Professional Documents
Culture Documents
doi:10.1111/ijau.12033
This study seeks to determine whether audit committee compositional features are associated with the timeliness
of financial reporting by Australian firms. Timeliness of financial reporting by firms, of which the length of an
audit is a fundamental component, adds information content and impacts firm value, making an examination of
audit report lag determinants important. Results indicate that audit committee members with financial expertise,
prior audit committee experience and those who are independent are associated with shorter audit report lag.
Results suggest that legislation mandating audit committee financial expertise and independence are effective also
in improving the timeliness of financial reporting. More importantly, our results suggest that there may be benefits
in constituting audit committees with other compositional features such as prior committee experience in overall
efforts to improve the timeliness, and therefore quality, of financial reporting by firms.
Key words: Audit report lag, audit committee, financial reporting quality
INTRODUCTION
A double-edged information relevance-reliability
dilemma has long plagued external auditors. Prior
literature suggests that delays in the timely reporting
of accounting information significantly undermine the
quality of earnings, increase information asymmetry,
critically affect the chances of investors being defrauded,
enable well-informed investors to further utilise private
information to exploit less-informed investors and
increase uncertainty regarding investment evaluations
and expected payoffs (Hakansson, 1977; Bushman &
Smith, 2001). Provision of unverified financial accounting
statements and associated information, however,
automatically undermines the value of timely
information. There is, therefore, pressure on the external
auditor to complete the audit, and issue the audit report
without undue delay.
Emerging technology and new media forums only
serve to amplify the external auditors information
relevance-reliability dilemma in todays highly
reactionary news-driven society. Reductions in capital
flow barriers, increased market integration and the
development of high-frequency trading platforms enable
investors to participate in a broader set of investment
markets. However, these developments may also
contribute to greater market volatility. Consequently, the
demand for auditor-verified financial statements and
associated financial accounting information is ever more
essential. Understanding factors influencing the time
taken by the external auditor to issue the audit report
(termed audit report lag) is therefore an important area
of investigation. Such understanding can enhance the
development of effective corporate governance and
reporting protocols and procedures within firms that
enhance the delivery of timely, reliable financial
information to capital market participants.
Timeliness of financial reporting by firms is a
fundamental component of quality general purpose
reporting. Prior research has shown that timely financial
reporting adds information content and consequently
affects firm value (Beaver, Lambert & Morse, 1980;
Correspondence to: Harjinder Singh, Curtin University, GPO Box
U1987, Bentley 6845, Perth, Western Australia, Australia. Email:
h.singh@curtin.edu.au
N. Sultana et al.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Timely release of financial information by firms is an
important aspect of financial reporting playing a
fundamental role in the information marketplace and in
the investment decisions made by users. Audit report lag
jeopardises the quality of financial information by not
providing timely information to key stakeholders. In
principle, it is argued that there is an inverse relationship
between information value and the time taken to prepare
financial statements, specifically the longer the time taken
by the auditor to complete the audit, as reflected in the
audit report lag, the stronger the signal to the market as
there may be negative issues arising from the audit.
Acknowledging the theoretical and practical importance
of timely financial information to the decision-making
process of capital market participants, regulators such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the ASX have established mandatory time periods within
which firms are required to provide audited financial
statements to shareholders and other key stakeholders
via statutory filing requirements. Past studies have
determined that delays in the timely release of financial
reports can adversely impact firm value (Givoly &
Palmon, 1982; Blankley et al., 2014). Specifically, Beaver
et al. (1980) pointed out that investors postponed
transactional activity of securities until earnings
announcements were made. Similarly, Givoly and
Palmon (1982) determined that the share price reaction to
early earnings announcements was more significant than
the reaction to late announcements, suggesting that the
early release of financial performance data was viewed
more favourably. Blankley et al. (2014) found that,
compared to non-restating firms, firms that eventually
restate their financial statements have longer abnormal
audit report lags. The corporate governance framework
within firms, particularly audit committees, should
Int. J. Audit. : (2014)
N. Sultana et al.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
N. Sultana et al.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The following sub-sections provide details of the sample
selected, source documentation, measurement details for
all the variables in this study and specify the statistical
models utilised to formally test the hypotheses of this
study.
