
Broadie' s only referencesto very early medieval logic and very late
scholastic logic. They do not indicate a sure grasp of changes and
developmentsin logic throughthe ages.
I should now like to focus more closely on certain aspects of
Broadie' s use ofmodern formallogic. In chaptersix, Broadie embarks
on an analysis of the differencesbetween medieval and modern
inferencetheory, in the course of which he distinguishes between
axiomatic systemsand systemsof natural deduction, which he thinks
most relevant to medieval logic. He claims that the main featureof
4
natural deduction systemsis that they 'do not have axioms" (p. 64),
thoughtheydo have "a fixedset of rules of inference" (p. 65). Leaving aside the undoubted presence of axioms in many natural deduction systems, from Gerhard Gentzen's classic 1934 presentation
onward, surelyone of the main featuresof a natural deduction system
is the provisionof two typesof rule, structuralrules, and paired introduction and elimination rules for connectives and quantifiers. One
might, I suppose, find certain analogues of structural rules in
medieval texts;and one can certainlypick out some introductionand
eliminationrules. Broadie does explicitlygive conjunctionelimination
on p. 84 and disjunctionintroductionon p. 85, thoughhe failsto note
that both conjunction introductionand disjunction elimination (if set
yields AvB and set k,A yields and set k,B yields C, then set
yieldsC) can be found in Paul of Venice ( Logica magna, fol.l80ra, fol.
189va). But any search forpaired rules is going to come up against at
least two awkward facts. First, the conditional connective is not
treatedtruth-functionally
by the medievais, so we are not easily going
to find a homogeneous set of introductionand elimination rules for
propositional connectives; second, as Broadie's own presentation
shows, medieval logicians were simply not thinkingin termsof a set
of neatlypaired rules at allMoreover, I thinkit is safe to say that the
reason theyhad no concept of "a fixedset of rules of inference" is that
theyhad no concept of a formalsystem,a concept which carries along
withit the desiderata of soundness and completeness. What fixesa set
149

12:33:25 PM

of rules fora formalsystemS is that(a) each rule is independent(-this

is forthe very tidy-minded-)and (b) a set entails a wffA in S if and
only ifA is derivable fromset in S. Broadie no doubt knows all this,
but he does not say so with any directness;and he offersno definition
for the notion of a fixed set of rules even though he employs it a
number of times in the chapter in question.
Finally, I must describe the scholarlyapparatus of the book. There
are no footnotes,and very few references,so that the reader is leftto
guess whethera remarkor a proofis taken froman actual fourteenthcenturywriter,or whetherit is merely Broadie's own extrapolation.
There are verybriefbiographical notes on two thirteenth-century
logicians, five fourteenth-century
logicians, and six sixteenth-century
logicians, all but one of whom are Scottish. There is a minimal
bibliography,which is extremelyimportantforwhat it reveals about
the materials on which this book is based. For Walter Burley, there
is no referenceto his work on supposition(edited by Stephen Brown)
or any of his Perihermeneias
commentaries (also edited by Stephen
For
there
is no referenceto works other than the
Ockham,
Brown).
SummaLogicae, and in the entryfor this Broadie manages to get the
title wrong, the date of publication wrong, and to omit two of the
editors. For Buridan, thereis no referenceto the Summulae
, nor to the
tract on supposition from the Summulaewhich was edited by M.E.
Reina. Broadie cites incunabular editions of Buridan's Conseqentiae
and Sophismatadespite the modern editions by Hubert Hubien and
.. Scott. Nor is the picture much betterwhen one turn to secondary literature.The only secondary sources on the historyof medieval
(as opposed to post-medieval) logic firstpublished after1970 are The
and D.P. Henry's idiosynCambridge
HistoryofLaterMedievalPhilosophy
craticMedievalLogicandMetaphysics
. L.M. de Rijk is mentionedin the
text (p. 16) but has not been placed in the bibliography. Fortunately,
any studentwith the good sense to consult the Cambridge
Historywill
find there more than adequate bibliographical help, togetherwith
detailed referencesto all the modern text-editionsI have just mentioned.
In sum, whatever the independent merits of this book, I do not
regard it as a proper introductionto medieval logic. Perhaps this is
because I am looking for the wrong things?
Waterloo, Ont.
University
of Waterloo
150

12:33:25 PM

WorksCited
Ockham
Adams,MarilynMcCord,William
, 2 vol.,NotreDame, Indiana1987
E.J.,Language
andLogicinthePost-Medieval
Period
1974
Ashworth,
, Dordrecht
E.J.,TheStructure
Ashworth,
SomeProblems
Discussed
ofMental
Language:
byEarlySixteenth
20 (1982),59-83
, in: Vivarium,
Century
Logicians
Buridan
ontheFourth
in: RevueinternaHubien,Hubert,
John
oftheSyllogism,
Figure
tionalede philosophie,
29eanne,113(1975),271-285
Grabmann,
TheCambridge
Kretzmann,
Norman,
Anthony
Kenny,
JanPinborg
(editors),
History
Medieval
1982
, Cambridge
ofLater
Philosophy
Paul ofVenice,LogicaMagna
, Venetiis1499.

