February 27, 2006

Guy Duperreault
Applicant

EI Umpire
500-5050 Kingsway
Burnaby BC V5H 4C2

Re.: Denial of EI Benefits – File #-915-154; Case# 05-1457

In my original letter of appeal I cited two sections of the charter that are put
into jeopardy or even violated by the policies of the EI board. As a result of
doing research for my appeal to the board of referees, I learned that my
charter arguments were applied against a policy questionnaire that is itself
an error in the administration of the EI Act 36(1). And I also learned that
36(1) of the EI Act is itself in violation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Specifically 36(1) of the EI Act violates section 15(1) of the Charter.

Furthermore, I argue that the section of the act that has denied me benefits,
as it has been administered and justified by referees and umpires, is
inherently flawed, and that those actions of the EI board and its agents also
violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically 2(a), 2(d) as noted
in my original appeal, but now that I know this questionnaire is unnecessary,
also section 12.

There is an inequity in how 36(1) has been enforced over the years, and that
hypocrisy impugns the integrity of blinkered enforcement of 36(1) and
invalidates the reasons for my claim’s denial. The referees who dismissed
my appeal did not err in law, but the law itself is in error.

I also argue that the interpretation of 36(1) that I have read in the
jurisprudence by the board and its agents is morally and legally incorrect.
These justifications may have arisen from a psychological and/or emotional
need within the members of the EI boards and agents to try to justify what is
known to be an unfair law because, as it stands, 36(1) requires no
justification to deny claims to labourers embroiled in a labour dispute. Given
that 36(1) requires no justification in denying claims, it is puzzling that most
boards, referees and umpires who have ruled on 36(1) have verbosely
justified it. Although there is at least one exception to that.

After I conclude my general arguments, I show how these failures relate to

me, specifically, in the dispute my employer put upon me.

Note: I will have informed the various Attorney-Generals of this appeal, as is

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required by article 57 of the Federal Courts Act, when a date is set for the
hearing of my appeal.

36(1) of the EI Act violates section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, in that it discriminates against a distinguishable class or group in
society: the labourer, in favour of another distinguishable class or group,
the employer. Furthermore, the discrimination is not designed to ameliorate
the situation of a disadvantaged group, so 15(2) does not apply to validate
the discrimination. Functionally it exacerbates the discrimination by shifting
the inequality extant between the labourer and the employer further in
favour of the employer than already exists.

36(1) Reads:
Subject to the regulations, if a claimant loses an employment, or is
unable to resume an employment, because of a work stoppage
attributable to a labour dispute at the factory, workshop or other
premises at which the claimant was employed, the claimant is not
entitled to receive benefits until the earlier of
(a) the end of the work stoppage, and
(b) the day on which the claimant becomes regularly engaged
elsewhere in insurable employment.

What is a labour dispute? An employer, willingly or less willingly, suffers

work not getting done, and any/all financial and contractual consequences
to achieve perceived economic and/or financial objectives, while the
employees, willingly or less willingly, suffer through reduced income, with all
its financial and contractual consequences, to achieve perceived socio-
and/or personal economic and work environment objectives. All things
being equal, each party will recognize the "market" reality of their positions
and eventually sign a collective labour agreement with which each party can
live – and, ideally, thrive.

The issue of "all things being equal" is, ostensibly, at the heart of the oft
repeated cry that EI is to remain neutral in a labour dispute. For example:
It has been stated in considerable of the jurisprudence that this
section (Section 36(1), formerly Section 31 and formerly Section 41
of the Act) is based on the proposition that government neutrality
should be preserved in a labour dispute. This is stated by the Court
in Caron v. Richard et al. CUB 14267 where Hugessen and
Desjardins, J.J. quoted L'Heureux-Dubé, J. in Hills, [1988] 1
at 537:
"The two principles generally invoked in the interpretation of s
44 rest on the proposition that government neutrality should
 3

be preserved in a labour dispute and that it would be

inequitable for an employer's contribution to the
Unemployment Insurance fund to finance a strike against
himself. Hickling [M. A. Hickling, Labour Disputes and
Employment Insurance Benefits in Canada and England
(1975)], at p 1, puts it as follows:

The neutrality of the state is to be preserved, and funds

to which employers are compelled to contribute are
not to be used against them." [My emphasis.]

It is worth noting that the OED Shorter Dictionary defines inequitable as "Not
equitable, unfair."

And from the Jurisprudence Index on Labour Disputes:

As an expression of its firm desire to prevent the EIA from having
any influence whatsoever on labour-management relations,
Parliament has imposed strict rules to prevent employment
insurance being used to support either party to a labour
dispute. This jurisprudence is essential in defining a labour, when it
begins and ends, and clarifying the relationships between the
various parties to each other [my emphasis].

These, and many other similar citations and cases, provide evidence of the
aetiological nature of the enforcement of the act – it is a law which has in its
case-law the intent or constriction of neutrality and fairness in a labour
dispute with respect to, ostensibly, both parties in the dispute. And, as with
most things in life, the measure and vitality of an intent is in how it is made
manifest through the actions and their associated consequences by those
entities that hold the power to see that intent made manifest in tangible,
pragmatic ways. The language of the intent is lucid and succinct. I repeat,
with changed emphasis:
As an expression of its firm desire to prevent the EIA from
having any influence whatsoever on labour-management
relations, Parliament has imposed strict rules to prevent
employment insurance being used to support either party to a labour
dispute [my emphasis].

The questions that come to mind are: Is Parliament’s intent of fairness

made manifest in the consequences of the actions taken by the EI board and
its agents to ensure that fairness? Is the EI board's strivings for neutrality
supported by their actions, despite their incessant reliance that their ONLY
proof of neutrality is to enforce denial of benefits? And do the board’s
actions correspond with the law of the land, both within the EI Act and within
 4

the Charter of Rights and Freedoms?

I begin the discussion on EI's neutrality by elaborating that the purpose of

government/EI neutrality is, to quote the decision above, to ensure that the
"funds to which employers are compelled to contribute are not to be used
against them." A slight reading between the lines infers that EI is to help
provide a neutral and fair financial "playground" for the disputants. All things
being equal. And that “equality” is to be assumed extant, despite the
employee not being named as one who also is compelled to make EI
contributions.

And to that end I turn to the concern cited within many of the denied appeals
relating to employers financing strikers via their compulsory EI contributions,
if these strikers were to receive EI payments whose benefits have been paid
for by their erstwhile employer. This overlooks the fact that the employee
also contributes to EI. And thus the frequent citation that an employer's
compulsory payments are not to be used against them is not neutral: it is an
inequity because the employees who have contributed to EI are being denied
all insurance owed them – and not just the part paid for by the employer.