Sample selection
Due to the time-consuming task of hand collecting
key longitudinal data, analysis is limited to a
stratified-randomly selected sample of 100 firms
continuously listed on the ASX from 1 January 2004 to 31
December 2008.3 A stratified-random approach is used to
control for potential firm size bias.
The studys initial sample comprises 2,128 firms listed
on the ASX as at 1 January 2004. Consistent with prior
research (e.g., Ball, Kothari & Robin, 2000; Ruddock,
Taylor & Taylor, 2006), financial (133), insurance (10),
utilities (30), IPO (106) and trust (92) firms are excluded.
Consistent also with Clifford and Evans (1997), foreign
incorporated and domiciled firms (64) are excluded,
because their financial statements are not necessarily
prepared in accordance with Australian disclosure
requirements. To avoid the undue influences of
unexpected share price changes, 222 firms not
continuously listed on the ASX throughout the entire
observation period (i.e., firms de-listed and subsequently
re-listed) were eliminated. Finally, 381 firms are excluded
due to missing data.
Following exclusions, the useable pool to conduct the
stratified-random sample selection comprised 1,090
firms that were ranked by market capitalisation (as at 1
January 2004) before being categorised into quartiles.
Following Balvers, Cosimano and McDonald (1990), 25
firms are randomly selected from each quartile. Annual
data spanning a five-year period (20042008) is collected4
for the 100 selected firms allowing for a maximum of
500 firm-year observations for the final sample. Six
firm-year observations are, however, excluded due to
data reliability concerns or incomplete information.
Consequently, the main analysis is based on 494 firmyear observations. Panel A of Table 1 provides a summary
of the sample selection process, whilst Panel B of
Table 1 presents an industry breakdown (by firm-year
observations) of the final useable sample.
2,128
Exclusions:
Financial institutions
Insurance
Utilities
IPO firms
Trust
Foreign incorporated firms
Firms that are not continuously
listed
Missing data
Total Number Excluded:
Sample pool for random selection
Number randomly selected by
Quartiles per year
Excluded due to missing data
(133)
(10)
(30)
(106)
(92)
(64)
(222)
(381)
100*5
(1,038)
1,090
500
(6)
494
No. firm-year
observations
80
19
35
70
128
34
115
13
494
%
Sample
16.19
3.85
7.09
14.17
25.91
6.88
23.28
2.63
100
(1)
(2)
(3)
where:
ARLit = Number of days from the end of financial year of
firm i in period t to the day the external auditor signs
the audit report;
F_Expertiseit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one
if at least one director of the audit committee of firm i
in time period t has necessary expertise (based on
educational, professional affiliations and/or a for-profit
role) to be financially qualified; and zero otherwise;
Experienceit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one
if at least one director of the audit committee of firm i
in time period t has prior audit committee experience;
and zero otherwise;
Femaleit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if at
least one director of the audit committee of firm i in
time period t is female; and zero otherwise;
Sizeit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the
number of members of the audit committee of firm i in
time period t are greater than three; and zero
otherwise;
Independenceit = Indicator variable that takes the value of
one if the majority of the audit committee of firm i
in time period t are independent directors; and zero
otherwise;
Meetingsit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if
the audit committee of firm i in time period t meets at
least four times or more a year (or if the board acts as a
surrogate audit committee, the board then meets 10
times or more a year); and zero otherwise;
Big4it = Indicator variable is scored one if the external
auditor appointed to verify the financial statements
of firm i for the period t is a Big4 audit firm (i.e.,
KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst and Young or PriceWaterhouse
Coopers); and zero otherwise;
LnAssetsit = Natural logarithm of the book value of total
assets of firm i at end of time period t;
Leverageit = Total assets divided by total assets minus total
liabilities of firm i at the end of time period t;
Growthit = Market-to-book ratio of firm i for time period t
measured as a ratio of market value of equity and book
value of equity;
Busyit = Indicator variable is scored one if the end of
financial year for firm i for period t is 30 June; and zero
otherwise;
Riskit = Ratio of current liabilities to current assets of firm
i for period t;
Qual_Rit = Indicator variable is scored one if the audit
report for the financial statements of firm i for period t
is qualified; and zero otherwise;
Int. J. Audit. : (2014)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The following sub-section details descriptive statistics
and correlation results followed subsequently with the
reporting of the main multivariate results.