151

12:33:25 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 2 (1988)
Reviews

TheLatinRhetorical
KarinM. Fredborg,
Commentaries
, Toronto,
byThierry
ofChartres
1988.Pontifical
Institute
ofMedievalStudies,Studiesand Texts84, 403 pp.
ofChartres,
one ofthemostimportant
scholars
oftheXllthcentury,
is
Thierry
also becoming
one of thebestknown.Aftertheeditionof his commentaries
on
Boethius
commentaries
arenowaccessible
to theaverage
byHring,hisrhetorical
medievalist
in a moderneditionbyKarinFredborg.
AsThierry
inChartres
as wellas inParis,theeditormentions
teached
inherintroduction
thesomewhat
surrealistic
discussion
thattheSchoolofChartres
hasaroused
thelastdecades.Sherightly
observes
thata seriesoffamous
masters
"can be
during
shownto havetaughtthere,at somepointoftimeor another".Thierry
probably
started
histeaching
careeratChartres
before
toParisinthe1130s,andbefore
moving
thedeclineofChartres
in thesecondhalfofthecentury.
Another
hardto findbecauseitis
interesting
passagein theintroduction,
though
coveredby thetitle"Didacticmethods",is thecomparison
between
and
Thierry
Dominicus
Gundissalinus.
showsthatGundissalinus
tookover
Fredborg
convincingly
tothecommentary
introduction
onDe inventione
She
Thierry's
, andnottoocarefully.
thusputsan endtothediscussion
aboutThierry's
this
possible
'plagiarism'
(although
is a wordthatshouldbe usedwithmuchcarein themedieval
context).
Forlatinists
itis goodtolearnthatThierry
attached
muchimportance
totheright
use ofvocabulary
and handeddownto later
and, as theeditorsays,"established
medievalrhetoricians
a standard
ofcoherent
technical
terminology".
The textcomprises
bothThierry's
onDe inventione
commentary
(p.49-215)andhis
on theRhetorica
ad Herennium
commentary
(p.221-361).As theeditorpointsout,the
De inventione
hadpriority
inThierry's
witha muchlongerintroeyesandis provided
duction(accessus
circaartem
rhetoricam).
As fortheedition,
thetraditional
method
hasbeenapplied,grouping
themss.into
twoor morefamilies
and thusestablishing
a stemma
leadingto theoldestpossible
text.Thisisofcourseingeneral
theonlymethod
fortheedition
ofclassicaltexts,
but
inthecaseofa XHth-century
textofwhichseveral
I am
mss.survive,
Xllth-century
notsureitistheonlyoreventhebestway.Apparently,
inthiscase,itwasnotpossible
tocomeanywhere
neartheoriginal
theexplanation
text,although
givenbytheeditor
is notclear:"Because of thecontamination
in HPh and and becauseof the
inferior
ofAHL, thetextis mainlybasedon BMOPh and the
relatively
readings
stemma
below"(p.40). Does thismeanthatshemakesa personal
choiceeachtime
thatthereadings
ofthesemss.differ?
ina caselikethis,wherethems.tradiPerhaps,
tionis generally
method
wouldhavebeenpreferable,
thatis
sound,the'historical'
tosaya textbasedforexampleon B, whichseemsa rather
ms.,
goodandconsistent
corrected
andcompleted
ifnecessary,
withthehelpofthemostcloselyrelatedmss.
Thiswouldnothavehadthevalueoftheauthor's
text,ofcourse,butatleastitwould
havebeenalmostentirely
a 'real' text,as usedbyThierry's
Andit
contemporaries.
152

12:33:35 PM

wouldhavehad another
do exist,evenin the
standards
Orthograpical
advantage.
MiddleAges,though
The choiceof
andstrange.
theyoftenseemtous inconsistent
onems.as thebasisoftheedition
wouldhavemadeitpossible
itsXHthtomaintain
renders
well
Ofcourse,thetextwehavenowprobably
perfectly
century
orthography.
- and Thierry
whatThierry
wantedto say. But ifone caresaboutmedievallatin
himself
classical
did- it is a pityto read his textin a standardized
apparently
in
a
inwhichnorThierry
noranyofhiscontemporaries
would
and
form
orthography
havewritten
it.
it mustbe saidthatthetextseemscarefully
asidethisformal
Putting
objection,
of chapterand paragraph
established
and is, by the insertion
titles,takenfrom
of
ownwords,easytoconsult.A veryusefulquotation
testifies
Thierry's
apparatus
theeditor'swideknowledge
rhetorics.
in thefieldofmedieval
Anappendix
on a fragment
on De inventione
in a Prahams.,a
ofthecommentary
and twoindexescomplete
thiscompactbook.The firstindexis of
bibliography
also fornoninteresting
examplesused by Thierry,the second,particularly
contains,
specialisists,
partof Thierry's
apartfrompropernames,an important
arethesubject
ofdescription
ofdefiwhich
terms
andconcepts
vocabulary,
especially
in a particular
nition.It is notalwaysclearwhythelemmais presented
gender(for
it is true,feminine
instance
coniuncta,
etc.,foradjectives
attenuata,
accompanying,
orwhyincertain
casestheclassical
instead
oftheclassical
nouns,cachinnum
cachinnus)
is abandoned
instead
ofpeadagogus
orthography
), butthiddoesnotdistract
{pedagogus
fromtheusefulness
of thisindex,whichgivesa goodidea of Thierry's
anything
in rhetorical
matters.
vocabulary
ofmedievalrhetorics
and
On thewhole,thisbookis a precious
toolforscholars
intellectual
an interesting
activity.
piecein thepuzzleofXHth-century
's-Gravenhage

