(Reviewer) Administrative Law - Jose Rizal Memorial State University - 85p

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law
Administrative Law Reviewer
Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

INTRODUCTION
I.
Concept/definition of administrative law
The branch of public law that fixes the organization of the government
and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to
individual remedies for the violations of his rights.
II.
Scope of administrative law
Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to

control, the administrative operations of the government.
III.
Classification of administrative law

A.
That body of statutes setting up or creating administrative
agencies and endowing them with power and duties;
B.
That body of agency-made law, i.e., rules, regulations and
orders promulgated in the exercise of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions;
C.
That body of legal principles governing the acts of public agents
which conflict with private rights;
D.
That body of determinations, decisions and orders of
administrative bodies made in the settlement of controversies arising in
their particular fields.
IV.
Origin and development of administrative law
V.
Advantages of the administrative process

NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
I.
Concept
A.
Definition of administrative agency - An administrative agency
is defined as "[a] government body charged with administering and
implementing particular legislation. Examples are workers' compensation
commissions, x x x and the like. x x x The term 'agency' includes any
department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority, board or bureau x x x ."
Facts: Sugar Regulatory Administration and Republic Planters Bank questioned the
decision of the CA which dismissed the petition of the former on the ground of lack
of capacity to sue.
Issue: WON administrative agency has only such powers as expressly granted to it
by law and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof?
RULING: The SC ruled in the negative. Administrative agency has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it by law and those that are necessarily implied in the
exercise thereof?
In this case, administrative agency is judicially defined as government body
charged with the administering and implementing particular legislation examples
are workers compensation commissions and the like. The term agency includes
any department, independent establishment, commission, administration,
authority or bureau.
B.
Test for determining administrative nature
1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the

citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuriously affected;
2. Directory if no substantial right depend on it and no injury can result
from ignoring it and purpose of legislature can be accomplished in a
manner other than that prescribed and substantially, the same results
attained.
C.
Administrative function, defined - Administrative functions are
those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules
and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Facts: Its a petition file by judge manzano allowing him to accept the appointment
by executive order by the governor of ilocos sur Rodolfo farinas as the member of
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ilocos norte provincial committee on justice created pursuant to presidential order.
That his membership in committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment
to his present position as executive judge of branch xix, RTC, first judicial region
and as a member of judiciary.
detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power
to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
D.
Public office, defined in relation to administrative law
Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Fernandez vs Sto. Tomas 248 SCRA 194
Ruling: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the Policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic
law of its existence
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of
the judiciary to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
(Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)
Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and
Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative
agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties
within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line
insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
"Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery
of government and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It
refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials
as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an
element of positive action, of supervision or control.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence
"we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice
would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations
nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member
of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration
of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy
disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or
Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de
Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.
Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection
and Audit while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the
Personnel Relations, both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in
Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution
No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A. Sto. Tomas and Ramon
Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was
issued .
Issues :
(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems
and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR
[Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development
Office]; and
(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-37 10 violated petitioners' constitutional right
to security of tenure.
Ruling: Public office is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public (radlapsbip)
Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPERA
and ORR, and as well each of the other Offices, consist of aggregations of Divisions,
each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and
Office comprises groups of positions within the agency called the Civil Service
Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or
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functions these functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced
by a common or general subject matter. These offices relate to the internal
structure of the Commission.
The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were
described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the
organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of
service." These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on
the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions
effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field
Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission
and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that
they are mandated to serve.
N.B. We (SC) note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are
not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular
positions or ranks. Thus a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or
Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of
Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners
were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any
particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons
holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.
E.
Reasons for creation of administrative agencies Lianga Bay Logging, Inc. vs Judge Enage 16 July 1987
Ruling: As recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the
need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on
technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of
grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable.
Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

Ruling: As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become
necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation
of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they
can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
Reyes vs Caneba
Ruling: "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction
and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency
must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the
perimeters of its own competence."
Blue Bar Coconut Phil. Vs Tantuico 29 July 1988
Ruling: The petitioners also question the respondents' authority to audit them.
They contend that they are outside the ambit of respondents' "audit" power which
is confined to government-owned or controlled corporations. This argument has no
merit. Section 2 (1) of Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that "The
Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit,
and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts of, and expenditures
or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, and on a postaudit basis. x x x (d) such nongovernmental entities receiving subsidy or equity
directly or indirectly from or through the Government which are required by law or
the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity."
(Italics supplied) The Constitution formally embodies the long established rule that
private entities who handle government funds or subsidies in trust may be
examined or audited in their handling of said funds by government auditors.
E.
Types of administrative agencies
1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some

gratuity, grant, or special privilege; (SSS, GSIS,PAO)
2. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry
on certain functions of government; (BIR, LRA, BoC, BI)
3. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing
some business service for the public; (Bureau of Posts, PNR, MWS)
4. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
regulate business affected with public interest; (LTFRB, ERB, HLURB)
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5. Those set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under
the police power to regulate private business and individuals; (MTRCB, GAB,
DDB)
6. Those agencies to set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy
involved. (NLRC, ECC, DAR, COA)
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned or controlled corporations.
4.
Definition of Administration US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332
F.
Relation between administrative agencies and courts
Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows

them to interpret and apply rules and regulations. Findings of these administrative
agencies are rendered conclusive on the courts.
G.
Administrative framework of the Philippines (Executive Order
No. 292)
Iron and Steel Authority vs CA 249 SCRA 538
1. Definition of Government of the Republic of the Phils. refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the
functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is
made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.
2. Definition of Agency of the government - refers to any of
the various units of the Government, including a department,
bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporations, or a local government or a distinct unit
therein.
3. Definition of Instrumentality - refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department
framework vested within special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
Facts: Dorr is the owner of newspaper manila freedom charge with the crime of
libel together with Eduard OBrian.
The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the
complaint, and each was sentenced to six months imprisonment at hard labor and
a fine of $1,000, United States currency. From this judgment the defendants have
appealed to this court.
During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking
that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article 111, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the
Constitution, which motion was denied by the court, and an exception was also
taken to this ruling.
Issue : The issue is to determine whether these provisions of the Constitution of
the United States relating to trials by jury are in force in the Philippine Islands.
Ruling: Administration is the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the reins
of government are for the time being.
1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by
and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and
the territories which are a part-of the United States with reference to the
Constitution of the United States.
2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris,
under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the
status of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.
3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not
extend the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles
of fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the
Constitution and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the
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general spirit of the Constitution, and except those express provisions of the
Constitution which prohibit Congress from passing laws in their contravention
under any circumstances; that the provisions contained in the Constitution relating
to jury trials do not fall within either of these exceptions, and, consequently, the
right to trial by jury has not been extended here by the mere act of the cession of
the territory.
4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the
Constitution relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine
Islands, at the date of their cession, for trials by jury, and consequently there is no
law in the Philippine Islands entitling the defendants in this case to such trial; that
the Court of First Instance committed no error in overruling their application for a
trial by jury
The act of Congress of July 1, 1902, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for the
administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for
other purposes, in section 5 extends to the Philippine Islands nearly all of the
provisions of the Constitution known as the Bill of Rights. But there was excepted
from it the provisions of the Constitution relating to jury trials contained in section
2, Article 111, and in the sixth amendment.
The court reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body expressly
recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to pass laws, and
has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants where convicted.
II.
Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies

A.
Creation of administrative agencies
Ruling: No. "Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation
of public offices is primarily a legislative function, In so far as the legislative power
in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the
legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties,
the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional
offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become
ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly
within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office
and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office."
B.
Abolition of administrative agencies

Busacay v. Buenaventura 93 Phil 787
Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war

toll collector, classified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, but was laid
off due to the destruction of the bridge caused by flood. When the bridge was
reconstructed and reopened to traffic, Busacay notified the respondent Provincial
Treasurer of his intention and readiness to resume his duties, but he was refused
reinstatement.
Issue: Whether or not the total destruction of the bridge abolished the position of
toll collector.
Held: The SC ruled in the negative. All offices created by statute are more or less
temporary, transitory or precarious in that they are subject to the power of the
legislature to abolish them. But this is not saying that the rights of the incumbents
of such positions may be impaired while the offices exist, except for cause.
Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196

Facts: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute.
She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank, On
August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service
Board. All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil
Service Commission2 passed Resolution No. 934359. The resolution became an
impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.
Issue: WON the CSC had the power to abolish the career executive service board.
De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294
Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980 by imputing the lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the president his
authority to fix compensation and allowance of the justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. On the other hand, the solicitor general interposed a defense
of legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa.
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Issue: WON the enactment into law of BP 129 was done in good faith.
Ruling: Yes, it was done in good faith and is valid. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the
Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise
thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of
the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in the
cage of the Supreme Court.
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134
Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1341 converting the Phil
College of Commerce into a Polytechnic University, defining its objectives,
organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 1341 did not abolish but only changed, the former PCC
into what is now the PUP.
Held:
No, what took place was a change in academic status of the educational
institution not in its corporate life.
When the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to
replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so.
Neither the addition of a new course offerings nor changes in its existing structure
and organization bring about the abolition of an educational institution and the
creation of a new one only an express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking
authority will.
Stand transferred simply means that lands transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the
PUP as the new name of the institution.
But these are hardly indicia of an intent to abolish an existing institution and to
create a new one. New course offerings can be added to the curriculum of a school
without affecting its legal existence. Nor will changes in its existing structure and
organization bring about its abolition and the creation of a new one. Only an
express declaration to that effect by the lawmaking authority will.
C.
Reorganization of administrative agencies

1.
Reorganization, defined
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration vs CSC 221 SCRA 145
Facts: he records show that in 1977, petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws graduate
and a First grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII
under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of
Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also appointed
under permanent status up to September 1984. She was for two years, more or
less, designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By
virtue of Executive Order No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) which
authorized the restructuring of the Land Registration Commission to National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration and regionalizing the Offices of the
Registers therein, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register
of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, under temporary status, for not being a member of
the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of Justice but her request was
denied. Petitioner Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion remained
unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner Garcia was administratively charged with
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While said case was pending
decision, her temporary appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a
Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then Minister, now Secretary, of Justice
notified petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on the ground that she was "receiving bribe money". Said Memorandum
of Termination which took effect on February 9, 1987, was the subject of an appeal
to the Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred the appeal to the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).
Issue: Whether or not membership in the Bar, which is the qualification
requirement prescribed for appointment to the position of Deputy Register of
Deeds under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 649 (Reorganizing the Land
Registration Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration or NALTDRA) should be required of and/or applied only to new
applicants and not to those who were already in the service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the issuance and implementation of the abovesaid
Executive Order.
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Ruling: If the newly created office has substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an office
different from the one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of the duties
of the old office it will be considered as an abolition of one office and the creation
of a new or different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its duties,
for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or office.
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to improve the services and better
systematize the operation of the Land Registration Commission. A reorganization is
carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar membership to qualify for key
positions in the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing circumstances and
new development of the times. Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have such qualification. It is thus
clear that she cannot hold any key position in the NILTDRA. The additional
qualification was not intended to remove her from office. Rather, it was a criterion
imposed concomitant with a valid reorganization measure.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.
III.
Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President

A.
Executive power, defined

Marcos vs Manglapus 177 SCRA 668
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to
the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the Tight of the marcoses
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill
of Rights, to wit:
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to
wit:
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scopes of
presidential power and its limits.
Executive power
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not
define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it touches
on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant-amnesty with the
concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the
President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall
exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these enumerated powers the
breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what
is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius."
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollary, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
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specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is
neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grantamnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee
foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Secs. 14-23]. (more than the sum of the powers enumerated)
B.
Power of control, defined power of the president to nullify,
modify, alter or set aside the decisions of a subordinate.
The Power Involved

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of
the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. H, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and
order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general
welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not
mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in
drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the
Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and
adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses
to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to
consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having
sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation
under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance
the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
Ruling: As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." (Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does
not define what is meant by "executive power" although in the same article it
touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause,
Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290

Facts: The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 6975 otherwise
known as the PNP Organic law placing the Philippine National Police under the
reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government in pursuant to the
provision of the constitution that the state shall establish and maintain one police
force which is national in scope and civilian in character. The petitioner alleged that
the said law limits only the power of the National Police Commission into an
administrative control over the PNP, thus, control remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the PNP and NAPOLCOM were placed.
Issue
Whether or not the control over the PNP is vested soley to the
Department Secretary of the DILG.
Ruling
The Presidential Power of control was held to mean the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter. This Presidential power of control over the executive branch
of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk and has been held by us. Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of
control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn,
and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.
8|Page

Araneta vs Gatmaitan 101 Phil 238
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised

Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating
municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a
taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor
general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive
orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by
R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held:
Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of
powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers
of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as
well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter,
the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take
appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an
ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting the
banning of trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging the same as null and void.
Issue: WON the executive orders in question are null and void.
Held: Since the secretary of agriculture was empowered to regulate or ban trawl
fishing, the President, in the exercise of his power of control, can take over from
him such authority and issue the executive order to exercise it. The Presidents
power of control means that if a cabinet secretary or a head of a bureau or agency
can issue rules and regulations, as authorized by law, the President has the power
not only to modify or amend the same but can also supplant the rules by another
set entirely different from those issued by his subordinate.
C.
Doctrine of qualified political agency, defined alter ego
doctrine;
Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

Facts: It appears that on several occasions prior to 1968, various land titles (Torrens
titles) covering lands situated within the Province of Rizal were amended on the
basis of supposed corrective resurveys, by increasing the respective areas covered
by said titles. The corresponding certifications of the verifications of these
resurveys were issued by the Land Registration Office, headed then by petitioner
Noblejas, and subsequently approved by the court, in instances where the
subdivision plans were complex, the action of the office being sufficient where the
subdivision plans were simple. Allegedly, however, it turned out that the increases
in said various amendments were far in excess of the respective corresponding real
areas of the lands involve, so much so that even vast portions of lands and waters
of the public domain not capable of appropriation by any private person or entity
have been included within the expanded titles.
Noblejas contention: That the State is stopped to prosecute the accused because it
used him as a prosecution witness in cases similar to this case and because Fiscal
Benjamin H. Aquino, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice, exonerated the
defendant from any criminal complicity in resurveys with expanded areas.
9|Page

As a matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code places him under
the 'general supervision and control' of the Department of Justice together with
other prosecuting officers and under Section 74 of the same Code, the Secretary of
Justice as 'Department Secretary shall assume the burden and responsibility of all
activities of the Government under his control and supervision. Consequently, the
constitutional power of the President of control of all executive departments,
bureaus or offices (sec. 10, Art. VII, Constitution of the Philippines) should be
considered as embracing his office.
Issue: Can the agent act for and in behalf of the principal.
Ruling: The power of control . . . . implies the right of the President (and naturally
of his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by
law in the officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a
chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall be understood as also
conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have authority to act
directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or action
of said chief of bureau, office, division or service. Accordingly, the law confers upon
the Secretary only 'general supervision and control' may not be construed as
limiting or in any way diminishing the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of
control which is constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of the
President. Acts of the (alter ego) secretary is presumed to be that of the president.
D.
Limitations on the power of control
Does not include:

1. the abolition or creation of an executive office;
2. the suspension or removal of career executive officials or employees
without due process of law;
3. the setting aside, modification, or supplanting of decisions of quasijudicial agencies, including the office of the President, on contested cases
to have become final pursuant to law or to rules and regulations
promulgated to implement the law;
E.
Power of supervision
Mondano vs Silvosa 97 Phil 143
Facts : The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, province of Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende
filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to
the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action
and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in
obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by
the provincial governor with the provincial board. On the same day, the provincial,
governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from office.
Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against
the petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative
case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the
respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect.
Issue : Whether or not the department head as agent has the direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction
Ruling : The department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and, offices
under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his department
is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law (section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution). If the
provisions of section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed
as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction,
and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order
the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10,
article VII, of the Constitution. In administrative law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties. Control, on
the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
10 | P a g e

substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The power to oversee
that the officials concerned performs their duty and if they later fail or neglect to
fulfill them, to take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973

Facts: An original action of certiorari instituted in the Supreme Court by the
Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board of Pangasinan to
nullify the disapproval of the Secretary of Finance of their Resolution abolishing the
positions of three special counsel in the province, to prohibit the provincial
treasurer and the district from paying the salaries if three special counsel and to
prevent the latter from continuing to occupy and exercise the functions incident to
their positions.
Issue: Whether or not the said resolution requires the approval of the Secretary of
Finance.
Ruling: The court granted the petition. While the Secretary of Finance has the
power to revise their budget, local governments should be given a large degree of
freedom in determining for themselves the propriety and wisdom of the expenses
that they make provided that the expenses contemplated are within their financial
capacity. The supervisory authority of the President over local governments is
limited by the phrase as provided by law and where there is no law in accordance
with which said authority is to be exercised, it must be exercised in accord with
general principles of law. The Secretary of Finance is an official of the central
government, not of provincial governments, which are distinct and separate. The
power of general supervision granted to the President over local governments, in
the absence of any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to
mean that hem or his alter ego the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and
manner in which local officials shall perform or comply with their duties. Further,
the court ruled that the act of the provincial board in suppressing the positions of
three special counsel not being contrary to law, nor an act of maladministration,
nor an act of abuse, the same may not be disapproved by the Secretary of Finance
acting as a representative of he President by virtue of the latters power of general
supervision over local governments.
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes

decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino SecretaryVicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales
Respondent Leandro L Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the
election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted.
Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V
of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by
respondent Secretary.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an
election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the
exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the President through
the Secretary of Local Government.
F.
Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs IAC 146 SCRA 294
Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to

correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done
11 | P a g e

by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the
instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio
corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the
power of supervision and review over him.
they can work with other departments and conduct checks and balances
regarding the actions of each.
1.
No function is capable of exact definition. Description
is only a generalization concerning its principal but not all of its
characteristics;
2.
The Constitution allocated to the several departments
specific powers which in their nature did not ordinarily pertain
to them.
3.
Practical necessity of exercising powers incidental to
those that are express or are appropriate to it, even if such
incidental powers should fall within the category of functions
pertaining to another department.
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

I.
Doctrine of separation of powers

A.
Distribution of powers of government:

1.
Legislative power is the power to propose, enact,
amend and repeal laws.
2.
Executive power is the power to execute and
implement the laws.
3.
Judicial power is the power of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving legal rights which are
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
Basis for blending of powers:
II.
Doctrine of non-delegation of powers - what has been delegated cannot
be delegated.
A.
General rule
US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned anywhere by such

name in the 1987 Constitution, can be inferred from its provisions. The heart of the
doctrine is that the basic powers of the government must be kept separate from
each other, each power being under the principal control of a branch of
government. The legislative power is granted to the Congress, the executive power
to the President, and the judicial power to the Judiciary. The President as Chief
Executive exercises control over agencies and offices which perform rule-making or
adjudicatory functions. If the agency is created by Congress, consider the law that
created it. If the law is silent as to the control which the President may exercise,
the President can only supervise, i.e., to see to it that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Ruling: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred
upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws
must be made until the constitution itself is changed.
B.
Exception to the general rule

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one

department (one person or group of persons) that would lead to abuse.
Facts: Calalang, in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of

Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the
recommendation of the Director of Public Works and the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal
drawn vehicle for a specific time.
C.
Blending of powers though each department has their own
duties and functions, they nevertheless exercise the same in concert that
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative
B.
Purpose of doctrine
12 | P a g e

to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that
such act is invalid delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in
connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.
public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise
vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section
5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve
and periodically review and adjust reasonable fares, rates and other related
charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by
motorized vehicles."
Issue: WON the said constitute an invalid delegation of legislative power.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of
power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and
to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of
the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
C.
Prohibition against re-delegation; exceptions
Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in

order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for
governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws.
Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of
determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the
transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of
subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case,
the LTFRB may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by neither filling
in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to
provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a
common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service.
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount
to art undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate fixing and its far-reaching
effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important
function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry.
American Tobacco vs Director of Patents 67 SCRA 287 GRN L-26803 Oct. 14, 1975
KMU vs Garcia, Jr. 239 SCRA 386
Facts: Petitioner KMU question the constitutionality of the memoranda no. 92-009
issued by the DOTC and LTFRB which, among others, to authorize provincial bus
and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares
without application there for with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval
thereof by said agency and other matters.
Issue: WON the Memoranda issued is constitutional?
Ruling: Petition granted and held the memoranda No. 92-009 invalid. Legislature
delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of
Facts: This is an original action in the Supreme Court for Mandamus with
preliminary injunction. Petitioners herein, who have pending interference and
cancellation proceedings, questions the validity of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of
Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases as amended which
authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to
hear inter partes proceedings. Moreover, the rule also provided that judgment
on the merits shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed
by him. Petitioners contend that the amendment made by the Director on the Rule
vesting hearing officers authority to hear their cases was illegal and void because
under the law, it is the Director who should personally hear the cases of
petitioners.
13 | P a g e

Issue: Whether or not the Director has the power to delegate his functions.
Ruling : It has been held that the power conferred upon an administrative agency
to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and
orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purpose and
provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular
function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been
withheld. There is no provision under the general law and RA 165 and 166 which
prohibits such authority insofar as the designation of hearing examiners is
concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director
suggests that the aforementioned laws should be construed so as to give aforesaid
official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious
discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. Judgment and discretion
will still be exercised by him since that the parties will still be able to adduce
evidence. Due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require the
actual taking of testimony before the same officer who will make the decision.
III.
Powers of administrative agencies, in general

A.
Sources of powers of an administrative agency

1.
Constitution is the body of rules and principles by
which the fundamental powers of the government are
established, limited and defined.
2.
Statutes rules and regulations promulgated by the
legislature.
B.
Limitations to the powers of an administrative agency
Matienzon vs Abellera 162 SCRA 1

