TOPIC: Marriage Certificate as Evidence

G.R. No. 173540

January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31
August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the
25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint
for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to
the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the
ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her
complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942
in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus,
only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948;
Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952.
Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla
and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by
the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous an
action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, 4 essentially
averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in
Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns in
her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla
herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued
by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol; 5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta
Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were
actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in
1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed
during the liberation of Manila; 8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they
cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to
spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina. 15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when
he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was
once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to
substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he

contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one
Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and
Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; 19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil
Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. 20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad
faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio;
hence, her entitlement to damages and attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision 21 denying Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas
counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged disregard of the
evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision, 23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol;
[Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was
married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to
appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn
the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of,
without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best
evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to
prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being
presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on
Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the
trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing
was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial
court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a
Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila
on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of
1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way
of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage
between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in
Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of
Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior
significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy of the said
proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial
court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between
Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4)
children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same
Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of
Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented
by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v.
Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the
fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. 29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents,
were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,
the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of
the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary.
It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually
produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its
contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to
establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility
of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other
competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing
officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to
whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held that
"[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was
present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of

the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. 30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during
the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and
documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the
solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol;
[Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was
married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded. 31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale
behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1wphi1 Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not
what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish
priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC: RA 9262 Anti-VAWC Law

G.R. No. 170701

January 22, 2014

RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, Regional Trial Court, Imus,
Cavite; and ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Decision 1 dated October
28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for herself and in behalf of her minor children,
Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth Lois, and J ezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 046405 and raffled-off to Branch 22. Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from
petitioners abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her and the children
physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; that she was actually
deprived of custody and access to her minor children; and, that she was threatened to be
deprived of her and her childrens financial support.
Respondent and petitioner were married on January 10, 1998 in Makati City. They have three
children, namely, Joshua Raphael born on February 9, 1999, Jesse Ruth Lois, born on June 27,
2000, and Jezreel Abigail, born on December 25, 2001. In her Affidavit 3 attached to the petition,
respondent claimed, among others, that: there was a time when petitioner went to her room and
cocked his gun and pointed the barrel of his gun to his head as he wanted to convince her not to
proceed with the legal separation case she filed; she hid her fears although she was scared;
there was also an instance when petitioner fed her children with the fried chicken that her
youngest daughter had chewed and spat out; in order to stop his child from crying, petitioner
would threaten him with a belt; when she told petitioner that she felt unsafe and insecure with
the latter's presence and asked him to stop coming to the house as often as he wanted or she
would apply for a protection order, petitioner got furious and threatened her of withholding his
financial support and even held her by the nape and pushed her to lie flat on the bed; and, on
May 4, 2005, while she was at work, petitioner with companions went to her new home and
forcibly took the children and refused to give them back to her.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), 4 which we quote in full:
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days
from date of receipt is hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.

For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order, the respondent (herein
petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered to:
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or through another,
physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse against the herein petitioner (respondent)
and other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly or indirectly or engaged
in any psychological form of harassment;
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law are hereby commanded
to effect this Order immediately and to use necessary force and measures under the law to
implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5
In his Comment6 to respondent's Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO, petitioner denied
respondents allegations and alleged, among others, that he had been maintaining a separate
abode from petitioner since November 2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and
threatened him whenever their children's stay with him was extended; that respondent had been
staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety and moral implications of such
set-up; that despite their written agreement that their minor children should stay in their
conjugal home, the latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their conjugal
dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said Zuiga; and, that respondent is mentally,
psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner
contended that the issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold
departure order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to avoid grave and
irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to temporarily enjoin the parties and their
agents from enforcing the assailed May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05. 7
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Manifestation,8 praying that the enforcement of all orders, decision to be issued by the RTC and
all the proceedings therein be restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently, conducted on the
motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD. 10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA 9262 is still pending
before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised therein could not be passed upon in the petition
for certiorari filed with it. The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein proceedings,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC and which matter could not
also be a subject of this petition which assails the TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion
to quash should have been filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the RTC and found no grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the same were in complete accord with the
provision of RA 9262.
As to petitioner's argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the TPO, considering that
the provision authorizing such issuance is unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter
raised herein was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter
could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions.
And that the requisites that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the
case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE
THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE
LATTER ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23 MAY 2005 WITHOUT
OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN
RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD
WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS
FINDINGS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE. 11
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the issue of the
constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very lis mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his Comment to respondent's
Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without
awaiting for the resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the Constitution. Contrary to the
CA's finding that the matter raised in the petition filed with it was the RTCs alleged grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to rule on the

constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner is assailing the
validity of RA 9262 wherein respondent's right to a protection order is based upon, the
constitutionality of the said law must first be decided upon. After all, the alleged
unconstitutionality of RA 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance
of a protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to declare RA 9262
unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA 9262 contending that
had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he would have been afforded due process of law
and had properly presented his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply
encourages arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects his life,
liberty and property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO prior to or on the date
of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on
the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for
the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance
of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs . Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is

necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice
and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x.
The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative power to the court and to
barangay officials to issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Congress shall have the power
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof." Hence, the primary
judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is
primarily the function of the legislature. 15 The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of
protection orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes

involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress
of wrongs for violations of such rights.16
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14 pertinently provides:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on
the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon
by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must
be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was
unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.1wphi1
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available
Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his
duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."17
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the petition was bereft of any indication of
grounds for the issuance of the same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex
parte, there must be a judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends that the
allegations in respondent's affidavit attached to the petition, and without admitting the same to
be true, are nothing more than normal or usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are
not grave or imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference, thus:
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of
the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall
schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO.
The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the court
sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the
respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it
is within the courts discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to
determine that the violent acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have
been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed
with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody
to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual
activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or
through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her
child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her
child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or
pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked the gun and pointed the
same to his head in order to convince respondent not to proceed with the legal separation case;
feeding his other children with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying
child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and holding respondent by
her nape when he got furious that she was asking him not to come often to their conjugal home
and hold office thereat after their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of
the financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for the issuance of a
TPO. Petitioner's actions would fall under the enumeration of Section 5, more particularly,
paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h, and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18We find that the CA did not
err when it found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during the hearing on the
merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding the Regional Trial Court's issuance of the
Temporary Protection Order dated May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite is hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondent's Petition for a Permanent
Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC: Rule 108, Nullity of Marriage (Collateral Attack)

G.R. No. 189538

February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order 3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP.
Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for
cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. 5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the
case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as
a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her
to obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed
celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage
contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in
the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent,
the court found basis in granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the
terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that:
(1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage
contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioners
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondents identity was used by
an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code. 13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the
following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE
ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO. 14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected,
because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who
appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latters personal

circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of
a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and
final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is
a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which
does not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the
issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract
which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with
the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions;
(i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same
in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing
themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." 20 An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have
been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and
the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It
requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may
claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil
registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the
court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words,
she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR
from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized
the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was
conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also
considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondents
signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not

hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office 24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve
his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void
as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

TOPIC: Sec 14 PD 1529, Property Registration Decree

G.R. No. 186639

February 5, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 87505. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-11496.
The Facts
On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an
application4 for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion)
Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110 square
meters and more particularly described as Lot No. 2697-B of the Pateros Cadastre. In support of
his application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for
various years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the
property is classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a
certification issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial
settlement of estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6)
escritura de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to
Felicisima Cotas Cortez mother.
As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed
to present his evidence ex-parte.
Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his
mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died, he and his
siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased
parents and one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged that the
subject property had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject
parcel of land is not part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and is, in fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development (BFD).
Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has
known the family of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-ininterest have been in possession of the subject property since he came to know them.

