G.R. No.

84362 July 7, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PEREZ alias "ROGELIO PEREZ", accused- appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Bertolome P. Reus and Martina L. Millan for accused-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant Fernando Perez was charged before the Regional Trial

Court of Roxas City with the crime of rape committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of June, 1987, in the City of
Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above accused, armed with a knife
and with the use of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge [of] one CHRISTINE DORADO, an 8-year old
girl, against the will of the said Christine Dorado, in the
following manner; that the accused grabbed the said
Christine Dorado, pointing a knife at her body and telling
her not to shout otherwise, he will kill her, removing her
underpants, making her to spread her legs, lie with and
have carnal knowledge [of] Christine Dorado against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined

and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Acts No. 2632 and 4111, and
sentences him to suffer imprisonment for life (reclusion
perpetua) and to pay the complainant and offended party
P50,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages. Pursuant to
the provisions of Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the
accused, who is a detention prisoner, shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with the full time during which
he had undergone preventive imprisonment, provided he
agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.

After trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 6 June 1988, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing this Court finds
the accused Fernando Perez, alias 'Rogelio Perez", GUILTY

The present appeal assigns the following as errors said to have been
committed by the trial court:
I
The trial court erred in convicting accused despite failure
of prosecution to present sufficient evidence to establish
Identity as the rapist of Christine Dorado.
II
The trial court erred in convicting accused despite
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The facts of the case as found and summarized by the trial court are as
follows:
It appears from the testimony of the offended party,
Christine Dorado, at 8 a girl of tender years and a Grade
III pupil, that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of June 3,
1987, while she was alone washing some dishes on a
cemented portion outside the kitchen of their house at the

PHHC Housing Project in Brgy. Lawa-an, Roxas City, the

accused, whom she Identified in court as her assailant,
surreptitiously approached her from behind, poked a knife
at her, threatened to kill her if she shouted, and then
forced to lie down. When she was already lying on the
ground, the accused held her by her hands, raised her
skirt and forcibly removed her underwear. Then the
accused forced his sex organ into her genitals.
This assault inflicted upon the complainant a fresh
hymenal laceration with slight bleeding at 5 o'clock
position and a lacerated wound with moderate bleeding at
the vaginal mucosa, as shown in the medical certificate
issued by Dr. Evelyn B. Sicad who examined her at the
Roxas Memorial General Hospital. According to the
examining physician, there was complete penetration as
the hymen was almost completely broken. This finding of
the doctor was confirmed by the testimony of the young
complainant herself who said that when the accused
forced his sexual organ into her genitals, there was
complete penetration, causing her vagina to bleed
profusely and making her feel severe pain that made her
cry. That the young girl bled profusely as a result of the
sexual assault committed against her cannot be denied.
She identified in court the pink dress she was then
wearing which was full of bloodstains. She likewise
identified the underwear she had on which the accused,
according to her, forcibly removed, thereby tearing the
garter, in order to realize his carnal desires.
Before pointing in court to the accused as her assailant
that fateful early evening of June 3, 1987, young Christine
Dorado had twice clearly and positively Identified the
accused as the man who criminally assaulted her. The first
time she did so was when immediately after the arrest of
the accused by the Roxas City Police he was taken to their
house and then and there, in the presence of the
apprehending officers and many other people, she
Identified and pointed to him as her assailant. She did this

again at the Roxas City Police Station in the presence of

her parents and police investigators during the
investigation of this case by the police. At the police
station, following his Identification by the complainant,
the accused admitted his guilt. 3
Appellant controverts the trial court's findings of fact and submits the
following recital:
[Accused Fernando Perez testified] that in the evening of
June 3, 1987, he was at the house of his girlfriend located
at the upper portion of Homesite, Brgy. Lawa-an, Roxas
City. He was working at the fishpond in Tico, Pontevedra
and was brought there by Tawi Aga-in. He was
apprehended at the house of his girlfriend, Mercedita.
Then he was handcuffed and brought to the house of the
victim for identification, however, the victim could not
recognize him. But after the victim had talked to the
police, victim pointed him as her assailant. He was then
brought to the police station where he was manhandled
and forced him to admit that he raped the victim. He
fainted, then they splashed water on his face and after
regaining consciousness, he was made to stand and was
hit by the butt of an armalite on his forehead. He was
forced to admit the crime because he could not withstand
the maltreatment. He has never been accused of rape or
acts of lasciviousnessous. 4
The appellant principally contends that there is no evidence sufficient to
show that his identity was fully established by prosecution; that the
identification made by the victim of the appellant as her rapist was not
made "spontaneously." 5 This, appellant contends, is shown by
testimony of the victim herself, which went as follows:
CROSS EXAMINATION:
ATTY. CONANAN:

Q When for the first time did you meet the

accused Fernando Perez in this case?

A He was brought to our house, sir.

Q And when he was brought to your house,
you do not know him?

COURT:
After June 3 or before, because she
mentioned that she had not met him before
June 3.

A No, sir.

ATTY. CONANAN:

Q And then after that he was brought to the

Police Station together with you and your
mother?

Q After June 3, 1987?

A Yes, sir.

A When he was brought to the Police

Station.

Q Now, since you were there at the police

station, what did the police do with the
accused Fernando Perez?

Q Were you there at the Police Station when

he was brought?
FISCAL POSADAS:

A He was manhandled sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Precisely, your Honor.

Q And he was manhandled and castigated

by the policemen and the accused Perez
then acknowledged that he was the one
who raped you?

COURT: Witness may answer.

A Yes sir.

A Yes, sir.
ATTY. CONANAN:
Q And it was the first time that you knew
that he was the one who raped you because
he told you that he was the one who raped
you after he was castigated by the police?

Q Why were you there?

A Because the police ordered me to be
there, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q Was it not a fact that accused Fernando
Perez was brought to your house before he
was brought to the Police Station?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q But while he was in your house, you did

not point to him?
A I did your Honor because the Police asked
to point to him your Honor.
Q While there in your house?

definiteness of Christine's pointing to appellant as her attacker are all

the more impressive when it is recalled that the police had earlier
presented to her three (3) other possible suspects and that she had
denied the involvement of any of the three (3) in the attack upon her.

Appellant's contention that Christine was not in a position to have seen

the face of her assailant in the course of the rape was negated by the
following testimony given by Christine:

A Yes, your Honor.

Q If you could still recall Christine Dorado,
what does (sic) Fernando Perez wearing at
that time?

Q While there in your house, did the

accused admit that he was the one who
raped you?

A He was wearing something brown.

A No, he did not your Honor.
Q Was he wearing long pants or short
pants?

Q And it was only in the Police Station that

he admitted?

A Long pants, sir.

