G.R. No.

179987
2013
HEIRS
OF
MARIO
(Represented
by
Malabanan), Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC
OF
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

September 3,
MALABANAN,
Sally
A.
THE

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the
motions for reconsideration of the parties
who both assail the decision promulgated on
April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling
of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
application of the petitioners for the
registration of a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground
that they had not established by sufficient
evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for
registration is a parcel of land situated in
Barangay
Tibig,
Silang
Cavite,
more
particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the
property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, uninterrupted,
public
and
adverse
possession
and
occupation of the land for more than 30
years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain,
Malabanan
presented
during
trial
a
certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by
the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land

designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D,
Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr. Virgilio
Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq.
meters as shown and described on the Plan
Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC
rendered judgment granting Malabanans
application for land registration, disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places
under the operation of Act 141, Act 496
and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property
Registration
Law,
the
lands
described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot
9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four
(71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its
technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog,
Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and
executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing
that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and
that the RTC erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated
its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application for registration of Malabanan.
Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the

classification of the land as alienable and

disposable was inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Noting that the CENRODENR certification stated that the property
had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession
prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanans
period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise
during the appeal in the CA, his heirs
elevated the CAs decision of February 23,
2007 to this Court through a petition for
review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon
Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling
doctrine especially if the property involved is
agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled
that any possession of agricultural land prior
to its declaration as alienable and disposable
could be counted in the reckoning of the
period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No.
141) and the Property Registration Decree.
They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to
the effect that the declaration of the land
subject of the application for registration as
alienable and disposable should also date
back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere
obiter dictum considering that the land
registration proceedings therein were in fact
found and declared void ab initio for lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support
their argument that the property had been
ipso jure converted into private property by
reason of the open, continuous, exclusive
and
notorious
possession
by
their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was
that the property had been "converted" into
private property through prescription at the
time of the application without regard to
whether the property sought to be registered
was previously classified as agricultural land
of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for
review on certiorari because Malabanan

failed to establish by sufficient evidence

possession and occupation of the property on
his part and on the part of his predecessorsin interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners
submit
that
the
mere
classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to
convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De
Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue
that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable opened it to
acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code;
that Malabanan had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith
that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with
the right to validly transmit title and
ownership thereof; that consequently, the
ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of
the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, applied in
their favor; and that when Malabanan filed
the application for registration on February
20, 1998, he had already been in possession
of the land for almost 16 years reckoned
from 1982, the time when the land was
declared alienable and disposable by the
State.
The
Republics
Reconsideration

Motion

for

Partial

The
Republic
seeks
the
partial
reconsideration in order to obtain a
clarification with reference to the application
of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic
contends that the decision has enlarged, by
implication, the interpretation of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
through judicial legislation. It reiterates its
view that an applicant is entitled to
registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and
disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we

consider to be imperative to discuss the
different classifications of land in relation to
the existing applicable land registration laws
of the Philippines.
Classifications
ownership

of

land

according

to

Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may

be classified as either of public dominion or
of private ownership.11Land is considered of
public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for
public use; or (b) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and is intended
for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such
character, or although of such character but
no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial
property of the State.13 Land that is other
than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is
of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura
Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under
private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of
the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified
or alienated them to private persons. 17
Classifications of public land according to
alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is
alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under
the
Constitution.
Under
the
1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain
were
classified
into
three,
namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section
10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
classified lands of the public domain into
seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or

commercial,
residential,
resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land,
with the reservation that the law might
provide other classifications. The 1987
Constitution adopted the classification under
the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest
or timber, and mineral, but added national
parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further
classified by law according to the uses to
which
they
may
be
devoted. 21 The
identification of lands according to their legal
classification is done exclusively by and
through a positive act of the Executive
Department.22
Based on the foregoing, the Constitution
places a limit on the type of public land that
may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated;
all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State
fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership
under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by
the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or
timber, mineral, or national parks are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless
they are reclassified as agricultural.24
A positive act of the Government is
necessary
to
enable
such
25
reclassification, and
the
exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive
Department, not in the courts.26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or
national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit
of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a
law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.27 Thus,
until
the
Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress

or the President declares that the State no

longer intends the land to be used for public
service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No.
141) provides the manner by which alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain,
i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes can be disposed of only
as follows, and not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free
patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the
proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, which expressly requires possession by a
Filipino citizen of the land since June 12,
1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title thereafter, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of

title under the provisions of this chapter.

(Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act used the words "lands of the public
domain" or "alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral,
forest or timber, or national parks, and lands
of patrimonial or private ownership, are
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act.
What the law does not include, it excludes.
The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable
and disposable" further limits the coverage
of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands
of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy
the following requirements in order for his
application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest,
has
been
in
possession and occupation of the property
subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have
taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application
must be an agricultural land of the public
domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive
Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, presupposes that the land subject of
the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of
the public domain in order for the provision
to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies,
and overcomes the presumption that the
land is alienable and disposable as laid down
in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required

by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is

classification or reclassification of a public
land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or
reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise
have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
because any possession of the land prior to
such
classification
or
reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that
the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative
intent be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12,
1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole
prerogative of Congress, the determination
of which should best be left to the wisdom of
the lawmakers. Except that said date
qualified the period of possession and
occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of
the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and
literal meaning of the law as written by the
legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land
subject of the registration should have been
classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect
or incomplete title is derived only from
possession and occupation since June 12,
1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the
application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration,
not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor,
either
personally
or
through
his
predecessors-in-interest,
openly,
continuously and exclusively during the
prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or
completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue
of this doctrine, corporations may now
acquire lands of the public domain for as
long as the lands were already converted to

private ownership, by operation of law, as a

result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land
Act.30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need
not be classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of
possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the
land should have been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land at the time
of the application for registration is
necessary only to dispute the presumption
that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and
disposable also serves to determine the point
at which prescription may run against the
State. The imperfect or incomplete title
being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is title that is acquired by
reason of the applicants possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where
all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government are complied with through
actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive
and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired by
operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is
not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective
of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet
titles to unregistered lands in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the
number of years prescribed by law32 will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in
mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears
out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to
liberalize
stringent
requirements
and
procedures in the adjudication of alienable
public
land
to
qualified
applicants,
particularly residential lands, subject to area
limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is

classified as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into
patrimonial or private land of the State, the
applicable provision concerning disposition
and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in
conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such,
prescription can now run against the State.
To sum up, we now observe the following
rules relative to the disposition of public land
or lands of the public domain, namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to
belong to the State and, therefore, may not
be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the
general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain
are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes
enumerated under Section 11 of the Public
Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the time of
the application, provided the applicants
possession and occupation of the land dated
back to June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thereby, a
conclusive presumption that the applicant
has performed all the conditions essential to
a government grant arises,36 and the
applicant becomes the owner of the land by
virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By
legal fiction, the land has already ceased to
be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of
national wealth are removed from the sphere
of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of
private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of

acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If

the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that
the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition
sine qua non in observance of the law
(Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the
State not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to
present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private
property
even
upon
the
subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the
State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise,
the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property
Registration
Decree
unless
Congress enacts a law or the President
issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for
the
development
of
the
national
wealth.1wphi1
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
DENIES
the
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
the
respondent's
Partial
Motion
for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174626

2013

October 23,

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LUIS MIGUEL O. ABOITIZ, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
Republic), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General OSG), seeking to set aside
the
December
14
2005
Amended
1
Decision of the Court of Appeals CA), in CAG.R. CV No. 75032 and its September 12
2006 Resolution2 affirming the February 21
2002 Decision3 of the Regional Trial . Court
Cebu City Branch 11 RTC), which granted the
application for registration of respondent Luis
Miguel O. Aboitiz Aboitiz) in Land Registration
Case LRC) No. 1474-N.

In support of his application, Aboitiz attached

the original Tracing Cloth Plan with a
blueprint copy, the technical description of
the land, the certificate of the geodetic
engineer surveying the land, and the
documents
evidencing
possession
and
ownership of the land.

To prove his claim, Aboitiz presented his

witness, Sarah Benemerito (Sarah), his
secretary, who testified that he entrusted to
her the subject property and appointed her
as its caretaker; that he purchased the
subject property from Irenea Kapuno (Irenea)
on September 5, 1994; that he had been in
actual, open, continuous, and exclusive
possession of the subject property in the
concept of an owner; that as per record of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Region VII, the subject
property had been classified as alienable and
disposable since 1957; that per certification
of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City, the
subject property was not covered by any
subsisting public land application; and that
the subject property had been covered by
tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 in
Ireneas name, and from 1994 to present, in
his name.

The Facts
On September 11, 1998, respondent Aboitiz
filed his Application for Registration of Land
Title of a parcel of land with an area of 1,254
square meters, located in Talamban, Cebu
City, and identified as Lot 11193 of the Cebu
Cadastre 12 Extension, before the RTC.

After establishing the jurisdiction of the RTC

to act on the application for registration of
land title, hearing thereon ensued.

Another witness for Aboitiz, Luz Kapuno

(Luz), daughter of Irenea, the original owner
of the subject property, testified that she was
one of the instrumental witnesses in the
deed of sale of the subject property and that
saw her mother affix her signature on the
said document. She added that her mother
was in open, continuous, peaceful, and
exclusive possession of the said property.

Subsequently,
the
Republic,
through
Assistant City Prosecutor Edito Y. Enemecio,

manifested that it would not adduce any

evidence to oppose the application for
registration of Aboitiz.

On February 21, 2002, the RTC granted

Aboitizs application for registration of the
subject property. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing

premises,
the
Court
hereby
renders
judgment in this case granting the
application filed by the applicant. The Court
hereby accordingly adjudicates the land
described on plan RS-07-000856 located in
Talamban, Cebu City, together with all the
improvements thereon, as belonging to the
applicant, and confirms his title thereto. The
Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered
to issue the corresponding Decree of
Registration to confirm the applicants title to
the said land and to subject the said land
under the operation of the Torrens System of
Registration.

Upon this decision becoming final, let a

decree of confirmation and registration be
entered and, thereafter, upon payment of
the fees required by law, let the
corresponding original certificate of title be
issued in the name of the applicant.

Furnish copies of this decision to the

Administrator of the LRA, the Director of
Lands and the Director of the Bureau of
Forestry, the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Cebu City Prosecutor.
SO ORDERED.4

Not in conformity, the Republic appealed the

RTC ruling before the CA.

In its June 7, 2005 Decision, 5 the CA reversed

the ruling of the RTC and denied Aboitizs
application for registration of land title, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court

dated February 21, 2002 is hereby
REVERSED
and
the
application
for
registration of title is accordingly DISMISSED
.
SO ORDERED.6

The CA ruled that it was only from the date

of declaration of such lands as alienable and
disposable that the period for counting the
statutory requirement of possession since
June 12, 1945 or earlier would commence.
Possession prior to the date of declaration of
the lands alienability was not included. The
CA observed that the subject property was
declared as alienable and disposable only in
1957, and so the application clearly did not
meet the requirements of possession needed
under the first requisite of Section 14 (1) 7 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 which
must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Thereafter, Aboitiz moved for reconsideration

of the June 7, 2005 Decision of the CA which
dismissed his application for registration of
title. Aboitiz asserted, among others, that
although the subject land was classified as
alienable and disposable only in 1957, the
tax declarations, from 1963 to 1994, for a
period of thirty one (31) years, converted the
land, by way of acquisitive prescription, to

private property. He asserted that the

evidence he presented substantially met the
requisite nature and character of possession
under P.D. No. 1529.

In its December 14, 2005 Amended Decision,

the CA reversed itself and granted the
application for registration of land title of
Aboitiz. The pertinent portion of the said
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

June 7, 2005 Decision of this Court is hereby
REVERSED and the Decision dated February
21, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Cebu City with respect to L.R.C. No.
1474-N is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.8

In granting the application for registration of

land title, the CA relied on Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529.9 It stated that although the
application for registration of Aboitiz could
not be granted pursuant to Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529 because the possession of his
predecessor-in-interest commenced in 1963
(beyond June 12, 1945), it could prosper by
virtue of acquisitive prescription under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 upon the lapse
of thirty (30) years. The CA explained that
the original owners (Ireneas) possession of
the subject property beginning from 1963 up
to 1994, the year Aboitiz purchased the
subject property from Irenea, spanning thirty
one (31) years, converted the said property
into private land and, thus, susceptible to
registration. The CA also declared that
although tax declarations and real property
tax payments were not by themselves
conclusive evidence of ownership of land,

they were nevertheless good indicia

possession in the concept of an owner.

of

The Republic moved for reconsideration but

was denied by the CA on September 12,
2006. Hence, this petition.

ASSIGMENT OF ERROR
THE CA ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING
THE
APPLICATION
FOR
REGISTRATION OF LOT 11193 UNDER PLAN
RS-07-000856 BASED ON THE EVIDENCE IT
RELIED UPON EARLIER DISMISSING THE SAID
APPLICATION.10

In his Memorandum,11 Aboitiz contends that

the Republic is raising questions of fact
which is beyond the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court. Consequently, the findings of fact
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA are final,
binding and conclusive upon the Court.
Aboitiz claims that sufficient evidence was
presented to establish the nature and
character of his possession of the subject
property as required by P.D. No. 1529.

In its Memorandum,12 the Republic, citing

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 13 argues
that Aboitiz failed to validly establish the
alienability of the subject property because
he only adduced a CENRO certification to
that effect, without presenting a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records.
Further, a declaration that the property is
alienable and disposable is not sufficient to
make
it
susceptible
to
acquisitive
prescription.
An
express
government
manifestation that the property is already

patrimonial or no longer intended for public

use, for public service or for the
development for the national wealth
pursuant to Article 42214 of the New Civil
Code must also be shown. The Republic
asserts that it is only when the property has
become patrimonial that the period of
acquisitive prescription can commence to
run against the State.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. The vital issue to
be resolved by the Court is whether Aboitiz is
entitled to the registration of land title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, or, in the
alternative, pursuant to Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation to

Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141,15 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No.
1073,16 provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The

following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive
and
notorious
possession
and
occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2)
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens
of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
[Emphases supplied]

Based on the above-quoted provisions,

applicants for registration of land title must
establish and prove: (1) that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; (2) that the
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of
the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

The foregoing requisites are indispensable

for an application for registration of land
title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to
validly prosper. The absence of any one
requisite
renders
the
application
for
registration substantially defective.

Anent the first requisite, to authoritatively

establish the subject lands alienable and
disposable character, it is incumbent upon
the applicant to present a CENRO or
Provincial
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) Certification; and a
copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.17

Strangely, the Court cannot find any

evidence to show the subject lands alienable
and disposable character, except for a
CENRO certification submitted by Aboitiz.
Clearly, his attempt to comply with the first
requisite of Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 fell
short due to his own omission. In Republic v.
Hanover
Worldwide
Trading
18
Corporation, the Court declared that the
CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring the alienability and
disposability of public lands. Thus, the
CENRO Certification should be accompanied
by an official publication of the DENR
Secretarys issuance declaring the land
alienable and disposable. For this reason, the
application for registration of Aboitiz should
be denied.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be

shown that the possession and occupation of
a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself

or through his predecessors-in-interest,

started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. 19 A mere
showing of possession and occupation for 30
years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.20

Unfortunately, Aboitiz likewise failed to

satisfy this third requisite. As the records and
pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest
that he and his predecessor-in-interest can
trace back possession and occupation of the
subject land was only in the year 1963.
Evidently, his possession of the subject
property commenced roughly eighteen (18)
years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning
date expressly provided under Section 14(1)
of P.D. No. 1529. Here, he neglected to
present any convincing and persuasive
evidence to manifest compliance with the
requisite
period
of
possession
and
occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Accordingly, his application for registration of
land title was legally infirm.

Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

Notwithstanding his failure to comply with
the requirements for registration of land title
under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, Aboitiz
advances that he has, nonetheless, satisfied
the requirements of possession for thirty (30)
years to acquire title to the subject property
via prescription under Section 14(2) of P. D.
No. 1529.

Regrettably, the Court finds Itself unable to

subscribe to applicants proposition.

Significantly, Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529

provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following

persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:

(b) The right to register granted under

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

In the case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.

Republic,21 the Court clarified the import of
Section 14(1) as distinguished from Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and
confirms that "those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires

possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 4722 of the
Public Land Act.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the

Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is
recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property.

However, public domain lands become only

patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express
government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of
national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of

the
government.1wphi1 The
person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property
by prescription under the Civil Code is
entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by

which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under
ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of

patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)

years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.23 [Emphasis supplied]

On September 3, 2013, the Court En Banc

came out with its Resolution,24 in the same
case of Malabanan, denying the motion for
reconsideration questioning the decision. In
the said resolution, the Court authoritatively
stated that x x x the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service
or for the development of the national
wealth."25

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529,

for acquisitive prescription to commence and
operate against the State, the classification
of ' land as alienable and disposable alone is
not sufficient. The applicant must be able to
show that the State, in addition to the said
classification, expressly declared through
either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued, by the President that
the subject land is no longer retained for
public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Consequently,
without an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be a property of public
dominion and, hence, not susceptible to
acquisition by virtue of prescription.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the

CA
lacks
sufficient
factual
or
legal
justification. Hence, the Court is constrained
to reverse the assailed CA Amended Decision
and Resolution and to deny the application
for registration of land title of Aboitiz.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The

December 14, 2005 Amended Decision and
the September 12, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75032,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Application for Registration
of Title of respondent Luis Miguel O. Aboitiz
in Land Registration Case No. 1474-N is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179990

2013

October 23,

REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.

In her verified application in LRC Case No. N452, the respondent claimed that she is the
owner of the two parcels of land, which are
situated, bounded and specifically described
in Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd072219-004551,4 to wit:

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
DECISION
Lot 2007, Cad. 545-D, identical to lot
3135-A, Csd-072219-004552
(Luisa Ceniza)
REYES, J.:
The present petition is one for review under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The
Republic of the Philippines petitioner)
challenges the Decision1 dated September
21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CAGR. CV No. 70078, affirming the Decision 2 of
the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, which granted the
application
of
Diosdada
I.
Gielczyk
(respondent) for the original registration of
title of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-A of Plans
Csd-072219-004552
and
Csd-072219004551, both situated in Jugan, Consolacion,
Cebu. The petitioner prays that the Court
annuls the CA Decision dated September 21,
2007 in CA-GR. CV No. 70078, and that it
should dismiss Land Registration Commission
(LRC) Case No. N-452 for utter lack of merit.3

A parcel of land (lot 20047, Cad.545-D,

identical to lot 3135-A, Csd-072219-004552),
being a portion of lot 3135, Cad. 545-D
(new), situated in the Barrio of Jugan,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of
Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the NE.,
along line 1-2 by lot 20048 (identical to lot
3135-B, Csd-072219-004552), on the SE.,
along line 2-3 by Camino Vicinal Road, on the
SW., along line 3-4 by lot 3126, on the NW.,
along line 4-1 by lot 3136, All [sic] of Cad.
545-D (New). Beginning at a point marked
"1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69
m. from BLLM No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.

thence S. 61 deg. 20E., 40.69 m. to point 2;

thence S. 26 deg. 14W., 57.80 m. to point 3;
Antecedent Facts
thence N. 61 deg. 26W., 38.40 m. to point 4;
On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the
registration under her name of the lands
denominated as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No.
3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and
Csd-072219-004551.
Both
lands
were
situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu.

thence N. 23 deg. 59E., 58.02 m. to point of

the
beginning. Containing an area of TWO
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
(2,285) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All
points referred to are indicated on the plan
and are marked on the ground as follows;

points 1 and 2 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40

cms. and the rest are old P.S. cyl. conc. mons
15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original
survey July 14, 1987-November 11, 1987,
and that of the subdivision survey executed
by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on
November 12, 1993 and approved on May
24, 1994.5

SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points

referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground as follows; points 1
and 6 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms.
and the rest are old P.S. cyl. conc. mons
15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original
survey July 14, 1987-November 11, 1987,
and that of the subdivision survey executed
by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on
November 19, 1993 and approved on May
26, 1994.6

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS
Lot 20045, Cad. 545-D, identical to
Lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551
(Constancio Ceniza)
A parcel of land (lot 20045, Cad.545-D,
identical to lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551),
being a portion of lot 3136, Cad. 545-D
(New), situated in the Barrio of Jugan,
Municipality of Consolacion, Province of
Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SE.,
along line 1-2 by lot 3135, on the SW., along
line 2-3-4 by lot 3126, on the NW., along line
6-1 by lot 20046, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D
(New), on the NE., along line 6-1 by lot
20046 (identical to lot 3136-B, Csd-072219004551). Beginning at a point marked "1" on
plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69 m. from
B.L.L.M. No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.

thence S. 23 deg. 59W., 58.02 m. to point 2;

thence N. 65 deg. 10W., 41.39 m. to point 3;
thence N. 35 deg. 15W., 2.55 m. to point 4;
thence N. 20 deg. 43E., 44.05 m. to point 5;
thence N. 20 deg. 44E., 12.48 m. to point 6:

The respondent further alleged the following:

(a) that the said parcels of land were last
assessed for taxation atP2,400.00; (b) that to
the best of her knowledge and belief, there is
no mortgage nor encumbrance of any kind
affecting said land, nor any person having
interest therein, legal or equitable; (c) that
she had been in open, complete, continuous,
and peaceful possession in the concept of an
owner over said parcels of land up to the
present time for more than 30 years,
including the possession of her predecessorsin-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said
land by virtue of the deeds of absolute sale;
and (e) that said land is not occupied. 7

The respondent, as far as known to her, also

alleged that the full names and complete
addresses of the owners of all lands
adjoining the subject land are the following:
ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3135-A:
North - Lot 3135-B owned by Mrs. Luisa
Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

thence S. 65 deg. 37E., 46.79 m. to point of

the

East - Municipal Road

c/o Municipal Mayor
Consolacion, Cebu

beginning. Containing an area of TWO

THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TEN (2,610)

South - Lot 3126 owned by Mr. Rene Pepito

Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

West - Lot 3136-A owned by the applicant.

same lots are not subject to public land

application.16

ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3136-A:

North - Lot 3136-B, owned by Mr. Constancio
Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

Furthermore, when the respondent testified

in court, her testimony sought to establish
the following:

East - Lot 3135-A, owned by the applicant;

South - Lot 3126, owned by Mr. Rogelio M.
Pepito
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu
West - Lot 3138, owned by Mr. Miguel
Hortiguela Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu8

To prove her claim, the respondent submitted

the following pieces of evidence:
(a) Approved plans of Lot Nos. 3135-A and
3136-A;9
(b) Approved technical descriptions of the
same lots;10
(c) Certification from the Chief, Technical
Services
Section,
Department
of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
Region
7,
Central
Visayas
Lands
Management Services in lieu of surveyors
certificates;11
(d) Latest tax declarations of the lots; 12
(e) Latest tax clearance of the same lots; 13
(f) Deeds of Sale in favor of the respondent; 14
(g) Certifications from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO), Cebu City, that the lots are
alienable and disposable;15 and
(h) Certification from the Chief, Records
Section, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City that the

(i) That the respondent acquired Lot No.

3136-A (which is identical to Lot 20045, and
is situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with
an area of 2,610 sq m), and Lot No. 3135-A
(which is identical to Lot 20047, and is
situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an
area of 2,285 sq m) through purchase from
Constancio
Ceniza
and
Luisa
Ceniza
17
respectively;
(ii) That the respondent was never
delinquent in paying the taxes for the said
lots. In fact the following tax declarations
were issued for Lot No. 3136-A: Tax Dec. No.
01258 for the year 1948; Tax Dec. No.
012459 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No.
20846 for the year 1980; Tax Dec. No. 29200
for the year 1981; Tax Dec. No. 04210 for the
year 1985; and Tax Dec. No. 13275 for the
year 1989; while the following tax
declarations were issued for Lot No. 3135-A:
Tax Dec. No. 01670 for the year 1948; Tax
Dec. No. 012931 for the year 1965; Tax Dec.
No. 021294 for the year 1968; Tax Dec. No.
25146 for the year 1973; Tax Dec. No. 01411
for the year 1974; Tax Dec. No. 20849 for the
year 1980; Tax Dec. No. 04208 for the year
1985; Tax Dec. No. 13274 for the year
1989;18
(iii) That the said parcels of land are
alienable and disposable and are not covered
by subsisting public land application;19
(iv) That the respondent and her respective
predecessors-in-interest
had
been
in
possession of Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No.
3136-A for more than 40 years in the
concept of an owner, exclusively, completely,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, notoriously

and adversely, and no other person has

claimed ownership over the same land;20 and
(v) That the respondent is a Filipino Citizen
and that despite her marriage to an
American national, she has retained her
Filipino citizenship.21

(4) That the parcel of land applied for is a

portion of the public domain belonging to the
petitioner and that the said parcel is not
subject to private appropriation.25

On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its

Decision26 in favor of the respondent, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
The petitioner filed an opposition dated
September 18, 1995 to the respondents
application for registration of title, alleging
among others:
1) That neither the respondent nor her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous,
exclusive,
and
notorious
possession and occupation of the land in
question since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto;22
(2) That the muniments of title and/or the
tax declarations and tax payment receipts of
the respondent attached to or alleged in the
application do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, or
prior thereto; and that said muniments of
title do not appear to be genuine and the tax
declarations and/or tax payment receipts
indicate the pretended possession of the
respondent to be of recent vintage;23
(3) That the respondent can no longer avail
of the claim of ownership in fee simple on
the basis of Spanish title or grant since she
has failed to file an appropriate application
for registration within the period of six
months from February 16, 1976 as required
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From
the records, the petitioner further alleged
that the instant application was filed on July
7, 1995;24

WHEREFORE,
from
all
the
foregoing
undisputed facts supported by oral and
documentary evidence, the Court finds and
so holds that the applicant has registrable
title over subject lots, and the same title is
hereby
confirmed.
Consequently,
the
Administrator, Land Registration Authority is
hereby directed to issue Decree of
Registration and Original Certificate of Title
to Lots 3135-A and 3136-A [sic], both
situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu in the
name of the applicant DIOSDADA I.
GIELCZYK, 44 years old, Filipino, married to
Philip James Gielczyk, American national,
resident of No. 4 Noel St., UHV, Paranaque,
Metro Manila, as her exclusive paraphernal
property.

Upon finality of this judgment, let a

corresponding decree of registration and
original certificate of title be issued to
subject lot in accordance with Sec. 39, PD
1529.
SO ORDERED.27

Not convinced of the RTCs decision, the

petitioner filed an appeal dated August 5,
2002 before the CA, which was also denied
on September 21, 2007,28 the dispositive
portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED

and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in its
entirety.29

Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition

for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, raising the sole issue:

Issue
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT
SHE AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
HAVE
BEEN
IN
OPEN,
COMPLETE,
CONTINUOUS, NOTORIOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
PEACEFUL POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS
SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 40
YEARS THROUGH MERE TAX DECLARATIONS
AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF WHEN THE
SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED ALIENABLE
AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.30

Our Ruling
It must be noted that the respondent did not
file any comment on the petition despite
efforts to notify her and her counsel of
record. Thus, in the Resolution 31 dated March
30, 2011, this Court resolved to dispense
with the respondents comment and shall
decide the instant petition based on
available records.

