People vs.

Marti 193 SCRA 57

Facts :
Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift wrapped
packages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she could
inspect the packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his
friend.
Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and he
soon found out that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI who
acknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Constitutional Issues :
1. Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
seach and siezure and privacy of communication.
Ruling :
1. Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmental
interference, the libertied guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
2. Mere presence of NBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to look at that which is
plain sight is not search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.
Commissioner Bernas :
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy...is a protection against the State.
The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the State. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare
some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder.

People vs Sandiganbayan
People vs. Sandiganbayan (2nd Division)
[GR 145951, 12 August 2003]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., Julian Alzaga, Manuel Satuito, Elizabeth Liang and Jesus
Garcia were all charged with Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents
before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25741. The Information alleged that
Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted for their personal use the amount
of P250,318,200.00 from the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). On 12 November 1999,
Ramiscal filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Motion to Declare Nullity of
Information and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest." He argued, inter alia, that
the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because the AFP-RSBS is a
private entity. The said Urgent Motion was later adopted by Alzaga and Satuito. The
Urgent Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution promulgated on 6
January 2000. Ramiscal, et. al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution

issued on 12 May 2000, the Sandiganbayan sustained Ramiscal, et. al.'s contention
that the AFP-RSBS is a private entity. Hence, it reconsidered its earlier Resolution
and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case 25741. Upon denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration, the prosecution filed the present special civil action for certiorari
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation or a
private corporation and, corollarily, whether its funds are public or private.
Held: The AFP-RSBS was created by Presidential Decree 361. Its purpose and
functions are akin to those of the GSIS and the SSS, as in fact it is the system that
manages the retirement and pension funds of those in the military service.
Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
are expressly excluded from the coverage of The GSIS Act of 1997. Therefore,
soldiers and military personnel, who are incidentally employees of the Government,
rely on the administration of the AFP-RSBS for their retirement, pension and
separation benefits. For this purpose, the law provides that the contribution by
military officers and enlisted personnel to the System shall be compulsory. Its
enabling law further mandates that the System shall be administered by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines through an agency, group, committee
or board, which may be created and organized by him and subject to such rules and
regulations governing the same as he may, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of National Defense, promulgate from time to time. Moreover, the investment of
funds of the System shall be decided by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense. The funds of the
AFP-RSBS, except for the initial seed money, come entirely from contributions and
that no part thereof come from appropriations. While it may be true that there have
been no appropriations for the contribution of funds to the AFP-RSBS, the
Government is not precluded from later on adding to the funds in order to provide
additional benefits to the men in uniform. The above considerations indicate that
the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public interest. As
such, we hold that the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature
of public funds.

DUE PROCESS

Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her

ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently,
she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those
afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male
hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of
Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name
be changed to Jeff.
ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.
HELD:
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
April 11, 2014 by fuckyeahemir

CASE DIGEST: Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819,

204934, 204957, 205003, 205138, 204988, 205043,
205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111,
207172, 207563)
Click here for the full text of the Decision.
Read the RH Law (RA 10354) here.
Read the IRR of the RH Law here.
Read enforcement mechanisms of the RH Law with the unconstitutional provisions stricken out
here.

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

A. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for

violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it mandates the Statesponsored procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by compelling medical health
practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other
institutions despite their conscientious objections
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring would-be spouses,
as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a seminar on parenthood, family
planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to determine
WON a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
* HELD:
A.
1. NO.

2. NO.
3.
a.) NO.
b.) YES.
c.) NO.
4. YES.
5. NO.
6. NO.
7. NO.
8. NO.
B. NO.
C. NO.
* RATIO:
1.) Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this
matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did
not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the

fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was
to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot
interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of
abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the
life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)),
which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2.) Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, nonabortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary
and in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section
9 of the RH Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that
the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit the sale and
distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the
Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made
available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must
keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory
only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the

FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.) The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong
according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether
or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
3a.) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to
immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
These provisions violate the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. They
are contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free Exercise Clause,
whose basis is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers to refer patients to other
providers and penalizing them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of
penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the
freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure compliance to it,
a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the effective implementation of the
law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR)
also violates the equal protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between public
health officers and their private counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the
government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling state interest to limit the free
exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.