N. Sultana et al.
Meana
Median
Std. Dev.
Minimum
Maximum
ARLit
#No_F_Expertiseit
Pro_F_Expertiseit
F_Expertiseit
#No_Experienceit
Pro_Experienceit
Experienceit
#No_Femaleit
Pro_Femaleit
Femaleit
#No_Sizeit
Sizeit
#No_Independenceit
Pro_Independenceit
Independenceit
#No_Meetingsit
Meetingsit
Big4it
Total Assets (AUD$000)
LnAssetsit
Leverageit
Growthit
Busyit
Riskit
Qual_Rit
Industryit
B_Sizeit
Dualityit
80.67
0.97
0.31
0.77
1.49
0.46
0.76
0.18
0.13
0.16
3.16
0.30
1.73
0.55
0.60
3.40
0.35
0.57
555,325
17.73
2.23
3.48
0.87
0.96
0.09
0.40
5.27
0.11
87.00
1.00
0.33
44.38
0.89
0.29
35.00
0.00
0.00
204.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
1.18
0.33
0.00
0.00
5.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.42
0.12
0.00
0.00
2.00
0.67
3.00
0.94
1.00
6.00
2.00
0.67
1.30
0.38
0.00
0.00
6.00
1.00
3.00
1.95
1.00
13.00
38,175
17.46
1.84
2.13
1,552,852
2.37
2.80
6.93
567
13.25
1.33
5.47
8,003,883
22.80
18.76
32.81
0.66
2.90
0.02
7.35
5.00
2.02
3.00
12.00
For variables measured using a dichotomous scoring approach, the mean value is to be interpreted as the proportion of the
pooled-sample being awarded a score of one for the respective dichotomous measure. For variables measured using a
dichotomous approach, the median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum are not reported as such detail is primarily
irrelevant given the nature of a dichotomous measure. ARLit = Number of days from the end of financial year of firm i in period
t to the day the external auditor signs the audit report; #No_F_Expertiseit = Number of members of the audit committee of firm
i in time period t with the necessary expertise (based on educational, professional affiliations and/or a for-profit role) to be
financially qualified; Pro_F_Expertiseit = Proportion of the audit committee of firm i in time period t of members with the
necessary expertise (based on educational, professional affiliations and/or a for-profit role) to be financially qualified;
F_Expertiseit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one director of the audit committee of firm i in time period
t has necessary expertise (based on educational, professional affiliations and/or a for-profit role) to be financially qualified; and
zero otherwise; #No_Experienceit = Number of members of the audit committee of firm i in time period t that has prior audit
committee experience; Pro_Experienceit = Proportion of audit committee of firm i in time period t of members with prior audit
committee experience; Experienceit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one director of the audit committee
of firm i in time period t has prior audit committee experience; and zero otherwise; #No_Femaleit = Number of audit committee
members of firm i in time period t that are female; Pro_Femaleit = Proportion of audit committee of firm i in time period t who
are female; Femaleit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if at least one director of the audit committee of firm i in time
period t is female; and zero otherwise; #No_Sizeit = Number of members of the audit committee of firm i in time period t;
Sizeit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the number of members of the audit committee of firm i in time period
t are greater than three; and zero otherwise; #No_Independenceit = Number of members of the audit committee of firm i in time
period t that are independent directors; Pro_Independenceit = Proportion of members of the audit committee of firm i in time
period t that are independent directors; Independenceit = Indicator variable that takes the value of one if the majority of the audit
committee of firm i in time period t are independent directors; and zero otherwise; #No_Meetingsit = Actual number of audit
committee meetings held by the audit committee of firm i during time period t; Meetingsit = Indicator variable that takes the
value of one if the audit committee of firm i in time period t meets at least four times or more a year (or if the board acts as a
surrogate audit committee then meets 10 times or more a year); and zero otherwise; Big4it = Indicator variable is scored one if
the external auditor appointed to verify the financial statements of firm i for the period t is a Big4 audit firm (i.e., KPMG,
Deloitte, Ernst and Young or PriceWaterhouseCoopers); and zero otherwise; LnAssetsit = Natural logarithm of the book value of
total assets of firm i at end of time period t; Leverageit = Total assets divided by total assets minus total liabilities of firm i at the
end of time period t; Growthit = Market-to-book ratio of firm i for time period t measured as a ratio of market value of equity
and book value of equity; Busyit = Indicator variable is scored one if the end of financial year for firm i for period t is June 30;
and zero otherwise; Riskit = Ratio of current liabilities to current assets of firm i for period t; Qual_Rit = Indicator variable is
scored one if the audit report for the financial statements of firm i for period t is qualified; and zero otherwise;
Industryit = Indicator variable is scored one if firm i is defined as being within an Industrials and/or Materials ASX GICS
business sector; and zero otherwise; B_Sizeit = Number of members on the board of directors of firm i at the end of period t; and
Dualityit = Indicator variable is scored one if the same individual holds the positions of chairperson of the Board and CEO for
firm i at the end of period t; and zero otherwise.