After a thorough study of the records, the

Court resolves to grant the petition.

The respondent failed to completely prove

that there was an expressed State
declaration that the properties in question
are no longer intended for public use, public
service, the development of the national
wealth and have been converted into
patrimonial property, and to meet the period
of possession and occupation required by
law.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The Property

Registration Decree enumerates the persons
who may apply for the registration of title to
land, to wit:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in- interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by
right of accession or accretion under the
existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by
law.

In the assailed decision granting the

respondents application for registration of
title, the CA explained that the RTCs
decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D.

No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the

same decree.32 The CA said:

prescription under the provisions of existing

laws."

However, a judicious scrutiny of the

attendant facts would reveal that the
assailed decision of the RTC was based not
on PD No. 1529, Section 14(1), but under
Section 14(2) of said issuance. The pertinent
portion of the decision is quoted as follows:

"Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring

ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties
classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of
open, continuous and exclusive possession of
at least thirty (30) years. With such
conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of "private lands"
under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to
registration by those who have acquired
ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12,
1945, and such possession being been [sic]
open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the
land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree."

"From the documentary evidence presented

and formally offered by the applicant, the
Court is convinced that she and her
predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in
open, complete, continuous, notorious,
exclusive and peaceful possession over the
lands herein applied for registration of title,
for a period of over 40 years, in the concept
of an owner and that applicant has
registrable title over same lots in accordance
with Sec. 14, PD 1529."

A closer scrutiny will show that the

questioned decision was based on PD No.
1529, Section 14(2).

In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs.

Court of Appeals and Naguit, it was ruled
that:
Did the enactment of the Property
Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D.
No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public
domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and
authorizes the application of "those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by

In the instant case, applicant-appellee was

able to present tax declarations dating back
from 1948. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive
evidence
of
ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the
possession in the concept of owner for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual, or at
the least constructive, possession. They
constitute proof that the holder has a claim
of title over the property. The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests, not only ones sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the
property, but it also announces his adverse
claim against the State and all other
interested parties, including his intention to
contribute to the needed revenues of the
Government. All told, such acts strengthen
ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.33 (Citations omitted)

The Court agrees with the CAs finding that

the RTCs grant of the respondents
application for registration of title was based
on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on
Section 14(1) of the same decree. As the CA,
citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals and Naguit,34 correctly explained, an
applicant may apply for registration of title
through prescription under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, stating that patrimonial
properties of the State are susceptible of
prescription and that there is a rich
jurisprudential precedents which rule that
properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive
possession of at least 30 years.35

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 36 the

Court further clarified the difference between
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529. The former refers to registration of
title on the basis of possession, while the
latter
entitles
the
applicant
to
the
registration of his property on the basis of
prescription. Registration under the first
mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D.
No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while
under the second mode is made available
both by P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code.
Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30year period is in relation to possession
without regard to the Civil Code, while under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year
period involves extraordinary prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137.37

failed to show proof of an expressed State

declaration that the properties in question
are no longer intended for public use, public
service, the development of the national
wealth or have been converted into
patrimonial property. It pointed out that the
certification which the respondent submitted
did not indicate when the lands applied for
were declared alienable and disposable. 38

On this point, the Court cannot completely

agree with the petitioner. Indeed, the
respondent attempted to show proof as to
when the subject lands were declared
alienable and disposable. While the RTC and
the CA failed to cite the evidence which the
respondent submitted, the Court cannot, in
the name of substantial justice and equity,
close its eyes to the September 23, 2004

Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P.

Carreon (Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the
respondent attached in her Appellees brief
in the CA,39 as a supplement to her earlier
submissions, particularly Annex "G" and
Annex "G-1" or the June 28, 1995
Certifications issued by Eduardo M. Inting,
CENRO.40

Carreons Certification is reproduced here:

Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE
Cebu City
23 September 2004

Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly

shows the basis of the respondents
application for registration of title. However,
the petitioner argued that the respondent

CENRO, Cebu City, Lands Verification

CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL (Consolacion,
Cebu)

CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection
conducted by Forester Restituto A. Llegunas
a tract of land lots 3135 and 3136, Cad 545D(New) containing an area of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN
(15,687) square meters[,] more or less,
situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu as
shown and described in the sketch plan at
the back hereof as prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Aurelio Q. Caa for CONSTANCIO
CENIZA ET AL was found to be within
Alienable and Disposable Block I of Land
Classification Project No. 28 per L. C. Map No.
2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063
dated September 1, 1965. (Emphasis
Supplied)

This is to certify further that the subject area

is
outside
Kotkot-Lusaran
Watershed
Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No.
1074 dated Sept. 2, 1997.

This certification is issued upon the request

of Mr. Constancio Ceniza for the purpose of
ascertaining the land classification status
only
and
does
not
entitle
him
preferential/priority rights of possession until
determined by competent authorities.

FEDENCIO P. CARREON
OIC, Community Environment
& Natural Resources Officer

However, following our ruling in Republic of

the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 41 this
CENRO Certification by itself is insufficient to
establish that a public land is alienable and
disposable. While the certification refers to
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063
dated September 1, 1965, the respondent
should have submitted a certified true copy
thereof to substantiate the alienable
character of the land. In any case, the Court
does not need to further discuss whether the
respondent was able to overcome the burden
of proving that the land no longer forms part
of the public domain to support her
application for original land registration
because of other deficiencies in her
application.

Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the

required period of possession and occupation
for purposes of prescription. From the time of
the declaration on September 1, 1965 that
the properties in question are purportedly
alienable and disposable up to the filing of
the application of the respondent on July 17,
1995, the respondent and her predecessorsin-interest had possessed and occupied the
said properties for only 29 years and 10
months, short of two months to complete the
whole 30-year possession period.

Granting por arguendo that the respondent

and
her
predecessors-in-interest
had
possessed and occupied the subject lots
since 1948, the Court cannot still tack those
years to complete the 30-year possession
period since the said lots were only declared
alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965. In Naguit, we ruled that for as long as
the land was declared alienable and
disposable, the same is susceptible of
prescription for purposes of registration of
imperfect title.42 In Lim v. Republic,43 we
further clarified that "while a property
classified as alienable and disposable public

land may be converted into private property

by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of at least 30 years,
public dominion lands become patrimonial
property not only with a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable but also
with an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public use, public service
or the development of national wealth. And
only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run."44
While the subject lots were supposedly
declared
alienable
or
disposable
on
September
1,
1965
based
on
the
Certifications of the CENRO, the respondent
still failed to complete the 30-year period
required to grant her application by virtue of
prescription.

possession and occupation of the lot. 46 In the

said case, the Court clarified what it actually
meant when it said "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation," to wit:

The petitioner submits that even granting

arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not
assigned to it during the Spanish regime or it
is not the owner thereof pursuant to the
Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for
many decades thereafter vests ipso jure or
by operation of law upon the petitioner a
government grant, a vested title, to the
subject property. It cites Subsection 6 of
Section 54 of Act No. 926 and Subsection b
of Section 45 of Act No. 2874.
This contention is likewise not persuasive.

The respondent failed to present specific acts

of ownership to substantiate her claim of
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
adverse possession in the concept of an
owner.

The petitioner contends that the respondent

failed to present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the latters claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession in the concept of an owner. Here,
the Court agrees with the petitioners
argument.

In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v.

Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan, 45 the Court
ruled that for an applicant to ipso jure or by
operation of law acquire government grant or
vested title to a lot, he must be in open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious

One of the important requisites for the

application of the pertinent provisions of Act
No. 926 and Act No. 2874 is the "open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation" of the land by
the applicant. Actual possession of land
consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own
property. The phrase "possession and
occupation" was explained as follows:

It must be underscored that the law speaks

of "possession and occupation." Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make
one synonymous with the order [sic].
Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-

encompassing
effect
of
constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for one to qualify under paragraph
(b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of
the land must not be mere fiction. As this
Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of Lands:

talked of by the public or the people in the

neighborhood.

x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the

doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v. Director
of Lands . But it should be observed that the
application of the doctrine of constructive
possession in that case is subject to certain
qualifications, and this court was careful to
observe that among these qualifications is
"one particularly relating to the size of the
tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the
claimant." While, therefore, "possession in
the eyes of the law does not mean that a
man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said that he
is
in
possession,"
possession
under
paragraph 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45 of
Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol
of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like
claim of dominion over an immense tract of
territory. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is
not a mere fiction. x x x.

Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open,

continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation of Lot 138-B since
1894 as evidenced by the church structure
built thereon. However, the record is bereft
of any evidence that would tend to show that
such possession and occupation extended to
Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same
period. No single instance of the exercise by
the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of
dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction
of the municipal building as well as the
subsequent improvements thereon, e.g., the
rural health center, Buruanga community
Medicare hospital [sic], basketball court,
Rizal monument and grandstand, was [sic]
by its tolerance does not constitute proof of
possession and occupation on its (the
petitioners) part. Absent the important
requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereon
since 1894, no government grant or title to
Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the
petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law.
Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54
of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b)
of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained
by mere nominal claim.47 (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken
and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive
when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and

Use of land is adverse when it is open and

notorious.

In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous,

exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation" does not suffice. An applicant for
a grant or title over a lot must be able to
show that he has exercised acts of dominion
over the property in question. The

applicants possession must not be simply a

nominal claim where he only plants a sign or
symbol of possession. In other words, his
possession of the property must be patent,
visible,
apparent,
notorious
and
not
clandestine; it should be uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional;
it should demonstrate exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to his
own use and benefit; and it should be
conspicuous, which means generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in
the neighborhood.48

The Court held in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, et

al.,49 that therein petitioners were able to
show clear, competent and substantial
evidence establishing that they have
exercised acts of dominion over the property
in question. These acts of dominion were the
following:
(a) they constructed permanent buildings on
the questioned lot;
(b) they collected rentals;
(c) they granted permission to those who
sought their consent for the construction of a
drugstore and a bakery;
(d) they collected fruits from the fruit-bearing
trees planted on the said land;
(e) they were consulted regarding questions
of boundaries between adjoining properties;
and
(f) they religiously
property.50

paid

taxes

on

lots. Admittedly, the respondents best

evidence to prove possession and ownership
were tax declarations and receipts issued in
her name or the names of her predecessorsin-interest, but these tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or right of possession over a piece
of land. "Well settled is the rule that tax
declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any
other evidence.

The fact that the disputed property may

have been declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the applicants for registration
or of their predecessors-in- interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership." 51

In the instant case, the respondent failed to

show that she or her predecessors-in-interest
have exercised acts of dominion over the
said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the
respondent who testified to substantiate her
allegations in the application. She did not
present anyone else to support her claim of
"open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation." Unfortunately,
her
testimony
simply
made
general
declarations without further proof, to wit:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, are you the same Diosdada
Gielzcyk, the applicant in this case?

the
A - Yes.
Q - Are you familiar with Lots No. 3135 and
20045, both of Consolacion, Cebu?

However, in the present petition, the

respondent failed to specifically show that
she and her predecessors-in-interest had
exercised acts of dominion over the subject

A - Yes.
Court:

Excuse me, You can answer in English? You

dont need an interpreter?

A - I am in possession.
Court:

A - Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Germino:
Who is the owner of these lots?
A - I am the one.

Physically? I thought you are residing in

Manila?
A - Because my family is living there in
Consolacion and I always come home every
month. I have my parents and brothers
there.

Q - How large is 20047?

Court:
A - It has an area of 2,286 square meters.
The same property?
Q - How much is the assessed value of Lot
20047?

A - Near my parents house,Your Honor.

A - I do not think, P430.00 per square meters

is the assessed value reflected in the
document. Court:

Court:

Is that reflected in the tax declaration?

Atty. Germino:

Atty. Germino:

Q - How long have you been in possession of

the lots?

Proceed.

Yes, Your Honor.

Court:
Then the tax declaration would be the best
evidence.

A - Including my predecessors-in-interest, for

over a period of 40 years.
Q - What is the nature of your possession?

Atty. Germino:

A - Adverse against the whole world,

continous
[sic],
peaceful,
open
and
uninterrupted.

Q - Do you know if there are other persons

who are interested whatsoever over the lots
you have mentioned?

Q - How did you acquire Lot 20047?

A - I purchased it from Luisa Ceniza.

A - No sir.
Atty. Germino:

Q - Do you know how did Luisa Ceniza

acquire the same?

Q - Are there liens and encumbrances

affecting the lots?

A - She inherited it from her father Remigio

Ceniza.

A - No, sir.

Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?

Q - Who is in possession of these lots?

A - Yes, I have.52

xxxx

Atty. Germino:

Atty. Germino:

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. [no

number was indicated in the TSN] in the
name of Luisa Ceniza for the year 1963 tell
the court whether that is the tax declaration
for the year 1973? A - Yes, this is the one. 53

Q - You said that includ[i]ng your

predecessors-in-interest, your possession
including your predecessors-in-interest has
been for over forty (40) years. Do you have
the tax declaration of Lot 20047 since 1948
until the present?
A - Yes.
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 01670
in the name of the heirs of Remigio Ceniza
covering land in Consolacion for the year
1948, please examine and tell the court
whether that is the tax declaration of Lot
20047 for the year 1948?

In the continuance of her testimony, the

respondent added no further information for
this Court to conclude that she indeed
exercised specific acts of dominion aside
from paying taxes. She testified thus:
xxxx
Atty. Germino:

A - Yes, this is the one.

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, one of the last lot subject

to [sic] your petition is Lot 20045, how large
is this lot?

xxxx

A - 2,610 square meters.

Atty. Germino:

Q - How much is the assess value of this lot?

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No.

012931 in the name of heirs of Remigio
Ceniza for the year 1965, please examine
the same and tell the Honorable court what
relation has that to the tax declaration of lot
20047 for the year 1965?

A - P970.00

A - This is the same.

Q - Who is in possession of this lot?

A - I am the one.
Q - How long have you been in possession?

xxxx

A - Including my predecessors-in-interest is
[sic] over a period of 40 years.

Atty. Germino:

COURT: (to witness)

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No.

021294 in the name of Luisa and Constancio
Ceniza for the year 1968, please examine
and tell the court whether that is the tax
declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1968?

Q - Personally, how long have you been in

possession of this property?

A - Yes, this is the same.

xxxx

A - If I remember right, 1985.

ATTY. GERMINO:
Q - How did you acquire lot 20045?
A - I purchased it from Constancio Ceniza.

Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?

We ask your Honor the tax clearance be

marked as double "C".

A - Yes.
COURT: Mark it.
COURT:
xxxx
We are talking about 3136-A?
COURT: (to witness)
ATTY. GERMINO:
Yes, we are through with Lot 3135?
COURT:
This is 3136-A equivalent to Lot 20045.
Proceed.
ATTY. GERMINO:

I am showing to you a deed of absolute sale

by Constancio Ceniza over lot 3136-A
acknowledged before Notary Public Marino
Martillano, as Doc. No. 2637 book 4, series of
1988, please examine this document and tell
the Court if that is the deed of sale?

Q - You said that including your predecessorin-interest, your possession of the land
applied for is more than 40 years, do you
have a Tax Declaration of lot 3136-A from
1948 until the present? A - Yes.
Q - I am showing to you a bunch of Tax
Declaration, 6 in all, from the (sic) year 1948,
1965, 1980, 1981, 1985 and 1989, please
examine this Tax Declaration and tell us
whether these are the Tax Declarations of Lot
3136-A from 1948 until the present in your
name?
A - These are the ones.
ATTY. GERMINO:

A - Yes.
xxxx
Q - Are you not delinquent in the payment of
taxes for lot 3136-A?
A - No, sir.
Q - Do you have a tax clearances [sic]?

We ask that the Tax Declaration in bunch be

marked as Exhibit double "F" and the
succeeding Tax Declaration to be marked as
double "FF-1" up to double "F-5".
COURT:
Mark it.54

A - Yes, I have.
Q - I am showing to you tax clearance issued
by the municipal treasurer of Consolacion,
Cebu, is that the tax clearance you referred
to?
A - Yes, sir.
ATTY. GERMINO:

The respondents cross-examination further

revealed that she and her predecessors-ininterest have not exercised specific acts of
dominion over the properties, to wit:
COURT:
Cross-examination?

FISCAL ALBURO:

FISCAL ALBURO:

May it please the Honorable Court.

That is all, your Honor.

COURT:

ATTY. GERMINO:

Proceed.

No redirect, your Honor.

FISCAL ALBURO:

COURT: (to witness) By the way, where do

you stay often?

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, how many lots are involved

in this petition?
A - 2 portions.

A - Usually in Manila.
Q - Who takes care of the property in
Mandaue City?

Q - How did you acquire this lot [sic]?

A - I purchased it [sic] from Constancio
Ceniza.
Q - When was that?

A - My brothers because there are coconut

trees and some fruits and he watched it [sic].
Q - Who is using the coconut trees and the
fruits? A - Just for consumption, there are few
coconuts.55 (Emphasis supplied)

A - If I remember right in 1985 or 1986.

Q- In other words, you srarted [sic]
possessing the property since 1985, until the
present?
A- Yes.
Q- But you are not in actual occupant [sic] of
the property because you are residing in
Paranaque?
A- But I have a cousin in Consolacion.
Q- But you are not residing in Consolacion?
A- I used to go back and forth Cebu and
Manila.
Q- Who is in charge of your property in
Consolacion?
A- My brothers.
Q - In other words, your property is being
taken cared of by your brothers?
A - Yes.

From the foregoing testimony of the lone

witness (the applicant-respondent herself),
the Court can deduce that, besides
intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No.
3135-A, the respondent did not exercise acts
of dominion over it. Neither can the Court
give credence to the respondents claim that
her predecessors-in-interest had exercised
dominion over the property since the
respondent failed to present any witness who
would substantiate her allegation. The pieces
of documentary evidence, specifically the tax
declarations and the deeds of absolute sale,
can neither be relied upon because the same
revealed no indication of any improvement
that would have the Court conclude that the
respondent exercised specific acts of
dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute
sale simply said that the improvements on
Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut
trees, one (1) mango tree, one (1) caimito
tree and one (1) jackfruit tree.56 The tax
declarations have not shown any indication

supporting the respondents claim that she

exercised specific acts of dominion.57

As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute

sale showed that there were 14 coconut
trees, eight (8) jackfruit trees, and a
residential building, which was actually
possessed by the vendor Constancio Ceniza.
Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos.
29200, 04210 and 13275 where it was
declared that a residential building has been
built in Lot No. 3136-A.58 And based on the
records, Tax Declaration No. 29200, where
the residential building was first indicated, is
dated 1981. It may be said then that it was
only in 1981 when the respondents
predecessors-in-interest exercised specific
acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the
period of which consists barely of 14 years.
Thus, the respondent has not completed the
required 30 years of "open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation."

Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and

testimonial evidence, and considering that
the respondent did not present any other
witness to support her claim, the Court has
no other recourse but to declare that she has
not presented the premium of evidence
needed to award her title over the two
parcels of land.

Finally, the Court cannot end this decision

without reiterating the final words of former
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga in the case
of Malabanan59. Justice Tinga correctly
pointed out the need to review our present
law on the distribution of lands to those who
have held them for a number of years but
have failed to satisfy the requisites in
acquiring title to such land. Justice Tinga
eloquently put the matter before us, thus:

A final word. The Court is comfortable with

the correctness of the legal doctrines
established
in
this
decision.1wphi1Nonetheless, discomfiture
over the implications of todays ruling cannot
be discounted. For, every untitled property
that is occupied in the country will be
affected
by
this
ruling.
The
social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and
the Court would be abdicating its social
responsibility to the Filipino people if we
simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands,

whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and
cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called "Third World" countries.
This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the
reality on the ground. The law so far has
been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative
means of acquisition of these public domain
lands, such as through homestead or free
patent, have proven unattractive due to
limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal
settlement of alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, yet even that system, as
revealed in this decision, has considerable
limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos

who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived
and raised their families. Many more have
tilled and made productive idle lands of the
State with their hands. They have been
regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners.

There is much to be said about the virtues of

according them legitimate states. Yet such
virtues are not for the Court to translate into
positive law, as the law itself considered
such lands as property of the public
dominion.

It could only be up to Congress to set forth a

new phase of land reform to sensibly
regularize and formalize the settlement of
such lands which in legal theory are lands of
the public domain before the problem
becomes
insoluble.
This
could
be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending
the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for
the conversion of public dominion property
into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights

infuses into every aspect of well-being not
only of that individual, but also to the person
s family. Once that sense of security is
deprived, life and livelihood are put on stasis.
It is for the political branches to bring
welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.60 (Citation omitted and emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, the Court can only do as much to
bring relief to those who, like herein
respondent, wish to acquire title to a land
that they have bought. It is for our
lawmakers to write the law amending the
present ones and addressing the reality on
the ground, and which this Court will
interpret and apply as justice requires.

WHEREFORE
in
consideration
of
the
foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
GRANTED and the Decision dated September

21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CV No. 70078 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179181

2013

November 18,

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF

MANILA, Petitioner,
vs.
CRESENCIASTA.TERESA
RAMOS,
assisted by her husband PONCIANO
FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on
Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court the challenge to the April 10 2007
decision2 and
the
August
9,
2007
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA decision
affirmed, with modification, the January 17,
2005 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case
No. N-5811 that denied the application for
confirmation and registration of title filed by
the petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila (RCAM).

The Factual Antecedents

At the core of the controversy in the present
petition are two parcels of land Lot 1 with
an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with
an area of 760 square meters- covered by
amended Plan PSU-2239195 property), both
located in what used to be Barrio
Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On September
15, 1966, the RCAM filed before the R TC,
(then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
11, acting as a land registration court, an
application
for
registration
of
6
title (application) of property, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public
Land Act).7On October 4, 1974, the RCAM

amended its application8 by reducing Lot 2 to

760 square meters (from 1,832 square
meters).

In its amended application, the RCAM

claimed that it owned the property; that it
acquired the property during the Spanish
time; and that since then, it has been in
open, public, continuous and peaceful
possession of it in the concept of an owner. It
added that to the best of its knowledge and
belief, no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind affects the property, and that no person
has any claim, legal or equitable, on the
property.

The RCAM attached the following documents

to support its application: amended plan Psu223919; technical description of Lots 1 and
2;9 surveyor
s
certificate;10 and
Tax
Declaration No. 9551 issued on September 6,
1966.11

On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the

Philippines (Republic), through the Director of
Lands,
filed
an
opposition12 to
the
application. The Republic claimed that the
property is part of the public domain and
cannot be subject to private appropriation.

On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia

Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her husband
Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition 13 to
the RCAM's application. She alleged that the
property formed part of the entire property
that her family owns and has continuously
possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to
the present. Cresencia submitted the
following documents,14 among others, to

support her requested

imperfect title:

confirmation

of

1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta.

Teresa and Eulogia Sta. Teresa Vda. de
Ramos (Cresencia's parents);
2.) her marriage certificate;
3.) their children's birth certificates;
4.) certificates of ownership covering two
bancas;
5.) photographs of these two bane as with
her youngest child while standing on the
property and showing the location of the
RCAM' s church relative to the location of the
property;
6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand
(allegedly for their gravel and sand business)
on the property;
7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni
Maria standing on the property;
8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to
Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as
sole dealer of its gasoline products in
Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal;
9.) a photograph of their La Compania
Refreshment Store standing on their titled lot
adjacent to the property;

already on record:16 tax declarations issued

in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981, 1990, 1993,
and 1999;17 the certified true copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 0082 covering the lot
in the name of Garcia, which adjoins the
property on the south; and the affidavit of
Garcia confirming the RCAM's ownership of
the property.18 It likewise submitted several
testimonial evidence to corroborate its
ownership and claim of possession of the
property.

The ruling of the RTC

In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC
denied
the
RCAM's
application
for
registration of title. The RTC held that the
RCAM failed to prove actual possession and
ownership of the property applied for. The
RTC pointed out that the RCAM's only overt
act on the property that could be regarded
as evidence of actual possession was its
construction of the bahay ni Maria in 1991.
Even this act, according to the RTC, did not
sufficiently satisfy the actual possession
requirement of the law as the RCAM did not
show how and in what manner it possessed
the property prior to 1991. The RCAM's tax
declarations were also inconclusive since
they failed to prove actual possession.

11.) the registration certificate for their

family's
sheet
manufacturing
business
15
situated m Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal.

In contrast, the numerous businesses

allegedly conducted by Cresencia and her
family on the property, the various pieces of
documentary evidence that she presented,
and the testimony of the RCAM' s own
witnesses convinced the RTC that she and
her family actually possessed the property in
the manner and for the period required by
law.

The RCAM presented in evidence the

following documents, in addition to those

This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to

order the issuance of the title in Cresencia's

10.) a photograph of the certificate of

dealership given to Ponciano by a Tobacco
company for his dealership in Bagumbayan,
Taguig, Rizal; and

name. The RTC held that Cresencia failed to

include in her opposition a prayer for
issuance of title.
The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision
before the CA.

The CA ruling
In its April 10, 2007 decision, 20 the CA
affirmed with modification the RTC's January
17, 2005 ruling. The CA confirmed
Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect title to
the property, subject to her compliance with
the requisites for registration of title.

The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality

of the evidence on record unquestionably
showed that Cresencia was the actual
possessor and occupant, in the concept of an
owner, of the disputed property. The CA held
that Cresencia s use of the property since
the Spanish time (through her predecessorsin-interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s
witnesses,
clearly
demonstrated
her
dominion over the property. Thus, while she
failed to register the property in her name or
declare it for taxation purposes as pointed
out by the RCAM, the CA did not consider this
non-declaration significant to defeat her
claim. To the CA, Cresencia merely tolerated
the RCAM s temporary use of the property for
lack of any urgent need for it and only acted
to protect her right when the RCAM applied
for registration in its name. Thus, the CA
declared that Cresencia correctly waited until
her possession was disturbed before she
took action to vindicate her right.

The CA similarly disregarded the additional

tax declarations that the RCAM presented in
support of its application. The CA pointed out
that these documents hardly proved the

RCAM s alleged ownership of or right to

possess the property as it failed to prove
actual possession. Lastly, the CA held that it
was bound by the findings of facts and the
conclusions arrived at by the RTC as they
were amply supported by the evidence.

The RCAM filed the present petition after the

CA denied its motion for reconsideration.21

Assignment of Errors
The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred
and gravely abused its discretion in:22
1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect
title of the oppositor when the magnitude of
the parties evidence shows that the
oppositors merely had pretended possession
that could not ripen into ownership;
2. failing to consider that the RCAM had
continuous, open and notorious possession
of the property in the concept of an owner
for a period of thirty (30) years prior to the
filing of the application; and
3. confirming the oppositors incomplete and
imperfect title despite her failure to comply
with
the
substantial
and
procedural
requirements of the Public Land Act.
The Issue
In sum, the core issue for our resolution is
who -between the RCAM and Cresencia -is
entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for
confirmation and registration of imperfect
title.