Facts : Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators. Private
respondents filed their petitions with the respondent board for the legalization of
their unauthorized taxicab units citing PD 101 in order to eradicate the harmful
and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to
become legitimate and responsible operators. Petitioners contend that the BOT
does not have jurisdiction over the case since the law provided a period of six (6)
months which limited the time period to legitimize such clandestine operations by
certain taxicab operators.
Issues : Whether or not the BOT had the power to legalize illegal taxicab operators
under PD 101 even after the lapse of six (6) months.
Ruling : There was nothing in said law to suggest the expiration of such powers
granted to the BOT, six (6) months after its promulgation. It is a settled principle of
law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain power, the
authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which
it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of
the legislative intent should be upheld as being germane to the law.
Heirs of Santiago Pastral vs Secretary of Public Works 162 SCRA 619
Facts : Private respondent herein led a group of residents in filing a case against
herein petitioner with the Department of Public Works and Communications for
the reason that latter were encroaching a part of the river with their fishpond. The
petitioner countered that they were given permission by the Bureau of Fisheries.
The secretary of public works designated the City Engineer to conduct hearings on
the same and eventually ordered the same be removed. Petitioners went to the
Court of First Instance to assail the decision of the secretary and obtain an
injunction which were ruled in their favor. The secretary appealed the lower courts
decision.
Issues : Whether or not the secretary had the power to order an investigation and
order the removal of the encroachment made on the river.
Ruling : Section 1 of Republic Act 2056 is explicit in that "Any provision or
provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction or building of
dams, dikes x x x which encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal
waters and any other navigable public waters or waterways x x x shall be ordered
removed as public nuisance or as prohibited construction as herein provided x x x.
The record shows that the petitioners' fishpond permit was issued in 1948 while
the Act took effect on June 3, 1958. Therefore, the Secretary's more specific
authority to remove dikes constructed in fishponds whenever they obstruct or
impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream or would cause
inundation of agricultural areas (Section 2, Republic Act 2056) takes precedence.
Moreover, the power of the Secretary of Public Works to investigate and clear
public streams from unauthorized encroachments and obstructions was granted as
early as Act 3708 of the old Philippine Legislature and has been upheld by this
Court in the cases of Palanca v. Commonwealth (69 Phil. 449) and Meneses v.
Commonwealth (69 Phil. 647). The same rule was applied in Lovina v. Moreno,
14 | P a g e

(supra) Santos etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications (19
SCRA 637).
C.
Nature of the powers of administrative agencies
Quasi legislative consists of issuance of rules and regulations; general

applicability; and prospective in application;
Quasi Judicial refers to orders, rewards or decision; applies to a specific
situation; and determination of rights, privileges,etc. (fact finding
investigate)
Depends on the enabling statute
D.
Such power, furthermore, is subject to an express limitation contained in Section

16(i), namely, the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law." Accordingly,
it does not obtain at all in those instances where the power of removal is by law
conferred on another body alone, with no appeal therefrom, as in the case
provided for in Section 14 of Republic Act 296.
LLDA v. Court of Appeals 231 SCRA 292
Ruling : LLDA has a special charter that gives it the responsibility to protect the
inhabitants of the laguna lake region from the deleterious effect of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding area. It has the
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA 4850 and its
amendatory laws. Moreover, the power to make, alter, or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution is also impliedly bestowed upon LLDA by EO 927.
Express and implied powers

Villegas vs Subido 30 SCRA 498
Facts : The commissioner on Civil Service issued a memorandum which provided for
the procedure of removal and suspension of policemen. Petitioner herein contends
that the Civil Service Act impliedly repealed RA 557 which provides, among others,
that charges against policemen shall be referred by the mayor and investigated by
the city or municipal council.
Issues : Whether or not RA 2260 impliedly repealed RA 557 and Sec. 22 of RA 409
so as to vest in the Commissioner of Civil Service exclusive and original jurisdiction
to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the City of Manila in
competitive service.
Ruling : Republic Act 2260, particularly Section 16 (i) thereof, is not inconsistent
with the power of the City Council under Republic Act 557 to decide cases against
policemen and the power of the City Mayor of Manila under Section 22 of Republic
Act 409 to remove city employees in the classified service.
Necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers

It is a fundamental power rule that an administrative agency has only such power
as are expressly granted to it by law, likewise an administrative agency has also
such power as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
Polloso vs Gangan 335 SCRA 750

Facts : Petitioner was the project manager of NPC who filed a letter of explanation
and appeal from the notice of disallowance issued by the COA. The case stemmed
from the hiring of a private lawyer, Atty. Satorre, who was compensated by virtue
of a contract entered by the NPC and the former. The COA held several persons
liable for payment of the amount due to said lawyer which included herein
petitioner. Petitioner contends the nature of services that was contracted with the
lawyer. Respondent contends that there was a memorandum prohibiting the hiring
of private lawyers without following the necessary procedures required by the
COA.
Issue : Was the issuance of the COA circular valid and applicable in this case?
Section 16 (i) of Republic Act 2260 leaves no doubt that the removal, suspension or
separation effected by said City Council or City Mayor, can be passed upon or
reviewed by the Commissioner of Civil Service. Nonetheless, the Commissioner's
"final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension" of classified
service employees presupposes, rather than negates, the power vested in another
official to originally or initially decide the removal, separation or suspension which
the Commissioner is thereunder empowered to pass upon.
Ruling : What can be gleaned from a reading of the circular is that government
agencies and instrumentalities are restricted in their hiring of private lawyers to
render legal services or handle their cases. No public funds will be disbursed for the
payment to private lawyers unless prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is a
written conformity and acquiescence from the Solicitor General or the Government
Corporate Counsel. It bears repeating that the purpose of the circular is to curtail
the unauthorized and unnecessary disbursement of public funds to private lawyers
15 | P a g e

for services rendered to the government. This is in line with the Commission on
Audits constitutional mandate to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or uses of
government funds and properties.
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency who is

authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is not the duty of the
Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such function belongs to the
President or his duly empowered alter ego.
Blaquera vs Alcala 295 SCRA 411

Facts : Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments
and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 292 1 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative Code
of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V 2 of EO 292. On January 19,
1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued Administrative
Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for
the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 3 and reiterating the
prohibition 4 under Section 7 5 of Administrative Order No. 268 ("AO 268"),
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the
President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed "[a]ll departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the
amount authorized under Section 1 hereof [are hereby directed] to immediately
cause the return/refund of the excess within a period of six months to commence
fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this Order." In compliance therewith, the
heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the
herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances
of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the
respondents from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the
petitioners have come before the Supreme Court to seek relief.
Issues : Whether or not the issued Administrative Orders are valid.
Ruling : In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized
to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who
perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in
connection with, or in relation to, their official employment." (Chapter 5, Subtitle A,
Book V).
RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 GRN 93237

Buenaseda vs Flavier 226 SCRA 645
Facts : The petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the
preventive suspension of petitioners for violations of graft and corruption.
Issues : Whether or not the ombudsman has power to suspend government
officials and employees pending investigation of administrative complaints.
Ruling : The Ombudsman is vested with authority to preventively suspend officers
as contained in sec. 24 of the Ombudsman Act.
E.
Discretionary powers vs. ministerial duty

Carino vs Capulong 222 SCRA 593
Facts: The petitioner filed the present case to annul the order issued by the
respondent Judge and prevent the same in conducting further hearing thereof.
AMA Computer College situated in Davao city operated as an Educational
Institution without the required authorization that must be secured first before the
DECS. As a consequence thereof, the DECS issued an order for the closure of the
said school with the aid of the military as per agreement of the two governmental
agencies. The private respondent filed a case before the RTC Davao to enjoin DECS
from implementing the said closure pending the approval of the request to operate
of the said school. The said request was denied by the DECS for not complying the
requirements prescribed by the Department. The said case was dismissed,
undaunted the private respondent appeal before the CA which later affirmed the
decision of the lower court. The private respondent then filed a petition before the
RTC of Makati with the same cause of action now using the organization of the
16 | P a g e

parents of their students. The said court presided by the respondent Judge issued
the preliminary injunction sought by the private respondent. Hence, this petition.
The private respondent contended that the same should be permitted to operate
because DECS is only performing a ministerial power over the circumstance. The
DECS on the other hand contended that it exercises a discretionary power in
pursuant to the provisions of law with respect to educational institutions.
Issues : Whether or not the public petitioner exercised ministerial or discretionary
function.
Ruling : The SC ruled that the public petitioner exercised discretionary power with
respect to the issuance of permit to operate as an educational institution. The
Court further distinguished ministerial and discretionary powers. A purely
ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
Accordingly, the granting of license to operate is vested upon the judgment of the
DECS in securing the quality education that an educational institution should
provide pursuant to the constitutional provision on education and the organic law
authorizing said department to issue rules and regulations pertinent thereto.
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,

without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
(remedy mandamus)
2.
Discretionary power, defined - If the law imposes a
duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide
how or when the duty shall be performed (remedy certiorari)
3.
Importance of knowing distinction to determine the
remedies available
4.
Delegation of ministerial and discretionary power
Binamira vs Garrucho 188 SCRA 154

Facts : Petitioner herein filed a quo warranto seeking reinstatement to the Office of
General Manager in the Department of Tourism. In 1986, petitioner was designated
by then Minister Gonzales as General Manager of the PTA. The Minister sought the
approval of the president which was favored by the latter. In 1990, respondent was
the new Secretary of Tourism and asked for the resignation of the petitioner. The
president issued a memorandum to Garrucho designating him as General Manager
for the reason that petitioner was not appointed by the President as required by
PD 564 but only by the Secretary of Tourism which was invalid. Petitioner contends
that he was validly appointed to the position since that the act of then Minister
Gonzales was also the act of the president which presumes that the act of the
department heads were the act of the president.
Mateo vs CA 196 SCRA 280

Issue : Whether or not petitioner was validly appointed to his position.
Facts : Petitioners filed an action for the recovery of a parcel of land. RTC ruled in
favor the petitioner. Issued execution of judgment for private respondent.
Petitioner filed relief from judgment. Judge denied petition for relief from
judgment. Petitioner filed mandamus.
Issues : Whether or not granting of the petition for relief from judgment is
ministerial?
Ruling : Ministerial duty in granting appeal. But deciding on judging on the appeal is
discretionary.
1.
Ministerial duty, defined - is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
Ruling : PD 564 clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of
the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines,
not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which
because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for
Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely
mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even
if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the
presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent
to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute
17 | P a g e

another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
another.
F.
Mandatory/prohibitory and permissive/directory duties and
powers
Article 5 Civil Code
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
stranger or informer would be allowed to usurp and control the official functions of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue would create disorder and confusion, if not
chaos and total disruption of the operations of the government.
Agpalo: A directory statute is a statue which is permissive or discretionary in nature
and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from
ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other that
prescribed and substantially the same result obtained.
G.
Error in the exercise of powers

1.
Doctrine of non-suability of the state inapplicable
the state cannot be sued without its consent.
1.
Mandatory/prohibitory statute, defined and effect

Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713
Sarina vs CFI of Bukidnon 24 SCRA 715
Ruling: A mandatory statute is a statute which commands either positively that

something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something
be not done, leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.
Facts : Petitioner was applying for a position for guidance counselor in a school
(navy based) which was denied even though she was qualified. Filed a case against
the military officials concerned because of discrimination. The military invoked the
non-suability of the state.
Issue : Whether or not the non-suability clause applies.
2.
Permissive/directory statute, defined and effect

Meralco Securities Corp. vs Savellano 117 SCRA 804
Facts: This case sought to set aside and annul the writ of mandamus issued by
Judge Savellano, ordering petitioner Meralco Securities Corporation to pay and
petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue to collect from the former the
amount of 51M by way of alleged deficiency corporate income tax, plus interests
and surcharges due thereon and to pay private respondents 25% of the total
amount collectible as informers reward.
Issue: WON the writ of mandamus is correct.
Ruling : Thus, after the Commissioner who is specifically charged by law with the
task of enforcing and implementing the tax laws and the collection of taxes has
after a mature and thorough study rendered his decision or ruling that no tax is due
or collectible, and his decision is sustained by the Secretary, now Minister of
Finance (whose act is that of the President unless reprobated), such decision or
ruling is a valid exercise of discretion in the performance of official duty and cannot
be controlled much less reversed by mandamus. A contrary view, whereby any
Ruling : The principle of non-suability does not apply because the petitioner is
questioning the personal judgment or discretion of the officials not their office by
virtue of their official capacity.
2.
Estoppel inapplicable
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs CTA 234 SCRA 348

Ruling : Illegal or invalid acts which are in excess of the jurisdiction of
administrative agency cannot bind the government, therefore estoppels does not
apply.
3.
Presumption of regularity
Blue Bar Coconut vs Tantuico 163 SCRA 716

Facts: The President issued PD 232 creating the Philippine Coconut Authority and
established a coconut stabilization fund. The members were originally 11 but
18 | P a g e

reduced to 7. Thereafter, respondent chairman of the coconut authority initiated a
special coconut end-user companies which included the petitioner. The chairman
directed to collect short levies and overpriced subsidies to apply the same to
settlement of short levies should they fail to pay. COA agreed to release the
subsidy provided they post a bond equal to the amount of the disputed claim.
Petitioner contended that it is unacceptable that the COA Chairman and Auditor
had no jurisdiction. They caused the withholding of the subsidy case endorsed to
the court.
Facts: Manila public school teachers association (MPSTA) and alliance of concerned
teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public
authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been bought to the
latters attention. As a result of the said action, the DECS secretary dismissed from
the service one of the private respondents and the other nine were suspended.
Issue: WON respondent COA chairman may disregard the PCA rules and decision
had became moot.
Issue: WON the CHR has jurisdiction over certain specific type of cases. 2. Won the
CHR can try and decide cases as court of justice even quasi-judicial bodies do?
Ruling : The legal presumption is that official duty has been duly performed; and it
is 'particularly strong as regards administrative agencies x x vested with powers
said to be quasi-judicial in nature, in connection with the enforcement of laws
affecting particular fields of activity, the proper regulation and/or promotion of
which requires a technical or special training, 'aside from a good knowledge and
grasp of the overall conditions, relevant to said fields, containing in the nation. The
consequent policy and practice underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of
justice should respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless
there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly,
manifestly and patently insubstantial.
Ruling : The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is

not a judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions.
Acts done by an official are presumed to be valid.
IV.
Investigatory Powers
A.
Scope and extent of powers
De Leon : Investigatory or inquisitorial powers include the power to inspect, secure,

require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise. They
are conferred on practically all administrative agencies. In fact, the investigatory
powers of administrative agencies, or their power and facilities to investigate,
initiate action, and control the range of investigation, is one of the distinctive
functions which sets them apart from the court.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Court declared that CHR has no jurisdiction on adjudicatory power over certain
specific type of cases like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political
rights.
The most that may be conceded to the CHR in the way of adjudication power is
that it may investigate,.eg,. Receive evidence and make findings of facts as regard
claimed human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining facts of controversy is not
judicial function. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusion in controversy may be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes or review as may be provided by law.
The power to investigate does not carry with it the power to adjudicate.
Does the power of quasi-legislative carries with it the power to investigate?
Quasi-legislative may or may not possess the power to investigate depending on
the law granting such power.
Can an administrative agency perform investigation with or without quasilegislative or quasi-judicial power? Yes. For the reason that some agencies are
formed for the sole purpose of investigation only (fact finding, etc.)
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Concerned Officials of MWSS vs Vasquez 240 SCRA 502

Facts: MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project in order to
provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the
Metropolitan area. The project was financed by funds loaned by the Overseas
Economic Coop Fund of Japan to the National Government.
MWSS caused the publication or an invitation for pre-qualification and bids. The
major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants financial condition,
technical qualification and experience to undertake the project. Private
Respondent Phil. Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers Association sent
letters offering suggestions on the technical specifications.
Thereafter 3 lowest bidders for the project were known PBAC-CSTE recommended
F.F Cruz and Inc. but other members both disagreed and opted for a rebidding
bating the contract to be awarded to Joint Venture. But MWSS Board Committee
on construction Management and Board Committee on Engineering that contract
be awarded to F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. being the lowest complying bidder.
PLDPPMA, through its President filed with the office of the Ombudsman a lettercomplaint protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS to favor suppliers
of fiberglass pipes and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation there
on.
Ombudsman, in its fact-finding investigation pursuant to power, functions and
duties of the office under Sec. 15 of R.A 6670 MWSS was diverted to set aside the
recommendation of MWSS to award contract.
Petitioner filed a special civil, action in the SC and cited that respondent
Ombudsman acted beyond the jurisdiction notwithstanding that Section 20 of the
Ombudsman Act, which enumerated the administrative act, or omission that may
not be the subject of investigation clearly among the cases exempts the same by
his office.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
PLDPPMAs complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing
the Board of Trustees of the MWSS to se aside the recommendation of the PBACCTSE.
Ruling : No, the particular aspect in question is the investigatory power and public
assistance duties that can be found in the first and second part of Sec.13, Art. XI of
the Constitution. While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any
act or omission which xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient may be
yielded, it is difficult to equally concede however, that the constitution and the
Ombudsman Act have intended to confer upon it veto or provisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion is lawfully vested.
While the authority of the ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, other than those specifically excepted under the
Constitution and Republic Acts No. 6770, which appears illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient, is broad, the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act did not intend to
confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment
or discretion is lawfully vested. Thus, on the question of whether to accept or reject
a bid and award contract vested by law in a government agency, which involves the
exercise of discretion, the Ombudsman has exceeded his power by reviewing the
award and granting it to another bidder.
Deloso vs Domingo 191 SCRA 545

Facts : An alleged ambushed led to the prosecution of Governor Delloso who was
charged before the Special Prosecutor with multiple murder. Governor Delloso
questioned the said referral to the Ombudsman alleging that the same has no
jurisdiction over the case for being irrelevant of the crime he committed to his
official function as governor.
Issue : Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : The Court ruled in positive manner. As protector of the people, the office
of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials and to investigate
any act or omission of any public officials when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. Ombudsman is also empowered to direct the
officer concerned, in this case the Special Prosecutor, to take appropriate action
against a public official and to recommend his prosecution. Further, the court ruled
that the law does not required that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.
B.
Requirement of notice and hearing when the law is silent,
notice and hearing may be dispensed with, which depends upon the
stage of the proceedings. (substantial right can be given notice and
hearing)
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Secretary of Justice vs Lantion 322 SCRA 160

Facts: A request for extradition was filed against Mark Jimenez for alleged violation
of many criminal laws in the US. The DOJ formed a panel of lawyers to review and
study the request. Pending the review, MJ requested copies of all documents and
papers relative to the request that the proceedings be suspended for the
meantime. The DOJ denied the request, hence MJ filed a petition for mandamus
before the RTC of Manila to compel the DOJ to furnish him the documents. The RTC
of Manila issued a TRO to maintain a status quo ante, hence the DOJ filed an appeal
to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not MJ is entitled to notice and hearing during the preliminary
or the evaluation stage of the extradition treaty against him.
administrative orders. / Was the petitioner entitled to be informed of the findings

of an investigative committee created to inquire into charges against him?
Ruling : Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and
recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges
filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on
substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the
charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committees.
Pefianco vs Moral 322 SCRA 439

Ruling : From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extradite.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Facts: Ma. Luisa Moral instituted an action for mandamus and injunction before the
regular courts against Secretary Gloria, who was later replaced by Secretary
Pefianco, praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee
Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of
dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. Moral was ordered dismissed
from the government service. Respondent did not appeal the judgement .
Ruiz vs Drilon 209 SCRA 695

Facts : GR No. 103570 refers to a petition for review on the decision of the court of
appeals consolidated with GR No. 101666 for certiorari and prohibition to review
the decision of the executive secretary.
Petitioner herein was the president of Central Luzon State University who was
dismissed by the President of the Philippines from his position after investigation of
a committee on several charges against him. Petitioner undertook to ask for a
reconsideration on the same which respondent Drilon, as executive secretary
denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with a prayer for TRO
which granted the latter prayer. After eight days, petitioner filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO. The CA
dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition was not meritorious and a
case of forum shopping. The SC dispensed with the comment of the Solicitor
General for the public respondents it being that the pleadings and papers already
filed were already adequate for them to act on said petition.
Issue : Whether or not the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
or any act without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed
Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for lack of cause of action
but the trial court denied his motion, thus elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari which sustained the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
Certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion to dismiss.
Ruling : A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the
hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded
these rights.
C.
Right to counsel in administrative investigations a counsel
may or may not assist a person under investigation. (Remolona v. CSC)
D.
Importance of administrative investigations
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Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99
Larin vs Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713
Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that
preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in
connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency
all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
Facts: Petitioner herein was an assistant commissioner of the excise tax service of
the BIR being appointed by then President Aquino. Sometime in 1992, a decision
was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner of grave misconduct.
Acting on a report by then acting Finance Secretary Leong, the President, through
its executive secretary, issued a memorandum creating an executive committee to
investigate the administrative charge against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner
submitted a position paper as required by the committee. Consequently, the
president issued a memorandum which streamlined the operations of the BIR
abolishing some of the offices which included the office of excise tax and another
memorandum dismissing herein petitioner from office as a result of the
investigation. Petitioner contends that he is a Career Executive Service officer and
he cannot be removed. On the other hand, respondents contended that since
petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the
president.
Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue
subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
Issue: Who has the power to discipline the petitioner or does the president have
the power to order an investigation against herein petitioner?
Ruling : Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of

future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise.
Ruling : The position of Assistant Commissioner of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service under the law which is appointed by the president. As a
presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service, he comes
under the direct disciplining authority of the president in line with the principle
that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred by the
Constitution. The memorandum issued by the president which created a
committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner was pursuant
to the power of removal by the president. However, the power of removal is not
absolute since the petitioner herein is a career service officer who has in his favor
the security of tenure who may only be removed through a cause enumerated by
law.
E.
Executive power to investigate, source

Section 64c Revised Administrative Code
Power of the president to order, when in his opinion the good of the
public service so requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of
any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.
Section 20 Book III, 1987 Administrative Code
Residual Powers unless congress provides otherwise, the President shall

exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which
are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law.
Evangelista vs Jarencio 68 SCRA 99

Facts: Petitioner filed a case before the SC seeking to annul the order of the
respondent judge in civil case manalastas vs. bagatsing et, al. which order that
preliminary injunction restraining respondent from further issuing subpoena in
connection with the fact finding investigation against petitioner.
22 | P a g e

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency
all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation.
absolved from legibility. On appeal, CA dismissed the petition and therefore a

review by the SC.
Issue : Whether or not the CSC can dismiss the petitioner despite of the fact that
the offense committed was not done in the performance of his official duty.
Ruling : If the government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of
oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office.
Rule making power - the power to issue rules and regulations.
Issue : Whether or not PARGO has the power to issue subpoenas

A.
Nature of power, definition Administrative agencies are
endowed with powers legislative in nature or quasi-legislative, and in
practical effect, with the power to make law. However, the essential
legislative functions may not be delegated to administrative agencies and
in this sense, it is said that administrative agencies have no legislative
power and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.
Ruling : The subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico Evangelista to respondent

Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.
Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.
People vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450

Requirements in issuing a subpoena:
1.
2.
3.
V.
Within the authority of the agency

Information is reasonably relevant
Demand is not indefinite
Facts: The case at bar involves the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
fishing in fresh water.
Issue: Whether or not the Fishery Administrative Order No. 84 penalizing electro
fishing.
Quasi-legislative /Rule-Making Powers