That has all the earmarks of a built in unfairness. But, despite that, it is not
unreasonable to see some kind of fairness in this because it can be seen to
be unfair to the employer if, in their planning of an extended “break-the-
employer” kind of strike, the employees were able to count on the EI
benefits as a secondary strike fund.

It is important to note that this scenario of “fairness” differentiates the

employer from the employee, and requires a reading in of intent on the part
of the employee in the planning of an extended dispute. What if the intent of
the employee wasn’t a protracted dispute, but that the strike had been
engineered by the employer in its bid to “break the union”? Blind
administration of “fairness” would, in this instance, be of a questionable
kind.

Now, what about the scenario in which an employer plans for and enacts a
“break the union” kind of lockout? Does the case law admit that in this
scenario, the compulsory contributions of the employee made before the
lockout are an unfair financial cost that helps the employer in its lockout?
No. It does not. In fact I have not read any jurisprudence referring to the
employee's contributions. And that is unfair, because, if we follow the
financial argument as it relates to employers, the employees contributions to
EI amount to the employees helping destitute themselves because the
employee is denied even access to the base contributions s/he made before
the labour dispute – with or without interest – let alone any type of
reasonable insurance benefit based on his or her contributions!
 5

I extend this argument further: an employer actually receives, relative to the

employee, an unfair financial benefit from a labour dispute in the form of
reduced expenses. How so? Because the employees' expenses remain
relatively fixed during a labour dispute – despite the removal of EI and CPP
fees – while in the aggregate for an employer the removal of these may not
be all that significant in comparison to their reduced payroll costs. In other
words, not only has an employer lost the huge expense of bankrolling payroll
paycheques and EI contributions, but for a time the employer's revenues
may remain relatively unaffected. Concomitantly the employees' expenses
have often or usually remained almost exactly the same, and their income
has been severely curtailed if not stopped completely. Fairness and
neutrality are not the descriptions that describe an employee’s denial of
benefits in this scenario.

I am not the first to have raised the issue of how fair has been the effort of
the EI Board towards achieving neutrality. The issue of "fairness" has been
addressed in the jurisprudence. For example, from the FCA Docket A-90-81,
October 28, 1981, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA applicant, and GARY
SCHOEN respondent, regarding CUB 6384,:
There is perhaps another way to explain the umpire's decision. While
he did not say so, he may have read subsection 44(l) as disentitling a
claimant from receiving only the benefits o[r] the portion of the
benefits that, if the subsection did not exist, would become payable
as a result of the loss of employment attributable to a labour dispute.
In other words, according to that interpretation, the subsection would
not disentitle a claimant, whose employment is terminated by a
labour dispute, from receiving the benefits to which he would have
been entitled if that employment had not been terminated; it would
merely disentitle him from receiving additional benefits as a
consequence of the termination of his employment by reason of a
labour dispute. That interpretation would certainly produce fair
results. I have nevertheless reached the conclusion that it must
be rejected. Under the Act, when a person is, by reason of section
44, disentitled from receiving benefits for a day or a period, that
person thereby loses his right to receive any benefit for that day
or period. This, in my view, flows from paragraph 16(1)(a) and
subsection 27(2) 2 . It follows that:, in my opinion, subsection
44(1) cannot be interpreted so as to disentitle a claimant of only a
part of the benefits that he would otherwise have the right to
receive. [My Emphasis.]

Fairness is here explicitly excluded! And yet, in case after case after case,
fairness is cited as a reason to exclude benefits because it would be unfair
to an employer. It is okay for the law to be unfair to the employee, but not the
employer.
 6

By this judgement Judge Pratte belies even the pretext of neutrality in the
law’s enactment, and clearly establishes the context of unfair
discrimination: the enforcement of 36(1) is blatantly unfair, and all decisions
that use fairness case law are subject to Charter arguments and “fairness”
scrutiny. Is the aetiology of the act and the purpose of board to ensure
neutrality and fairness between disputants or to assist employers in the
disenfranchisement of labour? If you decide that the aetiology of the act is
strictly to be fair to the employer and to that end assist the employer its
subjugation of labour, then I suggest that the Board stop the hypocritical
citations referring to fairness. If, on the other hand, the aetiology of the act
is to make manifest a neutral and fair playground for the owners of labour
and the labourers themselves, so that each may participate in a democratic
society as socio-economic equals in fair market haggling, then I suggest
that boards such as this one do not pretend that ignoring the circumstances
of individual cases is being fair. Neutrality does not arise from
dispassionate blinkered adherence to some organized letters that comprise
a statute.

To remain neutral between two opposed parties requires understanding of

the nature of both parties before neutrality can be considered, let alone
achieved. Neutrality is not achieved by the blind enforcement of deaf words.
Such behaviour is antithetical to a democracy because blinkered
enforcement of any law subjugates the citizens hurt by that law to the state
and belies that citizen being a participating member of a free democracy.
Justice Wilson says this powerfully in R. v. Morgentaler (1988) 1 S.C.R. 30
[p.178]:
As is pointed out by Professor Cyril E. M. Joad, then Head of the
Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Birkbeck College,
University of London, in Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics
(1938), the role of the state in a democracy is to establish the
background conditions under which individual citizens may pursue the
ethical values which in their view underlie the good life. He states at p.
801:
For the welfare of the state is nothing apart from the good of the
citizens who compose it. It is no doubt true that a State whose
citizens are compelled to go right is more efficient than one whose
citizens are free to go wrong. But what then? To sacrifice freedom in
the interests of efficiency, is to sacrifice what confers upon human
beings their humanity. It is no doubt easy to govern a flock of sheep;
but there is no credit in the governing, and, if the sheep were born as
men, no virtue in the sheep.

Professor Joad further emphasizes at p. 803 that individuals in a

democratic society can never be treated "merely as means to ends
beyond themselves" because:
To the right of the individual to be treated as an end, which entails
 7

his right to the full development and expression of his personality, all
other rights and claims must, the democrat holds, be subordinated.
I do not know how this principle is to be defended any more than I
can frame a defence for the principles of democracy and liberty.

Professor Joad stresses that the essence of a democracy is its

recognition of the fact that the state is made for man and not man for
the state (p. 805) [my emphasis].