The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are least intrusive means to
achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken other secular steps to
ensure that the right to health is protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of
a marriage license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The law does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar. Those who
attend the seminar are free to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent
of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial
privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the
basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character
shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which
reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this
situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In
addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.) The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet
formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will
be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.) The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section 4(n)
of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care
institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care service
provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of information
and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted
from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of
the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1),
the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive
health.
7.) To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is not
a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of
the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged,
sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical
care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the
RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and
desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a

couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care
service providers to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not amount to involuntary
servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and nongovernment RH service providers to render pro bono service. Besides the PhilHealth
accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do
not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this digest.)
B. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA not only has the power
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods (under RA
3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. The RH Law does not infringe upon the autonomy of local governments. Paragraph (c) of
Section 17 provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services. Unless a local government unit (LGU) is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has
been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if
the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
In addition, LGUs are merely encouraged to provide RH services. Provision of these services are
not mandatory. Therefore, the RH Law does not amount to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM merely
delineates the powers that may be exercised by the regional government. These provisions
cannot be seen as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit
the general welfare.

Roe v. Wade Case Brief Summary

Summary of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).

Facts
Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on
medical advice to save the life of the mother.
Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for
violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought an
injunction against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The
defendant was county District Attorney Wade (D).
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had
standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted.
The court also ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does
complaint was not justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion
statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that injunctive
relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-appealed
the district courts judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.

Issues
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on
medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the
United States?
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain
an abortion?
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting
abortion?
4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated naturally before
this case was decided by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot?
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?

Holding and Rule (Blackmun)

1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving
procedures on the mothers behalf, and that do not take into consideration
the stage of pregnancy and other interests, are unconstitutional for violating
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a
womans right to terminate her pregnancy, against state action.
3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate
her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant
womans health and the potentiality of human life at various stages of
pregnancy.
4. No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not render her suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.

The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left to
the judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies, states
may promote their interests in the mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related to
the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote their
interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except when
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet
evading review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at each
stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only declaratory
relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is brought
on appeal from specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of both
injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which might or might
not occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was
unnecessary for the Court to decide Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once the Court
found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.

Disposition
Roe wins the district court judgment is affirmed.
Hallford loses the district court judgment is reversed.

The Does lose the district court judgment is affirmed.

Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)
Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949
Liberty of abode and travel
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety
or public health, as may be provided by law.
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his
cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment
agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was
detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the
province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
without
returning
the
advance
payment
it
gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective
employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement.
The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the
respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or
groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element
that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of

another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for
respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such
indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way
subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact
that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary
losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The
fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human
freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or
any other business enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who,
in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to
work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is
prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining
her.

Lupo Lupangco vs CA G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 160 SCRA 848Action
: petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
Issue
: Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so
that itcannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter.Commission lawfully
prohibit the examines from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, orthe like
three (3) days before the date of the examination?
Facts:
Oct 6, 1986, (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 "Additional Instructions to Examines," to all who
will take thelicensure examinations in accountancy.

No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or
any review center or the like orany reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of
the aforementioned or similars institutionsduring the three days immediatel
y proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this
instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
Oct 16, 196, petitioners et al, filed an injuction suit against PRC, in the RTC
RTC Held:
that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing
andgiving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.PRC to CA
Appeal
CA HELD: RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement of the
Resolution No.105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the Professional Regulation
Commission and the Regional Trial Courtare co-equal bodies.
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the
Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each
other or interfere with each other's acts. 3 Lupangco to SC:
SC HELD: RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the respondent
PRC fromenforcing its resolution.
RE: Reso 105: The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even withoutany ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations
conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore,it is inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examineeduring the three days before the
examination period.It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should
not act arbitrarily and capriciously inthe issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules
and regulations must be reasonable and fairlyadapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they areauthorized to be issued, then they must be
held to be invalid.
AYOG VS CUSI

LAYNO SR VS SANDIGANBAYAN