Remolona vs CSC 362 SCRA 304
Facts: Esrelito Romolona was the post master at the postal office service in Infanta,
Quezon, District Supervisor of the DECS inquired from the Civil Service Commission
as to the status of the Civil Service eligibility of Mrs. Remolona who got a rating of
81.25% of as per report of rating issued by the National Board for Teachers. After
an investigation, Remolonas name is not in the list of passing and failing
examinees. Remolona admitted that he was responsible in acquiring the alleged
fake eligibility, that his wife has no knowledge and that he did it because he
wanted them to be together.
Ruling: The fishery laws did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. The lawmaking
body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to declare what act
constitute a criminal offense. Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of PD 704.
Thus, an administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend
an act of the legislature. In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it
must clearly appear that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred
by law.
1.
Ordinance power of the President/Delegation to the
President
-
A formal charge was filed against petitioner Remolona, Nery C. Remolona and Atty.
Hadji Sdupadin for possession of fake eligibility, falsification and dishonesty. CSS
found Estelito Remolona and Nery remolona guilty but Nery Remolona was
The president has the power to issue rules and regulations (executive
orders, proclamations, etc.)
Sections 23.2, 28.2, Article VI, Constitution
23 | P a g e

Section 23. 2. - In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by
law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders.- Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be
issued as general or special orders.
Section 28. 2 - The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government.
Facts: The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders restricting and
banning trawl fishing from San Miguel Bay. However, a group of other trawl
operators questioned the said executive orders alleging that the same is null and
void.
Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Book III, Title I, Chapter 2, 1987 Admin. Code
Chapter 2
ORDINANCE POWER
Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328
Issue
: Whether or not the issuance of the executive order was valid.
Ruling : Before the issuance of the eo, a resolution by the municipality allowed
thrall fishing. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or
pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without
requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the
performance of its duty to implement or enforce said policy.
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. - Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
EO issued by the secretary was valid since that it was part of the agencies
functions.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular

aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Olsen & Co. vs Aldanese, 43 Phil. 259
Sec. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or

condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation
of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in
proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Facts: Walter Olsen, a duly licensed domestic corporation engaged in the

manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippines
assailed the constitutionality of Act 2613, allegedly depriving them of their right of
exporting cigars to the United States due to the refusal of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to issue certificate of origin and that the cigars were not manufactured of
long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the province of Cagayan, Isabela or
Nueva Viscaya.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. - Acts of the President on matters of administrative

detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular
officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. - Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all
or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for
information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Issue: Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make

rules and regulations which are not within the scope of Act 2613.
Ruling: The only power conferred to the Collector of Internal Revenue was that a
proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined and that all
of these who produce tobacco of the same standard would have equal rights and
opportunities. Such delegated power the rules and regulations promulgated should
be confined to and limited by the power conferred by the legislative act.
24 | P a g e

Sections 5 and 9, Article X, Constitution
The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to makes rules and regulations is
specified and defined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification,
marking and packing of leaf or manufactured tobacco of good quality and the
handling of it under sanitary conditions.
2.
Delegation to the Supreme Court

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.
First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30

Facts: BOI granted First Lepanto to amend certificate of recognition by changing
scope of its reg product from glazed floor tiles to ceramic stiles. Mariwasa oppose
filed motion for reconsideration. Mariwasa filed petition for review with
respondent CA. it is temporarily restrained BOI from implementing decision, 20
days lapsed without respondent court issuing preliminary injunction. Lepanto filed
motion to dismiss, court appellate. Jurisdiction over BOI vested with SC.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own
sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines
and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.
Section 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral
representation as may be prescribed by law.
Sections 54, 55, 56, 57, Republic Act No. 7160

SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan shall
be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may
be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his
signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return
the same with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider
the same. The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief
executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the
ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes.
(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the
Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in
the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed
approved as if he had signed it.
Issue: Whether or not CA has jurisdiction.
(c) ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by the
majority of all its members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.
Held:
Yes, E.O 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions of BOI. It simply
deals with procedural aspects with court has the power to regulate by virtue of its
cons rule-making power. Circular 1-91 repealed or suspended EO 226 in so far as
the manner of appeal. Appeals from decisions of BOI, which statutes allowed to be
filed with SC, are brought to CA.
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief
executive may veto any ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, or Sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial
to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.
3.
Delegation to LGUs
(b) The local chief executive, except the Punong Barangay, shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an
25 | P a g e

ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the
veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item
or items shall not take effect unless the Sanggunian overrides the veto in the
manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations
ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be
deemed reenacted.
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the

ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances.
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The
Sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by twothirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even
without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds
the Barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the
Sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the
same with its comments and recommendations to the Sangguniang Barangay
concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the
effectivity of the Barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision
called for is effected.
SECTION 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions

by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the
secretary to the Sanggunian Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan shall forward to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the
resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs
formulated by the local development councils.
(b) If the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails
to take action on Barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof,
the same shall be deemed approved.
B.
Rationale for the delegation of quasi-legislative power

Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in
making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is
beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in
part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall
advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30)
days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
SECTION 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the Sangguniang
Barangay shall furnish copies of all Barangay ordinances to the Sangguniang
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of
the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy
projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every
law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of
the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
26 | P a g e

determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Ruling: The court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No.
372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it
disagrees with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by
Congress in its present form, the law violates the Constitution.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the
only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test,
there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
not. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegates who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional
landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power has become an
inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of government. To cede
to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to transgress
the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a
strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot
infringe the terms of agency.
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for
sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate,
petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has
no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law,
thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter
prevails. Petition is dismissed.
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221
Facts: Pangasinan Transportation Co. has been engaged in transporting passengers

in Pangasinan and Tarlac to Nueva Ecija and Zambales by means of TPU buses for
20 years. It filed with Public Service Commission to be authorized to operate ten
additional new Brockway Trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply
with the terms and conditions of its current certificates. As a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public Service Commission denied it.
Motion for Reconsideration denied. Petition for a writ of certiorari filed.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the legislative powers granted to the Public Service
Commission by Sec.1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 454 constitute a complete and
total abdication of the Legislatures functions and thus unconstitutional and void.
(2) Whether or not Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority.
Held:
(1) No, Commonwealth Act no. 454 is constitutional. Section 8 of Art. XIII
of the Constitution provides that no franchise, certificate or any other form of
authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be for a longer period than
fifty years and when it was ordained. While in Sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
146 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454 that the Public Service
Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate. That it
shall be valid only for a period of time it has been declared that the period shall not
be longer than 50 years. Therefore, all that has been delegated to the commission
is the admin function\, including the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the
National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of public interests in
a proper and suitable manner.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
powers by the legislative and towards the approval of the practice by the courts.
(2) No, this right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon
the police power, applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence
after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
27 | P a g e

Calalang vs Williams 70 Phil 726
Facts: Calalang in his capacity as taxpayer questioned the constitutionality of

Commonwealth Act 548. The Secretary of Public works and highways with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works and the Chairman of the National
Traffic Commission promulgated a rule closing a certain road in Manila for animal
drawn vehicle for a specific time.
The petitioner, in his contention, empowers the Secretary of Public Works with the
recommendation of the Director of Public works to legislate rules and laws relative
to the regulation of traffic in the country. Further, the petitioner contended that
such act is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
The respondent public official asserted that such promulgation of rules is in
connection with the powers vested to them by the said law.
Issue: Whether or not the said Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative
power.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the said act is not an invalid delegation of
power. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what
public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by
the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the
National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and
to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of
the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the
condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly
discharged by the National Assembly, It must depend on the discretion of some
other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether
the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
C.
Limitations on the rule-making power
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908, 12 August 2003
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
filed against the National Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph
A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner
Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitioners allege that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property
without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and
expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of
identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void
ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction of the case
Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasilegislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity
of the said issuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the
25
regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts
28 | P a g e

26
of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs NLRC 106 SCRA 444
Ruling : By virtue of such rule-making authority, the Secretary of Labor issued on

May 1, 1977 a set of rules which exempts not only distressed employers but also
"those who have granted in addition to the allowance under P.D. 525, at least
P60.00 monthly wage increase on or after January 1, 1977, provided that those
who paid less than this amount shall pay the difference (paragraph k of said rules).
institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy

projects and activities of the energy industry."
On February's, 1997, the President implemented the full deregulation of the
Downstream Oil Industry through E.O. No.372.
Petitioner contends that that the inclusion of the tariff provision in Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 8 180 violates Section 26(l) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every
law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. That the
imposition of tariff rates in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject of
the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President and the Secretary of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
Issue: WON RA No. 8180 is unconstitutional?
Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to

the Secretary of Labor, and the same is therefore void. The recognition of the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the administration of the
statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. It
is of elementary knowledge that an act of Congress cannot be amended by a rule
promulgated by an administrative agency. "It seems too clear for serious argument
that an administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A
regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to
have been erroneous becomes a nullity."
D.
Requisites for valid delegation of quasi-legislative power
Tatad vs Secretary of DOE 281 SCRA 330
Facts: This is a petition to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes".R.A. No. 8 180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation of
the downstream of industry. In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7638 which
created the Department of Energy to prepare, the law also aimed to encourage
free and active participation and investment by the private sector in all energy
activities. Section 5(e) of the law states that "at the end of four (4) years from the
affectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President,
Ruling: the court ruled that RA No. 8180 is declared unconstitutional and ED. No.
372 void.The rational of the Court annulling RA No. 8180 is not because it disagrees
with deregulation as an economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its
present form, the law violates the Constitution. The right call therefore should be
for Congress to write a new oil deregulation law that conforms to the Constitution
and not for this Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the
Constitution. Striking down RA. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to
the oil oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is
not quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supranormal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental principles
of the Constitution. When confronted by a law violating the Constitution, the Court
has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed, the Constitution is a
covenant that grants and guarantees both the political and economic rights of the
people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be the guardian not only of the
people's political rights but their economic rights as well. The protection of the
economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of greater importance to them for
they are concerned more with the exoteric of living and less with the esoteric of
liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution reigns supreme so long will this Court
be vigilant in upholding the economic rights of our people especially from the
onslaught of the powerful. Our defense of the people's economic rights may
appear heartless because it cannot be half-hearted.
1.
Completeness test the law must be complete in all
its items and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
29 | P a g e

when it reaches the delegate, the only thing they will have to
do
is
enforce
it
(Eastern
Shipping vs. POEA)
What cannot be delegated are those which are purely legislative in nature. He
cannot determine what the law shall be.
US vs Ang Tang Ho L-4288 20 Nov 1952
Eastern Shipping Lines vs POEA 166 SCRA 533
Facts: Davao pilot association filed a petition against the Eastern shipping lines for
sum of money and attorneys fee claiming that herein respondent rendered
pilotage service to petitioner, the lower court ruled in favor of the respondent;
herein petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA.
The factual antecedents of the controversy are simple. Petitioner insists on paying
pilotage fees prescribed under PPA circulars. Because EO 1088 sets a higher rate,
petitioner now assails its constitutionality.
Issue: won EO 1088 is unconstitutional
Ruling: it is axiomatic that administrative agency like Philippine port authority has
no discretion whether or not to implement the law. Its duty is to enforce the law,
thus, there is a conflict between PPA circular and a law like EO 1088, the latter
prevails. Petition is dismissed.
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
Facts: Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before

the trial court, under the provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine
Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the
crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he would
observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office
which recommended denial of the same 18 June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of
Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for hearing
on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition
to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an
opposition on 5 April 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming
that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is

nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the
provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective or otherwise in their respective provinces. The private prosecution also
filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the
questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937,
Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Cu Unjieng "es
inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted by the
Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3
July 1937, counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying
probation and a notice of intention to file a motion for reconsideration. An
alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by counsel on 13 July
1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration
submitted on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July
1937, but said hearing was postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng
because a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33
(34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937, the Fiscal
of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order
of execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu
Unjieng to jail in obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera
issued an order requiring all parties including the movants for intervention as amici
curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937. On the last-mentioned date,
the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution of
judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but,
upon objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the
hearing of both motions. The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for
execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to
intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which
said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to
court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and
the People came to the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an
end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila
which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the
courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial
machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The scheduled hearing before the trial court was
30 | P a g e

accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by the
Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.
Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present case.
Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and
the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The
unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying
that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in
whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set
aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can
challenge the validity of its own laws.
2.
Sufficient standard test
to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority by defining legislative
policy and indicating circumstances under which it is pursued.
Issue: Whether the Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the
President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted.
Whether the grant of power to the President is included in the subject expressed in
the title of the law.
Ruling: A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied, nor it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other
statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.
Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the
bill. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are pertinent to that
subject. The Reorganization of the remaining administrative regions is pertinent to
the general subject of R.A 6734, which is the establishment of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied.
Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other
statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. With respect to
the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in
the same policy underlying the grant to the President in the law.
Serve to canalize the banks of the river from overflowing.

Cervantes vs Auditor General L-4043 26 May 1952
Chiongbian vs Orbos 245 SCRA 253
Facts: Petitioners challenged the validity of a provision of R.A 6734, authorizing

the President of the Philippines to merge by administrative determination the
regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous Region, and the
Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, Providing for
the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanano. Four provinces
includes, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted in favor of
creating an autonomous region, thus became ARMM. After the plebiscite, E.O 429
as amended by E.O 439 was issued by the Chief Executive providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. The contentions of the
Petitioners contends that R.A 6734 is unconstitutional because 1.) it unduly
delegates the legislative power to the President by authorizing him to merge the
existing regions. 2.) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
Facts: Petitioner was manager of the national abaca and Fibers Corporation. Its
board of directors granted quarter allowances to petitioner. Submitted to the
control of the government enterprise council created in EO 93 in pursuance to RA
51 for approval, the resolution was disapproved on recommendation by auditor
general. 1. That quarter allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited
by NAFCO charter. 2. Financial condition of NAFCO.
Reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition for review by certiorari/
Issue: that EO 93 is invalid as based on the law that is unconstitutional being an
undue delegation of legislative power to executive.
Ruling: the rule that so long as the legislative lays down policy and a standard is
established by the statute there is no undue delegation. RA 51 is authorizes the
president to make reforms and changes in the government controlled corporation
31 | P a g e

for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their
operations. This lays down a standard and policy. pursuant to this authority, the
president promulgate EO 93 creating government enterprises council with power
to pass upon the program of activities and yearly budget of member corporations.
Petition is dismissed.
Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised

Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating
municipalities. However, Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a
taxpayer instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against the Auditor
general from passing in audit any public funds. The petitioner alleges that executive
orders are null and void, upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by
R.A no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
Issue: Whether or not the said executive order is a valid delegation of power.
Ruling: The court ruled in that the said order is an invalid delegation of power. The
court further ruled that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment
on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of
legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons,
the court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
3.
Exceptions to the requirement of sufficient
legislative standards
Issue: Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power.
Held:
Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative in nature. Although congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation of
powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set forth the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits
of which are sufficiently determinate of determinable
Ynot vs IAC 148 SCRA 659
Facts: The petitioner is questioning the validity of the Executive order issued by the
President of the Philippines prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive
Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age. Obviously, the petitioner was
affected to the said order with the contention that the said order is an invalid
delegation of power and unduly oppressive to the industry. The Solicitor General
contended that the said law is a proper delegation of legislative power to the
President of the Republic.
1.
power which is not directly or exclusively a
legislative one and has no relation whatsoever to
personal or property rights;
2.
power to regulate a mere matter of
privilege
E.
Issues on validity of legislation

1.
Against the delegating statute itself --- whether or not
the requisites of valid delegation are present;
2.
Against the exercise of the delegated power --whether or not the rule or regulation conforms with what the
statute provides and whether the same is reasonable.
Solicitor General vs Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837
Facts: For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license
pursuant to a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Cesar P.
Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally
32 | P a g e

parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the abovementioned decision in a memorandum.
"Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal
of a rule.
Issue: WON Memorandum/ordinance of MMA is valid.

Held: (1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, NULL and VOID; and (2) enjoining all lawenforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates
of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver's
licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be imposed by the challenged
enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not
to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without
such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation
of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI
43) and of driver's licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
An ordinance to be valid:
Must not be in contravention of the constitution
Must not be oppressive
Must not be discriminatory
Must not regulate or prohibit trade
Must not be against a statute

F.
Rule and rule-making, defined
Eslao vs COA 236 SCRA 161
Facts: Eslao, in his capacity as president of the Pangasinan State University asked
the SC to set aside the COA decision which denied honoraria and per diems claimed
under the National Compensation Circular No. 53 by certain PSU personnel
including petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not the acts done by the COA in the case at bar are valid.
Ruling: COA is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law
or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not
agree at least not before such law or regulation was set aside by authorized agency
of government as unconstitutional or illegal and void.
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law have the force of law and are entitled to great respect.
Supplementary legislation A statute which leaves to the executive the power to

fill in the technical details in view of the latters expertise is a recognized delegation
of legislative power.
Must be in compliance with the enabling law and not
1.
Section 2.2 Book VII, Admin Code of 1987

"Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or
interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of,
an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements
concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting
the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
Section 4, Book VII, Admin Code of 1987
2.
Classification of rules and regulations

a.
Those issued by an administrative superior
and directed exclusively to the subordinates --- rules
and regulations of internal administration to be
observed by subordinate officials for the prompt and
efficient dispatch of government business and to
facilitate the transactions of the general public with
the government;
b.
Those directed not only to the inferior
officers but also and primarily to private individuals,
fixing the manner by which the terms of a statute are
to be complied with.
Types of rule-making powers
33 | P a g e

2.1.
Rule-making by reason of particular
delegation of authority (supplementary or detailed
legislation)--- refers to the power to issue rules and
regulations which have the force and effect of law;
2.2.
Rule-making by the construction and
interpretation of a statute being administered
(interpretative legislation)--- refers to the power to
interpret and construe the statutes entrusted to them
for implementation;
2.3.
The ascertainment of facts which will form
the basis for the enforcement of a statute (contingent
legislation or determination).
G.
Supplementary/detailed legislation
1.
Source enabling law;
2.
Requisites for validity:

Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Facts: Assailed in this petition for certiorari and prohibition is that part of the
decision of the Director of Mines, affirmed by the Minister of Natural Resources,
which declared that petitioners have abandoned and lost their rights over their
mining claim.
This case originated from a protest case for alleged overlapping or encroachment
between two mining claims.
Petitioners filed with the Bureau of Mines a letter complain against private
respondents for alleged overlapping and encroachment of the "Ullmann" claim
over the "Ped" claim.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision declaring that there was no conflict
between the "Ped and "Ullmann and dismissed the petition.
Since the protest case was filed after Pres. Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974) took effect on May 17, 1974, the provisions of the
law were made applicable to petitioners. Pres. Decree No. 463 mandates
compliance with certain requirements in order for subsisting mining claims, such as
the "Ped" claim, to avail of the benefits granted under the Decree. Otherwise,
mining rights to the claim will be lost.
Issue: (1) whether or not public respondents have jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the "Ped" claim in a protest case of overlapping of mining claims; and (2)
should public respondents have such jurisdiction, whether or not they committed
grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioners to have
abandoned their mining claim.
Ruling: Petition dismissed. The public respondent has jurisdiction. Petitioners had
filed the protest case pursuant to Pres. Decree No. 463 which vests the Bureau of
Mines with jurisdiction over protests involving mining claims [Section 48, Pres.
Decree No. 4631.
Under the same Decree, Section 90 confers upon the Secretary of Natural
Resources, upon recommendation of the Director of Mines, the authority to issue
rules, regulations and orders necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of
the Decree. In accordance with the statutory grant of rulemaking power.
Section 128 of the implementing rules invoked by public respondents as basis for
their jurisdiction cannot be tainted with invalidity. First, it was issued by the
Department Head pursuant to validly delegated rule-making powers. Second, it
does not contravene the provisions of Pres. Decree No. 463, nor does it expand the
coverage of the Decree. Section 128 merely prescribes a procedural rule to
implement the general provisions of the enabling law. It does not amend or extend
the provisions of the statute
It is established in jurisprudence that Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
4 requisites of the valid supplementary delegation
must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law
conform to the standards that the law prescribes
must be reasonable
must be related to carrying in to effect the general provisions of law
UST v. Court of Tax Appeals 93 Phil 376

Facts: The Collector of Internal Revenue notified petitioner that its income as an
educational institution was taxable. Later on UST submitted a memorandum before
the Sec. of Finance disputing the decision of the latter as regard the taxability of
the formers income from tuition fees.
34 | P a g e

The case was elevated before the Board of Tax Appeals in accordance with the
rules romulgated by said Board under E.O. No. 401-A, whereby the petitioner
questioned the jurisdiction of respondent to take cognizance of the petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not E.O. No. 401-A is tainted with invalidity for the reason that it
deprives the CFIs of their jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases involving
recovery of taxes.
Held: E.O. No. 401-A does not merely create the BTA, which, as an instrumentality
of the Dept of Finance may properly come within the purview of R.A. No. 422, but
goes as far as depriving the CFIs of their jurisdiction to act on internal evenue
cases, a matter which is foreign to it and which comes within the exclusive province
of Congress. This the Chief Executive cannot do, nor can that power be delegated
by Congress alone has the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various department.
which categorically exclude from the definitions of basic salary earnings and other
remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal of the two sets
of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad inclusion is
now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary Rules and Regulations cure
the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and
earnings within the definition of basic salary.
"The all embracing phrase 'earnings and other remunerations' which are deemed
not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation,
or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest days and special
holidays, pays for regular holidays and right differentials. As such they are deemed
not part of the basic salary and shall not be considered i the computation of the
13th month pay. If they were not excluded it is hard to find any 'earnings and other
remunerations' expressly excluded in the computation of the 13-month pay. Then
the exclusionary provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
GMCR vs Bell Telecommunication Phil., Inc. 271 SCRA 79

Boie Takeda Chemicals vs Dela Serna 228 SCRA 329
Facts: This is a consolidated case questioning the supplementary regulation issued
by the Department of Labor and Employment Secretary regarding the application
th
and implementation of 13 month pay law. The Department order included
th
commission as part of the computation of determining the 13 month pay of the
employees. Upon inspection, the petitioners were found to be violators of the law
th
for not including the commission on its employees in the computation of the 13
month pay. The petitioner contended that the Secretary Drilon is acting in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
same. The Secretary however contended that the said order was just a
supplementary to the law which the same tried to erase the cloud thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the said order is a valid administrative regulation.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners. The court further ruled that the
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 is
even more emphatic in declaring that earnings and other remunerations which are
not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the l3thmonth pay.
"While doubt may have been created by the prior Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which defines basic salary to include all
remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee, this cloud is
dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Facts: Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body under
Executive Order No. 546 3 and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and act en bane,
i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of
its quasi-judicial functions.
Issue: WON NTC is a collegial body
Held: We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote
out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or
any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of the commission,
as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring
vote coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive
at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the
NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the
commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or
any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC.
35 | P a g e

Romulo, Mabanta vs HDMF 333 SCRA 777
Grego vs COMELEC 274 SCRA 481
Facts: Deputy Sheriff Basco was found guilty by the city court of manila of serious
misconduct and dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or local
government, its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCC.
Facts: Issue of the validity of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, which require the existence of a plan
providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits for exemption from
the Pag~IBIG Fund coverage under Presidential Decree No. 1752, as amended.
Issue: WON the amendments are valid
Basco run as a councilor in 1988 election won and assume office. In the 1992
election he run again and this time his victory not without unchallenged.
A quo warranto was filed against him but was dismissed. At second time petitioner
Grego a registered voted file a petition with comelec for disqualification and
suspension of his proclamation. Basco was proclaimed and assume office;
petitioner filed an urgent motion seeking to annul a hasty and illegal proclamation.
Issue: Does Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992?
Ruling: There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the
same operates retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case. Basco was NOT subject to
any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after
January 1, 1992.
Held: The amendments are null and void insofar as they require that an employer
should have both a provident/ retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the
benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the
Fund coverage.
Nasipit Lumber Co. vs NWPC 289 SCRA 667
3.
Requirement of reasonableness
a.
Bears a reasonable relation to the purpose
sought to be accomplished;
b.
Supported by good reasons;
c.
Free from constitutional infirmities or
charge of arbitrariness
Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
"We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only
to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The
regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into
effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not
be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into
effect the provision of the law, they are valid.'
Facts: PRC issued resolution no. 105 that no examine shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference, or the like conducted by or shall receive any handouts, review
material or any tip from school or any review center during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.
Issue: won the resolution no. 105 is valid.
Ruling: the court rule in favor of petitioner. Its is an axiom of administrative law
administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance
of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to secure the end view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation
to the purpose for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held
invalid.
36 | P a g e

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to carrying into effect what is
provided in the legislative enactment.
H.
Interpretative legislation
1.
Distinction between rule and interpretation
Issue: What weight should the court observes in administrative construction.

