Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958

February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery
and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record
before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of
chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven
men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at
about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all
armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to
the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women,
were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a
matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lollo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands.
There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the
Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment
was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to
the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in
the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a
process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is
robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi,
and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done
in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in
law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind.
It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into
which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it
is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to
crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is
whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit
the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the
physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and
fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of
a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The political law of the
former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding
General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment
of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new
order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupations.
This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
(Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant
to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not
only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil
law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor
to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and
punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations.
(U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary
ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined

by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.)
The framers of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy
are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction
of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United
States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case
of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal
Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers,
but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and
154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154.
There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against
chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed which added
ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and
the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court
as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth
Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 111709

August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime.
It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M.
No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and
40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro
near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant
Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to
paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel,

as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name
"Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the
Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine
Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship
arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel
which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March
14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical
miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on
March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo
to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea.
On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning
not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991,
otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted
passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in
proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco
at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to
the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the
incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K.
Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was
arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI
agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who MANAGED to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No.
532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,

CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9)
other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board
and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with
petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the
vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter
returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their
testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed
the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March 2,
1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and
Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked,
cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of
March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told
that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of
employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping
on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he
studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the
course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a vessel. He was
employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the
business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts,
Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel
"Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to
sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid
over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations
Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the
contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on
board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the
port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain
the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the
purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed
toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and
did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the
Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong
and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later
turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor
did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took
samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under
the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon
arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the
cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from
"M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time,
Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for
the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul
Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to
offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of
the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco,
who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was
told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted
at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person
by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked
in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not
arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by
this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San
Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the
principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio
Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong
San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to Article 52
of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no
longer return the same, the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to
said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine Currency, with
interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is
paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the
Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer
return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay,
jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the
accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau
of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that
they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the
City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With costs against all the
accused.
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in
allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr.
Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due
process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel
for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court

discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas
had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during
the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements
without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of
counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the
pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The
crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed
by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and
seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or
robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of
qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of
1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts
allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory,
stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial
court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in
fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by
direct participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any
participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he
had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of
qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified
piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters.
In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or
territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its
territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and
implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what
are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?;
(3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659
obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant
Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they
were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of
the right to sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only
be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants,
as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants
were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they
voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment
(Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman
is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by
law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were
sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the
record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally,
knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has
been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the socalled Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,

either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more
stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accusedappellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit
from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once the primary
source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
(the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accusedappellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information
is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to
convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court
that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and
Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial
judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of
the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as
among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30
o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said
vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough
Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to
the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on
March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the
vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for
more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the
officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify the seajackers and their leader.
In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and
Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the
said Accused as some of the pirates.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused
admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2,
1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be
off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not
supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of
participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were
hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
along the seashore at Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao"
which was then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks
and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without
even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal effects needed for
a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience.
As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was
at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping,
suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much more so when
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is
easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to
have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to
prove that he was in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest
respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of
witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284
SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it
(Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are
times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to
one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal
design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro,
while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from
the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to
provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be
present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view
of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant

Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto
Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said
corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their
families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents
were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a
relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been
accused in a seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off
Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while
Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in
Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article
122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons
out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy
committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any
person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to
passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither
members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage
of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. The
penalty ofreclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in
Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement
nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part
thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders
shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is
covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and
hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen
the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accusedappellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was
done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is
likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a
principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's
participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway
robbery brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects
pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the movement of
police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives property taken by
such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall
be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with
Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete
evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino,
40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the
crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983];People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had
failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo
by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by
buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He
even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi
Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the
illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with
food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List
was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in
the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accusedappellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily
discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and
prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant
Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991,
Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration"

(for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH",
Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening),
that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation"
and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel
from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm,
the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo
transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the
Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit
"11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration"
upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A
CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on
the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of
diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was
likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the
transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that
he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the
cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a
highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the
very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed
or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never
bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did
not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check
the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the
dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi
Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of MONEY without any receipt issued
therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with.
It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than
US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, THE EXCHANGE RATE at that time). Manifestly, the
cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware
of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and
money for transportation only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved.
This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well
aware that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his
superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a
superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine,
but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel.
Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port
and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said
acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an
intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the
nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi
Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation
of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for
having on 27 June 1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in
conspiracy with one another, by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously
attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who
were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their
damage and prejudice. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong
and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua. 2 Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy
as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the
Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away
from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them,
later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and
leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and
ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa." 3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of
the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered
him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan
Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with
its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were
now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the
engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so
he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. MANAGED to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open
sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's
hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos 4 held
by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that
was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was
new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat
cautioning them however not to move or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once
aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When
Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch,
Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill

you." 5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other
pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of
the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into
the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the
two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and
towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel,
or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters,
shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as
hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as
"any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one place to
another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats
used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against
his will, whether it be right or wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there
be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or
seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely
boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board that they used force to
compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal
had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat.
As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to
approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly,
appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as
penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of
piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other
than their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their
boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized
the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and
enlightening
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the
seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual
that happened?

A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived
and the passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how
many were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded
your pumpboat, how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the
pumpboat(emphasis supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your
pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at
us (emphasis supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say
anything to you?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the

pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion
of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these
persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to
ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the
accused suddenly approached them and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his
revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with
face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left
eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another
pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers
that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment
Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a
drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532
designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements
are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another,
thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting
the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the

offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle to the

economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea
waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to
bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend
for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive them of their very
subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to
the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been
for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone
helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine
in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the
truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down
and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair.
Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended
by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in
evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that
Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of
the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of
accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under
PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154130

October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001, 1 as well as its Resolutions
dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information against Benito
Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the
Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually
helping with unidentified persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato
Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of
their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of
Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with
the governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises
dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto

Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two
yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials, the team
learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not
around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.4
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in
the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop
and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with
the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor
Astorga.5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor
Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on
the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay
puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know
that I can box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) 6 Mayor Astorga
then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:006:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The
men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at
the team members.7 At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission.8 He
then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the DENR
in Catbalogan to inform them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed
Simons radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain
kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig." (Its better if you have no radio so that your office would not
know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help). 9Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo
puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate
it here.)10 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga
retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram.11Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an
mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat
ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you
confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.) 12 Simon then tried to
reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who
angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many things to
discuss there.)13
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team
had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:008:00 p.m.14 After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the

house, but not to leave the barangay.15 On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the
house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave. 16
1awphi1.nt

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men,
which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the
offenses charged.17 At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and
SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of Simons testimony was
not completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members
of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 19
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO
ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.20
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 200121 which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. 22 A Second Motion for Reconsideration
dated October 24, 200123was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
2002.24
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined and
penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and
conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5)
complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime
charged.25
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused,26 especially in light of the fact that the private complainants executed
a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.27 Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there
any competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon
the persons of the team members.28Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men at
the scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds
of the team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. 29
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.30 The elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar
is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or
employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by
some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for
self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being "singled out." 32 The detention was thus without
legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the
accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical
restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and
he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was
practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction.34
In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his
liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom
of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to
the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave
the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she do so.
We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and they
had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we
concluded that fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.36
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victims
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of
the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and
the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal was quickly followed by
the call for and arrival of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. 38 Given
such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquians statement that it was not "safe" to

refuse Mayor Astorgas orders.39 It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the
minds of the team members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants, suffice it to say
that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be
applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result
in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.40Indeed, the belated claims made in
the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident was the result of a
misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorgas orders "out of respect," are belied
by petitioners own admissions to the contrary.41 The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the information and
proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the
case. This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
1awphi1.nt

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations
with the local Chiefs Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and
project can be effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the betterment of
the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on government
support.42
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the case. 43 He also makes much of the
fact that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr.
Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early
morning of 2 September 1997."44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are conclusive and binding upon
appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.45 Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to deviate
from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is
completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be
exclusively supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon and
himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the
latter went to talk to petitioner.46 He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks.47 He was with
Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14
rifles.48 In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary
Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "while away the time" and take advantage of the
purported hospitality of the accused.49 On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied
that they were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their
departure early the following morning.50 SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they
did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. 51
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge", because the ponente
of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded "very
extensive clarificatory questions" on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not
an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out
the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions
were asked during the trial.52
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where the
detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to
two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to
a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion
in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary
or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form
part of our statute books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country. Those
provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American
rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not
repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic of
the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of said provisions,
it is very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It
is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers
should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted
in this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right
to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental
rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-93-813 September 15, 1993

FERNANDO CAYAO, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JUSTINIANO A. DEL MUNDO, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fernando R. Cayao with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondent Judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo, MTC, Indang Cavite with abuse
of authority.
Acting on said complaint, the Office of the Court Administrator directed Judge Enrique M. Almario,
Regional trial Court Branch XV, Naic, Cavite, to conduct an investigation and to submit his report and
recommendation thereon.
Based on the records as well as the report submitted by the investigating Judge, it appears that on
or about October 22, 1992 at 9:25 a.m., while traversing the stretch of Mataas na Lupa, Alulod,
Indang, Cavite, complainant, as driver of Donny's Transit Bus with Plate No. DWB 315, overtook a
Sto. Nio Liner with Body No. 5282 driven by one Arnel Ranes Muloy. As a consequence thereof, the
bus driven by complainant almost collided head-on with an oncoming owner-type jeepney with Plate
No. PJT 752. It turned out later that the jeepney was registered in the name of respondent Judge Del
Mundo who, at the time of the incident, was one of the passengers therein along with his sons
Rommel and June and one Edward Rommen. Respondent's son Rommel was behind the wheel.
At 3:30 p.m. of the same day, even before complainant could properly park his bus, he was picked
up by policemen of the Philippine National Police Station of Indang, Cavite at the Indang Public
Plaza and was immediately brought before the sala of respondent judge. There, complainant was
confronted by respondent judge and accused by the latter of nearly causing an accident that
morning. Without giving complainant any opportunity to explain, respondent judge insisted that
complainant be punished for the incident. Whereupon, complainant was compelled by respondent
judge to choose from three (3) alternative punishments none of which is pleasant, to wit: (a) to face a
charge of multiple attempted homicide; (b) revocation of his driver's license; or (c) to be put in jail for
three (3) days. Of the three choices, complainant chose the third, i.e., confinement for three (3) days,
as a consequence of which he was forced to sign a "waiver of detention" by respondent judge.
Thereafter, complainant was immediately escorted by policemen to the municipal jail. Though not
actually incarcerated complainant remained in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days,
from October 22 up to October 25, 1992, by way of serving his "sentence". On the third day,
complainant was released by SPO1 Manolo Dilig to the custody of Geronimo Cayao, complainant's
co-driver and cousin.
The fact of detention of complainant in the premises of the municipal jail for three (3) days was
confirmed and corroborated by the testimony of the jail warden of Indang, Cavite, SP04 Adelaida
Nova. The fact of complainant's release therefrom after three (3) days detention was testified to by
SPO1 Manolo Dilig who prepared the corresponding document of release. For his defense,
respondent judge merely made general denials.

The actuations of respondent judge herein complained of, constitute abuse of authority. To begin
with, respondent's verbal order for the arrest of complainant at the Indang Public Plaza without the
requisite complaint having been filed and the corresponding warrant of arrest having been issued in
order that complainant may be brought to his sala is characteristic of personal vengeance and the
abusive attitude of respondent. Being a judge, respondent above all, should be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for others to follow (Ompoc vs. Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Instead, respondent judge opted to avail of his judicial authority in excess of what is allowed by law
to gratify his vindictive purposes.
If respondent honestly believes that complainant committed violations of traffic rules and regulations
which nearly caused the accident involving their respective vehicles, respondent judge should have
caused the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against complainant and left it at that. On the
contrary, respondent is not one to let the law run its own course. This is a classic case where
respondent took it upon himself to be the accuser, prosecutor, judge and executioner at the same
time to condemn complainant for his alleged wrongdoing without the benefit of due process. Without
even an opportunity to air his side, complainant was unceremoniously made to choose his own
penalty. Left with no other choice but to face his predicament and overpowered by the imposing
authority of respondent, complainant picked the lesser evil of the three alternatives given to him.
Complainant can hardly be blamed for so doing. A perusal of the two (2) other choices presented to
him will illustrate why.
The first choice given to complainant was to face a charge of multiple attempted homicide. To
threaten complainant with a criminal case for multiple attempted homicide is indicative of
respondent's gross ignorance of the law. As a judge, he should know very well that such at charge
will not hold water in any court of law considering that no accident per se ever occurred and hence,
no life threatening injury was even sustained. To a mere bus driver who is not at all familiar with the
intricacies of the law, such a threat spelled not only the possibility of long-term imprisonment and all
the hardship it entails but also the onus and shame that will forever attach to his name. Surely, to his
mind, a threat of prosecution coming from a municipal trial court judge is alarming enough.
The second alternative punishment offered to complainant to choose from involves his very means
of livelihood revocation of his driver's license. This is tantamount to economic death penalty and
just as repulsive as the first alternative.
Faced with these grim prospects complainant voluntarily submitted himself to the jail warden of the
Indang Municipal Jail for detention after executing his "waiver of detention," complainant felt that he
had no other choice but to serve out the "penalty" forcibly and arbitrarily imposed upon him by
respondent.
While it is true that complainant was not put behind bare as respondent had intended, however,
complainant was not allowed to leave the premises of the jail house. The idea of confinement is not
synonymous only with incarceration inside a jail cell. It is enough to qualify as confinement that a
man be restrained, either morally or physically, of his personal liberty (Black's Law Dictionary, 270
[1979]). Under the circumstances, respondent judge was in fact guilty of arbitrary detention when he,
as a public officer, ordered the arrest and detention of complainant without legal grounds (Article
124, Revised Penal Code; U.S. vs. Battallones 23 Phil. 46 [1912]). In overtaking another vehicle,

complainant-driver was not committing or had not actually committed a crime in the presence of
respondent judge (Section 6, Rule 113, Rules of Court). Such being the case, the warrantless arrest
and subsequent detention of complainant were illegal. In the case at bar, no less than the testimony
of the jail warden herself confirmed that complainant was indeed deprived of his liberty for three (3)
days:
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, did you or did you not in fact detain Fernando Cayao on
that premises? On the ground of that premises?
WITNESS (jail warden):
A I did not put him inside the jail, your Honor, but he was inside the
police station.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q Alright, as a police officer, I ask you again, did you or did you not
detain Fernando Cayao based on the premises that you said under
oath before this Court?
A Yes, your Honor, inside the police station.
Q Does it mean that he could not have gone freely of his own volition
outside the police station without your authority or permission?
A He can move freely.
COURT:
Q When you said that, you meant he could have gone home, he
could have gone eating in restaurant, he could have gone to a theatre
or in any public place. Is that what you mean?
WITNESS:
A No, your Honor. Only inside the police station.
Q Why only in the police station? Inside? What is your order? What
did you tell him?

A Because he voluntarily went to the police station to be detained.

Q Alright, so, had he told you that he would have gone to other
places, you will have no objection? You will have no interpolation or
you would not feel that you have a right to have him under your
custody. Is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A I will still prevent him.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, pp. 9-10)
Of equal importance is the perception of complainant himself as to whether his liberty, was actually
restricted or not:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, summarily speaking, you feel that you were detained in the
municipal jail of the station of Indang, Cavite?
A Yes, your Honor, because I was not able to get out from the police
station from the time that I was detained.
(TSN, November 19, 1992, p. 16)
It would be well to emphasize at this point that the gravity of the misconduct of respondent is not
alone centered on his order for the detention of complainant. Rather, it is ingrained in the fact that
complainant was so detained without affording him his constitutional rights.
As previously mentioned, complainant was condemned by his own accuser without the benefit of
due process. Complainant was not even accorded any of the basic rights to which an accused is
entitled. When respondent insisted on punishing hire without a chance to air his side, complainant
was deprived of the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard by himself and counsel, the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him as well as the right to an
impartial and public trial. Moreover, complainant was made to execute a waiver of detention without
the assistance of counsel. Worse, the aforesaid waiver was even subscribed by complainant before
the very same judge who was his accuser. Certainly, such intentional and blatant violations of one's
constitutional rights committed by respondent cannot be tolerated by this Court.
As public servants, judges are appointed to the judiciary to serve as the visible representation of the
law, and more importantly, of justice. From them, the people draw their will and awareness to obey
the law (De la Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 (1975)). If judges, who swore to obey and uphold the
constitution, would conduct themselves in the way that respondent did in wanton disregard and

violation of the rights of complainant, then the people, especially those with whom they come in
direct contact, would lose all their respect and high regard for the institution of the judiciary itself, not
to mention, cause the breakdown of the moral fiber on which the judiciary is founded.
Undoubtedly, the actuations of respondent judge represent the kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice that so quickly and severely corrodes the respect for law and the courts without
which the government cannot continue and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Ompoc vs.
Judge Torres, 178 SCRA 14 [1989]).
Furthermore, the reprehensible conduct exhibited by respondent judge in the case at bar exposed
his total disregard of, or indifference to, or even ignorance of the procedure prescribed by law. His
act of intentionally violating the law and disregarding well-known legal procedures can be
characterized as gross misconduct, nay a criminal misconduct on his part (Babatio vs. Tan, 157
SCRA 277 [1988]). He used and abused his position of authority in intimidating the complainant as
well as the members of the Indang police force into submitting to his excesses. Likewise, he closed
his eyes to the mandates of the Code of Judicial Conduct to always conduct himself as to be beyond
reproach and suspicion not only in the performance of his duties but also outside his sala and as a
private individual. (Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 199 SCRA 75 [1991]).
Clearly, there is not, an iota of doubt that respondent, through his oppressive and vindictive
actuations, has committed a disservice to the cause of justice. He has unequivocably demonstrated
his unfitness to continue as a member of the judiciary and should accordingly be removed from the
service.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge Justiniano A. Del Mundo of the Municipal Trial Court of Indang,
Cavite is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave
credits with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office including governmentowned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO
VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the Philippines versus
Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera,
Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as
follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and
Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY
DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio
Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons,

namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez
by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal
grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty,
accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat,
members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said
Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11)
hours.(Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to
support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an
opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary
Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated
April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which
was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, 3 that is,
that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat.
Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner
Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
elements of the crime are present.

The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the
detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of
the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when
the former made this finding in the questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan
Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any way connected with
the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered
Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority
vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that
the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the
authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is
neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing
to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet
considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree
No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. 12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named
barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various
cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church. They made him pass through
the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he
was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of
Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound
and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the
justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day
when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime,
Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the maintenance of public order in the

barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce
all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio; 19 and to organize and lead an
emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order
within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to
say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For
public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order,
what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where
possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he
may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other
public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to
those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller.
Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can
be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the
facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only
sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of
such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to
quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not

only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only
one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. 31
lawphi1

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy
has already attached in his favor32 on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial,
is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused
cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded
to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.

[ G. R. Nos. L-6033-35, September 30, 1954 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LORETO A. OLIVA, ET.
AL.,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an appeal in three separate criminal cases tried and decided by the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan.
In Case No. 1091-a (now G.R.No. L-6033), for the murder of Fernando Pablo, the accused Cecilio
Rol was acquitted, while the res of his co-accused - Loreto Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva, Adriano
Quinsay, and Daniel Ulsano - were convicted of the crime, qualified by abuse of superior strength,
and aggravated by the circumstance of having taken advantage of their public position as municipal

policemen, offset by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the
one committed; and sentenced to suffer each reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally
the heirs of the deceased Fernando Pablo in the sum of P6,000 without subsidary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay 1/5 of the costs. From this judgment, the four convicted accused
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which forwarded the case to us for decision, considering that all
the appellants have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
In Cases Nos. 1092-A and 1093-A for arbitrary detention of Eliseo and Sofronio Arreola, with
physical injuries (now G.R.No.L-6034 and 6035), accused Angel C. Adap, Alfonso Martinez,
Restituto Fronda, Joel Macataig, and Marcelo guillermo were acquitted; while the other defendants
Loreto A. Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva, Daniel Ulsano, and Adriano Quinsay were found guilty as
charged, and all of them were sentenced in each of the two cases to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of from 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum to years and 4 months of prision correccional as
maximum; to pay jointly and severally to Elisea Arreola the sum of P75,00 in Case No. 1092-A and
to Sofronio Arreola the sum of P50.00 in Case No. 1093-A, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency but not exceeding 1/3 of the principal penalty; and to pay in each of said cases 1/10 of
the costs. From this judgment, the defendants likewise appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the
latter again certified the case to us, for decision together with the appeal in the murder case, upon
the ground that the three cases arose out of the same acts and occasion.
During the pendency of these cases in this Court, appellant Adriano Quinsay moved to withdraw his
appeal in all three cases, which motion was granted. This decision therefore involves only the
appeals of Loreto A. Oliva, Jose C. Villanueva, and Daniel Ulsano
Upon a careful review of the records, we find the following facts to be undisputed:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 3, 1951 a police patrol composed of ten
members of the police force of Aparri, Cagayan composed of Sgt. Jose C. Villanueva, and
Policemen Daniel Ulsano, Alfonso Martinez, Joel Macatiag, Marcelo Guillermo, and Angel Adap, at
the command of Lieutenant Loreto A. Oliva, headed for barrio Bakiling, Aparri, to investigate the
reported murder or suspicious death of one Remegio Marcos. The investigation in Bakiling lasted up
to about 4 o'clock in the afternoon; and when the partol was about to return to the poblacion, it was
met by a truck of the Panifual Saw Mill, from which one Anacleto Abarriao (alias "Big Boy") alighted
and complained to the police that on the previous day, at the cockpit of Binalan, Aparri, he had
trouble with and was maltreated by the brothers Eliseo and Sofronio Arreola and their relative
Fernando Pablo, all of Fugu, Ballesteros. Wherefore, the patrol rode on the Sawmill truck and

proceeded to Fugu. Upon arrival, Lt. Oliva instructed his men to summon Elisep Arreol, Sofronio
Arreola, and Fernando Pablo, for the purpose of settling their trouble with Abarriao. Policemen
Ulsano, Macatiag, and Guillermo picked up Eliseo from his house and Sofronio from the ricefield
where he was plowing; while Mariano Dancel fetched Fernando Pablo. The three men, who were
interested in having their dispute with Abrriao settled, voluntarily went with the police, and when
brought before Lt. Oliva were asked be the latter to board the truck and come with the police to
Aparri so that they could save the expense of the fare in going to town the following day. At
Nagsirucan, the patrol picked up three other persons, who were suspected of being responsible for
the death of Remgio Marcos. After crossing the Cagayan River at Camalaniugan ferry, the party
boarded a Sambrano passenger bus. Upon reaching the town of Aparri, the bus stopped at the
Sambrano garage. Lt. Oliva ordered his men to proceed on foot to the municipal building with the
Arreola brothers, Fernando Pablo, and the three murder suspects, while he stayed behind to settle a
controversy with the Sambrano inspector.
As to what transpired later in the municipal building, the evidence for the prosecution and of the
defense are at variance. After contrasting and weighing the same, we find no error in the lower
Court's having taken as proved beyond reasonable doubt that, after arriving at the municipal
building, the policemen under the direction of sergeant Villanueva separated Fernando Pablo and
the two Arreolas from the suspects of the killing of Remegio Marcos, and then proceeded to maltreat
systematically the first three. Sergeant Villanueva slapped and boxed Fernando Pablo first, saying
"You rascal, we almost got into trouble because of you"; then assaulted Eliseo Arreola in the same
way, and after him, his brother Sofronio. As soon as Villanueva had finished with one suspect,
policemen Ulsano and Quinsay took turns in taking up the maltreatment of the detainees. The worst
beating was administered to Fernando Pablo who do not only received fist blows, but was repeatedly
hit in the abdominal region with the rifle butts until he fell prostate; and when lying thus, Pablo's
tormentors tried to make him stand up with blows and kicks, and finally sought to bring him back to
consciousness by pouring water on his face.
At this juncture, Lieutenant Oliva came un asking what happend, to which Ulsano replied "Zarzuela,
sir", meaning that Pablo was merely feigning injury. Oliva reprimanded the men, instructed them to
desist from further maltreatment and led Pablo's companions, the Arreola brothers, outside the room,
telling them to report to him if somebody would again maltreat them, and advised them to sleep in
the municipal building because it was already late. Oliva then ordered Pablo placed inside one of the
jail cells, with other prisoners. The latter noticed that Pablo was already dead and called the guard,
Rol, to the cell. Finding the prisoners' statement to be correct, Rol informed Lt. Oliva of Pablo's
death, and the two went to the house of Dr. Ricardo Alvarado, President of the 4th Sanitary Division,

woke him up, and informed him of the death of Fernando Pablo in the municipal jail. At about 12:00
p.m. of September 3 and 1:00 a.m. of the next day, Dr. Alvarado came with the policemen to the
municipal building, and as he could not perform an examination of Pablo's body because it was dark
in the cell, he merely removed the dead man's outer garments. The next morning, at about 8:00
o'clock, Dr. Alvarado conducted an autopsy of Pablo's remains, and the result of his post-mortem
examination is stated as follows:
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have this day performed an autopsy on the person of FERNANDO PABLO,
single, resident of Fugu, Balesteros, Cagayan, and found the following:
1.Externally - Ecchymoses around the pelvis and loin below the umbilicus.
2.Internally - On opening the the abdomen below the sternum at the line of the linea alba down to
the pelvis and on reaching the peritoneum was found blood serum and hupermia.On reaching the
inner part of the abdomen, blood serum and dark clotted blood was found along the sides of the
intestines and omentum. The intestines itself were found to be clean and light pale, but the omentum
was mostly hyperemic and congested blood forum thru out the greater and lesser omentum. The
spleen was well exposed and found that the tail was ecchymotic. Much dark blood was found inside
the abdomen of about 2 or 3 liters. The gall bladder was full and light greenish in color. The urinary
bladder was found to have been emptied with a tear wound, showing that the urine was
extravasated into the abdomen.
I further certify that the cause of death was internal hemorrhage.
(Sgd) RICARDO G. ALVARADO
President 4th Sanitary Division"
(Exh. A, p.3, Rec. Case No.1091-A)
In the morning of September 4, Sgt. Villanueva took the Arreola brothers to the place where they had
their breakfast. He asked them to sign an affidavit to the effect that Pablo fell from the truck and that
he was a Huk, but the brothers refused it was not true. In the afternoon, Villanueva ordered the
brothers to guard the remains of Fernando Pablo. They stood guard up to the afternoon of
September 5, when they helped bury Pablo's remains. After the burial, Sgt. Villanueva still did not
permit the Arreola brothers to go home, saying that they must wait for Lt. Oliva. the Arreolas were

actually released only in the afternoon of September 6. The morning after their release, they went to
the Ballesteros Emergency Hospital, where they were treated by Dr. Emilio A. Alonso for the injuries
inflicted upon them by the policemen Villanueva, Quinsay and Ulsano. According to the medical
certificates Exhs. H and J (p.69, Rec Case 1092-A; and p.60, Case 1093-A), Dr. Alonso found on the
person of Eliseo Arreola a contusion on the right lower costal region with marked ecchymosis, which
took 20 days to heal, and contusions on the right and left arms (dorsal), side, which healed in 10
days; while on the person of Sofronio Arreola, he found swellings on the left arm, right hand, and
chest, and also swellings with ecchymosis on the forearm; which lesions healed in 10 days'
treatment. Dr. Alonzo charged and received from the brothers P25.00 for medicine used, without
collecting from them any professional fees because they were poor.
The maltreatment of the deceased Pablo and of the Arreola brothers by appellants Ulsano and
Villanueva, (and by the accused Quinsay who has abandoned his appeal), was amply attested in
court not only by Sofronio and Eliseo Arreola and by Eusebio Caculita, a detainee who had been
lodged in the prison cells of the municipal building some time before the arrival of Pablo and the
Arreolas, but also by the testimonies of doctors Alvarado and Alonzo. Upon the other hand, the
attempt of these appellants to attribute Pablo's death to injuries inflicted by "Big Boy" Abarriao the
day previous, is belied by the seriousness of the injuries, as disclosed by the autopsy. Were the
defense version truthful, the internal hemorrhage and the rupture of the urinary bladder would have
caused Pablo to expire the next day, even before reaching the municipal building in the evening of
September 3. At least, he would have arrived at Aparri in a condition that would have caused the
police to immediately call for a physician or take Pablo to the hospital instead of the jail. Certainly he
would not have been able to walk a hundred meters from the Sambrano bus station to the municipal
building.
The same reason militate against the alternative defense that Fernando Pablo's death was due to a
fall inside the truck where he rode with the policemen when the speeding vehicle at one time was
suddenly braked to a stop to avoid hitting a carabao. Such a fall could not have inflicted such
extensive injuries as the autopsy has revealed.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the conviction of Lieutenant Loreto oliva of either murder or
arbitrary detention is entirely without support. Sofronio and Eliseo Arreola, as prosecution witnesses,
testified that Oliva arrived only after Pablo had been tortured by Sgt. Villanueva and policemen
Ulsano and Quinsay, and already lay dying on the floor of the police quarters. The Arreolas also
asserted that Oliva inquired what happened and angrily upbraided his men for the maltreatment of
Pablo (t.s.n. pp. 66 and 112), a clear indication that the torture was done without his knowledge.

Eusebio Cacilitan, testifying for the prosecution stated that Oliva had taken one of the Arreolas out of
the police department for a separate investigation and arrived only to order some one to revive
Pablo by pouring water on his face he lay sprawling on the floor (t.s.n. pp. 34-36). Oliva therefore
took no hand in the death of Pablo, and there is no proof that he ordered or conspired with his men
to torture the deceased of that he had any knowledge of it nor opportunity to stop the maltreatment
one time. There is no support for the trial Court's finding that Oliva made the maltreatment possible,
or that Oliva arrested the offended parties out of complaisance for "Big Boy" Abrriao.
Neither can appellant Oliva be held responsible for the Arreolas' detention until September 6, since
Eliseo Arreola himself testified that he and his companions voluntarily went to Aparri with the patrol
and that after the death of Pablo, Lt. Oliva permitted the Arreola brothers to sleep in the hall of the
municipal building.
"A * * * When Milo Tan asked me, I told him that Lt. Oliva released us the previous night and asked
whether we had any place wherein to sleep and we told him that we would sleep in the house of Milo
Tan and that because it was already late, we slept in the municipal hall."(t.s.n. p. 3)
The extrajudicial statements of Olivia's co-accused are not competent proof against him, not being
made in his presence. They are not even admissible in rebuttal because Olivia presented no
evidence in his behalf.
The records of the case are thus clear that those really responsible for the death of Fernando Pablo
were Sergeant Villanueva and policemen Ulsano and Quinsay. Likewise, despite in his denials, it is
abundantly proved that it was the sergeant, Villanueva, who detained the Arreola Brothers and
forbade them from leaving the municipal building until Pablo was buried, unsuccessfully attempting
in the meantime have them subscribed to an affidavit that Pablo's death was due to accidental
injuries, and that the deceased was a Huk. The sergeant would not allow the Arreolas to go home on
the 4th of September, when Pablo's relatives arrived, notwithstanding the orders of Lieutenant Oliva,
so that the Arreolas were in fact arbitrarily detained by him from the 4th to the 6th of September,
when they were finally allowed to depart and tend to their injuries. While the brothers were
occasionally permitted to leave the municipal building and eat at the house of one Milo ta, the
complainants were evidently too terrorized to take advantage of these occasional sallies and meekly
returned to custody even docilely stood guard over the remains of Pablo until it was buried. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief.
" * * *. It clearly appears from this testimony that it was Sergeant Villanueva who continuously kept
them under guard the remains of Fernando Pablo and to help prepare his coffin, by telling them to
come back to the municipal building after taking their meals outside, and making sure that they came

back by conducting them, and by telling them not to go until after the burial of the remains of Pablo
(pp. 67, 70, 105, 106, 123, 124, 382, 390, t.s.n.) (Brief of Appellee, p. 25)
The cooperation of appellant Daniel Ulsano toward this arbitrary detention is not satisfactorily shown.
The probabilities are that, as a disciplined subordinate, he left everything to his superior, Sergeant
Villanueva, and anyway he could not presume to overrule the latter's orders. For this reason, we are
not inclined to hold him responsible for this charge. But the record is clear that he must stand equally
responsible with the sergeant for the murder of Fernando Pablo, in whose maltreatment this accused
actively participated together with his co-accused Quinsay and Villanueva, as well as for the physical
injuries inflicted upon the brothers Arreola.
There being no clear evidence that the maltreatment inflicted on the offended parties was for the
purpose of extorting confessions or information, Art. 235 of the Revised Penal Code does not aplly.
Wherefore, the conviction of appellants Jose Villanueva and Daniel Ulsano in case No. 1091-A of the
Court of First Instance of Cagayan (G.R. No. L-6033) for the murder of Fernando Pablo (with
aggravating circumstance of public position utilized by the offender offset by the lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong doing as the one inflicted) is hereby affirmed. Loreto Oliva is, however,
acquitted of this charge, with costs de oficio.
In the other two cases (Nos. 1092-A and 1093-A of the Court below, L-6034 and 6035 of this
Court),the conviction and sentence of appellant Jose A. Villanueva, for arbitrary detention complexed
with physical injuries, is likewise affirmed. But appellant Loreto A. Oliva is acquitted therefrom, with
costs de oficio. Appellant Daniel Ulsano is likewise acquitted from this charge and, instead,
conviected only of less serious physical injuries, aggravated by the circumstance of having taken
advantage of public position (U.S. vs. Yumul, 34 Phil. 169; U.S. vs. Cerdena, 51 Phil. 393), and
sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor.
The civil liabilities imposed by the trial Court shall be understood as imposed only upon appellants
Jose Villanueva and Daniel Ulsano, in solidum with the accused Adriano Quinsay, who abandoned
his appeal.
Costs in this instance shall be taxed against appellants Jose Villanueva and Adrian Quinsay. So
ordered.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Jugo, Bautista, Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga,
Albay Public Marketwhen a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his
waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three
other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the
ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old
welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the
fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his
nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that
the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the
chest, and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of
death as hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed
an Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the RevisedPenal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931
before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his death, to
the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the
accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in
conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs.
Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the
civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said
widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00)

Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in

case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision
finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting
his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.
Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of
subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts.
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely
acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a
participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor
General avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the
defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was
for "political and subversive ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were
to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a
participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends,
but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals
found guilty as participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is
committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. 7 By its
very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot
be confined a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion
is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they
acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, 9 thus:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like
homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then it
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of
the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a
state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People
v. Gempes, 10 this court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since
moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to
state, which they could easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime
alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit from the law's
relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin, 12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No.
1829, 13 for allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's
knowledge that Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's
contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the principle that
rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the
senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of
rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R.
Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding
that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for
rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that
the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes

but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the
political offense. 15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further
underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is
a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the
act is committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion,
then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being
punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act,
and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and
of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is
striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander
Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of
Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA
hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive
was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive
lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or
defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The
lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being
an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate
to establish that the motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant's
obvious interest in testifying to that effect. 18
Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the
reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the
defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas
Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise
showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private
differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the killing,
though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement. 20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the
act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted

that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also
executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact
to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief
in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted that:

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the
objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to
comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He
states that accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial
but also self serving 23an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case,
we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame
the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for
the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the
PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a
warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar
where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and
denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to
having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male
person a certainalias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one
unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked
them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call
a passenger jeepney and told me board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we
alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped
walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you
used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?