By blindly following a law which has even been deemed unfair by not just
Louis Pratte, the federal court judge who wrote the Schoen decision, but by
the two other judges who participated in that decision – John Urie and D.J.
Verchere – the enforcement of 36(1) of the EI Act violates the principle that
“the state is made for man and not man for the state.” In enforcing an unfair
law, man – in this case the labourer – is subjugated to the state and its
agents. Specifically, by blindly enforcing 36(1) in a lockout, EI is a tool
assisting the impoverishment of labour as a means to an end beyond the
individual labourer, that being the model of labour management fashionable
within today’s flavour-of-the-day corporatist ideology. If the labourer sees
as one of its goals the collective well being of society via a respected and
reasonably paid labour force, any action on the part of the state, even
through the EI board, to hurt that is a violation of the principles of a
democratic society as stated by Joad, and a violation of 15(1) of the charter.
I feel that Joad’s statement deserves repeating:
For the welfare of the state is nothing apart from the good of the
citizens who compose it. It is no doubt true that a State whose
citizens are compelled to go right is more efficient than one whose
citizens are free to go wrong. But what then? To sacrifice freedom in
the interests of efficiency, is to sacrifice what confers upon human
beings their humanity. It is no doubt easy to govern a flock of sheep;
but there is no credit in the governing, and, if the sheep were born as
men, no virtue in the sheep.

Judge Pratte, who explicitly expunged fairness as an argument against

denial of benefits, was at least being honest to 36(1), unlike the
jurisprudence that has invariably denied benefits to labour disputants as
almost uniformly the method sine qua non, of being fair.

Besides the blatantly stated unfairness of the FCA ruling that overturned the
“fair” decision of CU6384 above, there is, for inexplicably unfair non-
reasons, no distinction made by EI between workers locked out and those
who have initiated a strike. In the argument that follows I honour the
distinction, and extend the argument that EI neutrality is at least improbable
when the distinction is ignored in general – but in the case of employers who
take advantage of 94.2(1) of the Canadian Labour Code, which allows the
use of replacement workers during a labour dispute, it is impossible, and
 8

any pretext at it being neutral is not just asinine, but antithetical to any
reasonable principle of democracy.

In pragmatic terms, the case law history of the blanket denial of EI benefits
to a locked out labourer amounts to a benefit the employer can take
advantage of in its planning for and management of a labour dispute –
especially in a "break-the-union" kind of dispute for which the employer has
taken great effort to plan and prepare. An employer with a knowledge of the
EI Act and 36(1)'s jurisprudence may very well plan for an extended dispute
with the full knowledge that its employees will be facing destitution and no
assistance from EI.

My argument has, in fact, some jurisprudence behind it. From DENNIS HILLS,
"et al", – v. – ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA (REFERENCE NO: CUB 8764;
JUDGMENT NO: A-175-84); COURT FILE NO: 19094; DATE OF ISSUE;
November 21, 1997 (March 24, 1988)):
a) Government Neutrality in a Labour Dispute
In order to remain neutral the law should but does not distinguish
between strikes and lockouts. The reasonableness of the claims and
the merits of the dispute are ignored in the determination of the question
whether the labour dispute actually exists. The government can hardly
invoke neutrality if it declines to differentiate between a legitimate
grievance leading to a lockout and a voluntary stoppage of work
following a breakdown in industrial relations. It is indeed difficult to
classify as neutral a refusal to pay benefits in the former situation (Terry
Norris, "Dissociating from a Trade Dispute, and Claiming Unemployment
Benefit" (l985), 135 New L.J. 967 at p. 967). As mentioned by Susan H.
Ephron: "The neutrality principle can serve as a justification for the
"labour dispute disqualification" only if the parties to the dispute
stand on equal footing. In the majority instances they do not" (Susan
H. Ephron, "Redefining Neutrality: Alternative Interpretations of the
Labour Dispute Disqualification in Unemployment Compensation"
(1986), 8 Comp. Lab. L. 89, at p. 104).

If an employer insists upon unreasonable terms in the settlement of a

labour dispute and the employees are aware of the fact that
unemployment insurance benefits will not be paid if there is a
stoppage of work due to lack of agreement, the employees may be
induced to accept unfavourable terms of employment which they
would not otherwise accept. Under such conditions the Act becomes
an instrument of coercion (In re McKay (1946), 53 Man. R. 364, at pp.
372-73). A refusal to pay benefits in those circumstances is hardly a
neutral stance. Likewise, to guarantee benefits only to those who do
not pay union dues may deter workers from combining their
economic strength, particularly if the payment of union dues is
construed as financing the dispute (see Milton I. Shadur
 9

"Unemployment Benefits and the "Labour Dispute" Disqualification"

(1950), 17 U.: Chi. L. Rev. 294, at pp. 296 to 298, Leonard Lesser,
"Labour disputes and Unemployment Compensation" (1945), 55 Yale
L.J. 167, Note, "Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits of Persons
Involuntarily Unemployed Because of Labour Disputes" (1949) 49
Colum. L. Rev. 550).

In the final analysis, while it might be desirable that the government

remain neutral in a labour dispute, it is questionable whether the
disqualification provision, applied to the circumstances of this case,
would in fact achieve such a result. Absent proof, as here, that the
claimant voluntarily chose unemployment in order to foster the strike, the
neutrality principle does not seem to justify depriving such claimant of
unemployment insurance benefits.

b) Employer financing strike against himself

It is also argued that the legislature cannot have intended that the
employer, through his contribution to the unemployment compensation
fund, finance a strike against himself. This argument does not take into
account that such contributions will eventually be shifted by the
employer to the consumer or to his or her employees. Such "financing"
may not even materialize since strikes are often of lesser duration than
the usual benefit-waiting period. Even if it did, the absence of benefits
during the waiting period, combined with the prospect of benefits
amounting to a fraction of normal wages, will rather dissuade labour
unions from calling a strike than encourage them to do so (Shadur,
supra, at p. 298).

I do not think that it is necessary to belabour the point further. Suffice it

to say that the rationale underlying s. 44 as it was originally enacted in
England and later incorporated in its Canadian counterpart, does not
today enjoy such favour in the United States or in Canada and no
wonder, given the materially different state of labour relations [my
emphasis].