Ruling: The court ruled that where the court of last resort has not previously
interpreted the stature, the rule is that the courts will give considerations to
construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. The
construction of the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions
of a statute should be given controlling weight.
Victorias Milling Co vs Social Security Commission 114 Phil 555
Melendres vs COMELEC 319 SCRA 262
Ratio : When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, in the

exercise of its rule making power delegated to it by the legislature, it makes a new
law with the force and effect of a valid law. When it renders an opinion, or gives a
statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, hence, merely advisory.
Facts: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing
and promulgating ex parte the assailed resolution without complying with the
provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 28, Section 1 of Rule 10, Sections 1 to 6 of
Rule 14, Sections 1 to 4 of Rule 17 and Section 9 of Rule 18, all of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
2.
Types of executive construction/interpretation

a.
Construction by an executive officer directly
called to implement the law. It may be express
(embodied in a circular, directive or regulation) or
implied (practice or mode of enforcement of not
applying the statute to certain situations; by usage or
practice);
b.
Construction by the Secretary of Justice as
chief legal adviser of the government. May be
reversed by President in the exercise of the power to
modify, alter or reverse;
c.
Interpretation handed down in an adversary
proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive
officer exercising quasi-judicial power.
2.
Petitioner were candidates for the position of Barangay Chairman of Barangay

Caniogan, Pasig City, in the May 12, 1997 barangay elections. After the counting of
the votes, petitioner (Concepcion) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay
Chairman. On May 21, 1997, private respondent (Melendres) filed an election
protest against petitioner (Concepcion) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig
City, contesting therein the results of the election in all forty-seven (47) precincts of
said barangay. The case was assigned to Branch 68.
On June 4, 1997, after the preliminary hearing of the election case, it was shown
that no filing or docket fee was paid by the protestant therein, which payment is
required in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 37, Sec. 6. Petitioner
Concepcion moved to dismiss the case on the ground of failure to comply with this
requirement. In the contested Order, public respondent denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the requirement of payment of filing or docket fee is
merely an administrative procedural matter and [is] not jurisdictional.
Weight accorded to administrative constructions

Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Asturias Sugar Central vs Commissioner of Customs 29 SCRA 617

Facts: The Bureau of Customs issued an Administrative Order in the silence of the
Tariff and Customs Code which extends the period of exportation of a specific
containers in which the petitioner was directly affected. The petitioner questioned
the said order alleging that the construction of a specific statute by an
administrative body must not be observed.
Held: On the basis of all the foregoing considerations, it is resolved that the
payment of the filing of fee for purposes of an election protest and counter-protest
is not jurisdictional and, hence, non-compliance therewith at the outset will not
operate to deprive the Court of jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and acquired
pursuant to the Rules. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the instant petition is
hereby denied.
37 | P a g e

When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy,

it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative interpretation is at
best advisory for it is the court that finally determine what the law means.
J.
Penal rules and regulations

1.
Requisites for validity of penal rules and regulations
Peralta vs CSC 212 SCRA 425
Marcos vs CA 278 SCRA 843
United Christian Missionary Society vs SSC 30 SCRA 982
US v. Panlilio 28 Phil 608
Facts: this is the appeal from SSC, seeking to annul the orders of commissioner in
dismissing the petition, on the ground that in the absence of express provision in
Social Security act, vesting in the commission the power to condone penalties.
Petitioners contention that they had under the impression that international
organization, they were not cover under SSC. They paid their premiums and ask for
condonation, which was denied by commissioner.
Facts: Dependant Panlilio was charged and convicted of the CFI of Province of
Pampaga of a violation of the law relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous diseases known as rinderpest. The conviction was grounded on
illegal and voluntary act of herein accused by way of permitting and ordering the
carabaos on issue to be taken from the corral while the quarantines against the
same was still enforce. On other hand, that herein defendant interposed a defense
that the acts complained of did not constitute a crime.
ISSUE: WON the commission erred in ruling that it has no authority under SSC to
condone the penalty prescribed by law for late premiums.
Issue: WON the acts complaint of in the case at bar did not constitute a crime.
RULING: No error in the commissioners action. The provision on the SSC precisely
enumerates the power of the commission, nowhere from the said powers may it
shown that the commissioner is granted expressly or by implication the authority
to condone penalties imposed by the act.
Ruling: the court ruled in the negative. The acts complaint in the case at bar do not
fall within any of the provisions of the Act No. 1760. However, the said finding does
not prevent the court from finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of
the revised penal code.
3.
Construction of administrative rules and regulations
People v. Exconde 101 Phil 1125

People v. Maceren 79 SCRA 450
Ollada vs Secretary of Finance 109 Phil 1072

Ratio : An administrative body has the power to interpret its own rules and such
interpretation becomes part of the rule itself. Unless shown to be erroneous,
unreasonable or arbitrary, such interpretation is entitled to recognition and respect
from the courts, as no one is better qualified to interpret the intent of the
regulation than the authority that issued it. Thus, its interpretation that the rule it
issued is not retroactive, not being unreasonable, should be followed.
I.
Contingent legislation or delegation to ascertain facts

Cruz vs Youngberg 56 Phil 234
People vs Vera 65 Phil 56
US vs Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil 1
Lovina vs Moreno 9 SCRA 557
2.
K.
Imposition of penalties by administrative authorities
Rate-fixing power
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
Facts: Philippine Satellite Corporation filed a petition seeking to annul and set aside
an order issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the NTC, which
directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner
for certain specified lines of its services by 15% with the reservation to make
further reduction later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative power and a denial or procedural, as well as
substantial due process of law. The said provisional reduction is allegedly under the
38 | P a g e

contemplation of E.O. 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its ratefixing powers; and E.O. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent
NTC.
Issue: Whether or not the order in issue is constitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the challenged order, particularly on the
issue of rates provided therein, being violative of due process clause is void and
should be nullified . Thus, temporary rate-fixing order is not exempt from the
procedural requirement of notice and hearing. Moreover the temporary rate-fixing
becomes final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case.
In case of delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the admin authority is that the rate
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an
express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. The fixing
of rate is quasi-legislative when the rules or the rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines, in which case, notice and
hearing are not required for their validity.
L.
Effectivity of administrative rules and regulations

1.
Publication requirement
Chapter 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out
the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall
be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by
law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)
days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying
the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules
known to persons who may be affected by them.
Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall:
Section 2, Civil Code

Section 2, Civil Code states that the law shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following their completion of their publication in the Official Gazette unless
otherwise provided.
Section 18, Book 1, 1987 Administrative Code
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Chapter 2 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the
preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in
effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center
may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be
unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule
shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the
bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule
and new copies thereof may be obtained.
39 | P a g e

(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full
text.
Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the
bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President,
Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the
codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or
agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to
cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of
each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall,
as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of
any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed
rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two
(2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern
(Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini)
seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director,
Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette
of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative

orders.
Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates
Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity
of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the
people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones,
ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the lawmaking process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The
publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published,
shall
have
no
force
and
effect.
However,
the
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which
40 | P a g e

cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
The publication must be full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of its contents.
2.
Notice and hearing requirement
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders vs DOF 238 SCRA 63

3.
Application, general rule that the issuance of rules
and regulations to implement the law does not require that
there be prior notice and hearing conducted by the
administrative agencies. However, if the statute making the
delegation requires such hearing, then one must be conducted
before such rules and regulations are issued. On the other
hand, if the statute is silent on the matter, a public hearing, if
practicable, may be conducted.
VI.
Adjudicatory Powers
a.
Quasi-judicial power and quasi-judicial body, defined
Quasi-judicial power - This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
Quasi-judicial body an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or
rule making power.
Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
ab initio.
Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act
which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of
the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-
41 | P a g e

judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature.
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As
the school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students
For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the
purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school
Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally
adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first,
second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises were
thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third placer"
Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as counsel,
sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made, by instituting
the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
committee members along with the District Supervisor and the Academic
Supervisor of the place.
Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion
Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to a real grave abuse
of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors
in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of certiorari.
WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS. It is difficult, if not impossible,
precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there is considerable
conflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right
to a writ of certiorari, it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be
performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
It is not essential that the proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in
the sense in which that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is
sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making
their decision, whatever may be their public character. . ..'
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The exercise
of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative

dudes, and the performance of administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a
measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions,
he acts judicially.
Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs Oil Industry Commission 145 SCRA 433
Facts: Respondent Manuel B. Yap is a gasoline dealer by virtue of a "Sublease and

Dealer Agreement" entered into with petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (hereinafter known as Shell) originally in the year 1965 and
superseded in the year 1969. The latter was filed and registered with the OIC.
While petitioner Shell complied with its contractual commitments, Manuel B. Yap
defaulted in his obligations upon failure to pay for his purchases of gasoline and
other petroleum products. Petitioner Shell sent demand letters to respondent
Manuel B. Yap who continued to ignore these demands letters forcing petitioner
Shell to exercise its contractual rights to terminate the contract. Petitioner Shell
sent respondent Yap the required 90-day written notice to terminate their contract
as provided for by Sec. 5 of their "Sublease and Dealer Agreement."
Despite the pendency of the controversy before the ordinary civil courts, OIC
persisted in asserting jurisdiction over it by rendering a decision stating it has
jurisdiction to pass upon the alleged contractual right of petitioner to declare Yap's
contract terminated. The OIC negated the existence of such right because the
stipulation is an "unfair and onerous trade practice." Respondent OIC also allowed
respondent Yap reasonable time from receipt of the decision within which to pay
his judgment debt to petitioner as adjudged in a Civil Case. Petitioner Shell moved
for a reconsideration but respondent OIC denied it.
Issue: WON Respondent OIC has jurisdiction to hear and decide contractual
disputes between a gasoline dealer and an oil company.
Held: The contentions of petitioner are well-founded. A detailed reading of the
entire OIC Act will reveal that there is no express provision conferring upon
respondent OIC the power to hear and decide contractual disputes between a
gasoline dealer and an oil company. It is of course a well-settled principle of
42 | P a g e

administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies like
respondent OIC, are bereft of quasi-judicial powers.
As We declared in Miller vs. Mardo, et al (2 SCRA 898):
" . . . It may be conceded that the Legislature may confer on administrative boards
or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion,
as incident to the performance of administrative functions, but in so doing, the
legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as
even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to
those incidental to, or in connection with, the performance of administrative duties
which do not amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested
in the courts."
b.
Distinguished from judicial power
Judicial Power is the power to courts of justice to settle actual case of

controversies involving legal rights which are demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion.
Carino vs CHR 204 SCRA 483
Facts: Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT)
undertook what they described as amass concerted actions" to "dramatize and
highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention.
According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions"
after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without
disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of
demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. Through their
representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an
order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private
respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report
and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily
replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges in accordance with P.D. 807."
Issue: WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type
of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political rights.
Held: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasijudicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the
latter.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution
clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise
that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that
power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant
immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such
remedy as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate
or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
"x x 'It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to
determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to
a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.'x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC
43 | P a g e

Luzon Development Bank vs Association of LDB Employees 249 SCRA 162
Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration
case to resolve the following issue:
Issue: WON the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement
provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion.
Held: It will thus be noted that the Jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited compared to the original
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and the appellate jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for that matter.4 The state of our present law
relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of the
Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties,"5 while the
"(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders."6 Hence, while there is an
express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715
is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
c.
Distinguished from administrative function
Administrative Function are those which involve the regulation and control over
the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature as such are
devoled upon the admin agency by the organic law of existence.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 348

Facts: The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's
arm assigned to investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the
country. PADS issued search warrants against certain companies.
Issue: WON the PADS is a quasi-judicial body issue search warrants under the 1973
Constitution?
Held: A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other
than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such
bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the
government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special
privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on
Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the
government is seeking to carry on certain government
functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of
Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank
of the Philippines.
government is performing some business service for the public,
like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National
Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
government is seeking to regulate business affected with public
interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
office, office of the Insurance Commissioner.
government is seeking under the police power to regulate
private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange
Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for
Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social
policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor,
the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and
Minors Bureau.
As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or
to determine rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper
reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of
the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No.
1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the
Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and
decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to
44 | P a g e

combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign
exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such
activities, but nothing more.
Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226
Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute all
persons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above
directive the Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of
the possible involvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds.
Upon the creation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG
was charged with the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of
illgotten wealth or unexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the
investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to
the Commission from time to time and to prevent a repetition of the same in the
future.
Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary
investigation of the complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating
petitioner's rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that the
PCGG has no right to conduct such preliminary investigation.
Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the
power to conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases
filed by the Solicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents
for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.
Held: Considering that the PCGG, like the courts, is vested with the authority to
grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezing assets, and (3)
provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachment and
receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for the
sequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair
opportunity to contest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both
are assured under the foregoing executive orders and the rules and regulations
promulgated by the PCGG.
The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG is concerned, it may be
divided into two stages. The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal
investigation stage is the factfinding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agents whereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after
which they assess the evidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint
for the purpose of preliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary
investigation stage of the said complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed,

where it is ascertained if there is sufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.
It is in such instances that We say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at the
same time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law
enforcer, he cannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary
investigation of his own complaint, this time as a public prosecutor.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the
PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the
records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an
independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.
Sideco vs Sarenas, 41 Phil. 80
Facts: Two parties, Crispulo Sideco on the one hand, and Leocadio Sarenas and
Rufino Sarenas on the other hand, claim the exclusive right to the use of the waters
flowing through the estero for irrigation purposes. The claim of Sideco goes back to
1885 when the predecessor in interest of his father constructed a dam in these
waters; the use of the dam was afterwards interrupted by outside causes such as
imprisonment and war, but again reasserted in 1911, 1915, and 1916. Exactly what
the two Sarenas' contention is, is not quite clear on the facts before us. However, it
appears that they made application to the Director of Public Works, only to meet
with the opposition of Sideco, and that the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications, granted the two
Sarenas the right, in preference to all other persons, to use the waters of the estero
Bangad. Sideco then took the proceedings to the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija. After trial, judgment was entered, dismissing the complaint and the appeal of
Sideco and confirming the decision of the administrative authorities, with the costs
against the plaintiff.
The further appeal of Sideco to this court, while conceding the correctness of the
findings of the trial court, squarely challenges its judgment.
Issue: WON
Held: Administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes as to the use of
waters is provided by the Irrigation Act, as amended. Controversies must be
submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications through the
Director of Public Works. The "decision" of the Secretary thereon is final "unless
45 | P a g e

appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within. thirty days after the date of
the notification of the parties of said decision. In case of such appeal the court
having jurisdiction shall try the controversy de novo." (See. 4.) A more extensive
method is also provided, somewhat akin to our cadastral system, which makes it
the duty of the Director of Public Works to make a technical examination of
streams and to prepare a list of priorities. In the performance of this work, the
Director of Public Works or any official especially authorized by him, may examine
witnesses under oath, and can issue for this purpose subpoenas and subpoenas
duces tecum. (Secs. 8, 41.) Certificates signed by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications are then granted each appropriator. (Secs. 9, 18.) "Appeal" lies
from the "decision" of the Director of Public Works, as approved by the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications, to the Court of First Instance of the province in
which the property is situated. Such action must be brought within ninety days of
the date of the publication of the approved list of priorities. (Sec. 10.)
DECISION OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AS PART OF JUDICIAL RECORD.-The
decision of the Director of Public Works, affirmed by the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications, containing as it does the technical findings of officers
especially qualified in irrigation engineering, should invariably be made a part of
the judicial record because (1) the determination of these officials would be most
useful to the courts, and (2) the exact date of the decision is of moment since it
decides whether the appeal was taken in time.
subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare
the same unconstitutional.
Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional
Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not
a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them
of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious dayswhen they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the
review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of
such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be
terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.
Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are
committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the
powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No.
223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all
legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed.
Ocampo vs US 234 US 91
d.
Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making
e.
power
Rationale for vesting administrative agencies with quasi-judicial
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. vs Hibionada 191 SCRA 268

Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848
Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part
of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the
following pertinent provisions:
"No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like
conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day
including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
Facts : The petitioner as agent of private respondent Pleasantville Development

Corporation sold a subdivision lot on installment to private respondent Efren
Diongon. The installment payments having been completed, Diongon demanded
the delivery of the certificate of title to the subject land. When neither the
petitioner nor Pleasantville complied, he filed a complaint against them for specific
performance and damages in the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental. The
case was set for initial hearing. It was then that C.T. Torres Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the competent body to
hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. The
motion to dismiss was denied by the court contending that it had jurisdiction over
the matter.
46 | P a g e

Issue : WON the trial court have jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio : P.D. No. 957, promulgated July 12, 1976 and otherwise known as "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," provides that the
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real
estate trade and business.
P.D. No. 1344, which was promulgated April 2, 1978, and empowered the National
Housing Authority to issue writs of execution in the enforcement of its decisions
under P.D. No. 957, specified the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the agency as follows:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National
Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman.
This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified
by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently
to the pressing problems of the modem world.
f.
Scope of quasi-judicial powers of an administrative agency

GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Facts : The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6)
employees as being "notoriously undesirable," they having allegedly been found to
be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. Five of

these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board
found the dismissals to be illegal because affected without formal charges having
been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and ordered the
remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. The GSIS
appealed to the Civil Service Commission. By Resolution, the Commission ruled that
the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal. GSIS appealed to the SC and affirmed the
decision of the CSC with a modification that it eliminated the payment of back
salaries until the outcome of the investigation and reinstatement of only 3
employees since the other two had died. The heirs of the deceased sought
execution of the order from the CSC which was granted. GSIS opposed and came to
the SC on certiorari contending that the CSC does not have any power to execute
its resolution or judgment.
Issue : WON the CSC had powers to execute its resolution or judgment.
Ratio : The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, is a constitutional commission invested by the Constitution
and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also
with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal.
The Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting,
approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant to the authority granted by the
constitutional and statutory provisions. The provisions are analogous and entirely
consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807,
subject to policies and resolutions adopted by the Commission. In light of all the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny
to the Civil Service Commission the power or authority to enforce or order
execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has
been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority
to decide cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally
and logically be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of
disciplinary administrative proceedings, or the continuation of any then pending,
against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and purposes, it makes
47 | P a g e

exoneration in the administrative proceedings a condition precedent to payment of
back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless
exercise.
the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no
protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. Confirmation of the
election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge
his duties as such member.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

Facts : This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the
Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said
petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the
Province of Tayabas. Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Commission.
Issue : Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ratio : The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to
promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive powers to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members
against whom no protests has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3,
1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of
election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to
decide election contests was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by
the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the
authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario, Jr. 231 SCRA 463

Facts : Petitioner PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation
engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan
and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production
of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to
engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code
1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban
against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A.
J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches
from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter
from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the
case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of
the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs,
and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the
Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality
of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding
the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
48 | P a g e

intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards
or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the
court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is
with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it clearly abuses or
exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occassion to rule on the
issue of grave abuse of discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
Ratio : Under Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is no such
qualification in said provision of law that makes a distinction between a perfected
sale and one that has yet to be perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be
understood to be anyone who purchases anything for money. Under the
circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is as much a buyer as one who
buys by virtue of a perfected contract of sale. Said powers have since been
transferred to the HLRB.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, it is therein provided
that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over claims involving refund filed against
project owners, developers, and dealers, among others.
When an administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all
controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are
deemed to be included within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or
body. Split jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for refund of
reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a subdivision lot obviously the
HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
Cario vs. CHR 204 SCRA 483

Tejada v. Homestead Property Corporation 178 SCRA 164
Facts : Private respondent Taclin V. Baez offered to sell to petitioner Enriqueto F.
Tejada a 200 square meter lot owned by respondent corporation. Private
respondent suggested that petitioner pay a reservation fee of P20,000.00, which
would form part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of sale
and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should the parties fail to
reach an agreement. After paying the reservation fee, the respondent corporation
changed the terms of monthly amortization which resulted in the demand of the
petitioner for the return of his reservation fee. Respondent refused to return the
same and petitioner brought suit with the RTC for a collection of sum of money.
Respondents herein filed a motion to dismiss contesting the jurisdiction of the RTC
to hear the case. The same was denied and respondents appealed to the CA who
decided in their favor. Petitioner argues that inasmuch as there is no perfected
contract of sale between the parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee
properly falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of the HSRC.
Ruling : Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power
"to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced
it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the
merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in
by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by
law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and
the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions
of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions,
or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the
particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Issue : WON the RTC had jurisdiction over the recovery of reservation fee.
49 | P a g e

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted
to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.
one Edgardo Sandagan. Said subpoena was issued upon request by Generosa
Sandagan who sought the help of respondent because she could not get a share of
the proceeds of the life insurance policy of her dead husband whose beneficiary
was Caamic.
Issue : Propriety of the subpoena issued by the respondent judge.
g.
Classification of adjudicatory powers