Olga Weyers

'
PartVof
'Designificato
Richard
from
propositions
Brinkley's
Theory
ofSentential
Reference.
andnotesby
withintroduction
hisSummanovade logica.Editedandtranslated
desMittelalters,
Michael
Studien
undTextezurGeistesgeschichte
J. Fitzgerald,
XVIII, Leiden(E.J.Brill)1987,pp. IX +
Zimmermann,
hrsg.vonDr. Albert
159,ISBN 90-04-08430-4.
Paul ofVenice
First,thegoodnews.In Treatise11 ofPartII oftheLogicamagna
or the
of a proposition,
discussesfivetheories
aboutthesignificatum
extensively
in thesecondhalfofthefourofa declarative
thatwerecurrent
sentence,
meaning
ofRimini,Peterd'Ailly,and
teenth
Besidestheviewsdefended
byGregory
century.
to whichthemeaning
Paul himself,
oneaccording
he mentions
twootheropinions,
ofa declarative
sentence
is nota thingbuta modeofa thing{modus
rei)and one
or dividing
ofthecompounding
to whichthatmeaningis a composition
according
no
fortheselatterviews,whicharealsodiscussed
mind.Untilrecently,
elsewhere,
hasedited,
ButnowMr. Fitzgerald
onehadbeenabletoidentify
a particular
author.
fromtwo manuscripts
at Pragueand Leipzig,thatpartof Richard
preserved
Summa
novade logica(about 1360)whichdealswiththemeaningof a
Brinkley's
toRichardBillingham,
reiviewis ascribed
andtherethemodus
declarative
sentence;
as theopinionof a certainBermwhilethementalcomposition
viewis specified
andwitha third
owndoctrine
Thesetwoviewsarecontrasted
withBrinkley's
ingham.
The Introducofthemoderns
whichwassupported
opinion
byRichardFerrybridge.
devoted
tothelifeandwritings
tion(pp. 1-32)ofthepresent
bookis almostentirely
- whomhe also
ofBrinkley.
aboutBermingham
Fitzgerald
sayspractically
nothing
he has been
that
without
William
of
calls,
anyexplanation,
Berminghamexcept
known
is ofcoursea better
unabletolocateanyworksbyhim.RichardBillingham
153

12:33:41 PM

I andII Fitzgerald
inAppendix
addstheLatintextoftworelevant
Moreover,
figure.
Utrum
idem
from
Sortes
etSortem
esse(Ripoll141,fol.74r-80v)
hiswritings:
fragments
A third
and De significato
CathedralF 35, fol.109v-110v).
(Worcester
propositionis
thereaderwiththatpartofFerrybridge's
which
wasleftout
Appendix
provides
Logica
del Puntaon p. 228 ofhiseditionprinted
I in Paul of
as Appendix
by Francesco
PartII, Fascicule
theIntroduction
6, Oxford,1978.In between
Venice,Logicamagna,
treatise
and theAppendices
pages33-117containboththeLatintextofBrinkley's
followed
translation,
and, facingit, Fitzgerald's
by somenotes(pp. 119-24).A
and a generalindexconcludethebook.
selected
bibliography
theories
As thestudyofmedieval
themeaning
ofdeclarative
sentences
concerning
stillsuffers
froma lackofreadilyaccessible
source-material,
everyadditionto the
thewayinwhichFitzgerald
availablestockis mostwelcome.
Unfortunately,
presents
his newfindings
leavesmuchto be desired.The bookteemswithtypographical
errors.But thereare manyotherrespectsin whichhe displaysa deplorable
To beginwithsomeexamples
from
theIntroduction:
onp. 21heisquite
carelessness.
esseto Brinkley
estSortem
theviewthatDeusestdeum
esseandSortes
wronginascribing
thatBrinkley's
viewmusthavebeenoneofthedominant
views
andthenconcluding
WilliamofHeytesbury,
and
becauseit was discussed
by Ferrybridge,
Billingham,
thefactthattheviewdiscussed
is theopinion
byFerrybridge
JohnVenator.Already
himself
thatarerejected
withwhichFerrybridge
agreesandalsooneoftheopinions
on p. 23 itis contended
shouldhavegivenpausetotheauthor.Further,
byBrinkley
thereferent
ofthesentence
'No
thatin De significato
propositionis
Billingham
regards
andnotaccusatively.
takenablatively
As is obvious
chimera
exists'as an aliqualiter
heldthata truesentence,
from
theLatintext(p. 147),however,
actually
Billingham
inthesensethatithasbotha modus
affirmative
ornegative,
whether
aliqualiter
significai
anda modus
a falsesentence
t' whereas
aliqualiter
quosignificai
significai
only
quem
significa
. Thus,truesentences,
suchas 'No chimera
inthesensethatithasa modus
quosignificai
bothablatively
andaccusatively,
whilefalsesentences
exists',signify
signify
aliqualiter
It mayalso be remarked
thatsuchpassagesmakeitclear
onlyablatively.
aliqualiter
as 'the
thatFitzgerald's
policyof rendering
significatum
consistently
propositionis
is notaltogether
referent
ofa sentence'
felicitous.
in general
As fortheLatintextofBrinkley's
treatise,
readable,itis
though
fairly
flawed
a fartoogenerous
nonetheless
useofinverted
commas.In I, 153-5
by,first,
one shouldread:
(p. 42; I quotebyChapterand line),forinstance,
Siclicet
tamen
exhocnonsequitur
sitsignificatum
significatum
propositionis,
propositionis
sedaliqua.
quodsitaliquid.Sedcumhocstaiquodnonsitaliquid
licet
inverted
commasaroundthesetofwordsbetween
andtamen
, andtwice
Putting
ofthe
aroundthewordsthatfollow
butmakesnonsense
, is notonlysuperfluous,
quod
or evenright.That the
is notalwayshelpful
passage.Secondly,thepunctuation
in III, 98-9
authoris notverysure-footed
inthisareais shownbya curiousexample
Omnis
deinesse,
from
thepremisses
quaesignificai
propositio
(p. 80). Theretheconclusion
'Chimaera
est', sisolum
Istapropositio
sicut
estesse,
estcontingens.
significai
composicontingens
istapropositione
estesse,is givenas Igitur
tionem
sicut
mentis,
(sic),data
significai
contingens
is wrong,
butthepunctuation
istaconsequentia,
estcontingens.
Heretheform
propositione
translates:
'Consequently,
giventhis
Fitzgerald
happensto be right.Nevertheless,
theheadingssuppliedby the
is contingent.'
thentheinference
sentence,
Thirdly,
inIV, 198and241(p. 94,p. 96),and
editoraresometimes
forinstance,
misleading,
asproresponsio
inV, 93 (p. 104);nottospeakofsucha solecism
(p. 56 andfrequently
afterwards).
for
The translation
is farfrom
reliable.Sometimes
singlewordsaremistranslated,
doesnotmean'deduce'but
in II, 124and237(p. 58,p. 66),wherededucere
example,
dividentem
et
rather'take away', and in V, 148 (p. 108), whereperintellectum
intellect'
butrather
andentrusted
doesnotmean'bya separated
'bya
sequestrantem
ofthe)intellect'.
Evenmoreserious,
is
andseparating
however,
dividing
(operation
154