From this judicial statement it is very clear that if employees find the thought
of EI benefits not an enticement to strike – and I can certainly attest to that in
my case – it is equally true that the lack of benefits is certainly a
consideration in an employers' lockout plans, especially if the labour dispute
is anticipated, expected and planned to be protracted, and the employer
takes advantage of 94.2(1) of the Canadian Labour Code, which allows the
use of replacement workers. This tangible, even measurable difference in
attitude between "labour" and "employer" towards EI contributions/benefits
belies equality and fairness between the disputants, and makes a mockery
of the enforcement of 36(1) as a means of ensuring state neutrality. The
denial of benefits, which is basically an act of inaction, clearly favours the
 10

employer and thus perverts the board’s intent of neutrality and fairness.
That the employer clearly gets a benefit, supplies additional evidence of
discrimination that can produce measurable disenfranchisement of the
labourer and imbalanced benefit at the labourer’s expense for the employer.
Clearly 36(1) of the EI Act is in violation of 15(1) of the charter, as well as the
fundamental principles of a democracy requiring that all are equal before
the law.

Now, how does all that apply to me? I was locked out by TELUS. Is there
evidence that TELUS is aware of labour and EI law by which they could make
plans for a protracted lockout? Their having hired a bevy of lawyers
certainly infers that they did, yes. There is no reason to suppose that TELUS
hired those lawyers in order to remain ignorant of labour law in any and all of
its aspects. At the very least as a responsible corporate entity, TELUS
requires knowledge of EI in order to administer its accounts. Furthermore,
as evidence of their legal preparations, TELUS took a very aggressive
stance towards the use of 94.2(1) of the Canadian Labour Code – see
evidence document #1.

Is there evidence that TELUS was an employer who “insist[ed] upon

unreasonable terms in the settlement of a labour dispute?” Yes. A perusal
of the various CIRB rulings as they relate to the TWU/TELUS bargaining
process will amply indicate this. I will cite from, for example, CIRB ruling
RD0271:
[4] The TWU gave notice to bargain to TELUS on August 15, 2000, and
filed their bargaining proposals on with a view to renewing the TWU
agreement. Collective bargaining commenced on November 1, 2000.
TELUS did not file bargaining proposals but issued statements of
“issues and objectives” with a view to concluding an entirely new
collective agreement. There have been two conciliation attempts, the
latest of which commenced on November 14, 2003, and has now been
concluded. Both attempts have been unsuccessful. After three years of
negotiations, the parties have yet to conclude a collective agreement or
sign off any collective agreement language. The only two issues on
which the parties have been able to agree are a maintenance of services
agreement and the conciliation process. [My emphasis.]

And:
[127] The Board is dismayed that an experienced and sophisticated
employer should seek to take advantage of a “very carefully crafted”
undertaking given to the Board through its learned counsel, at public
hearings, in order to devise other circumstances that avoid the strict
wording of its undertaking. Such actions are contrary to effective
industrial relations and sound labour-management relations
promulgated by the Code in its Preamble. In the circumstances of this
case, the employer’s actions have had the consequence of poisoning
 11

the collective bargaining process in which the parties are engaged

and have effectively destroyed whatever remaining trust may have
been necessary for the parties to voluntarily conclude a collective
agreement. [My emphasis.]

And, from citation 2004 FCA 438, in which the Federal Court of Appeals
dismissed with costs TELUS's appeal to the CIRB's dismissed appeal of
CIRB Ruling RD278:
[72] The applicants provided no authority for the proposition that
employee wishes had to be considered by the Board when determining
whether there was a valid labour relations purpose for issuing a single
employer declaration.

[76] In my opinion, it was not patently unreasonable for the Board to

conclude, on the basis of its jurisprudence and the facts before it, that the
inclusion of the new employees would not involve such change.

[83] Given these differences, it cannot be said that the 2004 Decision was
patently unreasonable in applying the more relevant Board
jurisprudence dealing with accretions to a bargaining unit.

[84] For these reasons, I am not persuaded that the 2004 Decision so
misinterpreted the Board's jurisprudence as to render it patently
unreasonable for the Board to exercise its discretion under section 18.1
without first ascertaining the wishes of the new employees.

[87] ... The complaint is unfounded in so far as it alleges that the 2004
Decision simply overlooked the fact that the 2001 Decision distinguished
between employees hired as a result of TELUS' expansion of its existing
operations, and employees of acquired companies. As I indicated
earlier in these reasons (at [19]), when making its 2004 Decision the
Board was very alive to this distinction: see, for example, paras. 186-88
and 313 of the reasons for the 2004 Decision.

[106] In my view, there is no merit in these contentions.

See also para.s [89], [90], [96], [98], [100], [105], and

[112] For these reasons, I would dismiss the application for judicial
review with costs.

Is there evidence that TELUS made extensive use of replacement workers

to help it extend the lock out? I have provided a copy of the legal complaint
that the TWU filed with the CIRB on September 9th, 2005. In it are detailed
listings and proof of TELUS’s extensive recruiting and use of replacement
workers – see evidence document #1.
 12

As evidence of the effectiveness of the coercive nature of the dispute after

17 weeks of labour disruption, the union membership signed a contract very
little changed from that enforced upon them at the beginning of the
disruption. (I have supplied a copy of the original "imposed" contract of July
21, 2005, and that which was accepted by the union membership in
November.) Briefly, there are few significant changes. Evidence documents
#2a and #2b.] For example, there are six instances of the use of the
abbreviation “etc.” in the final agreement – more than in the proposed. And
while some are innocuous – if that is possible in a legal contract – some are
not and remained exactly the same in the two documents. For example:
25. 01 The Company may assign or transfer an employee, on a temporary
or permanent basis, from one headquarters to another or from one job title
to another, as required to conduct its business efficiently and to effectively
deploy and develop its employees. Without limiting the foregoing, this
includes such considerations as matching available staff to workload,
reasonable accommodation, placement of surplus, training and
development of employees, moves associated with office closures,
consolidations or centralizations, etc.
The employees have given the employer the right to transfer any body any
where, at any time, for any reason, regardless, experience, familial
demands and, astoundingly, the heart and soul of union contracts, seniority.

A retired employee has this to say about the new collective agreement:

I have grave concerns, (as do others), about our Pension Plan with this
Co. [TELUS] and this Union [TWU]. Last collective agreement there was
a cut of the employer’s contribution of .75%. The Co. is setting up their
own L[ong] T[erm] D[isability] plan and the criteria for qualifying will be
different than [it was for] the LTD plan under the T[elecommunications]
W[orkers] P[ension] P[lan]. Meanwhile, the Union has to continue funding
our LTD plan for the people who are still on it. So when I asked the
Administrator of the Plan where the money was coming from for that, she
said that they are doing a review of the LTD plan and will be negotiating
with the Co. to cover it, so, - how successful do you think we will be to get
more money out of the Company for our LTD plan? How does zero,
nada, nil, zilch, forget it, ha ha ha, sound to you. Because the C.A. was
written by the Co. there was NO consultation with our Plan. And the
members passed this C.A.
(As a point of interest, this issue of the LTD funding was not
discussed by the union executive at the ratification meeting I
attended, nor do I remember seeing it in their literature
preceding the second vote.)