A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue

walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion
told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN
TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I
placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions
continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting
white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said
policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman
in front of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the
asphalted road, ALWIN took the service firearm of the said
policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a
hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the
handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it
radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir. 25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that
he was a member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which
would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost
merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through
upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to
be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he
was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial
court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative
of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while upholding the rest of it. 29 While disbelieving the
portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership in the NPA, the trial court correctly
gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such narration is even
corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the
appellant himself.

In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime
being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified
that, upon the prodding of aliasAlwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization's
goals. 31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our
organization," 32 without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been
a member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so
general and non-specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have
made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman,
was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.
Against appellant's attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on
record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently
infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas,
crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political
color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary
crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly
observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or
irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled.
Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the Government
authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist groups of the
right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need
for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder. 36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that
the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against appellant's claims
that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of
impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. 38Moreover, neither may lack of motive be
availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude
conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's case was furthermore
bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore
no grudges against each other.40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was
sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993,
sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6025

May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
----------------------------G.R. No. L-6026

May 30, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People
vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In
Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons
and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado
Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres
Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn
their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders,
arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.;
they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously
thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they
had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as
well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged inCriminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082,
14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and
also with others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise
affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged
in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines,
and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly
known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and
take arms against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed
public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the
allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by
then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and
fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit:
(Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946,
August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949,
August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950
and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated
the said accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several
others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or

maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee
on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or
associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines,
as an active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and
synchronize its activities as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained
by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent
success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres
Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto
and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila, the seat of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and
the place chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the
different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officials and/or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps"
(HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines; having
come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082,
14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and decided to commit the
crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in
said criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof,
together with many others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing
of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly and take Arms against the
Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in
fact, the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly
and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and
ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson, kidnappings,
planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to
facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of
thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6, 1946,
April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950,
August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29,
1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present
appeals.

APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:
(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,
Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as
other publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor
Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and
held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a
mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the
military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the
Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the
CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by the court that Hernandez made various speeches
encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress
of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was
organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos,
Guillermo Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary
evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the said evidence supports the findings of the
court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October,
1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of
Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was
given the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis".
He made various speeches on the following dates and occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in
which he announced that the people will soon meet their dear comrade in the person of
Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which
occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM
are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and
the CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party.
1wph1.t

(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the
World Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from abroad a dinner was given to him by
the people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he
preferred to go with the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the
Government.

(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the
frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the elections and that if improvement
cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go
to the hills and join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the
World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P. Campa. He attacked the city mayor and
incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four
comrades under the leadership of Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at
330 P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a resolution urging the Government to
give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only
way out was to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse
Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai Shek from his country, and
that Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino,
etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez
expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to
the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming
heroes by fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the
CLO since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a
Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by
force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called
dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of
the present government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as
the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and intellectual group; the CLO
was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee
of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by
the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially
the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a good majority of the members of the
Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those
directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to
by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how the CLO will conduct
its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V.
Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the
present government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of
propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very
constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the theory of classless society and the
eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution
contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579").
Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and disseminated
Communist ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh.
V-1662), founder of Communism in the Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO
headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World
Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International Union of Students magazine,
Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders
of the Peace magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and
World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-911, V-907, V-910, V-899,
V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the
"Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist Party organs; "The Philippine Labor
Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V.
Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by
means of organization of committees in the educational department as well as
researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of
party members and selected leaders of the HMB within the trade unions under the control of
the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and
organizers to different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the
union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist leaders and the CLO in turn, will
register said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of
the workers is continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of
the Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB with the trade unions under
the control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its
aims, they will begin the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and antiCommunist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That revolutionary crisis
will be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides
and made them come to the city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the
simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of the
CLO.

Important Documents Submitted at Trial

1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was
referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter
of his sympathies for other communists, describing his experiences with Communists
abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-20012004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." mentions different groups of labor unions of which
Victor heads one group, consisting of the MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU
(Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez
as Victor from co-party members Hugo and Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor.
(Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not
published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was however published by
Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor.
(Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at
Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from the Communist Party. (Exh.
D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with
Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has
"tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal with leaders of the party"; that
he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground.
(Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2)
His election as President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)

(b) To SOBSI Jakarta that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the
East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh.
W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 Extends greetings to National Union of
Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one common struggle "the
liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism".
(Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like
Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker condemns Wall Street maneuvers;
corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc. (Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO Praises Balgos and
Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army
and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and
PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" States of a delegation to Roxas attacking
unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
(r) Press statement of Hernandez opposes acceptance of decorations from
Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)

3. Other Activities of Hernandez.

(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he
sent to the field. Letters show of sending of supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks.
(Exh. C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan
for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed
forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs,
Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued
press release about their going underground. (Exh. F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh.
D-451-451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was
fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its aims and policies a established a National
Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB),
and National Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in
their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11, 1950 the SEC discussed the
creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950
the SEC organized a special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a
body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather essential military intelligence
and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National
Finance Committee was also organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the
country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs command; (6)
that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and
since then the Party had gone underground and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national
liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the
decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such
plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and development not only of the Party but also of the
HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB
from 10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.

Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations
for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of
the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in
May, 1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26,
1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August
19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950;
March 29, 1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had
taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission of the crimes that had been
committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct
participation in the commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases
have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in the prosecution
and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the
organization called the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same
pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a Central Committee (which acts in the
absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts
when the National Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven
permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public Relations, Different
Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist
Party dominate the committees of the CLO. The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of
which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates
was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-time ranking member of the Communist Party
and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia,
which is one of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays
its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other material forms of
help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done
by lectures, meetings, and the organization of committees of the educational department as well as
researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist
Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories in forming a union. These Party
Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and
ultimately effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the
so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these Communist Party members to
indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party
ideology. After the right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader,
this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same with the Department of
Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the
CLO. The primary objective of the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It

seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for concessions
which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant
the same. Then a strike is declared. But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate
attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the
CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is given for the armed forces of the Communist
Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within
the city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime
charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its
decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief, discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V.
Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently
exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes
against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino administration, which he
dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of
Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy
to overthrow by force the constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as
testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays merely the role of propagation by lectures,
meetings and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely
allowed Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the
CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to the Communist ideology; if, as also
indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by
making demands from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the
same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes have been carried out
and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would
intervene and carry the revolution it is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the
preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO had no
function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It
was only a preparatory organization prior to revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the
CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the
actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the
rebellion as charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and
indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual rebellion by
the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had
declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground,
with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it

was decided by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The
court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this resolution or acts of the
Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The
seditious speeches of Hernandez took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went
underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among
all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he
took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a revolutionary situation, or that he had gone
underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused
to go underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial
and which were confiscated from the office of the Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of
Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary
situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee,
or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist Party; so NO presumption can arise that he had
taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no evidence,
direct or indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to
continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the deliberations leading to the uprising being
inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for
important members, if they intend actually to join the rebellion, to go underground, which meant
leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of
September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside.
Present problem of fighting legally to Com. Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom,
retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and
other relatively exposed mass leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground
forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City, engaged in the work of propaganda, making
speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him
to publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following
reasons (excuses) given by him for not going underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of
the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the
CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista
Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has tendencies of careerism, and tending to
want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational
procedures."

The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field.
But the very document dated December 3, 1949, Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p.
49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not
been received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had
come from a crew member of a ship of the American President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a
portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine
received by Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President
Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of the SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant
Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts
in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions
as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information. And his refusal to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned by
his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his acts on the
Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the
Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated, creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his
Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the
Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion for which he is held to account in this criminal
case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the
Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit
rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision
reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. The conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and
by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a
criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very
nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow
constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or
intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy
of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As
a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to
punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does

he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship
must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in
an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been
recognized by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the
elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in
the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be
recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that
"act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and
activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement
which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may
indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete,
practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on
the part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished
from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his
membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course
of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of
conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and
active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated
in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor
leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the
CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to
support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he
was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to
advance his political aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor
has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated
action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the
leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding,
evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with
said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof.
Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he
acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not

appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or
to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the
chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster
the rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of
propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion can be considered as a criminal act of
conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and
rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there
was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in
arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the
principles of Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia
que se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a la calle para conseguir aunque
fuera preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera
responsable de un delito de conspiracion para la sedicion? El Tribunal Supreme ha
resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio lo
contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay
conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se conciertan para la execution de un delito y
resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que
se refieren en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de
induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la mismo produjo en el animo
de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso,
resulta evidence que faltan los clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de
Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually participated in the rebellion or in any act of
conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these
circumstances, to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the
crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the
information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is
believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of
their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have
exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere
membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or

of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such
advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual
rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising
or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from
thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by
such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such
membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of
the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of
conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he
commits rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the
"Katipunan", the purpose of which was to overthrow the government by force. Each of the
defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held
that the defendants were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and
not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are
guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or engaging in rebellion, but rather of the
crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each
of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and March, 1903, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy
by force the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et
al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of
the CLO member of the Central Committee of the CPP and as such committed to the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He
should therefore be absolved of the charges contained in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of
the CLO a communications center of the Communist Party, having been found in possession of
letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.

Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the
Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went
underground. We have been unable to find the evidence upon which the court bases its conclusion
that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced
beyond reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of
the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in
Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his
membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these
facts being corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist,
Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary contributions coming from the areas under his
jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters
at Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies
of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party
indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown that the contributions that he received from
Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the
Communist Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk
rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion
because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for
the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is
for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a member of the Central Committee of the
CLO Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber
Unions and attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one
Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the
use of the said unit.

Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that
by giving his contributions he actually participated in the conspiracy to overthrow the government
and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities
consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB,
turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his
house at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of
the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with
the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court
was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a coconspirator in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the
Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a Communist was to help in the office of the
National FINANCE Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he
accompanied the purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the
Huks; that he is a member of the Communication Division of the CPP in Manila, in charge of
distribution of letters or communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the
Communist Party, when he asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in constant communication with the
communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted
in court and in it he admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the
PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government
and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication with the Communist Party and served it as
courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that
not having actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to
commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga,
under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella"
and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like
Alejandrino, Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a
son.

Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva
Ecija, later Chairman of the FINANCE Department, and then promoted to Finance Officer of the
Central Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the
mountains to Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.
Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We
are satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB
from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and
considering that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there
cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other members of her Party against the
constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that
she is guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P.
Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was dismissed because they have not been
apprehended at the time of the trial.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking
aims against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or
its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under
Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act No. 292). As the specific charge against
appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held
guilty of inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership
in any organization or association committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the
appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the
commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act
punishes participation or membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted
Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V.
Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges
contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendantsappellants Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and
the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R.
No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and
punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby

sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay their proportional share of the costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Padilla, Barrera and Regala, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN NUEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN
DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN; ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @ KA ERMI
@ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO
ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @ BOBBY, accused,
RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE, ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT

APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that
his extra-judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been admitted and
considered by the trial judge. This accusation is whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for
appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity of the
police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood by him during the investigation.
Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is likewise a matter of record that
before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. Finally, the alleged use of force
and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as
has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of appellant to back track from his prior
voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF. The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement of
men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though
crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a
police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a
separate charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A. 4203). The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes
the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of his conviction by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuez and 6 others who are still at large, in an information
which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed
with unlicensed firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his
death soon thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a policeman who was then in the
performance of his official duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nues entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the
prosecution had presented its first witness, accused Nues changed his plea of "not guilty" to
"guilty." Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said

accused until the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing,
Nuez died on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August 4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto
Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to
assist in canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon
controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc. Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as
back-up and posted himself at Norkis TRADING building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom he
identified as Edwin Nuez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of
the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing that they were being followed,
they immediately proceeded to the middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At
that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other group and thereafter saw Pfc.
Manatad sprawled on the ground. Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora
sought refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons take Pfc. Manatad's gun
and again fired at him to make sure that he is dead while the rest of the group including Nues acted
as back up. Thereafter, the Nues group commandeered a vehicle and fled from the scene of the
shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he can identify accused-appellant Nues because of a
mole at the bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the accused passed 2 or 3
meters in front of him together with his companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to conduct surveillance on a
suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon
reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nues trying to escape. The team of
Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nues and confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and
ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his
pursuers, but was shot on his left upper arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver
with 17 live ammunitions were confiscated from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while Nues was turned over to the
Metrodiscom for investigation. Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC
Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital
in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law
Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant who did not have a lawyer. Before
the start of the interrogation, Atty. Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his
services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig of his constitutional rights. The
interrogation was conducted in Cebuano upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nues killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted
that he and Nues were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and
"Mabi," respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by
him on every page thereof with the first page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which
states: "I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and that I am assisted by my
counsel in the course of this investigation" followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The
extra-judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City Asst. Fiscal Salvador
Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was
taken was legally defective, and contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very sick and
consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense.
That even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence as
said counsel did not actively assist him and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was
merely to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect appellant against
possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig, likewise questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in
protecting his rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist advocate and that the law
firm to which he belongs has represented high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated
that he had personally examined the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was
free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his presence and swore under oath as to
the veracity of everything therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted the affiant
from the start of the investigation up to its termination. Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced
myself as a lawyer. So they informed me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself
as a lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we had a confrontation with
Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then
he told me yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in connection with that investigation which
was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira,
myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will be
used against or in his favor in the court of justice?

A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.

Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were the answers of the accused,
Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions propounded by the investigator voluntary?
A Yes, they voluntary.
Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00, we proceeded to the office of the
City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic)
and then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court that the
extra-judicial confession of the appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused during his investigation was properly
informed and appraised of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that time he did not signify his
intention to retain a lawyer of his own choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at that time, to assist him during the
custodial investigation conducted by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army
Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit on his upper left arm and in fact,
Atty. Parawan only consented to assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the
affirmative to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted by him as his counsel
of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato Parawan after consenting to be his
counsel was with him when his extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and
sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who,
before accused has actually affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial
confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights and has explained the contents of
his extra-judicial confession.

"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after
having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan language, a language known to him,
found on the last page thereof now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is collaborated by the sworn statement of his
co-accused Edwin Nues dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to before City Fiscal
Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
or leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four square to the case at bar. In
Parojinog this court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12 (1) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel he must provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the commission
of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show that no objection was voiced by
the accused throughout the entire proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he
subscribed to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he apparently acquiesced to
the choice of the investigators. He complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice
only during trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial confession was legally defective
and hence, should not have been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In an attempt to avoid criminal
liability, he now questions the integrity of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who
stood by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a matter of record is the fact
that appellant was assisted by Atty. Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-judicial confession, he was first
asked if he was amenable to the services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been substantiated by evidence other than
his self-serving testimony. As has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of
appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt. Evidently, the taking of his extrajudicial confession was done with regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he is guilty, what he committed was
a political crime of simple rebellion, and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct
assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this point as manifested in the People's
brief, which We quote:

"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court erroneously convicted him of Murder
with Assault Upon a Person in Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. (Article
135, Revised Penal Code). In this case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership
with the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of Pfc. Manatad
while manning the traffic in Mandaue City in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice
that the sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing
of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA.
Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a
person in authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are
deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police officer, knowing too
well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act
done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where the accused who was charged
with murder admitted his membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the
crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to persons
convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at
bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime committed. As a matter of
fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the
group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an unknown
leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision
mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession was
legally obtained. However, appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the liquidation
squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to overthrow the duly constituted government,
the crime committed is simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of
prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1755

March 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appelle.
MALCOLM, J.:
No more serious violation of the criminal law of these Island and nor more wanton defiance of the
law by the very men whose sworn duty it was to enforce the law, has ever been brought before this
court than is now presented for consideration in this case. To avenge a fancied wrong, member of
the Philippine Constabulary murdered six member of the police force of the City of Manila, among
them the respected Captain William E. Wichman, assistant chief of police, and two private citizens,
and gravely wounded three other civilians.
To the task of reviewing the facts, of preparing an opinion on the pertinent issues, and of rendering
judgement, if no reversible error be found, regarding the appropriate penalty, we no propose to
address ourselves.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

On December 13, 1920, policemen of the city of Manila arrested a woman who was a member of the
household of a Constabulary soldier stationed at the Santa Lucia Barracks in this city. The arrest of
the woman was considered by some of the Constabulary soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks as an
outrage committed by the policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between members of the
Manila police department and members of the Philippine Constabulary.
The next day, December 14, at about sunset, a policeman named Artemio Mojica, posted on Calle
Real, in the District of Intramuros, city of Manila, had an encounter with various Constabulary
soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private Macasinag of the Constabulary. Private Macasinag
was seriously, and as afterwards appeared, mortally wounded.
The encounter between policeman Mojica and other companions of the Manila force and private
Macasinag and other companions of the Constabulary, with its grave consequences for the
Constabulary soldier, engendered a deep feeling of resentment on the part of the soldiers at Santa
Lucia Barracks. This resentment was soon converted into a desire for revenge against the police
force of the city of Manila. The officers of the Constabulary appear to have been aware of the state
of excitement among the soldiers at Santa Lucia Barracks because almost immediately after the
shooting of private Macasinag, Captain Page, the commanding officer of the barracks, increased the
number of guards, and confined all the soldiers in the barracks.
During the afternoon of the next day, December 15, 1920, a rumor spread among the soldiers in San
Lucia Barracks to the effect that policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty on the streets of
Intramuros and that private Macasinag had died as a consequence of the shot he received the night
before. This rumor contributed in no small degree in precipitating a movement for reprisal by the
Constabulary soldiers against the policeman.
At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day, December 15, 1920, corporal Ingles of the Fourth
Company approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the man in charge of quarters, and asked
him to let then the man in charge of quarters of the Fourth Company. Private Torio was easily
persuaded to permit private Francisco Garcia of the Second Company to saw out the window bars of
the quarters in his charge, and to allow soldiers to escape through the window with rifles and
ammunition under the command of their sergeants and corporals. When outside of the quarters,
these soldiers divided into groups for attack upon the city police force.
On platoon of Constabulary soldiers apparently numbering about ten or twelve, on Calle Real,
Intramuros, fired in the direction of the intersection of Calles Real and Cabildo where an American
policeman named Driskill was stationed, and was talking with a friend named Jacumin, a field clerk
in the United States Army. These two men were shot and died soon afterwards. To the credit of
policeman Driskill be it said, that although a dying conditions and in the face of overwhelming odds,
he valiantly returned the fire with his revolver. Jacumin was killed notwithstanding that in response to
the command of the Constabulary, "Hands up!." he elevated both arms.
A street car happened to stop at this time at the corner of Calles Real and Cabildo. Without
considering that the passengers in the car were innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a

volley into the car, killing instantly the passenger named Victor Torres and gravely wounding three
other civilian passengers, Gregorio Cailles, Vicente Antonio, and Mariano Cortes. Father Jose
Tahon, a priest of the Cathedral of Manila, proved himself a hero on this occasion for, against the
command of the Constabulary, he persisted in persuading them to cease firing and advanced in
order the he might administer spiritual aid to who had been wounded.
The firing on Calle Real did not end at that time. Some minutes later, Captain William E. Wichman,
assistant chief of police of the city of Manila, riding in a motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala,
arrived at the corner of Calles Real and Magallanes in Intramuros, and a volley of shots by
Constabulary soldiers resulted in the instantaneous death of Captain Wichman and the death shortly
afterwards of patrolman Saplala.
About the same time, a police patrol came from the Meisic police station. When it was on Calle Real
near Cabildo, in Intramuros, it was fired upon by Constabulary soldiers who had stationed
themselves in the courtyard of the San Agustin Church. This attack resulted in the death of
patrolmen Trogue and Sixon.
Another platoon of the Constabulary, between thirty and forty in number, had, in the meantime,
arranged themselves in a firing line on the Sunken Gardens on the east side of Calle General Luna
opposite the Aquarium. From this advantageous position the Constabulary fired upon the motorcycle
occupied by sergeant Armada and given by policeman Policarpio who with companions were
passing along Calle General Luna in front of the Aquarium going in the direction of Calle Real,
Intramuros. As a result of the shooting, the driver of the motorcycle, policeman Policarpio, was
mortally wounded. This same platoon of Constabulary soldiers fired several volleys indiscriminately
into the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret service of the city of Manila across Calles
General Luna and Padre Burgos, but fortunately no one was injured.
General Rafael Crame, Chief of the Constabulary, and Captain Page, commanding officer of the
Santa Lucia Barracks, rounded up some of the soldiers one after another returned to the Barracks
where they were disarmed. No list of the names of these soldiers was, however, made.
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1920, Colonel Lucien R. Sweet of the Constabulary in
compliance with order from General Crame, and assisted by other Constabulary officers and later by
the fiscals of the city of Manila, commenced an investigation of the events of the night before. He
first ordered that all the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks, at that time numbering some one hundred
and eighty, be assembled on the parade ground, and when this was done, the soldiers were
separated into their respective companies. Then Colonel Sweet, speaking English, with assistance
of Captain Silvino Gallardo, who interpreted his remarks into Tagalog, made two brief statements.
The first was, in effect: "Those of you who for one reason or another left the Barracks last night, may
step forward." Responding to this order, nearly one hundred moved to the front. Thereupon, Colonel
Sweet said to these: "For the good of the body to which you belong, of your companions, and of
yourselves, those who participated in the riot last night may take another step forward." Seventythree soldiers then advance a step. The names of four other who took part but who were not present
were taken down by Captain Gallardo.

What occurred on the occasion above described can best be told in the exact language of Colonel
Sweet:
After conferring or speaking among themselves, for probably two minutes, I inferred or
observed from their attitude that they were waiting for a call to order. Accordingly, I called
them to order and some eight-five took one step forward. After that I called them to attention;
I advised them that for the good of themselves and their companions who did not participate
in the shooting of the night before, for the good of the body and also of all parties interested,
those who took part in the shooting of the night before should take another step forward. I
spoke so rapidly that it is impossible for me to repeat exactly what I told them that morning. I
spoke them that morning approving the decision of those of them who took one step forward.
I believe that some seventy-two (72) took one step forward as admitting that they took part in
the shooting on the night before. I then asked if they brought with the, ammunition or arms
not belonging to them. They answered viva voce that each one of them carried their own
arms and ammunition. I asked them if there was any one who was with them the night before
but who was not present that morning; whereupon, one or two soldiers mentioned the names
of some who were not then present. That is how the total number of those who left and who
were not in the Barracks reached seventy-seven (77).
The statements of the seventy-seven soldiers were taken in writing during the afternoon of the same
day, December 16. The questionnaire prepared by the fiscal of the City of Manila was the same for
each soldier, and was filled out either in English or Spanish. The questions and answers were,
however, when requested by the soldiers, translated into their dialects Each statement was signed
by the soldier making it in the presence of either two or three witnesses.
Although the answers to the questions contained in these statements vary in phraseology, in
substance they are the same. One of them, the first in numerical order, that of sergeant Graciano L.
Cabrera, taken in Spanish and interpreted into Tagalog, may be selected as typical of the rest, and is
here literally transcribed:
1. Give your name, age, status, occupation, and residence. Graciano L. Cabrera, 24
years old, single, sergeant of the first company of the General Service, of the Constabulary,
residing in Santa Lucia Barracks.
2. To what company of the Philippine Constabulary do you belong? First company,
General Service of the Constabulary.
3. Where were you garrisoned yesterday afternoon, December 15, 1920? In the Santa
Lucia Barracks.
4. Did you leave the barracks at about 7 o'clock yesterday evening? Yes, sir.
5. For what reason, and where did you go? We went in search of the policemen and
secret service men of Manila. It has been sometime now since we have been having
standing grudge against the police of Manila. The wife of one of our comrades was first
arrested by the policemen and then abused by the same; and not content with having

abused her, they gave this woman to an American; after this incident, they arrested two
soldiers of the Constabulary, falsely accusing them of keeping women of bad reputation;
after this incident, came the shooting of Macasinag, a shooting not justified, because we
have come to know that Macasinag did nothing and the policemen could have arrested him if
they desired. Moreover, the rumor spread among us that the police department of Manila
had given orders to the policemen to fire upon any constabulary soldier they found in the
streets, and we believe that the rumor was not without foundation since we noticed that after
the Macasinag affair, the policemen of Manila, contrary to the usual practice, were armed
with carbines or shot-guns. For this reason we believed that if we did not put an end to these
abuses of the policemen and secret service men, they would continue abusing the
Constabulary. And as an act of vengeance we did what we had done last night.
6. How did you come to join your companions who rioted last night? I saw that almost all
the soldiers were jumping through the window and I was to be left along in the barracks and
so I followed.
7. Who asked you to join it? Nobody.
8. Do you know private Crispin Macasinag, the one who was shot by the Manila police the
night before last on Calle Real? Yes, sir, I know him because he was our comrade.
9. Were you offended at the aggression made on the person of said soldier? Indeed, yes,
not only was I offended, but my companions also were.
10. State how many shots you fired, if any, during the riot last night. I cannot tell precisely
the number of shots I fired because I was somewhat obfuscated; all I can assure you is that I
fired more than once.
11. Do you know if you hit any policemen or any other person? If so, state whether the
victim was a policemen or any civilian.
12. State the streets of the city where you fired shots. I cannot give an exact ACCOUNT
of the streets where I fired my gun. I had full possession of my faculties until I reached Calle
Victoria; afterwards , I became aware that I was bathed with perspiration only upon reaching
the barracks.
13. What arms were you carrying and how much ammunition or how many cartridges did you
use? I carried a carbine; I cannot tell precisely the number of cartridges I used; however, I
placed in my pocket the twenty cartridges belonging to me and I must have lost some on the
way.
14. How did you MANAGE to leave the barracks? By the, window of the quarters of the
Fourth Company, through the grating which I found cut off.
15. Are you above statements made by you, voluntarily freely, and spontaneously given?
Yes, sir.