12:33:41 PM

thefactthatoccasionally
wholepassagesarecompletely
misunderstood.
One example
is IV, 274ff.(p. 98), where,I submit,
theLatintextgivenbyFitzgerald
shouldbe
alteredas follows:
'
*albus
isteterminus
tamsubiectum
accidentis
Quiaigitur
significai
utrumque,
quamipsum
ideoquando
istitermino
ab eo
accidens,
' negaietremovei
negatio
praeponitur
'significai
Et ideoistapropositio
forward
estfalsa
utrumque
significatum.
(put
by
Ferrybridge)
'Isteterminus
'albus
' inista
'Sortes
' non
estalbus
aliamrema re
propositione
significai
subiectum
*.
Sed
realiter
aliam
etsignificai
significata
per
significai (namely,
whiteness)
eandem
convertibiliter
eandem
sed
(namely,a whitething).Nontarnen
significai,
remutinformatur
eandem
albedine.
significai
In thisform
thetextis fairly
whatFitzgerald
offers
is utterly
clear,whereas
obscure,
bothin Latinandin English.
Another
exampleis tobe foundinV, 187ff.(p. 110),
whereBrinkley
statements
theverb'to be'
arguesthatinnecessary
(andimpossible)
doesnotindicate
tothesubject.A seriesofmistakes
anytimewithrespect
prevents
from
thispassagecorrectly.
Ratherthanwhathe makesof
Fitzgerald
understanding
In suchnecessarily
true
it, theimportofV, 191-202seemsto be thefollowing.
statements
as 'Man is an animal'or 'Man is capableoflaughing'theintellect
does
notaffirm
ofthesubjectthatwhichis cosignified
bytheverb'is'. Forifitdid,such
a proposition
wouldnotbe trueperse, sincethatwhich
thewholepredicate
wouldthen
ofutterance),
moment
adequately
signify
(namely,
beingan animalat theparticular
wouldnotbelongtothedefinition
ofthething
expressed
bythesubjectnorbe somethatfollowed
from
the(definition
ofthe)thing
thing
expressed
bythesubject.Forthe
term'whoexistsnow'(thatis, 'existing
at theparticular
moment
ofuttering
Homo
estanimal1)
doesnotbelongtothedefinition
ofmannordoesitfollow
from
(thedefinitionof)man;becauseifitdid,itwouldbe truethatwhenever
therewillbe a man,
thatterm'whoexistnow'willbe (applicable
to him).Butthatconsequent
is false;
theantecedent
islikewise
false.Among
othermisinterpretations,
therefore,
Fitzgerald
readsterminus
inverted
'a termwhich
, without
commas,and translates
quinuncest
existsnow'.Furthermore,
inV, 206and211 (p. 112)hereadspropositionis
necesse
and
veritates
necesse
necesse
as an adverb,
instead
ofpropositionis
necessariae
andveritates
, taking
necessariae
arenotin time,
thattruths,
, and so comesto thetranslation
necessarily,
thatthentheappealtoAristotle,
, IV, 12,221b 3-4and
apparently
believing
Physics
23-5,is stillappropriate.
I havethegravest
aboutthesoundness
oftheLatintextsinthe
Finally,
misgivings
form
in whichtheyarepresented
in thethreeAppendices.
No painsbyFitzgerald
editorwouldleaveitem8 on p. 126,forinstance,
in thefollowing
taking
disguise:
Item
inPraedicamentis
7 dicit
ad verbum
non, Aristoteles
capitulo
quodsic<ut> negatio
estoppositum,
sicetresquaesubutraque
suntidem,
utsedere
etnon
affirmationem
potestate
sedere
estres.
sedere,
igitur
I compared
III withtheprovisional
madebyMr. Francesco
Appendix
transcription
delPunta,which
hewaskindenoughtosendmeyearsago. His textis quiteintelligithetranscription
offered
is bothverydifferent
and often
ble,whereas
byFitzgerald
To giveonlyoneexample,
at theendofR 3.7 on p. 152
utterly
incomprehensible.
no less thannineteen
wordshave been omitted,
so thatthe intricate
argument
becomessheernonsense.
On theonehand,then,thereis reasonto thankMr. Fitzgerald
forpointing
the
newinformation
aboutmedievaltheories
the
wayto someinteresting
concerning
ofdeclarative
sentences.
thathehas
On theotherhand,itis tobe regretted
meaning
carried
outthetaskhesethimself
insuchan unsatisfactory
manner,
thereby
making
a muddleofmanya respectable
readerstheimpression
andso giving
that
argument
medieval
semantics
is hardly
worththeirwhile.
Leiden