The Court s Ruling

Preliminary considerations: nature of he

issues;
factual-issue-bar
rule
In
her
comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out
that
the
present
petition
essentially
questions the CAs appreciation of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
who attested to her actual, public and
notorious possession of the property. She
argues that these are questions of fact that
are not proper for a Rule 45 petition. In
addition, the findings of the RTC were well
supported by the evidence, had been
affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on
this Court.

sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of

fact25 and is barred in a Rule 45 petition.

We are not entirely convinced of the merits

of what Cresencia pointed out.

Moreover, the RCAM also questions the

propriety of the CA s confirmation of
Cresencia's title over the property although
she was not the applicant and was merely
the oppositor in the present confirmation and
registration proceedings. Stated in question
form -was the CA justified under the law and
jurisprudence in its confirmation of the
oppositor's title over the property? This, in
part, is a question of law as it concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to
recognized facts.

The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this

Court over petitions for review on certiorari is
limited to the review of questions of law and
not of fact. "A question of law exists when
the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to
a certain set of facts; or when the issue does
not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when a doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence x x x as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and
the probability of the situation."24

An examination of the RCAM's issues shows

that the claimed errors indeed primarily
question the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the lower courts' conclusion that
Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in
possession of the property in the manner and
for the period required by law. When the
presented
question
centers
on
the

Nevertheless,
jurisprudence
recognizes
certain exceptions to the settled rule. When
the lower courts grossly misunderstood the
facts and circumstances that, when correctly
appreciated, would warrant a different
conclusion, a review of the lower courts'
findings may be made.26 This, in our view, is
the exact situation in the case as our
discussions below will show.

Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the

petition on the merits.

Requirements
for
confirmation
and
registration of imperfect and incomplete title
under C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529

C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and

disposition of lands of the public domain.
Section 11 of C.A. No. 141 provides, as one
of the modes of disposing public lands that
are suitable for agriculture, the "confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles." Section 48,

on the other hand, enumerates those who

are considered to have acquired an imperfect
or incomplete title over public lands and,
therefore, entitled to confirmation and
registration under the Land Registration Act.

The RCAM did not specify the particular

provision of C.A. No. 141 under which it
anchored its application for confirmation and
registration of title. Nevertheless, the
allegations in its application and amended
application readily show that it based its
claim of imperfect title under Section 48(b)
of C.A. No. 141. As amended by P.D. No.
1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141 currently provides:

Section 48. The following described citizens

of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance [now
Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration
Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since June
12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant

and shall be entitled to a certificate of title

under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphases and italics ours]

Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D.

No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, then
operated under the Republic Act R.A.) No.
1942 (June 22, 1957) amendment which
reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least
thirty years, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphases and italics ours]

Since the RCAM filed its application on

September 15, 1966 and its amended
application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b)
of C.A. No. 141, as amended by R.A. No.
1942 (which then required possession of
thirty years), governs.

In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of

Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree specifies those
who are qualified to register their incomplete
title over an alienable and disposable public
land under the Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529,
which was approved on June 11, 1978,
superseded and codified all laws relative to
the registration of property.

The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D.

No. 1529 reads:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. [italics ours]

Under these legal parameters, applicants in

a judicial confirmation of imperfect title may
register their titles upon a showing that they
or their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
27 since June 12, 1945, or earlier (or for at
least 30 years in the case of the RCAM)
immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title. The
burden of proof in these cases rests on the
applicants who must demonstrate clear,
positive and convincing evidence that: (1)
the property subject of their application is
alienable and disposable land of the public
domain; and (2) their alleged possession and
occupation of the property were of the length
and of the character required by law. 28
On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled
to the benefits of C A No. 141 and P.D. No.
1529

Reiterating its position before the RTC and

the CA, the RCAM now argues that it actually,
continuously,
openly
and
notoriously
possessed
the
property
since
time
immemorial. It points out that its tax
declarations covering the property, while not
conclusive evidence of ownership, are proof
of its claim of title and constitute as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.

For her part, Cresencia counters that the

RCAM failed to discharge its burden of
proving possession in the concept of an
owner. She argues that the testimonies of
the RCAM s witnesses were replete with
inconsistencies and betray the weakness of
its claimed possession. Cresencia adds that
at most, the RCAM s possession was by her
mere tolerance which, no matter how long,
can never ripen into ownership. She also
points out that the RCAM s tax declarations
are insufficient proof of possession as they
are not, by themselves, conclusive evidence
of ownership.

We do not see any merit in the RCAM s

contentions.

The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC,

dismissed the RCAM s application for its
failure
to
comply
with
the
second
requirement possession of the property in
the manner and for the period required by
law.

We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the

CA findings on this point. They had carefully
analyzed and weighed each piece of the
RCAM s evidence to support its application

and had extensively explained in their

respective decisions why they could not give
weight to these pieces of evidence. Hence,
we affirm their denial of the RCAM' s
application. For greater certainty, we
expound on the reasons below.

a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the

property in the manner and for the period
required by law

The possession contemplated by Section

48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not fictional
or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the
Philippines,29 the
Court
explained
the
character of the required possession, as
follows:

The
law
speaks
of
possession
and
occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with
the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds
the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all-encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his
possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.

Accordingly, to prove its compliance with

Section 48(b)' s possession requirement, the
RCAM had to show that it performed specific
overt acts in the character an owner would

naturally exercise over his own property.

Proof of actual possession of the property at
the time of the filing of the application is
required because the phrase adverse,
continuous, open, public, and in concept of
owner," the RCAM used to describe its
alleged possession, is a conclusion of
law,30 not an allegation of fact. Possession is
open when it is patent, visible, apparent
[and] notorious x x x continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent
or
occasional;
exclusive
when
[the
possession
is
characterized
by
acts
manifesting] exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to [the
applicant's] own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is
generally known and talked of by the public
or the people in the neighborhood." 31

Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or

point to any specific act characterizing its
claimed possession in the manner described
above. The various documents that it
submitted, as well as the bare assertions it
made and those of its witnesses, that it had
been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the property, hardly
constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence
required
in
cases
of
this
nature.32 We elaborate below on these
points.

First, the tax declarations issued in the

RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977, 1984,
1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way
prove the character of its possession over
the property. Note that the settled rule is that
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence
showing
actual,
public
and
adverse
possession.33 The declaration for taxation
purposes of property in the names of
applicants for registration or of their

predecessors-in-interest
may
constitute
collaborating evidence only when coupled
with
other
acts
of
possession
and
34
ownership; standing
alone,
it
is
inconclusive.

This rule applies even more strongly in this

case since the RCAM's payments of taxes
due on the property were inconsistent and
random. Interestingly, while the RCAM
asserts that it had been in possession of the
property since the Spanish time, the earliest
tax declaration that it could present was that
issued in 1948. Also, when it filed its
application in 1966 and its amended
application in 197 4, the RCAM presented
only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and
1966) covering the property. And since then,
up to the issuance of the January 1 7, 2005
decision of the R TC, the RCAM presented
only five other tax declarations -those issued
in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999. The
case of Tan v. Republic35 teaches us that this
type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of
alleged ownership does not prove open,
continuous,
exclusive
and
notorious
possession and occupation.

Second, even if we were to consider the

RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for
inferring possession, 36 the RCAM still failed
to prove actual possession of the property for
the required duration. As already noted, the
earliest tax declaration that it presented was
for 1948. We are in fact inclined to believe
that the RCAM first declared the property in
its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration
does not appear to have cancelled any
previously-issued tax declaration. Thus,
when it filed its application in 1966, it was in
possession of the property for only eighteen
years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to
count the possession period from the filing of
its amended application in 1974, its alleged
possession (which was only for twenty-six

years counted from 1948) would still be short

of the thirty-year period required by Section
48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No.
1942. The situation would be worse if we
were to consider the amendment introduced
by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for
the RCAM's claimed possession of the
property to give rise to an imperfect title,
this possession should have commenced on
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Third, the amended plan Psu-223919,

technical description for Lots 1 and 2, and
surveyor s certificate only prove the identity
of the property that the RCAM sought to
register in its name.37 While these documents
plot the location, the area and the
boundaries of the property, they hardly
prove that the RCAM actually possessed the
property in the concept of an owner for the
required duration. In fact, the RCAM seemed
to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly
possesses and over which it claims
ownership. The total area that the RCAM
applied for, as stated in its amended
application and the amended survey plan,
was 794 square meters (34 square meters
for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for Lot 2).
Yet, in its various tax declarations issued
even after it filed its amended application,
the total area declared under its name was
still 1,832 square meters. Notably, the area
stated in its 1948 tax declaration was only
132.30 square meters, while the area stated
in the subsequently issued tax declaration
(1966)
was
1,832
square
meters.
Significantly, the RCAM did not account for or
provide sufficient explanation for this
increase in the area; thus, it appeared
uncertain on the specific area claimed.
Fourth, the RCAM did not build any
permanent
structure
or
any
other
improvement that clearly announces its
claim of ownership over the property. Neither
did it account for any act of occupation,
development, maintenance or cultivation for

the duration of time it was allegedly in

possession of it. The "bahay ni Maria" where
the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and
Lenten activities could hardly satisfy the
possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As
found out by the CA, this structure was
constructed only in 1991 and not at the time
of, or prior to, the filing of its application in
1966.

Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly

supplemented the inherent inadequacy of its
documentary evidence. While apparently
confirming the RCAM s claim, the testimonies
were undoubtedly hearsay and were not
based on personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the RCAMs
claimed actual, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession.

b. The RC M failed to prove that the property

is alienable and disposable land of he public
domain

Most importantly, we find the RCAM s

evidence to be insufficient since it failed to
comply with the first and most basic
requirement proof of the alienable and
disposable character of the property.
Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement
referring to this requirement was ever made
in the decisions of the R TC and the CA.
To prove that the property is alienable and
disposable, the RCAM was bound to establish
"the existence of a positive act of the
government
such
as
a
presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports
of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute."38 It could have
also secured a certification from the
government that the property applied for

was alienable and disposable. 39 Our review of

the records shows that this evidence is
fatally absent and we are in fact
disappointed to note that both the RTC and
the CA appeared to have simply assumed
that the property was alienable and
disposable.

We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for

two basic reasons. One, in this jurisdiction,
all lands belong to the State regardless of
their
classification.40 This
rule,
more
commonly known as the Regalian doctrine,
applies with equal force even to private
unregistered lands, unless the contrary is
satisfactorily shown. Second, unless the date
when the property became alienable and
disposable is specifically identified, any
determination on the RCAM' s compliance
with the second requirement is rendered
useless as any alleged period of possession
prior to the date the property became
alienable and disposable can never be
counted in its favor as any period of
possession and occupation of public lands in
the concept of owner, no matter how long,
can never ripen into ownership.41

On this ground alone, the R TC could have

outrightly denied the RCAM' s application.

On the CAs authority to confirm the title of

the
oppositor
in
land
registration
proceedings

The RCAM next argues that the CAs act of

confirming Cresencia's title over the property
is contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
RCAM points out that it filed the application
for registration of title under the provisions of
C.A. No. 141 or alternatively under P.D. No.

1529;
both
statutes
dictate
several
substantive and procedural requirements
that must first be complied with before title
to the property is confirmed and registered.
In affirming Cresencia's title without any
evidence showing her compliance with these
requirements, it claims that the CA, in effect,
made Cresencia the applicant entitled to the
benefits of the land registration proceedings
that it initiated before the lower court.

We differ with this view.

Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court

the authority to confirm the title of either the
applicant or the oppositor in a land
registration proceeding depending on the
conclusion that the evidence calls for.
Specifically, Section 29 provides that the
court "x x x after considering the evidence x
x x finds that the applicant or the oppositor
has sufficient title proper for registration,
judgment shall be rendered confirming the
title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the
land x x x x." (emphases and italics ours)

Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the

CA has the authority to confirm the title of
Cresencia, as the oppositor, over the
property. This, of course, is subject to
Cresencia's satisfaction of the evidentiary
requirement of P D No. 1529, in relation with
C.A. No. 141 in support of her own claim of
imperfect title over the property.
The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to
the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No.
1529

The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence

belies Cresencia's claim of continuous, open

and notorious possession since the Spanish

time. The RCAM points out that, first,
Cresencia failed to declare for taxation
purposes the property in her name, thus
effectively indicating that she did not believe
herself to be its owner. Second, Cresencia did
not have the property surveyed in her name
so that she could assert her claim over it and
show its metes and bounds. Third, Cresencia
did not register the property in her name
although she previously registered the
adjoining lot in her name. Fourth, Cresencia
did not construct any permanent structure
on the property and no traces of the
businesses allegedly conducted by her and
by her family on it could be seen at the time
it filed its application. And fifth, Cresencia did
not perform any act of dominion that, by the
established jurisprudential definition, could
be
sufficiently
considered
as
actual
possession.

We agree with the RCAM on most of these

points.

While we uphold the CA' s authority to

confirm the title of the oppositor in a
confirmation and registration proceedings,
we cannot agree, however, with the
conclusion the CA reached on the nature of
Cresencia's possession of the property.

Under the same legal parameters we used to

affirm the RTC's denial of the RCAM' s
application, we also find insufficient the
evidence that Cresencia presented to prove
her claimed possession of the property in the
manner and for the period required by C.A.
No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia was
bound to adduce evidence that irrefutably
proves her compliance with the requirements
for confirmation of title. To our mind, she also
failed to discharge this burden of proof; thus,

the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary

findings
of
the
RTC
and
confirmed
Cresencias title over the property.

We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons

outlined below.

First, the various pieces of documentary

evidence that Cresencia presented to
support her own claim of imperfect title
hardly proved her alleged actual possession
of the property. Specifically, the certificates
of marriage, birth and death did not
particularly state that each of these certified
events, i.e. marriage, birth and death, in fact
transpired on the claimed property; at best,
the certificates proved the occurrence of
these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal
and on the stated dates, respectively.

Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two

bancas in the name of Ponciano, the
registration certificate for their family s sheet
manufacturing business, the photograph of
the certificate of dealership in the name of
Ponciano given by a tobacco company, and
the photograph of the plaque awarded to
Ponciano by ESSO Standard Philippines as
sole dealer of its gasoline products did not
prove that Cresencia and her family
conducted these businesses on the disputed
property itself. Rather, they simply showed
that at one point in time, Cresencia and her
family conducted these businesses in
Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In fact, Cresencia
s claim that they conducted their gasoline
dealership business on the property is belied
by the testimony of a witness who stated
that the gas station was located north (or the
other side) of Cresencia s titled lot and not
on the property.42

The presence on the property, as shown by

photographs, of Cresencia s daughter, of the
two bancas owned by her family, and of the
pile of gravel and sand they allegedly used in
their gravel and sand business also hardly
count as acts of occupation, development or
maintenance that could have been sufficient
as proof of actual possession. The presence
of these objects and of Cresencia s daughter
on the property was obviously transient and
impermanent; at most, they proved that
Cresencia and her family used the property
for a certain period of time, albeit, briefly
and temporarily.
Finally, the records show that the La
Compania Refreshment Store business (that
they allegedly conducted on the property)
actually stood on their titled lot adjoining the
property.

Second, while Cresencia registered in her

name the adjoining lot (which they had been
occupying at the time the RCAM filed its
application and where their La Compania
Refreshment Store stood), she never had the
property registered in her name. Neither did
Cresencia or her predecessors-in-interest
declare the property for taxation purposes
nor had the property surveyed in their names
to properly identify it and to specifically
determine its metes and bounds. The
declaration for taxation purposes of property
in their names would have at least served as
proof that she or her predecessors-in-interest
had a claim over the property 43 that could be
labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof
of actual possession.

Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and

Florencia Francisco Mariano (Cresencia's
daughter) on the nature and duration of their
family's alleged possession of the property,
other than being self-serving, were mere
general statements and could not have

constituted
the
factual
evidence
of
possession that the law requires. They also
failed to point out specific acts of dominion
or ownership that were performed on the
property by the parents of Cresencia, their
predecessors-in-interest. They likewise failed
to present any evidence that could have
corroborated their alleged possession of the
property from the time of their grandfather,
Cipriano, who acquired the property from its
previous owner, Petrona Sta. Teresa.
Interestingly, other than Ponciano and
Florencia, none of the witnesses on record
seemed to have known that Cresencia owns
or at least claims ownership of the property.

At any rate, even if we were to consider

these pieces of evidence to be sufficient,
which we do not, confirmation and
registration of title over the property in
Cresencia' s name was still improper in the
absence of competent and persuasive
evidence on record proving that the property
is alienable and disposable.
For all these reasons, we find that the CA
erred when it affirmed the RTC's ruling on
this matter and confirmed Cresencia's
imperfect title to the property.WHEREFORE,
in light of these considerations, we hereby
DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with
MODIFICATION the decision dated April 10,
2007 and the resolution dated August 9,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 84646 to the extent described below:

1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of

Appeals as it affirmed the January 17 2005
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811
that DENIED the application for confirmation
and registration of title filed by the
petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila; and

2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the

confirmation made by the Court of Appeals
of the title over the property in the name of
respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for
lack of sufficient evidentiary basis.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192896

July 24, 2013

DREAM
VILLAGE
NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Incumbent
President,
GREG
SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES
DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:
Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision2 dated September 10, 2009 and
Resolution3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85228
nullifying and setting aside for lack of
jurisdiction the Resolution 4 dated April 28,
2004 of the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP Case
No. 99-500. The fallo of the assailed COS LAP
Resolution reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment

is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the subject property, covering
an area of 78,466 square meters, now being
occupied by the members of the Dream
Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be
outside of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.
2. In accordance with the tenets of social
justice, members of said association are
advised to apply for sales patent on their
respective occupied lots with the Land
Management Bureau, DENR-NCR, pursuant to
R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.

3. Directing the Land Management BureauDENR-NCR to process the sales patent

application of complainants pursuant to
existing laws and regulation.
4. The peaceful possession of actual
occupants be respected by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.5

Antecedent Facts
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to
represent more than 2,000 families who have
been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in
Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in
the
concept
of
owners
continuously,
exclusively and notoriously."6 The lot used to
be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban
(Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y
Ochoa and registered under a Torrens
title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal.8 Maricaban
covered several parcels of land with a total
area of over 2,544 hectares spread out over
Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque.9

Following the purchase of Maricaban by the

government of the United States of America
(USA) early in the American colonial period,
to be converted into the military reservation
known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued
in the name of the USA to cancel OCT No.
291.10 The US government later transferred
30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad
Company, for which TCT No. 192 was
cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the
first in the name of the Manila Railroad
Company for 30 has., and the second in the
name of the USA for the rest of the
Maricaban property.11

On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was

cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688, and
later that year, on September 15, 1914, TCT
No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT
No. 2288, both times in the name of the
USA.12 On December 6, 1956, the USA
formally ceded Fort William Mckinley to the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on
September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524,
this time in the name of the Republic. 13 On
July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia
issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing
from sale or settlement the tracts of land
within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed
Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for
military purposes.14

On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E.

Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio
alienable and disposable15 in the manner
provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos. 274
and 730, in relation to the Public Land
Act,16 thus allowing the sale to the settlers of
home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan,
Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. 17

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C.

Aquino
issued
Proclamation
No.
172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting
to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298
the areas in Western Bicutan open for
disposition.18

On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was

passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee
and accelerate the conversion of Clark and
Subic military reservations and their
extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace

Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station,

San Miguel Naval Communications Station
and Capas Relay Station) to productive
civilian uses. Section 820 of the said law
provides that the capital of the BCDA will be
provided from sales proceeds or transfers of
lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro
Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio.
The law, thus, expressly authorized the
President of the Philippines "to sell the above
lands, in whole or in part, which are hereby
declared alienable and disposable pursuant
to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government
properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for
the BCDA. Titles to the camps were
transferred
to
the
BCDA
for
this
22
purpose, and TCT No. 61524 was cancelled
on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888,
23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and
23891, now in the name of the BCDA.23

Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are:

a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for
the National Capital Region (NCR) Security
Brigade, Philippine Army officers housing
area, and Philippine National Police jails and
support services (presently known as Camp
Bagong Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has.
in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift
Wing, one squadron of helicopters for the
NCR and respective security units; c) twenty
one (21) areas segregated by various
presidential
proclamations;
and
d)
a
proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for
families to be affected by the construction of
Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4,
provided that the boundaries and technical
description of these exempt areas shall be
determined by an actual ground survey. 24

Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully

asserting title to Dream Village and
unlawfully subjecting its members to
summary demolition, resulting in unrest and

tensions
among
the
residents,25 on
November 22, 1999, the latter filed a lettercomplaint with the COSLAP to seek its
assistance in the verification survey of the
subject 78,466-sq m property, which they
claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298
and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172.
They claim that they have been occupying
the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept
of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously for several years," and have built
their houses of sturdy materials thereon and
introduced paved roads, drainage and
recreational and religious facilities. Dream
Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not
among those transferred to the BCDA under
R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent
applications by the occupants should be
processed by the Land Management Bureau
(LMB).

On August 15, 2000, Dream Village

formalized its complaint by filing an
Amended Petition26 in the COSLAP. Among
the reliefs it sought were:
d. DECLARING the subject property
alienable and disposable by virtue
applicable laws;

as
of

e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of

subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in
the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, which is presently being occupied by
herein petitioner as within the coverage of
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside
the claim of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK
COMPLEX
and/or
BASES
CONVESION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau
to
process
the
application
of
the
ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of
their respective lots under the provisions of
Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring
supplied)

Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated

November
23,
2000
questioned
the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP to hear Dream
Villages complaint, while asserting its title to
the subject property pursuant to R.A. No.
7227. It argued that under Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 561 which created the COSLAP, its
task is merely to coordinate the various
government offices and agencies involved in
the settlement of land problems or disputes,
adding that BCDA does not fall in the
enumeration in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it
being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a
timber concessionaire, or a government
reservation grantee, but the holder of
patrimonial government property which
cannot be the subject of a petition for
classification, release or subdivision by the
occupants of Dream Village.

In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the

COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation
conference on March 22, 2001, during which
the
parties
agreed
to
have
a
relocation/verification survey conducted of
the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP
wrote to the Department of Environment and
Natural
Resources
(DENR)-Community
Environment and Natural Resources OfficeNCR requesting the survey, which would also
include Swo-00-0001302, covering the
adjacent
AFP-RSBS
Industrial
Park
established by Proclamation No. 1218 on
May 8, 1998 as well as the abandoned
Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road). 30

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the

final report of the verification survey and a
blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty.
Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director
for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of
the DENR report states:

3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation

172.
Dream
Village
Neighborhood
Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot
13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of
78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area
actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of
BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring
supplied)

COSLAP Ruling
On the basis of the DENRs verification
survey report, the COSLAP resolved that
Dream Village lies outside of BCDA, and
particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and
thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process
the applications of Dream Villages members
for sales patent, noting that in view of the
length of time that they "have been openly,
continuously and notoriously occupying the
subject property in the concept of an owner,
x x x they are qualified to apply for sales
patent on their respective occupied lots
pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation
to the provisions of the Public Land Act." 32

On the question of its jurisdiction over the

complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood
that the summary eviction by the BCDA of
more than 2,000 families in Dream Village
could stir up serious social unrest, and
maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561
authorizes it to "assume jurisdiction and
resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and explosive in nature considering,
for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest, or other similar
critical
situations
requiring
immediate
action," even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O. No.
561 also allows it to take cognizance of
"petitions for classification, release and/or

subdivision of lands of the public domain,"

exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream
Village. Rationalizing that it was created
precisely to provide a more effective
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems "in general," the COSLAP
invoked as its authority the 1990 case of
Baaga v. COSLAP,33 where this Court said:

It is true that Executive Order No. 561

provides that the COSLAP may take
cognizance of cases which are "critical and
explosive in nature considering, for instance,
the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social tension or
unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action." However, the
use of the word "may" does not mean that
the COSLAPs jurisdiction is merely confined
to the above mentioned cases. The
provisions of the said Executive Order are
clear that the COSLAP was created as a
means of providing a more effective
mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems in general, which are
frequently the source of conflicts among
settlers, landowners and cultural minorities.
Besides, the COSLAP merely took over from
the abolished PACLAP whose functions,
including its jurisdiction, power and authority
to act on, decide and resolve land disputes
(Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it.
The said Executive Order No. 561 containing
said provision, being enacted only on
September 21, 1979, cannot affect the
exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP
Provincial Committee of Koronadal on
September 20, 1978. Neither can it affect the
decision of the COSLAP which merely
affirmed said exercise of jurisdiction.34

In its Motion for Reconsideration 35 filed on

May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the
validity of the survey results since it was
conducted
without
its
representatives

present, at the same time denying that it

received a notification of the DENR
verification survey.36 It maintained that there
is no basis for the COSLAPs finding that the
members of Dream Village were in open,
continuous, and adverse possession in the
concept of owner, because not only is the
property not among those declared alienable
and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial
property of the State.37

In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the

COSLAP
denied
BCDAs
Motion
for
Reconsideration, insisting that it had due
notice of the verification survey, while also
noting that although the BCDA wanted to
postpone the verification survey due to its
tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey
when it failed to suggest an alternative
survey date to ensure its presence.

CA Ruling
On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA
argued that the dispute is outside the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the
lands history of private ownership and
because it is registered under an indefeasible
Torrens title40; that Proclamation No. 172
covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298
in Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village
occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo00-0001302, which also belongs to the
BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based
on an erroneous DENR report stating that
Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because
Lots 10, 11, and portion of Lot 13 of Swo-000001302 are within the DA42; that the
COSLAP was not justified in ignoring BCDAs
request to postpone the survey to the
succeeding year because the presence of its
representatives in such an important
verification survey was indispensable for the
impartiality of the survey aimed at resolving
a highly volatile situation43; that the COSLAP

is a mere coordinating administrative agency

with limited jurisdiction44; and, that the
present case is not among those enumerated
in Section 3 of E.O. No. 56145.

The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained

that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides
that it may assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes in "other similar
land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude,"46 and the present case is one
such problem.

The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10,

2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the
question of whether Dream Village is within
the areas declared as available for
disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond
its competence to determine, even as the
land in dispute has been under a private title
since 1906, and presently its title is held by a
government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to
the case of Baaga relied upon by Dream
Village, where the disputed land was part of
the public domain and the disputants were
applicants for sales patent thereto.

Dream Villages motion for reconsideration

was denied in the appellate courts Order 48 of
July 13, 2010.