A After he was manhandled, he admitted
before the Police your Honor. 6
From the aforequoted testimony the defense suggests that the victim
did not even recognize the accused as her assailant when the latter was
first brought to her residence; that she pointed to him as the rapist only
after the police asked her to do so; that the victim only knew that the
accused was her attacker when the latter admitted having committed
the crime. 7
Apropos the allegation that Christine Dorado had not clearly identified
the appellant as her assailant, the trial court found that Christine had on
two occasions unequivocably pointed to appellant as the man who had
sexually assaulted her. The first time she did so was right after the arrest
of appellant by the Roxas City police who immediately brought appellant
to Christine's home and there, "in the presence of the apprehending
officers and many other people" she pointed to him as the attacker. The
second time she identified appellant was at the Police Station, in the
presence of her parents and police investigators. The clarity and

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, you said you know that accused as
Fernando Perez, how did you know
considering that it was night time?
A Because there was light sir, as the 3
flourescent lamp of our neighbors were
switch on and lighted his face. 10 (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, there is no merit to appellant's suggestion that Christine did not
recognize him as the attacker when asked if she knew him at the time
he was brought to her residence. An examination of victim's testimony
before the lower court would show that the victim was confused by the
question and that her answer thereto referred to the name of the
appellant, not to his Identity as the rapist. Her testimony was as follows:

Q But that time you do not know actually

who was the person who raped you, isn't it?
COURT:
The name of the person.
A I did not know him first at that
time. 11 (Italics supplied)
What emerges from examination of the transcript of Christine's
testimony is that appellant's above suggestion was made possible
principally by the weakness of the translation of the proceedings (both
questions and answers) into English. The verb "to know" was used where
"to see" or "to recognize" would have been more precise; "to know a
person" was used where "to know the name of a person" was really
meant.
As against appellant's suggestion and denial, the trial court found the
victim's testimony clear, definite and entitled to fun credence:
... After such a careful study and evaluation of the
evidence adduced during the trial, the Court has come to
the inescapable conclusion that the evidence presented
by the prosecution is more credible and convincing, and
thus entitled to greater weight, than that adduced by the
defense. The Court, observing the demeanor and the
obvious honesty and innocence of so young a victim as
Christine Dorado on the witness stand, has found no
reason at all to doubt the veracity of her testimony and
that when she clearly, unhesitatingly and positively
pointed to and identified the accused as the man who
ravished her near the kitchen of their house in the early
evening of June 3, 1987, she was telling the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth. The fact that the
young girl admitted that it was only at the time of the
incident that she saw the accused for the first time and
that she did not know him before does not in any way
diminish the weight that should be given to her clear and

convincing testimony. The Court is convinced that the girl

is quite sure of the identity of the accused, so much so
that when several suspects were presented to her by the
police for Identification she readily told the police that the
culprit was not one of them. It was only when the herein
accused was brought before her that she was able to tell
the police that they had finally found the man they were
looking for. 12
That an innocent eight-year old child would impute a crime as serious as
the one at bar to a person she had never met before the attack, if
indeed he had not assaulted her, strains belief excessively. The further
suggestion that the child may have been influenced by her parents and
the police to make a false charge must fail, absent any showing of
malice or ill motive on the part of either parents or police.
The testimony of Christine was moreover corroborated by the testimony
of other witnesses:
[Testimony of Mr. Ambrosio Dorado]
Q Now, you said that after your daughter
Christine Dorado was examined by the
Nurse at the Saint Anthony Hospital, she
told you that she was assaulted by
someone, whom she could recognize by
face, is it right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Since then, has your daughter ever
pointed to a man who allegedly assaulted
her?
A She said that she could only recognize
the face but not his name.

Q Has she ever pointed to a man after she

told you that, as having criminally
assaulted her?

Q Mrs. Dorado, how many times did the

policemen investigate you or your daughter
after the alleged incident on June 3, 1987?

A As of now she has pointed somebody.

A Twice sir.

Q That man your daughter pointed to you

as having criminally assaulted her inside
this room?

Q Was that investigation in your house in

the National Housing Authority or at the
Police Station?

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL POSADAS:

Q Will you point to him?

I object to the word investigation on the

announcer.

A He is there. (Witness pointing to the

accused Fernando Perez). 13

ATTY. CONANAN:

[Testimony of Norma Dorado]

Policemen.

ATTY. CONANAN:

A At the Police Station.

Q By the way, when your daughter Christine

Dorado already recovered, you asked her
how does the alleged rapist who raped her
look like?

Q And during that investigation there were

already several suspects presented by the
Police Station and all of them were
presented to you and your daughter?

A Yes. I asked her.

A Yes, sir.

Q And what was her answer?

Q Now, if you can still recall, how many of

them?

A Short and stocky fellow and had a

squinting eyes.

A I cannot remember. There were several of

them.

Q And in fact his hair was curly?

A No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, and all of them were not Identified

by your daughter?

A No, sir. The ones who were brought to the

hospital she did not Identify.

Q And it was when you arrived that your

daughter Christine Dorado pointed the
accused as the man who raped her?

Q Now, the accused in this case Fernando

Perez was apprehended several days after
the alleged raped of your daughter and he
was brought to your house in the National
Housing Authority, Lawa-an, Roxas City, can
you still recall that?

A Yes, sir.

[Testimony of Pat. Ernesto Apruebo]

A After he was booked by the Desk Officer
and investigated, we brought him back to
Lawa-an for Identification of the victim and
the victim Dorado pointed to him as her
assailant.

A Yes, sir.
Q And at the time when the accused was
brought to your house, your daughter was
in your house?

Q Was the accused Fernando Perez the only

suspect whom you showed to the victim
Christine Dorado?

A Yes, sir.
Q And you were not there according to you
because you were in the well fetching
water?

A There were others sir who were picked up

and apprehended by Pat. Dorde.
Q Do you know if Pat. Dorde showed the
suspects he apprehended to the victim
Christine Dorado?

A Yes, sir.
Q Now, how far is this well where you fetch
water from your house?
A About one and half (1-1/2) kilometer, it is
near the TELECOM Station.

14

A Yes, he did but the victim did not point to

them as her assailant.
xxx xxx xxx

Q And when you arrived in your house after

fetching water, the accused Fernando Perez
was still in your house?

Q Do you know if being investigated the

victim Christine Dorado pointed to the
accused as her assailant?

A Yes, sir.

A Yes, she did your Honor when Pat. Olendo

asked her to Identify the accused.

Q Did you actually see the victim point to

her assailant in the Roxas City Police
Station?
A Yes, your Honor.