1.00
0.09**
0.11**
0.08
0.09
0.14*
0.16*
0.07
0.26*
0.01
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.09
0.05
0.20*
0.04
(1)
(3)
0.28*
0.10**
1.00
0.11**
0.11**
0.24*
0.09**
0.28*
0.21*
0.05
0.02
0.09**
0.04
0.16*
0.06
0.25*
0.33*
(2)
0.22*
1.00
0.10**
0.15*
0.12**
0.26*
0.09**
0.23*
0.29*
0.03
0.01
0.11**
0.00
0.12*
0.06
0.31*
0.16*
0.22*
0.15*
0.11**
1.00
0.20*
0.27*
0.25*
0.10**
0.27*
0.02
0.01
0.28*
0.03
0.10**
0.00
0.27*
0.06
(4)
0.07
0.12**
0.11**
0.20*
1.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.16*
0.01
0.02
0.09**
0.07
0.06
0.15*
0.28*
0.03
(5)
0.42*
0.26*
0.24*
0.27*
0.00
1.00
0.23*
0.43*
0.45*
0.02
0.03
0.19*
0.09
0.23*
0.07
0.49*
0.19*
(6)
0.20*
0.09**
0.09**
0.25*
0.07
0.23*
1.00
0.19*
0.37*
0.02
0.08
0.22*
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.34*
0.01
(7)
0.31*
0.23*
0.28*
0.10**
0.00
0.43*
0.19*
1.00
0.44*
0.05
0.04
0.24*
0.01
0.18*
0.11**
0.41*
0.13*
(8)
0.52**
0.28**
0.20**
0.24**
0.13**
0.46**
0.34**
0.44**
1.00
0.01
0.04
0.28**
0.03
0.25**
0.10*
0.68**
0.11*
(9)
0.24*
0.10*
0.05
0.10**
0.04
0.14*
0.10**
0.17*
0.32*
1.00
0.58*
0.00
0.05
0.09**
0.03
0.00
0.03
(10)
0.07
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.13*
0.14*
0.06
0.15*
0.18*
1.0
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.08
0.06
(11)
0.22*
0.11**
0.09**
0.28*
0.09**
0.19*
0.22*
0.24*
0.25*
0.13*
0.08
1.00
0.02
0.06
0.09**
0.28*
0.01
1(2)
0.05
0.14*
0.00
0.08
0.04
0.13*
0.07
0.14*
0.22*
0.56*
0.02
0.18*
1.00
0.11**
0.09
0.04
0.02
(13)
0.28*
0.12*
0.16*
0.10**
0.06
0.23*
0.05
0.18*
0.26*
0.03
0.07
0.06
0.13*
1.00
0.04
0.22*
0.03
(14)
0.11**
0.06
0.07
0.01
0.15*
0.07
0.04
0.11*
0.12*
0.03
0.00
0.09**
0.06
0.04
1.00
0.04
0.03
(15)
0.47*
0.34*
0.28*
0.27*
0.29*
0.53*
0.31*
0.45*
0.66*
0.28*
0.03
0.24*
0.24*
0.25*
0.07
1.00
0.19*
(16)
0.16**
0.16**
0.33**
0.06
0.03
0.19**
0.01
0.13**
0.11*
0.03
0.09*
0.01
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.23**
1.00
(17)
