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Paolo Antoniou Trinidad

1F
CASE DIGESTS
1.) Article VI, Section 1. Legislative Power
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.
2.) Grant of Quasi-Legislative Power; In general; LGU: Rubi v. Provincial
Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660 (1918-19)
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make
rules and regulations that results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,
should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be relevant to the objects and purposes of the law, and be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law. They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of
the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by an administrative body,
as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It
may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
39 Phil 660 (March 7, 1919)
FACTS: Resolution No. 25 published by the provincial board of Mindoro
provides that uncivilized tribes within their jurisdiction to be
transferred into unoccupied lands delegated by the provincial
government. In this case, 800 hectares of land in Sitio Tigbao, Province
of Mindoro is provided for the Manguianes as permanent settlement. In

line with Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, all the Manguianes
in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Manguianes east of the
Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place
in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of
Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Manguianes who shall refuse to
comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed
in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code.
This resolution is declared as measures for the protection of the
Manguianes and to incorporated with them civilization. Another reason
is for the protection of the forests where they formerly reside. It
appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed
their staying within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be
punished.
It is purported that the Manguianes are being illegally underprivileged
of their liberty by the government of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held
under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive
a person of his/her liberty and if it is inconsistent with the Constitution.
HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of
the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement
of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them
to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of
the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is

considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines.
3.) Issues on Delegation of Power; Valid delegation
Agustin v. Edu
88 SCRA 195 (1979)
FACTS: This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to
procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from
such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. The petitioner was an owner
of a Volkswagen beetle car, model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and
aft, which could very well serve as an early warning devise in case of
emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No.229, as amended
as well as the Land Transportation Commission. Respondent Land
Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular
No. 32 pursuant to Letter of Instruction NO. 229 as amended. It
required the use of Early Warning Devices on motor vehicles. This
petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the
provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue
delegation of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Letter of Instructions as well as the
implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and constitutional.
HELD: The court held that the letter of instructions No. 229 as
amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid
and constitutional as a valid police power measure as such was
established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the
letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adapting
to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and
basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations
- that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of
road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and
highways. The petition was dismissed.
4.) Executive Misapplication
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy
281 SCRA 330 (1997)

FACTS: Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history


shows that the government has always been finding ways to improve
the oil industry. The government created the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180 to accommodate these
innovations in the oil industry. This law allows that any person or
entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil
or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring
by the Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the
law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of different tariff
rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil
industry who do not have their own refineries and will have to source
refined petroleum products from abroad. 3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products. The
petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition.
HELD: The court declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it
violated Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision
because it only strengthens oligopoly that is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that.
Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the
oil market. All other players belong to the small league. As the
dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries
of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to
their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and
Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of
pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%.
They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players
to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to
attract new players and burdening them with heavy disincentives
cannot attract them. Without new players belonging to the league of

Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is


an idle dream.
CASE SYNTHESIS: Undue Delegation
People v. Vera
65 Phil 56 (1937-1938)
FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed
for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded
the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial,
he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime
he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal
to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging
that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it
is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of
probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the
law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated
therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered
by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute
discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact
it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue
delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by
Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non-delegability of
power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the
constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide
appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation

within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces
where no probation officer is instituted might not avail of their right to
probation.
United States v. Barrias
11 Phil 327 (1908)
FACTS: Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged in CFI with violations of
par. 70 and 83 of Circular no. 397. Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397
reads as follows: No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft
shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed
by steam or moved by other adequate power. Paragraph 83 reads, in
part, as follows:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations,
the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5
and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court. Counsel
for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two
grounds: First that it is unauthorized by section 19 of Act No.
355; and, second, that if the acts of the Philippine Commission
bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate
such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of
legislative power. The complaint in this instance was framed with
reference to sections 311 and 319 [19 and 311] at No. 355 of the
Philippine Customs Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos.
1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only
empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to "fix
penalties for violation thereof," not exceeding a fine of P500.
ISSUE: Whether or not Collector of Customs can fix the penalty of a
law?
HELD: The answer is in the Negative. Although the Collector of
Customs can make and publish rules and regulations but it cannot
make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is
in this case that it will be an illegal delegation of power. One of the
settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon
the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department
to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has
located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is
changed. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but also a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another.

United States v. Panlilio


28 Phil 608 (1914)
The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body
issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in
nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense punishable by
law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to
the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or
contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of
trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being
authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos
exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said
carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined
and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that
the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not
constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of
the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there
provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of
Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions
of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only
sections of the Act that prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful
are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A
violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the
force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it.
Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of
Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any
way therein. However, the accused did violate
Art. 581, Section 2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who
violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease
among animals.
People v. Dacuycuy

173 SCRA 90 (1989)


FACTS: Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670
(Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They also charged
constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than
P100 nor more than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory
construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of
legislative power and is valid.
HELD: Not valid. The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment
was left for the courts to determine as if the judicial department was a
legislative department. The exercise of judicial power is not an attempt
to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an
instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing
laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on
separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative powers
Case Synthesis
The four cases above render Undue Delegation of Legislative Power.
In the case, People v. Vera 65 Phil 56, there was undue delegation of
power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The
provincial boards are given absolute prudence, which violates the
constitution and the doctrine of the non-delegability of power.
In the case, United States v. Barrias 11 Phil 327, the Collector of
Customs can make and publish rules and regulations but it cannot
make the duty of the legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is
in this matter that it will be an illegal delegation of power.
In the case, United States v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608, the accused was
penalized for the violation of Act 1760. Act No. 1760 provides that any
person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished. However, the only sections of the Act that prohibit acts
and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case
does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau
of Agriculture is not a violation of the provision of the Act. Therefore,
the conviction and then punishment of the defendant falls within
undue delegation of powers. Whereby, sanctions beyond the statutes

were enacted.
In the case, People v. Dacuycuy 173 SCRA 90, the duration of penalty
for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if
the judicial department was a legislative department. The exercise of
judicial power is not an attempt to use legislative power or to prescribe
and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice and
the application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said
section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability
of legislative powers.
From the above cases, the court has laid down the manifestations of a
republican government like ours is the observance of the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances.
The executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines. The
legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of representatives. The judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law. In other words, as the Philippine Constitution
provides, the legislative department makes the law (as well as
corresponding punishments within), the executive department
executes the law and the judiciary interprets the law. This principle
separates the purposes of the 3 departments, and no department
could interfere with another as to their functions.