15

(Emphasis supplied)

The trial court found the above-quoted testimonies credible and

convincing. It is firmly settled doctrine that the finding of the trial court,
which had the inestimable advantage of observing the detailed
demeanor of the witnesses, are entitled to great respect. 16 We find no
reason at all to doubt the findings of the trial court here. It must be
noted that these witnesses had no known reason falsely to impute a
serious charge against the appellant. As held by this Court in People v.
Patog, 17 "[W]here there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the
principal witness for the prosecution was [moved] by improper motives
the presumption is that he was not so [moved] and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit."
Appellant also put up the defense of alibi. He claimed that early in the
evening of 3 June 1987, at about the time the rape was committed, he
was visiting his girlfriend, Mercedita de la Cruz, in her house "in the
upper and hilly portion of the PHHC Housing Project where, incidentally,
the house of the offended party's parents was also located." 18 The trial
court disposed of this defense quickly and decisively:
... Where the crime was committed could hardly be a few
hundred meters away from Mercedita's house. Being
familiar with the place, the Court takes judicial notice of
the fact that the PHHC Housing Project in this City is laced
with good, all-weather roads. It is not a big housing
complex, with an area of a few hectares only, and it would
not take a man more than 30 minutes to walk [at]
ordinary pace from one end to the other. So from where
he said he was at the time, it would have taken the
accused only a few minutes to reach the offended party's
house. It was that near and accessible. 19

As the trial court noted, appellant had himself testified that on the
evening when Christine Dorado was sexually assaulted, he was "in the
vicinity of the crime scene (sic) and not in a distant town." 20
It is also contended by appellant that the trial court disregarded his
constitutional light against self-incrimination, when it held that:
... the accused has been positively identified by the
offended party as the perpetrator of the crime and who, in
fact, has admitted his culpability in the presence of a
number of witnesses. 21
Appellant claims, predictably, that he was forced to admit the crime
imputed to him because he could no longer endure the brutalities
inflicted upon him by the police authorities; that he was not assisted by
counsel when he made said admission; that such maltreatment was
even unqualifiedly attested to by the victim herself It is argued that the
trial court gravely erred when it appreciated and admitted said
admission as evidence against the appellant.
The foregoing allegation need not detain us for long. The case against
appellant herein was not founded solely nor even principally on the said
admission but rather on the positive Identification of the appellant by
victim. The basis of the trial court's finding of guilt was not the said
admission but the evidence adduced by the prosecution quite
independently of that admission. In fact, in its decision, the court made
only a passing reference to the admission appellant now attacks.
Appellant tries to make capital of the testimony of Christine Dorado
apparently attesting to the fact of the said forced admission.
Assuming arguendo that appellant had indeed been made to admit to
the crime by the exercise of force and intimidation by the police, it
should be noted that even before said admission was given, the victim
had already positively Identified him as her assailant. Appellant's
extrajudicial confession may and should be disregarded, if, as here, the
other evidence submitted by the prosecution is sufficient to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 22

In sum, we agree with the trial court that the guilt of the appellant has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The sexual violence inflicted
upon the eight-year old child is a particularly appalling outrage. The
trauma sustained by her is not merely physical and may be expected to
remain with her for a long, long time, possibly for life. We believe that in
this case, the victim is entitled to the heightened level of moral and
exemplary damages that the trial court awarded her P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED in its totality.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116617. November 16, 1998]
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A.
MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and
THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPS. RODOLFO
V.
ROSALES
and
LILY
ROSALES,respondents.
[G.R. No. 126395. November 16, 1998]
RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
METRO
MANILA
TRANSIT
CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO
TOLENTINO,
FELICIANA
CELEBRADO
and
THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are appeals brought, on the one hand, by the Metro Manila
Transit Corporation (MMTC) and Pedro Musa and, on the other, by the
spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales from the decision, [1] dated
August 5, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with

modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City

holding MMTC and Musa liable to the spouses Rosales for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and the costs of suit for the
death of the latters daughter. MMTC and Musa in G.R. No. 116617
appeal insofar as they are held liable for damages, while the spouses
Rosales in G.R. No. 126395 appeal insofar as the amounts awarded are
concerned.
The facts are as follows:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro
Manila area. Musa was its driver assigned to MMTC Bus No. 27. The
spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school
student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.
At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986,
MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was
then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness said the
girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound
for the south, hit her.[2] She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled
between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left
rear tires thereof.[3] Her body was dragged several meters away from the
point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center,
[4]
but efforts to revive her proved futile.
Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 2 years and 4
months, as minimum, to 6 years, as maximum, by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.[5] The trial court found:
All told, this Court, therefore, holds that the accused, who was then the
driver of MMTC Bus No. 027, is criminally responsible for the death of the
girl victim in violation of Article 365(2) of the Revised Penal Code. For, in
the light of the evidence that the girl victim was already at the center of
the Katipunan Road when she was bumped, and, therefore, already past
the right lane when the MMTC Bus No. 027 was supposed to have
passed; and, since the said bus was then running at a speed of about 25
kilometers per hour which is inappropriate since Katipunan road is a
busy street, there is, consequently, sufficient proof to show that the

accused was careless, reckless and imprudent in the operation of his

MMTC Bus No. 027, which is made more evident by the circumstance
that the accused did not blow his horn at the time of the accident, and
he did not even know that he had bumped the girl victim and had ran
over her, demonstrating thereby that he did not exercise diligence and
take the necessary precaution to avoid injury to persons in the operation
of his vehicle, as, in fact, he ran over the girl victim who died as a result
thereof.[6]
The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages
against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino,
and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). They
subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a
dispatcher of the MMTC, as a defendant therein. The counsel of MMTC
and Musa attempted to introduce testimony that Musa was not negligent
in driving Bus No. 27 but was told by the trial judge:
COURT:
That is it. You can now limit your question to the other defendant here
but to re-try again the actual facts of the accident, this Court would not
be in the position. It would be improper for this Court to make any
findings with respect to the negligence of herein driver. You ask
questions only regarding the civil aspect as to the other defendant but
not as to the accused.[7]
The counsel submitted to the ruling of the court.[8]
In a decision rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City found MMTC and Musa guilty of negligence and ordered
them to pay damages and attorneys fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendant Metro Manila Transit Corporation primarily
and defendant Pedro Musa subsidiarily liable to plaintiffs-spouses
Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales as follows:
1. Actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00;

2. Moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;

3. Exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. Attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000.00; and
5. Costs of suit.[9]
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. On August 5, 1994,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with the
following modification:
WHEREFORE, except for the modification deleting the award
of P150,000.00 as actual damages and awarding in lieu thereof the
amount of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, the decision appealed from
is, in all other aspects, hereby AFFIRMED.[10]
The spouses Rosales filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
appellate court, in a resolution, dated September 12, 1996, partly
granted by increasing the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie
from P30,000.00 toP50,000.00. Hence, these appeals.
In G.R. No. 116617, MMTC and Musa assail the decision of the Court
of Appeals on the following grounds:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUOS DECISION PARTICULARLY IN
NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC
EXERCISED THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVERS. THIS
BEING THE CASE, APPELLANT MMTC IS ENTITLED TO BE
ABSOLVED FROM ANY LIABILITY OR AT LEAST TO A
REDUCTION OF THE RECOVERABLE DAMAGES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS, JUST LIKE
THE COURT A QUO, OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER MMTC, A GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATION,
COMMITTED NO FRAUD, MALICE, BAD FAITH, NOR WANTON,

FRAUDULENT, OPPRESSIVE AND MALEVOLENT ACTUATIONS

AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUOS DECISION TO HOLD
PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC PRIMARILY LIABLE TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P500,000 AS MORAL DAMAGES, P100,000 AS
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND P30,000 BY WAY OF DEATH
INDEMNITY.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUOS DECISION IN RENDERING
JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P50,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTSAPPELLEES.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 126395, the spouses Rosales
contend:
The Court of Appeals erred in:
First, considering that death indemnity which this Honorable Court set
at P50,000.00 is akin to actual damages;
Second, not increasing the amount of damages awarded;
Third, refusing to hold all the defendants, now private respondents,
solidarily liable.
MMTC and Musa do not specifically question the findings of the
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City that Liza
Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27. Nonetheless, their petition
contains discussions which cast doubts on this point. [11] Not only can
they not do this as the rule is that an appellant may not be heard on a
question not specifically assigned as error, but the rule giving great
weight, and even finality, to the factual conclusions of the Court of
Appeals which affirm those of the trial court bars a reversal of the

finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa. Only where it is

shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can
they be overturned. To the contrary, the findings of both the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are solidly anchored on the
evidence submitted by the parties. We, therefore, regard them as
conclusive in resolving the petitions at bar. [12] Indeed, as already stated,
petitioners counsel submitted to the ruling of the court that the finding
of the trial court in the criminal case was conclusive on them with regard
to the questions of whether Liza Rosalie was hit by MMTC Bus No. 27 and
whether its driver was negligent. Rather, the issue in this case turns on
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility
of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance
of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the
employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. [13] The
rationale for the rule on vicarious liability has been adumbrated thus:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a
rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the
torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the
conduct of the employers enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise
itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the
employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the
basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of
employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the
innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better
able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or
liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the
community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an
employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be
careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and
to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.
[14]

In Campo v. Camarote,[15] we explained the basis of the presumption

of negligence in this wise:

The reason for the law is obvious. It is indeed difficult for any person
injured by the carelessness of a driver to prove the negligence or lack of
due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the choice of the
driver. Were we to require the injured party to prove the owners lack of
diligence, the right will in many cases prove illusory, as seldom does a
person in the community, especially in the cities, have the opportunity
to observe the conduct of all possible car owners therein. So the law
imposes the burden of proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the
driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the
owner was negligent and imposes upon him the burden of proving the
contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of
their employees within the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can
show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.[16] For this purpose, they have the burden of proving
that they have indeed exercised such diligence, both in the selection of
the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in the supervision of
the performance of his duties.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service
records.[17] On the other hand, with respect to the supervision of
employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof.[18] To establish these factors in a trial involving the
issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof,
including documentary evidence.[19]
In this case, MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family with respect to the selection of employees by
presenting
mainly
testimonial
evidence
on
its
hiring
procedure. According to MMTC, applicants are required to submit
professional driving licenses, certifications of work experience, and
clearances from the National Bureau of Investigation; to undergo tests of
their driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision; and, to complete
training programs on traffic rules, vehicle maintenance, and standard
operating procedures during emergency cases.[20]

MMTCs evidence consists entirely of testimonial evidence (1) that

transport supervisors are assigned to oversee field operations in
designated areas; (2) that the maintenance department daily inspects
the engines of the vehicles; and, (3) that for infractions of company
rules there are corresponding penalties. [21] Although testimonies were
offered that in the case of Pedro Musa all these precautions were
followed,[22] the records of his interview, of the results of his
examinations, and of his service were not presented.
MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for
prospective employees on vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and
driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to determine
driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, [23] but there is no
record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said
examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that
Musa did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of
daily inspections, allegedly conducted by supervisors, ever presented.
Normally, employers keep files concerning the qualifications, work
experience, training, evaluation, and discipline of their employees. The
failure of MMTC to present such documentary proof puts in doubt the
credibility of its witnesses. What was said in Central Taxicab
Corporation
v.
Ex-Meralco
Employees
Transportation
Corporation[24] applies to this case:
This witness spoke of an affidavit of experience which a driver-applicant
must accomplish before he is employed by the company, a written time
schedule for each bus, and a record of the inspections and thorough
checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn; yet no
attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents,
despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession and control
of the defendant company.
....
Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final
tests given by him as well as a record of the qualifications and
experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather strange,

therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of

Roberto, the driver involved in this case.
The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or
other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the
trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its
pretensions.
It is noteworthy that, in another case involving MMTC, testimonial
evidence of identical content, which MMTC presented to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of employees and thus avoid vicarious liability for the
negligent acts of its employees, was held to be insufficient to overcome
the presumption of negligence against it. In Metro Manila Transit
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, [25] this Court said:

has through the years been gradually increased based on the value of
the peso. At present, it is fixed at P50,000.00.[26] To conform to this new
ruling, the Court of Appeals correctly increased the indemnity it had
originally ordered the spouses Rosales to be paid from P30,000.00
to P50,000.00 in its resolution, dated September 12, 1996.
Actual Damages. Art. 2199 provides that except as provided by
law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The
spouses Rosales are claiming actual damages in the amount
of P239,245.40. However, during the trial, they submitted receipts
showing that expenses for the funeral, wake, and interment of Liza
Rosalie amounted only toP60,226.65 itemized as follows: [27]
Medical Attendance

P 739.65

Funeral Services

5,100.00

Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that
testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that matter,
inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we
cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. Petitioners attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral
evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.

Wreaths

Having found both MMTC and its driver Pedro Musa liable for
negligence for the death of Liza Rosalie on August 9, 1986, we now
consider the question of damages which her parents, the spouses
Rosales, are entitled to recover, which is the subject of the appeal in
G.R. No. 126395.