On February 7, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 which granted Cortez application for
registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and ORDERS
the registration of the applicants title thereto.
As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after payment of the required fees, let the
corresponding Decrees be issued in the name of the applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration
Authority, Land Management Bureau, and the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.
SO ORDERED.6
In granting Cortez application for registration of title to the subject property, the RTC made the
following ratiocinations:
From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief prayed for. It
having been established by competent evidence that the possession of the land being applied for
by the applicant and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and
adverse possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time
prescribed by law, the title of the applicant should be and must be AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED.7
The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite
the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The
petitioner pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest
were in possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever
presented that would establish his predecessors-in-interests possession of the same during the
period required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez assertion that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject
property for more than thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible evidence
required in land registration cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been given
weight by the RTC.
Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no certification from any government agency that
the subject property had already been declared alienable and disposable. As such, the petitioner
claims, Cortez possession of the subject property, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership
or possessory rights.
On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, 8 dismissed the petitioners appeal
and affirmed the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled that Cortez was able to
prove that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
declaration/notation from the BFD.
Further, the CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 15299, sufficed to convert it to private property. Thus:

It has been settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30
years. Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2) of
PD 1529, over which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the second paragraph of
Section 14 of PD 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose
possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may
have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945. x x x
xxxx
While it is significant to note that applicant-appellees possession of the subject property can be
traced from his mothers possession of the same, the records, indeed, show that his possession
of the subject property, following Section 14(2) [of PD 1529], is to be reckoned from January 3,
1968, when the subject property was declared alienable and disposable and not way back in
1946, the year when he inherited the same from his mother. At any rate, at the time the
application for registration was filed in 2003, there was already sufficient compliance with the
requirement of possession. His possession of the subject property has been characterized as
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an
owner.10 (Citations omitted)
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
dated February 7, 2006, which granted the application for registration filed by Cortez.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which
authority Cortez application for registration of title to the subject property was granted. In
granting the application for registration, the RTC merely stated that "the possession of the land
being applied for by [Cortez] and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual,
uninterrupted, and adverse possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all
within the time prescribed by law[.]" 11 On the other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez
application for registration was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in
the application for registration he filed with the RTC, proffered that should the subject property
not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, it could still be registered under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D.
No. 107312 in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, the Court deems it proper to
discuss Cortez application for registration of title to the subject property vis--vis the provisions
of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the provisions
of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
xxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply
with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and
(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under
Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain ;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."13
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey
plan Csd-00-00063314(conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D, Pateros Cadastral
Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as alienable & disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.
However, Cortez reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property
remains part of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus
Corporation,15 the Court clarified that, the applicant must at the very least submit a certification
from the proper government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for
registration is indeed alienable and disposable, viz:
It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by
law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are
alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that
the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the

existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive

order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a
legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that
the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan
bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the
certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. 16 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Similarly, in Republic v. Roche,17 the Court declared that:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the
land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He
must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through
survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and
technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification.
She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate
government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration
of title under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.18 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by
law as proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to
the classification of the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing
that the DENR Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable.
Having failed to present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez claim that the subject property
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain must fail.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish
the same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and
documentary evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the subject property
since 1946, the year in which his mother supposedly inherited the same.
Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the subject property since time immemorial,
Cortez failed to present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed
possessed the subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere claim and not factual proof of

possession. "It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual
proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress
thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the
land."19
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to
explain why, despite his claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the subject property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his predecessors-ininterest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for
fifty-seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would likewise
not entitle him to registration thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides,
only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the
Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are considered private."20
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,21 the Court however clarified that lands of the public
domain that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription and,
accordingly, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession
in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten
(10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial
property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason
to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just
title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as
well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.22 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the
development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere
declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and
disposable would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run
from the time that the State officially declares that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public use, public service, or for the development of national wealth. Thus:

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain.
Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from
property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition,
alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides
that all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no
longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of
the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes
clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth" are public
dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property,
even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public
service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription
can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 23 (Emphasis
supplied)
In Republic v. Rizalvo,24 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his
claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years.
However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes
of acquiring ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only
begins from the moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. x x x.25 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be
acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription
could commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable
and disposable; it must also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use,
public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by
the State, the land remains to be property of public dominion. 26
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial
character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun
to run against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue

thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
of the subject property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. "[l]t
is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable public land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The
indispensability of an official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private
capacity or placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the
State cannot be overemphasized. "27
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505, which
affirmed the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68,
in LRC Case No. N-11496, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N-11496 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.