And has the employer made good on the new found power it has? Yes.
TELUS has begun the process of dismissing significant portions of its
 13

workforce, as it may now easily do under its current contract, but which
would have been more difficult under the old one. (For example, the DAC
offices on the second floor of the "Glenlyon" office – where I work on the
first floor.) This makes manifest one of the significant fears the
membership had while picketing, and that had kept them on the picket lines
17 weeks. The other was that the new contract would allow the company to
displace a unionized workforce at will with contract workers. And this too,
has begun to happen, as, for example, the janitorial services have been
expunged from the union and that vacuum has been filled by contract
workers. The company can, as the above example affirms, move any one
any where at any time – and this too, they have begun to do, and which most
employees believe has as its primary purpose getting as many
“troublesome” union-strong British Columbia employees to quit as they can.
(At a time the company can have many of the service jobs done anywhere in
the world, offices are being closed in BC and moved to Alberta at not
insignificant and, ostensibly, unnecessary expense.) And the final example I
will here cite is TELUS having surreptitiously announced its intention to keep
on staff until further notice some of the replacement workers as contract
workers in Installation and Repair. This is in contradistinction to its
preamble to the new collective agreement regarding contract workers in
"traditional/core" jobs, where the company announced that TWU members
may be required to work with contractors for no more than two weeks after
the locked out employees' labour return to work. (This requirement was also
specified in my indoctrination process, complete with Powerpoint slides,
that I was forced to submit to upon and as a condition of my return to work
after the dispute.)

What effect would the presence of a significant number of replacement

workers have on any purported fairness arguments? As stated in "Hills vs
AG Canada", regarding disqualification of benefits failing to be a neutral
(in)action, "In the final analysis, while it might be desirable that the
government remain neutral in a labour dispute, it is questionable whether
the disqualification provision, applied to the circumstances of this case,
would in fact achieve such a result." This citation pre-dated the existence
of legalized replacement workers under the Canadian Labour Code, the
existence of which makes this argument even more germane!

In fact, under the statutory circumstances extant today as they relate to

both the EI and CLC acts, it would be unreasonable to expect an employer
not to plan using EI and CLC against employees in breaking the union
because it can count on not only reducing its own cash outflows into
paycheques, EI and other benefits, but on the employee being denied EI
benefits while the replacement workers minimize the income losses. Thus,
an employer who uses replacement workers not only steals from labour
labour's one and only tool in a labour dispute – its labour – but EI steals from
the labourer their EI contributions by failing to give unemployment relief and
 14

turning a blind eye to an army of workers hired without benefits to further

steal from the locked out workers their contributions. Under what rock
would the disqualification from benefits in this circumstance be considered
a neutral “action” by government or its agencies? Under what blind eye
would this considered to be fair?

Was the use of replacement workers effective in assisting the employer in

imposing its collective agreement? I have copied here TELUS's proud third
quarter announcement:
TELUS profits up 21% to $190.1M in Q3 on mobility division, dividends
up 37.5%
The Canadian Press
Nov 10 2005 08:30:00

VANCOUVER (CP) _ Major telecommunications provider TELUS Corp.

reported Thursday a 21.4 per cent surge in third-quarter profit to $190.1
million as growth at its mobility division powered revenues up six per
cent.
The Vancouver-based company said it has approved a 37.5 per cent
increase in its dividend on the basis of the strong performance.

TELUS (TSX:T) said it earned 53 cents per diluted share in the three
months ended Sept. 30, which compared with a profit of $156.6 million,
43 cents per share, in the same period a year earlier

The earnings came in just above an average forecast for a 52 cent per
share profit, based on 11 analyst estimates gathered by Thomson
Financial

Operating revenues for the period were $2.06 billion, up from $1.95
billion a year ago

Revenues from TELUS's mobility division were the main driver of the
upswing, increasing 16 per cent to $864 million year-over-year. But
stable revenues and a lengthy strike by workers in its communications
division kept revenues flat in that business at $1.2 billion in the quarter

TELUS's third-quarter results reflect continued strong, on-strategy

growth,'' president and CEO Darren Entwistle said in a statement

TELUS mobility delivered another outstanding quarter with excellent

subscriber growth, ARPU and churn results that resulted in wireless
revenue and EBITDA increases of 16 per cent and 28 per cent,
respectively.''
The strong results prompted TELUS to raise its dividend to 27.5 cents
from 20 cents per quarter, payable on Jan. 1, 2006
 15

Workers at the company's communications division are to vote on a new

contract by a mail-in balloting process this week. Thousands of
unionized TELUS workers walked off the job in July, a day before the
company was to impose a new contract after almost five years of failed
negotiations.
The two sides reached a tentative deal in October, but that was rejected
last week by the union membership by a margin of just 53 votes.

As ancillary evidence of TELUS having planned for just such an eventuality, I

point you to their having pre-arranged by many months, if not years, the
hiring of AFI, a known union breaking company; and by TELUS having hired
the Bell executive who managed Bell's labour dispute, which resulted in a
collective agreement that gave Bell the unmitigated power to force
retirements, relocations and contracting out. I also point to TELUS's careful
imposition of the terms of the contract via "soft lockout" measures, and
their failure to bargain in good faith until they unilaterally imposed their
“bargained” contract, as was repeatedly asserted in rulings against TELUS
by the CIRB over the course of four years of negotiations. As a particular
example of this evidence, I refer again to the cited CIRB Ruling RD0271. I
have also included their pre-lockout pamphlet entitled "Team Member
Guidelines for Potential Work Stoppage" which was published in anticipation
of their locking out the TWU membership. Evidence document #3.

In an impromptu “cheer-the-troops” meeting, TWU president Bruce Bell said

to me and the dozen or so other picketers on the line on a Sunday in mid-
August, 2005, that he had it on good authority that CEO Darren Entwistle was
prepared for the dispute to extend for nine months or more.

And as final evidence of the breadth of TELUS's planning, I cite below one
members' recollection of a meeting that occurred between MP Peter Julian
(New Westminster), Bruce Bell and others members of the TWU.
NDP MP Peter Julian has been unquestionably our strongest supporter.
Carolyn Chalafeault (sp?) is from Local Labour Council (VDLC)

Peter Julian said the TWU does not have the political support required to
win this battle. On the other hand [TELUS CEO] Darren [Entwistle] has
big and powerful political support. It is not a co-incidence that the anti-
scab legislation [Bill: C-263, To prohibit the use of replacement workers
in labour disputes] was defeated. The political world has known for at
least a couple of years that Darren planned to use replacement workers.
He called in his political favours to make sure the bill did not pass.