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

On petition for review on certiorari to this
Court, Dream Village interposes the following
issues:
A

IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP

IN
COSLAP
CASE
NO.
99-500,
THE
HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN A
MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT;
B
THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT
COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES
HEREIN.49

The Courts Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa

Makati are essentially not much different
from the controversy below. There, 20,000
families were long-time residents occupying
98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who
vainly sought to avert their eviction and the
demolition of their houses by the BCDA upon
a claim that the land was owned by the USA
under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme Court
found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been
cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of
the Republic, which title was in turn
cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos.
23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890,
and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The
Court ruled that the BCDAs aforesaid titles
over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible
and beyond question, since TCT No. 61524
was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to
an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the
legal basis for BCDAs takeover and
management of the subject lots.52

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has

long been decided with finality. In Samahan
ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v.
BCDA,50 it was categorically ruled as follows:
First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine
Government, and now the BCDA, has title
and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case
of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds
of Pasay City, Pasig and Makati is final and
conclusive on the ownership of the then
Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the
Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue
on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort
Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view
that the USA is still the owner of the subject
lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim
of ownership or interest in them.51

Dream Village sits on the

abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable
and disposable.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the

following surveys were conducted by the
Bureau of Lands to delimit the boundaries of
the areas excluded from the coverage of
Proclamation No. 423:
Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved
1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October
21, 1986
2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13,
1986
3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13,
1986

4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January

15, 198753

However, the survey plan for Western

Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3,
4, 5 and 6 thereof are inside the area
segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani
under Proclamation No. 208, which then
leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298
as available for disposition. For this reason, it
was necessary to amend Proclamation No.
2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only
Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 are declared
alienable and disposable.54

The DENR verification survey report states

that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of
Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots
10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x
x x Dream Village is outside Lot1, SWO-13000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot
13, SWO-00-0001302 with an actual area of
78466 square meters. The area is actually is
[sic]
outside
SWO-00-0001302
of
BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the
DENR also states that the area is outside of
BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA
holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio,
even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11
and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This
area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of
Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the
Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary
line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really
the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which
was abandoned when, as constructed, it was
made to traverse northward into the Libingan
ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has not
disputed this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5

Road
to
cross
Swo-00-0001302
was
abandoned by deviating it northward to
traverse the southern part of Libingan ng
mga Bayani does not signify abandonment
by the government of the bypassed lots, nor
that these lots would then become alienable
and disposable. They remain under the title
of the BCDA, even as it is significant that
under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a
relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be
reserved for families affected by the
construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere
claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-000001302 are part of the said relocation site.
These lots border C-5 Road in the
south,56making them commercially valuable
to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim
that the government has abandoned them to
Dream Village.

While property of the State or any of its

subdivisions
patrimonial
in
character may be the object of prescription,
those
"intended
for
some public service or for the development
of
the
national
wealth" are considered property of public
dominion and therefore not susceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that

"property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription."
Articles 420 and 421 identify what is
property of public dominion and what is
patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of

public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as

roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without
being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development
of the national wealth
.
Art. 421. All other property of the State,
which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the

area occupied by Dream Village is
susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was
pointed out that from the moment R.A. No.
7227 was enacted, the subject military lands
in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified
that the said lands did not thereby become
patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the
express reservation that they are to be sold
in order to raise funds for the conversion of
the former American bases in Clark and
Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of
the law can be tied to either "public service"
or "the development of national wealth"
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such
that the lands remain property of the public
dominion, albeit their status is now alienable
and disposable. The Court then explained
that it is only upon their sale to a private
person or entity as authorized by the BCDA
law that they become private property and
cease to be property of the public
dominion:58

For as long as the property belongs to the

State,
although
already classified
as

alienable or disposable, it remains property

of the public dominion if when it is "intended
for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth."59

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code,

public domain lands become patrimonial
property only if there is a declaration that
these are alienable or disposable, together
with an express government manifestation
that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when
the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that
before
acquisitive
prescription
can
commence, the property sought to be
registered must not only be classified as
alienable and disposable, it must also be
expressly declared by the State that it is no
longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, or that
the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Absent such an express
declaration by the State, the land remains to
be property of public dominion.60

Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423

in 1957, vast portions of the former
Maricaban have been legally disposed to
settlers, besides those segregated for public
or government use. Proclamation No. 1217
(1973) established the Maharlika Village in
Bicutan, Taguig to serve the needs of
resident
Muslims
of
Metro
Manila;
Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended
by Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared
more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper
and Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and
Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable;
Proclamation No. 518 (1990) formally
exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the

Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West

Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and
Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared
them open for disposition.

The above proclamations notwithstanding,

Fort Bonifacio remains property of public
dominion of the State, because although
declared alienable and disposable, it is
reserved for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth, in this
case, for the conversion of military
reservations in the country to productive
civilian
uses.61Needless
to
say,
the
acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream
Village has not even begun to run.

Ownership of a land registered under a

Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse possession.

Dream Village has been unable to dispute

BCDAs claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13
of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned rightof-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast
titled territory of Fort Bonifacio. We have
already established that these lots have not
been declared alienable and disposable
under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.

Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under

a Torrens title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. 62 Section
47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration
Decree, expressly provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. And,
although the registered landowner may still
lose his right to recover the possession of his
registered
property
by
reason
of

laches,63 nowhere has Dream Village alleged

or proved laches, which has been defined as
such neglect or omission to assert a right,
taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an
adverse party, as will operate as a bar in
equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the
assertion
of
a
right
which
works
disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or
parties. It is based on public policy which, for
the peace of society, ordains that relief will
be denied to a stale demand which otherwise
could be a valid claim.64

The subject property having been expressly

reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village settlers.

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the

COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream
Villages complaint. Concurring, the CA has
ruled that questions as to the physical
identity of Dream Village and whether it lies
in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or
whether Proclamation No. 172 has released
the disputed area for disposition are issues
which are "manifestly beyond the scope of
the COSLAPs jurisdiction vis--vis Paragraph
2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561,"65 rendering its
Resolution
a
patent
nullity
and
its
pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said,
under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the
COSLAPs duty would have been to refer the
conflict to another tribunal or agency of
government in view of the serious
ramifications of the disputed claims:

In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted

outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance

of the case. It would have been more

prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred
the controversy to the proper forum in order
to fully thresh out the ramifications of the
dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned
Resolution is a patent nullity since the
tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction.
Thus, the pronouncements contained therein
are void. "We have consistently ruled that a
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right or the creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating
from
it
have
no
legal
66
effect." (Citation omitted)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been

reserved for a declared specific public
purpose under R.A. No. 7227, which
unfortunately for Dream Village does not
encompass the present demands of its
members. Indeed, this purpose was the very
reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been
transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very
purpose which takes the dispute out of the
direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP. A review of
the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify
that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes over
public lands not reserved or declared for a
public use or purpose.

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued

E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action
Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP) to
expedite and coordinate the investigation
and resolution of all kinds of land disputes
between settlers, streamline and shorten
administrative procedures, adopt bold and
decisive measures to solve land problems, or
recommend other solutions.67 E.O. No. 305,
issued on March 19, 1971, reconstituted the
PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases involving public lands and
other lands of the public domain, 68 as well as
adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms:

"To investigate, coordinate, and resolve

expeditiously land disputes, streamline
administrative proceedings, and, in general,
to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve
problems involving public lands and lands of
the public domain."69

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832

reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its
functions and duties. Section 2 thereof even
granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP.

The PACLAP shall have the following
functions and duties:
1. Direct and coordinate the activities,
particularly the investigation work, of the
various government agencies and agencies
involved in land problems or disputes, and
streamline administrative procedures to
relieve small settlers and landholders and
members of cultural minorities of the
expense
and
time-consuming
delay
attendant to the solution of such problems or
disputes;
2. Refer for immediate action any land
problem or dispute brought to the attention
of the PACLAP, to any member agency
having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That
when the Executive Committee decides to
act on a case, its resolution, order or decision
thereon shall have the force and effect of a
regular administrative resolution, order or
decision, and shall be binding upon the
parties therein involved and upon the
member agency having jurisdiction thereof;
xxxx
4. Evolve and implement a system of
procedure for the speedy investigation and
resolution of land disputes or problems at

provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring

supplied)

(b)
Between
occupants/squatters
government reservation grantees;

and

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public

land claimants or applicants;
On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561
abolished the PACLAP and created the
COSLAP
to
be
a
more
effective
administrative body to provide a mechanism
for the expeditious settlement of land
problems among small settlers, landowners
and members of the cultural minorities to
avoid social unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3
of E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates
the instances when the COSLAP can exercise
its adjudicatory functions:
Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The
Commission shall have the following powers
and functions:
1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the
investigation
work,
of
the
various
government offices and agencies involved in
the settlement of land problems or disputes,
and streamline administrative procedures to
relieve small settlers and landholders and
members of cultural minorities of the
expense
and
time
consuming
delay
attendant to the solution of such problems or
disputes;
2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action
by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction
any land problem or dispute referred to the
Commission: Provided, That the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume
jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence
or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a)
Between
occupants/squatters
and
pasture lease agreement holders or timber
concessionaires;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or

subdivision of lands of the public domain;
and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave
urgency and magnitude.
xxxx

Citing the constant threat of summary

eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the
seriousness and urgency of the reliefs sought
in its Amended Petition, Dream Village insists
that the COSLAP was justified in assuming
jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But
in Longino v. Atty. General,71 it was held that
as an administrative agency, COSLAPs
jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically
mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No.
561. The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP,

are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as
such, could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling
statutes. x x x.
xxxx

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has

two options in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, namely, (a) refer
the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b)
assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of
those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of
the law, if such case is critical and explosive

in nature, taking into account the large

number of the parties involved, the presence
or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action. In resolving whether to
assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer
the same to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the
nature or classification of the land involved,
the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not
vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem.72 (Citation omitted)

The Longino ruling has been consistently

cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among
them Davao New Town Development Corp. v.
COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v.
COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v. de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v.
Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and Vda.
de Herrera v. Bernardo.79
Thus, in Machado, it was held that the
COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O.
No. 561 to assume jurisdiction over "other
similar land problems of grave urgency,"
since the statutory construction principle of
ejusdem generis prescribes that where
general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent
but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind as those
specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule,
COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to disputes
involving lands in which the government has
a proprietary or regulatory interest, 81 or
public lands covered with a specific license
from the government such as a pasture lease
agreements, a timber concessions, or a
reservation grants,82 and where moreover,
the dispute is between occupants/squatters
and pasture lease agreement holders or

timber
concessionaires;
between
occupants/squatters
and
government
reservation
grantees;
and
between
occupants/squatters
and
public
land
claimants or applicants.

In Longino, the parties competed to lease a

property of the Philippine National Railways.
The
high
court
rejected
COSLAPs
jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is
not public land, and neither party was a
squatter, patent lease agreement holder,
government reservation grantee, public land
claimant or occupant, or a member of any
cultural minority, nor was the dispute critical
and explosive in nature so as to generate
social tension or unrest, or a critical situation
which required immediate action.83

In Davao New Town Development Corp., it

was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent
jurisdiction with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes
concerning the implementation of agrarian
reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive
and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters on the DAR implies that no other
court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to
resolve disputes properly cognizable by the
DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing and
resolving the case, COSLAP should have
simply
referred
private
respondents
complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to
the Court:

The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2)

of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the
power to resolve land disputes, does not
confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to
assume every matter referred to it. Its
jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over
lands in which the government has
proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover,

the land dispute in Baaga involved parties

with conflicting free patent applications
which was within the authority of PACLAP to
resolve, unlike that of the instant case which
is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to

demolish structures encroaching into private
property.1wphi1 The Supreme court ruled
that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes
"involving public lands or lands of the public
domain or those covered with a specific
license from the government such as a
pasture
lease
agreement,
a
timber
86
concession, or a reservation grant."

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no

jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between
two local government units, that its decision
is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari,
that it can never become final and any writ
of execution based on it is void, and all acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. 87
In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction
of COSLAP does not extend to disputes
involving the ownership of private lands, or
those already covered by a certificate of title,
as these fall exactly within the jurisdiction of
the
courts
and
other
administrative
88
agencies."
In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP
has no jurisdiction over controversies
relating to ownership and possession of
private lands, and thus, the failure of
respondents to properly appeal from the
COSLAP decision before the appropriate
court was held not fatal to the petition for
certiorari that they eventually filed with the
CA. The latter remedy remained available
despite the lapse of the period to appeal
from the void COSLAP decision.89

In Machado, the high court ruled that

COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over
private lands between private parties,
reiterating the essential rules contained in
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 governing the
exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two

different rules in acting on a land dispute or
problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can
assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one
of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e)
of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case
to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction
for settlement or resolution. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or
to refer it to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the
nature or classification of the land involved;
(b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of
the questions raised; and (d) the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injury to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The terms of the law
clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the
general power to assume jurisdiction over
any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO
561, the instances when the COSLAP may
resolve land disputes are limited only to
those involving public lands or those covered
by a specific license from the government,
such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions,
or
reservation
90
grants. (Citations omitted)

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed

jurisdiction
over
a
complaint
for
"interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,
harassment and trespassing" over a private
parcel of land. The CA ruled that the parties
were estopped to question COSLAPs
jurisdiction since they participated actively in
the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting

from the complaint that the case actually

involved a claim of title and possession of
private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC
has jurisdiction since the dispute did not fall
under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of
E.O. No. 561, was not critical and explosive in
nature, did not involve a large number of
parties, nor was there social tension or
unrest present or emergent.91

the parties to the case, the nature of the

questions raised, and the need for
immediate and urgent action thereon to
prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property.

WHEREFORE, premises
petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked

Baaga to assert its jurisdiction. There,
Guillermo Baaga had filed a free patent
application with the Bureau of Lands over a
public land with an area of 30 has. Gregorio
Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent
application for the same property. The
opposing claims and protests of the
claimants remained unresolved by the
Bureau of Lands, and neither did it conduct
an investigation. Daproza wrote to the
COSLAP, which then opted to exercise
jurisdiction over the controversy. The high
court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its
jurisdiction is not confined to the cases
mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O.
No. 561, but includes land problems in
general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and
cultural minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in

Longino and in the other cases aforecited,
the land dispute in Baaga was between
private individuals who were free patent
applicants over unregistered public lands. In
contrast, the present petition involves land
titled to and managed by a government
agency which has been expressly reserved
by law for a specific public purpose other
than for settlement. Thus, as we have
advised in Longino, the law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem, but it has to consider the
nature or classification of the land involved,

considered,

the

G.R. No. 202932

2013

October 23,

EDILBERTO U. VENTURA JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES PAULINO and EVANGELINE
ABUDA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
annul the Decision1 dated 9 March 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
92330 and the Resolution2 dated 3 August
2012 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The Decision and Resolution dismissed the
Appeal dated 23 October 2009 and affirmed
with modification the Decision3dated 24
November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32 (RTC-Manila).

Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior

subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin)
when she married Esteban. Socorro married
Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was
not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the
time of Socorros marriage to Esteban.

Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand,

was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in
1960. According to Edilberto, sometime in
1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot
situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio
Street, Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property).
The remaining portion was thereafter
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers
behalf sometime in 1970.4 The Vitas property
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 141782, dated 11 December 1980,
issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
Filipino, married to Socorro Torres."5

Edilberto also claimed that starting 1978,

Evangeline and Esteban operated small
business establishments located at 903 and
905 Delpan Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan
property).6

The Facts
The RTC-Manila and the CA found the facts to
be as follows:
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes
(Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980.
Although Socorro and Esteban never had
common children, both of them had children
from prior marriages: Esteban had a
daughter
named
Evangeline
Abuda
(Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who
was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.
(Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.

On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas

and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her
husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).7 According
to Edilberto:
when Esteban was diagnosed with colon
cancer sometime in 1993, he decided to sell
the Delpan and Vitas properties to
Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the
amortizations on the two (2) properties
situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations,
together with the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which
Esteban requested as advance payment,
were considered part of the purchase price of

the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise

gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) for the purchase of the Vitas
properties and she shouldered his medical
expenses.8

Esteban passed away on 11 September

1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July
1999.

Sometime
in
2000,
Leonora
Urquila
(Leonora),
the
mother
of
Edilberto,
discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto,
represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for
Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTCManila. Edilberto alleged that the sale of the
properties was fraudulent because Estebans
signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that
because of Socorros prior marriage to
Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban
was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over
the properties purchased by Esteban and
respondents.9

of the first spouse of such person shall be

illegal and void from its performance unless:
1. The first
dissolved; or

marriage

was

annulled

or

2. The first spouse had been absent for

seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or
if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee
is presumed dead according to articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void.

During trial, Edilberto offered the testimony

of
Socorros
daughter-in-law
Conchita
Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit,
Conchita claimed that Crispin, who was a
seaman, had been missing and unheard from
for 35 years. However, Conchita recanted her
earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit
of Retraction.11

The Ruling of the RTC-Manila

The RTC-Manila dismissed the petition for
lack of merit.

The RTC-Manila ruled that the lack of a

judicial decree of nullity does not affect the
status of the union. It applied our ruling in
Nial v. Badayog:12

The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage

between Socorro and Esteban was void from
the beginning.10 Article 83 of the Civil Code,
which was the governing law at the time
Esteban and Socorro were married, provides:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states

that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. x x x

Art.
83.
Any
marriage
subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime

Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a

void marriage, so far as concerns the
conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is

as though no marriage had ever taken place.

And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in
any proceeding in which [the] fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after
the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts.13

According to the RTC-Manila, the Vitas and

Delpan properties are not conjugal, and are
governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 144. When a man and a woman live

together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from
the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the
benefits as well as in the charges, shall be
proportional to their respective interests. Any
stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall
be void.

The portions belonging to the co-owners in

the co-ownership shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved.

The RTC-Manila then determined the

respective shares of Socorro and Esteban in
the properties. It found that:

with respect to the property located at 2492

State Alley, Bonifacio St. Vitas, Tondo, Manila
covered by TCT No. 141782, formerly Marcos
Road, Magsaysay Village, Tondo, Manila,
[Evangeline] declared that part of it was first
acquired by her father Esteban Abletes
sometime in 1968 when he purchased the
right of Ampiano Caballegan. Then, in 1970,
she x x x bought the right to one-half of the
remaining property occupied by Ampiano
Caballegan. However, during the survey of
the National Housing Authority, she allowed
the whole lot to be registered in her fathers
name. As proof thereof, she presented
Exhibits "8" to "11" x x x. These documents
prove that that she has been an occupant of
the said property in Vitas, Tondo even before
her father and Socorro Torres got married in
June, 1980.14

Anent the parcels of land and improvements

thereon 903 and 905 Del Pan Street, Tondo,
Manila, x x x Evangeline professed that in
1978, before her father met Socorro Torres
and before the construction of the BLISS
Project thereat, her father [already had] a
bodega of canvas (lona) and a sewing
machine to sew the canvas being sold at 903
Del Pan Street, Tondo Manila. In 1978, she
was also operating Vangies Canvas Store at
905 Del Pan Street, Tondo, Manila, which was
evidenced by Certificate of Registration of
Business Name issued in her favor on 09
November 1998 x x x. When the BLISS
project was constructed in 1980, the
property became known as Units D-9 and D10. At first, her father [paid] for the
amortizations for these two (2) parcels of
land but when he got sick with colon cancer
in 1993, he asked respondents to continue
paying for the amortizations x x x.
[Evangeline] paid a total of P195,259.52 for
Unit D-9 as shown by the 37 pieces of
receipts x x x and the aggregate amount
of P188,596.09 for Unit D-10, as evidenced
by 36 receipts x x x.15

The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did

not contribute any funds for the acquisition
of the properties. Hence, she cannot be
considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot
claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan
properties.16

If one of the parties is validly married to

another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

Aggrieved, Edilberto filed an appeal before

the CA.
The Ruling of the CA

In its Decision17 dated 9 March 2012, the CA

sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED
and the challenged Decision of the court a
quo STANDS.
SO ORDERED.18

The CA ruled, however, that the RTC-Manila

should have applied Article 148 of the Family
Code, and not Articles 144 and 485 of the
Civil Code. Article 148 of the Family Code
states that in unions between a man and a
woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other:
x x x only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall

likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.

The CA applied our ruling in Saguid v. Court

of Appeals,19 and held that the foregoing
provision applies "even if the cohabitation or
the acquisition of the property occurred
before the effectivity of the Family
Code."20 The CA found that Edilberto failed to
prove that Socorro contributed to the
purchase of the Vitas and Delpan properties.
Edilberto was unable to provide any
documentation evidencing Socorros alleged
contribution.21

On 2 April 2012, Edilberto filed a Motion for

Reconsideration,22 which was denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated 3 August 2012.23

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of this Court

We deny the petition.

Edilberto admitted that in unions between a

man and a woman who are incapacitated to
marry each other, the ownership over the
properties acquired during the subsistence of
that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted
our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar 24 in his
petition:

It is necessary for each of the partners to

prove his or her actual contribution to the
acquisition of property in order to be able to
lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of
co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply.25

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the

Family Code, which the CA applied in the
assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein

the parties are incapacitated to marry each
other], only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to

another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her

share shall be forfeited in the manner

provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall

likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas
and Delpan properties can be considered
common property if: (1) these were acquired
during the cohabitation of Esteban and
Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title

covering the Vitas property shows that the
parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and
Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate
of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or
several months after the parties were
married; and (2) title to the land was issued
to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to
Socorro Torres."26

We disagree. The title itself shows that the

Vitas property is owned by Esteban
alone.1wphi1 The
phrase
"married
to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his
civil status, and does not show that Socorro
co-owned the property.27The evidence on
record also shows that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of
title was issued after the celebration of the
marriage. Registration under the Torrens title
system merely confirms, and does not vest
title. This was admitted by Edilberto on page
9 of his petition wherein he quotes an
excerpt of our ruling in Borromeo:

Registration is not a mode of acquiring

ownership. It is only a means of confirming
the fact of its existence with notice to the
world at large. Certificates of title are not a
source of right. The mere possession of a
title does not make one the true owner of the
property.
Thus,
the
mere
fact
that
respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is
quiet, and that it is perfect, absolute and
indefeasible. However, there are well-defined
exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and
did not acquire the subject properties for a
valuable consideration.

Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual

contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since
Evangeline
shouldered
some
of
the
amortizations.28 Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to
the acquisition of the Del pan property.

We cannot sustain Edilberto s claim. Both the

RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan
property was acquired prior to the marriage
of Esteban and Socorro.29 Furthermore, even
if payment of the purchase price of the
Delpan property was made by Evangeline,
such payment was made on behalf of her
father. Article 1238 of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person

who does not intend to be reimbursed by the
debtor is deemed to be a donation, which

requires the debtor s consent. But the

payment is in any case valid as to the
creditor who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on

behalf of her father, and the parties intended
that the Delpan property would be owned by
and registered under the name of Esteban.

During trial, the Abuda spouses presented

receipts evidencing payments of the
amortizations
for
the
Delpan
property.1wphi1 On
the
other
hand,
Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro s alleged monetary
contributions. As correctly pointed out by the
CA:

settled is the rule that in civil cases x x x the

burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.
x x x. Here it is Appellant who is duty bound
to prove the allegations in the complaint
which undoubtedly, he miserably failed to do
so.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195825

2013

February 27,
Antecedents

SPOUSES
ALFONSO
AND
MARIA
ANGELES
CUSI, Petitioners,
vs.
LILIA V. DOMINGO, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 195871

RAMONA LIZA L. DE VERA, Petitioner,
vs
LILIA V. DOMINGO AND SPOUSES
RADELIA AND ALFRED SY, Respondents.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under
the
Torrens
system
of
land
registration, the registered owner of realty
cannot be deprived of her property through
fraud, unless a transferee acquires the
property as an innocent purchaser for value.
A transferee who acquires the property
covered by a reissued owner's copy of the
certificate of title without taking the ordinary
precautions of honest persons in doing
business and examining the records of the
proper Registry of Deeds, or who fails to pay
the full market value of the property is not
considered an innocent purchaser for value.

Under review in these consolidated appeals

is the Decision promulgated on July 16,
2010,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90452 affirmed the revised
decision rendered on March 1, 2007 by the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC)
against the petitioners and their seller.2

The property in dispute was a vacant

unfenced lot situated in White Plains, Quezon
City and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. N-165606 issued in the name
of respondent Lilia V. Domingo by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. It had an
area of 658 square meters. 3 In July 1999,
Domingo learned that construction activities
were being undertaken on her property
without her consent. She soon unearthed the
series of anomalous transactions affecting
her property.

On July 18, 1997, one Radelia Sy

(Sy),4 representing herself as the owner of
the property, petitioned the RTC for the
issuance of a new owners copy of Domingos
TCT No. N-165606, appending to her petition
a deed of absolute sale dated July 14, 1997
purportedly executed in her favor by
Domingo;5 and an affidavit of loss dated July
17, 1997,6 whereby she claimed that her bag
containing the owners copy of TCT No. N165606 had been snatched from her on July
13, 1997 while she was at the SM City in
North EDSA, Quezon City. The RTC granted
Sys petition on August 26, 1997. 7 The
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City then issued
a new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N165606, which was later cancelled by virtue
of the deed of absolute sale dated July 14,
1997, and in its stead the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City issued TCT No. 186142 in Sys
name.8

Sy subsequently subdivided the property into

two, and sold each half by way of contract to
sell to Spouses Edgardo and Ramona Liza De
Vera and to Spouses Alfonso and Maria
Angeles Cusi. The existence of the individual

contracts to sell was annotated on the dorsal

portion of Sys TCT No. 186142 as Entry No.
PE-8907/N-186142,9stating
that
the
consideration of the sale was P1,000,000.00
for each set of buyers, or for a total
of P2,000,000.00 for the entire property that
had
an
actual
worth
of
not
less
than P14,000,000.00. TCT No. 186142 in the
name of Sy was then cancelled by virtue of
the deeds of sale executed between Sy and
Spouses De Vera, and between Sy and
Spouses Cusi, to whom were respectively
issued TCT No. 18956810 and TCT No.
189569.11 All the while, the transactions
between Sy and the De Veras, and between
Sy and the Cusis were unknown to Domingo,
whose TCT No. N-165606 remained in her
undisturbed possession.12

Ruling of the RTC

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered a
decision,14 disposing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing
judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) declaring the sale between Lilia V.
Domingo and Radella Sy void and of (sic)
effect;
(b) declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona
Liza De Vera and Sps. Alfonso and Maria
Angeles Cusi to be purchasers in good faith
and for value;
(c) lifting the writ of preliminary injunction;

It turned out that the construction activities

taking place on the property that Domingo
learned about were upon the initiative of the
De Veras in the exercise of their dominical
and possessory rights.

Domingo commenced this action against Sy

and her spouse, the De Veras and the Cusis
in the RTC, the complaint being docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-99-39312 and entitled Lilia
V. Domingo v. Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy,
Spouses Alfonso G. and Maria Angeles S.
Cusi, Spouses Edgardo M. and Ramona Liza
L. De Vera, BPI Family Savings Bank and The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, seeking
the annulment or cancellation of titles,
injunction and damages. Domingo applied for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction, and a
temporary restraining order (TRO). 13 The RTC
granted Domingos application for the TRO
enjoining the defendants from proceeding
with the construction activities on the
property. The RTC later granted her
application for the writ of preliminary
injunction.

(d) finding defendant Radella Sy liable to the

plaintiff Lilia Domingo liable (sic) for
damages, as follows:
1. Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00)
representing the value of the property
covered by TCT No. 165606 plus legal rate of
interest until fully paid;
2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
representing moral damages;
3.
Five
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00)
representing
exemplary
damages;
4.
Five
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00) representing attorneys fees;
5.
Two
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P200,000.00)
representing
litigation
expenses; and
6. Costs of Suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Acting on the motions for reconsideration

separately filed by Sy and Domingo, 15 the
RTC reconsidered and set aside its
September 30, 2003 decision, and allowed
the presentation of rebuttal and sur-rebuttal
evidence.