16. Do you swear to said statements although no promise of immunity is made to you?
Yes, sir; I confirm them, being true.
(Sgd.) G. L. CABRERA
Witnesses:
(Sgd.) S. GALLARDO
LAURO C. MARQUEZ.
The defendants were charged in one information filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila with the crime of sedition, and in another information filed in the same court, with the crimes
of murder and serious physical injuries. The two cases were tried separately before different judges
of first instance. In the sedition case, which came on for trial first, all of the accused, with the
exception of eight, namely, Francisco Ingles, Juan Noromor, P. E. Vallado, Dionisio Verdadero,
Francisco Garcia, Benigno Tagavilla, Felix Lamsing and Paciano Caa pleaded guilty, but later, after
the first witness for the prosecution had testified, the accused who had pleaded guilty were
permitted, with the consent of the court, to substitute therefor the plea of not guilty. In the murder
case, all entered a plea of not guilty. On petition of the defense, two assessors were chosen to sit
with the judge.
The prosecution presented, in the making of its case, the seventy-seven confession of the
defendants introduced in evidence as Exhibits C to C-76, inclusive, and all were identified by the
respective constabulary officers, interpreters, and typists who intervened in taking them. The
prosecution further relied on oral testimony, including eyewitness to the homicides.
The attorneys for the accused presented three defenses. The first defense was that of jeopardy; the
second was based on the contention that the written statements Exhibits C to C-076 were not freely
and voluntarily made by the defendants; and the third defense, in favor of the defendants Vicente
Casimiro, Juan Noromor, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano Garcia, Felix
Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol,
Ildefonso de la Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Francisco Garcia, Genaro Elayda, Hilario Hibalar, Primitivo E.
Vallado, Maximo Perlas, and Benigno Tagavilla, was to the effect that they not take part in the riot.
The court overruled the special defenses and found that the guilt of the accused had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thereupon, the court rendered judgement finding all of the defendants
guilty of the crimes charged in the information and sentenced the three sergeants Graciano L
Cabrera, Pascual Magno, And Bonifacio Eugenio, and the eight corporals, E. E. Agbulos, Francisco
Ingles, Clemente Manigdeg, Hilario Hibalar, Juan Abarques, Pecro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado and
Genaro Elayda, to cadena perpetua (life imprisonment), and each of the remaining defendants to
seventeen years, four months and one day of cadena temporal, all with the accessory penalties
provided by the Penal Code and all to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each deceased in
the sum of P500, and to pay a proportional part of the costs.
For the statement of the cases and the facts which has just been made, we are indebted in large
measure to the conspicuously fair and thoughtful decisions of the Hon. Carlos Imperial who presided
in the murder case, and of the Hon. George R. Harvey who presided in the sedition case. As

stipulated by the Attorney-General and counsel for the defendants, the proof is substantially the
same in both cases.
In all materials respects, we agree with the findings of fact as made by the trial court in this case.
The rule is again applied that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the judgement of the trial
court in passing upon the credibility of the opposing witnesses, unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstances of weight and influence which as been overlooked or significance of
which has been, interpreted. (U. S. vs. Ambrosio and Falsario [1910], 17 Phil., 295; U. S. Remegio
[1918], 37 Phil., 599.) In the record of the case at bar, no such fact or circumstance appears.
OPINION
An assignment of six errors is made by the counsel for the defendants and appellants. Two of the
assignments of error merit little or no consideration. Assignments of error 5 and 6 (finding their
counterpart in assignment of error No. 2 in the sedition case), in which it is attempted to establish
that Vicente Casimiro, Juan Noromor, Salvador Gregorio, Paciano Caa, Juan Abarquez, Mariano
Garcia, Felix Liron, Bonifacio Eugenio, Patricio Bello, Baldomero Rodriguez, Roberto Palabay,
Roque Ebol, Ildefonso dela Cruz, Cipriano Lizardo, Primitivo E. Vallado, Maximo Perlas and Benigno
Tagavilla did not leave the Santa Lucia Barracks on the night of the tragedy, is predicated on the
special defense raised in the lower court for these defendants and which was found untenable by the
trial court. Any further discussion of this question falls more appropriately under our consideration of
assignment of error No. 3, relating to the conspiracy between the accused.
Assignment error No. 4 relating to the judge deciding the case without taking into consideration the
transcript of the stenographic notes in the case for sedition does not constitute reversible error.
Counsel for the defendants is the first to admit by stipulation that the facts in the two case are
substantially the same.
The three pertinent issues in this case relate to: (1) The admission of Exhibits C to C-76 of the
prosecution (assignment error No. 2, murder case; assignment of error No. 1, sedition case); (2) the
conspiracy between the accused (assignment of error No. 3, murder case; assignment of error No.
4, sedition case); and (3) the defense of double jeopardy (assignment of error No. 1, murder case).
1. THE ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS C TO C-76
Appellants claim that fraud and decit marked the preparation of the seventy-seven confession. It is
alleged that some of the defendants signed the confessions under the impression that those who
had taken part in the affray would be transferred to Mindanao, and that although they did not in fact
so participate, affirmed that they did because of a desire to leave Manila; that others stepped
forward "for the good of the service"; while still other simply didn't understand what they were doing,
for the remarks of Colonel Sweet were made in English and only translated into Tagalog, and their
declarations were sometimes taken in a language which was unintelligible to them. Counsel
evidence of Exhibits C to C-76, and the Attorney-General is wrong in stating otherwise.
Section 4 of Act No. 619 entitled "An Act to promote good order and discipline in the Philippines
Constabulary" and reading: "No confession of any person charged with crime shall be received as

evidence against him by any court of justice unless it be first shown to the satisfaction of the court
that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or
of promises or offers of reward or leniency," was repealed by the first Administrative Code. But the
same rule of jurisprudence continues without the law. As has been repeatedly announced by this and
other courts, "the true test of admissibility is that the confession is made freely, voluntarily, and
without compulsion or inducement of any sort." If the confession is freely and voluntarily made, it
constitutes one of the most effectual proofs in the law against the party making it. (Wilson vs. U. S.
[1895], 162 U. S., 613.) The burden of proof that the confession was not voluntarily made or was
obtained by undue pressure is on the accused. (U. S. vs. Zara [1921], 42 Phil., 308.)
What actually occurred when the confessions were prepared is clearly explained in the record. The
source of the rumor that the defendants would be transferred to Mindanao if they signed the
confessions, is not established. On the contrary it is established that before the declarations were
taken, Lieutenant Gatuslao in response to a query had shown the improbability of such a transfer.
With Military where the dialect is Tagalog, all of the defendants must have understood the substantial
part of Colonel Sweet's remarks. What is more important, there could be no misunderstanding as to
the contents of the confessions as written down. In open court, sixty-nine of the defendants
reiterated their guilt. The officers who assisted in the investigation were of the same service as the
defendants and would naturally not be inclined to prejudice the rights of their own men.
I must also be remembered that each and every one of the defendants was a member of the Insular
police force. Because of the very nature of their duties and because of their practical experience,
these Constabulary soldiers must have been aware of the penalties meted out for criminal offenses.
Every man on such a momentous occasion would be more careful of his actions than ordinarily and
whatever of credulity there is in him, would for the moment be laid aside. Over and above all desire
for a more exciting life, over and above the so-called espiritu de corps, is the instinct of selfpreservation which could not but be fully aroused by such stirring incidents too recent to be forgotten
as had occurred in this case, and which would counsel prudence rather than rashness;
secretiveness rather than garrulity.
These confessions contain the statements that they were made freely and voluntarily without any
promise of immunity. That such was the case was corroborated by the attesting witnesses whose
credibility has not been successfully impeached.
We rule the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibits C to C-76 of the prosecution.
2. THE CONSPIRACY BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
The contention of the appellants is that evidence is lacking of any supposed connivance between the
accused. Counsel emphasizes that in answer to the question in the confession, "Who asked you to
join in the riot?," each of the accused answered, "Nobody." The argument is then advanced that the
appellants cannot be held criminally responsible because of the so-called psychology of crowds
theory. In other words, it is claimed that at the time of the commission of the crime the accused were
mere automatons obeying the insistent call of their failure of evidence and the positive evidence,
counsel would deduce the absence of conspiracy between the accused.

It is a primary rule that if two or more persons combine to perform a criminal act, each is responsible
for all the acts of the others done in furtherance of the common design; and "the results is the same
if the act is divided into parts and each person proceeds with his part unaided." (U. S. vs. Maza
[1905], 5 Phil., 346; U. S. vs. Remigio [1918], 37 Phil., 599; decision of the supreme court of Spain of
September 29, 1883; People vs. Mather [1830], 4 Wendell, 299.)
Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the defendants
pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same, so as
to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, one will be justified in the conclusion
that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. (5 R. C. L., 1088.) Applied to the facts
before is, it is incontestable that all of the defendants were imbued with the same purpose, which
was to avenge themselves on the police force of the city of Manila. A common feeling of resentment
animated all. A common plan evolved from their military training was followed.
The effort to lead the court into the realm of psychology and metaphysics is unavailing in the face of
actualities. The existence of a joint assent may be reasonably inferred from the facts proved. Not
alone are the men who fired the fatal shots responsible, not alone are the men who admit firing their
carbines responsible, but all, having united to further a common design of hate and vengeance, are
responsible for the legal consequences therefor.
We rule that the trial court did not err in declaring that there was a conspiracy between the accused.
3. THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The constitutional inhibition in the Philippine Bill of Rights is "that no person for same offense shall
twice be put in jeopardy of punishment.," Somewhat in application thereof, the code of Criminal
Procedure provides that "When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or once placed
in jeopardy upon an information or complaint, the conviction, acquittal or jeopardy shall be a bar to
another information or indictment for the offense charged, or for an attempt to commit the same, or
for a frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily therein included of which he might been
convicted under such complaint or information." (Sec. 26.) The guaranty in Philippine organic and
statutory law relating to double jeopardy has received controlling interpretation both by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The prohibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense. To entitle a defendant to plead
successfully former jeopardy, the offense charge in the two prosecutions must be the same in law
and in fact. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but
whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. The same acts may violate two or more
provisions of the criminal law. When they do, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution
under another.
In corroboration and in exemplification of the rules pertaining to the subject of double jeopardy, we
have only to turn to leading decisions of the United States Supreme Court on Philippine appeals. In
Flemister vs. United States ([1907], 207 U. S., 372),1 it was held that treating as two different
offenses assaults on two different individuals does not place the accused twice in jeopardy for the

same offense, even if these assaults occurred very near each other, in one continuing attempt to
defy the law. In Garcia Gavieres vs. United States ([1911], 220 U. S. 338),2 it was held that the
offenses of behaving an indecent manner in a public place, open of insulting a public officer by deed
or word in his presence, contrary to the Penal Code, are not identical, so that a conviction of the first
will bar a prosecution for the other, although the acts and words of the accused set forth in both
charges are the same. The court said that "It is true that the acts and words of the accused set forth
in both charges are the same; but in the second case it was charged, as was essential to conviction,
that the misbehavior in deed and words was addressed to a public official In this view we are of
opinion that while the transaction charged is the same in each case, the offenses are different." In
Diaz vs. United States ([1912], 223 E. S., 442), it was held that the prosecution for homicide of a
person previously convicted of an assault and battery from which the death afterwards ensued does
not place the accused twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The court said that "The Instance and
the assault and a battery for which he was tried before the justice of the peace, although identical in
some of their elements, were distinct offenses both in law and in fact. The death of the injured
person was the principal element of the homicide, but was no part of the assault and battery."
Appellants rely principally on the decision of this Court in the case of United States vs. Gustillo
([1911], 19 Phil., 208). It was there only held that the possession of a shotgun and a revolver by the
same person at the same time and the in the same place, is but one act of possession, one violation
of the law, and that a conviction and punishment for the possession of the one arm is a bar to the
prosecution for the possession of the other. (Compare with the U. S. vs. Capurro and Weems [1906],
7 Phils., 24, and other Philippine Cases).
The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of practically the same
facts, which can be found in the American authorities, relate to the crimes of assault and riot or
unlawful assembly. A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly
and riot and the offense of assault and battery are distinct offenses; and that a conviction or an
acquittal for either does not bar a prosecution for the other offense, even though based on the same
facts. ([1835], 27 Fed. Cas., State vs. Vazquez [1905], 9 Porto Rico, 488; contra, State vs. Lindsay
[1868] 61, N. C., 458.)
It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a
crime not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against a crime directed against the
existence of the State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquillity; murder is
a crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U. S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.) Sedition in its
more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state' murder at common law
is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the
sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.
The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are perfectly distinct in point of
law however nearly they may be connected in point of act. Not alone are the offense eo
nomine different, but the allegations in the body of the informations are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the constabulary in order to attain by
force and outside of legal methods the object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the
persons of the police force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of
Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the Constabulary, conspiring together,

illegally and criminally killed eight persons and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of murder
and serious physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition; and the
defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the first information.
The evidence required to convict under the first information would not have been sufficient to convict
under the second. Proof of an additional and essential fact; namely, the death of one or more human
beings, was necessary to constitute the offense charged in the second information. The defendants
may have been tried for the same act or acts; they have not been put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
We rule that the trial court did not err in not allowing the defense of double jeopardy.
JUDGMENT
The persistent effort of counsel to protect the interest of his client cannot be permitted to becloud the
prominent facts of the record. This is as clear a case of cold-blooded murder as ever came to our
attention. The judicial archives of the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands, for the full extent of
its existence extending over more than two decades, can be searched in vain for another case which
compares with the instant one either in certainty as to guilt or in an unwavering necessity for a
severe sentence. Not the learned briefs of the counsel for the accused and for the people, not the
eloquent pleas on the hand for mercy and on the other for conviction, not the application of various
legal authorities, not even the voluminous transcript of the oral testimony, either separately or all
combined, constitute the sole elements which irresistibly move us toward a stern judgment, but the
most eloquent pleaders for justice top the dead and safety for the living come from the silent
photographs of the dead and safety for the living come from the silent photographs of the dead
introduced in evidence under the prosaic denomination of Exhibits J, K, LL, M, N, , and O. The
bloody spot on the escutcheon of an otherwise great organization must be removed.
It is a disagreeable duty, therefore, which the members of this court are called upon to perform. But
that it is disagreeable should not of course swerve us from its performance. Were cases of this
nature allowed to pass without condemnation, the lives of mankind would constantly be imperilled
and there would be no security in the State, for its peace and tranquility would be upset and the
authority of the Government would be put at naught by the very agents of law and order who have
sworn to protect it. The courts were instituted precisely to function in times of peril to the State, to
protect the rights of the people, to mete out punishment to those who have rendered it unsafe for
individuals to live at peace with their fellowmen.
With the determination of the trial court as to the circumstances which fix the degree of the penalty,
we are, generally speaking, in accord. The circumstance of evident premeditation was found to exist,
thus qualifying the crime as that of murder. All the actions of the accused demonstrate that their
purpose was to kill any members of the city police whom they should meet. A considerable number
of the accused in their confessions gave as the reason for the affray the desire to revenge
themselves on the city police. One of them while marching through the streets was heard to exclaim
"They killed one of us; we will kill ten (policemen) for one." Another was heard to exclaim, "Al
cuartel!" and this was repeated by his companions, "Al cuartel!"

The trial judge found present as circumstances which aggravate criminal liability, that the crime was
committed in the nighttime and that advantage was taken of superior strength, but, resolving the
doubt in favor of the accused, was unable to find that the act was committed with treachery. We
concur with His Honor, Judge Imperial. Advantage was taken of the shades of night in order to better
serve the unlawful purpose. Seventy-seven armed Constabulary soldiers in military formation were
vastly superior in number and equipment to the policemen whom they happened to meet.
The trial judge found present no circumstance which would mitigate the criminal liability of the
sergeants and corporals, but did estimate as a mitigating circumstance, in the cases of the privates,
that provided by article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, relating to the degree of instruction and
education of the offenders. Certain members of the Court entertain an identical opinion, while other
members take a contrary view. However, the result will be the same, since there is not a unanimous
vote with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty on the private soldiers.
Both the trial judge in the sedition case and the trial judge in the murder case found a difference
between the situation of the non-commissioned officers and of the common soldiers. The opinion
was expressed by the two judges that the sergeants and corporals among the defendants deserved
a larger measure experience of the non-commissioned officers and their more responsible positions,
we feel that this is a proper appreciation of the facts.
The trial judge found the crimes as falling within the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code.
Certain members of the court agree. Other members disagree and would make use of the provisions
of articles 87 and 88 of the Code. At least such doubt as exists should be resolved in favor of the
accused, and this means that, in conformity with the provisions of article 87, they are guilty of the
crimes of multiple murder with grave injuries. The penalty is then death for the eleven sergeants and
corporals, and cadena perpetua, imprisonment for a maximum period of forty years, for the sixty-six
private soldiers. (See U. S. vs. Balaba [1917], 37 Phil., 260.)
The result is to modify the judgement appealed from by sentencing each of the Constabulary
soldiers Patricio Rubio, Mariano Aragon, Silvino Ayangco, Guillermo Inis, Julian Andaya, Crispin
Mesaluche, Prudencio Tasis, Silvino Bacani, Salvador Gregorio, Juan Noromor, Petronilo Antonio,
Patricio Bello, Nemesio Decena, Baldomero Rodriquez, P. E. Vallado, Pedro Layola, Felix Cenon
(Liron), Dionisio Verdadero, Francisco Garcia, Domingo Peroche, Florentino Jacob, Lorenzo
Tumboc, Paciano Caa, Domingo Canape, Arcadio San Pedro, Daniel Coralde, Vicente Casimiro,
Casiano Guinto, Nemesio Gamus, Luis Borja, Severino Elefane, Vicente Tabien, Victor Atuel,
Venancio Mira, Benigno Tagavilla, Masaway, Marcos Marquez, Quinto Desierto, Teofilo Llana, Felix
Lamsing, Victorino Merto, Timoteo Opermaria, Bernabe Sison, Eusebio Cerrudo, Julia Acantilado,
Maximo Perlas, Ignacio Lechoncito, Pascual Dionio, Marcial Pelicia, Rafael Nafrada, Cornelio
Ilizaga, Zacarias Baile, Roberto Palabay, Roque Ebol, Benito Garcia, Cipriano Lizardo, Ildefonso de
la Cruz, Juan Miranda, Honorio Bautista, Crisanto Salgo, Francisco Luzano, Marcelino Silos,
Graciano Zapata, Felizardo Favinal, Nicanor Perlas, and Gaspar Andrada, to suffer cadena
perpetua, computed as imprisonment for forty years, and by sentencing each of the sergeants and
corporals Graciano L. Cabrera, Pascual Magno, Bonifacio Eugenio, E. E. Agbulos, Francisco Ingles,
Clemente Manigdeg, Juan Abarquez, Pedro V. Mateo, Juan Regalado, Hilario, and Genaro Elayda,
to suffer the death penalty as provided by law at Bilibid Prison, at such time as shall be fixed by the

Judge of First Instance sitting in Sala No. 4 in the city of Manila, and as thus modified, judgment is
affirmed with a proportional part of the costs of this instance against each appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84450 February 4, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GLORIA UMALI y AMADO AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria Umali and
Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
under an information which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion, Municipality
of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a prohibited drug to one
Francisco Manalo y Arellano, without authority of law.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)
Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali remained at
large. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is
entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against
Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be
revived until the arrest of said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued
against her is hereby ordered reiterated.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE BIASED TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF ACCUSED'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED NEVER

DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES
FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND
THAT WHICH WAS USED BY PIERRE PANGAN RESULTING TO THE LATTER'S
DRUG DEPENDENCY
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA 1, GUILTY
OF VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE BASIS OF MERE
CONJECTURES AND NOT ON FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN
V
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY. (Rollo, p. 49)
The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:
On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra
for drug dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the
investigation, the policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of
committing crime against property, only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre
Pangan is a minor, the police investigators sought the presence of his parents.
Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the police headquarters and was
informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the police investigators if
something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which has not
only socially affected his son, but other minors in the community. Previous to the
case of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise
investigated by operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a
case for violation of the Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, covered by
Criminal Case No. 85-516 before Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena
City. Aside from said case, accused Francisco Manalo was likewise facing other
charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other crimes against property.
Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the help of
Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs
like marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a
detention prisoner was touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and
agreed to help in the identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked
the policeman to help him in some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate
his case for violating the dangerous drug act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the
charged (sic) before the sala of Judge Eriberto Rosario.
With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation
Division gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known
to him. The serial numbers of the money was entered in the police blotter. The

instruction was (sic) for Manalo to bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to
the police headquarters. Few minutes there after (sic), Manalo returned with two (2)
foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought from the accused Gloria Umali.
Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a statement on the
manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana foils
from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the
two (2) foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court
for the issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search the house of
Gloria Umali located at Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing
the same, the police operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the
search warrant on her. Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali were the four
P5.00 bills with serial numbers BA26943, DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873,
respectively as reflected in the police blotter. Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00
bills were the letters T which were placed by the police investigators to further identify
the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house was made in the
presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search resulted in the confiscation of a can of
milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were placed in a
tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored. The return of the
search warrant reads as follows:
DATE: 22 April 1985
WHAT: "RAID"
WHERE: Residence of Dr. Emiliano Umali
Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon
WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP
TIME STARTED/ARRIVED AT SAID PLACE:
221410H Apr '85
SERVED TO: MRS. GLORIA UMALI
MR. EMILIANO UMALI
PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED
Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of
Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves
TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85

WITNESSES (sic) BY:

1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal
2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion
4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino
Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Came
Laboratory for examination. Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory
took the witness stand, testified and identified the marijuana submitted to her and in
a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she gave the following findings:
Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned
above gave POSITIVE result to the tests fur marijuana.
In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his
possession Indian Hemp on April 5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of
Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
Court in rendering against him disposed the case as follows:
In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of "Indian
Hemp" penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as amended
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00). Let the period of detention of the accused be credited to
his sentence.
Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found in
his possession on April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to him
by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did not dispute the claim of the
prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator came to
know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which he used and
smoked resulting in his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)
The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court
committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.
Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his desire to
have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was
then facing several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as
a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more so, it was also corroborated
in its material respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp.
83-84)
The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were confiscated for no
other purpose than using them as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued is illegal from the very beginning. She
stressed that there can be no other plausible explanation other than that she was a victim of a
frame-up.
In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the evidences
submitted by the prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional right against illegal
search and seizure.
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was
charged were never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the
court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises and
conjectures.
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the happening together with the physical evidence
submitted clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting the trial
court's factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal for the trial
judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand observing and examining the testimonial and
other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore better situated to form accurate
impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 68422, 29
December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and
should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked certain facts
of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Alverez y
Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249; People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R. No. L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA
400). Hence, in the absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain substantial
facts, said factual findings are entitled to great weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.
Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,
and perceiving can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.
The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into ACCOUNT
Article 821 of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."
(Paras, RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to
disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact
that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify
him as a witness.
The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he
was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157 SCRA
718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was actuated by
improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.
Appellant's contention that she was a victim of a "frame-up" is devoid of merit. "Courts must be
vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up and that the police attempted to extort
from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in appreciating such defense. It is just as easy
to concoct as a frame-up. At all times the police, the prosecution and the Courts must be always on
guard against these hazards in the administration of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No.
82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119)
The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit. "Where
marked peso bills were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the appellant, the
admissibility of these marked peso bills hinges on the legality of the arrest and search on the person
of the appellant" (People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February 1989, 170 SCRA 681). Since the
search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any showing that such was procured
maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.
Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures, hence the
essential elements of the crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.
Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a criminal offense
must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's evidence consisted
of the testimony of witness Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the physical evidence consisting
of the seized marked peso bills, the two (2) foils of marijuana purchased and the can containing
sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of
proof to the contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989, 170 SCRA 497). Hence,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, full credence should be accorded to the prosecution's

evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently established that Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana
to witness Manalo for which she was given and received four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and
fully supports conviction for drug pushing in violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the basis of
the evidence on record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised the penalty
for selling prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty
thousand pesos (People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984, 133 SCRA 132) Thus, the
trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment but failed to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 172324

April 4, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CELINO NABONG y OSENAR (a.k.a. Salvador Abaquita), ALVIN LAGUIT y BRENDO and
NOLFE LADIAO (a.k.a. Roel Salutario), Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00731 which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, finding accused-appellants
Celino Nabong y Ocenar (aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel
Salutario) guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide and imposing upon them the
death penalty.
On 5 April 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City an Information for the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide against the appellants and
a certain Arnel Miraflor y Awitan.
On 21 April 1999, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information on the ground that
certain material evidence arose subsequent to the filing of the original information which
necessitated its amendment. Said motion was granted on the same date.3
An Amended Information was filed on 21 April 1999, indicting appellants and Arnel Miraflor for the
crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide, punishable under Republic Act No. 8357, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused men conspiring, confederating and

mutually helping each other and taking advantage of nighttime, superior strength and by means of
treachery, evident premeditation, force and violence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to have sexual intercourse with a woman AAA,4 against her will and consent,
thereby commencing the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts but did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of rape as a consequence by reason of
causes independent of their own spontaneous desistance, that is, AAA resisted; and by reason or on
the occasion of the attempted rape the accused, with intent to kill, attack, assault and stabbed with a
bladed weapon AAA on the different parts of her body thereby inflicting serious physical injuries
which directly caused her death.5
Upon arraignment, all of the accused pleaded not guilty6 of the crime charged. Hence, trial ensued.
The prosecution proved the following facts.
The four accused, Celino Nabong (Nabong), Alvin Laguit (Laguit), Nolfe Ladiao (Ladiao) and Arnel
Miraflor (Miraflor), were all construction workers employed as steelmen by EEI, a construction firm,
and assigned at its OCW-RCBC Plaza Project located at Ayala Avenue, Makati City.
The victim, AAA was a 22-year old ACCOUNTANT employed as junior auditor at the Alba and
Romeo Auditing Firm.
Reynaldo Patenio, a steelman of EEI construction and a co-worker of the accused, testified that on
the fateful night of 23 March 1999, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, he and the four accused,
together with their co-workers, Rogelio Amit, Lilia and Ariel Cortez, were inside the workers barracks
at the OCW-RCBC Plaza when they decided to go out for a drinking session. They walked from their
barracks and at about 9:15 p.m. reached a nearby videoke bar in Amorsolo Street in Makati City, just
across the Makati Medical Center. There, each of them consumed six bottles of Colt 45 beer.
By 11:30 p.m., they stopped drinking when the videoke bar closed for the night. Rogelio Amit, Lilia
and Ariel Cortez left ahead of the group. The four accused proceeded to Ayala Avenue and stopped
at a vacant lot in front of the Makati Medical Center, where concrete pipes used for construction
were lying around. Reynaldo Patenio, who decided to call it a day, also stepped out of the videoke
bar and was just about five meters away from the four accused, when they invited him to join them.
When Reynaldo Patenio joined the group, they taunted him and made fun of him by pushing him
around like a ball being tossed from one man to another.
1a\^/phi1.net

Patenio was able to extricate himself from the group and was about to leave when he heard one of
the accused saying loudly "Huwag nayan, lagas nayan," which was directed at a woman who was
then boarding a jeepney. The word "lagas" means old in the Visayan dialect. At about the same time,
AAA was walking towards the center island near the corner of Buendia Avenue and Ayala Avenue
with her officemate Minerva Arguelles Frias. Laguit and Ladiao, who were then standing by the
corner of Ayala Avenue and Buendia Avenue, spotted the two women. Therefrom, Laguit and Ladiao
crossed the street and waited at the island for the two women. Minerva Arguelles Frias then boarded
a bus, leaving AAA alone with Laguit and Ladiao.
Laguit took his shirt off and was laughing while waving his shirt in the air. Ladiao, who was between
Laguit and AAA, had a smirk on his face. Nabong then appeared from the dark portion of the vacant
lot holding a "kabilya," a 7-inch pointed metal bar, sort of an improvised iced pick, and approached
Laguit, Ladiao and AAA. Nabong suddenly stabbed AAA on the right thigh using the pointed metal
bar. Simultaneously, Ladiao jumped at AAA and covered her mouth. The victim slumped on the
pavement while Ladiao, Laguit, Nabong and Miraflor crowded around the woman.

Miraflor, upon seeing what his companions were doing, hurriedly left and went to the barracks.
Patenio also left the scene and went back to the barracks about the same time Miraflor did.
Witness Ofelia A. Camba, a vendor at the RCBC Plaza, testified that on that same night between
11:00 and 11:30, while she was walking towards a creek to urinate, she overheard a group of men
talking. Upon hearing their voices, she changed her mind and instead continued to walk towards her
house at the Botanical Garden, near Urban Avenue. When she passed by the group from where the
voices emanated, she noticed two men who were seated and a man who was standing. She later
identified the man standing as Nabong. She heard Nabong, who was two meters away from her
saying "Huwag yan, lagas na yan." Having understood the remark, she suddenly felt scared.
For her part, Virginia Mabayao, another vendor in the area, testified that at or before midnight of 23
March 1999, while she was walking along Buendia Ave., she saw three men who told her, "Hi, ate
pakape ka naman." She responded by telling them to go to her vending place located at Ayala
Avenue near RCBC. They did not follow her. She noticed that one of them who was standing held a
piece of metal while swaying his head from left to right. The other two were seated. At around 1:00
a.m. the next day, she heard from the barangay captain of the killing incident. Later, at the Makati
police station, she saw the same men again whose identities she subsequently learned as Nabong,
Miraflor, and Laguit. She recalled that Nabong was the man who was standing.
Minerva Arguelles Frias, through her sworn statement, disclosed that she was with the victim that
night. They walked from their office until they reached Ayala Avenue where she boarded a bus,
leaving the victim on site.
PO3 Libretto Buisan testified that on the night of the incident, he, together with PO1 Elmer Garcia,
was on a patrol duty at the Pasong Tamo, Buendia Avenue and Makati Avenue area from 8:00 p.m.
to 8:00 a.m. the following day. At around 11:45 that night, they noticed a commotion along Buendia
Avenue near Tindalo Street. As they went closer, they discovered the body of a woman, later
identified to be that of the victim, lying on the pavement on her back, her undergarment pulled down
almost exposing her private parts. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her left breast exposed. Her
dress was torn and raised showing her belly. PO3 Buisan found the left side of the victims body
heavily bloodied. The center part of the street was splattered with blood. There were also drops of
blood on the vacant lot where the concrete pipes were located as well as on the extension of Tindalo
Street. He asked the barangay tanod to bring the victim to the hospital.
Arnel Marzan, a traffic enforcer and a Bantay Bayan at Barangay San Lorenzo, testified that at past
midnight, on 24 March 1999, he received a call for assistance. He proceeded to the scene and found
the victim still breathing and moaning. He carried the victim to a tricycle that passed by, and together
with a certain Joven Lopez, took her to the Makati Medical Center.
PO2 Rico S. Bulacan, the investigator assigned to the case, narrated that in the early morning of 24
March 1999, he conducted a spot investigation at the scene of the crime. There, he found six
concrete pieces of culvert pipes at the dark side portion of Tindalo Street corner Buendia Avenue. He
also found out that the nearby traffic post which was about 200 meters away from the corner of
Tindalo St. was stained with freshly dried blood. The bloodstains, upon laboratory examination,
tested positive for human blood. Later, he found an earring belonging to the victim near one of the
concrete culvert pipes. It was to him that witness Mabayao first confided that she saw Nabong
holding onto the traffic sign post the previous night.
Pastor Maghamil, the security guard on duty at the workers barracks said that Patenio and Miraflor
entered the barracks at around 1:30 a.m. of 24 March 1999. He also saw a man wearing a bull cap,
in white "cheleko" vest and pants walking normally toward Ayala Avenue Extension. At round 9:00

a.m. of the same day, he learned of the incident from the construction workers. Later in the evening,
policemen arrived at the barracks to inquire as to who among the workers arrived at dawn. He
informed them that Patenio and Miraflor did.
Police inspector Thomas C. Sipin, the team leader of the group who apprehended the accused,
testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of 24 March 1999, he went to the crime scene at Buendia Avenue.
He discovered bloodstains at the back of the parking sign located at the sidewalk along Buendia
Avenue. He took samples of said bloodstains, which, upon NBI laboratory examination, turned out to
be Type O human blood. He proceeded to the RCBC barracks then to the RCBC construction site.
There, he was able to talk to two vendors, Mabayao and Camba, and the security guard. On the
morning of 25 March 1999, he came back to the barracks and invited Nabong, Miraflor and Patenio.
At the police station, PO2 Bulacan conducted an investigation of the three invited persons.
Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that the victim was stabbed six
times with the use of sharp, pointed, single-bladed instrument, three on the left chest, one on the
right chest, one on the back right side chest level, and one on the right thigh. He said that the cause
of death of the victim was hemoperigonio or collection of blood at the abdominal cavities caused by
the stab wounds.
BBB, the mother of AAA, testified specifically on the civil liability of the accused.

1awphi1.nt

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of the four accused who denied having
committed the crime and offered the defense of alibi.
The four accused admitted that they went on a drinking spree at the videoke bar at around 9:00 p.m.
of 23 March 1999 with Patenio and the other co-workers. They all claimed that they left the bar at
past midnight, after which they proceeded to the nearby Burger Machine to drink coffee. They also
admitted that they never had any quarrel with Patenio.
According to Nabong, after drinking coffee with the group they parted ways. He went home to
Marikina and arrived there at around 2:00 a.m. He slept and woke up at 6:00 a.m., got his bag then
went to the barracks, arriving there at 8:00 a.m. where he slept again. When he woke up at 12 noon,
he left the barracks to see a movie and returned at 2:00 p.m. He said he chose to start to work at
6:00 p.m. that day since it was very hot to work at daytime.
For his part, Laguit testified that he consumed four bottles of Colt 45 beer at the videoke bar. They
left at past midnight and stayed at the Burger Machine for a few minutes. From there, he proceeded
to the barracks with Miraflor and Patenio. He heard of the killing on 24 March 1999, from the guard.
The whole day he stayed in the barracks. At 9:00 a.m. of 25 March 1999, he was arrested and
brought to the police station where the police asked him to confess to the killing, but he refused.
According to Ladiao, the videoke bar was only less than five minutes walk from the barracks. He
returned to the barracks after dropping by the Burger Machine. On 25 March 1999, the police took
him to the police station.
Miraflor testified that after drinking coffee at the Burger Machine, he returned to the barracks with
Patenio, while Laguit followed them. Upon reaching the barracks, he slept. The following morning,
24 March 1999, he proceeded to work. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, the security guard
assigned in the barracks told him and Patenio about the incident and that some policemen were
looking for them. The following day, he and Patenio did not report for work and waited for the
policemen to arrive. When the policemen arrived, they were told that they will be investigated. They

were later brought to the police station where two vendors arrived and identified them as the ones
responsible for the death of AAA.
The trial court subsequently rendered a decision dated 18 June 2002, finding Celino Nabong, in
conspiracy with Alvin Laguit and Nolfe Ladiao, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997." For insufficiency of evidence to
sustain his conviction, Arnel Miraflor was acquitted. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the three accused Celino Nabong y Osenar
(aka Salvador Abaquita), Alvin Laguit y Brendo and Nolfe Ladiao (aka Roel Salutario) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide who are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), as exemplary damages, one hundred eleven thousand two hundred thirty-nine pesos
(111,239.00) as actual damages, one million five hundred eight thousand one hundred thirty pesos
(P1,508,130.00) for loss of earning capacity and fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages. Arnel Miraflor Awitan is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. 7
Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellants, the case was directly elevated to this Court for
review. This Court, however, referred the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review,
conformably with the ruling in the case of People v. Mateo. 8
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on 9 September 2005 affirming the conviction of
appellants, with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated June 18, 2002 of the RTC, Branch
66, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 99-569 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) be awarded to the heirs of AAA as civil indemnity.9
Appellant Nabong filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 23 January 2006.
Hence, the instant case.
Appellant Nabong assigns the following errors:
I. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate witness Reynaldo Patenios motive to perjure
himself.
II. There is no evidence on record that accused conspicuously adopted the alleged surprised
attack as a means of executing the crime.
III. There is sufficient basis on record to justify the appreciation of intoxication and low
degree of instruction as mitigating circumstances in favor of accused.
IV. The fundamental right of accused to legal counsel was violated.
For their part, appellant Laguit and Ladiao assign the following error:

BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ALVIN B. LAGUIT AND NOLFE LADIAO OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
HEREIN.
Appellants contend that the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in finding them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted rape with homicide. They claim that the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is meager to sustain their convictions and that
reasonable doubt exists in their favor.
We say that, contrary to appellants posture, the prosecution has discharged, through circumstantial
evidence, the burden of proving beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellants are guilty of the
charge.
This Court cites with approval circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution on the crime of
attempted rape as found by the trial court:
Ofelia Camba xxx testified that at about 11:30 p.m. of March 23, 1999, shortly before the commission
of the crime, she passed by a place near where she sold cigarettes and some food items. She was
about to proceed to the foot of a bridge at a nearby creek to urinate when she heard some voices
from a group of three persons, two of who were seated while the other was standing. She distinctly
heard one of them- the person standing- say softly to the other two: Huwag na yan, lagas na yan."
She was only two meters away when she heard the words uttered by one of the three person.
"Lagas," according to Camba, meant old. Obviously she was the one being referred to. She
positively identified Nabong as the one who uttered the aforequoted words.
May it be recalled at this juncture that Patenio had also testified that he heard one of the three
accused Ladiao, Laguit and Nabong- utter the same words. He said he was just a few yards away
from the three accused and heard distinctly one of them say: "Huwag na yan. Lagas na yan."
When the body of the victim was found by PO3 Liberato Buisan and PO1 Elmer Garcia, of the
Makati City Police Mobile Unit, her undergarment was "nakababa" (pulled down) and her private
parts were almost exposed. Her brassiere was torn off leaving her entire left breast open to view. Her
dress was torn apart that her belly was likewise exposed.
Such conditions were highly suggestive of force or violence applied upon the victim that is normally
preparatory to sexual attack. Moreover, there was effort on the part of the attackers to keep the
victim from screaming or shouting for help. Patenio saw Ladiao cover the mouth of the victim.
The words of injunction against taking interest in an old woman which can only mean that Camba, at
46, was not worth their while, give an inkling of what the three accused had in mind. Such words
gave away their mischievous intent which, coupled with the conditions that were found in the
sprawled body of the victim when discovered, may well prove the complex crime of attempted rape
with homicide even in the absence of direct evidence. 10
Likewise, the fact of the victims killing by the appellants was sufficiently established with moral
certainty by the prosecution. As aptly discussed by the trial court:
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the fact of killing have not been successfully
refuted by the defense. Patenio saw Nabong as he struck the first blow- the stab on the victims
thigh. While he did not see the succeeding five strikes upon the woman with the sharpened pointed
(sic) "kabilya", there can be no doubt that it was made by Nabong or any of the two others or both.