2.
Directing powers. Illustrated by the corrective powers
of public utility commissions, powers of assessment under the
revenue laws, reparations under public utility laws and awards
under;
3.
Enabling powers. The grant or denial of permit or
authorization;
1.
Dispensing powers. The authority to exempt from or
relax a general prohibition, or authority to relieve from
affirmative duty. The licensing power sets or assumes a
standard, while the dispensing power sanctions a deviation
from a standard;
2.
Summary powers. To designate administrative power
to apply compulsion or force against person or property to
effectuate a legal purpose without a judicial warrant to
authorize such action;
3.
Equitable powers. An administrative tribunal having
power to determine the law upon a particular state of facts has
the right to and must consider and make proper application of
the rules of equity.
VII.
Ruling : Respondent should have known or ought to know that under Section 1,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena "is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at
any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for taking of his
deposition." Although the subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a
form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, in fact, issued in connection
with a criminal case or for any other pending case in his court nor for any
investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law or by direction of this
Court. It was designated for a specific purpose, viz., administrative conference.
That purpose was, in no way connected with or related to some of his
administrative duties because he knew from the beginning that it was for a
confrontation with the complainant as solicited by Generosa. Sandagan for the
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo Sandagan which was received
by the complainant. Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court for her
claim; neither is there any case in respondent's court concerning such death
benefits. What Generosa wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or
conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the complainant, which was,
obviously, non-official and absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
remotely related to his official functions and duties, accommodating the request
and using his official functions and office in connection therewith was, by any
yardstick, improper.
The Power to Issue Subpoena

Carmelo vs Ramos 6 SCRA 836
In a suit for unfair competition, it is only through the issuance of the questioned
"subpoena duces tecum " that the complaining party is afforded his full rights of
redress.
Section 13 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code

Universal Rubber Products vs CA 130 SCRA 104
Caamic vs Galaon 237 SCRA 390
Facts : Respondent MTC judge issued a subpoena against Caamic which required
her to appear before his sala under the penalty of law. Caamic was surprised for
she was not aware of any case filed against her. When she appeared at the date,
time and place stated in the subpoena, she was berated by the respondent and
demanded 8K from her. Said amount was the amount of the life insurance policy of
Facts : Private respondents herein sued herein petitioner for unfair competition in
the lower court. During the trial and after the presentation of some of private
respondents witnesses, they requested the court for a subpoena duces tecum as
regards to the books of herein petitioner. Petitioner moved to quash the subpoena
on the ground that it can only be regarded as a fishing bill to discover evidence
50 | P a g e

against herein petitioner and that such is not applicable in a case for unfair
competition. The trial court denied the same.
Issue : WON the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is proper in a case for unfair
competition.
Ratio : A case for unfair competition is actually a case for injunction and damages.
As a general rule, on obtaining an injunction for infringement of a trademark,
complainant is entitled to an accounting and recovery of defendant's profits on the
goods sold under that mark, as incident to, and a part of, his property right, and
this rule applies in cases of unfair competition. In such case, the infringer or unfair
trader is required in equity to account for and yield up his gains on a principle
analogous to that which charges as trustee with the profits acquired by the
wrongful use of the property of the cestui que trust, and defendant's profits are
regarded as an equitable measure of the compensation plaintiff should receive for
the past harm suffered by him.
In order to entitle a parry to the issuance of a "subpoena duces tecum, " it must
appear. By clear and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be
produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue before the court,
and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been
so designated or described that it may be identified. A "subpoena duces tecum"
once issued by the court may be quashed upon motion if the issuance therof is
unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books. documents or things
does not appear, or if the persons in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to
advance the reasonable cost of production thereof.
In the instant case in determining whether the books subject to the subpoena
duces tecum are relevant and reasonable in relation to the complaint of private
respondent for unfair competition.
Ruling : The Commission on Elections has not only the duty to enforce and
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with
the elections. In this sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be
classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30,
Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasijudicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come
under its jurisdiction.
When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power
to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature.
". . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not
exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power
to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the,
administration of justice.
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited
to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power
by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been
held invalid.
VIII.
The Power To Punish For Contempt
Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27

Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged with
several others for CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxes without the
presence of the persons and/or parties indicated in its Resolution. After appearing
and showing cause why they should not be punished for contempt, the COMELEC
sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposing a fine. Masangcay filed a
petition for review with the SC.
Ruling: Rule 64 applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not
comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless
said contempt is [clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as
is done in paragraph 2 of Sec. 580 of the revised administrative code. The refusal to
comply with order of tenancy law, enforcement division is neither contempt nor a
penalized offense.
Issue : WON the COMELEC may punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.
51 | P a g e

Camelo v. Ramos 116 Phil 1152
IX.
Power to impose penalties

Scotys Department Store v. Micaller 99 Phil 762
Facts: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store
situated at 615 Escolta, Manila. This store was owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam,
Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao and Helen Yang. Pursuant to section 5(b) of the Industrial
Peace Act, Nena Micaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above
employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in
the National Labor Union and that, prior to her separation, said employers had
been questioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and
had interfered with their right to organize under the law.
of all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of
well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the record". All-this
means that an accused may be tried without the right "to meet the witnesses face
to face" and may be convicted merely on preponderance of evidence and not
beyond reasonable doubt.
This is against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be
contended that this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial
Relations to observe strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the
requirements of the Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the
law which is not within the province of the judicial branch of our Government.
CAB v. PAL 63 SCRA 524
X.
The employers denied the charge. They claimed that the complainant was
dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the
management and her co employees so much so that several criminal charges were
filed against her with the city fiscal of Manila who, after investigation, filed the
corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in
court.
The Court of industrial relation ruled in favor of Nina Micaller.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction to impose the
penalties prescribed in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling: In conclusion, our considered opinion is that the power to impose the
penalties provided for in section 25 of Republic Act No. 875 is lodged in ordinary
courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition
of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the decision of
the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners is illegal
and should be nullified.
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of Industrial Relations
in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees
to the accused. And this is so because, among other things, the law provides that
"the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling
and it is the spirit and intention of this Act that the Court (of Industrial Relations)
and its members and Hearing Examiners shall use every and all reasonable means
to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not
be bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself
Power in deportation and citizenship cases

Lao Gi v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 756
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
I. Jurisdiction
A.
Definition
People vs Mariano 71 SCRA 600
Facts: The Accused was convicted of the crime of abused of chastity. He filed an
appealed contending that he married the victim therefore his criminal liability
should be extinguished. The Attorney-General entered an opposition to said
petition wherein, after discussing the scope of article 448 of the Penal Code and
Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Legislature amending said article, he concluded that
the marriage of the accused with the offended party cannot extinguish his liability
as perpetrator of the crime of abuse against chastity.
Issue: The question is a purely legal one and sifts down to whether or not section 2
of Act No. 1773 includes the crime of abuse against chastity among those cases in
which criminal liability is extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the
offended party.
Ruling: The intention of our Legislature in enacting said Act No. 1773 was that the
marriage of the accused or convict with the offended party should extinguish the
criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction and rape and those involving
offenses included in said crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction,
abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the liability for a crime is extinguished
in the graver cases, it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in the lesser
52 | P a g e

crimes. Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not denominated rape, it
is only for the lack of the intention to lie, both crimes being identical in every other
respect, though of different degrees of gravity. We therefore conclude that the
crime of abuse against chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in
section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, the marriage of the accused with the
offended party in the present case has extinguished his criminal liability.
B.
Extent of jurisdiction of administrative agencies performing
quasi-judicial acts
Chin vs LBP 201 SCRA 190
Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512
Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes
decided to hold the election of katipunan despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out. The President elect - Ruperto Taule Vice-President- Allan Aquino SecretaryVicente Avila Treasurer- Fidel Jacob Auditor- Leo Sales. Respondent Leandro L
Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the
Secretary of Local Government,** protesting the election of the officers of the
FABC and seeking its mullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted. Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the
election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and
ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the
Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local Government.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered,

administrative agencies are bereft of judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of
administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves.20 Such
jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations."
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by
necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the
power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Construing the constitutional limitation on the power
of general supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that
respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so
will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect
give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in
a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay
as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest
autonomy may be achieved.
II.
Procedure to be followed
Sections 1 and 2.1 Book VII, 1987 Administrative Code
A.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but it was denied by
respondent Secretary. In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the resolutions of respondent for being null and void.
Source of authority to promulgate rules of procedure

Section 5.5, Article VIII, Constitution
Angara vs Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an

election protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of
Association of Barangay Councils, Assuming that the respondent Secretary has
jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election?
Ruling: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to
entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the FABC. There is no
question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as
set forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code. "(3) Promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies, functions, plans,
programs and projects;"
Facts: That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara
won. The provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memberelect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most
number of votes, the petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent Pedro Ynsua
filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of
the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other things, that said
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first
district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified.
Issue: WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election
53 | P a g e

of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such
election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Ruling: The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National
Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution. If we concede the power claimed in behalf
of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the
Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the
period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission
would be ineffective.
before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission; (3) the decisions of
the arbiters and respondent Commission are based on unsubstantiated and selfserving evidence and were rendered in violation of petitioner's right to due
process.
Issue: WON publics respondents claim is tenable.
Held: The labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due process, be
the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the Rules which are precisely
intended to assist the parties in obtaining the just, expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of labor disputes. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to
the Regional Arbitration Branch, Iligan City for further proceedings.
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power
regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also included. The incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
B.
Limitations on the power to promulgate rules of procedure

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA 231 SCRA 30
C.
Technical rules not applicable

Kanlaon Construction Enterprises vs NLRC 279 SCRA 337
Facts: This is a labor case involving Kanlaon for illegal termination of employment
of publics respondents. The arbitrations decision is appealed to the NLRC. Public
respondents in their appeal questioned the validity of the NLRCs decision on the
ground that the NLRC erroneously, patently and unreasonably interpreted the
principle that the NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly bound by the
rules of evidence.
In brief, it was alleged that the the decision is void for the following reasons: (1)
there was no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the hearings
Ruling: The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical

rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed
or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13, ibid.) And in the
light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated
by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be
said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations
of an administrative character.
Police Commission vs Lood 127 SCRA 757

Facts: Petitioner Police Commission seeks the setting aside of the decision of the
defunct Court of First Instance (respondent court) of Rizal, Branch VI, which
declared null and void its decision in Administrative Case No. 48 dismissing private
respondent Simplicio C. Ibea and instead ordered then Municipal Mayor Braulio
54 | P a g e

Sto. Domingo of San Juan, Rizal to reinstate said respondent to his former position
as policeman of the same municipality with back salaries from the date of his
suspension up to the date of his actual reinstatement.
Petitioner contends that the lower court erred in holding that respondent Simplicio
C. Ibea was deprived of due process of law because the Police Commission decided
Administrative Case No. 48 even without stenographic notes taken of the
proceedings of the case.
Ruling: Respondent court's ruling against petitioner's decision as falling short of the
legal requirements of due process, because it decided the subject administrative
case without stenographic notes (which were not taken by the Board of
Investigators) of the proceedings of the case, was in error. Rep. Act No. 4864 does
not provide that the Board of Investigators shall be a "board of record," and as such
it does not provide for office personnel such as clerks and stenographers who may
be employed to take note of the proceedings of the board. The proceeding
provided for is merely administrative and summary in character, in line with the
principle that "administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses." The formalities
usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative
investigation, provided that the parties are heard and gven the opportunity to
adduce their respective evidence.
D.
for violations of the Revised Securities Act, as well as implementing rules and
directives of the SEC, such as may be warranted.
The SEC decision which orders the two stock transfer agencies to "jointly replace
the subject shares and for FIDELITY to cause the transfer thereof in the names of
the buyers" clearly calls for an exercise of SEC's adjudicative jurisdiction. The
stockholders who have been deprived of their certificates of stock or the persons
to whom the forged certificates have ultimately been transferred by the supposed
indorsee thereof are yet to initiate, if minded, an appropriate adversarial action. A
justiciable controversy such as can occasion an exercise of SEC's exclusive
jurisdiction would require an assertion of a right by a proper party against another
who, in turn, contests it. The proper parties that can bring the controversy and can
cause an exercise by the SEC of its original and exclusive jurisdiction would be all or
any of those who are adversely affected by the transfer of the pilfered certificates
of stock. Any peremptory judgment by the SEC, without such proceedings having
initiated, would be precipitat.
The question on the legal propriety of the imposition by the SEC of a P50,000 fine
on each of FIDELITY and CUALOPING, is an entirely different matter. This time, it is
the regulatory power of the SEC which is involved. When, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the latter set aside the fines imposed by they the SEC, the latter, in its
instant petition, can no longer be deemed just a nominal party but a real party in
interest sufficient to pursuant appeals to this Court.
Justiciable controversy and forum shopping

SEC vs CA 246 SCRA 738
Facts: The petition before this Court relates to the exercise by the SEC of its powers
in a case involving a stockbroker (CUALOPING) and a stock transfer agency
(FIDELITY).
The Commission has brought the case to this Court in the instant petition for
review on certiorari, contending that the appellate court erred in setting aside the
decision of the SEC which had (a) ordered the replacement of the certificates of
stock of Philex and (b) imposed fines on both FIDELITY and CUALOPING.
E.
F.
Held: The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has both regulatory and
adjudicative functions. Under its regulatory responsibilities, the SEC may pass upon
applications for, or may suspend or revoke (after due notice and hearing),
certificates of registration of corporations, partnerships and associations (excluding
cooperatives, homeowners' associations, and labor unions); compel legal and
regulatory compliances; conduct inspections; and impose fines or other penalties
G.
Section 2.5 Book VII 1987 Admin Code

Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188
Villanueva vs Adre 172 SCRA 876
Chemphil Export & Import Corp. vs CA 251 SCRA 257
First Phil. Intl Bank vs CA 252 SCRA 259
R. Transport Corp. vs Laguesma 227 SCRA 826
Galongco vs CA 283 SCRA 493
Institution of proceedings; acquisition of jurisdiction
Section 5, Rule 7 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Santos vs NLRC 254 SCRA 675
Matanguihand vs Tengo, 272 SCRA 704
Pre-trial conference; default
Section 10 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Auyong vs CTA 59 SCRA 110
Hearing
Section 11.1 Book VII 1987 Admin. Code
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278
55 | P a g e

Simpao vs CSC 191 SCRA 396
Alejandro vs CA 191 SCRA 700
H.
Evidence
Section 12.3 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
State Prosecutor vs Muro 236 SCRA 505
1.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
People vs Bacalzo 195 SCRA 557
2.
Clear and convincing evidence
th
Blacks Law Dictionary 5 ed. P. 227
3.
Preponderance of evidence
New Testament Church of God vs CA 246 SCRA 266
4.
Substantial evidence
Velasquez vs Nery 211 SCRA 28
Malonzo ns COMELEC 269 SCRA 380
I.
Decision
Section 2.8, 14 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Marcelino vs Cruz 121 SCRA 51
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300
1.
Form of decision
Mangca vs COMELEC 112 SCRA 273
Malinao vs Reyes 255 SCRA 616
Sections 2.13 and 2.12 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
2.
Publication of decisions
Section 16.1.2 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
3.
Finality, promulgation and notice of decision
Section 15 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Robert Dollar Company vs Tuvera 123 SCRA 354
Lindo vs COMELEC 194 SCRA 25
Jamil vs COMELEC 283 SCRA 349
Zoleta vs Drilon 166 SCRA 548
4.
Collegiate decision, requirement to be valid
Mison vs COA 187 SCRA 445
Aquino-Sarmiento vs Morato 203 SCRA 515
5.
Finality of decisions
Section 15 Chapter III Book VII Admin Code of 1987
Administrative Order No. 18 Section 7
Uy vs COA 328 SCRA 607
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative vs Torres 286 SCRA 666
6.
Application of the doctrine of res judicata
Republic vs Neri 213 SCRA 812
Brillantes v Castro 99 Phil 497
Ipekdjian Merchandising vs CTA, L-15430, 30 Sept. 1963

Teodoro vs Carague 206 SCRA 429
J.
Administrative appeal in contested cases
Section 19, 20, 21, 22 Book VII 1987 Admin Code
Mendez vs CSC 204 SCRA 965
PCIB vs CA 229 SCRA 560
Diamonon vs DOLE 327 SCRA 283
De Leon vs Heirs of Gregorio Reyes 155 SCRA 584
Vda de Pineda vs Pena 187 SCRA 22
Reyes vs Zamora 90 SCRA 92
Zambales Chromite Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals 94 SCRA 261
Ysmael v. Dep Exec Sec 190 SCRA 673
K.
Execution
Divinagracia vs CFI 3 SCRA 775
GSIS vs CSC 202 SCRA 799
Vital-Gozon vs CA 212 SCRA 235
III.
Due process of law in administrative adjudication
A.
Substantive and procedural due process, defined
DUE PROCESS contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered, affecting ones person or property. It is designed to secure justice as a
living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance
must prevail over form.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Consists of the 2 basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the

guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal
By procedural due process is meant a law which hears before it

condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only
after trial
The constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty

and property without due process of law, which clause optimizes the
principle of justice which hears before it condemns which upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial.
Santiago vs Alikpala 25 SCRA 356
Facts: Petitioner Santiago was charged with violation of Arts. Of War 96 and 97. He
was arraigned though without summons and subpoena afforded to him. From the
proven facts and the admission likewise of the respondents, the court martial
56 | P a g e

which tried his case was not properly convened. There was no special order
published by the headquarters Philippine Constabulary creating or directing the
General Court Martial composed of the respondents to arraign and try however
was already an existing court trying another case.
The validity of the court martial proceeding was challenged by the
petitioner at the regular court on the ground of due process.
Issue: WON failure to comply with law on conveying a valid court martial amount
to denial of due process
Held: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH APPLICABLE LAW A DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS.- The failure to comply with the dictates of the applicable law insofar as
convening a valid court martial is concerned, amounts to a denial of due process.
There is such a denial not only under the broad standard which delimits the scope
and reach of the due process requirement, but also under one of the specific
elements of procedural due process.
LACK OF AUTHORITY OF COURT-MARTIAL TO TRY PETITIONER.- Nor is such a
reliance on the broad reach of due process the sole ground on which the lack of
jurisdiction of die court-martial convened in this case could be predicated.
Recently, stress was laid anew by us on the first requirement of procedural due
process, namely, the existence of the court or tribunal clothed with judicial, or
quasi-judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it. This is a
requirement that goes back to Banco Espaol Filipino vs. Palanca, a decision
rendered half a century ago. There is the express admission in the statement of
facts that respondents, as a court martial, were not convened to try petitioner but
someone else, the action taken against petitioner being induced solely by a desire
to avoid the effects of prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a
competent court or tribunal is most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due
process is therefore fatal to its assumed authority to try petitioner. The writ of
certiorari and prohibition should have been granted and the lower court, to repeat,
ought not to have dismissed his petition summarily. The significance of such an
insistence on a faithful compliance with the regular

Facts: President Marcos issued PD No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The
Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the
mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was
committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said
treaties. The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. private respondent,
through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as
well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Petitioner refused because it is not included in the procedure of
the RP-US Treaty.
Issue: WON private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process
clause in the Constitution?
Held: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting
evidence. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the
rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee.
However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation
of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United
States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body
which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil.
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to
inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of
information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
57 | P a g e

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of
its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.
Albert vs CFI of Manila 23 SCRA 948

Facts: Plaintiff Albert sued University Publishing Company, Inc. for breach of
contract. Albert died before the case proceeded to trial, and Justo R. Albert, his
estate's administrator, was substituted. Finally, defendant's liability was
determined by this Court in L-15275. Plaintiff was to recover P15,000.00 with legal
interest from judicial demand.
From the inception of the suit below up to the time the judgment in L15275 was to be executed, the corporate existence of University Publishing
Company, Inc. appears to have been taken for granted, and was not then put in
issue. However, when the Court of First Instance of Manila issued on July 22, 1961
an order of execution against University Publishing Company, Inc., a new problem
cropped up. By virtue of this writ, plaintiff's counsel and the Sheriff of the City of
Manila went to see Jose M. Aruego who signed the contract with plaintiff on behalf
and as President of University Publishing Company, Inc. They then discovered that
no such entity exists. A verification made at the Securities and Exchange
Commission confirmed this fact. On July 31, 1961, said Commission issued a
certification "that the records of this Commission do not show the registration of
UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC., either as a corporation or partnership."2 This
triggered a verified petition in the court below on August 10, 1961 for the issuance
of a writ of execution ordering the Sheriff of Manila to cause the satisfaction of the
judgment against the assets and properties of Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant
in the case.
All along, Jose M. Aruego and his law firm were counsel for the University
Publishing Company, Inc. Instead of informing the lower court that it had in its
possession copies of its certificate of registration, its article of incorporation, its bylaws and all other papers material to its disputed corporate existence, University
Publishing Company, Inc. chose to remain silent. On August 11, 1961, University
Publishing Company, Inc., by counsel Aruego, Mamaril and Associates (the law firm
of Jose M. Aruego aforesaid) merely countered plaintiff's petition for execution as
against Aruego with an unsworn manifestation in court that "said Jose M. Aruego is
not a party to this case," and, therefore, plaintiff's petition should be denied.
Issue: WON Aruego is a party to this case
Held: "The evidence is patently clear that Jose M. Aruego, acting as representative
of a non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon; that he
was the one who reaped the benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial
payment of the consideration were made by him; that he violated its terms,
thereby precipitating the suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the real
defendant. Perforce, in line with the ends of justice, responsibility under the
judgment falls on him.
"By 'due process of law' we mean 'a law which hears before it condemns;
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. . . .' (4
Wheaton, U.S. 518, 581); or, as this Court has said, 'Due process of law'
contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one's person or property.' (Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32).'
(Sicat vs. Reyes, 100 Phil., 505; 54 Off. Gaz. [17]4945.) And it may not be amiss to
mention here also that the 'due process' clause of the Constitution is designed to
secure justice as a living reality; not to sacrifice it by paying undue homage to
formality. For substance must prevail over form. It may now be trite, but none the
less apt, to quote what long ago we said in Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315, 321322: 'A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Laws uits, unlike duels, are not to be won by
a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts. There should he no vested rights in technicalities.
B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Cardinal primary requirements of due process
The right to a hearing which includes the right to present ones case and
submit evidence
The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
The decision must have something to support itself
The evidence must be substantial
The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing
The tribunal or body of any judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
The board or body should in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involves and reason for the decision rendered
58 | P a g e

8.
The officer or tribunal conducting the investigation must be vested with

competent jurisdiction
A violation of any of the cardinal requirements of due process
in administrative proceedings renders any judgment or order
issued therein null and void and can be attacked in any
appropriate proceeding
Ang Tibay vs CIR 69 Phil 635

Facts: The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the
vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding
of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The petitioner, Ang
Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the
respondent National Labor Uuion, Inc.
Issue: What are the cardinal primary rights?
Held: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.-There are cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right
to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations
or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations
should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know Lin: various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court

of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function
of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but
its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
Fabella vs CA 282 SCRA 256