There are many politicians saying that they wished that they could help
us but their hands are tied. The fact is they won’t help us. Legislation is
already in place that could be used to help us but they are choosing not
 16

to use it. Although these politicians claim they can’t, the truth is they
won’t. Peter Julian sited many different examples of this to the group.
Peter said the truth is, this battle is over. Our only hope is to vote ‘yes’
giving us 5 years to prepare for the next battle. We should use that time
to put ourselves in a better political position.

One of the TWU members at the meeting questioned Bruce Bell as to

whether he was selling out or cracking too easily. It upset Peter Julian
who quickly came to Bruce’s defence; but, more importantly Carolyn got
very angry and said we have no idea what Bruce has been through or
what he has been up against. (Please note that this is coming from a
woman who has 30 years experience in the labour movement and is as
hard core labour as they come. So her comments should not be taken
lightly).

(I have requested Julian's affidavit or to be a witness, but have yet to get a

response.)

Up to this point I have made general arguments relating to the failure of the
EI act to be neutral in a dispute in which the employer, as part of a union
breaking agenda that was years in the making, relies on EI to follow its
blinkered pattern of disentitlement rulings to abet their battle plan –
especially in the event of a lockout with expectations that it would be
protracted – such as what occurred at TELUS.

Now I would like to address the particulars of my situation, which extends

beyond the general statements above.

TELUS, has made it clear in its official lockout announcements that those of
us who find work with a competitor will be fired. From TELUS's pamphlet
entitled "Team Member Guidelines for Potential Work Stoppage":
Question: Can I work full-time or part-time for another
telecommunication's company or competitor?
Answer: No. Even during a work stoppage, you remain a
TELUS employee and are subject to conflict of
interest policies.
I question whether or not such an edict is legal or enforceable. However, as
an Outside Plant Technician (Tech Level III – now called "Engineering
Technologist" in the new collective agreement) specializing in
telecommunications, the only other comparably paid job that I am readily
qualified for, is with a competitor. And as an employee with twenty-four (24)
years in BC Tel/TELUS, I would be putting at risk, in seeking employment with
a competitor, twenty-four years of company contributions to my pension
because they do not lock in until my twenty-fifth anniversary. For myself, all
things being equal, the company whether deliberately (which I suspect) or
not, is taking advantage of the EI's desire to keep from employee's the
 17

company's contributions to EI by threatening consequences for my seeking

such employment. Dis-entitling me further imbalances from me towards
TELUS the balance of power in the labour dispute, and the blanket denial of
my claim clearly fails EI Board's averred neutrality mandate in my case.

I repeat from JUDGEMENT NO: A-175-84 COURT FILE NO: 19094, re. CUB
8764;
b) Employer financing strike against himself
It is also argued that the legislature cannot have intended that the
employer, through his contribution to the unemployment
compensation fund, finance a strike against himself. This
argument does not take into account that such contributions will
eventually be shifted by the employer to the consumer or to his or
her employees. Such "financing" may not even materialize since
strikes are often of lesser duration than the usual benefit-waiting
period. Even if it did, the absence of benefits during the waiting
period, combined with the prospect of benefits amounting to a
fraction of normal wages, will rather dissuade labour unions
from calling a strike than encourage them to do so (Shadur,
supra, at p. 298). [My emphasis.]

Because of my wage group within TELUS – I am amongst the highest paid

employees of TELUS's bargaining unit – when the labour dispute began I did
not consider applying for EI for two reasons: the benefits paid would not
suffice to cover my expenses, and I suspected that EI would rule me
ineligible for benefits. However, and significantly, I did not even research
the validity of my suspicion because I was too busy finding work outside my
field of expertise that would pay enough to complement sufficiently the
picket pay I would be receiving to cover my living expenses. Picket pay was
a flat rate, and not prorated to match income levels of the locked out
picketers. And my expenses included a three year old mortgage. Given that
I am a resident of greater Vancouver, such a mortgage is substantial.

In this dispute I did not choose to sever my income. My employer severed my

income in order to coerce me into accepting a labour-subjugating contract.
Denial of EI benefits abetted TELUS's coercive aims when my efforts at
earning income from disparate sources failed to meet my financial needs. My
financial needs would have been somewhat ameliorated by EI benefits
without hurting TELUS's ability to extend its revenue stream using
replacement workers and because a great deal of TELUS's immediate
income derives from the selling of services which require little if any labour,
as is evident by the 3rd quarter results cited above. In my case, in this labour
dispute, denial of my benefits was not a neutral act by the EI adjudicators.

Furthermore, when my temporary employment as a painting sub-contractor

was finished along with the painting project for which I had been contracted,
 18

I once again chose to find work outside of my field of expertise. And since I
had learned that I would be unable to survive financially or physically as a
competitive contract painter, I sought work less physically demanding, but
which I felt I would be capable of doing if given a chance. As I noted in my
original letter of appeal, I applied for a marketing position at the Arts Club
Theatre and as a lecturer/educator for the Council of Canadians, and a few
other lesser positions, without success. Not surprisingly, my being a
“mere” telecommunications engineering technologist, albeit with a good
vocabulary and creative turns of phrase, was not enough to get me hired at
any of these positions. I was more than willing to work during the labour
dispute – this is clearly shown by my having actually got a job for which I
worked 45 hour weeks – and by my applying for several other jobs when the
painting job was completed.

EI benefits are not a tool I can use to crush my employer. EI benefits are what I
would have been able to use to just barely get by without excessive reliance on
credit. EI's failure to act abetted the company's plans, as they applied to me, in
bludgeoning acceptance of its imposed "collective agreement" by inexorably
increasing my personal debt. Denying me benefits for which I had at least
partially contributed was in my particular circumstances neither fair nor neutral:
it abetted my employer's use of replacement workers to exhaust not only my
own personal resources but those of the TWU as well.

I now cite from two dead white philosophers. Their comments on the
balance of power between labour and the owners of labour of two hundred
and one hundred years ago are as vibrant and on point today as when they
wrote them. And while you may dismiss them with nary a thought as
belonging to a different time, I contend that, in our age of corporatist media,
a corporatist bias in the CIRB, a corporatist government that recently acted
to keep enacted replacement worker legislation, the pro-corporatist anti-
labour oligarchical nature of Canadian society today is not as far from what
Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill described as we would like to believe.