That it could not be ascertained if the succeeding stab wounds were inflicted by one or the other of
the accused, it would not make any difference anyway since there was unquestionably conspiracy
among the three accused in the commission of the crime.
Patenio gave testimony with details only an eyewitness could have given. He was candid even to
admit he felt a bit resentful that the accused made fun of him. His testimony clearly showed that
Nabong, Laguit and Ladiao performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as
unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design which is to rape the victim- and kill her, as
they did. Laguit and Ladiao gave the victim no chance to escape nor to shout for help. They blocked
her way at the slightest indication she would escape. They covered her mouth so she could not call
for help. Then Nabong appeared and stabbed her in the thigh to prevent her even more from running
away.11
In an attempt to discredit witness Patenios testimony, appellant Nabong insists that the formers
testimony is unreliable based on the following: (a) Patenio has an ax to grind against appellants for
making fun of him; (b) since Patenio was initially taken as a suspect, he was compelled to offer
perjurious testimony against the appellants to save himself from being included as one of the
perpetrators of the crime; (c) even as Patenio allegedly saw Nabong stab the victim in the thigh, he
did not lift a finger to dissuade Nabong from his supposed act, or at least report the incident to the
police.
As a rule, the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally accorded the highest
degree of weight and respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the unique
opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying. 12
In the case under consideration, appellant Nabong imputes ill motive to the prosecution witness
Patenio, alleging that the latter has a score to settle with the appellants for making fun of him.
However, such fact does not conclusively establish that the prosecution witness, in testifying against
the appellants, was moved by a desire to retaliate against the latter. In the absence of sufficient
proof of improper motive, the presumption is that the said witness was not so moved and his
testimony is thus entitled to full faith and credit.13 Besides, it must be recalled that it was witness
Patenio who admitted before the trial court that he felt a bit resentful that the appellants made fun of
him. This candid admission of the prosecution witness in fact bolsters his credibility and fortifies his
testimony against the appellants.
The fact that Patenio was one of the first suspects in the commission of the crime does not make his
testimony less credible. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Granting that Patenio was initially taken as a suspect in the crime, this fact does not affect his
credibility as a witness. Not all persons invited for questioning by the police turn out to be the real
culprits. It is but normal that the police will have several suspects for initial investigation. This
procedure helps the authorities to determine with clarity the real perpetrators. Some of these
witnesses even turn out to be state witnesses or eye-witness as in the case of Patenio. 14
Witness Patenios failure to report immediately to the proper authority does not impinge on his
credibility. This Court has ruled that, when confronted with startling occurences, behavioral
responses of witnesses are diverse.15Indeed, there is no uniform reaction or standard behavioral
response to grisly events.16 In numerous instances, this Court has declared that the reluctance of
eyewitnesses to testify on a crime and to get involved in a criminal investigation are but normal and
do not by themselves affect the witnesses credibility.17 The sealed lips of said witnesses are but a
natural and spontaneous reaction.18 They may opt to remain silent rather than to imperil their own
lives.19

In the instant case, witness Patenio, fearing for his safety, kept silent about the incident. This is
understandable because the witness has no relatives residing in the metropolis who may be able to
lend him a safe abode in case the appellants would retaliate against him for his testimony. In the
same vein, being an ordinary mortal, the witness, who may not have the virtues of fortitude and
altruism, cannot be expected to risk his life by preventing the appellants from completing their
criminal objective.
Appellants assert that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in appreciating treachery since
the evidence is bereft of proof that appellants plotted to carry out the attack on the victim.
Appellants contention is unmeritorious.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. 20 Thus, this Court has ruled that even frontal
attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. 21 Treachery
can still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to his/her person. 22 What
is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself/herself or to retaliate.23 In the present case, the victim did not even have sufficient warning of
the danger that was looming, since the attack against her came from behind and was so sudden and
unexpected, thus giving the victim no time to flee or to prepare her defense or enable her to offer the
least resistance to the sudden assault.
Appellant Nabong faults the lower courts in not appreciating intoxication and low degree of
instruction in his favor.
For intoxication to be considered as mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication
impaired the will power of the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not
comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.24 The person pleading intoxication must prove that he took
such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as would blur his
reason.25 This, the appellants failed to do. The records are bereft of any evidence that the quantity of
liquor they had taken was of such quantity as to affect their mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact
that appellants could recall details of what had transpired after their drinking session is the best proof
that they knew what they were doing during that occasion. The deception, the device, the place and
manner of perpetrating the crime all point to the fact that appellants had complete control of their
minds.
Neither can appellant Nabongs alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy alone
will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and
knowledge of the full significance of ones act.26 Besides, one does not have to be educated or
intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person. 27
In a desperate effort to exculpate himself from the charge against him, Nabong clutches at straws.
He argues that his fundamental right to legal counsel was violated when his counsel did not bother
to secure the attendance of witnesses in his defense, particularly Nabongs cousin, whose supposed
testimony would support his defense of alibi.
This argument deserves scant consideration. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this
issue was raised belatedly by appellant Nabong for the first time before the Court of Appeals in a
motion for reconsideration. The rule is that an issue not raised in the trial cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, much less in a motion for reconsideration.28

At any rate, the records do not show that Nabongs counsel had been remiss in his duty. Defense
witnesses were presented in the person of the four accused and cross-examination had been
conducted by the defense counsel.
As to the award of actual damages, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay the heirs of the
victim the following amounts: (a) P6,499.00 as medical expenses; (b) P35,000.00 as burial expense;
(c) P25,740.00 cost of the burial lot; and (d) P44,000.00 expenses incurred during the wake.
Appellant Nabong questions the award of P44,000.00 spent for the wake of the victim claiming that
the prosecution did not present official receipts for said expenses. The mother of the victim testified
that she expended the said amount for the wake of her daughter. Said expenses were reduced into
writing and marked as Exh. "V". The defense did not object to this during the direct examination of
the witness for the prosecution nor in the formal offer of evidence. Thus, the rule stating that
"evidence not objected to is deemed admitted" finds application in the case under
consideration.29 For this reason, the trial court can take into ACCOUNT such evidence in arriving at
the judgment.30 Hence, the trial courts judgment ordering appellants to pay P44,000.00 for the
expenses incurred during the wake is correct.
Also assailed is the certification of the victims monthly salary from her employer. It is contended that
said evidence is hearsay since nobody from the office of the victims employer testified on the said
document.
Again, this contention is unavailing. Failure on the part of the appellants to object to the presentation
of such evidence during the direct examination of the prosecution witness and the formal offer of the
certificate of employment dated 25 October 1999 issued by the victims employer and marked as
Exh. "W" makes the said evidence admissible and one that can be considered by the trial court in its
verdict.
The computation of the trial court with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At the time of her
death, the victim was 22 years old. She had been earning P6,500.00 monthly. Loss of earning
capacity is computed by applying the following formula:31
Net Earning
Capacity

life expectancy
[2/3(80-age at death)]

Gross Annual
Income (GAI)

living expenses
(50% of GAI)

(80-22)

]x

GAI

[50% of GAI]

(58)

]x

P78,000

P39,000

2
X

=[
3
2

=[
3
116

=[

]x

[P39,000]

Net Earning
Capacity
of the victim

[38.67]

P1,508,130.00

[P39,000]

Proceeding now to the appropriate penalty, it must be noted that the penalty for the crime of
attempted rape with homicide is "reclusion perpetua to death." Since the penalty is composed of two
indivisible penalties, then for the purpose of determining the imposable penalty, Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code must be considered.32 It provides in part:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.
With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery and there being no mitigating
circumstance, the higher penalty of death should be imposed.33
In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on 24 June 2006, the imposition of
the death penalty has been prohibited.34 Thus, the penalty imposed upon appellants should be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.35
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 00731, dated 9 September
2005 as well as its Resolution dated 23 January 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the
conviction of appelllants and the amount of damages are concerned. The sentence that shall be
imposed upon appellants, however, is MODIFIED. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without
parole. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173150

July 28, 2010

LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a
correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being
the duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from.1
Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision2 promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC Decision
convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the
CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.
Factual Antecedents
On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with Unintentional
Abortion committed as follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon,
Municipality of Bogo, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault,
attack, employ force and seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom teacher of
Nailon Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions as such which
acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S.
Micarsos.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the
NailonElementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydias son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at
the time material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning
from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek
and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydias violent
assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical
certificate5 issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981,
she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate 6 was issued.
The Defenses Version
Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so
that his classmates will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her
hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of
direct assault with unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered
to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as actual damages and
Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.7

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA vacated the trial courts judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault
since Gemma descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of
pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. 8 Likewise,
Lydias purpose was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling
of her son.9
The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there
was no evidence that she was aware of Gemmas pregnancy at the time of the incident. 10 However, it
declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical injuries, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23
of Cebu City, dated October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered
CONVICTING the accused-appellant for slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten (10)
days.
SO ORDERED.11
Issues
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight
Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to
suffer the penalty of arrestomenor minimum of ten days.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of
Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with
Unintentional Abortion.12
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate in the exercise of our
concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.13

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Direct assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The
provision reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
1avvphi1

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may
be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.14
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its
elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation,
or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the
actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past
performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent
in the exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.15
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official
duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils
who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry
when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to
be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principals office but Lydia followed and resorted to the

use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemmas
fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the
provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority Who shall be deemed as such.
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873,
approved June 12, 1985).16
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in
setting aside the trial courts verdict. It erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct
assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she
allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at
the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a
teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly,17 but Lydia
refused and instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia
aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall divider while
she was going to the principals office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.
The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime
of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of
Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the
medical certificate of Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the
court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her
medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. 18 It was therefore vital for
the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between
Lydias assault and Gemmas abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact
effect of the assault on Gemmas abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on
August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too
lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of
the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated
by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result
of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault,
she must suffer the penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00, when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.19 Here, Lydia is a
public officer or employee since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in authority.
1avvphi1

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.20Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to
an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, and
the maximum of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the
indeterminate term of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto
mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one
(21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods. A fine of not more thanP1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in
accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment
is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault
and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a
fine of P1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 138553, June 30, 2005 ]
ENRIQUE TOTOY RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari are the October 16, 1998
decision[1] and April 5, 1999 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17284, which
respectively affirmed in toto an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet
convicting herein petitioner Enrique Totoy Rivera of the crime of direct assault, and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information [3] for direct
assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province
of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously
resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging
the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus
injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official
duties.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of Not Guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of the victim himself, Lt.
Edward Leygo, and the two alleged eyewitnesses to the incident, SPO1 Jose Bangcado and Brenda
Dup-et. For its part, the defense presented the petitioner himself and one Alfredo Castro.
As summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals in the decision herein
assailed, the Peoples version[4] is, as follows:
On March 20, 1993 at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo,
Deputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol of the La Trinidad Police Station, La Trinidad,
Benguet and SPO1 Joseph Basquial were conducting routinary patrol on board a police car
somewhere in Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet when they came upon a truck unloading sacks of
chicken dung at the stall of accused Enrique Totoy Rivera which was located along the Halsema
Highway at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. Inspector Leygo advised the driver to stop unloading the
manure as it violates La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. I-91 (Exhibit C) which prohibits, among
others, the loading and unloading of chicken manure along the sidewalks or road shoulders or within

15 meters from the center of the Halsema Highway located at La Trinidad, Benguet. The driver
complied with the police directive. The policemen then escorted the truck back to Poblacion, La
Trinidad, Benguet and proceeded to the police headquarters.
Not long after, SPOI Jose Bangcado and SPOI Rivera Dayap, members of the La Trinidad Police
under Inspector Leygo were conducting patrol aboard a police car somewhere at Km. 6, La Trinidad,
Benguet when they observed a truck loaded with chicken dung proceeding towards Shilan, La
Trinidad, Benguet. Having in mind the instructions of La Trinidad Mayor Edna C. Tabanda and their
Commanding Officer Inspector Leygo to Implement Ordinance No. I-91, the two policemen followed
and stopped the truck at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet. Immediately they called Inspector Leygo on
the radio and informed him that they stopped a truck carrying chicken dung. Inspector Leygo
ordered them to restrain the truck, as he would be proceeding to the area.
Knowing that the truck being restrained by the two policemen was the same truck which they had
escorted earlier from Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet, Inspector Leygo felt ignored and insulted. He
immediately called SPO4 Justino Tiwtiwa, SPO1 Baldwin Ngolab and SPO1 Joseph Basquial and
the group sped to Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Meanwhile, back at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the accused arrived before the group of Inspector
Leygo did and ordered the driver not to obey the policemen but instead obey him, as he (accused)
was the boss. The truck driver followed the accuseds order and drove the truck towards Shilan, La
Trinidad, Benguet with the accused following closely behind in his vehicle.
Inspector Leygo and his group arrived in time to see the truck pulling away and so they gave chase.
The police were able to overtake and stop the truck at Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet.
Inspector Leygo confronted the truck driver and asked him why he still insisted on proceeding to
Shilan to unload chicken manure despite the fact that he was ordered to go back earlier in the
evening. The truck driver stated that he was just following the orders of the accused. Immediately,
Inspector Leygo turned around to see the accused who had at that time alighted from his vehicle
behind the truck. Inspector Leygo asked the accused why he insisted on defying the ban on the
unloading and loading of chicken manure. Instead of answering however, the accused pointed a
finger on the policeman and uttered words like Babalian kita ng buto (Ill break your bones).
Ilalampaso kita (Ill scrub you). Pulis lang kayo (you are only policemen) and other unsavory and
insulting words. Inspector Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop uttering
further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and then informed him that he was being
arrested for violation of the chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his jacket, placed it

inside the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the policeman. Inspector Leygo then
approached the accused and warned him anew that he was being arrested. The accused
responded by punching Inspector Leygo on his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled
as Inspector Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the help of Policemen Dayap and
Bongcado, the accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed into one of the police cars but
he resisted until Alfredo Castro, one of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car
to accompany him.
The accused was brought to the police headquarters where Inspector Leygo immediately called
Mayor Tabanda who arrived at about 10:00 oclock that same evening. She confronted the two
protagonists and at the same time admonished the accused for violating Ordinance No. I-91. Mayor
Tabanda then accompanied the accused and Inspector Leygo to the Benguet General Hospital
where both were examined by Dr. Antonio T. Carino. In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit A) of
Inspector Leygo, his injury described as contusion with 0.5 laceration, upper lip, left side with
healing period from 5 to 7 days. Subsequently, this present case was filed against the accused.
Reproduced from the same decision of the appellate court, the defenses version [5] runs:
At about 8:00 oclock in the evening of March 20, 1993, while the accused was at the Trading Post at
Km. 5, La Trinidad, Benguet, the driver reported to him that he was prevented by the police from
unloading chicken manure at Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. The accused reminded the driver that he
should have brought the chicken manure to Acop, Tublay, Benguet where dealers sell it when
prevented from unloading within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. As it would be more
expensive to return the chicken dung to Batangas where it came from, the accused told the driver to
bring the chicken dung to Acop, Tublay, Benguet. The driver expressed his fear that the police might
stop him along the way and so the accused ordered the driver to proceed and gave him the
assurance that he (accused) would follow later.
The truck then proceeded as instructed and the accused following after a short while. Arriving at
Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, the accused noticed that the truck was stopped at the side of the road
while a police vehicle and three policemen were across the road. Thinking that the policemen were
there trying to extort money from the driver, the accused told the truck driver to proceed. The truck
driver complied and the accused tailed along.
When the truck and the accused reached Dengsi, Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet, he heard a police
siren from behind. Immediately, a police vehicle overtook the truck, another police vehicle was
running along side the accuseds vehicle and a third police vehicle was right behind them. Thus, the
truck and the accused had no recourse but to stop.

Inspector Leygo alighted from one of the police vehicles and angrily uttered so many words at the
accused. The policeman then held the collar of accuseds jacket and forced the latter to get out of
his vehicle while shouting Ang tigas ng ulo mo. Sige, bumunot ka. (You are very stubborn. Go
ahead, draw your gun.) The accused explained that he had no gun to draw while removing his
jacket and raising his hands to show that there was no gun on his body. Inspector Leygo then held
the left hand of the accused and tried to put handcuffs on him. The accused tried to resist, pleading
that he had no fault and at the same time asking what infraction of law he committed. Inspector
Leygo answered by uttering insulting words and pointing his left forefinger on the accuseds face
while his right hand was poking a gun on the accused. The accused noticed that the policeman
smelled of liquor.
A crowd started to gather around the scene. Sensing that the onlookers were on his side, the
accused stated that he was going to get his camera inside his vehicle. As he was opening the door,
Inspector Leygo suddenly slapped and boxed him in the stomach causing the accused to feel dizzy.
This assault weakened him and so he did not resist when the police pushed him inside the police
vehicle. Inspector Leygo then ordered his men to bring the accused to the police headquarters. The
accused recognized Alfredo Castro among the onlookers and because he (accused) knew him to be
one of the chicken dung dealers, asked him (Castro) to accompany him to the police headquarters
for fear that something might happen.
At the police station, the accused suggested that Inspector Leygo should undergo medical
examination to determine if the policeman was positive of alcoholic breath. The accused, however,
was examined ahead and was issued a medical certificate (Exhibit 4) which described his injury as
erythema, lip left side face and contusion-midepigastric area. The healing period is from 3 to 5
days. With him sustaining this injury, the accused now wonders why this charge was filed against
him.
After weighing the parties respective versions of the incident, the trial court found that of the People
more credible. Accordingly, in its decision of April 22, 1994,[6] it convicted petitioner of the crime of
direct assault and sentenced him, thus:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the Court
hereby renders judgment finding the accused Enrique Totoy Rivera GUILTY and sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor as MINIMUM
to One (1) Year, One (1) Month and Eleven (11) Days of prision correccional as MAXIMUM. He is
likewise ordered to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner then went on
appeal to the Court of Appeals whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17284.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in its decision[7] of October 16, 1998, affirmed in
toto that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED,
and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of April 5, 1999.[8]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, submitting for our consideration the principal issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court.
We AFFIRM.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person
or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance.[9]
Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the
offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in
authority.[10]
In this recourse, petitioner argues that the appellate court, like the trial court, erred in finding the
testimony of complainant Lt. Leygo as clear and convincing. In an attempt to impugn the latters
credibility, petitioner contends that Lt. Leygo was mumbling while giving his testimony, adding that
the latter failed to identify which of his (petitioner) hands was used and the precise distance between
them when he punched the police lieutenant.

Admittedly, the record shows that the trial judge had to call Lt. Leygos attention for testifying in such
a low voice while on the witness box. Evidently, however, this did not prevent the trial court into
believing his testimony and from according it full faith and credit. As it is, the witness was able to
narrate and communicate the events that transpired. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
found the witness to have clearly and adequately recounted how the incident happened, and we find
no valid reason to discredit the truth and veracity of his narration. We quote:
Q Now, you said that Mr. Rivera faced you, when he faced you after he removed his jacket what did
you do?
A He positioned himself in a fighting stance, sir.
Q What do you mean in the fighting stance?
A He raised his fist. (Witness raised his hands with his clenched fist in front of him).
Q How about you, what did you do when Mr. Rivera did that?
A I informed him that I am arresting him.
Q How far were you when he faced you at first?
A At first before I went near him is about 6 feet, sir.
Q Now, you said you approached him, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do when you approached him?
A I told him that I am arresting him, sir.
Q And what was his response?
A He punched me at my face, sir.
Q You said he punched you, with what hand did Mr. Rivera punch you?
A I think it is his left hand, sir.[11]
Nor is Lt. Leygos credibility any less diminished by the circumstance that he failed to categorically
identify which of petitioners hands was used in punching him, and the exact distance between them
at that time. In all likelihood, this police officer was not expecting a physical attack by the petitioner
as he was just confronting the latter about the prohibited unloading of chicken dung when petitioner
laid hand on him. Under this scenario, any person, like Lt. Leygo, cannot be expected to remember
every single detail of the incident with perfect recall. [12] For sure, far from adversely affecting Lt.

Leygos credibility, his failure to recall every minute detail of what transpired even fortifies it. We have
thus held that the failure of a witness to recall each and every detail of an occurrence may even
serve to strengthen rather than weaken his credibility because it erases any suspicion of a coached
or rehearsed testimony.[13] What is vital in Lt. Leygos testimony is the fact that petitioner punched
him on his face, about which he was steadfast and unflinching.
In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity
to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while
testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be
disturbed on appeal.[14]
Petitioner also asserts that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Jose Bangcado and
Brenda Dup-et did not corroborate Lt. Leygos testimony. For, while SPO1 Bangcado merely
testified during direct examination that petitioner punched Lt. Leygo, this witness failed to reiterate
said testimony during cross-examination. As regards prosecution witness Brenda Dup-et, petitioner
alleged that this witness never testified that petitioner boxed Lt. Leygo.
The imputed shortcomings in the testimonies of said two (2) prosecution witnesses are not of their
own making. A witness is supposed to confine his answers only to questions propounded of him.
Here, the defense counsel focused his line of questioning on what the two protagonists were doing
immediately prior to the punching incident, and the answer correctly received by counsel was that
both petitioner and Leygo were pushing each other. There is no showing that counsel asked the
witness as to what happened after the pushing incident, as what the public prosecutor did of SPO1
Bangcado during the latters direct examination, to wit:
PROS. BOTENGAN:
Q And what happened when they faced each other?
A Totoy Rivera was shouting at Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q What was he shouting?
A Bakit ninyo ako tinutugis, hindi ako criminal. Magbabayad kayo rito. Hindi ninyo ako kaya, pulis
lang kayo. And some other words but I cannot remember them all, sir.
Q What else, if any, did he say?

COURT:
He said he cannot remember the other words.
WITNESS:
There is one thing more, sir. Ilalampaso kita. Babalian kita ng buto. And others, sir.
PROS. BOTENGAN:
Q To whom was Mr. Rivera saying this?
A To Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q What was Mr. Rivera doing when he said these?
A He was pointing to the face of Lt. Leygo and they are becoming closer and closer with each other,
sir.
Q At that time, what was Lt. Leygo doing?
A What I saw was they were pushing to one another and after that Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, sir.
Q You said they were pushing one another, what part of their body were they holding?
A At the breast, sir.
Q So each one was holding each others breast, is that what you mean?
A Yes, sir.
Q How long did they push each other?
A Seven to ten seconds, sir.
Q And was Lt. Leygo saying anything?
A He was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, sir.
Q You said that he was trying to arrest Totoy Rivera, did you hear him if he says anything?
A He was convincing Totoy Rivera to go to the Municipal Hall, sir.

Q You said Totoy Rivera boxed Lt. Leygo, what part of the body of Lt. Leygo was hit?
A His face, sir.
Q What part of his face?
A Here, sir. (Witness referring to his lower lip. Witness is holding his lower lip).
Q What happened when Lt. Leygo was hit?
A He ordered us to arrest Totoy Rivera, so were able to subdue Totoy Rivera and placed him in the
car, sir.[15]
But even assuming, in gratia argumente, that Lt. Leygos testimony was not corroborated by the two
(2) other prosecution witnesses during their cross-examinations, still the day cannot be saved for the
petitioner. Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that the testimony of a single witness, if
straightforward and categorical, is sufficient to convict. After all, witnesses are weighed, not
numbered, and evidence are assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is not uncommon, then, to
reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. Corroborative evidence is
deemed necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified
the truth or that his observations had been inaccurate. [16] Unfortunately for the petitioner, the trial
court found nothing to indicate that Lt. Leygo falsified the truth or that his observations had been
inaccurate.
Petitioner theorizes that he could not have hit Lt. Leygo, what with the circumstance that his copolicemen were present at the scene of the incident, and he finds it unusual that none of them
retaliated if he really hit Lt. Leygo.
We are not persuaded. The evidence on record clearly bears out that it was Lt. Leygo who was
attacked by petitioner, not the other way around, as petitioner would want us to believe. Both the
witnesses for the prosecution and the defense are one in saying that it was only petitioner who was
in confrontation with Lt. Leygo. Evidently, petitioners anger started to burst when the truck driver
reported to him that Lt. Leygo prohibited the unloading of the chicken dung and ordered him to
return, such that when the same delivery truck was again intercepted by Lt. Leygos group,
petitioners anger was too much for him to contain. We quote with approval what the trial court has
said in its decision:
The accused, however, denies that he ever laid hands on the cop. But the bigger question is, how
then did the policeman sustain his injuries? It is highly improbable, if not absurd, for the policeman
to inflict it on himself. It is also very unlikely that his co-policemen would punch him just to make it
appear that the accused did it. The accused admits of being at the place. He admits having been

confronted by the policeman but he denies that he ever lifted a finger against the policeman. Yet all
the witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense are in accord in saying that it was only the
accused who was in confrontation with the policeman. The only logical conclusion that can be
derived from this is that it is indeed the accused who punched the policeman. Evidence to be
believed must not only proceed from the mouth of the credible witness but it must be credible in
itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of the testimony of a witness than its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind (People vs. Maspil, Jr., 186 SCRA
751).
That the other police officers did not retaliate is no basis for us to share petitioners submission that
Lt. Leygo was the aggressor. In the nature of things, they naturally reacted the way they
should, i.e. placed petitioner under arrest when ordered by Lt. Leygo.
Petitioner next contends that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance of his official duties as a police
officer and asDeputy Chief of Police for Operation and Patrol at the time he was attacked.
Again, We disagree.
It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual
performance of his official duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform and was on board
a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading chicken
manure. Because the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La Trinidad Municipal Ordinance
No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck driver to return from where he came, but petitioner, in
defiance of such lawful order, commanded the truck driver to return to Shilan, the place where the
truck was first intercepted, and on being informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant
had every reason to assume it did return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus
stopped it from doing so.
Under the circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that Lt. Leygo was not in the performance
of his lawful duties as a police officer when the assault upon him was perpetrated by the petitioner.
Nor are we impressed by petitioners submission that the prosecutions failure to present the doctor,
who examined Lt. Leygo, proved disastrous to the Peoples case, arguing that the alleged injury of
Lt. Leygo cannot be proved without the testimony of the attending physician.
That Dr. Antonio T. Carino did not testify on the medical certificate he issued is of no moment. If
ever, the medical certificate is only corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element of

the crime of direct assault filed against petitioner. The unequivocal piece of evidence against
petitioner is no less Lt. Leygos credible and consistent testimony that he was punched on his face
by the petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner puts the Court of Appeals to task for sustaining the trial courts observation that he
exuded an aura of arrogance and defiance of authorities.
We have consistently ruled that the trial court judge is in the best of position to see and observe the
demeanor, actuation and countenance of a witness, matters which are not normally expressed in the
transcripts of his testimony. We see no reason, therefore, to disturb the following observations of the
trial court in its decision:
The demeanor of the accused on the witness stand also shows that he is the kind who is impatient
with authority. His manner of answering questions bespeaks of one who has trouble abiding with
authority. He portrayed a very aggressive manner and his answers were always on the defensive as
if he had every right in this world to do and say whatever he wanted to. Over all, he exuded an aura
of arrogance and defiance of authority.
In closing, let it be noted that the attention of this Court has not been called to of any ulterior or
improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner.
Absence such a motive, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 88189 July 9, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIBURCIO ABALOS, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p
In this appeal, accused-appellant Tiburcio Abalos seeks absolution from the judgment of conviction
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Catbalogan, Samar which pronounced him guilty
of the complex crime of direct assault with murder in Criminal Case No. 2302. His arguments in the
present appeal turn on the central question of unwarranted credence allegedly extended by the trial
court to the version of the criminal incident narrated by the sole prosecution witness. The totality of
the evidence adduced, however, indubitably confirms appellant's guilt of the offense charged.
Accordingly, we affirm.
An information filed in the trial court, dated April 21, 1983, imputed the crime of direct assault with
murder to herein appellant Tiburcio Abalos, alias "Ewet," with the allegations
That on or about the 20th day of March, 1983, at nighttime, in the Municipality of
Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and knowing fully well that one Sofronio Labine
was an agent of a person in authority being a member of the Integrated National
Police with station at Catbalogan, Samar, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and strike said Sofronio Labine with a piece of wood,
which said accused ha(d) conveniently provided himself for the purpose while said
P/Pfc. Sofronio Labine, a duly appointed and qualified member of the said INP, was
engaged in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion of such
performance, that is, maintaining peace and order during the barangay fiesta of
Canlapwas, of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon him "Lacerated wound 2
inches parietal area right. Blood oozing from both ears and nose" which wound
directly caused his death.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was
present. 1
At his arraignment on June 7, 1983, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. 2 The trial conducted thereafter culminated in the decision 3 of the trial court on February 3, 1989
finding appellant guilty as charged and meting out to him the penalty of "life imprisonment, with the
accessories of the law." Appellant was likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of

P30,000.00; actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P2,633.00, with P15,000.00 as moral
damages; and to pay the costs. 4

As recounted by prosecution witness Felipe Basal, a farmer residing in Barangay Pupua,