GabrielNuchelmans
155

12:33:41 PM

La Vera
, a curadi AdaLamacchia;
traduzione,
introduzione,
Religione
Sant'Agostino,
1986.
annotazione
di PasqualePorro,Bari,Adriatica
Editrice,
after
hisreturn
written
De vera
isoneofhisearlyworks,
shortly
religione
Augustine's
toAfrica,
theyearsinThagaste(388-390).LiketheDialoguesofCassiciacum
during
theenthusiasm
itlackstheirconversational
itreflects
oftheneophyte,
andalthough
work.In writing
it theconvert
formit is a vividand in placesmostexpressive
in a comprehensive
wasaiminghigh:he intended
todescribe
the
system
Augustine
of Christian
fundamentals
doctrine.This purposewas not fullyachieved.Antiarederogatory
to
Manichaean
ofNeo-Platonist
andtheinfluence
polemics
thinking
whichis further
marred
thebalanceofthetreatise,
bylong-winded,
repetitious
arguitis a convincing
defence
mentation.
Butforallitsdefects
andpowerful
presentation
theuniquecharTheintroductory
oftheChristian
faith.
chapters
bringoutforcefully
Revelation
andtheprominent
roleoftheChristian
Churchinhuman
acterofChrist's
setsforth
theitinerary
ofMan,SoulandBody,towards
The mainargument
history.
thenatureofEvil,
anddiscusses
concomitant
Truth,Beauty,Happiness,
problems,
theenslavement
ofMan byPassion,Prideand
Reason- Authority,
theopposition
Curiosity
(cf. 1John2, 16),etc.
oftheworkforour
thistreatise
is notan easytask,buttheimportance
Translating
and intellectual
has causedmany
ofAugustine's
evolution
spiritual
understanding
hasbeenactive:atleastsixItaliantranslatoappear.Italianscholarship
translations
halfofthiscentury
tionshaveseenthelightin thefirst
(cf.J. Pegon,Bibliothque
de saintAugustin
Oeuvres
8, Paris 1951,p. 21). The present
one, by
Augustinienne.
in confrontation
withthe
PasqualePorro(ifI readthetitlewell),hasbeenachieved
ofBassi(1930)andtheFrenchandGermantranslations
ofPegon
Italiantranslation
As I couldnot
(1951;neweditionbyMadec1982)andThimme(1962)respectively.
to be madewas withPegon'sand
theonlycomparison
consultBassi'srendering,
Confronted
comesin
Thimme'stranslations.
withboth,Porro'stext,inmyopinion,
thecomplexity
oftheLatin
second.Although
reading
verywell(which,considering
is no smallachievement),
Thereareomissions:
it is lackingin accuracy.
original,
... servantem
clauses,wordsare missingin 3,3,9(sedunum
sentences,
), 29,52,144
and8,14,43(per
tiner
... praeponitur),
31,57,158
e)' inthesimileof
dicitur)
(recte
(quaelibet
thecharioteer
alongbyhishorses(45,83,238)thedetailofthehorsesabout
dragged
In morethanonepassagethe
deathis omitted.
tomakea spectacle
ofthecharioteer's
ettotailla
missesthepoint.In theabove-mentioned
similethetextcurrus
translation
... quaeruina
et
eiusetipsum
iunctio
afjligebat
(thechariotand thewholeofitsoutfit)
cursum
withquaeandruina
takentogether
moderationis
amiserat
is translated
decentissimae
is an ablative.In 34,64,181the
toformthesubjectofthefollowing
clause,butruina
esseoportet
istasuntquaephanLatinreads:verum
contemplor;
numquid
quodintellectu
forte
tasmata
is rendered:
'Nonsonoforse
dicisoient?
Thesecondsentence
questerappresenbutitiscertainly
not
tazioniquellechesolitamente
si chiamano
mentali?',
immagini
ideathattheso-called
mentali'
couldbe theTruth.Augustine
'immagini
Augustine's
Deusomnia
estunde
habet
fecit
speciem
nullamque
quodnullam
saysaboutCreation:Id igitur
formam,
quodnihilestaliudquamnihil(18,35,96);theclausewithquodmeans:'which
butreadsin theItaliantranslation:
is noneotherthannothing',
'poichil nullanon
nonestaliudquamnihil);
altrochenulla'(whichinLatinwouldhavebeen:quodnihil
in thefootnote
assertsthatAugustine,
to makematters
here,is
worse,a comment
is addedtoa passageinAugustine's
nearertoPlotinus
thantoPlato,anda reference
whichis nottothepoint.In 8,14,42satisapparebit
homo
De immortaliate
animae,
quantum
chiaro,inquantol'uomopucomprendere,
assequi
quam. .. shouldbe 'Apparir
potest,
con
chiarofinoa qualelimite
l'uomopossaspingersi
come...', insteadof'Apparir
la sua intelligenza
e come...'. Andinthenextparagraph
(8,14,43),intheenumeraoftheCreed,virginis
is not(Mary'sown)'Immacolata
tionofa seriesofarticles
partus
156