From Adam Smith:

It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon
all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the
other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in
number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides,
authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it
prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of parliament against
combining to lower the price of work; but many against combining to
raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer. A
landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did
not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the
stocks which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not
subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without
 19

employment. In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his

master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate.
(Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations, Bk. I, Ch. 8, “Of the Wages of Labour” par. 12.)

From John Stuart Mill:

It is a great error to condemn, per se and absolutely, either trade unions
or the collective action of strikes. Even assuming that a strike must
inevitably fail whenever it attempts to raise wages above that market rate
which is fixed by the demand and supply; demand and supply are not
physical agencies, which thrust a given amount of wages into a
labourer's hand without the participation of his own will and actions. The
market rate is not fixed for him by some self-acting instrument, but is the
result of bargaining between human beings—of what Adam Smith calls
"the higgling of the market;" and those who do not "higgle" will long
continue to pay … more than the market price for their purchases. Still
more might poor labourers who have to do with rich employers, remain
long without the amount of wages which the demand for their labour
would justify, unless, in vernacular phrase, they stood-out for it, and how
can they stand out for terms without organized concert? What chance
would any labourer have, who struck singly for an advance of
wages? How could he even know whether the state of the market
admitted of a rise, except by consultation with his fellows, naturally
leading to concerted action? I do not hesitate to say that associations
of labourers, of a nature similar to trades unions, far from being a
hindrance to a free market for labour, are the necessary
instrumentality of that free market; the indispensable means of
enabling the sellers of labour to take due care of their own interests
under a system of competition. There is an ulterior consideration of
much importance…. Experience has at length enabled the more
intelligent trade to take a tolerably correct measure of the circumstances
on which the success of a strike for an advance of wages depends. The
workmen are now nearly as well informed as the master, of the state
of the market for his commodities; they can calculate his gains and
his expenses, they know when his trade is or is not prosperous, and
only when it is, are they ever again likely to strike for higher wages;
which wages their known readiness to strike makes their employers
for the most part willing, in that case, to concede. The tendency,
therefore, of this state of things is to make a rise of wages in any
particular trade usually consequent upon a rise of profits, which … is a
commencement of that regular participation of the labourers in the profits
derived from their labour … since to it we have chiefly to look for any
radical improvement in the social and economical relations between
labour and capital. Strikes, therefore, and the trade societies which
render strikes possible, are for these various reasons not a mischievous,
but on the contrary, a valuable part of the existing machinery of society.
 20

(Bk. V, Ch. 10 par 32: Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy
with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy. Edited with an
introduction by W. J. Ashley, M.A., M.Com., Professor of Commerce in
the University of Birmingham, Sometime Fellow of Lincoln College,
Oxford. 1909, London; Longmans, Green and Co. Based on the 7th
edition. First edition published 1848; first publication of the 7th edition,
1870.) [My emphasis.]

I have used a rather odd phrase, above: “… in our age of corporatist media,
a corporatist bias in the CIRB, a corporatist government …“ What do I mean
by that? Here are examples of what I mean. Throughout the labour dispute,
in typical anti-labour fashion, the media described the dispute as a “strike”.
Rarely was it described as a “lock-out.” When I managed to “catch” Fazil
Mihlar, an editorialist of The Vancouver Sun, libeling the TWU in The Sun’s
effort to abet TELUS its pre-lockout propaganda, not only did he admit to
having knowingly lied, but he rationalized it:
While it is true that the TWU proposed renewing the existing contract with
improvements, our considered judgement was since Telus [sic] was a
new company (merging of the two firms from Alberta and B.C.) and the
competitive landscape had changed, any proposal should consider these
realities. So in our view, there was no new proposal or counter proposal to
what Telus [sid] had on the table. [See evidence document #4a.]
When I rejected Mihlar’s self-serving, self-aggrandizing panegyric to the BC
Press Council, my complaint was dismissed because Mihlar’s editorial “was
not intended to be, and was not, a chronology of labor [sic] relations between
the Telecommunications Workers' Union and Telus [sic], or a chronology of
events.” See evidence document #4b.

The CIRB, during the course of the “negotiations”, and during the dispute,
developed a reputation amongst the labourers of delaying decisions
requested by the union; for example, the Union’s request for an expedited
decision to the CIRB on TELUS’s use of replacement workers to undermine
the TWU’s effectiveness as a bargaining agent was not acted on in 6 or 7
weeks. When TELUS was found guilty of unfair bargaining practices, TELUS
lost on appeal. That loss took almost a year to be decided, that year being a
delay that benefited TELUS’s “negotiating” replacement worker
preparations. But, most amazingly, in having re-confirmed that TELUS had
bargained unfairly, the CIRB struck the penalty that had been originally
imposed! See evidence document 5, from which I have cited the pertinent
bits. CIRB Board Files: 24220-C, 24375-C CIRB/CCRI Decision no. 317 April
20, 2005
[276] This reconsideration panel upheld, for the reasons set out in this
decision, the original panel’s ultimate findings that the employer
communications were impermissible and contrary to section 94(1)(a) of
the Code.
[277] This panel concluded that the imposition of the remedial relief,
 21

including the communications ban, in relation to the first complaint, and

the imposition of the order directing the employer to offer binding
arbitration to the union, in relation to the third complaint, constituted
errors in law or policy that cast serious doubt on the interpretation of the
Code.

...

Following a thorough review of the extensive submissions of the parties,

the Board is allowing, in part, the present reconsideration application,
with reasons to follow. Specifically, this reconsideration panel:
1) upholds the ultimate findings in respect of the alleged
contraventions of the Code, that form the subject matter of Board File
no. 23742-C, no. 24063-C and no. 24160C;
2) annuls the remedial relief, both the declaration and orders, issued
in relation to Board File no. 23742-C as imposed by the Board in its
April 8, 2004 decision;
3) annuls the order directing TELUS to offer binding arbitration to the
TWU that was issued in relation to Board File no. 24160-C; and
4) reinstates and continues the January 17, 2004 interim cease and
desist order, as amended, so that it will have full force and effect and
will bind TELUS until the conditions set out in section 89 of the Code
have been fulfilled.

This is a unanimous decision of the Board ...

And, finally, the failure of the federal government to remove from the labour
code the replacement worker legislation.

The above comprises a short list of the oligarchic, anti-democratic, nature of

the Canadian labour environment that made itself evident during this labour
dispute. And it is this concert of disparate parties enacting a common anti-
labour theme that I have loosely called “corporatist.”