Catbalogan, Samar, appellant assaulted the victim, Pfc. Sofronio Labine, at around 8:00 P.M. of
March 20, 1983, which was then the day of the barangay fiesta celebrations in Barangay
Canlapwas, Catbalogan, Samar. The incident transpired near the house of appellant at the
said barangay. Felipe Basal was then having a drinking session in front of the shanty of one Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. which was situated just a few meters from the residence of appellant.
According to Basal, at about that time he noticed the father of appellant, Police Major Cecilio Abalos,
scolding his employees in his transportation business for turning in only two hundred pesos in
earnings for that day. While Major Abalos was thus berating his employees, appellant arrived and
asked his father not to scold them and to just let them take part in the barangay festivities. This
infuriated the elder Abalos and set off a heated argument between father and son. 5
While the two were thus quarreling, a woman shouted "Justicia, boligue kumi! Adi in mag-aaringasa." meaning, "Police officer, help us! Somebody's making trouble here." The victim, Pfc.
Sofronio Labine, then appeared on the scene and asked Major Abalos, "What is it, sir?" The victim
saluted Abalos when the latter turned around to face him. As Major Abalos leveled his carbine at
Labine, appellant hurriedly left and procured a piece of wood, about two inches thick, three inches
wide and three feet long, from a nearby Ford Fiera vehicle.
He then swiftly returned and unceremoniously swung with that wooden piece at Labine from behind,
hitting the policeman at the back of the right side of his head. Labine collapsed unconscious in a
heap, and he later expired from the severe skull fracture he sustained from that blow. Felipe Basal
and his wife took flight right after appellant struck the victim, fearful that they might be hit by possible
stray bullets 6 should a gunfight ensue.
Appellant's testimony, on the other hand, is of a different tenor. He admits having struck Labine with
a piece of wood during the incident in question but claims that he did so in the erroneous belief that
his father was being attacked by a member of the New People's Army (NPA). According to appellant,
he was then seated inside their family-owned Sarao jeepney parked beside the store of Rodulfo
Figueroa, Jr. near their home in Barangay Canlapwas when he noticed a man in fatigue uniform
suddenly accost his father. At that time, appellant's father had just arrived from a trip from Wright,
Samar and had just alighted from his service vehicle, a Ford Fiera.
The man tried to disarm Major Abalos of his firearm but the latter resisted and while the two were
grappling for possession of the gun, appellant instinctively went to the rescue of his father. He got a
piece of wood from Figueroa's store with which he then clubbed Labine whom he did not recognize
at that point. When Labine fell to the ground from the blow, appellant immediately fled to Barangay
Mercedes nearby, fearing that the man had companions who might retaliate. When he came to know
of the identity of his victim the following morning, he forthwith surrendered to the authorities. 7
As mentioned at the outset, the foregoing version of the factual antecedents as presented by
appellant was roundly rejected by the lower court which found the same unworthy of belief. Appellant

ascribes reversible errors to the trial court (a) in not giving credence to the evidence adduced by the
defense; (b) in believing the evidence presented by the prosecution; (c) in relying on the
prosecution's evidence which falls short of the required quantum of evidence that would warrant a
conviction; (d) in finding that treachery attended the commission of the crime and failing to credit in
appellant's favor his voluntary surrender; and (e) in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. 8
In the main, appellant insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the story of the
lone eyewitness for the prosecution. He also contends that since the testimony of that witness bore
clear traces of incredibility, particularly the fact that he could not have had a clear view of the incident
due to poor visibility, the prosecution should have presented as well the woman who had called for
help at the height of the incident if only to corroborate Basal's narration of the events. Appellant also
assails as inherently incredible the fact that it took quite a time for witness Felipe Basal to come
forward and divulge what he knew to the authorities. All these, unfortunately, are flawed arguments.
From the evidence in the case at bar, the prosecution has convincingly proved, through the clear and
positive testimony of Basal, the manner in which the victim was killed by herein appellant. The
record is bereft of any showing that said prosecution witness was actuated by any evil motivation or
dubious intent in testifying against appellant. Moreover, a doctrine of long standing in this jurisdiction
is that the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an
accused. 9 There was thus no need, as appellant would want the prosecution to do, to present in court the
woman who shouted for assistance since her testimony would only be corroborative in nature.
The presentation of such species of evidence in court would only be warranted when there are
compelling reasons to suspect that the eyewitness is prevaricating or that his observations were
inaccurate. 10 Besides, it is up to the People to determine who should be presented as prosecution
witness on the basis of its own assessment of the necessity for such testimony. 11 Also, no unreasonable
delay could even be attributed to Felipe Basal considering that during the wake for Pfc. Labine, Basal
came and intimated to the widow of the victim that he was going to testify regarding her husband's
slaying. 12
Appellant's contention that the deceased had attacked and attempted to divest his father of his
firearm is rather preposterous considering that no reason was advanced as to why the deceased
patrolman would assault a police officer of superior rank. Parenthetically, the condition of visibility at
the time of the incident was conducive not only to the clear and positive identification of appellant as
the victim's assailant but likewise to an actual and unobstructed view of the events that led to the
victim's violent death.
Basal was seated just a few meters away from the protagonists whom he all knew, he being also a
long-time resident of that municipality. There was a twelve-foot high fluorescent lamppost located
along the road and which, by appellant's own reckoning, was just seventeen meters away from
them. 13 Notwithstanding the fact that a couple of trees partly obstructed the post, the illumination cast by
the fluorescent lamp and the nearby houses provided sufficient brightness for the identification of the
combatants.
Curiously enough, appellant's assertion that there was poor visibility is ironically contradicted by his
testimony which is detailed on facts that one could readily recall after witnessing an event in broad

daylight. While appellant considers unbelievable Basal's identification of him supposedly because of
inadequate lighting, he himself, under the same conditions, could clearly see his father's assailant
wearing a fatigue uniform which was different from that worn by policemen. He even asserts that he
saw his father clutching the carbine with his hands holding the butt while his purported assailant held
on tightly to the rifle. 14 What these facts establish is that the lights in the area at the time of the incident
were enough to afford Basal an excellent view of the incident, contrary to appellant's pretense. Appellant's
testimony is thus negated by the rule that evidence, to be believed, must have been given not only by a
credible witness, but that the same must also be reasonably acceptable in itself.
Appellant's flight right after he had assaulted the victim is also corrosive of his testimony. For, if it
were true that he had merely labored under the wrong notion that his father was being attacked by a
member of the NPA, and that it was an innocent case of error in personae, he could have readily
surrendered to his father right then and there. After all, Cecilio Abalos was a police major and was
the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police (INP) in Wright, Samar. Further, there was
no necessity at all for him to flee from the crime scene for fear of retaliation considering that he was
in the company of his own father who, aside from his position, was then armed with a carbine.
Appellant's explanation is, therefore, absurd and should be considered as self-serving evidence with
no weight in law.
On the offense committed by appellant, the trial court correctly concluded that he should be
held ACCOUNTABLE for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
committingatentados contra la autoridad o sus agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code.
The first is not a trueatentado as it is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, except that there is no
public uprising. On the other hand, the second mode is the more common way of committing assault
and is aggravated when there is a weapon employed in the attack, or the offender is a public officer,
or the offender lays hands upon a person in authority.15
Appellant committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that there must be an
attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; the
assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that
the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority. 16
Here, Labine was a duly appointed member of the then INP in Catbalogan, Samar and, thus, was an
agent of a person in authority pursuant to Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
There is also no dispute that he was in the actual performance of his duties when assaulted by
appellant, that is, he was maintaining peace and order during the fiesta in Barangay Canlapwas.
Appellant himself testified that he personally knew Labine to be a policeman 17 and, in fact, Labine
was then wearing his uniform. These facts should have sufficiently deterred appellant from attacking him,
and his defiant conduct clearly demonstrates that he really had the criminal intent to assault and injure an
agent of the law.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there
arises the complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide. 18 The killing in the instant case
constituted the felony of murder qualified by alevosia through treacherous means deliberately adopted
Pfc. Labine was struck from behind while he was being confronted at the same time by appellant's father.

The evidence shows that appellant deliberately went behind the victim whom he then hit with a piece of
wood which he deliberately got for that purpose.

Obviously, appellant resorted to such means to avoid any risk to himself, knowing fully well that his
quarry was a policeman who could readily mount a defense. The aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nocturnity, however, were not duly proven, as correctly ruled by the court
below. On the other hand, appellant's voluntary surrender even if duly taken into ACCOUNT by the
trial court would have been inconsequential.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in
the maximum period. Considering that the more serious crime of murder then carried the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the imposable penalty should have been
death. The mitigating circumstance, in that context, would have been unavailing and inapplicable
since the penalty thus imposed by the law is indivisible. 19 At all events, the punishment of death could
not be imposed as it would have to be reduced toreclusion perpetua due to the then existing proscription
against the imposition of the death penalty. 20
However, the designation by the trial court of the imposable penalty as "life imprisonment" is
erroneous, as the same should properly be denominated as reclusion perpetua. 21 Also, the death
indemnity payable to the heirs of the victim, under the present jurisprudential policy, is P50,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Tiburcio
Abalos should be reclusion perpetua, and that the death indemnity is hereby increased to
P50,000.00, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 2302 is AFFIRMED in all other
respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-84921 June 8, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR., y
BALDERAS, accused. ROLANDO DURAL and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR., accused appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

An amended information for Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons In Authority was
filed on 15 February 1988 with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City charging the accused
Rolando Dural, also known as Ronnie Javelon, and Bernardo Itucal Jr. as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1988 at Caloocan City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually aiding one another, without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill with treachery, evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously

attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the persons of TSGT. CARLOS
PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, as duly appointed and qualified
members of the Philippine Constabulary, CAPCOM, Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
Taguig, while the latter were engaged in the performance of their official duties,
knowing the said TSGT CARLOS PABON PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC,
to be agents of persons in authority by then and there shooting TSGT. CARLOS
PABON, PC and CIC RENATO MANGLIGOT PC, on the different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries, which eventually
caused their death.
Contrary to law. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and assigned to branch 131 of the said
court. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty upon their arraignment on 14 March 1988. 2 Pre-trial
was conducted on 30 March 1988 3 and, thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.
The witnesses who testified for the prosecution were Rodrigo Pascual, Sgt. Douglas Tagapulot, Cpl.
Angel Floranda, Guillermo Jaramilla, Vicente Rosadio, Pfc. Juanito Abella, Edwin Balag, Rener
Ramos, Dennis Santos, Erlinda Pabon and Erlinda Mangligot. The parties agreed to dispense with
the testimony of Dr. Desiderio Moralida, whose autopsy reports on the victims were admitted by
the defense. The witnesses who testified for the defense were Carmelita Aldaya, Lorelie Itucal,
Armando Amba, Nilda Maravilla, Bernardo Itucal, Grace Guevarra and Rolando Dural.
On 31 August 1988, the trial court promulgated a decision 4 finding the accused guilty as charged. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused ROLANDO
DURAL otherwise known RONNIE JAVELON and BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR. y
BALDERAS beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds both accused GUILTY of the
crime of DOUBLE MURDER, qualified by treachery with ASSAULTS UPON AGENTS
OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of double RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon PC and CIC Renato Mangligot PC in the
sum of P30,000.00 each as death indemnity; to pay Mrs. Erlinda Pabon the sum of
P23,299.00 representing the amount she spent for the burial and wake of her
husband T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon; to pay Mrs. Erlinda Mangligot the sum of P29,550.00
representing the expenses she incurred for the wake and burial of her husband CIC
Renato Mangligot; and to pay the costs.
It appearing that both accused are detention prisoners, the period of preventive
imprisonment they underwent shall be given full credit in their favor.
SO ORDERED. 5
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the judgment of conviction is anchored is summarized
by the trial court in this wise:

Two prosecution eye witnesses (sic) Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos when
presented to (sic) the witness stand corroborated each other's testimony more
specifically on material points and testified that:
"At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1988 both of
them (prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos) were
at the Macaneneng Street in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City as they
were supposed to go a (sic) "tupadahan" however, they were not able
to arrive at the tupadahan because while on their way or from a
distance of twelve (12) arms-length they heard successive gunfires
(sic) so they run (sic) and hid themselves in a concrete fence near a
store; from the place they were hiding or from a distance of ten (10)
arms-length they saw three (3) men each of them armed with .45
(sic) pistol, firing upon at (sic) the two Capcom soldiers on board a
Capcom mobile car which was then on a full stop although its engine
was still running; two of the gunmen positioned themselves beside
each of the side of the mobile car while the third gunman whom they
identified as accused Rolando Dural otherwise known as Ronnie
Javelon (Dural for brevity) claimed the hood of the mobile car and
positioned himself in front of the car; after the two Capcom soldiers
were immobilized, the gunman standing near the driver's seat opened
the left front door of the car and got the .45 (sic) service pistol and
armalite of the Capcom soldiers; thereafter, the three gunmen left;
during the shooting incident they also noticed the presence of two
persons, one was inside an owner jeep while the other one whom
they identified as accused Bernardo Itucal, Jr. (Itucal for brevity) was
standing near the scene of the incident with one of his arm (sic)
raised while one of his hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol;
immediately after the three (gunmen) who fired at the Capcom
soldiers left; (sic) the man who was riding on the owner jeep told
accused Itucal that he was leaving and instructed Itucal to take care
of everything; witness Dennis Santos even quoted the very word (sic)
of the man on board the owner jeep Pare, bahala ka na diyan; after
that, the accused Itucal walked away; two days after the incident or
on February 3, 1988 eyewitnesses Ramos and Santos voluntarily
went at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan
City to narrate what they have witnessed, consequently the
investigator brought them at (sic) the Capcom headquarters at
Bicutan then at (sic) Camp Panopio Hospital; at the said hospital,
they saw one of the three gunmen (referring to accused Dural) who
shot the two Capcom soldiers; then they went back at (sic) Bicutan
headquarters where they gave their respective statements (Exhs. "D"
and "E"). 6
Both Itucal and Dural denied authorship of the crime charged and interposed the defense of alibi.
The former, a student of the Guzman Institute of Technology at Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio,

Caloocan City, claims that at about 12:00 noon of 31 January 1988, while he was eating inside his
house at 63 Rosario Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, he heard gun reports and shouts and
when he peeped through the window, he saw people running or scampering away. He and his sister
Lorelie, wanted to go nearby Macaneneng Street from where the gun reports came, but they were
not able to reach it because of the presence of many onlookers at the scene of the shooting incident.
Before 12:00 noon or in the morning of 31 January 1988, he was at the Chapel conversing with
some people there.
Accused Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, who admitted that his real name is Rolando Dural,
testified thus: that he stayed in his sister's house at Block 10, Lot 4 South City Homes, Bian,
Laguna from 29 November 1987 up to 31 January 1988; two (2) days before 1 February 1988, he
told his sister, Agnes Javelon, that his stomach and chest were aching and although he was
suffering for quite a long time, it was only on 1 February 1988 when he experienced severe pain; as
a consequence, his sister got in touch with Dr. Jeremias de la Cruz; the said doctor first brought him
to the latter's clinic in Quezon City where his cyst was removed and his wound at the left side of his
body was sutured; the he was brought to the St. Agnes Hospital where he was admitted under the
name Ronnie Javelon for the reason that it was his sister who will be shouldering his hospital bills
and expenses. 7
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi on the ground that eyewitnesses Rener Ramos and
Dennis Santos, whose testimonies "were logical, straightforward and probable" and whose
"credibility was not shaken in any manner by the rigorous examination to which they have been
exposed," positively identified the accused. 8 It appreciated against the accused only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
Not satisfied with the lower court's decision, accused Dural and Itucal, hereinafter referred to as the
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on 1 September 1988. 9
Appellants interpose the following assignment of errors in their Brief:

10

1 The lower court erred in finding conspiracy among and between the accused.
2 The lower court erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses notwithstanding their inconsistencies on relevant and material points.
3 The lower court erred in not considering the defense of alibi interposed by both
accused.
4 The lower court erred in not considering the illegality of the arres of both accused in
favor of their defenses.
5 The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 11
In the first assigned error, appellants challenge the trial court's finding that conspiracy existed among
the accused, with Itucal acting as lookout. They allege that the evidence for the prosecution failed to

establish that the appellants knew of the criminal intent of their alleged two (2) unidentified
companions.
The People 12 maintains, however, that conspiracy was established by the presence of the appellants and
their companions at the scene of the crime and their participation in the killing of the victims. Witnesses
Ramos and Santos testified that they saw Dural go atop the hood of the CAPCOM car and fire a shot at
one of the CAPCOM soldiers seated in the front seat. One Edwin Balag, a witness for the prosecution and
a neighbor of Itucal, testified that he had witnessed the shooting of the CAPCOM soldiers and thereafter
saw Itucal go atop the hood of the CAPCOM car 13 and shout "Mabuhay and Sparrow."
A conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 14 Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, it may be shown by
acts and circumstances from which may be logically inferred the existence of a common design among
the accused to commit the crime charged. 15 It is sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective. 16 Confederacy was established beyond cavil in this case among
appellant Rolando Dural, a.k.a. Ronnie Javelon, and the two (2) other gunmen. Armed with deadly
weapons, they arrived together, each proceeding directly to a pre-assigned spot from where they
suddenly and unexpectedly shot their victims. They then fled together toward the same direction after
divesting the victims of their firearms. All these acts are eloquent proof of a common plan and design
deliberately and carefully executed with precision through coordinated action.
There is no doubt in Our minds as to the participation of appellant
Dural the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established his guilt with moral certainty.
Appellant Itucal, however, deserves a different treatment. The trial court held him liable as a coconspirator because its finding that he acted as the look-out and was armed with a .45 caliber pistol.
Our evaluation of the evidence yields factual foundation for such a finding. It is based on claims,
bordering on speculation, of prosecution witnesses Rener Ramos and Dennis Santos that from what
they saw, Itucal must have been a look-out. They did not categorically declared that Itucal was such.
They only presumed or speculated that he was. The following is the testimony on direct examination
of Rener Ramos:
Q Now aside from the persons that you have mentioned firing at the
soldiers inside the Capcom car, were there any other persons if any?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they doing?
A I saw two persons, sir, one was inside the owner jeep and the other
one was sanding near the scene of the incident.
Q How far was this owner jeep parked from the Capcom car?
A More or less 2 to arms length (sic) away, sir.

Q What about this other person whom you saw standing near the car,
how far was he from the capcom car?
A More or less two armslength (sic) away, sir.
Q What was this person, standing near the car doing at the time?
A He was standing there and he had his arm raised and one of his
hand (sic) was holding a .45 caliber pistol.
Q Will you tell us what was his participation in the killing?
xxx xxx xxx
A From what I saw, sir, he must have been the look-out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, you said, where are these two persons that you have
mentioned, the one you said was seated on the driver seat of the
owner jeep and the one holding a 45 caliber firearm, which (sic)
according to you acted as a look-out, if ever you will see them again
would you be able to identify them?
A Yes sir.
Q Will you please look around the court room, and see if they are
around, and if they are around please point to them?
A Only is here (sic), sir.
Q Please point to him?
A That person, sir.
(Witness pointing to prisoner on left, stood up and gave his name as
Bernardo Itucal).
Q Now, was he the one holding the firearm standing near the capcom
car, mobile car, which refers (sic) to be the look out?
A Yes sir.
Q Now, after these three persons who actually fired upon the soldiers'
car left, what did the other two do, if any?

A The one who was riding at the owner jeep told the other person
who was standing outside he was leaving the said person to take
care of everything.
Q To whom (sic) this person addressing?
A The person who was standing, sir, and holding the .45 caliber.
Q You were referring to accused Bernardo Itucal?
A Yes sir.
Q And afterwards what happened?
A The person who was carrying 45 pistol walked away, sir and we
left, sir, because we fell (sic) nervous at that time, sir. 17
The pertinent portion of the direct testimony of Dennis Santos on the same point is as follows:
Q Now, aside from these persons including Rolando Dural whom you
saw firing their gun, were there other persons there aside from the
three?
A Yes sir, there were still other (sic).
Q How many?
A Two (2), sir.
Q What were they doing at that time?
A One was boaring (sic) a vehicle and he was sporting a violet
standing near the basketball court and from what i saw he acted as a
look out, sir.
Q How far was this look out from (sic) the capcom car?
A About two armslength away, sir.
Q How about the owner jeep how far was it parked in relation to the
capcom car?
A The same distance, sir.
Q What did that look out do if, any, that you have mentioned?

A The person who was inside the owner jeep shouted in a loud voice
and said, "Pare bahala ka na diyan." And the one who acted as a look
out followed the three gunmen who entered Rosal Street, sir.
Q Now, was this look out that you have mentioned armed at that time
or not?
A I did not notice, sir.
Q If ever you will see this look out again would you able (sic) to
identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please look around the courtroom and see if he is inside,
and if he is inside please point to him.
A Witness pointing to the other prisoner stood up and gave his name
as Bernardo Itucal.
Q What about the driver of the said owner jeep is he inside the
courtroom?
A No, sir he was not present. 18
On cross-examination, Rener Ramos categorically admitted that it was only when the three (3)
gunmen had swiftly walked away toward Rosal Street that he saw Itucal for the first time:
Q In other words, there was only or it was only after the gunmen have
fled that you were able to see Bernardo Itucal, isn't?
Fiscal:
That would be misleading, your honor. Not fled.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You stated awhile ago that after the gunmen have taken the 45
caliber and the armalite of the soldier, they ran away, isn't?
A They walked away fast, sir.
Q Away from the sight (sic) where the killing took place, isn't?
A Yes sir, they were turning their heads towards a street (sic) Rosal.

Q And it was at that point that you were saying that you saw
Bernardo Itucal standing with a 45 on his hand and very near the
incident, isn't?
A Yes, sir.
Q And this was the first time that you saw Bernardo Itucal, isn't?
A Yes sir. 19
Dennis Santos also admitted on cross-examination that he saw Itucal for the first time only after the
gunmen had left the scene, thus:
Q You said that the look out was accused Bernardo Itucal, you have
seen Bernardo Itucal only after the gunmen have went (sic) away
from the scene of the incide (sic), isn't?
A Yes sir. 20
and that the only basis for his belief that Itucal was the lookout was the following parting statement of
the driver of the owner-type jeep addressed to Itucal: "Pare, bahala ka na diyan." Thus:
Q Why did you say that, Mr. Witness, that Bernardo Itucal was a look
out?
A Because I heard the passenger of the owner jeep bid goodbye, sir,
so I gathered that he was his companion and he remarked, "Pare,
bahala ka na diyan." 21
If Itucal was the lookout, he had to come either ahead of or simultaneously with the gunmen. By the
very nature of his duty or task, a lookout should not come to the scene of the crime after its
consummation. There is absolutely no evidence that Itucal came ahead of or simultaneously with the
gunmen; on the contrary, as shown above, he was seen for the first time only after the gunmen had
walked away. That he was armed, which could have enhanced the prosecution's theory that he was
a co-conspirator, was not likewise sufficiently proven. While Rener Ramos testified that he was, his
companion, Dennis Santos, who similarly focused his eyes on Itucal and the others and witnessed
almost everything that took place, did not notice any weapon in Itucal's possession. According to
Rener Ramos, Itucal "had his arm raised and one of his hand (sic) was holding a 45 caliber pistol." If
such were indeed the fact, Dennis Santos would not have failed to see it. That is not all to it. Another
prosecution witness, Edwin Balag who even testified that he had seen Itucal, his neighbor whom
he had known for more than two (2) years, 22 climb atop the hood of the CAPCOM car after the gunmen
shot the soldiers and shout "mabuhay ang sparrow" did not state that Itucal was armed. 23 The
prosecuting Fiscal did not attempt to extract any information or testimony to that effect from him. It was
the court which asked the appropriate question after the re-direct examination of Balag, but the witness
categorically admitted that Itucal was not armed at that time, thus:

COURT:
Itucal was not armed at that time?
A No, sir. 24
That Itucal shouted "mabuhay ang sparrow" and was told by the driver of the owner-type jeep:
"Pare, bahala ka na diyan," do not conclusively prove that he was a co-conspirator in the absence of
any evidence, as in this case, that he was a member of a subversive organization which operates
the sparrow unit and that the driver of the owner-type jeep was also a co-conspirator. Even
assuming for the sake of argument that he was a sympathizer of such a subversive organization,
mere sympathy is not enough to prove his participation in the conspiracy. The parting statement of
the driver of the owner-type jeep could be addressed to anybody at the scene and is susceptible of
two (2) interpretations, one of which is inconsistent with the participation of Itucal either in the
planning of the crime or in the execution of such plan. In the light of the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by the Constitution, and in the absence of credible inculpatory evidence, that
interpretation in his favor must prevail. While admittedly the alibi of Itucal is weak, the evidence of
the prosecution against him is likewise feeble. The prosecution cannot use the weakness of Itucal's
defense to enhance its case; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence. 25 And considering that
Itucal's culpability could only be anchored on his participation in a conspiracy, such participation must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence. The prosecution has failed to successfully discharge that
burden in this case, leaving this Court unconvinced, due to reasonable doubt, of the guilt of Itucal.
With the foregoing exposition, resolution of the second and third assigned errors is no longer
necessary. However, for the satisfaction of accused Dural, let it be stated that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to whether there was a basketball
game going on at the time the first gunfire was heard, who among the appellants climbed atop the
hood of the CAPCOM car, and which of the two (2) written statements of Ramos and Santos were
first made, refer to trivial or minor points. Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do
not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses'
honesty. 26 As a matter of fact, there is at all no inconsistency in the testimonies of the witnesses on the
second issue. As correctly pointed out by the People, both appellants did in fact climb atop the hood.
According to Ramos and Santos, Dural did so and fired at one of the soldier seated in the front seat of the
car. 27 According to Balag, Itucal climbed atop the hood only after the three (3) gunmen had fired at their
victims. 28
As to alibi, it is a fundamental juridical dictum that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of
the accused.29 In the instant case, Dural was positively identified by the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. It is equally settled that for alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that the accused was at
some other place at the time of the incident but that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 30 This was not proven by Dural.
The fourth assigned error is without merit. It is too late for the appellant to question the illegality of
their arrests. The irregularity, if any, was cured when they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the trial court by filing a petition for bail, 31 entering a plea of not guilty and actively participating at the
pre-trial and trial.

Nor is there merit in the fifth assigned error. Per the testimonies of Rener Ramos and Dennis
Santos, the victims, who had no opportunity to defend themselves as they were still inside the
CAPCOM car which was still maneuvering, were shot at close range immediately after the three (3)
gunmen, one of whom is appellant Dural, surrounded the car with each positioning himself, at preassigned spots, i.e., the left, right and front portions of the car. The autopsy reports 32 showed that
both victims sustained gunshot wounds mostly in the head. The suddenness of the attack on the unwary
victims and the simultaneous and coordinated gunfire trained at them insured the execution of the dead
without risk to the gunmen arising from any defense which the victims might make. Treachery then
attended the commission of the deed. The killing of the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers was thus qualified to
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend direct and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. 33
There is no doubt in Our minds that appellant Dural and the two (2) other gunmen knew that the
victims, T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Mangligot, were members of the Philippine
Constabulary detailed with the CAPCOM as they were then in uniform and riding an official
CAPCOM car. The victims, who were agents of persons in authority, were in the performance of
official duty as peace officers and law enforcers. For having assaulted and killed the said victims, in
conspiracy with the other two (2) gunmen, appellant Dural also committed direct assault under
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The crimes he committed, therefore, are two (2) complex
crimes of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Pursuant then to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum of the penalty for the more serious crime which is
murder, should be imposed. The maximum of the penalty prescribed for murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code is death penalty, 34 the proper imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua.
The trial court correctly imposed on appellant Dural two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. In conformity
with the prevailing jurisprudence, the indemnity for each death shall be increased from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) AFFIRMING, insofar as accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE
JAVELON) is concerned, the Decision of Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City in
Criminal Case No. C-30112, subject to the above modification of the death penalty.
(2) ACQUITTING, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant BERNARDO ITUCAL, JR.;
and
(3) Ordering accused-appellant ROLANDO DURAL (also known as RONNIE JAVELON) to pay onehalf (1/2) of the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113218

November 22, 2001

ALEJANDRO TECSON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal by certiorari is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 11744
promulgated on August 31, 1993, and its Resolution dated December 23, 1993, denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
This case stemmed from a charge of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as
defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, against herein petitioner
Alejandro Tecson y Florencio. The Information reads:
That on or about April 28, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control, with intent to use and pass, as in fact he did use and pass ten (10)
pieces of 100-US dollar notes of the Federal Reserve Note, or a sum of $1,000.00 (US
Dollar) to Pedro C. Labita, a confidential assistant of the Central BANK of the Philippines,
which bills were in the resemblance and similitude of the dollar bills issued by the United
States Government, the said accused knowing, as he did, that the said US dollar bills were
forged and falsified.

Contrary to law.
Upon being arraigned on July 20, 1990, the petitioner entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the charge.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision2 dated May 6, 1991, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares accused ALEJANDRO F. TECSON, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168 and penalized in Art. 166
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; and hereby sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its
medium period as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor in its medium period as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00; and to pay the
cost.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to burn the ten (10) pieces of 100 US dollar notes
subject of the offense.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, the petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court in toto on August 31, 1993. Petitioner sought a
reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court but it was denied on December 23, 1993. 3
Hence, the instant petition.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that a civilian informer personally
informed the Cash Department of the Central BANK of the Philippines that a certain Mang Andy
was involved in a syndicate engaging in the business of counterfeit US dollar notes. On April 26,
1990 a test-buy operation was ordered by Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of the
Central BANK , which resulted in the purchase from Mang Andy of one (1) US dollar note for Two
Hundred Pesos (P200.00) that was found to be counterfeit by the Currency Analysis and
Redemption Division of the Central BANK . Consequently, Atty. Chan formed a team to conduct a
buy-bust operation composed of prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita, Confidential Assistant of the
Investigation Staff of the Central BANK , and Cpl. Johnny Marqueta, a representative of the US
Secret Service, together with William Pasive, Warren Castillo and Carlos Toralde, Jr. also of the
Investigation Staff of the Central Bank.4
On April 28, 1990, at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, the team proceeded to the Jollibee
restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila. Three (3) members of the team namely: William Pasive,
Carlos Toralde, Jr., and Warren Castillo positioned themselves outside the Jollibee restaurant while
Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta proceeded inside. Subsequently, the civilian informer arrived
inside the restaurant and approached a man who was seated two (2) tables away from where Labita
and Marqueta were positioned. The informer introduced to Mang Andy the said Pedro Labita and
Johnny Marqueta as the persons interested in buying US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the
man drew ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, and upon a pre-

arranged signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta introduced themselves as Central Bank
operatives and apprehended the man called Mang Andy whom they later identified as the herein
petitioner Alejandro Tecson.5
During the investigation at the Central Bank, the petitioner affixed his initial on the dorsal portion of
each of the ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes6 and signed the corresponding receipt7 for the
said US dollar notes seized from him. He also executed a "Pagpapatunay" 8 attesting to the proper
conduct of the investigation by the Central Bank operatives on the petitioner. Subsequent
examination by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division of the Central Bank shows that the
ten (10) pieces of US $100 dollar notes confiscated from the petitioner are indeed counterfeit. 9
The defense denied any liability of the petitioner for the crime of illegal possession and use of
counterfeit US dollar notes. Petitioner testified that he was inside the Jollibee restaurant in Sta. Cruz,
Manila on April 28, 1990 to meet a certain Nora Dizon, wife of his friend, Reynaldo de Guzman, who
previously sought his assistance in securing insurance payment bond. After Nora's arrival at the
restaurant, she handed to him a sealed envelope which he accepted thinking that it contained the
documents pertaining to the insurance payment bond. Upon receipt of the sealed envelope,
however, two (2) male persons approached and immediately handcuffed him. They dragged him
outside the restaurant where three (3) other persons were waiting. After boarding a taxi, they
blindfolded the petitioner and took him to the Central Bank building in F. B. Harrison St., Manila
where he was investigated.10
The investigators inquired from the petitioner about the source of the fake US dollar notes. Petitioner
vehemently denied having possession nor any knowledge as to the source of the fake US dollar
notes and claimed that the same were merely planted by the arresting officers. Petitioner also
claimed that he was tortured into initialing the dorsal portions of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100
dollar notes and into signing the Receipt and Inventory for Property/Articles Seized as well as the
''Pagpapatunay".11
The instant appeal by certiorari12 reveals the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO FIND THAT THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN LAW.
In essence, petitioner claimed that no buy-bust operation took place inside the Jollibee restaurant in
Rizal Ave., Sta. Cruz, Manila on April 28, 1990 inasmuch as there was no haggling as to the price
between him and the poseur buyers, and that no money changed hands. He was merely framed up
by the Central Bank operatives by planting fake US dollar notes inside the envelope which was
handed to him by the wife of his friend who earlier asked for his assistance regarding insurance

payment bond. He accepted the envelope thinking that it contained the documents pertaining to the
insurance payment bond.
Assuming arguendo that a buy-bust operation was conducted, the petitioner claimed that the
testimony of prosecution witness Pedro Labita to the effect that the civilian informer had to convince
the petitioner negated any alleged intent on his part to sell counterfeit US dollar notes to the poseur
buyers. In addition, he averred that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta had no personal
knowledge as to petitioner's alleged possession of counterfeit US dollar notes as they merely relied
on the predetermined signal of the civilian informer before making the arrest. Hence, the ten (10)
counterfeit US $100 dollar notes allegedly confiscated from him (petitioner) incidental to his arrest
are inadmissible in evidence. Likewise, his initial on the dorsal portion of the said US dollar notes
and his signature on the "Pagpapatunay" are inadmissible for having been obtained without the aid
of counsel. That is the version of the petitioner.
The respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered in their
Comment that the absence of haggling among the parties to the buy-bust operation did not negate
petitioner's actual possession and use of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which fact of
possession is punishable by law. Prosecution witnesses Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta, who
acted as poseur buyers, testified that they saw the petitioner drew the subject fake US dollar notes
from his wallet13 in order to sell the same to them.
While respondents, through counsel, conceded that the "Pagpapatunay" and the "Receipt and
Inventory for Property/Articles Seized" which were signed by the petitioner during his custodial
investigation are inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in the absence of his counsel,
they maintained that there are sufficient independent evidence on record to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.14
By way of reply,15 the petitioner, who is now 70 years of age,16 contends that possession should be
coupled with intent to use the counterfeit US dollar bills in order to hold him liable under the provision
of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments
of credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the
preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent
to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are: 1 )
that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by
another person; 2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and
3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified
instruments.17 Hence, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with the act of using or at

least with intent to use the same as shown by a clear and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a
crime,18 as was sufficiently proven in the case at bar.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment of the trial court finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the case at bar. The prosecution established, through the testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny
Marqueta, that a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined agents of the Central Bank of
the Philippines and the US Secret Service, and that the petitioner was therein caught in flagrante
delicto in the possession of and in the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes. During the
buy-bust operation, prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta were introduced by the civilian
informer to the petitioner as interested buyers of fake US dollar notes. When the petitioner was in the
act of drawing the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes from his wallet, he was immediately
placed under arrest by Labita and his team.
The testimony of Pedro Labita which was corroborated by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation
during the trial of the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which were confiscated from the
petitioner when he was arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the
crime of illegal possession and use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court in its decision characterized the respective testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Labita and Marqueta as "clear, straightforward, impartial and (thus) convincing". 19 We fail
to discern any ill motive on the part of the said prosecution witnesses in testifying against the
petitioner whom they met for the first time only on April 28, 1990. Petitioner himself admitted during
the trial that he was not aware of any ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to implicate
him in the crime of counterfeiting US dollar notes. 20 The settled rule is that the testimony of even a
lone prosecution witness as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive
to impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full credit. 21
The absence of haggling as to the price of the subject fake US dollar notes between the petitioner
and the poseur buyers did not negate the fact of the buy-bust operation. Significantly, the transaction
for the purchase of fake US dollar notes was only at its inception when the Central Bank operatives
at that point decided to apprehend the petitioner. Mere possession coupled with intent to use the
counterfeit US dollar notes, as proven in the case at bar, is sufficient to constitute the crime under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts, as established by the evidence adduced, show that the civilian informer introduced
prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta to the petitioner as the persons interested in buying fake
US dollar notes. Having been thus convinced, petitioner removed his wallet from his pocket and
drew the ten (10) pieces of fake US $100 dollar notes to show the same to the supposed buyers.
Petitioner's natural reaction to the seeming interest of the poseur buyers to buy fake US dollar notes
constitutes an overt act which clearly showed his intention to use or sell the counterfeit US dollar
notes. In any event, what we have here is a case of entrapment which is allowed, and not instigation.
Petitioner cannot validly claim that he had no intention of committing the crime by citing the
testimony of Pedro Labita to the effect that he (petitioner) was merely convinced by the civilian
informer that Labita and Marqueta were interested to buy fake US dollar notes. The pertinent portion
of Labita's testimony reads, thus:

ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:

Q:
All right, let me clarify this, Mr. Witness. This informant or informer that you mentioned,
he also arrived there at the Jollibee Restaurant, Mr. Witness?
A:

Yes, sir, but he arrived late.