ARLit
F_Expertiseit
Experienceit
Femaleit
Sizeit
Independenceit
Meetingsit
Big4it
LnAssetsit
Leverageit
Growthit
Busyit
Riskit
Qual_Rit
Industryit
B_Sizeit
Dualityit
Variablesa
10
N. Sultana et al.
11
Main results
Regression analyses are reported in Table 4, Columns 13,
using regression models 13.6 In terms of individual audit
committee characteristics, coefficients on F_Expertiseit
and Experienceit are negative and statistically significant
in Table 4, Column 1 (t = 2.77, p < 0.01 and t = 1.98,
p < 0.05, respectively). Furthermore, the coefficient on
Independenceit is also negative and statistically significant
in Table 4, Column 1 (t = 1.99, p < 0.05). In contrast, the
coefficient on Femaleit is positive but insignificant. The
coefficients on Sizeit and Meetingsit are negative but
insignificant in Table 4, Column 1. In terms of
interpreting the reported audit committee coefficients in
Table 4, Column 1, as an example, if the firm has a
director on the audit committee with prior committee
experience, the audit report lag of that firm decreases by
almost 7 days (i.e., 6.98) holding other audit committee
Expected
sign
Intercept
F_Expertiseit
Experienceit
Femaleit
Sizeit
Independenceit
Meetingsit
Big4it
LnAssetsit
Leverageit
Growthit
Busyit
Riskit
Qual_Rit
B_Sizeit
Dualityit
Industryit
Year
Adjusted R2
F statistic (sig.)
Cox & Snell R2
Nagelkerke R2
Observations
?
?
+
+
+
+
+
Model 1
Coefficient
164.81
1.53
6.98
2.59
4.46
3.70
1.37
8.60
4.61
0.30
0.04
0.43
0.17
3.04
0.34
1.50
4.08
NR
Model 2
t-statistic
0.49
7.27***
494
7.87
2.77**
1.98*
0.440
0.954
1.99*
0.29
1.80
3.72***
0.35
0.11
0.07
0.25
0.41
0.23
0.23
1.00
NR
Coefficient
147.11
1.48
7.56
4.89
5.46
0.90
2.97
6.80
3.82
0.24
0.17
7.86
0.26
1.06
0.61
1.73
8.96
NR
Model 3
t-statistic
Coefficient
Wald p-
6.27
2.27**
1.84*
0.70
1.06
1.750
0.55
1.22
2.70**
0.25
0.44
1.054
0.33
0.45
0.37
0.22
1.89*
NR
0.66
0.35
0.43
0.26
0.01
0.05
0.33
0.20
0.13
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.11
0.82
0.11
0.14
0.07
NR
0.55
0.00**
0.06
0.39
0.97
0.03*
0.04*
0.46
0.05
0.67
0.21
0.97
0.35
0.06
0.17
0.72
0.75
NR
0.47
6.02***
395
0.29
0.39
395
***, **, *, = 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% significance with one-tailed significance level where direction of sign on coefficient
predicted, otherwise two-tailed. See Table 3 for dependent, independent and control variable definitions. Year = Series indicator
variables controlling time temporal differences of reporting periods for firm-year observations with firm i scored one if financial
data corresponds to time period t; otherwise scored zero. For Model 2, t1 = Each audit committee characteristic lagged by one
year. For Model 3, ARLit = Change in the audit report lag of a firm by one year. For models 13, 116 = coefficients on the
independent and control variables; 0 = intercept term; and it = error term.