On March 1, 2007, the RTC rendered a new

decision,16 ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
Judgment is hereby rendered:

foregoing,

(a) Declaring the sale between Lilia Domingo

and Radelia Sy void and of no effect;

4.
Two
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P200,000.00)
representing
litigation
expenses; and,
5. Costs of suit.
This Decision is without prejudice to
whatever civil action for recovery and
damages, the defendants Sps. De Vera and
Sps. Cusi may have against defendant
Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy.
SO ORDERED.

Ruling of the CA

(b) Declaring the Sps. Edgardo and Ramona

Liza De Vera and Sps. Alfonso and Maria
Angeles Cusi not purchasers in good faith
and for value;

On appeal, the assignment of errors each set

of appellants made was as follows:

(c) TCT Nos. 189568 and 189569 are hereby

cancelled and declared Null and Void Ab
Initio;

Spouses Cusi

(d) Directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon

City to annotate this Order on TCT No.
189568 and 189569;
(e) TCT No. 165606 in the name of Lilia
Domingo is hereby revalidated; and,
(f) Finding defendant Radelia Sy liable to the
plaintiff Lilia V. Domingo liable (sic) for
damages, as follows:

a) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY

ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS
SPOUSES ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES
CUSI ARE NOT PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH
AND FOR VALUE.
b) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER OR NOT CODEFENDANTS SPOUSES
RADELIA SY AND ALFRED SY ARE LIABLE FOR
SPOUSES CUSIS CROSS-CLAIM.

1. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)

representing moral damages;

c) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

FAILING
TO
AWARD
DAMAGES
AND
ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS SPOUSES
CUSI.17

2.
Five
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00)
representing
exemplary
damages;

Spouses Sy

3.
Five
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P500,000.00) representing attorneys fees;

a) THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT THE SALE BETWEEN LILIA
DOMINGO AND RADELIA SY VOID AND OF NO
EFFECT
AND
WAS
PROCURRED
(sic)
THROUGH FRAUDULENT MEANS.

b) THAT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN

AWARDING
ACTUAL
MORAL
DAMAGES,
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES THE SAME
BEING NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
CONTRARY TO LAW.
c) THAT THE SAID DECISION IS CONTRARY TO
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AS THE SAME
CONTAIN SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERRORS
WHEN THE COURT A QUO DECLARED THAT
TCT NOS. 189568 AND 189569 CANCELLED
AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
d) THE INSTANT ASSAILED DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT HAVE (sic) DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT[S] SPOUSES SY OF THEIR BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW.18
Spouses De Vera
a) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE DE VERA SPOUSES ARE NOT
PURCHASERS IN GOOD FAITH AND NOT
ENTITLED TO THE POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY COVERED BY TCT NO. N-189568.
b) THE LOWER COURT ALSO ERRED IN NOT
AWARDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DE VERA
HER COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE.19

As stated, the CA promulgated its decision

on July 16, 2010, affirming the RTC with
modification of the damages to be paid by
the Sys to Domingo, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

instant appeal is denied. Accordingly, the
Decision dated March 1, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification on the award of damages to be
paid by defendants-appellants Spouses

Radelia and Alfred Sy in favor of the plaintiffappellee Lilia V. Domingo, to wit;

1. P500,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. P200,000.00
damages;

by

3. P100,000.00 as
litigation expenses.

way

of

attorneys

exemplary

fees

and

SO ORDERED.20

The CA held that the sale of the property

from Domingo to Sy was null and void and
conveyed no title to the latter for being
effected by forging the signature of
Domingo; that Sy thereby acquired no right
in the property that she could convey to the
Cusis and De Veras as her buyers; that
although acknowledging that a purchaser
could rely on what appeared on the face of
the certificate of title, the Cusis and De Veras
did not have the status of purchasers in good
faith and for value by reason of their being
aware of Sys TCT No. 186142 being a
reconstituted
owners
copy,
thereby
requiring them to conduct an inquiry or
investigation into the status of the title of Sy
in the property, and not simply rely on the
face of Sys TCT No. 186142; and that the
Cusis and De Veras were also aware of other
facts that should further put them on guard,
particularly the several nearly simultaneous
transactions respecting the property, and the
undervaluation of the purchase price
from P7,000,000.00/half
to
only P1,000,000.00/half to enable Sy to pay
a lesser capital gains tax.

The CA later on denied the motions for

reconsideration.21

Issues
Hence, this appeal via petitions for review
on certiorari by the Cusis (G.R. No. 195825)
and Ramona Liza L. De Vera22 (G.R. No.
195871).
In G.R. No. 195825, the Cusis submit the
following issues:23
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 186142
REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF RADELIA SY IS
A RECONSTITUTED TITLE.

Firstly, now beyond dispute is the nullity of

the transfer of Domingos property to Sy
because both lower courts united in so
finding. The unanimity in findings of both the
RTC and the CA on this all-important aspect
of the case is now conclusive on the Court in
view of their consistency thereon as well as
by reason of such findings being fully
supported by preponderant evidence. We
consider to be significant that the Sys no
longer came to the Court for further review,
thereby rendering the judgment of the CA on
the issue of nullity final and immutable as to
them.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE
BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.
III
GRANTING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IS CORRECT WITH RESPECT TO THE
SECOND
ISSUE,
WHETHER
OR
NOT
PETITIONERS
ARE
ENTITLED
TO
REIMBURSEMENT OF ALL THE PAYMENTS
MADE
BY
PETITIONERS
TO
THEIR
CODEFENDANTS SPOUSES ALFRED AND
RADELIA SY IN ADDITION TO DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES.

In G.R. No. 195871, De Vera asserts that the

primordial issue is whether or not she was an
innocent purchaser for value and in good
faith.

Ruling of the Court

The petitions for review are bereft of merit.

Secondly, the Cusis and De Vera commonly

contend that the CA gravely erred in not
considering them to be purchasers in good
faith and for value. They argue that Sys TCT
No. 186142 was free of any liens or
encumbrances that could have excited their
suspicion; and that they nonetheless even
went beyond the task of examining the face
of Sys TCT No. 186142, recounting every
single detail of their quest to ascertain the
validity of Sys title, but did not find anything
by which to doubt her title.

The Court concurs with the finding by the CA

that the Cusis and De Vera were not
purchasers for value and in good faith. The
records simply do not support their common
contention in that respect.

Under
the
Torrens
system
of
land
24
registration, the State is required to
maintain a register of landholdings that
guarantees indefeasible title to those
included in the register. The system has been
instituted to combat the problems of
uncertainty, complexity and cost associated

with old title systems that depended upon

proof of an unbroken chain of title back to a
good root of title. The State issues an official
certificate of title to attest to the fact that
the person named is the owner of the
property described therein, subject to such
liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
what the law warrants or reserves.25

One of the guiding tenets underlying the

Torrens system is the curtain principle, in
that one does not need to go behind the
certificate of title because it contains all the
information about the title of its holder. This
principle dispenses with the need of proving
ownership by long complicated documents
kept by the registered owner, which may be
necessary under a private conveyancing
system, and assures that all the necessary
information regarding ownership is on the
certificate of title. Consequently, the avowed
objective of the Torrens system is to obviate
possible conflicts of title by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and, as a rule, to dispense with
the necessity of inquiring further; on the part
of the registered owner, the system gives
him complete peace of mind that he would
be secured in his ownership as long as he
has not voluntarily disposed of any right over
the covered land.26

The Philippines adopted the Torrens system

through Act No. 496,27 also known as
the Land Registration Act, which was
approved on November 6, 1902 and took
effect on February 1, 1903. In this
jurisdiction, therefore, "a person dealing in
registered land has the right to rely on the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with
the
need
of
inquiring
further, except when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such inquiry".28

To obtain a grasp of whether a person has

actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such inquiry, an internal matter,
necessitates an analysis of evidence of a
persons
conduct.29 That
renders
the
determination of intent as a factual
issue,30 something that the Court does not
normally involve itself in because of its not
being a trier of facts. Indeed, as a rule, the
review function of the Court is limited to a
review of the law involved.

But the Court now delves into the facts

relating to the issue of innocence of the
petitioners in their purchase of the property,
considering that the RTC, through its original
decision, at first regarded them to have been
innocent purchasers who were not aware of
any flaw or defect in Sys title based on the
fact that the property had been unfenced
and vacant. The RTC also regarded the
petitioners
making
of
reasonable
verifications as their exercise of the due
diligence required of an ordinary buyer. 31 The
RTC later completely turned around through
another decision, however, and it was such
decision that the CA affirmed subject to the
modifications of the damages granted to
Domingo.

There is no question that the petitioners

exerted some effort as buyers to determine
whether the property did rightfully belong to
Sy. For one, they did not find any
encumbrance, like a notice of lis pendens,
being annotated on the TCT of Sy.
Nonetheless, their observance of a certain
degree of diligence within the context of the
principles underlying the Torrens system was
not their only barometer under the law and
jurisprudence by which to gauge the validity
of their acquisition of title. As the purchasers

of the property, they also came under the

clear obligation to purchase the property not
only in good faith but also for value.

Therein lay the problem. The petitioners

were shown to have been deficient in their
vigilance as buyers of the property. It was not
enough for them to show that the property
was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it
would be too easy for any registered owner
to lose her property, including its possession,
through illegal occupation. Nor was it safe for
them to simply rely on the face of Sys TCT
No. 186142 in view of the fact that they were
aware that her TCT was derived from a
duplicate owners copy reissued by virtue of
the loss of the original duplicate owners
copy. That circumstance should have already
alerted them to the need to inquire beyond
the face of Sys TCT No. 186142. There were
other circumstances, like the almost
simultaneous transactions affecting the
property within a short span of time, as well
as the gross undervaluation of the property
in the deeds of sale, ostensibly at the behest
of Sy to minimize her liabilities for the capital
gains tax, that also excited suspicion, and
required them to be extra-cautious in dealing
with Sy on the property.

To the Court, the CAs treatment of Sys TCT

No. 186142 as similar to a reconstituted copy
of a Torrens certificate of title was not
unwarranted. In doing so, the CA cited the
ruling in Barstowe Philippines Corporation v.
Republic,32where the Court, quoting from
precedents, opined that "the nature of a
reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title of
registered land is similar to that of a second
Owners Duplicate Transfer Certificate of
Title," in that "both are issued, after the
proper proceedings, on the representation of
the registered owner that the original of the
said TCT or the original of the Owners
Duplicate TCT, respectively, was lost and

could not be located or found despite diligent

efforts exerted for that purpose;" 33 and that
both were "subsequent copies of the
originals thereof," a fact that a "cursory
examination of these subsequent copies
would show" and "put on notice of such fact
[anyone dealing with such copies who is]
thus warned to be extracareful."34

Verily, the Court has treated a reissued

duplicate owners copy of a TCT as merely a
reconstituted certificate of title. In Garcia v.
Court of Appeals,35 a case with striking
similarities to this one, an impostor
succeeded in tricking a court of law into
granting his petition for the issuance of a
duplicate owners copy of the supposedly
lost TCT. The impostor then had the TCT
cancelled by presenting a purported deed of
sale between him and the registered owners,
both of whom had already been dead for
some time, and another TCT was then issued
in the impostors own name. This issuance in
the impostors own name was followed by
the issuance of yet another TCT in favor of a
third party, supposedly the buyer of the
impostor. In turn, the impostors transferee
(already the registered owner in his own
name) mortgaged the property to Spouses
Miguel and Adela Lazaro, who then caused
the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT.
All the while, the original duplicate owners
copy of the TCT remained in the hands of an
heir of the deceased registered owners with
his co-heirs knowledge and consent.
The inevitable litigation ensued, and
ultimately
ended
up
with
the
Court.1wphi1 The
Lazaros,
as
the
mortgagees, claimed good faith, and urged
the Court to find in their favor. But the Court
rebuffed their urging, holding instead that
they did not deal on the property in good
faith because: (a) "the title of the property
mortgaged to the Lazaros was a second
owners duplicate TCT, which is, in effect a
reconstituted title. This circumstance should

have alerted them to make the necessary

investigation, but they did not;" and (b) their
argument, that "because the TCT of the
property on which their mortgage lien was
annotated did not contain the annotation:
"Reconstituted title," the treatment of the
reissued duplicate owners copy of the TCT
as akin to a reconstituted title did not apply,
had no merit considering that: "The nature of
a reconstituted Transfer Certificate of Title of
registered land is similar to that of a second
Owner's Duplicate Transfer Certificate of
Title. Both are issued, after the proper
proceedings, on the representation of the
registered owner that the original of the said
TCT or the original of the Owner's Duplicate
TCT, respectively, was lost and could not be
located or found despite diligent efforts
exerted for that purpose. Both, therefore,
aresubsequent copies
of
the
originals
thereof. A cursory examination of these
subsequent copies would show that they are
not the originals. Anyone dealing with such
copies are put on notice of such fact and
thus warned to be extra-careful. This warning
the mortgagees Lazaros did not heed, or
they just ignored it."36

The fraud committed in Garcia paralleled the

fraud
committed
here.1wphi1 The
registered owner of the property was
Domingo, who remained in the custody of
her TCT all along; the impostor was Sy, who
succeeded in obtaining a duplicate owners
copy; and the Cusis and the De Veras were
similarly situated as the Spouses Lazaro, the
mortgagees in Garcia. The Cusis and the De
Veras did not investigate beyond the face of
Sys TCT No. 186142, despite the certificate
derived from the reissued duplicate owners
copy being akin to a reconstituted TCT.
Thereby, they denied themselves the
innocence and good faith they supposedly
clothed themselves with when they dealt
with Sy on the property.

The records also show that the forged deed

of sale from Domingo to Sy appeared to be
executed on July 14, 1997; that the affidavit
of loss by which Sy would later on support
her petition for the issuance of the duplicate
owners copy of Domingos TCT No. 165606
was executed on July 17, 1997, the very
same day in which Sy registered the affidavit
of loss in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City; that Sy filed the petition for the
issuance of the duplicate owners copy of
Domingos TCT No. 165606; that the RTC
granted her petition on August 26, 1997; and
that on October 31, 1997, a real estate
mortgage was executed in favor of one
Emma Turingan, with the mortgage being
annotated on TCT No. 165606 on November
10, 1997.

Being the buyers of the registered realty, the

Cusis and the De Veras were aware of the
aforementioned several almost simultaneous
transactions affecting the property. Their
awareness, if it was not actual, was at least
presumed, and ought to have put them on
their guard, for, as the CA pointed out, the
RTC
observed
that
"[t]hese
almost
simultaneous transactions, particularly the
date of the alleged loss of the TCT No.
165606 and the purported Deed of Sale,
suffice[d] to arouse suspicion on [the part of]
any person dealing with the subject
property."37 Simple prudence would then
have impelled them as honest persons to
make deeper inquiries to clear the
suspiciousness haunting Sys title. But they
still went on with their respective purchase of
the property without making the deeper
inquiries. In that regard, they were not acting
in good faith.
Another circumstance indicating that the
Cusis and the De Veras were not innocent
purchasers for value was the gross
undervaluation of the property in the deeds
of sale at the measly price of P1,000,000.00
for each half when the true market value was

then
in
the
aggregate
of
at
least P14,000,000.00 for the entire property.
Even
if
the
undervaluation
was
to
accommodate the request of Sy to enable
her to minimize her liabilities for the capital
gains tax, their acquiescence to the fraud
perpetrated against the Government, no
less, still rendered them as parties to the
wrongdoing. They were not any less guilty at
all. In the ultimate analysis, their supposed
passivity respecting the arrangement to
perpetrate the fraud was not even plausible,
because they knew as the buyers that they
were not personally liable for the capital
gains taxes and thus had nothing to gain by
their acquiescence. There was simply no
acceptable reason for them to have
acquiesced to the fraud, or for them not to
have rightfully insisted on the declaration of
the full value of the realty in their deeds of
sale. By letting their respective deeds of sale
reflect the grossly inadequate price, they
should suffer the consequences, including
the inference of their bad faith in transacting
the sales in their favor.

De Vera particularly insists that she and her

late husband did not have any hand in the
undervaluation; and that Sy, having prepared
the deed of sale, should alone be held
responsible for the undervaluation that had
inured only to her benefit as the seller.
However, such insistence was rendered of no
consequence herein by the fact that neither
she nor her late husband had seen fit to
rectify the undervaluation. It is notable that
the De Veras were contracting parties who
appeared to have transacted with full
freedom from undue influence from Sy or
anyone else.

Although the petitioners argue that the

actual consideration of the sale was
nearly P7,000,000.00 for each half of the
property, the Court rejects their argument as

devoid of factual basis, for they did not

adduce evidence of the actual payment of
that amount to Sy. Accordingly, the recitals of
the deeds of sale were controlling on the
consideration of the sales.

Good faith is the honest intention to abstain

from taking unconscientious advantage of
another. It means the "freedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought
to put a person on inquiry."38

Given this notion of good faith, therefore, a

purchaser in good faith is one who buys the
property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays full and fair price for
the same.38As an examination of the records
shows, the petitioners were not innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. Their
failure to investigate Sy's title despite the
nearly simultaneous transactions on the
property that ought to have put them on
inquiry manifested their awareness of the
flaw in Sy's title. That they did not also
appear to have paid the full price for their
share of the property evinced their not
having paid true value.39

Resultantly, the Court affirms the lower

courts, and restores to Domingo her rights of
dominion over the propetiy.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision

of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July
16, 201 0; and ORDERS the petitioners to
pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174004

2013

October 9,

VIRGILIO
G.
CAGATAO, Petitioner,
vs.
GUILLERMO
ALMONTE,
ARTHUR
AGUILAR, SPS. ERNESTO FERNANDEZ
AND AVELINA FERNANDEZ, MARVIN
JOHN
FERNANDEZ,
MARSON
FERNANDEZ,
and
MARJUN
FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March
9, 2006 Amended Decision1 and the August
7, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 72094, modifying the
June 22, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Echague, Isabela (RTC), in
Civil Case No. Br. 24-0458, an action for
annulment of sale, cancellation of title and
damages.

The facts
This case stemmed from an action for
annulment of deeds of sale, cancellation of
title and damages filed on April 18, 1996 by
petitioner Virgilio G. Cagatao (Cagatao)
against respondents Guillermo Almonte
(Almonte), Arthur Aguilar (Aguilar), Spouses
Ernesto and Avelina Fernandez (Spouses
Fernandez), and Marvin John Fernandez,
Marson Fernandez and Marjun Fernandez
(collectively the Fernandez Siblings). 4

On February 16, 1949, a homestead patent

over the property subject of this controversy
(Lot No. 5598, Pls-67) was issued in favor of
Juan Gatchalian.5 Cagatao claimed that
sometime in 1940, Gatchalian sold the lotto
Delfin Manzulin (Manzulin) in exchange for
one carabao, as embodied ina barter
agreement
which
was
unfortunately
destroyed or lost during the Second World
War.6 In 1990, Manzulin allegedly executed a
private written document in the Ilocano
dialect, transferring ownership over the
property to his son-in-law, Cagatao. 7 The
latter then occupied and cultivated the land
until the Fernandez Siblings attempted to
take possession of the lot, thereby prompting
him to file the subject complaint before the
RTC.8

The respondents, on the other hand,

contended that on April 3, 1993,the Spouses
Fernandez purchased the property from
Almonte and Aguilar who had in their
possession a tax declaration covering the
said land.9 To protect their interest, on
January 17, 1996, Spouses Fernandez once
again
bought
the
same
property
for P220,000.00 from Emmaculada Carlos
(Carlos), believed to be the owner of the lot
by virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-12159-A, a reconstituted title in her
name.10 The former, in turn, executed a deed
of sale, dated January 22, 1996, in favor of
their children, the Fernandez Siblings,
resulting in the issuance of TCT No.T-249437
in their names.11

In his Memorandum before the RTC, Cagatao

questioned the sale to Spouses Fernandez by
Carlos because, at that time, Manzulin was
already the owner of the subject property. He
also pointed out that it was highly irregular
that Spouses Fernandez would buy the same
property from two different vendors on two

different occasions. Apart from these

anomalous transactions, Cagatao insisted
that TCT No. T-249437 in the name of the
Fernandez Siblings was a nullity because the
sale from the Spouses Fernandez was
simulated, as testified to by Avelina
Fernandez (Fernandez) who confirmed that
she and her husband did not sign the deed of
sale
purporting
to
have
transferred
ownership of the property to the Fernandez
Siblings.12
The respondents claimed that Cagatao was
unable to present proof of title or any public
document embodying the sale of the
property from Gatchalian to Manzulin and
from the latter to Cagatao. They also argued
that even if a homestead patent was indeed
issued to Gatchalian, the same became void
when he (Gatchalian) did not occupy the land
himself, in violation of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (Public Land Act of 1936).13

Pending litigation, the RTC issued a writ of

preliminary
injunction
restraining
the
respondents from disturbing Cagataos
possession of the land in question during the
pendency of the case.14 In its Decision, dated
June 22,2001, however, the RTC ruled that
Cagataos evidence was insufficient to prove
his ownership over the land in question
because Manzulin never acquired a lawful
title to the property from his predecessor,
Gatchalian. The court explained that the
transfer to Manzulin was null and void
because it failed to comply with Section
2015 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. As to the
supposed conveyance of the lot from
Manzulin to Cagatao, it could not have been
valid because the document alleged to be a
deed of sale was a private document which
did not conclusively establish his (Cagataos)
right to the property because of the
requirement in contract law that the
transmission of rights over an immovable
property must be contained in a public
document.

The RTC, after noting that Cagatao had no

valid title, ruled that his claim of possession
could not prevail over the claim of ownership
by Spouses Fernandez as evidenced by a
certificate of title. Accordingly, it upheld the
validity of the deed of sale, dated January 17,
1996, between Spouses Fernandez and
Carlos. It, however, nullified the transfer from
Spouses Fernandez to Fernandez Siblings
because Avelina herself admitted that she
and her husband never signed the deed of
sale which transferred ownership to their
children. Finally, the RTC sustained the
validity of TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of
Carlos, theorizing that someone must have
applied for an original certificate of title from
which the said title was derived.16 Thus, the
RTC disposed:
1. the dismissal of the plaintiffs [Cagataos]
Complaint;
2. the Cancellation and setting aside of the
writ of preliminary injunction;
3. the Register of Deeds to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-249437 issued in
favor of Marvin, Marson and Marjun, all
surnamed Fernandez, the Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "C") dated January 22, 1996 being
null and void; and
4. declaring the Deed of Sale (Exhibit "2")
dated January 17, 1996 in favor of Sps.
Avelina M. Fernandez and Ernesto S.
Fernandez and TCT No. T-12159-A registered
in the name of Emmaculada G. Carlos as
valid and binding.
SO ORDERED.17

Aggrieved, Cagatao elevated the case to the

CA. On July 29, 2005, the CA partly granted
his petition and modified the decision of the
RTC. The CA deemed as speculative and

without
legal
basis18 the
trial
courts
conclusion that Gatchalian might have
abandoned his homestead patent, leaving it
open for another person to apply for a patent
and secure an original certificate of title from
which TCT No. T-12159-A in the name of
Carlos originated. In other words, the
ownership of the land remained with
Gatchalian by virtue of the homestead
patent in his name, and neither the alleged
transfer to Manzulin nor the theory of
abandonment of the RTC could divest him of
said title.

In addition, the CA took note of Entry No.

7259 in the memorandum of encumbrances
at the dorsal side of TCT No. T-12159-A,
which disclosed the existence of another
deed of sale entered into by Carlos and the
respondents on January 17, 1979. Holding
that the two sales could not overlap, it
invalidated the January 17, 1996 deed of sale
between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez. It
also considered as void the sale of the same
property by Almonte to Spouses Fernandez
and observed that neither the latter nor the
Fernandez siblings invoked this transaction
as the basis of their claim.

Although the CA declared that Cagataos

claim of ownership could not be recognized,
it nevertheless ruled that his possession
could not be disturbed because only the true
owner could challenge him for possession of
the subject property. Leaving the parties
where it found them, the CA disposed:

between defendants-appellees Fernandez

siblings and the Fernandez spouses is
DECLARED NULL and VOID; 4) the Deed of
Sale dated April 3, 1993 between the
Fernandez spouses and Guillermo Almonte
and
Arthur
Aguilar
is
likewise
DECLAREDNULL and VOID; 5) the verbal sale
between Delfin Manzulin and plaintiffappellant is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The
Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
defendants-appellants Fernandez siblings is
made PERMANENT.19

The respondents moved for a reconsideration

of the CA decision on August 24, 2005. On
March 9, 2006, the CA rendered the
questioned Amended Decision, reversing
itself when it ruled that the deed of sale
between Carlos and Spouses Fernandez
could not be declared null and void,
especially because Carlos was not impleaded
as a party in the case. It, however, stressed
that Cagataos possession of the subject
property should be respected. Any party,
including the respondents, who would like to
assert their claim of ownership or a better
right over the lot should assert their right in
an appropriate action in court against him.

Not in conformity, Cagatao moved for

reconsideration but the motion was denied
by the CA in its Resolution, dated August 7,
2006.20

Hence, this petition.

1) the Register of Deeds is ORDERED TO
CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No.
249437 issued in favor of Marvin, Marsonand
Marjun, all surnamed Fernandez; 2) the Deed
of Sale dated January 17, 1996 between
Emmaculada Carlos and the Fernandez
spouses is declared NULL and VOID; 3) the
Deed of Sale dated January 22, 1996

The Issues
In his petition, Cagatao raises the following
issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERREDIN
NOT
RULING
THAT
THE
RECONSTITUTED TCT NO.12159-A IN THE
NAME OF EMMACULADA CARLOS IS VOID.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERREDIN NOT RULING THAT
HOMESTEAD
TITLE
HOLDERJUAN
GATCHALIAN AND THE PETITIONER AS
HISSUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST ARE THE TRUE
OWNERSOF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS
ERREDIN
RENDERING
THE
CHALLENGED
AMENDEDDECISION
BY
DELETING FROM THE DISPOSITIVEPORTION
OF THE ORIGINAL DECISION ITS RULINGTHAT
THE
DEED
OF
SALE
BETWEEN
EMMACULADACARLOS AND RESPONDENTS
SPOUSES FERNANDEZOVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS VOID.21

The Courts Ruling

Cagataos entire petition revolves around the
assertion that the reconstituted TCT No.
12159-A in the name of Carlos was a fake
and should have been declared void. This
claim is based on the existence of an
allegedly falsified annotation (Entry No.
7259), the speculative nature of the RTCs
declaration that the said title appeared valid,
and the fact that the respondents were not
able to present an affidavit of loss or any
proof of judicial reconstitution.22
The Court cannot accommodate the
petitioner.