Q:
So, he arrived late. Now, after the arrival of this informant at the Jollibee Restaurant,
what did this informant do inside the Jollibee restaurant while you were there, Mr. Witness?
A:
Our informer tried to convince the accused and after convincing that we are the buyers
of said counterfeit notes, he immediately draws (sic) from his wallet that (sic) counterfeit
notes, and upon pre-signal of our informer, we immediately apprehended the accused, sir.22
The above-quoted testimony of prosecution witness Labita negates the petitioner's claim that he was
merely instigated into committing the crime by the civilian informer. It appears that prior to the buybust operation, the petitioner already had the intention to sell counterfeit US dollar notes as he, in
fact, had an agreement with the civilian informer to arrange for a meeting with interested buyers. In
other words, the civilian informer did not have to convince the petitioner to sell fake US dollar notes
during the buy-bust operation on April 28, 1990 inside the Jollibee restaurant in Rizal Ave., Sta Cruz,
Manila. What the informer actually did during the buy-bust operation was simply to convince the
petitioner that prosecution witnesses Labita and Marqueta were interested buyers of counterfeit US
dollar notes.
The petitioner cannot validly impugn the admissibility of the subject ten (10) counterfeit US $100
dollar notes confiscated from him when he was thus arrested. It is clear from the testimony of
prosecution witness Pedro Labita that he saw the petitioner drew several pieces of fake US dollar
notes from his wallet to show to them after they were introduced by the civilian informer as the
interested buyers while they were inside the Jollibee restaurant, thus:
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR:
Q:
Now, Mr. Witness, after this Johnny Marqueta and you were introduced to the
accused, what did the accused do after the introduction?
A:
He immediately drew his counterfeit dollar notes from his wallet and right after that we
identified ourselves as agents of the Central Bank, sir.23
When the arrest of the petitioner was made, Labita did not have to rely on the prearranged signal of
the informer inasmuch as he (Labita) had unhindered view and appreciation of what was then taking
place right before his eyes. Hence, the ten (10) counterfeit US $100 dollar notes are admissible in
evidence for the reason that the petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto by the prosecution
witnesses during the said buy-bust operation. In other words, this is a case of a legally valid
warrantless arrest and seizure of the evidence of the crime.

In view of the foregoing, petitioner's allegation that he was framed-up by the Central Bank agents
does not deserve any consideration. This hackneyed defense of alleged frame-up of the accused
caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation has been viewed with disdain by the courts
for it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove.24 Besides, there is a legal presumption that public
officers, including arresting officers, regularly perform their official duties. 25 That legal presumption
was not overcome by any credible evidence to the contrary.
Apparently clutching at the last straws, as it were, petitioner also alleged that he was tortured into
signing the dorsal portions of the fake ten (10) US $100 dollar notes confiscated from him by the
arresting officers and the "i". Other than his self-serving testimony, the petitioner failed to prove his
allegation of torture. Also, he did not file any criminal or administrative action against his alleged
tormentors. Suffice it to state that petitioner's conviction for the crime charged in the information is
not anchored on the evidence obtained during his custodial investigation which were disregarded by
respondent appellate court for having been obtained without the assistance of his counsel.
In sum, there is no reversible error in the subject Decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11744 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 194367

June 15, 2011

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false BANK notes
under Article 1683 of the Revised Penal Code(RPC), as amended. Also assailed is the CA Resolution
dated October 14, 20104 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an
Information5 which reads:
That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to
use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings ["] IIB-1" to "IIB24", respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:
SERIAL NO.

PCS.

AMOUNT

SERIAL NO.

PCS.

AMOUNT

PX626388

P500.00 CC077337

P500.00

CC077337

500.00 CC077337

500.00

CC077337

500.00 CC077337

500.00

BR666774

500.00 CC077337

500.00

CC077337

500.00 BR666774

500.00

BB020523

500.00 BR666774

500.00

PX626388

500.00 CC077337

500.00

BR666774

500.00 WW164152

500.00

PX626388

500.00 WW164152

500.00

BR666774

500.00 BR666774

500.00

UU710062

500.00 PX626388

500.00

CC077337

500.00 PX626388

500.00

Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: 6
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle
Passilan, the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz,
the Assistant MANAGER of the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
[Their testimonies established the following:]
Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant
in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael
Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with
orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however,
recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and
Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant
to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed.
The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and
announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from
his back pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were
suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with "IIB-2" to
"II-B24". They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with "IIB1". Appellant was consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence
and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for interrogation.
Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting
Assistant MANAGER Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found
the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6)

P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337;
five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number
UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.
For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.
Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August 5, 2007,
he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael
Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any
warning, JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill.
JO1s David and Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to
follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office
of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the P500.00 bills inside the
confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he
was being charged with illegal possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan
bore a grudge against him. This was because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan
because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely,
threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC
gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit MONEY were
discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the
counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of
pieces involved.7 The RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by improper motive in
arresting petitioner,8 and applied in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence. As to petitioners defense of frame-up,
the RTC held that the purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the
prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The RTC likewise
found that it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly
being framed.9
As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioners
possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash Department of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant MANAGER Loida A.
Cruz.10 The RTC also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct
during the surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element of intention to use the
false BANK notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to use the bills was
confirmed by the information received by the jail officers from another inmate. 11
Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the evidence
used against him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who could have
corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC, however, only ruled
that there was no violation of petitioners constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures because the seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the
RPC. The trial court pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal
responsibility pointed to petitioner.12
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements
of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant
Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.13
The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners appeal. 14 The appellate
court found that the fact the petitioner was caught in possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of
fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards.
The CA agreed with the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1
David was already sufficient to establish petitioners guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill
motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilans friend. 15
1avvphi1

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances which, if
taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner intended to use the counterfeit bills in his
possession. The CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he
received a fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City jail
bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who gave him the fake MONEY ,
the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of
counterfeit P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which was taken from his back pocket. The
CA further held that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the prosecution's
case because even without his testimony, petitioners intent to use the counterfeit bills was
established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the
discretion of the prosecution.16
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated October 14, 2010.17 Hence, the present appeal.
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS
SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.18

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact
or circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated,
and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is
established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. 19
Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to
warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak
defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said
defense must be given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.
Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or BANK notes and other instruments of
credit. Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the
false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or BANK note
or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or
other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the
offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. 20 As held in People v.
Digoro, 21 possession of false treasury or BANK notes alone, without anything more, is not a
criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be
with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. 22
1avvphi1

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit MONEY or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the
fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they
were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the
Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal
knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.23 Their ACCOUNT ,
however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.24
This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of prosecution
witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion
belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its
case.25 However, in this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the
prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested
petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis
dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial
court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23)

pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a
state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29,
2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are
REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal possession and use of false BANK notes defined and penalized
under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171165

February 14, 2011

CAROLINA HERNANDEZ-NIEVERA, DEMETRIO P. HERNANDEZ, JR., and MARGARITA H.

MALVAR,Petitioners,
vs.
WILFREDO HERNANDEZ, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION, PROJECT
MOVERS REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARIO P. VILLAMOR and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This Rule 45 petition for review assails the October 19, 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 83852,2 as well as the January 11, 2006 Resolution3 in the same case which denied
reconsideration. The said decision had reversed and set aside the August 30, 2004
judgment4 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Laguna, Branch 32 in Civil
Case No. SP-5742(2000) one for rescission of a memorandum of agreement and declaration of
nullity of a deed of assignment and conveyance, with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages.
The facts follow.

Project Movers Realty & Development Corporation (PMRDC), one of the respondents herein, is a
duly organized domestic corporation engaged in real estate development. Sometime in 1995, it
entered through its president, respondent Mario Villamor (Villamor), into various agreements with corespondents Home Insurance & Guaranty Corporation (HIGC)5 and Land BANK of the Philippines
(LBP), in connection with the construction of the Isabel Homes housing project in Batangas and of
the Monumento Plaza commercial and recreation complex in Caloocan City. In its Asset Pool
Formation Agreement, PMRDC conveyed to HIGC the constituent assets of the two
projects,6 whereas LBP agreed to act as trustee of the resulting Asset Pool 7 for a consideration.8 The
execution of the projects would be funded largely through securitization, a method of sourcing
development FUNDS by the issuance of participation certificates against the direct backing assets
of the projects,9 whereby LBP would act as the nominal issuer of such certificates with the Asset Pool
itself acting as the real issuer.10HIGC, in turn, would provide guaranty coverage to these participation
certificates in accordance with its Contract of Guaranty with PMRDC and LBP. 11
On November 13, 1997, PMRDC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby it was
given the option to buy pieces of land owned by petitioners Carolina Hernandez-Nievera (Carolina),
Margarita H. Malvar (Margarita) and Demetrio P. Hernandez, Jr. (Demetrio). Demetrio, under
authority of a Special Power of Attorney to Sell or Mortgage,12 signed the MOA also in behalf of
Carolina and Margarita. In the aggregate, the realty measured 4,580,451 square meters and was
segregated by agreement into Area I and Area II, respectively pertaining to the parcels covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-3137, T-3138, T-3139 and T-3140 on the one hand, and
on the other by TCT Nos. T-3132, T-3133, T-3134, T-3135 and T-3136, all issued by the Register of
Deeds of Laguna. The MOA materially provides:
1. THAT, the consideration for the sale of the parcels of land (Areas I and II) shall be
TWENTY-FIVE PESOS (Php 25.00) per square meter or a total of PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
FOURTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY
(Php114,511,270.00);
1. THAT, the VENDEE shall have the option to purchase the above-described parcels of land
within a period of twelve (12) months from the date of this instrument and that the VENDEE
shall pay the vendor option MONEY in the following amounts and on the dates herein
specified:
Area I
PESOS: SIX MILLION (Php6,000,000.00) payable in two (2) equal installments of PESOS:
THREE MILLION (Php3,000,000.00), the first installment due on or before November 20,
1997; the second installment due on or before December 15, 1997, both installments to be
covered by postdated checks upon signing of this Agreement.
Area II
Option MONEY of PESOS: EIGHT MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(Php8,500,000.00) payable within thirty (30) days after conveyance to the Isabel Homes
Asset Pool.

2. THAT, should the VENDEE exercise the option to purchase the parcels of land within the
stipulated period, the VENDEE shall complete the TWENTY-FIVE (25%) PERCENT
downpayment inclusive of the option MONEY within the said stipulated period. Balance of
the TWENTY FIVE (25%) PERCENT downpayment exclusive of the option money for Area I
is PESOS: TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
SIXTY-TWO (Php10,482,262.00) and for Area II is PESOS: THREE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY- SIX (Php3,645,556.00).
The balance of the purchase price in the amount of PESOS: EIGHTY-FIVE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-SIX (Php85,883,456.00) shall be
payable within two (2) years in eight (8) quarterly installments covered by postdated checks.
Schedule of payments shall be as follows:
January 31, 1999

Php 10,735,432.00

April 30, 1999

10,735,432.00

July 31, 1999

10,735,432.00

October 31, 1999

10,735,432.00

January 31, 2000

10,735,432.00

April 30, 2000

10,735,432.00

July 30, 2000

10,735,432.00

October 31, 2000

10,735,432.00

3. THAT, should the VENDEE fail to exercise its option to purchase the said described
parcels of land within the stipulated period, the option money shall be forfeited in favor of the
VENDOR and that the VENDEE shall return to the VENDOR all the Transfer Certificates of
Title covering the said described parcels of land within a period of THIRTY (30) DAYS from
the stipulated period, FREE FROM ALL LIENS AND ENCUMBRANCES;
4. THAT, the VENDOR, at the request of the VENDEE, shall agree to convey the parcels of
land to any bank or financial institution by way of mortgage or to a Trustee by way of a Trust
Agreement at any time from the date of this instrument, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the
VENDOR is not liable for any mortgage or loans or obligations that will be incurred by way of
mortgage of Trust Agreement that the VENDEE might enter into;
5. It is agreed that the VENDOR shall have the sole responsibility in the settlement of the
tenants and eviction of the tenants and eviction of the occupants of the described parcels of
land after all consideration have been fully paid by the VENDEE to the VENDOR;

6. THAT, all taxes including capital gains tax, transfer tax and documentary stamps tax shall
be for the account of the VENDOR;
7. THAT, the VENDOR hereby warrants valid title to, and peaceful possession of the said
described parcels of land after all considerations have been fully paid. 13
As an implementation of the MOA, the lands within Area I were then mortgaged to Solid Bank for
which petitioners received consideration from PMRDC.14
Later on, PMRDC saw the need to convey additional properties to and augment the value of its
Asset Pool to support the collateralization of additional participation certificates to be issued. 15 Thus,
on March 23, 1998, it entered with LBP and Demetrio the latter purportedly acting under authority
of the same special power of attorney as in the MOA into a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance
(DAC)16 whereby the lands within Area II covered by TCT Nos. T-3132, T-3133, T-3134, T-3135 and
T-3136 were transferred and assigned to the Asset Pool in exchange for a number of shares of stock
which supposedly had already been issued in the name and in favor of Demetrio. These pieces of
land are the subject of the present controversy as far as they are affected by the explicit provision in
the DAC which dispensed with the stipulated obligation of PMRDC in the MOA to pay option money
should it opt to buy the properties.17
PMRDC admittedly did not avail of its option to purchase the lands in Area II in the twelve months
that passed after the execution of the MOA. Although PMRDC delivered to petitioners certain checks
representing the money, the same however allegedly bounced. 18 Hence, on January 8, 1999,
petitioners demanded the return of the corresponding TCTs.19 In its January 21, 1999 letter to
Demetrio, however, PMRDC, through Villamor, stated that the TCTs could no longer be delivered
back to petitioners as the covered properties had already been conveyed and assigned to the Asset
Pool pursuant to the March 23, 1998 DAC. In the correspondence that ensued, petitioners disowned
Demetrios signature in the DAC and labeled it a mere forgery. They explained that Demetrio could
not have entered into the said agreement as his power of attorney was limited only to selling or
mortgaging the properties and not conveying the same to the Asset Pool. Boldly, they asserted that
the fraudulent execution of the DAC was made possible through the connivance of all the
respondents.20
With that final word, petitioners instituted an action before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna,
Branch 32 for the rescission of the MOA, as well as for the declaration of nullity of the DAC. They
prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for the payment of damages. 21
Ruling for petitioners, the trial court, on August 30, 2004, declared the MOA to be an option contract
and ordered its rescission. It, likewise, declared the DAC null and void as it made a definite finding of
forgery of Demetrios signature as well as fraud in its execution, and accordingly, adjudged
respondents PMRDC and Villamor liable to petitioner for damages.22 The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants as follows:

1. Rescinding the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the plaintiffs and
Project Movers Realty [&] Development Corporation (PMRDC);
2. Declaring null and void the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) executed
between Project Movers Realty [&] Development Corporation, Land Bank of the Philippines
and Demetrio Hernandez whose signature is forged;
3. Ordering Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-3132, T-3133, T-3134 and T-3135, all in the
names of the plaintiffs, which are in the custody of the Court, to be delivered to plaintiffs
immediately and the plaintiffs are ordered to issue a corresponding receipt of said certificates
of title signed by all the plaintiffs to be submitted to the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of said titles;
4. Ordering defendants Mario Villamor and Wilfredo Hernandez to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, the following:
a. Actual damages of P500,000.00;
b. Moral damages of P200,000.00;
c. Exemplary damages of P200,000.00;
d. Attorneys fees in the amount of P300,000.00;
e. And the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.23
Aggrieved, respondents filed a notice of appeal and elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On
October 19, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision reversing and setting aside the
trial courts decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the appeal is GRANTED. The decision dated August 30,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, San Pablo City in Civil Case No. SP-5742 (2000) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Deed of Conveyance valid and
thus, the Transfer Certificates of Title subject of this case are ordered returned to HIGC. No costs.
SO ORDERED.24
Central to the ruling of the Court of Appeals is its contrary finding that the allegation of forgery of
Demetrios signature in the DAC was not established by the evidence and, hence, following the legal
presumption of regularity in the execution of notarized deeds, it upheld the validity of the DAC. 25 The
Court of Appeals noted that the incompatibility in the terms of the MOA and the DAC clearly signified
the intention of the parties to have the MOA novated by subsequent agreement and have the
properties conveyed to the Asset Pool in exchange for PMRDC shares to be issued to Demetrio.
This, according to the appellate court, completely changed the original obligations of PMRDC as

provided in the MOA. It noted further that it was premature to order the release of the subject TCTs
to petitioners at this stage of the proceedings, because that would amount to an execution of the
decision.26
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, 27 petitioners filed the instant petition for review
attributing error to the Court of Appeals in declining to rescind the MOA and declare the DAC null
and void.
Petitioners insist that the obligation of PMRDC to deliver back the TCTs arises on its failure to
exercise the option to purchase the lands according to the terms of the MOA, and that the deliberate
refusal of PMRDC to perform such obligation gives ground for the rescission of the MOA. This thesis
is perched on petitioners argument that the MOA could not have possibly been novated by the DAC
because first, Demetrios signature therein has been forged, and second, Demetrio could not have
validly assented to the DAC in behalf of Carolina and Margarita because his special power was
limited only to selling or mortgaging the properties and excludes conveying and assigning the said
properties to the Asset Pool for consideration.28 They also point out that the DAC itself is infirm
insofar as it stipulated to convey the lands to the Asset Pool as the latter supposedly is neither a
registered corporation nor a partnership and does not possess a legal personality.29
Commenting on the petition, PMRDC and Villamor advance that petitioners allegation of fraud and
forgery are all factual matters that are inappropriate in a Rule 45 petition. 30 More importantly, they
aver that the novation of the MOA by the DAC is unmistakable as the DAC itself has made an
express reference to the MOA provisions on the payment of option money and, hence, has expressly
modified the pertinent terms thereof.31
HIGC and its president, Wilfredo Hernandez, both represented by the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC),32 and LBP33 are of the same view.34 In addition, HIGC explains that
contrary to petitioners belief, the transfer of the properties under the DAC is valid as the conveyance
has been made to the Asset Pool with LBP, an entity with juridical entity, acting as trustee
thereof.35 Addressing the issue of forgery and fraud in the execution of the DAC, HIGC maintains that
these factual matters remain to be mere allegations which nothing in the records of the case could
conclusively prove, except the self-serving testimony of petitioners themselves. 36
The Court denies the petition.
Petitioners cause stems from the failure of PMRDC to restore to petitioners the possession of the
TCTs of the lands within Area II upon its failure to exercise the option to purchase within the 12month period stipulated in the MOA. Respondents maintain, however, that said obligation,
dependent as it is on the exercise of the option to purchase, has altogether been expressly
obliterated by the terms of the DAC whereby petitioners, through Demetrio as attorney-in-fact, have
agreed to novate the terms of the MOA by extinguishing the core obligations of PMRDC on the
payment of option money. This seems to suggest that with the execution of the DAC, PMRDC has
already entered into the exercise of its option except that its obligation to deliver the option money
has, by subsequent agreement embodied in the DAC, been substituted instead by the obligation to
issue participation certificates in Demetrios name but which, likewise, has not yet been performed

by PMRDC. But petitioners stand against the validity of the DAC on the ground that the signature of
Demetrio therein was spurious.
Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere allegation but
rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging the
same.37 The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been conclusively
discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports the allegation except only
perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his signature in open court. 38 Second, while in
fact Demetrio at the trial of the case had committed to have the subject signature examined by an
expert,39 nevertheless, the trial had terminated without the results of the examination being submitted
in evidence. Third, the claim of forgery, unsubstantiated as it is, becomes even more unremarkable
in light of the fact that the DAC involved in this case is a notarized deed guaranteed by public
attestation in accordance with law, such that the execution thereof enjoys the legal presumption of
regularity in the absence of compelling proof to the contrary.40
Yet the inquiry on the validity of the DAC does not terminate with the finding alone of the
genuineness of Demetrios signature therein, because petitioners also stand against its validity on
the ground of Demetrios non-authority to execute the same. They claim that the execution of the
DAC would be beyond the power of Demetrio to perform as his authority is limited only to selling or
mortgaging the properties and does not include assigning and conveying said properties to the Asset
Pool in consideration of shares of stocks for his lone benefit. For their part, respondents, who believe
Demetrios power of attorney was broad enough to effectuate a novation of PMRDCs core
obligations in the MOA or, at the least, implement the provisions thereof through the DAC, invoke the
4th and 5th whereas-clauses in the DAC which, in relation to each other, supposedly pertain to that
certain provision in the MOA which authorizes the conveyance of the properties to the Asset Pool in
exchange for corporate shares.41
The 4th and 5th whereas-clauses in the DAC read as follows:
WHEREAS, on November 3, 1997, PMRDC and LANDOWNER have entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement whereby the former agreed to convey to the Isabel Homes Asset Pool certain real
properties located at Sta. Maria, Laguna;
[WHEREAS], the LANDOWNER and PMRDC have agreed to revise and modify the said
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby the LANDOWNER shall dispense with the option money as a
requisite to the sale and purchase of the properties by PMRDC, and agreed to convey absolutely
and unqualifiedly the same properties directly to the Isabel Homes Asset Pool for and in exchange of
shares of stock or equity in PMRDC.42
While indeed we find no provision in the MOA such as that alluded to in the aforequoted 4th
whereas-clause in the DAC which purportedly embodies an agreement by the parties to assign and
convey the subject properties to the Asset Pool, we surmise that the clause could be referring to
paragraph 5 of the MOA which stipulates a commitment on the part of petitioners to give their
consent to an assignment and conveyance of the properties to the Asset Pool but only once a
request therefor is made by PMRDC. Paragraph 5 reads:

5. THAT, the VENDOR at the request of the VENDEE shall agree to convey the parcels of land to
any bank or financial institution by way of mortgage or to a Trustee by way of a Trust Agreement at
any time from the date of this instrument, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that the VENDOR is not liable for
any mortgage or loans or obligations that will be incurred by way of mortgage of Trust Agreement
that the VENDEE might enter into;43
Petitioners profess, however, that no such request was ever intimated to them at any time during the
subsistence of the PMRDCs right to exercise the option to buy. But respondents are quick to reason
that a request is unnecessary because Demetrio has been legally enabled by his special power to
give such consent and accordingly execute the DAC, effect a novation of the MOA, and extinguish
the stipulated obligations of PMRDC therein, or at least that he could assent to the implementation of
the MOA provisions in the way that transpired. We agree.
Demetrios special power of attorney granting the powers to sell and/or mortgage reads in part:
1. To sell and/or mortgage in favor of any person, corporation, partnership, private banking or
financial institution, government or semi-government banking or financial institution for such
price or amount and under such terms and conditions as our aforesaid attorney-in-fact may
deem just and proper, parcels of land more particularly described as follows:
xxx
2. To carry out the authority aforestated, to sign, execute and deliver such deeds,
instruments and other papers that may be required or necessary;
3. To further attain the authority herein given, to do and perform such acts and things that
may be necessary or incidental to fully carry out the authority herein granted. 44
It is in the context of this vesture of power that Demetrio, representing his shared interest with
Carolina and Margarita, entered into the MOA with PMRDC. It is likewise within this same context
that Demetrio later on entered into the DAC and accordingly extinguished the previously subsisting
obligation of PMRDC to deliver the stipulated option money and replaced said obligation with the
delivery instead of participation certificates in favor of Demetrio.
The powers conferred on Demetrio were exclusive only to selling and mortgaging the properties.
Between these two specific powers, the power to sell is quite controversial because it is the sale
transaction which bears close resemblance to the deal contemplated in the DAC. In fact, part of the
testimony of Atty. Danilo Javier, counsel for respondent HIGC and head of its legal department at the
time, is that in the execution of the DAC, respondents had relied on Demetrios special power of
attorney and also on his supposed agreement to be paid in kind, i.e., in shares of stock, as
consideration for the assignment and conveyance of the subject properties to the Asset Pool. 45 What
petitioners miss, however, is that the power conferred on Demetrio to sell "for such price or
amount"46 is broad enough to cover the exchange contemplated in the DAC between the properties
and the corresponding corporate shares in PMRDC, with the latter replacing the cash equivalent of
the option money initially agreed to be paid by PMRDC under the MOA. Suffice it to say that "price"
is understood to mean "the cost at which something is obtained, or something which one ordinarily

accepts voluntarily in exchange for something else, or the consideration given for the purchase of a
thing."47
Thus, it becomes clear that Demetrios special power of attorney to sell is sufficient to enable him to
make a binding commitment under the DAC in behalf of Carolina and Margarita. In particular, it does
include the authority to extinguish PMRDCs obligation under the MOA to deliver option money and
agree to a more flexible term by agreeing instead to receive shares of stock in lieu thereof and in
consideration of the assignment and conveyance of the properties to the Asset Pool. Indeed, the
terms of his special power of attorney allow much leeway to accommodate not only the terms of the
MOA but also those of the subsequent agreement in the DAC which, in this case, necessarily and
consequently has resulted in a novation of PMRDCs integral obligations. On this score, we quote
with approval the decision of the Court of Appeals, aptly citing the case of California Bus Lines, Inc.
v. State Investment House, Inc.48 thus
There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the
effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when
novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when the old
and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether the
two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they
are incompatible, and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed
incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take
place in any of the essential elements of the obligation such as its object, cause or principal
conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to
extinguish the original obligation.49
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no useful purpose in addressing all the other issues raised in
this petition.
A final note. Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 350 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 has
designated the OGCC to act as the principal law office of government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) in connection with any judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Yet between the
two respondents GOCCs in this case LBP and HIGC it is only the latter for which the OGCC has
entered its appearance. Nowhere in the records is it shown that the OGCC has ever entered its
appearance in this case as principal legal counsel of respondent LBP, or that at the very least it has
given express conformity to the LBP legal departments representation. 51
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez,52 citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. PanlilioLuciano,53 we explained that the legal department of LBP is not expressly authorized by its charter to
appear in behalf of the corporation in any proceeding as the mandate of the law is explicit enough to
place the said department under the OGCCs power of control and supervision. We held in that
case:
1avvphi1

[Section 10] mandates the OGCC, and not the LBP Legal Department, as the principal law
office of the LBP. Moreover, it establishes the proper hierarchical order in that the LBP Legal
Department remains under the control and supervision of the OGCC. x x x

At the same time, the existence of the OGCC does not render the LBP Legal Department a
superfluity. We do not doubt that the LBP Legal Department carries out vital legal services to LBP.
However, the performance of such functions cannot deprive the OGCCs role as overseer of the LBP
Legal Department and its mandate of exercising control and supervision over all GOCC legal
departments. For the purpose of filing petitions and making submissions before this Court,
such control and supervision imply express participation by the OGCC as principal legal
counsel of LBP. x x x
It should also be noted that the aforementioned Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OGCC to receive the attorney's fees adjudged in favor of
their client GOCCs, such fees accruing to a special fund of the OGCC. Evidently, the nonparticipation of the OGCC in litigations pursued by GOCCs would deprive the former of its due
funding as authorized by law. Hence, this is another reason why we cannot sustain Attys. Beramo
and Berbao's position that the OGCC need not participate in litigations pursued by LBP.
It may strike as disruptive to the flow of a GOCCs daily grind to require the participation of the
OGCC as its principal law office, or the exercise of control and supervision by the OGCC over the
acts of the GOCCs legal departments. For reasons such as proximity and comfort, the GOCC may
find it convenient to rely instead on its in-house legal departments, or more irregularly, on private
practitioners. Yet the statutory role of the OGCC as principal law office of GOCCs is one of
long-standing, and we have to recognize such function as part of public policy. Since the
jurisdiction of the OGCC includes all GOCCs, its perspective is less myopic than that
maintained by a particular legal department of a GOCC. It is not inconceivable that left to its
own devices, the legal department of a given GOCC may adopt a legal position inconsistent
with or detrimental to other GOCCs. Since GOCCs fall within the same governmental
framework, it would be detrimental to have GOCCs foisted into adversarial positions by their
respective legal departments. Hence, there is indubitable wisdom in having one overseer
over all these legal departments which would ensure that the legal positions adopted by the
GOCCs would not conflict with each other or the government.
x x x Certainly, Section 10, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987 can be
invoked by adverse parties or by the courts in citing as deficient the exclusive representation of LBP
by its Legal Department. Then again, if neither the adverse parties nor the courts of jurisdiction
choose to contest this point, there would be no impediment to the litigation to maintain. x x x 54
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 19, 2005 Decision and January 11, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA- G.R. CV No. 83852, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171497