Facts: The petitioner herein, successor in-interest in the case of the former DECS
Secretary against the public school teachers who were illegally dismissed for
staging a mass action and failure to heed to the return-to-work order, filed a
petition for the judgment of the trial court holding that said public school teachers
were denied of due process in the proceedings. It was held that the proceedings
contravened RA 4670 which required that administrative charges against a teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding school
superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who at least
have the rank of a supervisor, where the teachers belong, as chairman, a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers organization and supervisor of the Division, the last 2 to be designated by
the Director of Public Schools.
Petitioner argued that DECS complied with RA 4670 because all the
teachers who were members of the various committee are members of either the
QC Teachers Federation or the QC Elementary teachers Federation and are deemed
representatives of teachers organization.
Issue: WON there was denial of due process
Held: The Court held that there was indeed a denial of due process. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective organizations does not ipso facto
make them authorized representatives of the organizations. Under the law, the
teachers organization possess the right to indicate its choice of representatives.
Such right cannot be usurped by the Secretary of Education or the Director of
Public Schools or their underlings. The teachers appointed by the DECS as members
59 | P a g e

of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers
organization as its representatives in said committee.
Hence the failure to comply with the requirement vested no jurisdiction
to the committee to hear the case. Respondent teachers were denied of due
process.
one of competent jurisdiction. and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal

supported by substantial evidence* presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the records or disclosed to the parties affected
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
C.
Air Manila vs Balatbat 38 SCRA 489

Facts: PAL's proposal to introduce new Mercury night flights had been referred to a
hearing examiner for economic justification, PAL submitted a so-called
consolidated schedule of flights that included the same Mercury night flights and
this was allowed by Board Resolution No. 139(68). The Board's action was impelled
by the authorizations of certain flight schedules previously allowed but were
incorporated were about to expire; thus, the consolidated schedule had to be
approved temporarily if the operations of the flights referred to were not to be
suspended. In short, the temporary permit was issued to prevent the stoppage or
cessation of services in the affected areas.
The Board, considering the report of the hearing examiner, passed
Resolution No. 190 (68) approving, for a period of 30 days starting 31 July 1968,
only three or four frequencies of the seven proposed new flights. There is no proof,
not even allegation, that in all those hearings petitioner was not notified or give
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of its opposition.
Issue: WON PAL violated the requisites of administrative due process
Held: YES. It was precisely prescribed that "all schedules under the DTS-35 for
which no previous approval has been granted by the Board, are hereby referred to
a hearing examiner for reception of evidence on its economic justification."
It has been correctly said that administrative proceedings are not exempt from the
operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due
process requirements in investigations and trials (Asprec vs. Itchon. 16 SCRA 921).
And this administrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice*,
be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a
person s legal rights; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights*,
introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor: (c) a tribunal so
constituted* as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and
Necessity for notice and hearing
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the
enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain
duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.
Philippine Movie Pictures Wokers Association vs Premiere Productions, Inc., G.R.
No. L-5621, 25 March 1953
Facts: The Court of Industrial Relations authorized lay off of workers solely on the
basis of an ocular inspection.
Issue: WON the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the
basis of an ocular inspections without receiving full evidence to determine the
cause or motive of such a lay off
Held: No. The required process has not been followed. The court of quo merely
acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the
respondent company was incurring financial losses. The allegations cannot be
established by a mere inspection of the place of labor specially when conducted at
the request of the interested.
Mabuhay Textile Mills vs Ongpin 141 SCRA 437

Facts: Petitioner Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation (Mabubay) is a corporation
engaged in the garments and textile import business for the last twenty-seven
years. Among the government requirements for engaging in this type of business
are the export quota allocations issued by the respondent Garments and Textile
Export Board.
Sometime in 1982, the Board granted export quota allocations for 1983 to the
petitioner. These export quotas have been granted annually to the Petitioner since
60 | P a g e

1976. They are automatically renewed every year provided the grantee has utilized
its quotas during the previous years.
On March 2, 1983, the petitioner received a letter from the Board informing it that
its 1983 export quota allocations were revoked effective February 1983.
Furthermore, its major stockholders and officers were also distinguished from
engaging in business activities involving garment and textile exports.
Issue: WON the revocation of the quota is valid
Held: "The summary revocation of the export quotas and export authorizations
issued in favor of the petitioner without hearing violates not only the abovementioned provisions of the Raise and Regulations of the respondent board but
also the 'due proem of law' clause of the Constitution of the Philippines to the
effect that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.'(Article
TV, Sec. 1. New Constitution). According to Daniel Webster in the Dartmouth
College case. due proem is the equivalent of the law; a law which hears before it
condemns. which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The
meaning is that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.' (cited in Philippine
Constitutional Law, p. 168 by Neptali Gonzales, 1975 ed.)
"Administrative due process requires that there be an impartial tribunal
constituted to determine the right involved; that due notice and opportunity to be
heard be given; that the procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials
of a fair trial; and that the proceedings be conducted in such a way that there will
be opportunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of low and
procedure were observed.' (42 Arm Jur. p. 451, cited by Neptali Gonzales, p. 183,
Philippine Constitutional Law). "
Privileges that had long been enjoyed transforms and becomes in the character of
ones property.
Go vs NAPOLCOM 271 SCRA 447
Facts: This special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the
NAPOLCOM: The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house being
occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the apprehension of his wife and brother
in two (2) successive raids effected by law enforcement authority and his
intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in consequence thereof, are tangible
proofs that he was, indeed, an accessory - if not a principal - in said gambling

operation.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and
informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had actually been held by
the summary dismissal board: and that at any rate he was not heard.
Issue: WON the contention of petitioner is with merit
Held: YES. We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that
not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the opinion of his superiors - strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost
care be exercised lest in the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are
innocent are denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed
to escape punishment.
BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; OBSERVANCE THEREOF REQUIRED IN
SUMMARY DISMISSAL.- Petitioner's case was decided under P.D. No. 971, as
amended by P.D. No. 1707. While Sec. 8-A of the Decree authorizes summary
dismissals "without the necessity of a formal investigation" of members of the INP
"when the charge is serious and the evidence is strong," the Decree and the
implementing rules nonetheless give the respondent the right to be furnished a
copy of the complaint and to file an answer within three (3) days. The filing of
charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity to respondent to answer the
charges constitute the minimum requirements of due process. In summary
dismissal proceedings it is mandatory that charges be specified in writing and that
the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the complaint because these are
the only ways by which evidence against the respondent can be brought to his
knowledge. The formal investigation, which is dispensed with, refers to the
presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to the requirement
that the respondent be notified of the charges and given the chance to defend
himself.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD; BASIS OF
DECISION, NOT PROPER.- What the summary dismissal board appears to have done
in this case was simply to receive the report on two raids allegedly conducted on
petitioner's house in the course of which what were believed were gambling
paraphernalia were allegedly found and two witnesses allegedly admitted they
were collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go. But the report is not in the
record of this case which the NAPOLCOM transmitted to the Court. Nor does the
decision of the summary dismissal board disclose on what the supposed report was
based. This is in violation of the rule that in administrative proceedings "the
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decision must be rendered on the evidence contained in the record and disclosed
to the party affected." In all probability, said report was not in writing and the
supposed testimonies of the two witnesses were not taken down. This is evident
from the decision of the board which refers to the result of an -investigation.- The
facts found by the board were not the result of any investigation conducted by it
but by some other group.
D.
is a mockery of administrative justice.The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No. 137,

provides:
"SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations shall be submitted
to the Director of Mines for decision:
"Provided, That the decision or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources within thirty days from the date
of its receipt.
Cold neutrality of a judge
A reviewing official or body tasked to resolve an appeal must refrain from

participating in reviewing any decision rendered or concurred by him in another
official capacity. The reviewing officer must be other than the officer whose
decision is under review, otherwise there would be no different views or there
could be no real review of the case, in violation of due process of law.
Zamboanga Chromite Mining Co. vs CA 94 SCRA 261

Facts: Director Gozon issued an order dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed
the case filed by the petitioners or protestants (Zambales Chromite Mining Co., Inc.
or the group of Gonzalo P. Nava). In that case, they sought to be declared the
rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty-nine mining claims located in
Santa Cruz, Zambales.
On the basis of petitioners' evidence, Director Gozon found that the petitioners did
not discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with
law.
The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending. Director Gozon was appointed
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Instead of inhibiting himself, he
decided the appeal, as if he was adjudicating the case for the first time. Thus,
Secretary Gozon exercised appellate jurisdiction over a case which he had decided
as Director of Mines. He acted as reviewing authority in the appeal from his own
decision. Or, to use another analogy, he acted as trial judge and appellate judge in
the same case.
We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion in reviewing his
decision as Director of Mines. The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines
Issue: WON Petitioners-appellant were deprived of due process when Gozon

reviewed his own decision
Held: Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental
fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of Mines.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out
to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be
a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would
not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.
E.
Prior notice and hearing, essential elements of procedural due
process
In administrative cases, the general rule is that prior notice and hearing are
necessary only where the law so requires. The inquiry should therefore be into the
enabling statute which clothes an administrative agency or officer with certain
duties and responsibilities in the discharge of which some persons may adversely
affected.
Essential elements of due process:
a. An impartial tribunal
b. Due notice and opportunity to be heard be given
c. The procedure at the hearing be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial
d. The proceedings may be conducted in such a way that there will be
opportunity for the court to determine whether the applicable rules of
law and procedure
e. That the decision or ruling be supported by substantial evidence
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In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following
a. The right to actual or constructive notice
b. A real opportunity to be heard
c. A tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction
d. A finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
Villa vs Lazaro 189 SCRA 34

Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit issued by the City Engineer to
contrcust a funeral parlor. Following adverse judgment to the court in his suit to
enjoin the construction of the funeral parlor, Veneracion, instead of appealing the
judgment, lodged a complaint with the HSCR on substantially the same ground
litigated in the action relative parlors distance from hospitals whether public or
private. Villa received a telegram from the HSRC through Commissioner Dizon
requesting transmittal of proof of location clearance granted by this Office. Villa
sent a reply telegram reading: Locational Clearance based on certification of City
Planning and Development Coordinator and Human Settlement Officer, copies
mail. Subsequently, Villa received from Dizon an Order to Present Proof of
Locational Clearance. Since she had already sent the required locational
clearance, Villa made no response. Then Villa received a show cause Order,
requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a ceaseand desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational
clearance. In spite of her communication that she had already mailed all required
documents, she received an Order imposing on her a fine of P10,000 and requiring
her to cease operations, and later, a writ of execution in implementation of the
order. A motion for reconsideration to which she attached copies of the
Commission Proper was also denied on account of the finality of the Order. An
appeal to the office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, and so was the
motion for reconsideration.
Noteworthy are the following: neither Veneracion nor the Commision,
ever made known the complaint of Veneracion to Villa until much later, after the
Commission has rendered several adverse rulings against her; the orders of the
Commission made no reference whatever to the documents Villa had already sent
by registered mail; and the resolutions of the Presidential Assistant Lazaro likewise
omitted to refer to the telegrams and documents sent by Veneracion
Issue: WON Villa was denied due process against which the defense of failure of
Villa to take timely appeal will not avail.
Held: Yes. These facts present a picture of official incompetence or gross

negligence and abdication of duty, if not active bias and partiality that is most
reprehensible. The result has been to subvert and put to naught the judgment
rendered in a suit regularly tried and decided by a court of justice, to deprive one
party of rights confirmed and secured thereby and to accord her adversary, by
resorting to the prescribed practice of forum-shopping, the relief he had sought
and had been denied in said case.
The mischief done by the commissioner Dizons baffling failure even to
acknowledge the existence of the documents furnished by petitioner was
perpetuated by the Commissioner proper and respondent Lazaro, who threw out
petitioners appeals with no reference that would have been decisive.
There was absolutely no excuse for initiating what is held out as an
administrative proceeding against Villa without informing her of the complaint
which initiated the case; for conducting that inquiry in the most informal manner
by means only of communication requiring submission of certain documents, which
left the impression that compliance was all that was expected of her and with
which directives she promptly and religiously complied.
The court finds no merit in the proposition that relief is foreclosed to Villa
because her motion for reconsideration of Nov. 22, 1982 was filed out of time. The
very informal character of the so-called administrative proceedings, an informality
for which Com. Dizon himself was responsible and which he never sought to rectify,
militates against imposing strict observance of the limiting periods applicable to
proceedings otherwise properly initiated and regularly conducted.
RCA Communications vs PLDT 110 Phil 420

Facts PLDTCO entered into an agreement with the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, wherein both companies agreed to establish telephone
services between the Philippines and the United States. As it lacked the necessary
equipment and facilities, PLDTCO on the same date entered into another
agreement with RCA whereby the latter constituted itself a carrier of PLDTCO's
telephone messages to and from the United States. The term of the agreement was
for five years and "shall thereafter continue in force until terminated by either
party giving the other 24 calendar months previous notice in writing."
On January 3, 1956, PLDTCO sent RCA a notice of termination of its
arrangements with the latter, the same to be effective not later than February 2,
1958, and three months later, filed an application with the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, through the Radio Control Board, for authority to
construct and operate a radio-telephonic station of its own at Marilao, Bulacan,
and for the assignment to It of appropriate radio frequencies.
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RCA filed a petition for prohibition) with the Court of First Instance of
Manila to prevent the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the
Radio Control Board from proceeding further on PLDTCO's pending application. The
complaint alleged that the approval by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications of the construction permit in favor of PLDTCO without previous
hearing and opportunity to plaintiff RCA to present evidence in support of its
opposition was without due process of law.
Issue: Whether or not RCA was denied of hearing and opportunity present case.
Held: No, that in administrative proceedings, hearing is only necessary in those
cases where the statute so requires. A cursory reading of the Radio Control Law
(Act No. 3846, as amended) shows that, unlike in other proceedings or instances
specified in section 3, paragraphs d and 1, of the said law, no, hearing is required in
the consideration by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications of any
application for the installation, establishment, or operation of a radio station
(paragraph k). At any rate, even assuming that a hearing is required, RCA must be
considered to have waived its right thereto, its counsel having addressed a letter to
the Radio Control Board saying that "little would be gained by arguing the matter
both before yourselves and before the Public Service Commission."
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not

guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for
petitioner's suspension, citing see. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in
part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.-Any incumbent public officer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book 11 of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion alleging that preventive suspension
should therefore be ordered only when the legislative purpose is achieved, that is,
when "the suspension order x x x prevent(s) the accused from using his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the legislative purpose is
not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be decreed
Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension was proper.
Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan 235 SCRA 103
Facts: Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. information was filed

against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin
paper in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019).
That he and others wilfully and unlawfully enter into a purchase contract with
REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for the purchase of certain office
supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit
prim of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price of Fifty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only Fifty-Five Pews
(P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pews (P5,500.00), thereby
causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of FortyNineThousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00) CONTRARY TO LAW.
Held: Yes, It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it
mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a
valid information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal
Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
is filed.5 The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine
whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his
office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unIess the accused is suspended he
may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in
the same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law
requires the judge to issue a warrant fur the arrest of the accused. The law does
not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or evade
the jurisdiction of the court.
F.
Notice and hearing, when dispensed with
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1.
Where there is an urgent need for immediate action,
like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, the
preventive suspension of public servant facing administrative
charges;
adjudged before making the resolution effective, It is enough that a subsequent

judicial review be provided.
Estate of Gregoria Francisco vs CA 199 SCRA 595

Central Bank vs CA 220 SCRA 536
Facts: Monetary Board (MB)issued Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of
Triumph Savings Bank (TSB), forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines,
placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. TSB
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Central Bank
and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for injunction,
challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise
known as 'The Central Bank Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central
Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any
few or regulation, much less found guilty thereof.
The trial court granted the relief sought and denied the application of TSB
for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings under the receivership of the officials of
the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without first hearing the
side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can be the subject of
judicial review and may be set aside should it be found that the same was issued
with arbitrariness and in bad faith.
Issue: Whether or not summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a
denial of "due process.
Held:
Ruling: No, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank
may be directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4
(now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case within ten
(10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is
unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly,
the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing"
in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis
of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v Arca [1965],17
It was held that a hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the
constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the.
Monetary Board' s resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation be first
Facts The Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) issued to Tan Gin San,
surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the
building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31 December 1989. The
permittee was using the Quonset (hut) for the storage of copra.
Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action Officer,
notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset building, citing
Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its antiquated and dilapidated
structure; and. stressing the "clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary
surroundings along Strong Boulevard. Since the notifications remained unheeded
by petitioner, Respondent Mayor ordered the demolition.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily, without judicial
process, order the demolition of petitioner's Quonset building.
Ruling: No, Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not
of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized
to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was
no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent
public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in
abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of its
property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for
prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined
by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing
and the authority to demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
Sitchon vs Aquino 98 Phil 458

2.
Where there is tentativeness of administrative action;
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the
person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
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property of a delinquent taxpayer and the replacement of a
temporary appointee;
Lastimosa vs Vasquez 243 SCRA 497

Facts: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Because she and the Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a
criminal charge of attempted rape to the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from
prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge
for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman and were placed under preventive suspension. It appears that
petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found
that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.
Issues:
1.
2.
Ruling:
1.
2.
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could

file his answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the
opportunity to prove his innocence.
3.
Where the twin rights have previously been offered
but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Where the law is silent on prior notice and hearing as a

requirement before an agency action, which refers to the
whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction,
relief or its equivalent or denial thereof, can be done,
compliance with the requirement of prior notice and hearing
depends upon the nature of the power to be exercised or the
end to be achieved.
Prior notice and hearing is not required in the exercise of police

power
Prior notice and hearing is not required in granting provisional

reliefs
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Whether or not the preventive suspension is invalid as it denied them
opportunity to refute the charges against them
Yes, The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This
power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any
crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from,
the performance of his official duty 15 It is enough that the act or
omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape,
when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
No, Prior notice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being
a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
As held in Nera v. Garcia:
Asprec vs Itchon 16 SCRA 921

Facts: Respondent Jacinto Hernandez lodged with the Board of Examiners for
Surveyors administrative complaint2 for unprofessional conduct against petitioner
Cleto Asprec. He requested Asprec to undertake survey on his lot in Port Junction,
Ragay, Camarines Sur. That no survey was conducted and that it was a mere copy
of one Damian Alham. that Asprec was guilty of deceit and thus violated the Code
of Ethics for surveyors. The Board's unanimous decision of October 27, 1959
revoked, and required surrender of, Asprec's certificate of registration as a private
land surveyor. A complaint was but was absent in the hearing.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to present his case.
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Ruling: No, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself
before the Board. As he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date
of bearing, he cannot look to the law or to a judicial tribunal to whipsaw the Board
into giving him a new one. He cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the
Board in proceeding in his and his counsel's absence. And this because without
cause or reason, without any excuse at all, counsel and client have chosen to shy
away from the trial. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always
of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires to satisfy adherence
to this constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial, an
opportunity to be heard. Petitioner had notice of the trial of May 11th. More than
this, that date of trial (May 11) had been previously agreed upon by the parties and
their counsel. Petitioner cannot now charge that he received less-than-a-fairtreatment. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.6
Petitioner insists that the proceeding before the Board are quasi-criminal
in nature. From this he proceeds to draw the conclusion that no valid trial could
proceed even if he absented himself therefrom. We do not see eye to eye with this
view. It is best answered by a reference to the opinion of the court below, thus The
rule applies even to quasi-criminal or criminal proceedings. So, where the
respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the
hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived
of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support
he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard
G.
Petitioner received a letter of respondent informing the former of an alleged letterpetition of "Congressman Floro Crisologo and 107 alleged residents of Vigan, Ilocos,
Sur", charging the following:
The sale of 2,000 ELECTRIC METERS in blackmarket by the Vigan Electric Light
Company to Avegon Co., as anomalous and illegal and also report that the electric
meters in Vigan used by the consumers had been installed in bad faith and they
register excessive rates much more than the actual consumption.
The finding that the Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is making a net operating profit in
excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, we believe that it is in
the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that
reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect
immediately.
Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. is hereby ordered to reduce the present meter rates
for its electric service effective upon the billing for the month of June, 1962
Banco Filipino vs Central Bank 204 SCRA 767
Petitioner herein instituted the present action for certiorari to annul said order of
May 17, 1962, upon the ground that, latter had not furnished the former a "copy of
the alleged letter-petition of Congressman Crisologo and others. Respondent then
expressed the view that there was no necessity of serving copy of said letter to
petitioner, because respondent was merely holding informal conferences to
ascertain whether petitioner would consent to the reduction of its rates. That
petitioner had not even been served a copy of the auditor's report upon which the
order complained of is based, that such order had been issued without notice and
hearing; and that, accordingly, petitioner had been denied due process.
Notice and hearing in rate-fixing
Issue: WON the twin notice of hearing is required in rate fixing?
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as

to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public
service commission
Vigan Electric Light vs PSC 10 SCRA 46

Facts: Republic Act No. 316, granted petitioner Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., a
franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric light heat and/or power
plant for the purpose of generating and distributing light, heat and/or power, for
sale within the limits of several Municipalities of the province of Ilocos Sur.
Rulig: The hold that the determination of the issue involved in the order
complained of partakes of the nature of a quasi-judicial function and that, having
been issued without previous notice and hearing, said order is clearly violative of
the due process clause, and, hence, null and void.
Whether notice and a hearing is proceedings before a public service commission
are necessary depends chiefly upon statutory or constitutional provisions
applicable to such proceedings, which make notice and hearing, prerequisite to
action by the commission, and upon the nature and object of such proceedings,
that is, whether the proceedings, are on the one hand, legislative and rule-making
in character (SUBJECT TO STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS, ON DUE PROCESS), or are,
on the other hand, determinative and judicial or quasi-judicial (IN ALL INSTANCES,
67 | P a g e

DUE PROCESS IS REQUIRED), affecting the rights and property of private or specific
persons.
As a general rule, a public utility must be afforded some opportunity to be heard as
to the propriety and reasonableness of rates fixed for its services by a public
service commission.
H.
Motion for reconsideration as a cure
The rule that the filling of a MR of the decision /ruling against a party cures the
defect in the lack of prior notice and hearing as to preclude the party from claiming
denial of due process assumes that the other requirements of due process have
been complied with. However such opportunity is nothing and he is still denied due
process, where the decision against him has nothing to support itself, one of the
cardinal requirements of due process being that the decision or ruling of an
administrative body must be supported by substantial evidence.
Medenilla vs CSC 194 SCRA 278

Facts: Petitioner Medenilla is a contractual employee of DPWH as Public Officer II.
Later on, she was detailed as Technical Assistant in the office of the assistant
secretary for the admin. and manpower management. On Jan. 2, 1989, petitioner
was appointed to the contested position of Supervising Human Resource
Development Officer. Respondents {being the next-in-rank-employees} jointly
lodged a protest before the DPWH task force re-organization contesting the
appointment of petitioner. The task force dismissed the protest of the respondents
thereby appealing before the Civil Service Commission. The Commission
disapproved the appointment of the petitioner reversing the ruling of task force.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the CSC but to no avail,
hence , the petition then was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON CSC is correct in disapproving the appointment of petitioner and that
WON the petitioner was denied of due process of law in the absence of notice?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that CSC is incorrect in disapproving the
appointment of petitioner. The CSC is limited only to determine whether the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and not whether
another is more qualified than the petitioner. Petitioner was not notified of the
appeal before the Commission. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the
absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Any defect may be cured by
the filing of motion of reconsideration.
i.
Right to counsel, not a due process requirement

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a noncriminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings
Lumiqued vs Exevea 282 SCRA 125

Facts: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of
Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V.
Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52
dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs
instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional
Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of
Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,1
charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official documents.
From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of
falsification by padding gasoline receipts.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a
report dated July 31, 1992, finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
The investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against
him.
This instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22,
1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by
President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbingit prays for the "payment
of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued
by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed
from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.
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ISSUE: WON the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
RULING: While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in
an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of
the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself
and no duty rests in such a body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel,28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired
below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services
of counsel or not.
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of hearings attended by
Lumigued clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted he
represent himself.
The hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding
Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for
malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
IV.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

A.
Definition and objective
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a plaintiff should first seek relief
in an administrative proceeding before he seeks a remedy in court, even though
the matter is properly presented to the court, which is within its jurisdiction. The
court will not determine a controversy:
1.
2.
3.
Where the question demands administrative determination

requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal
Where the question requires determination of technical and
intricate issues of fact
Where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes
of the regulatory statute administered.

Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
ab initio.
25
26
Industrial Enterprises vs CA, 184 SCRA 426
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B.
Distinguished from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES applies where a claim
is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency; judicial intervention
is withheld until the administrative process has run its course.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts,
and comes into play whenever enforcement of claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views
Felizardo vs CA 233 SCRA 220
C.
Effect of doctrine
Villaflor vs CA 280 SCRA 327
FACT: This is petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the dismissal by the trial court of Petitioner
Vicente Villaflor complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc.
ISSUE: WON the director of land has primary jurisdiction over the case?
RULING: Primary Jurisdiction of the Director of Lands and Finality of Factual
Findings of the Court of Appeals
Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts is the doctrine of primary
Jurisdiction; courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question
which is within the Jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in
this case, since the questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the factual
qualification of private respondent as an awardee of a sales application require a
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with
the expertise to determine such matters. Because these issues preclude prior
judicial determination, it behooves the courts to stand aside even when they
apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
Jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Machete vs CA 250 SCRA 176

Villaflor in a Lease Agreement leased to Nasipit Lumber Co., Inc. a parcel of land.
Villaflor claimed having discovered that after the execution of the lease agreement,
that Nasipit Lumber 'in bad faith surreptitiously grabbed and occupied a big portion
of plaintiff's property.
Villaflor executed a document, denominated as a 'Deed of Relinquishment of
Rights, in favor of Nasipit Lumber.
The Director of Lands issued an 'Order of Award in favor of Nasipit Lumber
Company, Inc.
Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested the Sales Application of
Nasipit Lumber, claiming that the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided
in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights.
The Director of Lands found that the payment of the amount of P5,000.00 in the
Deed xxx and the consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly proven, and
ordered the dismissal of Villaflor's protest and gave due course to the Sales
Application of Nasipit Lumber.
Facts: Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope
Machete and 11 others. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a
leasehold agreement with respect to Villanons landholdings at Poblacion Norte,
Carmen, Bohol, under which Machete et al. were to pay private respondent a
certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated
demands and with no valid reason, Machete et al. failed to pay their respective
rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him
back rentals and damages.
Machete et al. moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended that the case arose out
of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the
complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under the Revised Rules of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
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The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and later denied the motion for
reconsideration. On appeal, the petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of
action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that respondent
appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural
leasehold contract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its
execution and the rights and obligations of the parries thereto are necessarily R.A.
3844, R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the
application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are
matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of
the trial court. The CA found the petition to be impressed with merit. E.O. 2298
vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those failing under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources in accordance with law, hence, this case.
Issue: WON the CAs decision is correct.
Ruling: There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to
the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond
the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence. Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing
the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the present legal
battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this
Court was quite emphatic in Quismundo v. Court o Appeals,the resolution by the
DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better position to resolve
agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary
in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and
evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be
adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive proceeding. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City
dated 22 August and 28 September 1989 are REINSTATED.
Director of Lands vs CA 194 SCRA 224
Provident Tree Farms vs Batario 231 SCRA 463

Facts : PETITIONER PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI), is a Philippine corporation
engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees in its plantations in Agusan
and Mindoro which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production
of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to
engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code
1 confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban
against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" products. Private respondent A.
J. International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) containers of matches from
Indonesia, which the Bureau of Customs, and two (2) more containers of matches
from Singapore. Upon request of PTFI, Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., of the
Department of Natural Resources and Environment issued a certification that
"there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines for the match
industry at reasonable price." PTFI then filed with the Regional Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a temporary restraining
order against respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter
from importing matches and "wood-derivative" products, and the Collector of
Customs from allowing and releasing the importations. AJIC moved to dismiss the
case asseverating that the enforcement of the import ban under Sec. 36, par. (1), of
the Revised Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs,
and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the
Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal basis.
Issue : WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling : PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the legality
of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative proceeding
the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Under the sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine
Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards
or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
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determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh
indispensable . . .
Moreover, however cleverly the complaint may be worded, the ultimate relief
sought by PTFI is to compel the Bureau of Customs to seize and forfeit the match
importations of AJIC. Since the determination to seize or not to seize is
discretionary upon the Bureau of Customs, the same cannot be subject of
mandamus. But this does not preclude recourse to the courts by way of the
extraordinary relief of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if the Bureau of
Customs should gravely abuse the exercise of its jurisdiction. Otherwise stated, the
court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is
with its prerogative; except when in the excrcise of its authority it claerly abuses or
exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occassion to rule on the
issue of grave abuse of discretion as excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.
decision of the DAR adjudicator.On the other hand, respondents argue that actions
for the fixing of just compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15
days from receipt of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision
becomes final and executory, pursuant to 51 of R.A. No. 6657.
Issue: Which contention is meritorious?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention has no merit. R.A. No. 6657 provides: The DAR is
hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . .The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
Philippine Veterans Bank vs CA 322 SCRA 139

Facts: Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum, Davao, which
are covered by Transfer Certificates. The lands were taken by the Department of
Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed a
petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The petition
was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao, which dismissed
the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. Since this case was filed only on
January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of Republic
Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within which to appeal,
already lapsed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It
was held that: Jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
but its motion was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the just
compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of just
compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from the
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
D.
When doctrine does not apply
Where the administrative agency has no jurisdiction, the doctrine does not apply. It
does not apply in any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Lagua vs Cusi 160 SCRA 260
Facts : This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which
was instituted by the petitioners against the private respondents for closing a
logging road without authority.
From the facts, petitioners were hauling logs to be loaded on a vessel. Private
respondent EastCoast ordered the closure of the road, a national highway, through
their security force, to prevent passage of the trucks hauling the logs for the
Japanese vessel. Private respondent claim that they were the only authorized
timber licensee to use the road. Petitioners filed a case before the trial court, which
was dismissed on lack of jurisdiction, the court a quo holding that the issue is
within the realm of the Bureau of Forestry which should have heard the case
before filing t case in court.
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Issue : WON the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry applies.
Held : The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular
courts have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court
had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first
determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages
can be instituted.
P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vast any
power in the Bureau of Forest Development to determine whether or not the
closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a prerequisite before an action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the
complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged
illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a
matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be
disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in
a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much less award
or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a
forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.
V.
Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

A.
Definition and purpose
As a general rule, recourse through court action cannot prosper until all the
remedies have been exhausted at the administrative level.
Rosales vs CA 165 SCRA 344

Ruling : Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse
through court action, as a general rule, cannot prosper until all the remedies have
been exhausted at the administrative level.
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a Litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the
same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts
is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect; convenience of the party
litigants and respect for a co-equal office in the government. If a remedy is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before

resort can be made to (the) court."
Petitioners however, claim that they were denied due process, obviously to show
that their case falls within one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
Such contention is however untenable, because in the first place, they were made
to avail in the same administrative agency, the opportunity or right to oppose,
which in fact they did, when they filed a motion for reconsideration and later when
the motion was denied, they appealed to the Secretary of Education and Culture.
Precisely, a motion for reconsideration or appeal is curative in character on the
issue of alleged denial of due process.
Gonzales vs Secretary of Education 5 SCRA 657

Facts: Jose L. Gonzales, a senior teacher civil service eligible, was appointed
Principal of the Lambunao High School established in the municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo. Lambunao High School was later converted into a Regional
Vocational High School under the name of Iloilo Vocational High School. Gonzales
then received a letter from the Secretary of Education appointing him as Head of
the Related Subjects Department of the Bureau of Public School. He also received a
copy of a letter of the Director of Public Schools addressed to respondent Alfredo
Pineda, at the time Principal of the Samar Trade School, appointing him as Principal
of the Iloilo Vocational School. When Pineda came to assume the office of Principal
of the latter school, Gonzales refused to yield the same to him, and sent a written
protest against Pineda's appointment as well as against his own appointment as
Head of the Related Subjects Department, addressed to the Superintendent of the
Iloilo School of Arts and Trades, who forwarded it without undue delay to the
Director of Public Schools by a second indorsement. Without waiting for any action
on his protest-in fact even before said protest could be forwarded and submitted
to the Director of Public Schools-Gonzales, filed the present petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to restrain the
Secretary of Education and the Director of Public Schools from giving effect to the
appointment of Alfredo Pineda as Principal of the Iloilo Vocational School, and to
recover damages. After due trial, the lower court rendered the appealed judgment.
Appellants claimed that the lower court erred in not holding that the present
action was instituted prematurely.
Issue: WON the appellee initiated the appropriate administrative proceeding.
73 | P a g e

Ruling: The facts of this case disclose that appellee initiated appropriate
administrative procedures to obtain relief from the orders that he considered
prejudicial to his rights by means of his first, addressed to the Superintendent of
the Iloilo School of Arts and Trades. This protest was forwarded by the latter to the
Director of Public Schools, but even before this date appellee instituted the present
action. It is, therefore, clear that he did not give his superior officers any
opportunity to reconsider the questioned orders before seeking judicial
intervention. The rule of exhaustion of appropriate remedies before resorting to
the courts to seek relief appears to be of stronger application to the present case
where, according to the record, appellant Pineda and the superior officers of
appellee did not appear to have exerted any undue pressure upon him to compel
him to yield and give up the position in question. The decision appealed from is
reserved, with the result that the present action is dismissed.
The petition was granted and that respondent court {RTC} was ordered to dismiss
the case filed by Pontejos.
The exceptions under the Doctrine of Exahaustion of Administrative Remedies
mentioned in this case are the following;
1) where the question is purely legal,
(2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
(3) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage,
(4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
(5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is sought to act on the
matter, and
(6) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
B.
Effect of failure to exhaust remedies
Carale vs Abarintos 269 SCRA 132

Facts: Private respondent Pontejos was issued a permanent appointment as Labor
Arbitration Associate by herein petitioner Carale who is the NLRC Chairman. Carale,
pursuant to his exercise of admin. authority and supervision over all NLRC officials ,
th
issued an admin. Order detailing and re-assigning private respondent to NLRC 4
division in Cebu. In this regard, private respondent filed a case before the RTC of
Cebu against petitioner for Illegal Transfer tantamount to removal without cause in
violation of the security of tenure under the Constitution. Petitioner moved for a
motion to dismiss the case but RTC denied the petitioner. Petitioner questioned
the courts jurisdiction to try the case without first resorting to exhaustion of
administrative remedy to the Civil Service Commission.
Issue: WON private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies available
to him?
Ruling: Private respondent did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to
him. Respondent Pontejos is subject to civil service laws and regulations pursuant
to the Constitution as Labor Arbitration Associate.
Respondents grievances must be first raised before the Civil Service Commission
before resorting to judicial intervention. Therefore the instant case is premature
and that respondent should exhaust all the available remedies to his grievances
before resorting to courts.
It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. The only effect of non-compliance
with the rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is
ground for a motion to dismiss. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
ground for motion to dismiss or is a defense which may be raised in the answer.
De los Santos vs Limbaga 4 SCRA 224
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City
dismissing a petition for mandamus to compel Limbaga, the engineer of that city,
to authorize de los Santos to construct a residential house on the land described in
the petition. It is alleged the respondent without any lawful cause refused to grant
said permit; and that in view of this refusal, petitioner suffered damages.
In his answer, the respondent, represented by the City Fiscal of Basilan, denied the
allegations of the petition and interposed the following affirmative defenses: that
after a fire which occurred in Lamitan that raged down a major portion of the
market site therein, the city government approved the purchase of an additional
area to enlarge the said site and that, incidentally, the lot claimed by the petitioner
was included in the area; that by virtue thereof, expropriation proceedings had
been instituted thereon, hence, the denial of the permit applied for by petitioner.
The city fiscal moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: that
mandamus will not lie since the issuance of the permit applied for was a
discretionary and not a ministerial duty on the part of the city engineer to which
the trial court agreed.
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Issue: WON the case will prosper and WON there is compliance with the DEAR.
Issue: WON the petitioner has cause of action in the herein case before the court.
Ruling: Mandamus cannot prosper in this case for the simple reason that, as the
record shows, the land in question is already the subject matter of expropriation
proceeding instituted by Basilan City pursuant to a resolution approved by the City
Council, which proceeding is now pending in the Court of First Instance of Basilan.
Moreover, herein petitioner has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him. Petitioner should have first brought the matter to the Director of
Public Works who, under the law, exercise supervision and control over city
engineers of chartered cities (see Commonwealth Act No. 424), and if he was not
satisfied with the Director's decision he should have appealed to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications.
Ruling: Special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus against the Import Control
Commission do not lie if the petitioner has a plain and adequate remedy by an
appeal to the President. Certiorari or mandamus against administrative officers
should not be entertained if superior administrative officers can grant relief. Thus,
the petition is denied.
The principle is fundamental that a party aggrieved by a decision of an

administrative official should. before coming to court, apply for review of such
decision by higher administrative authority. This principle rests on the presumption
that the administrative agency if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the
matter.
D.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan 255 SCRA 438

Factora, Jr. vs CA 320 SCRA 530
C.
When applied
The rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the
agency exercise judicial or quasi-judicial function. It does not apply in the exercise
of its rule-making power or legislative power.
Ang Tuan Kai vs Import Control Commission L-4427, 21 April 1952

Facts: The petitioner, a duly registered partnership of Manila, alleges in substance
(1) that it had placed orders for textiles amounting to about P340,000 with foreign
suppliers which orders were accepted before July 31, 1949; (2) that in November
1950 it requested the respondent to allow importation of the textiles against its
quota for 1949 pursuant to circular No. 12 and (3) but that respondent with grave
abuse of authority and discretion has denied the request and instead ordered that
said orders of Ang Tuan Kai & Co., be charged against the firm's 1951 quota and
exchange allocations in pursuant to the order issued previously by the same board.
Hence this case.
Exceptions to the doctrine

When there is a violation of due process
When the issue involved is purely a legal question
When the administrative agency is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction
When there is estoppels on the part of the administrative agency
concerned
When there is irreparable inquiry
When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an
alter ego of the President hears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter
When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable
When it would amount to a nullification of a claim
When the subject matter is private land in land cases proceedings
When the rule does not provide a plain speedy and adequate
remedy
There are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention (Paat vs. CA)
Sunville Timber Products vs Abad 206 SCRA 482

Facts: The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it
to cut, remove and utilize timber within the concession area covering 29,500
hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on
September 31, 1992.
On July 31, 1987, the herein private respondents filed a petition with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources for the cancellation of the TLA,
on the ground of serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry
laws and regulations.
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The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private
respondents, in a complaint for injunction with damages against the petitioner,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2732 in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City.
the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a
condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same
question by a court of justice.
Gonzales vs Hechanova, 60 OG 802

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had
no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by
Section I of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss on December 11, 1987,1 and
the motion for reconsideration on February 15,1988.2 The petitioner then elevated
the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a
decision dated July 4, 1988,3 and in its resolution of September 27, 1988, denying
the motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Ruling: The lower court erred in misapplying the doctrine. One of the reasons for
the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with matters coming primarily
(albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The
theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve
questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance
to do so. The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is
also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged, both in the
administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pagethan City, that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of
the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.21 The charge involves
factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is
best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized
knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts
may step in to exercise their powers of review. here is no question that Civil Case
No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as
the wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the
unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to determine
whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been
violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary
responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of
Facts : Respondent executive secretary authorized the importation of several tons

of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice
procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein for the
implementation of said proposed importation.
Petitioner is the president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association engaged
in the production of rice and corn, filed the petition herein, averring that, in making
or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned
respondents "are, acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207,
explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency; that petitioner has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a prelinainary
injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the
pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming
ineffectual. Respondent, among others, countered that the petitioner did not
exhaust all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court.
Issue : WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable in
this case.
Ruling : The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or where the
controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose
acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the
latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one
of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents' contention is,
therefore, untenable.
Paat vs CA 266 SCRA 167
Facts: The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck
of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San
Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
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Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found
concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an
order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen, (15) days
within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June
22, 1989, 1 Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained
petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck
invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No.of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this court. Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the buck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private
respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the
justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the
chance to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds:
(a) that the Secretary of DENR and his representatives have no authority to
confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products,
and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the commission of
the crime.
Ruling: This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's
intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical
and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as
tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one
and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Thus, while the administration grapples with the
complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these
resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies." To
sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant
controversy beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and fall within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated.
Corpus vs Cuaderno L-17860 30 March 1962

Facts: While petitioner-appellant was holding the position of Special Assistant to
the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines, he was charged in an
administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or
abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc., preferred against him by
employees of the Bank, resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the
Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The committee
was composed of representatives of the Bank, Bureau of Civil Service and the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After receiving the answer of the respondent
therein, the committee heard the case, receiving testimonies of witnesses on both
sides. On May 5, 1959, the committee submitted its Final Report, the pertinent
conclusion and recommendation therein reading as follows: "(1) In view of the
foregoing, the Committee finds that there is no basis upon which to recommend
disciplinary action against respondent and therefore respectfully recommends that
he be immediately reinstated." Unable to agree with the committee report, the
Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 957 on July 20, 1959 which considered
"the respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension." The
pertinent portion of the resolution reads thus:
"After an exhaustive and mature deliberation of the report of the aforesaid fact
finding committee, in conjunction with the entire records of the case and
representations of both complainants and respondent, through their respective
counsel; and, further, after a thorough review of the service record of the
respondent, particularly the various cases presented against him, object of
Monetary Board Resolution No. 1527 dated August 30, 1955, which all involves
fitness, discipline, etc. of respondent, and moreover, upon formal statement of the
Governor that he has lost confidence in the respondent as Special Assistant to the
Governor and In-Charge of the Export Department (such position being primarily
confidential and highly technical in nature), the Monetary Board finds that the
continuance of the respondent in the service of the Central Bank would be
prejudicial to be best interests of the Central Bank, and, therefore, in accordance
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with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent,
Mr. R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the .date of his suspension."
Three days after, the Monetary Board adopted Resolution No. 995, dated July 23,
1959, approving the appointment of herein respondent Mario Marcos to the
position involved in place of petitioner R. Marino Corpus. The lower court was of
the opinion that petitionerappellant should have exhausted all administrative
remedies available to him, such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
under Republic Act 2260, or the President of the Philippines who under the
Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments of the
government including its agencies and instrumentalities. This is the main issue
disputed in this appeal.
Ruling: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the
President or the Civil Service Commission. However, it is our opinion that a resort
to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, taking into account the
facts obtaining in this case. (1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President
in a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President had, in two instances cited
in the orders appealed from, acted on appeals from decisions of the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as precedents, but at most may
be viewed as acts of condescension on the part of the Chief Executive. (2) While
there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner
of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is
not bound to observe them, considering his status and the Charter of the Central
Bank. In Castillo vs,. Bayona, et al., 106 Phil., 1121, We said that Section 14,
Republic Act 265, creating the Central Bank of the Philippines, particularly
paragraph (c) thereof, "is sufficiently broad to vest the Monetary Board with the
power of investigation and removal of its officials, except the Governor thereof. In
other words, the Civil Service Law is the general legal provision for the
investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14
is a special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or
removal of employees of the Central Bank-, though they may be subject to the Civil
Service Law and Regulations in other respects."
In this case, the respondent Monetary Board considered petitioner resigned from
the office to which he has been legally appointed as of the date of his suspension,
after he has been duly indicted and tried before a committee created by the Board
for the purpose. An appeal to the Civil Service Commission would thereby be an act
of supererogation, requiring the presentation of practically the same witnesses and
documents produced in the investigation conducted at the instance of the
Monetary Board. Moreover, Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Law provides that
"except as otherwise provided by law," the Commissioner of Civil Service shall have
"final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all
permanent officials and employees in the competetive or classified service and
upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officials
and employees; * * *." Considering again the fact that the Charter of the Central
Bank provides for its own power, through the Monetary Board, relative to the
investigation, suspension or removal of its own employees except the Governor,
coupled with the fact that Petitioner has admitted that he belongs to the noncompetetive or unclassified service, it is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the
Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary. "The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative
remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said
remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto
proceedings it follows that he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the
proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs.
Fajardo, 38 Phil. 621, and Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil., 828; 46 Off. Gaz., 3683, public
interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as speedily
as practicable."
Facts: petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation
ab initio.
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25
26
Marinduque Iron Mines v. Sec. of Public Works