The validity of TCT No. 12159-A cannot be

attacked collaterally;

Carlos is an indispensable party

From the arguments of Cagatao, it is clear

that he is assailing the validity of the title of
Carlos over the land in question. Section 48
of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states that "a
certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law." An
attack on the validity of the title is
considered to be a collateral attack when, in
an action to obtain a different relief and as
an incident of the said action, an attack is
made against the judgment granting the
title.23 Cagataos original complaint before
the RTC was for the cancellation of TCT No. T249437 in the name of the Fernandez
Siblings and the nullification of the deeds of
sale between the Fernandez Siblings and
Spouses Fernandez, and the earlier one
between the latter and Almonte and Aguilar.
Nowhere in his complaint did Cagatao
mention that he sought to invalidate TCT No.
12159-A.1wphi1 It was only during the
course of the proceedings, when Spouses
Fernandez disclosed that they had purchased
the property from Carlos, that Cagatao
thought of questioning the validity of TCT No.
12159-A.

Although the CA correctly ruled that the

transfer from Gatchalian to Manzulin was
invalid, the existence of a valid Torrens title
in the name of Carlos which has remained
unchallenged before the proper courts has
made irrelevant the issue of whether
Gatchalian and his successors-in-interest
should have retained ownership over the
property. This is pursuant to the principle
that a Torrens title is irrevocable and its
validity can only be challenged in a direct
proceeding. The purpose of adopting a
Torrens System in our jurisdiction is to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.

This is to avoid any possible conflicts of title

that may arise by giving the public the right
to rely upon the face of the Torrens title and
dispense with the need of inquiring further
as to the ownership of the property. 24 Hence,
a Torrens certificate of title is indefeasible
and binding upon the whole world unless it is
nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction
in a direct proceeding for cancellation of
title.25

Moreover, Carlos, as the registered owner of

the lot whose title Cagatao seeks to nullify,
should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party. Section 7, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines
indispensable parties to be "parties in
interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action." It is clear in this
case that Cagatao failed to include Carlos in
his action for the annulment of TCT No.
12159-A.Basic is the rule in procedural law
that no man can be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger and
strangers to a case cannot be bound by a
judgment rendered by the court. 26 It would
be the height of injustice to entertain an
action for the annulment of Carlos title
without giving her the opportunity to present
evidence to support her claim of ownership
through title. In addition, it is without
question a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived
of property without due process of law.27

Thus, should Cagatao wish to question the

ownership of the subject lot of Carlos and
Spouses Fernandez, he should institute a
direct action before the proper courts for the
cancellation or modification of the titles in
the name of the latter two. He cannot do so
now because it is tantamount to a collateral
attack on Carlos title, which is expressly
prohibited by law and jurisprudence.

Deed of sale between Carlos and Spouses

Fernandez is presumed valid

The CA did not err in amending its decision

and recognizing the validity of the sale
between Spouses Fernandez and Carlos.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that a person dealing with a registered
land has the right to rely on the face of the
Torrens title and need not inquire further,
unless the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such an inquiry. The indefeasibility of a
Torrens title as evidence of lawful ownership
of the property protects buyers in good faith
who rely on what appears on the face of the
said certificate of title. Moreover, a potential
buyer is charged with notice of only the
burdens and claims annotated on the
title.28 As explained in Sandoval v. Court of
Appeals,29

. . . a person dealing with registered land has

a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of
title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further except when the party has
actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title
in his vendor or status of the title of the
property in litigation. The presence of
anything which excites or arouses suspicion
should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the
title of the vendor appearing on the face of
said certificate. One who falls within the
exception can neither be denominated an
innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser
in good faith; and hence does not merit the
protection of the law.30

In this case, there has been no showing that

Spouses Fernandez were aware of any
irregularity in Carlos title that would make
them suspicious and cause them to doubt
the legitimacy of Carlos claim of ownership,
especially
because
there
were
no
encumbrances annotated on Carlos title. At
any rate, that is the proper subject of
another action initiated for the purpose of
questioning Carlos certificate of title from
which Spouses Fernandez derived their
ownership because, otherwise, the title of
Spouses
Fernandez
would
become
indefeasible. The reason for this is
extensively explained in Tenio-Obsequio v.
Court of Appeals:31

The Torrens system was adopted in this

country because it was believed to be the
most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance
that the seller's title thereto is valid, he
should not run the risk of being told later
that his acquisition was ineffectual after all.
This would not only be unfair to him. What is
worse is that if this were permitted, public
confidence in the system would be eroded
and land transactions would have to be
attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of
ownership. The further consequence would
be that land conflicts could be even more
numerous and complex than they are now
and possibly also more abrasive, if not even
violent. The Government, recognizing the
worthy purposes of the Torrens system,
should be the first to accept the validity of
titles issued thereunder once the conditions
laid down by the law are satisfied.32
While the Court finds that the validity of TCT
No. 12159-A cannot be attacked collaterally
and that Cagatao had not sufficiently
established his claim of ownership over the

subject prope1iy, it agrees with the CA that

he, the current possessor, shall remain to be
so until such time that his possession is
successfully contested by a person with a
better right.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184589

June 13, 2013

DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
HON.
COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
PHILIPPINE
CHINESE
CHARITABLE
ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assails the Decision 1 dated
May
26,
2008 and
Resolution2 dated
September 17, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789 for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Said
Decision and Resolution reversed and set
aside the Orders dated April 10, 2007 3 and
November 22, 200t of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, in
Land Registration (Reg.) Case No. N-5098
(LRC Rec. No. N-27619).

The Facts are as follows.

On January 29, 1965, Purita Landicho
(Landicho) filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Application for
Registration of a piece of land, measuring
125 hectares, located in Barrio Patiis, San
Mateo, Rizal (subject property), which was
docketed as Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. 5 On
November 16, 1965, the CFI rendered a
Decision6 evaluating the evidence presented
by the parties as follows:

It has been established by the evidence

adduced by Landicho that the parcel of land
under consideration was formerly several
smaller parcels owned and possessed by the
spouses Felix San Pascual and Juanita
Vertudes, Ignacio Santos and Socorro Santos,
Caconto Cayetano and Verneta Bartolome,
Gavino Espiritu and Asuncion Cruz, and Lucio
Manuel and Justina Ramos, all of whom in
January 1960, executed instruments of
conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of Landicho, x x x, and on July
20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a final
deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded
the conditional sale. Gavino Espiritu, one of
the vendors, fifty-five years old, farmer,
resident of Barrio Geronimo, Montalban,
Rizal, testified that he and his co-vendors
have been in possession of the parcel of land
since 1930 and that the possession of
Landicho, together with her predecessors in
interest,
has
been
open,
peaceful,
continuous and adverse against the whole
world in the concept of an owner. It has also
been established that the parcel of land is
within the Alienable or Disposable Block-I of
I.C. Project No. 26 of San Mateo, Rizal, x x x;
that the parcel of land is classified as
"montaoso" with an assessed value
of P12,560.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7081, x x
x, taxes due to which for the current year
had been paid, x x x; and that the same is
not
mortgaged
or
affected
by
any
encumbrance.

The oppositor did not present testimonial

evidence but presented the report of
investigation of Land Investigator Pedro R.
Feliciano dated August 23, 1965, x x x which
stated
substantially
that
during
the
investigation and ocular inspection it has
been ascertained that no public land
application is involved and that no
reservation
is
affected
thereby,
and
therefore, he believed that the opposition
already filed can be withdrawn; x x x, 1st

Indorsement dated August 24, 1965 of the

District Land Officer, District No. 7, Bureau of
Lands,
to
the
Director
of
Lands,
recommending that, in view of said report of
investigation, the opposition be withdrawn;
and x x x, office memorandum of the Chief,
Records Division, Bureau of Land, addressed
to the Chief, Legal Division, dated September
23, 1965, to the effect that according to the
records, plan Psu-201023 is not covered by
any kind of public land application or patent.

It is therefore clear from the evidence on

record that the applicant is entitled to the
benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A. No.
141, as amended.7

In the end, the CFI decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby confirms the
title of the applicant, Purita Landicho, of legal
age, married to Teodorico Landicho, Filipino,
resident of 74-A South 19th St., Quezon City,
to the parcel of land under consideration and
orders the registration thereof in her name
and personal circumstances aforementioned.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is

hereby dismissed.

Once this decision becomes final and

executory, let the order for the issuance of
the decree issue.8

Upon finality of its Decision dated November

16, 1965, the CFI issued an Order 9 on
December
22,
1965
directing
the
Commissioner of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) "to comply with Section

21 of Act No. 2347"10 on the issuance of a

decree and original certificate of title (OCT).

Eventually, on July 11, 1966, Jose D. Santos

(Santos), Register of Deeds (ROD) for the
Province of Rizal, issued Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 16768111 in Landichos
name covering the subject property. Notably,
ROD Santos issued to Landicho a TCT rather
than an OCT for the subject property; and
although TCT No. 167681 stated that it was
issued pursuant to Decree No. 1480, no other
detail regarding the decree and the original
registration of the subject property was filled
out.

The subject property was thereafter sold

several times, and as the old TCTs of the
vendors were cancelled, new TCTs were
accordingly issued to the buyers. The sale of
the subject property could be traced from
Landicho to Blue Chips Projects, Inc. (BCPI),
which acquired TCT No. 344936 in its own
name on November 10, 1971; then to
Winmar Poultry Farm, Inc. (WPFI), TCT No.
425582, November 5, 1973; and finally, to
herein
respondent
Philippine
Chinese
Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), TCT No.
482970, July 15, 1975.12

Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc.

(ADRDI)13 instituted Civil Case No. 12044,
entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, which was still pending
before the RTC, Branch 167, of Pasig City as
of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the
subject property, which was a portion of a
bigger tract of land measuring around 513
hectares, covered by TCT No. 42999, dated
February 20, 1956, in the name of said
corporation. This bigger tract of land was
originally registered in the name of
Meerkamp Co. under OCT No. 301, pursuant

to Decree No. 1480, GLRO Record No. 2429,

issued on November 22, 1906. ADRDI caused
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens (as
regards Civil Case No. 12044) on TCT No.
344936 of BCPI. Subsequently, based on the
ruling of this Court in A. Doronila Resources
Dev., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,14 ADRDI was
also able to have its notice of adverse claim
over the subject property annotated on TCT
Nos. 344936 and 425582 of BCPI and WPFI,
respectively. ADRDI subsequently transferred
the subject property to Amado Araneta
(Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued
on March 25, 1983.

On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a

Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner
Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two
years later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.
Seven years hence, or on May 18, 2005,
Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion before
the RTC, Branch 75, of San Mateo, Rizal, in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Rodriguez
alleged therein that the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and Order dated
December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landichos
title over the subject property has not been
executed. Rodriguez specifically stated that
no decree of registration had been issued by
the
LRC
Commissioner
(now
the
Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority [LRA]) and that no OCT had been
ever issued by the ROD in Landichos name.
As Landichossuccessor-in-interest to the
subject property, Rodriguez prayed that:

a. Upon the filing of the instant motion, the

Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City be commanded to transmit to the
Honorable Court the complete records and
expediente of LRC No. x x x N-5098 (LRC Rec.
No. N-27619);

b. After hearing, the Honorable Court give

due course to the instant motions and issue
an Order as follows:
i. Directing the Administrator of the Land
Registration [Authority] to issue the Decree
of Registration, in accordance with the tenor
of the Decision dated November 16, 1965 x x
x and the Order dated December 22, 1965 x
x x, in the name of the petitioner
[Rodriguez];
ii. Thereafter, ordering the Register of Deeds
for Marikina City, through the Administrator
of the Land Registration Administration as
having direct supervisory authority thereover, to issue the Original Certificate of Title
containing the Technical Description as duly
confirmed in the said Decision and Order x x
x in the name of the herein petitioner
[Rodriguez].

PETITIONER further prays for such other

measures of relief as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises.15

In the course of the proceedings concerning

the
aforementioned
Omnibus
Motion,
Rodriguez himself submitted as his Exhibit
"GG" TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged
that said certificate of title was fictitious.
Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a
subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at
the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
set on November 8, 2006 at 9:00 a.m.; to
bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration
No. SM-02-0229; and to testify in connection
therewith.

On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before

the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to
Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.
PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing

that it was an indispensable party in the

case, having substantial legal interest
therein as the registered owner of the
subject property under TCT No. 482970.
PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez
himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970,
only alleging that said certificate was
fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez
maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus
Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid
and subsisting, there being no direct action
or final court decree for its cancellation.
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion constituted a
collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which
is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.
Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow
its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
so it could protect its vested rights and
interests over the subject property; to note
and admit its Answer-in-Intervention; and to
deny Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion for utter
lack of merit.

The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguezs

Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10,
2007, reasoning as follows:
Initially, the issue of jurisdiction arose
particularly as to whether this Court may
take cognizance of the instant case
previously assigned to the CFI Pasig and,
subsequently, rule upon the Omnibus Motion
of [Rodriguez] despite the lapse of more than
forty (40) years after the finality of the
Decision of November 16, 1965.

Clearly, this Court has jurisdiction because,

as earlier stated, the proceedings in this
Court is merely a continuation of the land
registration proceedings commenced in the
CFI Pasig. More importantly, with the creation
of this Court under the provisions of the
Judiciary Reorganization Law, all cases
involving properties within its territorial
jurisdiction, specifically in San Mateo, Rizal,

were transferred to this Court (Sec. 44, Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129).

Consequently, there is no legal impediment

for this Court to reiterate the Decision dated
November 16, 1965 and the Order dated
December 22, 1966 because the Rules on
execution of Judgment pertaining to civil
cases are not applicable to this kind of
proceedings. A final and executory judgment
in a land registration case, being merely
declaratory in nature, does not prescribe.
(Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of
Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA
316; vda. De Barroga vs. Albano, 157 SCRA
131; Cacho v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA
159)

Secondly, a more important issue was put to

forewhether this Court may issue a writ of
execution directing the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
registration over the subject property and
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
to issue an original certificate of title in the
name of [Rodriguez].

Consistency dictates and being a mere

continuation of the CFI Pasig proceedings,
this Court can only reiterate the directives in
the Order dated December 22, 196[5]. It
cannot, however, issue, as prayed for, a writ
of execution directing the issuance of a
decree of registration and an original
certificate of title in the name of [Rodriguez].

Finally, during the proceedings in this case,

this Court was made aware of the existence
of claimants to the subject property.
However, this Court cannot, at this time and
in this proceedings, rule on the legality or

illegality of these claims of ownership. It is

best that these claims be ventilated in
appropriate proceedings specifically sought
to for this purpose.16 (Underscoring deleted.)

The RTC decreed thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order
dated December 22, 1966 of the Court of
First Instance of Pasig, Branch 6, is hereby
REITERATED. The Land Registration Authority
is directed to issue a decree of registration
while the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal is likewise directed to issue an original
certificate of title of the subject property,
both in favor and in the name of applicant
Purita Landicho, of legal age, married to
Teodorico Landicho, Filipino and a resident of
74-A South 19th St., Quezon City, after
compliance with issuance requirements and
procedures.17

PCCAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of

the aforequoted Order of the RTC. The RTC
resolved both the Motion for Leave to
Intervene with the attached Answer-inIntervention and Motion for Reconsideration
of PCCAI in another Order dated November
22, 2007. The trial court held:

This Court after receiving evidence that a

Decision was rendered in favor of the
applicants spouses Landicho as owner in fee
simple of the subject parcels of land, and
that no title was issued pursuant to the said
Decision which has become final and
executory even after an Order to that effect
was issued, merely reiterated the said Order
for the implementation of the Decision dated
November 16, 1966, signed by the Hon.
Andres Reyes as Judge. In other words,
Intervention would not be allowed after the
Decision has become final and executory.

The issue in the instant Petition is the

issuance of a decree of registration and
nothing more is being tried.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

Motion For Leave To Intervene and the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCCAI
are both DENIED.18

The LRA, upon receipt of a copy of the RTC

Order dated April 10, 2007, filed a
Manifestation dated February 4, 2008
informing the trial court that it cannot
comply with said Order since there were
already two existing titles covering the
subject property, i.e., TCT No. 70589 of
Araneta (traced back to OCT No. 301 of
Meerkamp Co.) and TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI
(traced back to Landichos TCT No. 167681);
and to issue a decree of registration and OCT
in Landichos name would only further
aggravate the problem of double titling. The
LRA also explained that the ROD issued a
TCT, rather than an OCT, to Landicho for the
subject property in 1966, following the Order
dated July 7, 1966 of then LRC Commissioner
Antonio H. Noblejas (Noblejas), who took
cognizance of the fact that the subject
property, as part of a bigger parcel of land,
was already registered under OCT No. 301 in
the name of Meerkamp Co., pursuant to
Decree No. 1480 under GLRO Record No.
2429 issued in 1906. LRC Commissioner
Noblejas additionally stated in his Order that:

The new transfer certificate of title to be

issued by virtue hereof is deemed to have
been derived from Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-1. (Under Decree No. 1480 dated
November 22, 1906) which should be
deemed cancelled with respect to the said
property and that the issuance of the same
has been effected without the presentation

of the owners duplicate of subsisting

certificate of title.19 (Emphasis deleted.)

At around the same time, PCCAI filed a

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 101789, assailing the Orders dated April
10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the RTC
for having been issued without or in excess
of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. PCCAI acknowledged that it is
the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a writ
of execution for a final and executory
decision/order; however, PCCAI argued that
when subsequent facts and circumstances
transpired which renders the execution of the
final and executory decision/order unjust or
inequitable, then the trial court should
refrain from issuing a writ of execution.
PCCAI likewise asserted that the RTC, as a
land registration court, did not have the
jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of
ownership over the subject property. PCCAI
lastly
maintained
that
it
was
an
indispensable party in Land Reg. Case No. N5098 and that it should have been allowed
by the RTC to intervene during the hearing of
Rodriguezs
Omnibus
Motion
for
the
execution of the Decision dated November
16, 1965 and Order dated December 22,
1965 of the CFI.

The Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated

May 26, 2008, found merit in the Petition of
PCCAI. The appellate court gave great weight
and credence to the Manifestation dated
February 8, 2008 of the LRA reporting the
double titling and conflicting claims over the
subject property. The Court of Appeals held
that:

The Land Registration Authority, being the

repository of land registration documents
and the administrative agency with the
necessary
expertise
concerning
land
registration matters, We cannot but agree
with
the
above-quoted
Manifestation.
Moreover, from the above facts admitted by
the parties and the LRA, it cannot be denied
that there are conflicting claims on the
ownership of the property which cannot be
passed upon by the lower court as a land
registration court for lack of jurisdiction.20

The Court of Appeals additionally opined that

the intervention of PCCAI in Land Reg. Case
No.
N-5098
was
proper
given
the
circumstances:

Anent the issue of intervention, in the case of

Information Technology of the Philippines vs.
Comelec, G.R. 159139, August 22, 2006, the
following doctrine was enunciated, to wit:

"The basic doctrinal rule is that final

judgments may no longer be modified,
except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, or when the judgment is void, or if
supervening events or circumstances that
transpire after the finality of the decision
render its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the interest of substantial justice, this
Court has allowed exceptions to this rule. A
person who has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof, may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action."

We are not unmindful that [PCCAI] filed its

Intervention when the decision of the case
was already final and executory and during
the execution stage of the case. However,
the supervening event which is the issuance
of a decree of registration which was already
implemented and enforced upon the order of
the Administrator of the LRC way back in July
11, 1966 when the LRC issued TCT No.
167861 in the name of Purita Landicho
instead of an OCT makes the said
intervention proper and well-taken.

From the foregoing, it appears absurd and

senseless that an OCT be issued in favor of
Mr. Rodriguez. Furthermore, it is in the
paramount interest of justice that the
assailed orders be not implemented, [PCCAI]
being an indispensable party in the
execution and/or implementation of the said
orders. The non-execution of the said orders
will prevent further disarray, confusion and
complexity on the issue of who is or who
should be the real owner of the subject land
which is a matter that can be threshed out in
a proper case for quieting of title between
adverse claimants.21

Based on the foregoing, the appellate court

adjudged:

All told, the assailed orders were issued with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders are

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
[Rodriguez, RTC Presiding Judge Josephine
ZarateFernandez, the LRA Administrator, and
Marikina City ROD] are enjoined to cease and
desist from implementing the said orders

pending the outcome of a proper case before

an appropriate court where the issue of
ownership of the subject land can be put to
rest.22

Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the

foregoing Decision but was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
September 17, 2008.

Aggrieved, Rodriguez sought recourse from

this Court through the present Petition,
arguing that:
I
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED
AN OPEN-ENDED JUDGMENT.
A
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD ABDICATED
ITS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ON
THE MERE MANIFESTATION OF THE LRA THAT
THERE WERE ISSUES OF OWNERSHIP WHICH
HAVE FIRST TO BE RESOLVED.
B
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAS RESOLVED AN
ISSUE WHICH WAS IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL OR HAD OTHERWISE BEEN
RESOLVED.
II
THE [COURT OF APPEALS] HAD COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT
TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT
THE [PCCAI] HAD LEGAL STANDING TO
PREVENT OR SUSPEND THE OPERATION OF
THE LAND REGISTRATION LAWS BY WAY OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE ORDER DIRECTING
THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR

TO COMPLY WITH THE

DECEMBER 16, 1965.

ORDER

DATED

the remedies sought by Rodriguez can be

litigated and granted in an appropriate
proceeding by a court with proper
jurisdiction.

THE [PCCAI] HAD NO RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN

LRC NO. N-5098.
B.
THE [PCCAI] CANNOT CLAIM BUYER IN GOOD
FAITH STATUS AS ITS TITLE WAS DEFECTIVE
ON ITS FACE.
III
[RODRIGUEZ]
IS
ENTITLED
TO
THE
CORRECTIVE AND PREROGATIVE WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO INSURE THAT THE LAND
REGISTRATION LAWS ARE PROPERLY AND
FULLY IMPLEMENTED.23

The instant Petition has no merit.

At the outset, the Court finds unmeritorious

Rodriguezs claim that the Court of Appeals
rendered an open-ended judgment. In the
dispositive portion of its Decision dated May
26, 2008, the Court of Appeals clearly and
categorically "REVERSED AND SET ASIDE"
the Orders dated April 10, 2007 and
November 22, 2007 of the RTC in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098. The cease and desist order
of the appellate court in the second line of
the same dispositive portion is therefore a
superfluity. Obviously, by reversing and
setting aside the foregoing Orders, there is
nothing more to implement. The phrase
"pending the outcome of a proper case
before an appropriate court where the issue
of ownership of the subject land can be put
to rest,"24 does not mean that the very same
Orders which were reversed and set aside by
the Court of Appeals could later on be
revived or reinstated; rather it means that

To clarify matters, it must be stressed that

the issue brought before the Court of
Appeals did not involve the question of the
ownership.
The
appellate
court
only
concerned itself with the proper execution of
the November 16, 1965 Decision in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098 but, due to the
intricacy of the matter, was compelled to
take notice of the controversy between
Rodriguez and PCCAI, both of whom trace
back their titles to Landicho. In view of these
conflicting claims, Rodriguez now avers that
because ROD Santos issued TCT No. 167681
for the subject property in Landichos name,
the November 16, 1965 Decision in Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098 was not validly
implemented
since
no
OCT
was
25
issued. Corollary to this, Rodriguez posits
that PCCAI is not a buyer in good faith of the
subject property and that the latters TCT No.
482970 is spurious. PCCAI, on the other
hand, insists that the issuance of TCT No.
167681 to Landicho, from which its own TCT
No. 482970 may be traced back, was a valid
execution of the said CFI decision.

The LRA, in its Manifestation dated February

4, 2008 filed before the RTC, explained that a
TCT was issued to Landicho because the
subject property, as part of a bigger parcel of
land, was already covered by Decree No.
1480 and OCT No. 301 dated November 22,
1906 in the name of Meerkamp Co. In other
words, Landichos TCT No. 167681 is a
derivative of Decree No. 1480 and OCT No.
301 of Meerkamp Co. which were cancelled
to the extent of the subject property.

Complicating the matter further is the

pendency of Civil Case No. 12044 in the RTC,
Branch 167, Pasig City. Not only is PCCAI
questioning the right of Rodriguez to the
issuance of an OCT pursuant to the
November 16, 1965 Decision and December
22, 1965 Order of the CFI in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098, it is also defending the validity
of TCT No. 482970 (which is a derivative of
TCT No. 167681 issued to Landicho) against
Araneta who holds TCT No. 70589 (which is a
derivative of Meerkamp Co.s OCT No. 301).
In view of the foregoing, issuing an OCT
covering the subject property to Rodriguez
would give rise to a third certificate of title
over the same property. Such act would only
cause more confusion and complication,
rather than the preservation, of the Torrens
system of registration.

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to

quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is
registered, the owner may rest secure,
without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the
"mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of
losing his land. A Torrens title is generally a
conclusive evidence of the ownership of the
land
referred
to
therein.
A
strong
presumption exists that Torrens titles are
regularly issued and that they are valid. 26 In
this case, PCCAI is the registered owner of
the subject property under TCT No. 482970,
which could be traced back to TCT No. 16781
issued to Landicho. As between PCCAI and
Rodriguez, the former is better entitled to the
protection of the Torrens system. PCCAI can
rely on its TCT No. 482970 until the same has
been annulled and/or cancelled.

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,

otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, explicitly provides that "a certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral

attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or

cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law."

In Decaleng v. Bishop of the Missionary

District of the Philippine Islands of Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of
America,27 the Court declared that a Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the
issue on its validity can be raised only in an
action expressly instituted for that purpose.
A collateral attack is made when, in another
action to obtain a different relief, the
certificate of title is assailed as an incident in
said action.

Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 was an

application for registration of the subject
property instituted by Landicho before the
CFI, which was granted by the CFI in its
Decision
dated
November
16,
1965.
Rodriguez, asserting that he was Landichos
lawful successor-in-interest, filed an Omnibus

Motion before the RTC in Land Reg. Case No.

N-5098 seeking the issuance of a decree of
registration and an OCT in his name for the
subject property pursuant to the said CFI
judgment. Rodriguez acknowledged the
existence of TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI for the
same property, but he simply brushed aside
said certificate of title for allegedly being
spurious. Still, Rodriguez did not pray that
TCT No. 482970 be declared void and/or
cancelled; and even if he did, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to grant such relief in a land
registration case. Rodriguezs Omnibus
Motion in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, under
the circumstances, is a collateral attack on
said certificate, which is proscribed under
Section 48 of the Property Registration
Decree.

Deeds of the corresponding certificates of

title;
If Rodriguez wants to have a decree of
registration and OCT issued in his (or even in
Landichos name) for the subject property,
he should have directly challenged the
validity of the extant TCT No. 482970 of
PCCAI for the very same property in an
action specifically instituted for such purpose
(i.e.,
petition
for
annulment
and/or
cancellation of title, petition for quieting of
title) and pray the said certificate of title be
annulled or canceled. The proper court in an
appropriate action can try the factual and
legal issues involving the alleged fatal
defects in Landichos TCT No. 167681 and/or
its derivative TCTs, including TCT No. 482970
of PCCAI; the legal effects of Landichos sale
of the subject property to BCPI (the
predecessor-in-interest of PCCAI) in 1971 and
also to Rodriguez in 1996; and the good faith
or bad faith of PCCAI, as well as Rodriguez, in
purchasing the subject property. The
resolution of these issues will ultimately be
determinative of who between Rodriguez and
PCCAI is the rightful owner of the subject
property.