Model 1 (Main results)
ARLit = 0 + 1F_Expertiseit + 2Experienceit + 3 Femaleit + 4Sizeit + 5 Independenceit + 6 Meetingsit + 7 Big 4 it + 8 LnAssetsit
Year +
(1)
it
Year +
it
(2)
Year +
it
(3)
12
Sensitivity analysis
Extensive sensitivity analysis was undertaken to validate
the main results. For instance, all main regressions were
re-run using alternative proxy measures for the
dependent, independent and control variables. In the case
of the dependent variable, following Bamber et al. (1993),
abnormal audit report lag is calculated as the difference
between the firms audit report lag and the firms median
audit report lag, where the latter median is calculated
over the observation window.7 Alternative variables
measures for the six individual audit committee
2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
N. Sultana et al.
CONCLUSION
This study examines whether audit committee
compositional features are associated with the timeliness
of financial reporting (i.e., audit report lag) by Australian
publicly listed firms. An examination of audit report
lag determinants is essential if the financial performance
2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
13
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge the valuable
comments of two anonymous reviewers. The authors
also acknowledge the many helpful suggestions from
both the discussant and participants at the Accounting
& Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand
2013 conference and seminar participants at both the
Int. J. Audit. : (2014)
N. Sultana et al.
14
NOTES
1. The importance of audit committee members with
financial expertise is also underscored by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 passed by the US
Congress mandating the disclosure by firms whether
their audit committee includes a financial expert
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 1999). The
primary objective of SOX 2002 was to restore
credibility to the US financial reporting system already
tarnished by a number of well-publicised accounting
scandals. As such, it is expected that, pursuant to SOX
2002 requirements, the presence of financial experts on
an audit committee will increase its effectiveness
leading to better quality financial reporting outcomes
(Sultana & Van der Zahn, 2013), including timeliness of
financial reporting.
2. See Janis (1972) for a further discussion on the concept
of groupthink.
3. The longitudinal study covers a five calendar year
period (1 January 2004 and 31 December 2008). The
five-year period is selected to minimise any significant
extraneous influences on findings as a result of fallout
from the Dot.Com bubble, the introduction of new
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
and excessive volatility due to the 2009 Global
Financial Crisis. The period for the broader
longitudinal study is also selected as it transcends the
introduction of key corporate governance reforms in
Australia (i.e., CLERP 9 and ASX CGC 2003). Findings
from this study, therefore, may indicate whether
recommendations related to audit committees in
CLERP 9 and ASX CGC 2003 impact the audit
committee effectiveness/audit report lag linkage.
4. Data for the variables examined in this study were
hand collected from the 20042008 financial year
annual reports of each selected firm. Annual reports
were obtained from the Annual Reports Collection
(Connect 4 Pty Ltd), FinAnalysis/DatAnalysis Aspect
Huntleys Financial Database.
5. In this instance, the higher the denominator, the
greater the risk to the operations of the firm.
6. Our study uses panel data over the period 20042008,
creating a serial correlation problem among multiple
year observations. Consistent with past literature
(Knapp, 1987; Beekes, Pope & Young, 2004), a fixed
effects model is therefore used to control for year and
firm-specific differences not captured by the panel
data. All regressions include both year and firm fixed
effects to capture a possible trend towards timelines of
financial reporting over time. All reported results are
thus based on HuberWhite robust standard errors
clustered both at the year and firm level.
7. Furthermore, we undertook additional analysis by
partitioning our dataset between firms that had their
audit reports signed within 90 days of year-end and
those that exceeded this threshold (the latter being 158
firm-year observations out of a total of 494 firm-year
observations). We then re-ran our regression analysis
and found no significant variation to our main results.
8. Given that auditor industry specialisation and Big4
auditor variables are highly correlated, as all the Big4
auditors are also specialists in a number of industries,
2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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N. Sultana et al.
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AUTHOR PROFILES
Nigar Sultana (n.sultana@curtin.edu.au) is an
emerging researcher post-PhD and has research interests
in earnings quality, corporate governance, audit quality
and in capital markets research.
Harjinder Singh (h.singh@curtin.edu.au) is also an
emerging researcher post-PhD and has research interests
in audit fees, audit quality, corporate governance, internal
audit and initial public offering underpricing.
J-L. W. Mitchell Van der Zahn was a Professor of
Accounting with research interests in auditing, financial
reporting quality and capital markets at Curtin
University and is now an investment banker.