Photography

Indemnity for Death. Art. 2206 provides for the payment of

indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. Initially fixed in
said article of the Civil Code at P3,000.00, the amount of the indemnity

2,500.00

Embalment

1,000.00

Obituaries

7,125.00

Interment fees

2,350.00

Expenses during wake

Mourning clothes

14,935.00
5,000.00
3,500.00

Video Coverage
Printing of invitation cards
TOTAL

10,000.00
7,977.00
60,226.65

Hence, apart from the indemnity for death, the spouses Rosales are
entitled to recover the above amount as actual damages.
Moral Damages. Under
illegitimate descendants and
moral damages for mental
deceased. The reason for
explained thus:

Art. 2206, the spouse, legitimate and

ascendants of the deceased may demand
anguish by reason of the death of the
the grant of moral damages has been

. . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the

limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The intensity of the
pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender.[28]
In the instant case, the spouses Rosales presented evidence of the
intense moral suffering they had gone through as a result of the loss of
Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child. Rodolfo Rosales recounted
the place of Liza Rosalie in the family and their relationship with her in
the following words:
Q: Mr. Rosales, how was Liza to you as a daughter?
A: Well, Liza as a daughter was the greatest joy of the family; she
was our pride, and everybody loved her - all her brothers and
sisters - because she was sweet and unspoiled. . . . She was softspoken to all of us; and she still slept with us at night although
she had her own room. Sometimes in the middle of the night she
would open our door and ask if she could sleep with us. So we let
her sleep with us, as she was the youngest.[29]
The death of Liza Rosalie left a void in their lives. Rodolfo Rosales
testified on the devastating effect of the death of Liza Rosalie:
Q: And after she died, what changes, if any, did you feel in your
family?

A: Well, there is something hollow in our family, something is

missing. She used to greet me when I came home and smell if I
was drunk and would tell me to dress up and take a shower
before her mommy could see me. She would call me up at the
office and say: Daddy, come home, please help me with my
homework. Now, all these things, I am missing, you know. . . . I
do not feel like going home early. Sometimes my wife would
complain and ask: Where did you go? But I cannot explain to
her how I feel.[30]
Lily Rosales described life without Liza Rosalie thus:
Q: Now, your life without Liza, how would you describe it, Dr.
Rosales?
A: You know it is very hard to describe. The family was broken
apart. We could not go together because we remember
Liza. Every time we go to the cemetery we try as much as
possible not to go together. So, we go to the cemetery one at a
time, sometimes, my husband and I, or my son and another one,
but we never go together because we remember Liza. But before
her death we would always be together, the whole family on
weekends and on our days off. My husband works very hard, I
also work very hard and my children go to school. They study
very hard. Now we cannot go together on outings because of the
absence of Liza.[31]
The spouses Rosales claim moral damages in the amount
of P5,000,000.00. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[32] this Court awarded P1
million as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who
was murdered. This amount seems reasonable to us as moral damages
for the loss of a minor child, whether he or she was a victim of a crime
or a quasi-delict. Hence, we hold that the MMTC and Musa are solidarily
liable to the spouses Rosales in the amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral
damages for the death of Liza Rosalie.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages
may be recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant
acted with gross negligence. This circumstance obtains in the instant

case. The records indicate that at the time of the mishap, there was a
pending criminal case against Musa for reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries with another branch of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City.[33] The evidence also shows that he failed to stop his
vehicle at once even after eye witnesses shouted at him. The spouses
Rosales
claim
exemplary
damages
in
the
amount
of P5,000,000.00. Under the circumstances, we deem it reasonable to
award the spouses Rosales exemplary damages in the amount of five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
Attorneys Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorneys fees may be
recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are
awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
[34]
which involved the death of a minor child in the sinking of a vessel,
we held an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be
reasonable. Hence, we affirm the award of attorneys fees made by the
Court of Appeals to the spouses Rosales in that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 2206 of the Civil
Code provides that in addition to the indemnity for death caused by a
crime or quasi delict, the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; . . . . Compensation of this nature is awarded not for
loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. [35] Evidence must
be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death,
was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession.
[36]
In People v. Teehankee,[37] no award of compensation for loss of
earning capacity was granted to the heirs of a college freshman because
there was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would
eventually become a professional pilot. [38] But compensation should be
allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a minor
who has not yet commenced employment or training for a specific
profession if sufficient evidence is presented to establish the amount
thereof. In the United States it has been observed:
This raises the broader question of the proper measure of damages in
death cases involving children, housewives, the old, and others who
do not have market income so that there is no pecuniary loss
to survivors or to the estate of the decedent. The traditional

approach was to award no or merely nominal damages in such cases.

. . . Increasingly, however, courts allow expert testimony to be used to
project those lost earnings.[39]
Thus, in Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co.,[40] the court allowed the heirs
of a seven-year-old boy who was killed in a car accident to recover
compensation for loss of earning capacity:
Considerable evidence was presented by plaintiffs in an effort to give
the jury a foundation on which to make an award. Briefly stated, this
evidence showed Charles Haumersen was a seven-year-old of above
average characteristics. He was described as very intelligent and allAmerican. He received high marks in school. He was active in church
affairs and participated in recreational and athletic events, often with
children older than himself. In addition, he had an unusual talent for
creating numerous cartoons and other drawings, some of which plaintiffs
introduced at trial.
The record does not disclose passion and prejudice. The key question is
whether the verdict of $100,000 has support in the evidence.
Upon analysis of the record, we conclude that we should not disturb the
award.
The argument for allowing compensation for loss of earning capacity
of a minor is even stronger if he or she was a student, whether already
training for a specific profession or still engaged in general
studies. InKrohmer v. Dahl,[41] the court, in affirming the award by the
jury of $85,000.00 to the heirs of an eighteen-year-old college freshman
who died of carbon monoxide poisoning, stated as follows:
There are numerous cases that have held admissible evidence of
prospective earnings of a student or trainee. . . . The appellants contend
that such evidence is not admissible unless the course under study
relates to a given occupation or profession and it is shown that the
student is reasonably certain to follow that occupation or profession. It
is true that the majority of these decisions deal with students who are
studying for a specific occupation or profession. However, not one of
these cases indicate that evidence of ones education as a guide to

future earnings is not admissible where the student is engaged in

general studies or whose education does not relate to a specific
occupation.

Capacity

Considering her good academic record, extra-curricular activities,

and varied interests, it is reasonable to assume that Liza Rosalie would
have enjoyed a successful professional career had it not been for her
untimely death. Hence, it is proper that compensation for loss of
earning capacity should be awarded to her heirs in accordance with the
formula established in decided cases[47] for computing net earning
capacity, to wit:

ecessary
Net Earning

Life

Annual - Living

Expectancy

Income

Expe

nses

In sharp contrast with the situation obtaining in People v.