Clearly, the Court of Appeals cannot be

faulted for according weight and credence to
the Manifestation dated February 4, 2008 of
the LRA.

The LRA exists for the sole purpose of

implementing and protecting the Torrens
system of land titling and registration. 28 In
particular, it is tasked with the following
functions:

(1) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to

final judgments of the courts in land
registration proceedings and cause the
issuance by the Registrars of Land Titles and

(2) Be the central repository of records

relative to original registration of lands titled
under
the
Torrens
system,
including
subdivision and consolidation plans of titled
lands; and
(3) Extend assistance to courts in ordinary
and cadastral land registration proceedings
and to the other agencies of the government
in the implementation of the land reform
program.29

The duty of LRA officials to issue decrees of

registration is ministerial in the sense that
they act under the orders of the court and
the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found
in the record. They have no discretion in the
matter. However, if they are in doubt upon
any point in relation to the preparation and
issuance of the decree, these officials ought
to seek clarification from the court. They act,
in this respect, as officials of the court and
not as administrative officials, and their act
is the act of the court. They are specifically
called upon to "extend assistance to courts
in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings."30

In Ramos v. Rodriguez,31 the LRA filed a

motion for reconsideration of the decision
and order of the land registration court
respectively granting registration of a parcel
of land and directing the issuance of a
decree of registration for the same.
According to the LRA, there was already an
existing certificate of title for the property.
The land registration court granted the
motion for reconsideration of the LRA and set
aside its earlier decision and order. On
appeal, the Court declared that the land
registration court did not commit grave

abuse of discretion in reversing itself

because it was merely following the
recommendation of the LRA, which was then
acting as an agent of the court.

Prohibition of PCCAI largely based on the

Manifestation of the LRA, since the LRA filed
such a Manifestation as an officer of the
court.

In another case, Spouses Laburada v. Land

Registration Authority,32 the Court refused to
issue a writ of mandamus compelling the LRA
to issue a decree of registration as ordered
by a land registration court. The Court took
into account the LRA report that the parcels
of land were already registered and held:

Finally, intervention is governed by Rule 19

of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of
which read:

That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of

registration is understandable. Rather than a
sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is
reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same
parcel
of
land, such
issuance
may
contravene the policy and the purpose, and
thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens
system of registration.33

The LRA, in this case, filed the Manifestation

dated February 4, 2008 to inform the RTC
that the subject property is already covered
by two TCTs, both "uncancelled and
extant[;]" and for this reason, the LRA cannot
comply with the RTC Order dated April 10,
2007, directing the issuance of a decree of
registration and an OCT for the same
property in Landichos name, as it would
"further aggravate the already existing
problem of double titling." In filing said
Manifestation, the LRA was only faithfully
pursuing its mandate to protect the Torrens
system and performing its function of
extending assistance to the RTC as regards
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. Contrary to
Rodriguezs assertion, the Court of Appeals
did not abdicate its jurisdiction when it
granted the Petition for Certiorari and

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person

who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed
to intervene in the action. The court shall
consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties, and whether
or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate proceeding.

SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion

to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
attached to the motion and served on the
original parties.

The subject property is presently covered by

TCT
No.
482970
in
the
name
of
PCCAI.1wphi1 As the registered owner,
PCCAI clearly has a legal interest in the
subject property. The issuance of another
certificate of title to Rodriguez will adversely
affect PCCAI, constituting a cloud on its TCT
No. 482970.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period

when a motion to intervene may be filed, the
Court allowed exceptions in several cases,
viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible.

Interventions have been allowed even
beyond the period prescribed in the Rule,
when demanded by the higher interest of
justice. Interventions have also been granted
to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even
after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, when the petition for review of the
judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, and even
where the assailed order has already become
final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic
of the Philippines was allowed by this Court
to avoid grave injustice and injury and to
settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a

motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of
the appropriate circumstances. We stress
again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a
rule of procedure whose object is to make
the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. Its purpose is not to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice.34 (Citations
omitted.)

The particular circumstances of this case

similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of
procedure on intervention. First, the interests
of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject
property arose only after the CFI Decision
dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 became final and executory.

PCCAI bought the subject property from WPFI

on November 13, 1973 and was issued TCT
No. 482970 for the same on July 15, 1975;
while Rodriguez bought the subject property
from Landicho on November 14, 1996.
Second, as previously discussed herein, both
PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles back to
Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI
could not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of Landicho, the
original party in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098.
Third, the latest proceedings in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 involved Rodriguezs
Omnibus Motion, filed before the RTC on May
18, 2005, in which he prayed for the
execution of the November 16, 1965
Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to
intervene in the case only to oppose
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion on the ground
that the subject property is already
registered in its name under TCT No. 482970,
which originated from Landichos TCT No.
167681. And fourth, after learning of
Rodriguezs Omnibus Motion in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006
subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was
reasonably expected to oppose the same.
Such action was the most opportune and
expedient remedy available to PCCAI to
prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance
of a decree of registration and OCT in
Rodriguezs name. For this reason, the RTC
should have allowed the intervention of
PCCAI.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is

DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the
Orders dated April 10, 2007 and November
22, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
75 of San Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No.
N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
deleting the second sentence of the
dispositive portion for being a superfluity.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170604

2013

September 2,

HEIRS
OF
MARGARITA
PRODON, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND
VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY
REV.
MAXIMO
ALVAREZ,
JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when
the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for
quieting of title based on the inexistence of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase that
purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule
does not apply, and the defendant is not
precluded from presenting evidence other
than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of
the decision promulgated on August 18,
2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed
the
judgment
rendered
on
November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No.
96-78481 entitled Heirs of Maximo S Alvarez
and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev.
Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave,
represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v.
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds
of the City of Manila dismissing the
respondents action for quieting of title.2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and
damages against Margarita Prodon,3 the
respondents averred as the plaintiffs that
their parents, the late spouses Maximo S.
Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of that parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila;
that their parents had been in possession of
the property during their lifetime; that upon
their parents deaths, they had continued the
possession of the property as heirs, paying
the real property taxes due thereon; that
they could not locate the owners duplicate
copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy
of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of

Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original

copy contained an entry stating that the
property had been sold to defendant Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase; and that
the entry had been maliciously done by
Prodon because the deed of sale with right to
repurchase covering the property did not
exist. Consequently, they prayed that the
entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be
adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 SALE W/ RIGHT
TO REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF: MARGARITA
PRODON,
SINGLE,
FOR
THE
SUM
OF P120,000.00, THE HEREIN REGISTERED
OWNER RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE
RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY
FOR THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD
OF SIX MONTH (sic) FROM EXECUTION
THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET FORTH IN
(DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF
LISEO A. RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with
right to repurchase; that the deed had been
registered with the Register of Deeds and
duly annotated on the title; that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six
months from September 9, 1975 within
which to repurchase the property; and that
she had then become the absolute owner of
the property due to its non-repurchase within
the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of
the property attested that the copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase could
not be found in the files of the Register of
Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered
judgment,6 finding untenable the plaintiffs
contention that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase did not exist. It opined that
although the deed itself could not be
presented as evidence in court, its contents
could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its
execution or existence and of the cause of its

unavailability being without bad faith. It

found that the defendant had established the
execution and existence of the deed, to wit:
In the case under consideration, the
execution and existence of the disputed
deed of sale with right to repurchase
accomplished by the late Maximo Alvarez in
favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has
been adequately established by reliable and
trustworthy evidences (sic). Defendant
Prodon swore that on September 9, 1975 she
purchased the land covered by TCT No.
84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave
(TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7); that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase was drawn and
prepared by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid.,
p. 9); and that on September 10, 1975, she
registered the document in the Register of
Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been
confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary
Public Eliseo Razon dated September 10,
1975 (Exhibit 2), and by the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila
(Exhibit 4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others,
the following entries, to wit: "No. 321; Nature
of Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date
and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the
following data, to wit: Number of Entry:
3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975;
Hour and Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of
Contract: Sale with Right to Repurchase;
Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor:
Margarita Prodon; Date of Document: 9-9-75;
Contract value: 120,000. (Exhibit 4-a).
Under these premises the Court entertains
no doubt about the execution and existence
of the controverted deed of sale with right to
repurchase.7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs submission
that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. could not
have executed the deed of sale with right to
repurchase because of illness and poor
eyesight from cataract. It held that there was
no proof that the illness had rendered him
bedridden and immobile; and that his poor

eyesight could be corrected by wearing

lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase had
been lost, and that earnest efforts had been
exerted to produce it before the court. It
believed Jose Camilons testimony that he
had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao, but that he could not anymore
retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao
because the latter had meanwhile suffered
from a heart ailment and had been
recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the respondents assigned the
following errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE DUE EXECUTION AND
EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS
BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS
PROOFS OF THE DUE EXECUTION AND
EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS
BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE
PRODUCED IN COURT WITHOUT THE FAULT
OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
REJECTING THE PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THAT
THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED
THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME
OF ITS ALLEGED EXECUTION.8
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its
assailed decision, reversing the RTC, and
ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education
Culture and Sports (DECS) v. Del Rosario in
GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is
instructive in resolving this issue. The said
case held:

"Secondary evidence of the contents of a

document refers to evidence other than the
original document itself. A party may
introduce secondary evidence of the
contents of a written instrument not only
when the original is lost or destroyed, but
also when it cannot be produced in court,
provided there is no bad faith on the part of
the offeror. However, a party must first
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to
secondary evidence. A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production
of the original instrument. The correct order
of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, contents, although the court in its
discretion may change this order if
necessary."
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary
evidence as to the contents of a document
may be admitted in evidence, the existence
of [the] document must first be proved,
likewise, its execution and its subsequent
loss.
In the present case, the trial court found all
three
(3)
prerequisites
ha[ve]
been
established by Margarita Prodon. This Court,
however, after going through the records of
the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds
that the following circumstances put doubt
on the very existence of the alleged deed of
sale. Evidence on record showed that
Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between
August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975
(Exhibit "K"). It was also established by said
Exhibit "L" that Maximo Alvarez suffered
from paralysis of half of his body and
blindness due to cataract. It should further
be noted that barely 6 days later, on
September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was
again hospitalized for the last time because
he died on October of 1975 without having
left the hospital. This lends credence to
plaintiffs-appellants assertion that their
father, Maximo Alvarez, was not physically
able to personally execute the deed of sale
and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose
Camilions testimony that Maximo Alvarez,
with his wife, went to his residence on
September 5, 1975 to sell the property and
that again they met on September 9, 1975 to
sign the alleged deed of sale (Exhibits "A"
and "1"). The Court also notes that from the

sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was

finally filed, defendant-appellee never tried
to recover possession of the property nor
had she shown that she ever paid Real
Property Tax thereon. Additionally, the
Transfer Certificate of Title had not been
transferred in the name of the alleged
present owner. These actions put to doubt
the validity of the claim of ownership
because their actions are contrary to that
expected of legitimate owners of property.
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the
deed of sale did exist, the fact of its loss had
not been duly established. In De Vera, et al. v
Sps. Aguilar (218 SCRA 602 1993), the
Supreme Court held that after proof of the
execution of the Deed it must also be
established that the said document had been
lost or destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has
been established, it must next be proved
that said document has been lost or
destroyed. The destruction of the instrument
may be proved by any person knowing the
fact. The loss may be shown by any person
who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone
who had made, in the judgment of the court,
a sufficient examination in the place or
places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the
person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must
be accounted for before using copies. For,
since all the duplicates or multiplicates are
parts of the writing itself to be proved, no
excuse for non-production of the writing itself
can be regarded as established until it
appears that all of its parts are unavailable
(i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a
third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr.,
notary public who notarized the document
testified that the alleged deed of sale has
about four or five original copies. Hence, all
originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any one.
This[,] petitioners failed to do. Records show
that petitioners merely accounted for three

out of four or five original copies." (218 SCRA

at 607-608)
In the case at bar, Jose Camilions testimony
showed that a copy was given to Atty.
Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not recover
said copy. A perusal of the testimony does
not convince this Court that Jose Camilion
had exerted sufficient effort to recover said
copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince
this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted
sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he
said was with Atty. Lacanilao. It should be
noted that he never claimed that Atty.
Lacanilao was already too sick to even try
looking for the copy he had. But even
assuming this is to be so, Jose Camilion did
not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one in
his office to help him find said copy. In fine,
this Court believes that the trial court erred
in admitting the secondary evidence because
Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss or
destruction of the deed.
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary
evidence should not have been admitted
because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the
existence of the original deed of sale and to
establish its loss.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is
hereby REVERSED and a new one entered
ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 3816/T84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No.
84797 in order to remove the cloud over
plaintiff-appellants title.
SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who
meanwhile died on March 3, 2002) filed an
Omnibus
Motion
for
Substitution
of
Defendant and for Reconsideration of the
Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA
erred: (a) in finding that the pre-requisites for
the admission of secondary evidence had not
been complied with; (b) in concluding that
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
physically incapable of personally executing
the deed of sale with right to repurchase;

and (c) in blaming them for not recovering

the property, for not paying the realty taxes
thereon, and for not transferring the title in
their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued
itsresolution,11 allowing the substitution of
the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying
their motion for reconsideration for its lack of
merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon
(petitioners) have appealed to the Court
through petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the
following as issues, namely: (a) whether the
pre-requisites for the admission of secondary
evidence had been complied with; (b)
whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
been physically incapable of personally
executing the deed of sale with right to
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodons claim of
ownership was already barred by laches.12
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the
part of the CA that, albeit a harmless one,
requires us to re-examine and rectify in order
to carry out our essential responsibility of
educating the Bench and the Bar on the
admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads
us to conclude that the CA and the RTC both
misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this
case, and their misapplication diverted the
attention from the decisive issue in this
action for quieting of title. We shall endeavor
to correct the error in order to turn the case
to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be
produced; exceptions. When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or

under control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in
proving the terms of a written document the
original of the document must be produced
in court. The rule excludes any evidence
other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
(a) the existence or due execution of the
original; (b) the loss and destruction of the
original, or the reason for its non-production
in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on
the part of the offeror to which the
unavailability of the original can be
attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence
Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a
writing
are
brought
before
the
court,14 considering that (a) the precision in
presenting to the court the exact words of
the writing is of more than average
importance,
particularly
as
respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as
deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight
variation in words may mean a great
difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of
making a copy by handwriting or typewriting;
and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting
to give from memory the terms of a writing,
there is a special risk of error, greater than in
the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally.15 The rule further acts as
an insurance against fraud.16Verily, if a party
is in the possession of the best evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption
naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its
production
would
expose
and
defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects against
misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of
selected portions of a larger set of writings. 18

But the evils of mistransmission of critical

facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise
only when the issue relates to the terms of
the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule
applies only when the terms of a writing are
in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as
the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the
Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. 19 In
such a case, secondary evidence may be
admitted even without accounting for the
original.
This case involves an action for quieting of
title, a common-law remedy for the removal
of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the
title to real property by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title. In such an
action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants to place
things in their proper place and to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable
respect and not disturb the other. The action
is for the benefit of both, so that he who has
the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even
abuse the property. For an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (b) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.20
The action for quieting of title may be based
on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the
writing may or may not be material to an
action for quieting of title, depending on the
ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance,
when an action for quieting of title is based
on the unenforceability of a contract for not
complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article
1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides

that evidence of the agreement cannot be

received without the writing, or a secondary
evidence of its contents. There is then no
doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come
into play.
It is not denied that this action does not
involve the terms or contents of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. The principal
issue raised by the respondents as the
plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on,
was whether or not the deed of sale with
right to repurchase, duly executed by the
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.
They alleged in the complaint that:
xxxx
9. Such entry which could have been
maliciously and deliberately done by the
defendant Margarita Prodon created cloud
and [is] prejudicial to the title of the property
subject matter of this case, since while it is
apparently valid or effective, but in truth and
in fact it is invalid, ineffective or
unenforceable inasmuch that the instrument
purporting to be a Deed of Sale with right of
repurchase mentioned in the said entry does
not exist.21
xxxx
On her part, Prodon specifically denied the
allegation, averring in her answer that
"sometime
[o]n
September
9,
1975,
deceased Maximo S. Alvarez lawfully entered
into a Contract of Sale with Right to
Repurchase, object of which is the titled lot
located at Endaya Street, Tondo, Manila, in
favor of defendant."22 In the pre-trial order,
the RTC defined the issue to be tried as
"[w]hether or not the alleged document
mentioned in the said entry is existing, valid
or unenforceable,"23 and did not include the
terms of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase among the issues.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant
of the issues as defined, for none of them
thereafter ventured to present evidence to
establish the terms of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase. In the course of the trial,
however, a question was propounded to
Prodon as to who had signed or executed the
deed, and the question was objected to
based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC
then sustained the objection. 24 At that point
began the diversion of the focus in the case.
The RTC should have outrightly overruled the
objection because the fact sought to be

established by the requested testimony was

the execution of the deed, not its
terms.25 Despite the fact that the terms of
the writing were not in issue, the RTC
inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule
to the case and proceeded to determine
whether the requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had been complied with,
without being clear as to what secondary
evidence was sought to be excluded. In the
end, the RTC found in its judgment that
Prodon had complied with the requisites for
the introduction of secondary evidence, and
gave full credence to the testimony of Jose
Camilon explaining the non-production of the
original. On appeal, the CA seconded the
RTCs mistake by likewise applying the Best
Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded
differently, in that it held that Prodon had not
established the existence, execution, and
loss of the original document as the prerequisites for the presentation of secondary
evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence
Rule naturally led the CA to rule that
secondary evidence should not have been
admitted, but like the RTC the CA did not
state what excluded secondary evidence it
was referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was
not applicable because the terms of the deed
of sale with right to repurchase were not the
issue, the CA did not have to address and
determine whether the existence, execution,
and
loss,
as
pre-requisites
for
the
presentation of secondary evidence, had
been established by Prodons evidence. It
should
have
simply
addressed
and
determined whether or not the "existence"
and "execution" of the deed as the facts in
issue had been proved by preponderance of
evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to
prove the existence and due execution of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase, the
presentation of evidence other than the
original document, like the testimonies of
Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial
Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds,
would have sufficed even without first
proving the loss or unavailability of the
original of the deed.
2.

Prodon did not preponderantly establish the

existence and due execution of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial
tactics still required Prodon to establish and
explain the loss of the original of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase to establish the
genuineness and due execution of the
deed.26 This was because the deed, although
a collateral document, was the foundation of
her defense in this action for quieting of
title.27 Her inability to produce the original
logically gave rise to the need for her to
prove its existence and due execution by
other means that could only be secondary
under the rules on evidence. Towards that
end, however, it was not required to subject
the proof of the loss of the original to the
same strict standard to which it would be
subjected had the loss or unavailability been
a precondition for presenting secondary
evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon
did not adduce proof sufficient to show the
lossor explain the unavailability of the
original as to justify the presentation of
secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her
witnesses, testified that he had given the
original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not
anymore retrieve the original because Atty.
Lacanilao had been recuperating from his
heart ailment. Such evidence without
showing the inability to locate the original
from among Atty. Lacanilaos belongings by
himself or by any of his assistants or
representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a
duplicate original could have been secured
from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was
shown to have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample
indicia of the improbability of the existence
of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his
residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first
on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale
of the property in question, and the second
on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed
of sale with right to repurchase, viz:
Q
Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in
this case, Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife
Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness?

A
Yes, sir.
Q
A
Q
Under what circumstance were you able to
know the deceased plaintiff Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. and his wife?
When they went to our house, sir.
When was this specifically?
A
Sometime the first week of September or
about September 5, 1975, sir.
Q
What was the purpose of the spouses
Maximo and Valentina in meeting you on that
date?
A
They were selling a piece of land, sir.
xxxx
Q
At the time when the spouses Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave approached
you to sell their piece of land located at
Endaya, Tondo, Manila, what document, if
any, did they show you?
A
The title of the land, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that on the first week of September
or September 5, 1975 spouses Maximo and
Valentina approached you at the time, what
did you tell the spouses, if any?
A
I asked them to come back telling them that I
was going to look for a buyer, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez
to just come back later and that you will look
for a buyer, what happened next, if any?
A
I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
Q
A
What did you tell your aunt Margarita
Prodon?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if
any?
A
She agreed, provided that she should meet
the spouses, sir.

Q
After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what
happened next, if any?
A
I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring
them to my aunt, sir.
Q
Were you able to finally bring the spouses
before Margarita Prodon?
A
Valentina Clave returned to our house and
asked me if they can now sell the piece of
land, sir.
Q
What did you tell Valentina Clave?
A
Q
We went to the house of my aunt so she can
meet her personally, sir.
And did the meeting occur?
WITNESS
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What happened at the meeting?
A
I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of
my wife that they, the spouses, wanted to
sell the land, sir.
Q
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita
Prodon at the time?
A
That Valentina Clave should come back with
her husband because she was going to buy
the lot, sir.28
The foregoing testimony could not be
credible for the purpose of proving the due
execution of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase for three reasons.1wphi1
The
first
is
that
the
respondents
preponderantly established that the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of
the hospital around the time that the deed of
sale with right to repurchase had been
supposedly executed on September 9, 1975.
The records manifested that he had been
admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital
in Quezon City on several occasions, and had
then been diagnosed with the serious
ailments or conditions, as follows:
Period

of Diagnosis

confinement
March 31 May
Prostatitis,
19, 1975
chronic
Arteriosclerotic
heart
disease
Atrial fibrillation
Congestive heart
failure
CFC III29
June 21975

June

August
September
1975

6,
Chest
pains
(Atrial Flutter)
Painful urination
(Chronic
prostatitis)30
23- Arteriosclerotic
3, heart
disease
Congestive heart
failure,
mild
Atrial fibrillation

Cardiac
functional capacity
III-B31

September
15- Arteriosclerotic
October 2, 1975
heart
disease
Atrial fibrillation
Congestive heart
failure

Pneumonia

Urinary
tract
infection
Cerebrovascular
accident,
old

Upper
GI
bleeding probably
secondary
to
32
stress ulcers
The medical history showing the number of
very serious ailments the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered
it highly improbable for him to travel from
Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan,
where Prodon and Camilon were then
residing in order only to negotiate and
consummate the sale of the property. This
high improbability was fully confirmed by his
son, Maximo, Jr., who attested that his father
had been seriously ill, and had been in and
out of the hospital in 1975.33 The medical
records revealed, too, that on September 12,
1975, or three days prior to his final
admission to the hospital, the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade
fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and

cough
productive
of
whitish
sticky
sputum;"had
been
observed
to
be
"conscious" but "weak" and "bedridden" with
his heart having "faint" sounds, irregular
rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper
extremity and left lower extremity had
suffered 90% motor loss.34 Truly, Prodons
allegation that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase
had
been
executed
on
September 9, 1975 could not command
belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No.
84797 of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase and the entry in the primary
entry book of the Register of Deeds did not
themselves establish the existence of the
deed. They proved at best that a document
purporting to be a deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been registered with the
Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration
alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of
its authenticity or its due execution by the
registered owner of the property, which was
precisely the issue in this case. The
explanation for this is that registration, being
a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act
by which an instrument is inscribed in the
records of the Register of Deeds and
annotated on the dorsal side of the
certificate of title covering the land subject
of the instrument.35 It is relevant to mention
that the law on land registration does not
require that only valid instruments be
registered,
because
the
purpose
of
registration is only to give notice. 36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial
register of Notary Public Razon could only be
proof that a deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been notarized by him, but
did not establish the due execution of the
deed.
The third is that the respondents remaining
in the peaceful possession of the property
was
further
convincing
evidence
demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right
to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have
herself asserted and exercised her right to
take over the property, legally and physically
speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the
repurchase period stipulated under the deed,
including transferring the TCT in her name
and paying the real property taxes due on

the properly. Her inaction was an index of the

falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we
concur with the CA that the respondents
preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale
with right to repurchase executed by the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624
entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and
Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo
Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the
Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189316

June 1, 2013

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES BERNARD and CRESENCIA
MARANON, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:
This
is
a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Decision2 dated June 18,
2008 and Resolution3 dated August 10, 2009
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02513, which affirmed in toto the Orders
dated September 8, 20064 and December 6,
20065 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 54, directing petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to release in
favor of Spouses Bernard and Cresencia
Marafion (Spouses Marafion) the rental fees
it received amounting to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00).

The Facts
The controversy at bar involves a 152-square
meter parcel of land located at Cuadra-Smith
Streets, Downtown, Bacolod (subject lot)
erected with a building leased by various
tenants. The subject lot was among the
properties mortgaged by Spouses Rodolfo
and
Emilie
Montealegre
(Spouses
Montealegre) to PNB as a security for a loan.
In their transactions with PNB, Spouses
Montealegre used Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-156512 over the subject lot
purportedly registered in the name of Emilie
Montealegre (Emilie).6

When Spouses Montealegre failed to pay the

loan, PNB initiated foreclosure proceedings
on the mortgaged properties, including the
subject lot. In the auction sale held on
August 16, 1991, PNB emerged as the
highest
bidder.
It
was
issued
the
corresponding Certificate of Sale dated
December 17, 19917 which was subsequently
registered on February 4, 1992.8

Before the expiration of the redemption

period or on July 29, 1992, Spouses Maraon
filed before the RTC a complaint for
Annulment of Title, Reconveyance and
Damages9 against
Spouses
Montealegre,
PNB, the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City
and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7213, alleged that Spouses
Maraon are the true registered owners of
the subject lot by virtue of TCT No. T-129577
which was illegally cancelled by TCT No. T156512 under the name of Emilie who used a
falsified Deed of Sale bearing the forged
signatures of Spouse Maraon10 to effect the
transfer of title to the property in her name.

In its Answer,11 PNB averred that it is a

mortgagee in good faith and for value and
that its mortgage lien on the property was
registered thus valid and binding against the
whole world.

As reflected in the Pre-trial Order12 dated

March 12, 1996, the parties stipulated,
among others, that the period for legal
redemption of the subject lot has already
expired.

While the trial proceedings were ongoing,

Paterio Tolete (Tolete), one of the tenants of
the building erected on the subject lot
deposited his rental payments with the Clerk
of Court of Bacolod City which, as of October
24, 2002, amounted to P144,000.00.