12:33:46 PM

butJesus'Birthfrom
theVirginMary.The relatively
of
Concezione',
largenumber
errors
inwhatisotherwise
a fluent
translation
ofa difficult
treatise
mustbe deplored.
Anaccurate
revision
couldpresent
Italianandnon-Italian
readers
witha remarkable
version
ofa greattextfromChristian
Antiquity.
Nijmegen

A. Bastiaensen

157

12:33:46 PM

Vivarium
XXVI, 2 (1989)
BooksReceived

runies
, par I. Rosier,PressesUniversitaires
Lille,
Cinqtudes
L'ambigut:
historiques
I. Rosier,Introduction;
Lille 1988,186p. ISBN 2 85939301 3 - Contents:
S.
etl'ambigut;
etl'ambigut
Ebbesen,LesGrecs
J. Lallot,Apollonius
Dyscole
linguistietsolutions
etsynonymie
lestextes
; Fr. Desbordes,
Homonymie
que:problmes
d'aprs
desnotions
I. Rosier,Evolution
etunivocatio
auXllesicle
latins;
;
thoriques
d'equivocatio
dansla thorie
etla pratique
etquivoque
Polysmie,
ambigut
J. Cerquiglini,
potiques
duMoyen
; Index
Agefranais
TheFyveWyttes.
A LateMiddle
Devotional
R. H. Bremmer,
Treatise
Edited
English
from
BL MS Harley
2398, withan Introduction,
andGlossary,
Commentary
Rodopi,
Amsterdam
1987,VI + 129p. ISBN 90 6203899 9
du Moyende Copenhague),
Cahiers
de l'Institut
Vol. 55
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
R. Andrews,Petrusde Alvernia,
Quaestiones
super
(1988), 192 p.- Contents:
Anedition
inthe
TheScholastic
; K.M. Fredborg,
ofRhetoric
praedicamentis:
Teaching
were
inScholastic
Middle
Treated
Ages;S. Ebbesen,TheWayFallacies
Logic;id., Talkwhatis nomore;
L. B. Mortensen,
ViewoftheOrigin
SaxoGrammaticus'
ingabout
of
Models
theDanesandhisHistoriographical
; General
Information
de l'Institut
du MoyenCahiers
de Copenhague),
Vol. 56
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
I. Rosier,(tOMagister...
": Grammaticalit
etintelligibilit
(1988),238p. - Contents:
selon
unsophisme
duXlIIesicle
; S. Ebbesen,A Grammatical
Sophism
byNicholas
of
"Albus
musicus
est";R. Andrews,
Matritensis,
Quaestiones
super
Anonymus
Normandy,
AnEdition;
librum
Praedicamentorum:
S. Ebbesen& P. V. Spade,MoreLiars
; .
Ancient
MusicalTheory
inByzantine
Environments
Troelsgard,
de Copenhague),
Vol. 57
duMoyenCahiers
de l'Institut
Agegrecetlatin(Universit
in
TheFormai
Character
J. Christensen,
ofkoinoi
topoi
(1988),188p. - Contents:
andDialectic
Rhetoric
& . H. Kneepkens,
Grammatica
Aristotle's
; . M. Fredborg
inBritish
Notes
andFrench
Little
ManuPorretana
; S. Ebbesen,
Questions.
Stray
Logical
school
texts
on
Horatius
etethicus.
Twotwelfth-century
liricus
; K. Friis-Jensen,
scripts
B. P. McGuire,Rebirth
andResponsibility
: Cistercian
the
Horace's
Stories
from
poems;
Musical
'Testimonia'
LateTwelfth
; B. Schartau,OnCollecting
Century
ofByzantine
C. Knudsen,H XAPI TOY IHCOY XPICTOY... Dereigenhndige
Practice;
S. Ebbesen,
Addenda
etcordesPaulusalsErkennungszeichen
seiner
Briefe;
Schlussgruss
toCIMAGL3-56; IndextoCIMAGL1-56
rigenda
undEuropa.
Wiesbaden
Erasmus
vonAugustBuck,Harrassowitz,
herausgg.
Vortrge
: A. Buck,Einleitung.
Erasmus
und
1988,189p. ISBN 3 447028394 - Contents
- Frieden
L.-E. Halkin,Erasme
etlesPaysErasmus
undKrieg;
; O. Herding,
Europa
Erasme
Erasmus
undSpanien
etla France;
D. Briesemeister,
Bas;J.Cl. Margolin,
;
Erasmus
undEngland:
Erasmus
undMorus
H. SchulteHerbrggen,
; A. Ritokdes16. Jahrhunderts
Intellektuellen
unddie ungarischen
; P. G.
Szalay, Erasmus
unddie
Erasmus
unddiemittellateinische
Literatur
Erasmus
Schmidt,
; B. Hgglund,
aberein
einKnig,
oder
M. Knops,Das Sprichwort,
Manmuszentweder
Reformation;
undbeschrieben
vonHerrn
Erasmo
vonden
werden.
Auss
Narrgeborn
Roterodamo,
gelegt
158