Teehankee, where the prosecution merely presented evidence to show
the fact of the victims graduation from high school and the fact of his
enrollment in a flying school, the spouses Rosales did not content
themselves with simply establishing Liza Rosalies enrollment at UP
Integrated School. They presented evidence to show that Liza Rosalie
was a good student, promising artist, and obedient child. She
consistently performed well in her studies since grade school. [42] A
survey taken in 1984 when Liza Rosalie was twelve years old showed
that she had good study habits and attitudes. [43]Cleofe Chi, guidance
counselor of the University of the Philippines Integrated School,
described Liza Rosalie as personable, well-liked, and with a balanced
personality.[44] Professor Alfredo Rebillon, a faculty member of the
University
of
the
Philippines
College
of
Fine
Arts,
who
organized workshops which Liza Rosalie attended in 1982 and 1983,
testified that Liza Rosalie had the potential of eventually becoming
an artist.[45] Professor Rebillons testimony is more than sufficiently
established by the 51 samples of Liza Rosalies watercolor, charcoal, and
pencil drawings submitted as exhibits by the spouses Rosales. [46] Neither
MMTC nor Pedro Musa controverted this evidence.

Gross

Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds ( 2/3) multiplied by the

difference of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased. [48] Since Liza
Rosalie was 16 at the time of her death, her life expectancy was 44
more years.[49]Her projected gross annual income, computed based on
the minimum wage for workers in the non-agricultural sector in effect at
the time of her death,[50] then fixed at P37.00,[51] is P14,630.46.
[52]
Allowing for necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%) of her
projected gross annual income,[53] her total net earning capacity
amounts to P321,870.12.[54]
Finally, the spouses Rosales argue that the Court of Appeals erred in
absolving Conrado Tolentino, Feliciana Celebrado, and the GSIS of
liability. The spouses Rosales alleged that Tolentino, as Acting General
Manager of the MMTC, and Celebrado, as a dispatcher thereof, were
charged with the supervision of Musa and should, therefore, be held
vicariously liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. With respect to the
GSIS, they contend that it was the insurer in a contract for third party
liability it had with the MMTC.
Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions managers
among those made responsible for the negligent acts of others, it is
settled that this term is used in the said provision in the sense of
employers.[55]Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held liable for
the tort of Pedro Musa.
In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion,[56] it was ruled that an insurer in
an indemnity contract for third party liability is directly liable to the
injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it cannot
be held solidarily liable beyond that amount. The GSIS admitted in its
answer that it was the insurer of the MMTC for third party liability with
respect to MMTC Bus No. 27 to the extent of P50,000.00.[57] Hence, the
spouses Rosales have the option either to claim the said amount from
the GSIS and the balance of the award from MMTC and Musa or to
enforce the entire judgment against the latter, subject to reimbursement
from the former to the extent of the insurance coverage.[58]

One last word. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City erred in
holding MMTC primarily and Musa secondarily liable for damages arising
from the death of Liza Rosalie. It was error for the appellate court to
affirm this aspect of the trial courts decision.
As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the
negligence of its employee in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it
can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not make the
employees liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. [59] Hence,
the spouses Rosales have the option of enforcing the judgment against
either MMTC or Musa.
From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday[60] that the registered
owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a
consequence of injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicle.
In Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[61]it was held that to
escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an employee,
the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree
of care. Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[62] that the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle . . . for damages arising from the
tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or
solidary with the driver.

2) actual damages in the amount of sixty thousand two hundred

twenty six pesos and sixty five centavos (P60,226.65);
3) moral damages
(P1,000,000.00);

in

the

amount

of

one

million

pesos

4) exemplary damages in the amount of five hundred thousand

pesos (P500,000.00);
5) attorneys fees in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00);
6) compensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of
three hundred twenty-one thousand eight hundred seventy
pesos and twelve centavos (P321,870.12); and
7) the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-25499 February 18, 1970

VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A.
QUINTOS, AND JULITA A. QUINTOS,respondents.
Laurea and Pison for petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE

and another one is RENDERED holding the Metro Manila Transit
Corporation and Pedro Musa jointly and severally liable for the death of
Liza Rosalie R. Rosales and ORDERING them as such to pay to the
spouses Rodolfo V. Rosales and Lily R. Rosales the following amounts:

Bonifacio M. Abad, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
1) death indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00);

Petitioner, Villa Rey Transit, Inc., seeks the review by certiorari of a

decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First

Instance of Pangasinan. The basic facts are set forth in said decision of
the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu
First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the
defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and
driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for
Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased,
Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second
row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when
the vehicle was nearing the northern approach of the
Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto.
Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally
hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the
end of a bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and
tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the
windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo
pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart,
penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on
the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the
impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor.
The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left
side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple
wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other
causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca
passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San
Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap
and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the
municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime,
had gone to the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani
placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men
who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and
brought them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at
San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding
such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m.
on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock
due to cerebral injuries.

The private respondents, Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed

Quintos, are the sisters and only surviving heirs of Policronio Quintos Jr.,
who died single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants. Said
respondents herein brought this action against herein petitioner, Villa
Rey Transit, Inc., as owner and operator of said passenger bus, bearing
Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan, for breach of the contract of carriage
between said petitioner and the deceased Policronio Quintos, Jr., to
recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as damages, including
attorney's fees. Said petitioner defendant in the court of first instance
contended that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event, but this
pretense was rejected by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both
of which found that the accident and the death of Policronio had been
due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable
under its contract of carriage with the deceased. In the language of His
Honor, the trial Judge:
The mishap was not the result of any unforeseeable
fortuitous event or emergency but was the direct result of
the negligence of the driver of the defendant. The
defendant must, therefore, respond for damages resulting
from its breach of contract for carriage. As the complaint
alleged a total damage of only P63,750.00 although as
elsewhere shown in this decision the damages for wake
and burial expenses, loss of income, death of the victim,
and attorneys fee reach the aggregate of P79,615.95, this
Court finds it just that said damages be assessed at total
of only P63,750.00 as prayed for in plaintiffs' amended
complaint.
The despositive part of the decision of the trial Court reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the amount of
P63,750.00 as damages for breach of contract of carriage
resulting from the death of Policronio Quintos, Jr.
which, as above indicated, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
the present petition for review oncertiorari, filed by Villa Rey Transit, Inc.