8 SCRA 179
Facts: It appears from the allegations of the petition that the petitioner was
denounced before the Port and Harbor Board, Manila for making certain
constructions near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental; that
on September 11, 1958, petitioner was served with copy of the charges filed
against it by two investigators of respondent Secretary of Public Works and
Communications who conducted an investigation of said charges; that on the basis
of this investigation, respondent Secretary rendered a decision dated January 16,
1959 ordering the petitioner herein to remove the causeway illegally constructed
at the mouth of the Calat-an River and restore the bed of said river to its original
condition within thirty days from receipt of copy of the decision, otherwise, the
removal shall be effected by the government at the expense of herein petitioner.
Without appealing the decision of the respondent Secretary to the President,
herein petitioner has filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari seeking
that the decision of respondent be annulled."
Ruling: Nowhere in the foregoing provisions, or in any other part of Republic Act
No. 2056, is it required that appeal to the President should precede recourse to the
courts. The silence of the statute, to be sure, does not mean that the President may
not review the action of the Secretary. His power to do so is implicit in his
constitutional power of control of all the executive departments (Section 10, Works
and Communications par. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). This, however, does not
resolve the issue, which is not whether petitioner could have appealed to the
President but whether he should have done so before seeking judicial relief. The
answer depends, in turn, upon whether an appeal to the President would have
been sufficiently effective, adequate and expeditious, a negative finding in this
respect being the basis on which the extraordinary writ of certiorari, as prayed for
by petitioner, may be issued. The absence of an express provision in Republic Act
No. 2056 for an appeal to the President from the decision of the Secretary,
considered together with the peremptory character of the periods therein
prescribed, shows that such an appeal-assuming that it may be taken in view of the
President's constitutional power of executive control-would not affect the
inexorable requirement that those periods be observe& the only exception being in
favor of Works and Communications the Secretary, if there is justifiable or valid
reason for his failure or delay to terminate and decide a case or effect the removal
of the illegal construction such as, for Instance, an injunction issued by a court. We
are of the opinion that an appeal to the President from the order of respondent
Secretary would not have been expeditious enough for petitioner's purposes and
hence the latter did not have to resort to it before seeking judicial relief. In any
event, we believe the facts of this case place it within the rule enunciated in
Dimaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil., 237, as follows: "Such failure (to appeal
from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President) cannot preclude the plaintiffs from taking court action in view of the
theory that the Secretary of a Department is merely an alter-ego of the President;
the assumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the
President, unless the same is disapproved by the latter."
Bueno vs Patanao 9 SCRA 794

Facts: On April 29, 1958, Pedro B. Patanao commenced Special Civil Case No. 48
with the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Valeriano, C. Bueno and one
Juanito Merin, for injunction and damages. In his amended petition, Patanao
alleged that on March 10, 1958 the respondents therein disturbed him in his,
possession of his timber concession by illegally entering the same and cutting and
hauling logs therein; that when he went to the area to stop said respondents and
their laborers, truckers and loggers from cutting and hauling logs "he was met with
riot guns, pistols and other firearms"; and that defendants were able to cut no less
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than one million board feet of exportable logs worth not less than $64,000.00 and
would be able to cut and haul even a bigger amount in the space of one month as
they had allegedly concentrated all their logging machineries and equipment with
the apparent intention of illegally denuding the forest area covered by his license.
Patanao thus urged the court below to issue a writ of preliminary injunction so as
to enjoin the respondents, their agents, laborers and lawyers, from entering the
area and cutting and hauling logs therein pending trial and, after trial, to make the
injunction final and permanent, and to condemn said respondents liable in an
amount of not less than P175,000. 00 as actual and moral damages, attorney's fees
and costs.
Ruling: At first glance, petitioner's argument appears to be tenable. True, the
common boundary of the parties was verified by the Bureau of Forestry way back
in March 1955. It seems, however, that while petitioner Bueno had endeavored to
respect the verification report, respondent Patanao had refused to conform
thereto, so much so that the conflict was brought anew to the attention of the
Director of Forestry who has formally taken a hand therein. On or about April 8,
1958, before Patanao instituted Civil Case No. 48 with the respondent court, he
was officially requested to designate a representative to accompany Forestry
officials in the verification of the common boundary line between him and
petitioner (Exhibit 8, letter addressed to Patanao by Anastacio G. Sison, officerincharge, Esperanza Forest Station, Agusan, p. 5; Opposition to Urgent Motion to
Dissolve Writ of Preliminary Injunction, dated, July 23, 1958.) That said boundary
dispute is still pending in the Bureau of Forestry at the filing of this petition is
shown by the letter of the District Forester of Agusan, now in the record as Annex
A-Opposition. The record also discloses that Patanao's application for renewal and
consolidation of his timber licenses for 1957-58 had not yet been approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Its renewal depends upon the
consideration of the Director of Forestry. The granting of timber licenses, their
renewal or cancellation, and the determination of conflicting claims or boundary
lines involving forest zones, such as those presently occupied by the parties hereto,
are all vested by law primarily upon the Director of Forestry and ultimately upon
his Department head.
Continental Marble Corp. vs NLRC 161 SCRA 151

Facts: In his complaint before the NLRC, herein private respondent Rodito Nasayao
claimed that sometime in May 1974, he was appointed plant manager of the
petitioner corporation, with an alleged compensation of P3,000.00, a month, or
25% of the monthly net income of the company, whichever is greater, and when
the company failed to pay his salary for the months of May, June, and July 1974,
Rodito Nasayao filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission,
Branch IV, for the recovery of said unpaid salaries. The case was docketed therein
as NLRC Case No. LR6151. Answering, the herein petitioners denied that Rodito
Nasayao was employed in the company as plant manager with a fixed monthly
salary of P3,000.00. They claimed that the undertaking agreed upon by the parties
was a joint venture, a sort of partnership, wherein Rodito Nasayao was to keep the
machinery in good working condition and, in return, he would get the contracts
from end-users for the installation of marble products, in which the company
would not interfere. In addition, private respondent Nasayao was to receive an
amount equivalent to 25% of the net profits that the petitioner corporation would
realize, should there be any. Petitioners alleged that since there had been no
profits during said period, private respondent was not entitled to any amount. The
case was submitted for voluntary arbitration and the parties selected the herein
respondent Jose T. Collado as voluntary arbitrator. In the course of the
proceedings, however, the herein petitioners challenged the arbitrator's capacity
to try and decide the case fairly and judiciously and asked him to desist from
farther hearing the case. But, the respondent arbitrator refused. In due time, or on
29 December 1975, he rendered judgment in favor of the complainant, ordering
the herein petitioners to pay Rodito Nasayao the amount of P9,000.00, within 10
days from notice. Upon receipt of the decision, the herein petitioners appealed to
the National Labor Relations Commission on grounds that the labor arbiter gravely
abused his discretion in persisting to hear and decide the case notwithstanding
petitioners' request for him to desist therefrom: and that the appealed decision is
not supported by evidence. On 18 March 1976, Rodito Nasayao filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is
final, appealable, and immediately executory;3 and, on 23 March 1976, he filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Acting on the motions, the
respondent Commission, in a resolution dated 7 May 1976, dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the decision appealed from is final, unappealable and
immediately executory, and ordered the herein petitioners to comply with the
decision of the voluntary arbitrator within 10 days from receipt of the resolution.5
The petitioners are before the Court in the present recourse. As prayed for, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, restraining herein respondents from
enforcing and/or carrying out the questioned decision and resolution.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the private respondent that the petitioner
failed to follow the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies is tenable.
Ruling: The contention is without merit. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies cannot be invoked in this case, as contended. In the recent
case of John Clement Consultants, Inc. versus National Labor Relations
Commission, the Court said: "As is well known, no law provides for an appeal from
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decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission; hence, there can be no
review and reversal on appeal by higher authority of its factual or legal conclusions.
When, however, it decides a case without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, the party thereby adversely affected may obtain a review
and nullification of that decision by this Court through the extraordinary writ of
certiorari. Since, in this case, it appears that the Commission has indeed acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of a
belated appeal sought to be taken from a decision of Labor Arbiter and thereafter
reversing it, the writ of certiorari will issue to undo those acts, and do justice to the
aggrieved party."
Kilusang Bayan vs Dominguez 205 SCRA 92

Facts: On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa
(hereinafter, Municipality), Metro Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr.,
entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MCA
MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM)
represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's management
and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a
twenty-five (25) year term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like
period, unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the
parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be
paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month which shall,
however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years
only. Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago
Carlos, Jr., petitioner Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the
"virtual 50-year term of the agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and the "patently inequitable rental,"
directed a review of the aforesaid contract.3 He sought opinions from both the
Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of
the in strument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal
steps be taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC
even granted the Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the
cancellation. rescission of the above cited contract and make representations with
KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession, management and
operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of
Muntinlupa." Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the
Municipal Council, the latter approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45
abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye, together with his copetitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine Constabulary,
proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public market and announced to the general
public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the
management and operation of the facility, and that the stallholders should
thenceforth pay their market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market
Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in the first case failed to follow the doctrine
of exhaustion of admin remedies.
Ruling: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that
this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter,
unless actually disapproved by him.69 This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then
to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could
be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is
purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal,
arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter
shown, is correct.
Almine vs CA 177 SCRA 796

Facts: On December 25, 1975, petitioner filed a sworn application for retention of
her riceland or for exemption thereof from the Operation Land Transfer Program
with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), Regional Office in Tobaco, Albay.
After due hearing, Atty. Cidarminda Arresgado of the said office filed an
investigation report dated June 26, 1980 for the cancellation of the Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) of private respondent who appears to be petitioner's tenant
over her riceland. Upon failure of the Ministry to take the necessary action,
petitioner reiterated her application sometime in 1979-1985 alleging that her
tenant deliberately failed and refused to deliver her landowner's share from 1975
up to the time of the Ming of the said application and, that the latter had
distributed his landholding to his children. A reinvestigation was conducted this
time by Atty. Seth Evasco who on October 31, 1985 filed his report recommending
the cancellation of private respondent's CLT. Said report was elevated to the MAR.
In an endorsement dated November 25, 1985, Regional Director Salvador Pejo
manifested his concurrence with the report of Atty. Evasco holding that the
properties of the petitioner consist of 4.3589 hectares as evidenced by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 27167, 27168 and 27344 and hence not covered by the
Operation Land Transfer Program. Juanito L. Lorena, the Officer-in-Charge of MAR
likewise concurred therewith. However, in the order dated February 13, 1986, then
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Minister Conrado Estrella denied petitioner's application for retention. On April 17,
1986, petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The case
was entitled Hilda Ralla Almine vs. MAR and docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 08550.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. However, it was denied in
an order dated May 28, 1986. A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise
denied. After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision dated June 29, 19871 dismissing the appeal on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction holding that questions as to whether a landowner should or
should not be allowed to retain his land holdings, if administratively decided by the
Minister of Agrarian Reform, are appealable and could be reviewed only by the
Court of Agrarian Relations and now by the Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a
resolution dated October 22, 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the CA is tenable.

Ruling: A perusal of the provision above cited reveals that questions as to whether
a landowner should or should not be allowed to retain his landholdings are
exclusively cognizable by the Minister (now Secretary) of Agrarian Reform whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President and not to the Court of
Agrarian Relations. These cases are thus excluded from those cognizable by the
then CAR, now the Regional Trial Courts. There is no appeal from a decision of the
President. However, the said decision may be reviewed by the courts through a
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, as the case may be
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the respondent appellate court erred in
holding that it has no jurisdiction over the petition for review by way of certiorari
brought before it of a decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform allegedly made in
grave abuse of his discretion and in holding that this is a matter within the
competence of the Court of Agrarian Reform. The Court of Appeals has concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court and the Regional Trial Court over petitions seeking the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The failure to appeal
to the Office of the President from the decision of the Minister of Agrarian Reform
in this case is not a violation of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
as the latter is the alter ego of the President.
Tapales vs President of UP 7 SCRA 553

Facts: Ramon Tapales was duly appointed Director of the Conservatory Music in UP
as recommended by the President of the University of the Philippines after
compliance of the required qualifications under the Charter of the same.

Consequently, the Board of Regents of the said University issued a resolution fixing
the terms of the office of the Dean and Directors thereof allegedly in pursuant to
same charter. Thereafter, the University President issued a memorandum
reminding the Deans and Directors whose terms are about to expire that unless
they are recommended by the same for reappointment, their assumption to their
respective office is deemed terminated. Tapales was injured by the said resolution
and memorandum as such filed before the court a question on the validity of the
said resolution and memorandum. The respondent on the other hand alleged that
the petitioner failed to exhaust the required administrative remedies available.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
Ruling: It is contended in this connection, that the appellee failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies by not asking the Board of Regents to reconsider the
challenged resolution before bringing the matter to court. An administrative review
is not a condition precedent to judicial relief against a statute or ordinance which is
claimed to be unconstitutional and void (73 C.J.S. 357), or where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can
be done (73 C.J.S. 354). Here, appellee impugned the constitutionality and validity
of the Resolution of October 2, 1959, and appellee's objection thereto is a purely
legal one.
Quintos v. National Stud Farm 54 SCRA 210

Facts: Quintos is the legitimate owner of a racehorse which was duly and officially
registered with NSF and for which he is issued a certificate of registration, thereby
entitling it to participate in horse races and sweepstakes draws in legally
authorized racing clubs or tracks. In line with the SOP and usual racing practices for
horse owners, Quintos applied for inclusion of his horse in a particular race 3 days
before the date of the race which application was duly approved by Phil Racing
Club, Inc. On the very day when Quintos race-horse was scheduled to participate
in race no. 15, the PRC announced thru the PA system before the start of race no.
13 that his horse was being excluded from taking part in race no. 15. It was then
alleged that the cancellation of the certificate of registration of his horse was
arbitrary and oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of a formal
investigation or inquiry prior thereto. The trial court dismissed the complaint
primarily on the ground of lack of EAR that the admin remedy of Quintos was to
ask the Board of Trustees of NSF to reconsider its resolution cancelling the
certificate of registration, and in case of denial of appeal to the Games and
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Amusement Board or to the Office of the President. The CA certified the case to the
SC since it found that a purely legal question was involved, to wit: WON the trial
court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
The trial court originally granted the motion and ordered the change prayed for,
but later it reconsidered its decision and held itself without jurisdiction to act on
the matter. Its reason was that there was no observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Issue: Does Quintos have a valid cause for complaint?
Issue: Does the trial court have jurisdiction to order an amendment of a certificate
of title without previous exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Ruling: None. Quintos prematurely instituted a suit for damages. The reason for
this short-circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by Quintos. His
gives no reason for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed, there is
none. The order of dismissal, therefore, certainly cannot be considered as being in
derogation of the due process guarantee. The judicial forum sought by Quintos was
in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept of primary jurisdiction. In the
traditional language of administrative law, the stage of ripeness for judicial review
had not been reached. Quintos ignored factors not predetermined by formula but
by seasoned balancing for and against the assumption of jurisdiction. All that had
been said so far would seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower courts
insistence of the fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies
is more than justified.
Soto v. Jareno 144 SCRA 116
Facts: This is MOTION TO CORRECT ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-672
COVERING LOT NO. 4569 CAUAYAN CAD. FRANCISCA SOTO. Specifically, the change
sought is in the civil status of the registered owner, whom the petitioner wants to
be described in the certificate of title as married to her rather than as a widower.
The said registered owner was Sergio Serfino, who was married in January 1933 to
the petitioner. In 1939, he filed an application for a homestead patent, describing
himself as "married to Francisca Soto," but in 1953, when the original certificate
over the homestead was issued, it was in favor of "Sergio Serfino, widower."
Serfino died in 1965, and soon thereafter the petitioner filed a motion with the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that his description as a
"widower" be changed to "married to Francisca Soto." Two daughters of the couple
opposed the motion. While conceding that their parents were married in 1933, the
oppositors nonetheless pointed out that their mother had abandoned them in
1942 to live with another man. Later, they said, she had adulterous relations with
still a second man by whom she begot eleven children. According to these
oppositors, it was their father himself who had described himself as a widower in
1953 because he had not heard from the petitioner since 1942.
Their purpose, obviously, was to prevent the land from being considered conjugal
and therefore equally owned by the spouses.
Held: Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does

not affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long
line of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to
dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
court can then take cognizance of the case and try it.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable
to private lands, as also settled in a number of decisions rendered by this Court.
Once registered, the homestead granted to Sergio Serfino ceased to have the
character of public land and so was removed from the operation of the said
doctrine. But notwithstanding the above principles, the petition will still have to be
dismissed because the change sought is not authorized under Section 112 of Act
496, as interpreted by this Court.
Sunga v. NLRC 173 SCRA 338

Facts: Sunga, et al. filed before the NLRC a complaint against ACD Computer
Services and Cabel for illegal dismissal and non-payment of certain benefits. The
labor arbiter rendered a decision sustaining the petitioners' position. The labor
arbiter, then, upon motion of the petitioners, issued a writ of execution to enforce
said decision. The following day, the sheriff served a notice of garnishment to the
Commercial Bank of Manila after which the total amount of P15,031.85 was
garnished. This amount has already been turned over to the petitioners.
A levy on execution was made upon the properties found in the respondents' office
premises. ACD Group Inc., an American firm based in California, U.S.A., through its
Chairman, Dulay filed a third-party claim in the NLRC case on the ground that it is
the real owner of the computers levied upon and scheduled for auction. This thirdparty claim was denied.
ACD Computer Services and Cabel filed before the NLRC a petition for relief from
judgment in NLRC-NCR Case No. 6-2423-86 with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The NLRC then issued the
questioned resolutions incidental to Injunction Case. The petitioners filed before
83 | P a g e

the NLRC a motion to dismiss and/or answer to the petition on the ground that a
petition for relief is not a remedy granted under the Labor Code and NLRC Rules.
Without waiting for the NLRC's resolution on their motion to dismiss, the
petitioners filed the present petition. This petition seeks to annul the three NLRC
resolutions, to prohibit the NLRC from taking further proceedings in Injunction Case
and to direct the NLRC to dismiss said injunction case and to order the full
execution of the decision.
The Solicitor General recommends that the petition be dismissed for being
premature, applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He
further stressed the jurisdiction of the NLRC and its exercise of sound discretion.
Issue: WON the Soc Gens position is tenable.
Ruling: The Court gave due course to this petition on a finding, among others, that
the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible rule. In fact, it yields to
many accepted exceptions. As we have noted in a number of cases, exhaustion is
not necessary where inter alia there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking
the doctrine; where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; where there is unreasonable delay or official action that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant: where the amount involved is relatively
small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided anyway by the courts
of justice.
At least two of these exceptions are present in the instant case on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. There had been no action on the challenge to the petition
for relief from judgment for almost a year. This is considerably long considering
that the labor arbiter's decision had already become final and in fact has been
partially executed. The main case had been filed as early as June 20, 1986.
Moreover, this case involving the propriety of a remedy and the suspension of an
execution would only be further delayed if we remand it to the NLRC, only to have
any decision raised again before this Court.
Sabello v. DECS 100 SCRA 623

Facts: Petitioner Sabello, was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also
the Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of
Gingoog City. The barangay high school was in deficit at that time due to the fact
that the students could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at that time
also, the President of the Philippines who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid
in the amount of P2,000.00 for each barrio, the barrio council through proper
resolutions alloted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries of the high
school teachers, with the honest thought in mind that the barrio high school was a
barrio project and as such therefore, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund in
question. The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized
by the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was
subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the Talisay
Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of the herein petitioner as it
involves the very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds and of its
technicalities. Thus, the herein petitioner, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both were convicted to suffer a
sentence of one year and disqualification to hold public office. The herein
petitioner appealed his case to the Court of Appeals, Manila. The Court of Appeals
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being involved. The herein
petitioner, being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to proceed to
the highest court of the land.
Finally, Sabello was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to full civil and political rights. With this
instrument on hand, the herein petitioner applied for reinstatement to the
government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong position of a mere
classroom teacher and not to his former position as Elementary School Principal I.
Issue: WON petitioner Sabello should be reappointed to his position.
Ruling: The question of whether or not petitioner should be reappointed to his
former position is a matter of discretion of the appointing authority, but under the
circumstances of this case, if the petitioner had been unfairly deprived of what is
rightfully his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of giving justice to the
petitioner. It is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the appointing
power, but discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
As to the argument that the Department of Education, Culture and Sports cannot
be sued, the only answer is that its officials can be sued for alleged grave errors in
their official acts. Again, We ignore technicality by considering this a suit against
the officials of this government agency.
Taking into consideration that this petition is filed by a nonlawyer, who claims that
poverty denies him the services of a lawyer, the Court set aside the requirement of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and resolved to go direct to the merits of
the petition.
84 | P a g e

The petition is GRANTED in that the Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and/or his duly authorized representative is hereby directed to
appoint petitioner to the position of Elementary School Principal I or its equivalent
Montes v. Civil Service Board of Appeals 101 Phil 490

Facts: Montes was charged with negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No.
6 under him bad sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out
while under his care). the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the
basis of findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals
modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in not
pumping, the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered resigned
effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the
discretion of the appointing officer.
Montes then filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the
decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on the
ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he
instituted the action.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
No. 598, which provides: The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power
and authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on
appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by
the President of the Philippines.
Issue: WON the lower court erred in applying Sec 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598
in the instant case.
Ruling: There is no duty imposed on a party against whom a decision has been
rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to appeal to the President, and that
the tendency of courts has been not to subject the decision of the President to
judicial review. It is further argued that if decisions of the Auditor General may be
appealed to the courts, those of the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be
acted upon by the President also, before recourse may be had to the courts. It is
also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action should be final and
not reviewable by the courts because such a course of action would be derogatory
to the high office of the President. The judgment appealed from is thus affirmed.
85 | P a g e

(Reviewer) Administrative Law - Jose Rizal Memorial State University - 85p

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Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Administrative Law Reviewer

Republic v. Court of Appeals 200 SCRA 226

Concept/definition of administrative law

Scope of administrative law

Administrative law embraces all the law that controls, or is intended to

Classification of administrative law

Origin and development of administrative law

Advantages of the administrative process

Test for determining administrative nature

1. Mandatory statutory requirement intended for the protection of the

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Public office, defined in relation to administrative law

Issue: What is an administrative agency?

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Solid Homes vs Payawal 29 August 1989

Types of administrative agencies

1. Those created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and governmentowned or controlled corporations.

Definition of Administration US vs Dorr 2 Phil 332

Relation between administrative agencies and courts

Administrative agencies have certain quasi-judicial powers which allows

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Creation, reorganization, and abolition of administrative agencies

Creation of administrative agencies

Abolition of administrative agencies

Facts: Plaintiff Marcelino A. Busacay was a duly-appointed and qualified pre-war

Eugenio vs CSC 243 SCRA 196

De la Llana v. Alba 112 SCRA 294

Facts: The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the Judiciary

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals 258 SCRA 134

Reorganization of administrative agencies

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

Power of control, supervision and investigation by the President

Executive power, defined

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

The Power Involved

Section 17 Article VII, 1987 Constitution

Carpio vs Executive Secretary 206 SCRA 290

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Facts: The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the Revised

Noblejas vs Salas 67 SCRA 47

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Limitations on the power of control

Does not include:

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

Rodriguez vs Montinola 94 Phil 973

Taule vs Santos 200 SCRA 512

Facts: The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes

Power of review of other executive officers, defined

Ruling: The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to

Jose Rizal Memorial State University College of Law

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Doctrine of separation of powers

Distribution of powers of government:

Basis for blending of powers:

The Doctrine of Separation of Powers, though not mentioned anywhere by such

Exception to the general rule

So that the power of the government would not be concentrated in one