12:33:53 PM

einem
Anno1638;C.
Frsten
Christlichen
undHerren
, verdeutischet.
Tugenden
zustndig
Edition
ina European
Context
Reedijk,TheLeiden
ofErasmus'
OperaOmnia
Giovanni
Scoto
sulprologo
di Giovanni
Mondadori
, Omelia
, a curadi MartaCristiani,
Editore,1987,LXVIII + 145p. ISBN 88 04 298812
deSaint-Thierry,
Guillaume
De la nature
ducorps
etdel'ame.Textetabli,traduit
etcomment
Les BellesLettres,
Paris1988,249p. ISBN 2 251336
parM. Lemoine,
32 X
desgrammairiens
del'Antiquit
latins
auxLumires.
Actesdu Colloquede ChanL'hritage
1987,d. parIrneRosier,Peeters
tilly,2-4septembre
(Louvain),Paris1988,
360p. ( = Bibliothque
de l'information
I. Rosier,
grammaticale,
13). Contents:
Fr. Desbordes,La fonction
du grecchezlesgrammairiens
latins
Prsentation;
; P.
La dimension
chezlesgrammairiens
latins
Flobert,
; D. J.
historique
(Donat,Dosithe)
andtheOrigins
and
R. H. Robins,Priscian
Taylor,Varro
ofLatinLinguistic
Theory;
theContext
dephrase:
M.
desanciens;
ofhisAge;Fr. Charpin,La notion
l'hritage
de l'analysede l'nonc
chezles grammairiens
latins
Baratin,Les limites
; D.
- thegenesis
From
toparticle
S. Mellet,
Schenkeveld,
partcula
ofa classofwords;
ettemps
verbaux
dePriscien
Marone
e la
Sanctius
; G. Polara,Virgilio
Temporalit
delle
dottrine
V. Law,Serious
parodia
grammaticali;
Aspects
oftheWordplay
ofVirgilius
Marogrammaticus;
L. Holtz,Lesinnovations
:
dela grammaire
carolingienne
thoriques
Peudechose.
"cultiv"
deSaintAmand:
Le
?; M. Passalacqua,Unmanuscrit
Pourqoi
Absolutio:
A Noteonthehistory
par.lat.7498; . H. Kneepkens,
ofa grammatical
'Institutions
XVII.187: Three
Grammaticae'
I. Rosier,
; M. Sirridge,
reactions;
concept
Le traitement
desconstructions
auXIIle sicle
; L. G. Kelly,Godand
spculatif
figures
G. L. Bursill-Hall,
TheModistae
Fr.AlbanoLeoni,
Grammar;
Revisited;
Speculative
La tradizione
latina
nell'Islanda
W. K. Percival,
in
medioevale;
grammaticale
Anaphora
Medieval
andRenaissance
LatinGrammars;
P. Swiggers,
Lespremires
des
grammaires
vernaculaires
-romans
latine:
etdetransformagallo
face la tradition
Stratgies
d'adaptation
medievo-latin
dansla gramtion;M. L. CarvalhaoBuescu,Leparadigme
grammatical
maire
dela Renaissance
Le "De reciprocatone
suietsuus"de
; J. Chomarat,
portugaise
Lorenzo
etmodernes
anciens
dansles
Valla;V. BonmatiSanchez,Lesgrammairiens
"Introductions
Latinae"
d'Antonio
deNebrija
deLinacre
lecteur
; P. Lardet,Scaliger
; C.
Unecontrainte
del'hritage
latin:ledifficile
classement
del'article
chezles
Demaizire,
duXVIme
latini
sicle;B. Colombai,La placedesgrammatici
grammairiens
franais
dansl'horizon
dertrospection
desgrammairiens
del'Encyclopdie;
Indexnominum
A History
Western
editedby P. Dronke,Cambridge
of Twelfth-Century
Philosophy,
Press,Cambridge
1988,XI + 495 p. ISBN 0 521 258960
University
ZenonKaluza,Lesquerelles
doctrinales
Paris
: Nominalistes
etralistes
auxconfins
duXI Ve
etduXVesicles,
LubrinaEditore,
1988,204p. ISBN 88 7766
Pierluigi
Bergamo
034 1
dermittelalterlichen
Wolfgang
Kemp,SERMOCORPOREUS.DieErzhlung
Glasfenster,
Mnchen1987,325 p., ISBN 3 88814239 3
Schirmer-Mosel,
H. A. Krop,De status
vandetheologie
DunsScotus.
De verhouding
tussen
volgens
Johannes
enmetafysica,
1987,x + 279p. ISBN 90 62036007
theologie
Rodopi,Amsterdam
Gottfried
derUniversittsbibliothek
Mlzer,Die Inkunabeln
UB, Wrzburg
Wrzburg,
1986,320 p. ISBN 3 92395905 2
ClaudioMicaelli,Studi
suitrattati
M. d'AuriaEditore,
diBoezio,
teologici
Napoli1988,
131p.
Friedrich
Maimonides.
imMittelalter,
undToleranz
Niewhner,
Schneider,
Aufklrung
1988,61 p. ISBN 3 795307503
Heidelberg
MassimoParodi,Il conflitto
deipensieri.
Studio
suAnselmo
d'Aosta,
Lubrina,
Pierluigi
Bergamo1988,203 p. ISBN 88 7766037 6
A. Pattin,
Pourl'histoire
dusensagent
: La controverse
entre
deBruges
etJeande
Barthlemy
Sesantcdents
etsonvolution.
tudeet textesindites,
Press,
Jandun.
University
Leuven1988.XV + 450 p. ISBN 90 6186263 9
159