On June 2, 2006, the RTC rendered its

Decision13 in favor of the respondents after
finding, based on the expert testimony of
Colonel Rodolfo Castillo, Head of the Forensic
Technology Section of Bacolod City Philippine
National Police, that the signatures of
Spouses Maraon in the Deed of Sale
presented by Spouses Montealegre before
the Register of Deeds to cause the
cancellation of TCT No. T-129577 were
forged. Hence, the RTC concluded the sale to
be null and void and as such it did not
transfer any right or title in law. PNB was
adjudged to be a mortgagee in good faith
whose lien on the subject lot must be
respected.
Accordingly,
the
Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs herein respondents:
1. The cancellation of TCT No. 129577 over
Lot 177-A-1 Bacolod Cadastre in the name of
Bernard Maraon and the issuance of new
TCT No. 156512 in the name of defendant
Emilie Montealegre are hereby declared null
and void;
2. The defendant Emilie Montealegre is
ordered to reconvey the title over Lot No.
177-A-1, Bacolod Cadastre back to the
plaintiffs Maraon herein respondents;
3. The Real Estate Mortgage lien of the
Philippine National Bank registered on the
title of Lot No. 177-A-1 Bacolod Cadastre
shall stay and be respected; and
4. The defendants - Emilie Montealegre and
spouse are ordered to pay attorneys fees in

the sum of Php50,000.00, and to pay the

costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.14

Neither
of
the
parties
sought
a
reconsideration of the above decision or any
portion thereof nor did they elevate the
same for appellate review.

What precipitated the controversy at hand

were the subsequent motions filed by
Spouses Maraon for release of the rental
payments deposited with the Clerk of Court
and paid to PNB by Tolete.

On June 13, 2006, Spouses Maraon filed an

Urgent Motion for the Withdrawal of
Deposited
Rentals15 praying
that
the P144,000.00 rental fees deposited by
Tolete with the Clerk of Court be released in
their favor for having been adjudged as the
real owner of the subject lot. The RTC
granted the motion in its Order16 dated June
28, 2006.

On September 5, 2006, Spouses Maraon

again filed with the RTC an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion
for
Withdrawal
of
Deposited
Rentals17 praying that the P30,000.00 rental
fees paid to PNB by Tolete on December 12,
1999 be released in their favor. The said
lease payments were for the five (5)-month
period from August 1999 to December 1999
at the monthly lease rate of P6,000.00.

The RTC granted the motion in its

Order18 dated September 8, 2006 reasoning
that pursuant to its Decision dated June 2,

2006 declaring Spouses Maraon to be the

true registered owners of the subject lot,
they are entitled to its fruits.

The PNB differed with the RTCs ruling and

moved for reconsideration averring that as
declared by the RTC in its Decision dated
June 2, 2006, its mortgage lien should be
carried over to the new title reconveying the
lot to Spouses Maraon. PNB further argued
that with the expiration of the redemption
period on February 4, 1993, or one (1) year
from the registration of the certificate of
sale, PNB is now the owner of the subject lot
hence, entitled to its fruits. PNB prayed that
(1) the Order dated September 8, 2006 be
set aside, and (2) an order be issued
directing Spouses Maraon to turn over to
PNB the amount of P144,000.00 released in
their favor by the Clerk of Court.19

On November 20, 2006, the RTC issued an

Order again directing PNB to release to
Spouses Maraon theP30,000.00 rental
payments considering that they were
adjudged to have retained ownership over
the property.20
On December 6, 2006, the RTC issued
another Order denying PNBs motion for
reconsideration and reiterating the directives
in its Order dated September 8, 2006.21

also contended
mortgagee.

that

it

is

an

innocent

In its Decision23 dated June 18, 2008, the CA

denied the petition and affirmed the RTCs
judgment ratiocinating that not being parties
to the mortgage transaction between PNB
and Spouses Montealegre, Spouses Maraon
cannot be deprived of the fruits of the
subject lot as the same will amount to
deprivation of property without due process
of law. The RTC further held that PNB is not a
mortgagee in good faith because as a
financial institution imbued with public
interest, it should have looked beyond the
certificate of title presented by Spouses
Montealegre and conducted an inspection on
the circumstances surrounding the transfer
to Spouses Montealegre. The decretal portion
of the Decision thus read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders
dated September 8, 2006 and December 6,
2006, rendered by the respondent Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Bacolod City, in Civil Case NO. 7213 directing
the release of the deposited rental in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
([P]30,000.00) to private respondents are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24
Aggrieved, PNB sought recourse with the CA
via
a
petition
for
certiorari
and
22
mandamus claiming that as the lawful
owner of the subject lot per the RTCs
judgment dated June 2, 2006, it is entitled to
the fruits of the same such as rentals paid by
tenants hence, the ruling that "the real
estate mortgage lien of the PNB registered
on the title of Lot No. 177-A-1 Bacolod
Cadastre shall stay and be respected." PNB

PNB moved for reconsideration25 but the

motion was denied in the CA Resolution
dated August 10, 2009.26 Hence, the present
recourse whereby PNB argues that the RTC
Decision dated June 2, 2006 lapsed into
finality when it was not appealed or
submitted for reconsideration. As such, all

conclusions therein are immutable and can

no longer be modified by any court even by
the RTC that rendered the same. The CA
however erroneously altered the RTC
Decision by reversing the pronouncement
that PNB is a mortgagee-in-good-faith.

PNB further asseverates that its mortgage

lien was carried over to the new title issued
to Spouses Maraon and thus it retained the
right to foreclose the subject lot upon nonpayment of the secured debt. PNB asserts
that it is entitled to the rent because it
became the subject lots new owner when
the redemption period expired without the
property being redeemed.

in any respect even if the modification is

meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land.27 The significance of this
rule was emphasized in Apo Fruits
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28 to wit:

The reason for the rule is that if, on the

application of one party, the court could
change its judgment to the prejudice of the
other, it could thereafter, on application of
the latter, again change the judgment and
continue this practice indefinitely. The equity
of a particular case must yield to the
overmastering need of certainty and
unalterability of judicial pronouncements.

Ruling of the Court

It is readily apparent from the facts at hand

that the status of PNBs lien on the subject
lot has already been settled by the RTC in its
Decision dated June 2, 2006 where it was
adjudged as a mortgagee in good faith
whose lien shall subsist and be respected.
The decision lapsed into finality when neither
of the parties moved for its reconsideration
or appealed.

The
doctrine
of
immutability
and
inalterability of a final judgment has a twofold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration
of
justice
and
thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business and (2) to put an end to
judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is
not a mere technicality to be easily brushed
aside, but a matter of public policy as well as
a time-honored principle of procedural
law.29 (Citations omitted)

Being a final judgment, the dispositions and

conclusions therein have become immutable
and unalterable not only as against the
parties but even the courts. This is known as
the doctrine of immutability of judgments
which espouses that a judgment that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified

Hence, as correctly argued by PNB, the issue

on its status as a mortgagee in good faith
have been adjudged with finality and it was
error for the CA to still delve into and, worse,
overturn, the same. The CA had no other
recourse but to uphold the status of PNB as a
mortgagee in good faith regardless of its
defects for the sake of maintaining stability

We deny the petition.

of judicial pronouncements. "The main role of

the courts of justice is to assist in the
enforcement of the law and in the
maintenance of peace and order by putting
an end to judiciable controversies with
finality. Nothing better serves this role than
the long established doctrine of immutability
of judgments."30

Further, it must be remembered that what

reached the CA on certiorari were RTC
resolutions issued long after the finality of
the Decision dated June 2, 2006. The RTC
Orders dated September 8, 2006 and
December 6, 2006 were implements of the
pronouncement that Spouses Maraon are
still the rightful owners of the subject lot, a
matter that has been settled with finality as
well. This notwithstanding, the Court agrees
with the ultimate outcome of the CAs
assailed resolutions.

31

Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the

owner of the property32 producing it by right
of accession33.34 The rightful recipient of the
disputed rent in this case should thus be the
owner of the subject lot at the time the rent
accrued. It is beyond question that Spouses
Maraon never lost ownership over the
subject lot. This is the precise consequence
of the final and executory judgment in Civil
Case No. 7213 rendered by the RTC on June
3, 2006 whereby the title to the subject lot
was reconveyed to them and the cloud
thereon consisting of Emilies fraudulently
obtained title was removed. Ideally, the
present dispute can be simply resolved on
the basis of such pronouncement. However,
the application of related legal principles
ought to be clarified in order to settle the
intervening right of PNB as a mortgagee in
good faith.

The protection afforded to PNB as a

mortgagee in good faith refers to the right to
have its mortgage lien carried over and
annotated on the new certificate of title
issued to Spouses Maraon35 as so adjudged
by the RTC. Thereafter, to enforce such lien
thru foreclosure proceedings in case of nonpayment of the secured debt,36 as PNB did so
pursue. The principle, however, is not the
singular rule that governs real estate
mortgages and foreclosures attended by
fraudulent transfers to the mortgagor.

Rent,
as
an
accessory
follow
the
37
principal. In fact, when the principal
property is mortgaged, the mortgage shall
include all natural or civil fruits and
improvements found thereon when the
secured obligation becomes due as provided
in Article 2127 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the

natural accessions, to the improvements,
growing fruits, and the rents or income not
yet received when the obligation becomes
due, and to the amount of the indemnity
granted or owing to the proprietor from the
insurers of the property mortgaged, or in
virtue of expropriation for public use, with
the
declarations,
amplifications
and
limitations established by law, whether the
estate remains in the possession of the
mortgagor, or it passes into the hands of a
third person.

Consequently, in case of non-payment of the

secured debt, foreclosure proceedings shall
cover not only the hypothecated property
but all its accessions and accessories as well.
This was illustrated in the early case of Cu
Unjieng e Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar
Co.38 where the Court held:

That a mortgage constituted on a sugar

central includes not only the land on which it
is built but also the buildings, machinery,
and accessories installed at the time the
mortgage was constituted as well as the
buildings,
machinery
and
accessories
belonging to the mortgagor, installed after
the constitution thereof x x x .39

Applying such pronouncement in the

subsequent case of Spouses Paderes v. Court
of Appeals,40 the Court declared that the
improvements constructed by the mortgagor
on the subject lot are covered by the real
estate
mortgage
contract
with
the
mortgagee bank and thus included in the
foreclosure proceedings instituted by the
latter.41

However,
the
rule
is
not
without
42
qualifications. In Castro, Jr. v. CA the Court
explained that Article 2127 is predicated on
the presumption that the ownership of
accessions and accessories also belongs to
the mortgagor as the owner of the principal.
After all, it is an indispensable requisite of a
valid real estate mortgage that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
encumbered property, thus:

All improvements subsequently introduced or

owned by the mortgagor on the encumbered
property are deemed to form part of the
mortgage. That the improvements are to be
considered so incorporated only if so owned
by the mortgagor is a rule that can hardly be
debated since a contract of security,
whether, real or personal, needs as an
indispensable element thereof the ownership
by the pledgor or mortgagor of the property
pledged or mortgaged. x x x. 43 (Citation
omitted)

Otherwise stated, absent an adverse

claimant or any evidence to the contrary, all
accessories and accessions accruing or
attached to the mortgaged property are
included in the mortgage contract and may
thus also be foreclosed together with the
principal property in case of non-payment of
the debt secured.

Corollary,
any
evidence
sufficiently
overthrowing the presumption that the
mortgagor owns the mortgaged property
precludes the application of Article 2127.
Otherwise stated, the provision is irrelevant
and inapplicable to mortgages and their
resultant foreclosures if the mortgagor is
later on found or declared to be not the true
owner of the property, as in the instant
case.1wphi1

It is beyond question that PNBs mortgagors,

Spouses Montealegre, are not the true
owners of the subject lot much less of the
building which produced the disputed rent.
The foreclosure proceedings on August 16,
1991 caused by PNB could not have, thus,
included the building found on the subject lot
and the rent it yields. PNBs lien as a
mortgagee in good faith pertains to the
subject lot alone because the rule that

improvements shall follow the principal in a

mortgage under Article 2127 of the Civil
Code does not apply under the premises.
Accordingly, since the building was not
foreclosed, it remains a property of Spouses
Maraon; it is not affected by nonredemption and is excluded from any
consolidation of title made by PNB over the
subject lot. Thus, PNBs claim for the rent
paid by Tolete has no basis.

This is because as purchaser at a public

auction, UNIONBANK is only substituted to
and acquires the right, title, interest and
claim of the judgment debtors or mortgagors
to the property at the time of levy. Perforce,
the judgment in the main action for
reconveyance
will
not
be
rendered
ineffectual by the consolidation of ownership
and the issuance of title in the name of
UNIONBANK.46 (Citation omitted)

It must be remembered that there is

technically no juridical tie created by a valid
mortgage contract that binds PNB to the
subject lot because its mortgagor was not
the true owner. But by virtue of the
mortgagee in good faith principle, the law
allows PNB to enforce its lien. We cannot,
however, extend such principle so as to
create a juridical tie between PNB and the
improvements attached to the subject lot
despite clear and undeniable evidence
showing that no such juridical tie exists.

Nonetheless, since the present recourse

stemmed from a mere motion claiming
ownership of rent and not from a main action
for annulment of the foreclosure sale or of its
succeeding incidents, the Court cannot
proceed to make a ruling on the bearing of
the CA's Decision dated June 18, 2008 to
PNB's standing as a purchaser in the public
auction. Such matter will have to be threshed
out in the proper forum.

Lastly, it is worthy to note that the effects of

the foreclosure of the subject lot is in fact
still contentious considering that as a
purchaser in the public sale, PNB was only
substituted to and acquired the right, title,
interest and claim of the mortgagor to the
property as of the time of the levy.44 There
being already a final judgment reconveying
the subject lot to Spouses Maraon and
declaring as null and void Emilie's purported
claim of ownership, the legal consequences
of the foreclosure sale, expiration of the
redemption
period
and
even
the
consolidation of the subject lot's title in PNB's
name shall be subjected to such final
judgment. This is the clear import of the
ruling in Unionbank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals:45

All told, albeit the dispositive portions of the

assailed CA decision and resolution are
differently premised, they ought to be upheld
as they convey the similar conclusion that
Spouses Maraon are the rightful owners of
the rent earned by the building on the
subject lot.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated June 18, 2008 and Resolution dated
August 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02513 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517

September 18, 2013

HILARIA
BAGAYAS, Petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO
BAGAYAS,
FELICIDAD
BAGAYAS, ROSALINA BAGAYAS, MICHAEL
BAGAYAS,
and
MARIEL
BAGAYAS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari1 are the Resolutions2 dated January
6, 20093 and Order4 dated March 16, 2009 of
the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac,
Branch 68 (RTC) which dismissed on the
ground of res judicata the twin petitions of
Hilaria Bagayas (petitioner) for amendment
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
375657 and 375658,docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) Nos. 08-34 and 0835.

The Facts
On June 28, 2004, petitioner filed a
complaint5 for annulment of sale and
partition before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 04-42, claiming that Rogelio,
Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all
surnamed Bagayas (respondents) intended
to exclude her from inheriting from the
estate of her legally adoptive parents,
Maximino Bagayas (Maximino) and Eligia
Clemente (Eligia), by falsifying a deed of
absolute sale (deed of absolute sale)
purportedly executed by the deceased
spouses (Maximino and Eligia) transferring

two parcels of land (subject lands) registered

in their names to their biological children,
respondent
Rogelio
and
Orlando
6
7
Bagayas (Orlando). Said deed, which was
supposedly
executed
on
October
7,
1974,8 bore the signature of Eligia who could
not have affixed her signature thereon as she
had long been dead since August 21,
1971.9 By virtue of the same instrument,
however, the Bagayas brothers were able to
secure in their favor TCT Nos. 37565710 and
37565811 over the subject lands.

[2] Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale

dated October 7, 1974 is valid;

As a matter of course, trial ensued on the

merits of the case. Petitioner presented
herself and five other witnesses to prove the
allegations in her complaint. Respondents
likewise testified in their defense denying
any knowledge of the alleged adoption of
petitioner by Maximino and Eligia, and
pointing out that petitioner had not even
lived with the family.12 Furthermore, Rogelio
claimed13 that after their parents had died,
he and Orlando executed a document
denominated as Deed of Extra judicial
Succession14 (deed
of
extra
judicial
succession) over the subject lands toeffect
the transfer of titles thereof to their names.
Before the deed of extra judicial succession
could be registered, however, a deed of
absolute sale transferring the subject lands
to them was discovered from the old files of
Maximino, which they used by "reason of
convenience" to acquire title to the said
lands.15

With respect to the first issue, the RTC

declared petitioner to be anadopted child of
Maximino and Eligia on the strength of the
order of adoption, which it considered as
more reliable than the oral testimonies of
respondents
denying
the
fact
of
18
adoption. On the issue of the validity of the
questioned deed of absolute sale, the RTC
ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a
mere surplusage, as the subject lands
belonged exclusively to Maximino who could
alienate the same without the consent of his
wife.19

In a Decision16 dated March 24, 2008

dismissing the case a quo , the RTC
summarized the threshold issues for
resolution, to wit:
[1] Whether or not petitioner is an adopted
child of the late spouses Maximino Bagayas
and Eligia Clemente;

[3] Whether or not plaintiff can ask for

partition of the subject properties assuming
that she is an adopted child of the late
spouses Maximino Bagayas and Eligia
Clemente and assuming further that the
subject deed of sale is invalid; and
[4] Is the
damages?17

prevailing

party

entitled

to

The RTC further held that, even though

petitioner is an adopted child, she could not
ask for partition of the subject lands as she
was not able to prove any of the instances
that would invalidate the deed of absolute
sale. Moreover, the action for annulment of
sale was improper as it constituted a
collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and
Orlando.20

Insisting that the subject lands were conjugal

properties of Maximino and Eligia, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration 21 from the
aforesaid Decision, which was denied by the
RTC in a Resolution22 dated June 17,2008
holding that while it may have committed a

mistake in declaring the subject lands as

exclusive properties of Maximino (since the
defendants therein already admitted during
the pre-trial conference that the subject
lands are the conjugal properties of
Maximino and Eligia), the action was
nevertheless dismissible on the ground that
it was a collateral attack on the title of
Rogelio and Orlando.23 Citing the case of
Tapuroc v. Loquellano Vda.de Mende, 24 it
observed that the action for the declaration
of nullity of deed of sale is not the direct
proceeding required by law to attack a
Torrens certificate of title.25
No appeal was taken from the RTCs Decision
dated March 24, 2008or the Resolution dated
June 17, 2008, thereby allowing the same to
lapse into finality.

Subsequently, however, petitioner filed, on

August 1, 2008, twin petitions 26 before the
same RTC, docketed as LRC Nos. 08-34 and
08-35, for the amendment of TCT Nos.
375657 and 375658 to include her name and
those of her heirs and successors-in-interest
as registered owners to the extent of onethird of the lands covered therein. 27 The
petitions were anchored on Section 108 of
Presidential
Decree
No.
(PD)
28
1529, otherwise known as the "Property
Registration Decree," which provides as
follows:

Section 108. Amendment and alteration of

certificates. No erasure, alteration, or
amendment shall be made upon the
registration book after the entry of a
certificate of title or of a memorandum
thereon and the attestation of the same be
[sic] Register of Deeds, except by order of
the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner [sic] of other person having
an interest in registered property, or, in
proper cases, the [sic] Register of Deeds with

the approval of the Commissioner of Land

Registration, may apply by petition to the
court upon the ground that x x x

new interest not appearing upon the

certificate have arisen or been created; x x x;
or upon any other reasonable ground; and
the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest,
and may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant of
any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if
necessary, as it may consider proper;
Provided, however, That this section shall not
be construed to give the court authority to
reopen
the
judgment
or
decree
of
registration, and that nothing shall be done
or ordered by the court which shall impair
the title or other interest of a purchaser
holding a certificate for value and in good
faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or
their written consent. x x x.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
To substantiate her "interest" in the subject
lands, petitioner capitalized on the finding of
the RTC in its Decision dated March 24,
2008that she is the adopted child of
Maximino and Eligia, and that the signature
of the latter in the deed of absolute sale
transferring the subject lands to Rogelio and
Orlando was falsified.29

The petitions were dismissed30 by the RTC,

however, on the ground of res judicata . The
RTC ruled that the causes of action in the two
cases filed by petitioner are similar in that
the ultimate objective would be her inclusion
as co-owner of the subject lands and,
eventually, the partition thereof.31 Since
judgment had already been rendered on the
matter, and petitioner had allowed the same

to attain finality, the principle of res judicata

barred further litigation thereon.32

held in the case of Municipality of Bian v.

Garcia:37

Dissatisfied, petitioner argued in her motion

for reconsideration33 that the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 04-42 (for annulment of sale
and partition)on the ground that it was a
collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and
Orlando did not amount to a judgment on the
merits, thus, precluding the applicability of
res judicata.34 The motion was resolved
against petitioner, and the dismissal of LRC
Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 (for amendment of TCT
Nos. 375657 and 375658) was upheld by the
RTC in an Order35 dated March16, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition.

The first phase of a partition and/or

accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a coownership in fact exists, and a partition is
proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed)
and may be made by voluntary agreement of
all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may
end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by
the defendant from the real estate in
question is in order. In the latter case, the
parties may, if they are able to agree, make
partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court
shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In
either case i.e., either the action is
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is
decreed the order is a final one, and may
be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby.38 (Emphasis
supplied;
citations
omitted)

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or
not the dismissal of the earlier complaint on
the ground that it is in the nature of a
collateral attack on the certificates of title
constitutes a bar to a subsequent petition
under Section 108 of PD 1529.

The Court's Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that Civil
Case No. 04-42 was a complaint for
annulment of sale and partition. In a
complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks,
first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of
the subject properties; and second, the
conveyance of his lawful shares. An action
for partition is at once an action for
declaration
of
co-ownership
and
for
segregation
and
conveyance
of
a
determinate portion of the properties
involved.36 The determination, therefore, as
to the existence of co-ownership is necessary
in the resolution of an action for partition. As

In dismissing Civil Case No. 04-42, the RTC

declared that petitioner could not ask for the
partition of the subject lands, even though
she is an adopted child, because "she was
not able to prove any of the instances that
would invalidate the deed of absolute
sale"39 purportedly executed by Maximino
and Eligia. This conclusion came about as a
consequence of the RTCs finding that, since
the subject lands belonged exclusively to
Maximino, there was no need to secure the
consent of his wife who was long dead before
the sale took place. For this reason, the
forgery of Eligia's signature on the
questioned
deed
was
held
to
be
inconsequential.
However,
on

reconsideration, the RTC declared that it

committed a mistake in holding the subject
lands as exclusive properties of Maximino
"since there was already an admission by the
defendants during the pre-trial conference
that the subject properties are the conjugal
properties of the spouses Maximino Bagayas
and Eligia Clemente."40 Nonetheless, the RTC
sustained its dismissal of Civil Case No. 0442 on the ground that it constituted a
collateral attack upon the title of Rogelio and
Orlando.
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.41 (Lacbayan) which
is an action for partition premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of
ownership does not subject the Torrens title
issued over the disputed realties to a
collateral attack. It must be borne in mind
that what cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself.
As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate
of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but
that rule is not material to the case at bar.
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the
TCT. In contrast, the title referred to bylaw
means ownership which is, more often than
not,
represented
by
that
document.
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the
certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably
used.42 (Emphases supplied)

Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed

petitioners petition for annulment of sale on
the ground that it constituted a collateral
attack since she was actually assailing
Rogelio and Orlandos title to the subject

lands and not any Torrens certificate of title

over the same.

Be that as it may, considering that petitioner

failed to appeal from the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 04-42, the judgment therein is final
and may no longer be reviewed.

The crucial issue, therefore, to be resolved is

the propriety of the dismissal of LRC Nos. 0834 and 08-35 on the ground of res judicata.
It must be pointed out that LRC Nos. 08-34
and 08-35 praying that judgment be
rendered directing the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac to include petitioner's name, those of
her heirs and successors-in-interest as
registered owners to the extent of one-third
of the lands covered by TCT Nos. 375657and
375658, were predicated on the theory43 that
Section 108 of PD 1529 is a mode of directly
attacking the certificates of title issued to the
Bagayas brothers. On the contrary, however,
the Court observes that the amendment of
TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 under Section
108 of PD 1529 is actually not the direct
attack
on
said
certificates
of
title
44
contemplated under Section 48 of the same
law. Jurisprudence instructs that an action or
proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a
certificate of title when its objective is to
nullify the same, thereby challenging the
judgment pursuant to which the certificate of
title was decreed.45 Corollary thereto, it is a
well-known doctrine that the issue as to
whether the certificate of title was procured
by falsification or fraud can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for such
purpose. As explicated in Borbajo v. Hidden
View Homeowners, Inc.:46
It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as
to whether the certificate of title was
procured by falsification or fraud can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for

the purpose. A Torrens title can be attacked

only for fraud, within one year after the date
of the issuance of the decree of registration.
Such attack must be direct, and not by a
collateral proceeding. The title represented
by the certificate cannot be changed,
altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in
a collateral proceeding. The certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to
the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein.47 (Citations omitted)

Contrary to the foregoing characterization,

Section 108 of PD 1529 explicitly states that
said provision "shall not be construed to give
the court authority to reopen the judgment
or decree of registration." In fact, based on
settled jurisprudence, Section 108 of PD
1529 is limited only to seven instances or
situations, namely: (a) when registered
interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased; (b) when new
interests have arisen or been created which
do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when
any error, omission or mistake was made in
entering a certificate or any memorandum
thereon or on any duplicate certificate; (d)
when the name of any person on the
certificate has been changed; (e) when the
registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a
corporation, which owned registered land
and has been dissolved, has not conveyed
the same within three years after its
dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable
ground for the amendment or alteration of
title.48 Hence, the same cannot be said to
constitute an attack on a certificate of title
as defined by case law.1wphi1 That said,
the Court proceeds to resolve the issue as to
whether or not the dismissal of petitioners
twin petitions for the amendment of TCT Nos.
375657 and 375658 was proper.

Petitioner claims that the determination of

the RTC in Civil Case No.04-42 that she is an
adopted child and that the signature of her
adoptive mother Eligia in the deed of
absolute sale transferring the subject land to
Rogelio and Orlando was forged amounts to
a new interest that should be reflected on
the certificates of title of said land, or
provides a reasonable ground for the
amendment thereof.

The Court disagrees for two reasons:

First. While the RTC may have made a
definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as
well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on
the questioned deed, no partition was
decreed, as the action was, in fact,
dismissed. Consequently, the declaration
that petitioner is the legally adopted child of
Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a
declaration of heirship and co-ownership
upon which petitioner may institute an action
for the amendment of the certificates of title
covering the subject land. More importantly,
the Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship
in an ordinary civil action, for matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of
determining such rights.49

Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the

summary proceedings under Section 108 of
PD 1529 because the present controversy
involves not the amendment of the
certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio
and Orlando but the partition of the estate of
Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased.
As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v.
Valenzuela,50 the prevailing rule is that
proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529

are summary in nature, contemplating

corrections or insertions of mistakes which
are
only
clerical
but
certainly
not
51
controversial issues. Relief under said legal
provision can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or hat there is
no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest. This is now the
controlling precedent, and the Court should
no
longer
digress
from
such
52
ruling. Therefore, petitioner may not avail
of the remedy provided under Section 108 of
PD 1529.

in Civil Case No. 04-42 as they involve

different causes of action, the dismissal of
said petitions for the amendment of TCT
Nos.375657 and 375658 is nonetheless
proper for reasons discussed above. The
remedy then of petitioner is to institute
intestate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouses
Maximino and Eligia.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

In fine, while LRC Nos. 08-34 and 08-35 are

technically not barred by the prior judgment