The only issue raised in this appeal is the amount of damages

recoverable by private respondents herein. The determination of such
amount depends, mainly upon two (2) factors, namely: (1) the number
of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed and (2)
the rate at which the losses sustained by said respondents should be
fixed.
The first factor was based by the trial court the view of which was
concurred in by the Court of Appeals upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr., which was placed at 33-1/3 years he being over
29 years of age (or around 30 years for purposes of computation) at the
time of his demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 = life
expectancy) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or
the actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality. Upon the other
hand, petitioner maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting
said formula and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara v. Surro1 in
which the damages were computed on a four (4) year basis, despite the
fact that the victim therein was 39 years old, at the time of his death,
and had a life expectancy of 28.90 years.
The case cited is not, however, controlling in the one at bar. In the
Alcantara case, none of the parties had questioned the propriety of the
four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards
the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the non-inclusion, in its
computation, of the bonus that the corporation, which was the victim's
employer, had awarded to deserving officers and employees, based
upon the profits earned less than two (2) months before the accident
that resulted in his death. The defendants, in turn, objected to the sum
awarded for the fourth year, which was treble that of the previous years,
based upon the increases given, in that fourth year, to other employees
of the same corporation. Neither this objection nor said claim for
inclusion of the bonus was sustained by this Court. Accordingly, the
same had not thereby laid down any rule on the length of time to be
used in the computation of damages. On the contrary, it declared:
The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the
heirs of a deceased person has therefore no fixed basis.
Much is left to the discretion of the court considering the

moral and material damages involved, and so it has been

said that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the measure of
damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculation, but the amount recoverable depends on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life
expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiary,
whichever is shorter, is an important factor.' (25 C.J.S.
1241.) Other factors that are usually considered are: (1)
pecuniary loss to plaintiff or beneficiary (25 C.J.S. 12431250) ; (2) loss of support (25 C.J.S., 1250-1251); (3) loss
of service (25 C.J.S. 1251-1254); (4) loss of society (25
C.J.S. 1254-1255); (5) mental suffering of beneficiaries (25
C.J.S., 1258-1259) ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses
(26 C.J.S., 1254-1260)."2
Thus, life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also,
an important element in fixing the amount recoverable by private
respondents herein. Although it is not the sole element determinative of
said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard
and the adoption, in the case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such
as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals has not erred in basing
the computation of petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr.
With respect to the rate at which the damages shall be computed,
petitioner impugns the decision appealed from upon the ground that the
damages awarded therein will have to be paid now, whereas most of
those sought to be indemnified will be suffered years later. This
argument is basically true, and this is, perhaps, one of the reasons why
the Alcantara case points out the absence of a "fixed basis" for the
ascertainment of the damages recoverable in litigations like the one at
bar. Just the same, the force of the said argument of petitioner herein is
offset by the fact that, although payment of the award in the case at bar
will have to take place upon the finality of the decision therein, the
liability of petitioner herein had been fixed at the rate only of P2,184.00
a year, which is the annual salary of Policronio Quintos, Jr. at the time of
his death, as a young "training assistant" in the Bacnotan Cement
Industries, Inc. In other words, unlike the Alcantara case, on which

petitioner relies, the lower courts did not consider, in the present case,
Policronio's potentiality and capacity to increase his future income.
Indeed, upon the conclusion of his training period, he was supposed to
have a better job and be promoted from time to time, and, hence, to
earn more, if not considering the growing importance of trade,
commerce and industry and the concomitant rise in the income level of
officers and employees
therein much more.
At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned
with the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the
private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased,
and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings,
but of the support, they received or would have received from him had
he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In
fixing the amount of that support, We must reckon with the "necessary
expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his
earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held that earning capacity, as
an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is
necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money,
"less the necessary expense for his own living.3 Stated otherwise, the
amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss
of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have
received.4 In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be
considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in
the creation of such earnings or income6 and less living and other
incidental expenses.7
All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable
to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the
sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that,
consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly
estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33-1/3 years of his
life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be
added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed
and applied by this Court;8 (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private
respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee,
which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the

appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later
to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words,
the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced
to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal
rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision
of the trial court.
Thus modified, said decision and that of the Court of Appeals are hereby
affirmed, in all other respects, with costs against petitioner, Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983

CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:+.wph!1

In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Eastern Samar, DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through
reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased,
Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party
Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to file a separate civil action for
damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)

The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon
for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that
her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The
respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which
motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:t.hqw
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all
cases not included in the preceding section the following
rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same
offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action can
not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action. ...
According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule
111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only
after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." (Rollo, p.
33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent
judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is
highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the
Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted
hereinbelow:t.hqw

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided

for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111,
Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are
worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is exdelicto. This is manifest from the provision which uses the expressions
"criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is
supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:t.hqw
The underlying purpose of the principle under
consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in
a private action brought by him, regardless of the action
of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and
to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the
citizens to depend upon the government for the
vindication of their own private rights. It is true that in
many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a
criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be
remembered that while the State is the complainant in the
criminal case, the injured individual is the one most
concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He

should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong

which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p. 46.)
And Tolentino says:t.hqw
The general rule is that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party
reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a
criminal action has been commenced, no civil action
arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The
present articles creates an exception to this rule when the
offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these
cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the
criminal action, even if there has been no reservation
made by the injured party; the law itself in this article
makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the
right to determine whether the civil action should be
scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus
independent of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code,
p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the
crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.t.hqw
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation',
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two
terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the
Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as

a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult

to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and
another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily
injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case
the Code Commission recommended that the civil action
for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for
assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must hove been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries,
or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even
death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94, 96-97
[1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33
of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took
part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.
In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against
Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 141 is hereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 89306 September 13, 1990

MARCELO JERVOSO and NORMA CLOSA, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Manuel M. Benedicto for petitioners.

Jervoso was also present thereat. It was while Rogelio,

who was still walking back and forth, had his back turned
away from Marcelo when the latter, in the presence of his
spouse and co-appellant Norma Closa, pulled from his
waist a short bolo or 'pisao' measuring about 7-1/2 inches
in length (Exh. 'D') and stabbed Rogelio at the back with
said weapon (pp. 2-6, tsn, March 16, 1984).