12:33:53 PM

Elisabeth
retrouves.
Manuscrits
etbibliophiles
dumoyen
, bibliothques
Pellegrin,
Bibliothques
Recueild'tudespubliesde 1938 1985,Editions
du
geetdela Renaissance.
CNRS, Paris1988,XII + 568 p. & 24 planches
DiePhilosophie
im14. und15.Jahrhundert.
In memoriam
Michalski
Konstanty
(1879-1947),
Amsterdam
1988,LX + 639 p. - ISBN
hsgg.vonO. Pluta,B. R. Gruner,
90 6032297 5 - Contents:
M. Markowski,
; A. Usowicz,. Klsak,
Biographie
F. Bima,Bibliographie
La lutte
autour
del'meauXlVeetauXVesi; . Michalski,
d'Averros
etd'Alexandre
danslapsychologie
duXIVe
cle;id.,L'influence
d'Aphrodisias
sicle
et ParisauXIVesicle
etsa rpercussion
l'po; id., La lutte
pourl'me Oxford
D. P. Henry,Wyclif'
s Deviant
Mer
B. Mojsisch,
quedela Renaissance;
Platon,
eology;
"
- eineTheorie
Ficino. Wichtigste
ausPlatons"Sophistes";
D.
Plotin,
Gattungen"
undKontingenz.
Das Problem
der"futura
bei
Perler,Notwendigkeit
contingenta"
Wilhelm
von Ockham
latio rationis"in Buridan,
; G. Nuchelmans,' 'Appel
Probleme
der"Quaestiones
inlibros
IV, 9-15; S. Wielgus,
"Sophismata",
Ausgewhlte
' Doctrine
desBenedikt
HessevonKrakau;
M. M. Tweedale,DoesScotus
Physicorum"
onUniversals
MakeanySense?; J. Biard,Le cheval
deBuridan.
etphilosophie
Logique
du langage
dansl'analyse
d'un verbe
intentionnel
; M. de Gandillac,Prodromes,
cheminements
etconsquences
d'unervolution
C. Vasoli,Ficino
e il "De
cosmologique;
Christiana
S. Knuuttila
&M. Yrjnsuuri,
Norms
andAction
inObligational
religione";
Tracts
about
Der
; E. P. Bos,TwoSophistriaDisputations
1400;M. Markowski,
from
an derKrakauer
Buridanismus
Universitt
imMitelalter
Aristotle
as
; E. P. Mahoney,
"TheWorst
Natural
and"TheWorst
(pessimus
Philosopher"
naturalis)
Metaphysician"
His Reputation
SomeFranciscan
(pessimus
metaphysicus):
; J.-F.
among
Philosophers
Genest& P. Vignaux,La bibliothque
deJeandeMirecourt:
subtilitas
ou
anglaise
thomiste
dela causalit
divine.
Pourcomprendre
?; A. de Muralt,La mtaphysique
plagiat
la doctrine
occamienne
dela toute-puissance
divine
zurcoin; S. Meier,VonderKoinzidenz
cidenzaoppositorum.
Zum philosophiehistorischen
des Cusanischen
Hintergrund
Z. Kaluza,Le Statut
du25 septembre
1339etl'Ordonnance
du2
Koinzidenzgedankens;
1276; Z. Kuksewicz,
Onemore
Averroistic
septembre
?; I. Boh,John
Erfurt
Commentary
Entailment
Rules
"Notitia"
bei
ofGlogovia's
; L. Kaczmarek,
Rejection
ofParadoxical
Peter
vonAilly,
Sent.1, q. 3. Anmerkungen
zuQuellen
undTextgestalt;
A. S. McGrade,
SomeVarieties
Ockham'
s Case; . Flasch,Meister
Eckhart
und
ofSkeptical
Experience:
die "Deutsche
ZurKritik
eineshistoriographischen
L. Hdl,Die
Schemas;
Mystik".
imQuodlibet
desMglichen
desJacobvonAscoli
OFM( Quaestio
5 - EinSeinsdifferenz
undEdition);
O. Pluta,DieDiskussion
derFrage
nach
derUnsterblichkeit
ineiner
fhrung
desfrhen
15.Jahrhunderts
eclettico"
; P. Zambelli,"Aristotelismo
Leipziger
Handschrift
polemiche
? Immortalit
clandestine
dell'anima
e vicissitudini
dellastoria
universale
in
e Tiberio
Russilliano;
B. Burrichter
&T. Dewender,
DieDiskussion
Pomponazzi,
Nif
derFrage
nachderUnsterblichkeit
inden"Quaestiones
inlibros
De anima"desBenedikt
HessevonKrakau
Friedrich
vonRegensburg
andFribourg
Cordeliers
; W.J. Courtenay,
Indices.
26; F.-B. Stammktter,

160

12:33:53 PM