At this point, I would like to bring to the board's attention my concerns

regarding the "Labour Dispute Questionnaire" that was mailed out to me
before my claim for benefits would be processed. (Exhibit 5.1 from the
Board’s appeal package.)

The labour dispute questionnaire introduced the notion that a willingness to

cross the picket line is, perhaps, a condition upon which I would be eligible
for benefits. From the questionnaire:
The information requested below is required to determine your eligibility
for benefits. … Please sign and return this form in the enclosed self-
addressed envelope. Failure to provide the requested information may
delay your claim or result in a denial of benefits (my emphasis).
 22

This is a cruel joke! Actually, it is a lie: none of the information asked for on
the form is required by 36(1) to determine my ineligibility to receive benefits.
As soon as I confirmed that my claim arose as the result of a labour dispute
on my initial application for benefits, regardless of any other circumstances,
my claim would be denied! In fact, as per FCA Docket A-90-81, my claim
would have been denied even if it had been unfair to deny it! With that stark
reality staring out at me from the jurisprudence, the questionnaire I filled out
on the state of my labour situation is a clear violation of section 12 of the
Charter:
Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment [my emphasis].
Knowingly giving someone under considerable financial pressure and
familial stress false hope is clearly a form of unusual treatment, in as much
as that was unnecessary. The questionnaire gave me hope that my claim
would not be denied. My employer locked me out for 17 weeks and the
labour dispute questionnaire proffered me a lie!

The Board would be far more honest and less cruel to have sent out an
immediate denial of the claim because I had indicated I was embroiled in a
labour dispute. I extend that argument, and suggest that the board made a
mockery of 36(1) by mailing me this questionnaire because not only did it
unnecessarily put false hope in my heart, it also wasted my time and the
time of the board’s agents. Furthermore, all of the questions asked were
either irrelevant, redundant, inappropriate or a violation of my rights.
Instead, the weak hope the Board could have offered would have been to
supply the meager means and reasons of how and why I could appeal that
denial. And honesty would have compelled them to state that such an
appeal would be without question denied. The rigmarole of having to fill out
the labour questionnaire not only wasted time and money, but delayed my
ability to appeal that denial by the time it took to the board to receive and
process the questionnaire.

However, and regardless of the inappropriateness of the questionnaire, I

now turn my attention to its purpose. Why does this questionnaire, which is
unnecessary to 36(1), even exist? Is the inference to be made that a
willingness to cross on my part, that I was unable to put into action because
of extenuating circumstances, would entitle me to benefits? I repeat: why
else would such a question be extant on the questionnaire, but to determine
my eligibility for benefits based on my state of mind?

I would like to point out that whether or not I am willing to cross a picket line is
not only irrelevant for the purposes of disentitlement – as your own
jurisprudence amply attests – but the existence of the question suggests that a
willingness to cross the picket line may actually qualify me for benefits.
 23

Even if I ignore the existential nature of the questionnaire, there is a serious

Charter issue its question infringes. If I am to infer that my crossing the
picket line would entitle me to benefits, by the existence of the question
about my willingness to do such a thing, then the questionnaire forces me to
chose to either seek financial relief through crossing a legal picket line, or
face not just the disgust and censure of my fellow labourers, but also my
getting disbarred from my union. My willingness to cross a picket line would
entail by necessity my getting disbarred from an association of fellow
citizens, and would violate my rights to associate under 2(d) of the Charter.
And as proof of such a consequence for my crossing the picket line, in
August the TWU's local executive officers began the process of both
disassociating proven TWU members who scabbed and levying fines of up
to 1000 (one thousand) dollars per instance of scabbing.

Furthermore, the labour dispute questionnaire would seem to suggest that I

would quality for benefits if I had been willing to go against my conscience
and abet TELUS's efforts to destroy a legal organization with which I
associate and that has as its primary purpose the promotion of a healthy
and justly paid CANADIAN workforce, a workforce which must needs be
comprises a healthy Canadian society. I refer you to question 7 of the
questionnaire: 7(a) Was a picket line established at your place of
employment? If yes, did you attempt to cross the line? What happened as a
result of your actions? I repeat: this question implies that my willingness to
cross the picket line may have qualified me to receive benefits. Why else
would the question be extant?

My employer, TELUS, has demonstrated continuous record breaking profits,

record breaking executive salaries and bonus packages and continued high
share values. I cannot, in good conscience, help promote corporate greed
regardless how many politicians have sold out to the corporate greed-based
ideology that has as one of its demonstrable objectives the complete and
unnecessary subjugation of labour and the utter destruction of the middle
class that I believe is absolutely necessary for a hale society. Subsection
2(a) of the Charter expunges the validity of how 36(1) of the EI Act is being
administered and enforced by the Board as it pertains to me because I will
not, CANNOT, in good conscience assist TELUS corporate greed its quest to
destroy not just an organization with which I am free to associate, but the
health of Canadian society. As evidence of TELUS's intention to destroy the
TWU and hurt Canadian society, it publicly announced that it had opened a
call centre in the Philippines and contracted a call centre in India. I also
refer you to public statements made by TELUS’s CEO and VP of Corporate
Communications; see par. 45, 46 of Evidence Document 1.

About two months into the dispute TELUS mailed to me an advisory

informing me that those of us in BC who wanted to assist them in breaking
the TWU would be given safe employment in Alberta. (I've paraphrased their
 24

document.) TELUS even directed their first level managers to follow up the
written advisory with a phone call – which I received some time in late
August or early September. I believe that both these acts are at least in
contravention of the Canadian Labour Code if not illegal harassment. That
TELUS then proceeded to proffer IPODS as bribes was illegal. Again, as
usual, neither the CIRB nor the Minister of Labour gave TELUS anything but
their union-breaking friendly blind eyes. Now, even if I had the morality of my
TELUS’s CEO to consider TELUS's offer of safe employment – which I do not
– and a willingness to violate my conscience and belief in social justice –
which I have not – I am protected from having to compromise either
because of the protection given me by 2(a) of the Charter.

And that concludes my appeal.

Listing of Documents:

1. File: Replacement Workers CIRB 9 Sep 05.pdf.

2a. Imposed contract dated in April of 2005.
2b. Signed contract dated in November of 2005.
3. TELUS Pamphlet entitled "Team Member Guidelines for Potential
Work Stoppage."
4a. Sun Editorial, my complaint, Fazil Mihlar’s response.
4b. BC Press Council’s dismissal and my response.
5. CIRB decision RD0317.