The Solicitor General for respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for review, the petitioners assail the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming with modification of the penalty only, the decision
of the trial court which convicted petitioner Marcelo Jervoso of homicide
for the fatal stabbing of Rogelio Jervoso, but which appreciated in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The trial court
and the Court of Appeals also convicted his wife, Norma Closa, of slight
physical injuries committed against the deceased.
The Court of Appeals set forth in its decision the conflicting versions of
the prosecution and the defense as to how the crime was committed,
thus:
The facts as summarized in the People's brief as borne out
by the evidence and WE quote, [are] as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution showed that on October
24, 1982, at about 2:20 o'clock in the afternoon,
prosecution eyewitness Felicisimo Pamaus a childhood
friend of appellant spouses Marcelo Jervoso and Norma
Closa as well as of the victim, Rogelio Jervoso, was in the
poblacion of MacArthur, Leyte going towards the store of
appellants for the purpose of buying bread. While said
eyewitness was about four meters distance from the
store, he saw the victim, Rogelio Jervoso, walking back
and forth in front of said store and appellant Marcelo

After being wounded, Rogelio ran away but was chased by

Marcelo who was still holding the 'pisao' with his right
hand and was closely being followed by his wife and coappellant, Norma Closa, across the national highway and
inside the hollow blockfenced yard of a certain Mrs.
Olmedo. Catching up with Rogelio inside the fenced yard
of Mrs. Olmedo where Rogelio had already fallen face
downward upon entering the same, Marcelo stabbed
Rogelio again at the back of the latter with the 'pisao.'
Meanwhile, Norma Closa, who had picked up a stone
measuring about 8 inches in length and 3-3/4 inches in
width (Exh. 'E') struck the fallen Rogelio with said stone
held by both her hands, hitting the latter on the left side
of the face near the ear (pp. 5-8, 20, 21, 23, 24, tsn,
March 16, 1984).
Another eyewitness who was present and who saw the
incident in question from its inception up to the time of its
termination and who in fact tried to pacify Marcelo and
Rogelio was Eleno Requioma. After Marcelo inflicted on
Rogelio the second stab wound at the back and Norma
Closa hit the latter with a stone (Exh. 'E') on the left side
of the face near the ear and appellants went back to their
house, it was Requioma, together with Dominador Moquia
and Rolando Molero, who brought the victim to the
Abuyog General Hospital where he later expired (pp- 5,
25, 26, 28, tsn, March 16, 1984). Requioma, however,
failed to testify for the prosecution as he died during the
pendency of trial of the case (p. 6, decision, p. 229,
record).

The defense' evidence was briefly stated in the

appellant's brief which WE also quote, as follows:
At the trial of this case, principal accused MARCELO
JERVOSO declared that on October 24, 1982 at about 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon he was in his office situated in
front of his main house which is also near his store,
making list of goods to be purchased in Tacloban City for
his store; that his wife Norma Closa was inside their house
bathing their children preparatory to their taking their
afternoon nap that Rogelio Jervoso, son of the brother of
his adoptive father, entered his office without knocking,
and arrogantly asked him why he was possessing the
lands of Domingo Jervoso when he is not the real son and
he is not also a legally adopted son; that Rogelio Jervoso
was drunk at the time, demanded that an accounting of
all the produce of the coconuts and palay of Domingo
Jervoso's lands; that he told Rogelio to come back the
next day so both of them would go and see his adoptive
mother Afra Diaz who can enlighten him (Rogelio) about
the matter.
Seeing Rogelio already belligerent, Marcelo went outside
his office. While he was already outside and about a meter
from his store, he saw Ramon Taro and heard him shout:
'Boy, don't do that! Boy' is the nickname of Rogelio
Jervoso. Upon hearing Ramon Taro shout, Marcelo looked
back just as Rogelio delivered a stabbing blow on him,
hitting him on the left back part of Ms upper arm, with a
'pisao'(Exhibit 'D')
After the first stab blow delivered by Rogelio, he (Marcelo)
ran across the National Highway towards the gate of the
house of Mrs. Olmedo. Marcelo was able to enter the front
yard of Mrs. Olmedo's premises and he tried to escape,
but Rogelio intercepted him by passing the other way.
Marcelo ran toward the corner but was met by Rogelio, so
he tried to retrace his steps to the gate, but when he was
about to go out of the gate, Rogelio lunged at him and

delivered another stabbing blow but he was able to get

hold of the right wrist of Rogelio's hand holding the deadly
weapon. Meanwhile, Rogelio's left arm was choking his
check (sic) and pushing him towards the concrete fence of
Mrs. Olmedo.
So, he struggled to get hold of the 'pisao' and was able to
wrest it from the hold of Rogelio by twisting Rogelio's right
hand, but Rogelio was still holding his neck pinned in his
left arm against the concrete fence. To defend himself,
Marcelo, delivered two stabbing blows at the back of
Rogelio the first blow, with a downward stroke on his right
back portion and the second by an upward stroke on his
left back portion.
After stabbing the victim, Rogelio, he pushed Rogelio who
fell to the ground on his left side, he ran towards the gate
of Mrs. Olmedo's premises and on his way out he saw
Ramon Taro and called him instructing him to fetch a
policeman.' (pp. 31-34, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the plea of
self-defense was not proven by clear and convincing evidence:
Regrettably missing in the appellants' evidence are the
elements of self-defense which are: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent and repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The defense failed to demonstrate the concurrence of the
three essential elements with satisfactory evidence so as
to entitle the appellant of the defense of self-defense.
WE are entirely in accord with the trial court that the
affirmative defense of self-defense was not proven by
clear and convincing evidence. The evidence is doubtful,
and lacks that requisite of certainty and sufficient
credulity to sustain the plea of self-defense.

Suffice it to say that the trial court did not err in finding
that the guilt of both appellant was proven with proof
beyond reasonable doubt. (p. 36, Rollo.)

recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the

criminal action, unless the offended partywaives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The dispositive part of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED
in the sense that the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Marcelo Jervoso, should be an imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso in the
amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.
In all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed. Costs against both appellants. (p. 37, Rollo.)
In their petition for review, the petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred:
(1) in ordering them (petitioners) to pay indemnity of
P30,000 to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso despite the
reservation by said heirs of their right to file a separate
civil action against the accused, which they did file in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXI where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18958 entitled, "Digna
Carino-Jervoso, et al. vs. Marcelo Jervoso and Norma
Closa; and
(2) in finding the petitioners guilty of the crimes charged
without support of competent evidence and contrary to
applicable laws and decisions of this Court.
The first assignment of error is meritorious. Section 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the

Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to
file, any of the said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording
the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by
the heirs of the deceased victim is authorized under Article 33 of the
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

The term "physical injuries" in Art. 33 is used in a generic sense. It

includes consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Madeja vs.
Cruz, 126 SCRA 293, cited in Vol. I, p. 62 Civil Code, 1990 Ed., by R.C.
Aquino). Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are
precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the
accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the
same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to
the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil
indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil
action for that purpose. The Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming
the award.
The second assignment of error raises a purely factual issue: whether
the evidence is sufficient to convict the accused of homicide. That issue

may not be reviewed by this Court in an appeal by certiorari under Rule

45 of the Rules of Court, where only legal issues may be raised.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
04472 entitled, "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs. Marcelo
Jervoso and Norma Closa, defendants-appellants" is affirmed, except the
award of P30,000 as indemnity for damages to the heirs of Rogelio
Jervoso, which should be deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.