April 4, 201

MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, CONCEPCION TAMANI, ESTRELLA TAMANI, TERESITA TAMANI,

AZUCENA SOLEDAD, DOLORES GUERRERO, CRISTINA TUGADE DAMIETA MANSAANG,
MANUEL TAMANI, VALERIANA CASTRO, AURORA SANTIAGO and ROSARIO
CASTILLO, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA BRAVO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the September 30, 2005 Decision2 and February 10, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61674.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 29, 1986, a Complaint4 for quieting of title was filed by respondent spouses
Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo (respondents) against petitioners Maria Lourdes Tamani,
Concepcion Tamani, Estrella Tamani, Teresita Tamani, Azucena Soledad, Dolores Guerrero, Cristina
Tugade, Damieta Mamsaang, Manuel Tamani, Valeriana Castro, Aurora Santiago and Rosario
Castillo (petitioners), over a 431 sq. m. parcel of land located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. The case
was filed with Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and

docketed as Civil Case No. 5252. Petitioners are the surviving children and legal heirs of the
spouses Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan (Spouses Tamani).
Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land with an area of
776 sq. m. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8582.5 Under said title, respondents own 345
sq. m. of the property whereas the Spouses Tamani own the remaining 431 sq. m. (disputed
property).
On August 17, 1959, the Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz
(Cruz) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale6 for a consideration of Php 2,500.00.
On December 11, 1980, Cruz sold the disputed property to respondents through a Deed of Absolute
Sale for the same consideration of Php 2,500.00. Respondents thus acquired ownership over the
whole area of 776 sq. m. resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-8582 and the subsequent
issuance of TCT No. T-55328.7
In the meantime, in 1973, Benigno Magpale (Magpale) and Leoncia Velasco (Velasco) filed a
complaint forspecific performance against the Spouses Tamani in the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. In said complaint, Magpale and Velasco sought to compel the
Spouses Tamani to execute a deed of sale over a residential lot with an area of 496 sq. m., which,
they alleged, was sold to them by the Spouses Tamani in 1936 without documentation. In a
Decision8 dated February 28, 1977, the CFI dismissed the complaint. Magpale and Velasco
appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which, however, affirmed the decision of the CFI.
Since then, respondents have remained in possession over the disputed property.
At the RTC, petitioners filed an Answer9 wherein they argued that they were the lawful owners and
were in actual possession of the disputed property having inherited the same from their parents.
Petitioners contend that the signature of their parents were forged and thus assail the validity of the
August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute sale between Cruz and their parents.
During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of Demetrio Tamani appearing on the deed
of sale and his standard signatures were submitted for examination and comparison to
the Questioned Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Bienvenido C.
Albacea (Albacea), a document examiner of the NBI, filed a Report 10 (NBI report) finding that "the
questioned and standard signatures "DEMETRIO TAMANI" are WRITTEN by one and the same
person."11 Dissatisfied with the NBI report, petitioners asked for another examination of the
signatures, this time submitting the same to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
Service. Mely Sorra (Sorra), a document examiner of the PNP, filed a Report 12 (PNP report) finding
that "the questioned signature of DEMETRIO TAMANI marked Q appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 17, 1959 and the standard signatures of Demetrio Tamani marked S-1
to S-11 and S-19 WERE WRITTEN BY TWO DIFFERENT PERSONS."13
On July 28, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision14 ruling in petitioners favor. The dispositive portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated August 17, 1959, Exh. "A", purporting to be executed by
Demetrio Tamani in favor of the spouses Milagros Cruz and Cesar Cruz, as null and void and
without legal force and effect.
2. Declaring the Deed of Sale dated December 11, 1980, Exh. "B" executed by the spouses
Milagros Cruz and Cesar Cruz in favor of the spouses Roman Salvador and Filomena Bravo,
as null and void and without legal force and effect.
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55328, Exh. "C" in the name of the spouses Roman
Salvador and Filomena Bravo to be null and void and without any legal force and effect. The
Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is hereby directed to CANCEL the same in his Office.
4. Declaring that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 8582 evidencing ownership of Demetrio
Tamani and Josefa Caddauan for 431 sq. m. and Ramon Salvador and Filomena Bravo for
345 sq. m. to be valid and SUBSISTING in the land records of Nueva Vizcaya. The
Register of Deeds shall effect the same in his office.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.15
Confronted with conflicting testimonies from handwriting experts, the RTC gave more weight to the
PNP report and testimony of Sorra because of her educational, professional and work background.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the RTC, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal. 16
On September 30, 2005, the CA issued a Decision ruling in respondents favor, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHERFORE, premises considered, the APPEAL is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision,
dated July 28, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the validity
of the following documents: Deed of Absolute Sale executed on August 17, 1959, Deed of Sale
executed on December 11, 1980 and the TCT No. T-55328 in the name of appellants.
SO ORDERED.17
The CA ruled that the RTC erred when it relied solely on Sorras educational, professional and work
background when it decided to give more credence to the PNP report. The CA, after examining the
questioned and standard signatures of Tamani opined that "the similarities of strokes are more
prominent and pronounced than the dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are
overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned and the standard signatures." 18 The CA
also observed that petitioners surprisingly did not question the signature of Josefa Caddauan
(Caddauan). The CA surmised that Caddauan may have signed the Deed of Absolute sale because
she knew that her husband, Demetrio Tamani, was going to sell the property, otherwise, she would
have protested and not signed the deed.19 Lastly, the CA held that petitioners failed to overcome the

presumption that the deed of absolute sale, being a public document, carries the presumption of
authenticity and due execution.20
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,21 which was, however, denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated February 10, 2006.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising the following issues for this Courts consideration, to
wit:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISUSED (SIC) THE PROPER ROLE OF AN
APPELLATE COURT IN CASES WHERE THERE ARE CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES
AND IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED THEIR DUTY TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE THE
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE DEMETRIO TAMANI.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO BASIS IN OVERTURNING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE ASSAILED ISSUANCES WERE ISSUED IN GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE DECISIONS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.22
The petition is meritorious.
Well settled is the rule that in the exercise of Our power of review the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on this Court. However, there are recognized exceptions, among which is
when the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. 23 The disagreement
between the RTC and the CA in their respective factual conclusions with regard to the alleged
forgery of the signature of Tamani authorizes this Court to re-examine the testimonies and evidence
submitted by the parties. It is noteworthy to point out that two expert witnesses testified, each with a
different opinion on the issue at hand.
Before anything else, this Court observes that the present spectacle of having two expert witnesses
with conflicting findings could have been avoided had respondents timely objected to petitioners
motion to have a second re-examination of Tamanis signature. After all, respondents are correct in
their claim that the first examination was at the instance of petitioners. Respondents should have,
therefore, objected to the second re-examination, as the RTC would have likely sustained the
motion. However, a perusal of the records24 would show that counsel for respondents never objected
to petitioners motion for a re-examination of Tamanis signature.

A reading of the RTC Decision shows that, notwithstanding the availability of testimonies from two
expert witnesses on the matter of the authenticity of Tamanis signature, the RTC opted not to rule
squarely on the issue and instead conveniently disposed of the issue in the following fashion, to wit:
The two witnesses, Bienvenido C. Albacea and Mely Feliciano Sorra having examined the same
documents but arrived and submitted opposing conclusions. It would appear, however, that based on
their educational, professional and work backgrounds, the Court would give more weight to the
report and testimony of Mely Feliciano Sorra, that the questioned documents and the standard
documents were written by different persons.25
The manner by which the RTC disposed of the issue leaves much to be desired. While credentials of
an expert witness play a factor in the evidentiary and persuasive weight of his testimony, the same
cannot be the sole factor in determining its value. The CA was thus correct when it declared that the
judge must conduct his own independent examination of the signatures under scrutiny.26
The CA, for its part, after examining the questioned signature and standard signatures of Tamani
ruled that "although there are slight dissimilarities between them, one could not ignore the glaring
and striking similarities of strokes and pattern of handwriting in the questioned and standard
signatures of Demetrio Tamani. We opine that the similarities of strokes are more prominent and
pronounced than the dissmilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are overshadowed by the striking
similarities in the questioned and the standard signatures."27
Indeed, at first glance, it is easy to see why the CA ruled the way it did, considering the presence of
similarities between the questioned signature and standard signatures of Tamani. However, after
painstakingly reviewing the testimonies of the expert witnesses and the documentary evidence at
hand, this Court is more inclined to believe that the signature of Tamani appearing on the August 17,
1959 Deed of Sale was forged as can be gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the document
examiner from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Sorra testified that the questioned signature was executed in a slow and drawn manner, while the
standard signatures were executed in a fast manner. Moreover, the line quality of the questioned
signature, particularly the letters "o," "m" and "n" exhibited hesitation and patchings, while the
standard signatures exhibited equal distribution of ink line and had good line quality.28 In addition, the
lateral spacing of the questioned signature was crumpled, while the lateral spacing of the standard
signature is normal.29 Particularly, the chart below illustrates the specific differences noted by Sorra
in her testimony,30 thus:
Letter

Questioned Signature

Standard Signatures

Capital
letter D

Exhibit movement impulse

Continuous and fluent

Letter E

No initial stroke

Connected and has a small

initial stroke

Letter M

First hump is rounded

First hump is pointed and

angular

Letter T

"T-crossing" located at middle

letter t

"T-crossing" is above the

middle of the letter t

Letter O

Constricted and patched

O is Very obvious

Letter M

Patched- after the first hump

there is a small stroke

Three humps

I dot

Long and slanting to the right

Smaller and slanting to the

left

Letter N

Connected with letter a and has

only one hump

Two humps

Terminal
stroke

Tendency to go to the right and

is fluent

Tendency to go upward

During cross-examination, Sorra explained that the differences she ACCOUNTED for were not
"variations," which are normal and usual deviations. She explained that variations are attributable to
the fact that humans are not machines, such that it would be impossible to have two perfectly
identical handwriting samples. Instead, Sorra clarified that the differences were "different" based on
the hesitation in writing in the questioned signature. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities between
the questioned signature and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case involved
a "simulated forgery" or a copied forgery, such that there will be similarities, but the similarities will be
superficial.
The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a
writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.31 While admittedly
this Court was unable to fully comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony
was fairly technical in nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that this Court
has observed a good number of the differences noted by her. Moreover, while We are not unmindful
of the testimony of Albacea, the document examiner from the NBI, this Court is more inclined to
believe the findings of Sorra, because unlike Albacea, Sorra limited her examination to Exhibits "S-1
to S-11" and "S-19." Albacea, on the other hand, considered all 19 specimen signatures. Noticeably,
Exhibits "S-12" to "S-18" were executed several years apart from the questioned signature which
was supposedly written in 1959. However, the dates of execution of Exhibits "S-12" to "S-18"
covered years ranging from 1933 to 1952 and 1974. Thus, this Court finds that Sorra was correct
when she opted to disregard the said Exhibits in her examination. Lastly, while it was improper for
the RTC to rely solely on Sorras credentials, her superior credentials, compared to that of
Albacea,32 give added value to her testimony.

Furthermore, as observed by the RTC, the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property
militate its veracity and truthfulness, to wit:
1. The mortgage contract, Exh. "E", where the whole lot covered by TCT No. T-8582 was
given as a collateral to the GSIS for a loan of P12,000 on June 14, 1958 or before the
alleged sale. Demetrio Tamani was a signatory to the contract being a co-owner of the land
covered therein. If the mortgage value of the whole land on June 14, 1958 was then
P12,000.00 and Demetrio Tamani being the owner of 431 of the 771 sq. m. covered by the
title or more than one-half thereof, it would be contrary to human nature for him to sell his
portion of the land for only P2,500.00 a year after or on August 17, 1959 for less than the
loan value of the land.
2. Demetrio Tamani declared the land for taxation purpose under Declaration of Real
Property No. 21177, Exh. "16" and 4421, Exh. "17" and paid the taxes thereon under No.
6758595, Exh. "18" for P172.24 dated May 31, 1961 for the years 1955 to 1960; OR No.
6758596, Exh. "19" for P19.00 dated May 31, 1961 for the year 1961 and O.R. No. 1608650,
Exh. "20" for P72.35 dated August 28, 1973 for the years 1961-1973.
3. The certifications of the Municipal Treasurer Solano, Nueva Vizcaya dated August 13,
1975, Exh. "22," and August 14, 1975, Exh. "23," that Demetrio Tamani is the sole owner and
who paid taxes of the land under TD. No. 4421 and 14318 for the year 1961 to 1973.
4. Sworn statement of the Fair market value of Real Property on September 3, 1973, Exh.
"21" filed by Demetrio Tamani.
xxxx
The declaration of the land for taxation purposes and payments of the taxes due thereon by
Demetrio Tamani are not the acts of or (sic) one who is alleged to have sold the subject land.
These acts, in fact, are indications that he never parted with the said land.
It is [also not] disputed that the Tamanis and their heirs are in actual possession of the 431
sq. m. area on the subject land.
5. [That] contracts of lease, dated May 7, 1986 executed by Teresita Tamani in favor of the
tenants of the building erected on the subject land, namely, Antonio Taboy, Cipriano
Hernandez, Paulino Cadiente, Basilio Fernandez. These lease contracts were executed by
defendants over the property before this case was filed in Court which are acts of dominion
over the subject land.
On the contrary, Milagros Cruz as testified to by her, did not declare the land for taxation purposes
nor paid any tax thereon from the time she allegedly bought it on August 17, 1959 up to the time she
sold it on December 11, 1980.
It appears also from the testimony of Milagros Cruz (tsn, p. 30, Feb. 21, 1991) that she allegedly
bought the land for INVESTMENT purposes of P2,500.00 from Demetrio Tamani. She sold,

however, the land after 1133 years on December 11, 1980, for the same price of P2,500.00. This fact
casts doubt as to whether the alleged sale really took place.34
Moreover, it puzzles this Court as to how Cruz, a confessed businesswoman, could allegedly buy the
property in dispute for INVESTMENT purpose without bothering to ascertain the lands identity and
character. As can be gleaned from her testimony, Cruzs indifference and lack of prudence is
alarming, viz.:
Q. By the way, will you kindly tell us, more or less, the floor area of that small house which according
to you is the only house in the land in question?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You dont even know the exact material of the house that was erected thereon?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not even verify who were the persons residing therein?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not inspect the premises, the meets (sic) and bounds of that portion of that parcel of
land?
A. No, sir. 35
xxxx
Q. In other words, Mrs. Witness, you never came to know that a certain Benigno Magpale actually
resided on that portion of the lot claiming to be the absolute owner thereof?
A. There was somebody who was staying in the house but I do not know who [he was].
Q. You did not care to know it for yourself who that person is?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not also likewise care as to what is the nature of Benigno Magpales possession and what
is the claim over the property?
A. No, sir.36
xxxx
Q. You did not also know that there is a certain Cipriano Hernandez who has a house inside that
land?

A. No, sir.
Q. You did not care to know that there are other persons?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not care to know whether there are other houses aside from that of Mr. Magpale?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not also come to know that there is a certain Paulino Cadiente whose house was erected
thereon?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not also care to know whether there is another person in the name of Basilio Fernandez?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You did not know that there are at [least] six (6) houses inside the land in question?
A. I saw one house only, sir.
Q. What you saw is that house along the national road?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You did not care to see the houses at the back?
A. No, sir.
Q. Despite the fact you were purchasing this property?
A. No, sir. The land was only shown to me.37
Based on the foregoing, as aptly argued by petitioners, the following circumstances would show that
the alleged deed of sale was spurious: First, Cruz never took action to possess the property from
1959 to 1980; Second, even after the supposed sale, Tamani was continuously declaring the land in
his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon; any reasonable person who had
sold his property would not undertake the unnecessary burden of continuing to pay real property
taxes on the same; Last, the land was allegedly sold to Cruz for P2,500.00 in 1959 and yet twentyone years (21) after, Cruz sold the land to respondents for the same amount of P2,500.00. One who
alleges forgery has the burden of establishing his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence
which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. 38 Based on
the preceding discussion, this Court finds that petitioners have satisfactorily discharged such burden.

The deed of sale may have been notarized and it is true that a notarial document is considered
evidence of the facts expressed therein.39 A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution,40 and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal
presumption.41 Nonetheless, given the highly questionable circumstances present in the case at bar
such prima facie presumption was properly put in dispute.
Given the manner by which petitioners presented and defended their case, this Court is of the
opinion that respondents should have presented the individual who acted as witness to the deed of
sale and the notary public who acknowledged the instrument to shed light on the circumstances of
the same. However, when Cruz was asked if she remembered the person who acted as a witness to
the deed of sale, Cruz peculiarly said that she did not know or remember who the individual was, to
wit:
Q. Could you tell us who that person was who affixed his signature as witness to your deed of sale
with Mr. Tamani?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. You do not even remember the face?
A. No, sir [. It] was a long time ago. I know (sic) longer recall. I am already old. I am already 60. 42
Likewise, it appears that the identity of the notary public cannot be established. A perusal of the
acknowledgment would show that only the signature of the purported notary public was affixed to the
document without indicating basic and vital information such as his complete name.
1avvphi1

Finally, given the foregoing discussion, the question to be resolved then is should respondents be
considered buyers in good faith having purchased the property in dispute from Cruz?
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some other
person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at the time of
such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property.
He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner
and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable
man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.43 It is undisputed that respondents were
neighbors of petitioners and even co-owners of land under TCT No. 8582. Respondents have also
dealt with the Tamanis in the past, having mortgaged their property together when respondents
availed of a loan from the Government Service Insurance System. Thus, it is inconceivable for
respondents not to know that petitioners had been exercising open, continuous and notorious
possession over the property. Like Cruz, respondents should have ascertained the lands identity
and character given that houses were standing on the land in dispute and petitioners had been
leasing the same to tenants.
Withal, although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence inarguably
favors petitioners. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the

aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is
more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2005 Decision
and February 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61674 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185493

February 2, 2011

LtC. ROBERTO K. GUILLERGAN (Ret.), Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the conviction of an accused for an offense other than that charged in
the Information basedon a claim that the essential elements of the offense of which he was
convicted are also elements of the offense charged in the Information.
The Facts and the Case
On June 20, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman indicted petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan
(Guillergan) for estafa through falsification of public documents before the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 22904.1
The evidence shows that sometime in 1987, petitioner Guillergan, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), directed Master Sergeant Edna Seclon (Seclon), Chief Clerk of the
Comptrollers Office, to cause the preparation of the payrolls of their civilian intelligence
agents (CIAs) with supporting time record and book. The agents names were copied and, based on
their appointment papers, certified as correct by Guillergan and then approved by Brigadier General
Domingo T. Rio (Rio).2
Each time the processing unit returned the payrolls for lack of signatures of the payees, Guillergan
would direct Technical Sergeant Nemesio H. Butcon (Butcon), the Budget and Fiscal Non-

Commissioned Officer, to affix his initial on the "Remarks/Sig" column of the payrolls to complete the
requirements and facilitate the processing of the time record, book, and payrolls. 3
Also on Guillergans instruction, the CIAs payrolls in Region 6 for 1987, totaling P732,000.00, were
covered bycash advances payable to Captain Roland V. Maclang, Jr. (Maclang, Jr.), which advances
were issued upon his request as disbursing officer for that purpose. When ready, Guillergan received
the corresponding cash or checks then turned them over to Rio.4
At the end of 1987, Rio further received P787,000.00 in "administrative FUNDS " to be paid out to
contractors for repairs in the mens barracks, the firing range, the guesthouse and others. But Rio
requested that this "administrative FUNDS " be re-aligned to "intelligence funds" in order to facilitate
clearing.5
On April 14, 1989 the AFP Anti-Graft Board filed a complaint 6 against Rio, Butcon, Maclang, Jr.,
Seclon, and Guillergan for violating Articles of War 94 in relation to Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
After preliminary investigation, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued a resolution 7 dated May
24, 1991, recommending the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. On April 21, 1992, however, the
ombudsman investigator issued a memorandum, recommending the filing of charges of illegal use of
public FUNDS against Rio and the exoneration of the other respondents. In a memorandum 8 dated
February 11, 1993, the review panel in the Office of the Special Prosecutor affirmed the
recommendation.
On June 20, 1995, however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the filing of charges
against all the accused before the Sandiganbayan. Consequently, an Information was filed against
them for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a),9 in relation to Article 17110 of the RPC.
While the case was pending, Rio died, prompting the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case against
him.11
On January 20, 2006, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts with motion for judgment 12 based on
such stipulations. On June 30, 2008, the Sandiganbayan Second Division rendered
judgment,13 finding Guillergan guilty of falsification penalized under Article 17214 of the RPC and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 2 years and 4 months as minimum to 4
years, 9 months and 10 days as maximum. The court acquitted the other accused on the ground of
lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can convict Guillergan of violation of Article 172 of the
RPC under an Information that charged him with estafa in relation to Article 171 of the code;
and

2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
The Courts Rulings
The Information alleged that Guillergan committed falsification by making it appear in several public
documents that P1,519,000.00 in AFP FUNDS intended for the CIAs payroll were paid for that
purpose when in truth these were just given to Rio, resulting in damage and prejudice to the
government. Although the charge was estafa in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, the facts alleged in
the information sufficiently made out a case for violation of Article 172 of which Guillergan was
convicted. What is important is that the Information described the latter offense intelligibly and with
reasonable certainty, enabling Guillergan to understand the charge against him and suitably prepare
his defense.15
What is punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. 16 Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: 1)
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage of his official
position; and 3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is done. 17
On the other hand, the elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 are: 1)
the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his
official position; 2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171; 18 and 3) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. 19 All of
the foregoing elements of Article 172 are present in this case.
First. Guillergan was a public officer when he committed the offense charged. He was the
comptroller to the PC/INP Command in Region 6. While the Information said that he took advantage
of his position in committing the crime, the Sandiganbayan found that his work as comptroller did not
include the preparation of the appointments and payrolls of CIAs. Nor did he have official custody of
the pertinent documents.20 His official function was limited to keeping the records of the resources
that the command received from Camp Crame.21 Still, he took the liberty of intervening in the
preparation of the time record, book, and payrolls in question.
Second. The Information alleged that Guillergan committed the offense charged by "causing it to
appear that persons participated in an act or a proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate."22 In People v. Yanson-Dumancas,23 the Court held that a person may induce another to
commit a crime in two ways: 1) by giving a price or offering a reward or promise; and 2) by using
words of command. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that Guillergan ordered Butcon to sign
the "receive" portion of the payrolls as payee to make it appear that persons whose names appeared
on the same had signed the document when they in fact did not.24
Third. There is no dispute that the falsification was committed on the time record, book, and payrolls
which were public documents.

What is more, given that some of the essential elements of Article 171 constitute the lesser offense
of falsification of public documents under Article 172, then the allegations in the Information were
sufficient to hold Guillergan liable under Article 172.
As a rule, the Court regards as conclusive on it the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan unless
these fall under certain established exceptions.25 Since none of those exceptions can be identified in
this case, the Court must accord respect and weight to the Sandiganbayan's findings. It had the
better opportunity to examine and evaluate the evidence presented before it. 26 As aptly pointed out
by the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
There are tell-tales signs that the agents listed on the payrolls did not receive their salaries. First, x x
x Guillergan declared that he personally turned over the entire amount of [P1,519,000.00] to Gen.
Rio. Second, Butcons narration that he was instructed by Guillergan, to [affix his] initial at the
receive portion of the payrolls. Lastly, according to the records of the case, the office of Guillergan
had no business in processing the payroll of these personnel. x x x
Additionally, the appointment papers from which these payrolls were based do not reveal any
information about the acceptance of the appointments by the agents. In a letter dated April 14, 1989
of the Anti-Graft Board of the Armed forces of the Philippines x x x [to Ombudsman Vasquez], it was
stated that the appointment papers of the agents "must" be accompanied by the acceptance of the
agents. These papers "should ordinarily" be attached to the payrolls for proper clearing purposes.
Since there were no acceptance papers presented, it only suggests that the lists on the payrolls are
names of ghost agents. Even more, the board made a comment that x x x Guillergan denies
knowledge of the persons appointed even if he certified to the correctness of the payrolls.
The only conclusion x x x is the deliberate falsification of the payrolls; causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. 27
1avvphi1

The Court finds no error in the decision of the Sandiganbayan that found Guillergan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Documents under Article 172 of the RPC.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Sandiganbayans decision dated
June 30, 2008 and Resolution dated January 7, 2004 which found petitioner Roberto K. Guillergan
guilty of violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case 22904.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 174730-37

February 9, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 174845-52
PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on August
18, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and
Rosalio S. Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The facts are as follows:
Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16,
1986. He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998. 2
On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera)
for the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of
the Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual
employees of the municipal government.
In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos
answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated
"n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query.4 The boxes for
"Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN. 5 Rivera in
his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government. 6 In their 1996 SALN, both
Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query.7 Ongs
signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath when
Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional
Director, Civil ServiceCommission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested that:
This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and
issuance of appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the
total/supplemental appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of
positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism;

Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc.
have been duly complied with in the issuance of this appointment.
This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was
submitted for review and action.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.
On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a lettercomplaint9 before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then incumbent ViceMayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
for the crime of falsification of public documents.
On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
connection with the Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the
1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos. 10
On August 16, 2000, the following Informations11 were filed against the petitioners:
Criminal Case No. 26181
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and FINANCIAL Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused
Rosalio S.Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused
made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very
well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to
accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S.
Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26182

That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each
other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the
Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear
therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact,
as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is
related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T.
Riveras wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26183
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification
of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it
appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby
making false statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew
that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino
S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the
sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26184
That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each
other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The
Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made
it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working
in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in
fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T.
Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of
Federico T. Riveras wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26185
That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each
other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The
Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made
it appear therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working
in the government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in
fact, as accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T.
Rivera is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of
Federico T. Riveras wife being the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26186
That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification
of Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it
appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well

k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos
being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26187
That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating, together and
mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification
of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it
appear therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos
being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26188
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public
officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of aCertification in the form of a letter
addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)Region VII, Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment,
certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under
the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the
appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and
Laws on Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the mother of accused, which
Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the detriment of public
interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26189

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public
officer, being the former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of aCertification in the form of a letter
addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
Region VII, Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment,
certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under
the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office
of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,
when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was
nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T.
Rivera is related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T.
Riveras wife is the sister of the mother of accused, which certification caused the approval of the
appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following
admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong
is related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos
mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of
Riveras wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as Construction and Maintenance Man and
Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these
cases. Ong likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary exhibits
presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated June 1, 1994) except for
Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the
appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos"12).13
As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of
Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows
the mother of Galeos,Pining Suarez or Pearanda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned
"Bining Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez
is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos because Ongs mother,
Conchita Suarez, and Galeos mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife
Kensiana,14 is the daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew
the Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited
when he was still studying.15
Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not
personally fill up the forms as these were already filled up by "people in the municipal hall" when
they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he
understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He
claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other
entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years
1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to
sign them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted
that he carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him before he
affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term
"fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative. 17
Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor
because when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added
that it was not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ongs predecessor, Mayor
Vicente Mendiola.18
On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did
not know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several persons with the surname
"Galeos" in the municipality. He signed Galeos 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos
at his office. There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their
oaths on what were written on their SALN, among them were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know
of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the
Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows
him as a casual employee of the previous administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had
to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He
maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet
Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his
relatives while he was campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th
and 7th degree are still regarded as close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that
his style of campaigning was based only on his performance of duties and that he did not go from
house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no
longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had administered. He admitted
that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera to their permanent positions and signed their
official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was
related to them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to
the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it and their appointments were no
longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were
brought to his office, the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted
that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the
effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with.19
On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos
and Rivera, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium
as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
1auuphil

In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium
as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional
medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium
as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the

minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document
as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances, are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from
TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the
minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT
GUILTY for Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.20
In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration
of Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the
promulgation of the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him
were dismissed.
In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED
UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONERS VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND
LACK OF INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.
3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR
THE PROSECUTION.22
In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements
in his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure
cannot be considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they
were not made in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of
law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that

he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of
good faith, Galeos avers that the fourth element of the crime the perversion of truth in the narration
of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person is missing. He also faults the
Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutions sole
witness despite the fact that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
(a)
. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED
UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(b)
IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY
ADMINISTERING THE OATH IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(c)
. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE
ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENTS
EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONERS EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE
APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.23
Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a
narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the
execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer
administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document.
Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there
was no evidence adduced that it was made to support Riveras appointment.
In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of
the Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted during his testimony that
before affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries
therein have been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under
the joint stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all that he became aware of his relationship
with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of
knowledge of a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be
legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification reckons from the time
the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance on the
testimony of prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that
such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners. 24

With respect to Ongs liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful
statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the
administering officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this
is that the administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful.
However, when the facts laid out in the document directly involves the administering officer, then he
has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless
administers the oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false,
he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but because he participated
in the falsification of a document.25
After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.
Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document,
the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies.27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third

person because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 28
Falsification of Public Document
by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the prosecution.
Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has been complied
with in the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both
require the application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they cite
People v. Tugbang29 where it was held that "a statement expressing an erroneous conclusion of law
cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza, 30 it was held that when defendant
certified that she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned
out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of falsification because the
law violated pertains to narration of facts.
We disagree.
A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in
a particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which interprets the factual circumstances to
which the law is to be applied.31 A narration of facts is merely an ACCOUNT or description of the
particulars of an event or occurrence.32 We have held that a certification by accused officials in the
Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated
under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but
also words were used therein giving an ACCOUNT of the status of the flood control project.33
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not
call for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of
the Civil Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and
collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are
related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and
thus do not amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose
his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of
facts contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears
to stress that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employees eligibility
for the position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing
power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the
government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement
therein as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree
of consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and
1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v.
Mudlong,34 it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and
personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his
appointment and/or promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s
in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that
the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the
disapproval of his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which provides:
No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.
Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise
known as theAdministrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment
of a person who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations." Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No.
38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or
recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity.35
The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No.
40, series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:
SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters
shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or
recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
xxxx
The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and
reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the
disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated.36 Permanent employees employed by local government

units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN);
(b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service;
(c) FINANCIAL and business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law.37 A similar
requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives38. It shall be the duty of every public official or
employee to identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the
Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment
or fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public
office. Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted
against him.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos negative answer reflected in his SALN is
absolutely false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins
but denied having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed.
The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the
fourth degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended
family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal
government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure
having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the
1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first
cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal government and appointed by him to a permanent
position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time
unaware that he himself appointed to permanent positions the son of his mothers sister (Galeos)
and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture
renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his
knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to
Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in
finding that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have
no relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the
crime,39 as it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of
wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime.40 In this case, Ong administered the oaths to
Galeos and Rivera in the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he
concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein concerning relatives in the government
service.

Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism
As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the
certification recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos appointment although he admitted only
the authenticity and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the
prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 41 of R.A.
No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his
knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in
fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Riveras wife is the sister of Ongs mother,
Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of
facts. He also took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil
Service rules, is required to issue such certification.
The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the
local government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No.
7160 cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code
of 1987, a head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in
violation of Civil Service Law and Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional
misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates,
refuses or neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,42 we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor of a
relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the
law. Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public
document, it becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of relationship to the appointing
power in the local government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition
against nepotism.
1avvphil

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In
Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism
also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud
or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need
now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the outstanding civil servants, but also to plug
the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 43 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of
public documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal
ground to reverse petitioners conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128213 December 13, 2005
AVELLA GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
In an Information dated March 18, 1992, petitioner Avella1 Garcia (Avella) was charged with
Falsification of a Private Document, defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article
171 (6), of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the month of January, 1991 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Abella Garcia, being then in possession of a
receipt for Five Thousand Pesos dated January 21, 1991 issued by one Alberto Quijada, Jr. as
partial down payment [sic] of the sale of a house and lot situated at No. 46 P. Gomez St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila by Albert Quijada, Jr. to accused, said accused then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to defraud and damage Alberto Quijada Jr [sic] made
alterations and wrote words, figures and phrases to the original receipt which completely changed its

meaning by making appear thereon that it was issued on January 24, 1991 in the amount of Fifty
Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00) when in truth and in fact, the said accused fully well knew that
the receipt was only for the amount of Five Thousand Pesos.
Contrary to Law.2
Upon arraignment, Avella pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.3
The prosecutions version of the relevant facts is summarized as follows: 4
Sometime in early October 1990, a verbal agreement was entered into between Alberto Quijada, Jr.
(Alberto) and Avella for the sale of the formers house and lot located at 46 P. Gomez St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for thepurchase price of P1.2 million pesos.5 On October 23, 1990, an
"earnest MONEY " in the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) was given to Alberto by Avella.
On October 31, 1990, the amount of one hundred and fifty-five thousand pesos (P155,000) was
delivered by Avella representing this time the downpayment for the house and lot. A subsequent
payment of five thousand pesos (P5,000) was made on January 21, 1991. With respect to this last
transaction, Avella prepared in her own handwriting two identical receipts which are faithfully
reproduced below:6
January 21/91
Pasay City
Received from Abella [sic] Garcia for the amount of five thousand pesos cash (P5,000.00) as
additional downpayment for the purchase of the property located at 46 P. Gomez St. Mand. M. Mla.
With an area of 308 sq. m. including the improvements existing there one [sic] covered by T.C.T. #
397670. The total purchase price for said sale One Million Two hundred thousand only 1.2 M.
(Sgd.)
ALBERTO QUIJADA
(Sgd.)
ALICIA Q. GONZALES
(SISTER)
The two receipts were signed by Alberto and his sister Alicia Q. Gonzales, as witness. One receipt
was given to Alberto, while the other was retained by Avella.
The relationship between buyer and seller turned sour. Avella filed a complaint for estafa against
Alberto for his failure to execute a deed of sale and deliver the subject property. Among the evidence
she submitted was the copy of the receipt she prepared on January 21, 1991. However, the receipt
appeared to have been altered in the following manner: 1) the word "fifty" was inserted before the

word "five" on the second line of the receipt to read "fifty five thousand" instead of "five thousand"; 2)
the number "5" was inserted before "5,000.00" on the third line of the receipt so that it would read
"55,000.00"; 3) additional words were inserted in the last sentence of the receipt which reads, "Now
covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute of [sic] valid deed of
conveyance covering the same sale"; 4) on the date "January 21" the number 4 was superimposed
so that it would read as "January 24" instead; and 5) there now appears the amount of "55,000.00"
and below it the word "value" on the upper left hand corner of the receipt. 7
Thus, the receipt as altered now appears as follows: 8
55,000.00
value
January 24/91
Pasay City
Received from Abella Garcia for the amount of fifty five thousand pesos cash (P55,000.00) as
additional downpayment for the purchase of the property located at 46 P. Gomez St. Mand. M. Mla.
With an area of 308 sq. m. including the improvements existing there one covered by T.C.T. #
397670. The total purchase price for said sale One Million Two hundred thousand only 1.2 M. Now
covered by T.C.T. # 3998 R.D. Mandaluyong MM. the parties agree to execute of [sic] valid
deed of conveyance covering the same sale.
(Sgd.)
ALBERTO QUIJADA
(Sgd.)
ALICIA Q. GONZALES
(SISTER)
Having noticed the alterations, Alberto instituted a criminal action before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasay City charging that Avella had made it appear that he received P55,000 when he
received only P5,000. Needless to state, the City Prosecutor found that a prima facie case of
violation of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code had been committed by Avella and accordingly
filed the corresponding Information.
Avella, in her defense, admitted that she did in fact alter the receipt but claims that it was done in the
presence and at the request of Alberto. Her ACCOUNT is as follows:9
On January 21, 1991, Alberto, along with his sister, came to Avellas residence in Mandaluyong City
to ask for additional downpayment for the house and lot. At that time she only had P5,000 in cash

which she handed over to Alberto and then promised him a bigger sum in the future. Avella then
hand wrote two receipts which was signed by Alberto and his sister, as evidence of the payment
of P5,000. One receipt was her copy while the other was for Alberto. Three days later, on January
24, 1991, Avella called up Mr. Celso Cunanan (Celso), an architect, from whom she asked to
borrow P50,000. Celso had earlier committed to Avella that he would lend her P50,000. Celso
arrived at her house that evening to give her the money. Already present in the house were Avella,
her sister and Alberto. Celso delivered to Avella P50,000 which the latter, in the formers presence,
handed over to Alberto. With respect to the alteration, Avella explained that Alberto did not have with
him his copy of the January 21, 1991 receipt and so he told her to just "add" in her copy the amount
of P50,000 to make it P55,000. Avella acceded to the request and made the changes in front of
Alberto while he was counting the MONEY . Avella said she showed the altered receipt to Alberto
but that he was not able to affix his signature thereon because he was in a hurry to leave.
Avellas ACCOUNT was corroborated by the testimony of Celso who declared that all these
happened in his presence.10
Avella further claimed that this case was filed against her in retaliation for the estafa case she filed
against Alberto. As claimed by Avella, she found out that the deed of sale which purportedly
transferred ownership of the house and lot to Alberto was a fake. Upon her request, the National
Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.), Questioned Documents Division, examined the signatures of Mr.
Floro Caceres and Mrs. Paciencia Castor Caceres, the transferees of the subject property, contained
in the deed of sale. In its report the N.B.I. determined that the questioned signatures and sample
signatures of Floro Caceres and Paciencia Caceres were not written by one and the same
person.11 In further support of this allegation, she presented an affidavit executed by Richard Hui
Quijada, nephew of Alberto, who stated therein that he forged the signatures of the Spouses
Caceres at the behest of his uncle.12 Additionally, it was claimed that the notarization of the deed of
sale was also fake according to a certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court for the
Regional Trial Court of Manila stating that the lawyer who notarized it, Atty. Mallari, did not notarize
any document for the month of April 1977, which was when the deed of sale was supposedly
notarized.13
The trial court found Avellas ACCOUNT unworthy of belief. The court stated in its decision that if,
by her claim, she made the changes in the receipt while Alberto was counting the money it would not
have taken more than five (5) seconds to affix his signature thereon even if he was in a hurry to
leave. The trial court, thus, held that the elements of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of
the Revised Penal Code have been proven beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced Avella to suffer
imprisonment of Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to Six (6) Years
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000) pesos, plus
costs.14
Avella appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA modified the penalty by lowering it, but
affirmed the conviction.15 The CA was unconvinced by Avellas explanations regarding the
circumstances under which the alterations were made. Quoting at length the trial courts findings, the
CA declared that nothing therein would even remotely indicate that the conclusions were reached
arbitrarily. The dispositive portion of the CA decision stated:

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED but with the modification that the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from a minimum of
Four (4) months and One (1) day of Arresto Mayor, to Three (3) years, Six (6) months and TwentyOne (21) day of Prision Correccional as maximum, plus a fine of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00)
and costs.
Avella now comes before this Court through a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court asking the Court to reevaluate the evidence presented so that the Court may accept as true
her explanations to the alterations.
The plea lacks merit and is denied.
When the trial courts factual findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, for it is not this Courts function to analyze and
weigh the parties evidence all over again, except when there is serious ground to believe a possible
miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Save in exceptional instances, the Courts task in an
appeal via certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
CA.16 Other than her plea to interpret the evidence in a different light, Avella failed to offer any cogent
reason that would persuade this Court to alter the findings of the trial court and the CA, which
findings are in agreement.
Nevertheless, while the Court will not touch upon the findings of fact, it should review the conviction
to ensure that the law was properly applied. Under this premise, the Court now moves on to consider
whether errors of law have been committed.
The elements of the crime of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document; (2) that it was made
on a genuine document; (3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the
document; and (4) that the changes made the document speak something false. 17 When these are
committed by a private individual on a private document the violation would fall under paragraph 2,
Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent
evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. 18
Given the admissions of Avella that she altered the receipt, and without convincing evidence that the
alteration was with the consent of private complainant, the Court holds that all four (4) elements
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to the requirement of damage, this is readily
apparent as it was made to appear that Alberto had received P50,000 when in fact he did not.
Hence, Avellas conviction.
The Court now considers the penalty imposed, as modified by the CA. Article 172 punishes the
crime of Falsification of a Private Document by a private individual with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Thus, the duration of imprisonment must be
between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, this
being the medium, and four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, this being the
maximum. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the medium period in the
aforementioned range should be imposed, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one

(21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. The sentence of the CA was within these
ranges. The correct penalty was imposed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Petitioner Avella Garcias conviction in Criminal Case No. 920250 isAFFIRMED along with her sentence to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000) and the costs.
Cost de oficio in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139984. March 31, 2005
LEOPOLDO OANI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
During the school year 1988-1989, the Panabo High School in Panabo, Davao del Norte, headed by
its Principal, Leopoldo Oani, implemented the free secondary school program of the government.
During the period of November 1, 1988 to December 31, 1989, the high school received the amount
of P648,532.00 from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for Maintenance and
Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).1Of the said amount, P551,439.13 was earmarked for the
purchase of various supplies, materials and equipment.2
On March 1, 1990, the DECS Secretary received a letter3 from the Parents Teachers Association of
the Panabo High School regarding the investigation of Principal Oani and Bonifacio Roa, the
Resident Auditor regarding, among other things, the alleged overpricing of 12 fire
extinguishers for P15,000.00 each. The Regional Office of the COA then issued Assignment Order
No. 90-137 dated March 2, 1990 to a team of auditors, composed of Jaime P. Naranjo, as Chairman,
and Bienvenido Presilda and Carmencita Enriquez, as members. The team had the following tasks:
To determine whether the MOOE FUNDS of the Panabo High School, particularly for supplies,
materials and equipment were utilized and/or expended in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations.
Specific Objectives:
1. To be able to identify losses of FUNDS resulting from fraudulent transactions.
2. To be able to determine the following:
a) Existence of fraud.
b) Extent of fraud committed.
c) Method or means by which fraud was committed.
d) Persons liable.4

The team gathered information based on interviews of the persons involved, including Oani and
Roa, and other school personnel. They also secured documents from government agencies and
private entities to verify the purchase and delivery of fire extinguishers, as well as office and school
supplies to the high school which were charged against the MOOE. They, likewise, conducted ocular
inspections of other business establishments in connection with the said purchases.
The team discovered that on June 23, 1989, Oani had approved a Requisition and Issue
Voucher5 for the acquisition of 15 units of fire extinguishers for the use of the high school as
mandated by Presidential Decree No. 1185, also known as the Fire Code of the Philippines. The
supplies are described in the voucher as follows:
Quantity

Unit

Article

15

Units

10 lbs. capacity
powerline fire
extinquisher ABC TriClass dry chemical
general purpose
BRAND NEW In compliance with PD
1185 known as Fire
Code of the Philippines.

The amount of P55,000.00 was certified as available for the purpose. Instead of conducting a public
bidding, Oani decided to purchase the fire extinguishers from the Powerline Manufacturing Industry
(Powerline, for brevity) forP54,747.00. Powerline was owned by Francisco Cunanan and had its
business address at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin, Davao City. The enterprise was authorized by
the Department of TRADE and Industry to manufacture and refill stored pressure type (Light Pink
only) mono-ammonium phosphate for ABC fires.6
On June 27, 1989, Oani approved Purchase Order No. 27 for nine units of fire extinguishers and
requested Powerline to deliver the supplies. Upon delivery thereof, Oani approved a disbursement
voucher8 in favor of the supplier for the amount of P54,747.00. The supplier acknowledged receipt of
the said amount through check.9.
The members of the Audit Team that conducted a re-canvass for fire extinguishers of the same
brand and features as those supplied by Cunanan discovered that each unit could be purchased for
only P2,970.00, inclusive of 10% allowance. The purchase of the nine units of fire extinguishers was,
thus, overpriced byP23,040.00.10
Oani had also approved a Requisition and Issue Voucher for a set of Stereo Amplifier and
components described therein, thus:
Quantity

Article

1 set

Stereo Amplifier
Consisting of the [ff]:
1 unit Sound Research SR
100A 200 Watts
1 unit Sound Research 6 Mic.
Mixer
1 set 12" 3-Way Speaker
System
1 unit Radio Cassette
Portable
1 unit Phono Magnetic
2 units Microphone &
Microphone Stand w/ Holder

3 pieces

Electrical Bell 8-10 inches

diameter11

Separate invitations to bid were sent to ASM Enterprise, Edwin Marketing and RS Marketing, 12 which
submitted their bids to the Awards Committee composed of Oani, as Chairman, and Domingo
Pintongan, Mercita Jayoma and Roa as members. The contract was awarded to ASM Marketing. 13
On December 28, 1989, Oani approved a Purchase Order 14 for a complete set of amplifiers for the
price ofP35,650.00 and requested the ASM Marketing to deliver the merchandise. As per Oanis
request, Arlene Lomugdang, the accounting clerk of the school, issued a Certification that the
amount of P35,650.00 was available for the said expense.15
Check No. 095751 was drawn against the MOOE for P35,650.00 in payment of the said supplies
and was remitted to the ASM Marketing, after the disbursement voucher16 for the said amount was
approved by Oani.
Canvass forms were distributed to business enterprises, including Red Lion Marketing for the
purchase of office supplies. The contract was awarded to Red Lion Marketing for the price
of P61,912.35. The office supplies were delivered to the school, after which Oani approved the
disbursement voucher for the said amount which was drawn against the MOOE. 17 The supplier
thereafter received payment thereon.

In a separate transaction, Oani again approved the purchase of office supplies chargeable against
the MOOE. The contract was awarded to the Red Lion Marketing for P111,912.35. The supplies
were delivered by Red Lion Marketing to the high school per Sales Invoice Nos. 486, 487, 488 and
489 on March 10, 1989. Oani approved Disbursement Voucher No. 101-8903-017 18 in favor of Red
Lion Marketing for the said amount. Payment for the merchandise was, likewise, received by the
supplier.
The Auditing Team conducted a review of the prices of the stereo set and school and office supplies,
and discovered that they could be purchased for only P144,621.51 instead of the P227,857.45 paid
by the school. The Auditing Team recommended the filing of administrative and criminal complaints
for violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against Oani and Roa.
On March 30, 1993, Informations were filed against Oani and Roa in the Sandiganbayan for violation
of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18885 reads:
That on or about the month of December 1989, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, both public officers, LEOPOLDO OANI being then the
Secondary School Principal and BONIFACIO ROA being then the Resident Auditor, both of the
Panabo High School, Davao del Norte, while in the performance of their official functions, committing
the offense in relation to their office and conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government
in the following manner: in the purchase of nine (9) fire extinguishers for the Panabo High School,
accused deliberately disregarded the requirements on public bidding by allowing the forms such as
Request for Quotations and Canvass to be accomplished by the winning bidder notwithstanding the
fact that no canvass was made at all, as [a] result of which the nine (9) fire extinguishers were
purchased from Powerline Company at the total price of P54,747.00, although the real amount of
such fire extinguishers and which was supposed to have been paid was only P2,560.00 per unit
or P23,040.00 in all, thereby causing undue injury to the government in the amount of THIRTY-ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P31,700.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.19
The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 18886, reads:
That on or about the month of December 1989, in the Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
both public officers, LEOPOLDO OANI being then the Secondary School Principal and BONIFACIO
ROA being then the Resident Auditor, both of Panabo High School, Davao del Norte, while in the
performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office, and
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
through evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government in the following manner: in the
purchase of sound equipment, supplies and materials for the Panabo High School, accused
deliberately disregarded the requirements on public bidding by allowing the forms such as Request
for Quotations and Canvass to be accomplished by the winning bidders themselves notwithstanding

the fact that no canvass was made at all, as a result of which the sound equipment, office forms and
office supplies were purchased from ASM Marketing and Red Lion Marketing for a total price
of P227,857.45, although the real amount supposed to have been paid was only P144,621.51, thus,
causing undue injury to the Government in the amount of EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE & 94/100 pesos (P83,235.94), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.20
Oani admitted that no public bidding was conducted prior to the purchase and delivery of the fire
extinguishers, but averred that he was authorized to purchase the same by negotiation because
Francisco R. Cunanan, the proprietor of Powerline, submitted a Certification dated "January 1988"
pursuant to COA Circular No. 91-368 and Article 7, Section 442 of the Government Auditing Rules
and Regulations (GARR), stating that the company is the only authorized and duly-licensed
manufacturer and exclusive distributor of Powerline fire extinguishers brand, and that no other
dealer, sub-dealer or distributor was appointed or authorized to sell his major line products. 21Oani
averred that a canvass of prices was done for the purchase of the office and school supplies, and
that the Bidding Committee awarded the contract to ASM Marketing based on the abstract of bids
placed by the suppliers at the scheduled bidding. He then approved the purchase orders for the
supplies to ASM Marketing which delivered the equipment. The same procedure was followed for the
purchase of the office supplies. He asserted that the law and the COA procedures were followed in
the bidding process and the purchase of school and office supplies.
Oani further averred that the trial court erred in relying solely on the Audit Report of the auditing
team. He asserted that it was not his duty to check whether those participating in the bidding
were bona fide dealers. As long as such bidder could purchase the supplies and materials indicated
in the bidding request and the price is reasonable, there was sufficient basis to award the contracts.
He admitted the possibility that he had made a wrong assessment of the bidding and canvass, but
claimed that he acted in good faith.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision acquitting Roa, but convicting Oani of the
crimes charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered CONVICTING accused LEOPOLDO E. OANI of the
crime[s] charged in both Criminal Cases Nos. 18885 and 18886, his guilt having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 18885, Leopoldo E. Oani is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as minimum,
to EIGHT (8) YEARS as maximum, and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office. He is
ordered to restitute to the treasurer of the Panabo National High School the amount of TWENTYTHREE THOUSAND FORTY PESOS (P23,040.00).
In Criminal Case No. 18886, Leopoldo E. Oani is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS, as maximum,
and to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office. Also, he is hereby ordered to restitute the
amount of SEVENTY-THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY-EIGHT PESOS AND
SEVENTY-NINE CENTAVOS (P73,878.79) to the treasurer of the Panabo National High School.

The actual period of accused LEOPOLDO E. OANIs preventive imprisonment, if any, shall be
credited to the service of his sentence.
As to accused BONIFACIO ROA y GALINDO, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in
both Criminal Cases No. 18885 and 18886.
Accordingly, the cash bond of the said BONIFACIO ROA posted in both cases in the amount of
FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) each, as evidenced by O.R. No. 2968083 and O.R. No.
2968084, is hereby ordered CANCELLED.
Considering that the facts from which civil liability against the said Bonifacio Roa might arise did not
exist, no civil liability is imposed against him.
The Honorable Commissioner, CID, is hereby ordered to CANCEL the name of BONIFACIO ROA y
GALINDO from his Commissions Hold Departure List, if any.
With costs against accused LEOPOLDO E. OANI.22
Oani, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari with this Court and raised
therein the following sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF THE PETITIONER WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT TO CONVICT HIM OF VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019, AS AMENDED.23
We note that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised that in a petition for review on certiorari. The Court is not a trier
of facts; hence, it is not its duty to re-examine and reevaluate the evidence of the parties. Moreover,
the findings of facts of the CA or the Sandiganbayan are, as a general rule, conclusive on the Court.
And while the Court may entertain and resolve factual issues in exceptional circumstances, 24 the
petitioner in this case was unable to establish any such exceptional circumstance.
Indeed, the Court assiduously reviewed the records and found no justification for the modification,
much less the reversal of the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner avers that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019 for the purchase of the fire extinguishers without any public bidding. He maintains that
since Powerline was the exclusive manufacturer of the fire extinguishers and had not designated any
dealer or subdealer of its products as evidenced by the Certification of Cunanan, 25 he was justified in
dispensing with a public bidding and to purchase the fire extinguishers on a negotiated basis with
Powerline.
The petitioner is wrong.
COA Circular No. 78-84 dated August 1, 1978, provides that negotiated contracts may be entered
into where any of the following conditions exist:

1. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may involve the loss of,
or danger to life and/or property;
2. Whenever the supplies to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed
without causing detriment to the public service;
3. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who does not have
subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere at
more advantageous terms to the government;
4. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid for at least
two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in each instance
equipment, the purchase of nine (9) units fire extinguishers were exhorbitant or non-confirming to
specifications;
5. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through negotiated
purchase is most advantageous to the government as determined by the head of agency;
6. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government;
7. Whenever the purchase is made from a foreign government. 26
None of the foregoing conditions existed when the petitioner purchased the fire extinguishers on a
negotiated basis from Powerline.
The petitioner did not require Cunanan to submit any certification from the Department of Trade and
Industry that he was the exclusive distributor or manufacturer of fire extinguishers. Neither did he
require Cunanan to certify or execute an affidavit that no subdealer had been designated to sell the
said product at a lower price. The petitioner failed to ascertain whether a suitable substitute could be
obtained elsewhere, under terms more advantageous to the government. It turned out that as
declared by the trial court, another business enterprise, Systems Products Industries, was selling the
same brand and specifications at only P2,900.00 per unit.
Finally, accused Oani failed to present proof that "no suitable substitute can be obtained elsewhere
at more advantageous terms to the government," as thus, required by COA Circular 78-84, series of
1978.
Indeed, as it turned out, not only was there another manufacturer and refiller of similar type of fire
extinguisher and dry chemical used in it in Davao City, but more importantly, Systems Products
Industries, which was registered and accredited with the DTI, as evidenced by the said certification
of Syvelyn J. Tan, Regional Director, Region XI, DTI, was selling identical items at P2,700.00 each,
as shown by the re-canvass form dated March 13, 1990. Crediting to this the 10% allowance
authorized under COA Circular No. 85-55, the total per unit cost isP2,970.00. Subtracting this figure
from the unit cost stated in the Disbursement voucher, which is P5,530.00, we get a difference
of P2,560.00, which could have been saved had accused Oani conducted bidding or canvass, and
purchased the nine (9) units of fire extinguishers from Systems Products Industries. Consequently, in

failing to observe the requirements in government purchase, or at least, the diligence which a
similarly situated reasonable person would have taken, accused Oani caused the Panabo High
School and the government to suffer a total amount of P23,040.00, in Criminal Case No. 18885.27
To extricate himself from administrative and criminal liabilities for his acts and omissions, the
petitioner adduced in evidence a Certification purportedly dated "January 1988," that Cunanan was
the sole manufacturer/dealer of the fire extinguishers and had not designated a sub-dealer of his
products. However, as declared by the trial court, this certification, which the petitioner adduced in
evidence, exposed his travesty of foisting a falsified document as evidence, a felony under the last
paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.28 The Certification reads:
January 1988
CERTIFICATION
As Licensed Manufacturer and Exclusive Distributor
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that I, MR. FRANCISCO R. CUNANAN, of legal age, Filipino, Proprietor of
Powerline Manufacturing Industry, with business address located at Km. 5, Carnation St., Buhangin,
Davao City, is a duly-licensed Manufacturer and Exclusive Distributor of POWERLINE Fire
Extinguishers, do hereby certify and attest:
1. THAT, I am the owner and chairman of Powerline Manufacturing Industry engaged in
manufacturing POWERLINE brand fire extinguishers.
2. THAT, I have not appointed or authorized any dealer, subdealer and distributor to promote and sell
our major line product, the POWERLINE fire extinguishers in Mindanao Area or any parts/ area in
the Philippines.
3. THAT, I have in my possession all legal documents proving (sic) my Company is the only
authorized and duly-licensed manufacturer and exclusive distributor of POWERLINE fire
extinguishers brand.
4. THAT, I am executing this certification in (sic) pursuant to Article 7, Section 442 of the Government
Auditing Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I) under COA Circular No. 91-368 governing the
procurement from Duly-licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors.
5FURTHERMORE, I am executing this certification for whatever legal purposes it may serve our firm
and the undersigned.
Powerline Manufacturing Industry
By:

(Sgd.)
FRANCISCO R. CUNANAN
Manufacturer29
The Certification is dated "January 1988," making it appear that it had been issued before the
subject fire extinguishers were purchased on June 27, 1989. However, Cunanan could not have
executed the Certification in January 1988 because paragraph 4 thereof indicates that it was issued
pursuant to "COA Circular No. 91-368." It bears stressing that COA Circular No. 91-368 was issued
only on December 19, 1991, long after Cunanan signed the Certification. In fine, Cunanan could not
possibly have issued a certification pursuant to an administrative circular which did not as yet exist.
Hence, no such certification was issued on June 27, 1989, the most plausible explanation being that
it was executed and signed by Cunanan only after December 19, 1991. Besides, the petitioner never
submitted the certification when the auditing team conducted its investigation. If the certification was
indeed issued as early as January 1988, the petitioner should have submitted the same to the
auditing team. The trial court saw through the petitioners chicanery and declared in its decision:
Accused Oani submitted for the purpose a Certification dated 10 July 1988 issued by the Panabo
Fire Station, Panabo, Davao and the Certification dated January 1988, issued by a certain Francisco
R. Cunanan, proprietor of Powerline, that the latter is an exclusive distributor of the purchased fire
extinguishers and that no subdealer was appointed to sell the same.
After a careful evaluation of the respective evidences submitted by the parties on this issue, the
Court finds for the People and brushes aside as incredible the claims of the defense, particularly of
the accused Oani. It appears that the theory of the accused that bidding and canvass may be
dispensed with in view of the exclusiveness ofPowerline in the manufacture and distribution of the
purchased fire extinguishers, finds no leg to stand on, at the least, or a mere afterthought, at the
most. The penultimate paragraph of the said certification of Powerlineproprietor, Francisco R.
Cunanan, states,
"THAT, I am executing this Certification pursuant to Article 7, section 442 of the Government Auditing
Rules & Regulations (GAAM Volume I under COA Circular No. 91-368 governing the procurement
from Duly Licensed Manufacturers and Exclusive Distributors)."
Indeed, the GAAM was implemented by COA Circular No. 91-368. The latter, which was issued on
December 19, 1991, provided in the last paragraph thereof that the GAAM was to take effect on
January 1, 1992. The glaring inconsistency in the said Certification is that at the time it was issued,
i.e., on January 1988, the GAAM was not yet in existence. Hence, contrary to the testimony of
accused Oani, the Certification of Mr. Cunanan must have been issued only after December 19,
1991, the date of issuance of COA Circular No. 91-368, and necessarily,after the publication of the
special audit Report (Exhibit "B").

Further, had the said certification been the basis of accused Oani in approving the negotiated
purchase, he could have easily presented the same to the team in the course of their investigation.
But quite to the contrary, it was not even mentioned in the "management comment" portion of the
Report, which states:
"Management Comments:"
"When the Principal of the Panabo High School was made to comment on this particular finding, he
submitted a written justification that the purchase of the fire extinguishers was made due to the
persuasion of the Resident Auditor assigned in that agency. As per his letter, he contended that the
purchase of the said equipment was done only and after being recommended by the Resident
Auditor."

The records are bereft of even the slightest suggestion of any ill-motive on the part of the team,
which would justify Us to suspect that the members of the team maliciously omitted to consider such
an important document constituting the defense of the accused. Thus,

Otherwise stated, accused Oani cannot have Us believe that Exhibit "2," which made reference to
COA Circular No. 91-368 issued only on December 19, 1991, was already existing at the time the
nine (9) fire extinguishers were bought way back in 1989. Now, in the absence of a certification of
"exclusivity," it would be grossly negligent, if not naivete on the part of accused Oani, to rely on the
verbal representations of the Powerline Manufacturer. Besides, this certification was an
indispensable documentary support in the approval of the disbursement voucher considering that the
transaction was a mere exception to the general requirement of bidding and canvass. 30
On the purchase of the stereo component and school and office supplies, we agree with the trial
courts ruling that based on the evidence, the Bids and Awards Committee failed to conduct any
canvass and public bidding as mandated by law:
On the matter before Us, accused Oani testified that the bidding committee was chaired by him and
some instances co-chaired by Mr. Domingo Bugtungan, with Mrs. Sayoma and Mr. Campang as
members. Further, during the opening of the bids, the suppliers were present. A cursory examination
of the various Invitations to Bid, which were used as bid forms, the Canvass Forms, the existence of
which were admitted by both accused Oani and Roa, reveals that indeed, the signatures of the
bidding committee members, other than that of accused Oani,do not appear. As correctly observed
by the team in their Report, this was "unusual." The affixing of signatures by the committee members
are not mere ceremonial acts but proofs of authenticity and marks [of] regularity. The absence of
such signatures not only in some, but in ALL the Invitations to Bid and Canvass Forms indicate
something more than mere honest and unintentional omissions. These uniform omissions
collectively suggest a pattern of scheme tainted with ulterior motives, and altogether doubts the
authenticity of the supposed bidding or canvass.

The significance of the testimony and affidavit of state witness Edilberto Lacdao regarding the
purchase of the sound system, can hardly be ignored. As property custodian and teacher of Panabo
High School before and during the purchase and delivery of the sound system, subject of the Sales
Invoice dated December 29, 1989 in the amount of P35,690.00, his personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the acquisition cannot be doubted, there being no showing to the
contrary. Thus, the portion of his Affidavit dated March 10, 1990, which was the basis of his
testimony, states:
"That I and Mr. Paculangan, teacher, Panabo High School, Panabo, Davao prepared the RIV for the
following:
a. 1 unit amplifier 200 watts
b. 2 units electric bell
c. 1 unit trumpa-loudspeaker
d. 2 units megaphone
e. 1 unit tape deck"
"That I gave the filled-up RIV and canvass forms to Mr. Antonio Moraleda of ASM Enterprises who
happened to be in school, thinking that he will give us the quotation of the items;"
"That the RIV was changed as what had been previously prepared and that the delivered items
found in the revised RIV were the following:
a. 1 unit sound research SR 100 A 200 Watts
b. 1 unit sound research 6 mic mixer
c. 2 units L 2" 3-way speaker system
d. 1 unit Radio Cassette Recorder
e. 1 unit Phono Magnetic
f. 2 units microphone and microphone stand with holder
g. 3 units electrical bell 10" in diameter" x x x
"That I personally signed the RIV accepting the equipment." (Italics supplied)
Probative weight may be accorded to these declarations for its candidness and straightforwardness.
In addition, there is no showing in the record that from the time of its execution, until he testified
thereon, Edilberto Lacdao was harboring ill-feeling or ulterior motives against both or either of the

accused. This explains the absence of the signatures of the other members of the committee on bids
and strongly supports the findings of the special audit team that a simulated bidding and canvass
took place, at least in the purchase of sound system. In this case, what appears to have transpired
was that the RIVs containing the specific items to be purchased, were prepared by the property
officer, who then [gave] them to the favored suppliers, together with blank canvass forms. The
suppliers would then return the RIVs and the canvass forms to the property officer, which by then,
have already been filled up with inflated quotations by other enterprises showing the favored
suppliers as having quoted the lowest prices. What follows is a matter of clerical documentation to
make it appear that bidding and canvass was validly conducted. In the case of the sound system, it
was even the supplier, ASM Enterprises which modified the contents of the RIV. This very same
inference may be made from the testimony of Edilberto Lacdao on cross-examination, that he could
not remember Panabo High School having conducted bidding or canvass from 1984 to 1989.
In consciously allowing the suppliers to violate the requirements of bidding and canvass, accused
Oani brazenly undermined the objective of the process, namely, "To protect the public interest by
giving the public the best possible advantage thru open competition." Hence, not only did he act in a
"wantonly careless manner" but also in an unspeakable "breach of duty in a flagrant and
palpable" way. In full contemplation of the law, his acts constitute gross inexcusable negligence.
As occasioned by the lack of bidding and canvass, unqualified and non-bona fide entities that only
served as brokers, gained entry and participation to the transaction. Not only did this burden the
government with additional costs, as a result, but also exposed it to unnecessary risks and
disadvantages. Firsthand investigation and audit conducted by the COA auditors revealed the
following:
"The overpricing of purchases was obviously the result of exaggerated or inflated price quotations
made by non-bona fide dealers or middlemen of equipment, supplies and materials of which the
agency had contracted with. By using non-existing firms or establishment who were made to appear
in the records as the competing bidders with higher quoted prices than those offered by the nonbona fide dealers, it had paved the way for those unscrupulous bidders to win the bidding. This is the
plain and flagrant simulation and manipulation of canvass to the detriment of the government."
"Thus, the participation of non-bona fide dealers in the transactions of the agency was allowed
through the simulated canvass. This was further confirmed by personnel involved in the procurement
system of the agency when they claimed during the exit Conference that usually they gave the
Request and Issue Voucher (RIV) to a certain dealer and the same dealer should be the one to
process the documents needed for the purchase. This procedure was facilitated with the influence of
some officials of the agency who are clothed with the power to decide over and above the same
involving the MOOE funds of the agency. These officials were definitely and particularly identified in
the affidavits executed by the designated ACCOUNTABLE personnel in the agency which are
made as appendices to this report."
"Furthermore, per inquiry made by the team, two business establishments particularly the ASM
Enterprises and the Red Lion Marketing in Davao City who were often made as the winning bidders
of the rigged and/or simulated canvasses/biddings and had mostly supplied the agencies needs for
office and sound equipment, supplies and materials, were not dealers of such line COMMODITIES

. This was validated in one of our unexpected visits to their establishments where we had observed
that there were no stocks and/or displays of such commodities or merchandise as what had been
delivered to the agency."
"Per observation, the general outside and inside appearance of these two establishments are: Red
Lion Marketing portrays an ordinary office while ASM Enterprises appears as an ordinary residential
house and yet these establishments were considered by MANAGEMENT in the canvassing of
prices for the procurement of equipment, supplies and materials. The team could not find any valid
reason why management failed to consider in the canvassing of prices known establishments in the
main streets of Davao City, and those who are distinctly identified to be dealing with the sound and
office equipment, supplies and materials."
"Likewise, certification issued by the Business Bureau, Davao City (See Appendix 2) showed that
the ASM Enterprises and Red Lion Marketing declared capitalization of P20,000.00 and P40,000.00
in 1988, respectively, as against the contracts they entered into with the government which is
invariably more than their capitalization. Red Lion could also be declared a non-bona fide dealer on
the ground of non-payment of the business taxes for the year 1989, thereby disproving their license
to operate for that year." (Italics supplied)
Accused Oani and Roa did not dispute the foregoing findings of the team, much less present rebuttal
evidence. Instead, they elicited the stipulation from the prosecution "that the purchased equipment,
supplies and other materials were delivered to the Panabo High School," which the prosecution
readily admitted during the pre-trial. The fact that the subject inventories have been delivered would
have been a potent defense of the accused in the instant case had the purchases not resulted into
other forms of injuries to the government which brings us into the matter of overpricing. 31
As against the findings of the trial court supported by the evidence on record, the petitioner offered
nothing but his barren testimony. The petitioner also failed to offer any evidence except his bare
denial to the following findings of the trial court:
In the purchase of the sound system, covered by the purchase order dated December 28, 1989,
signed by accused Oani, the unit price of a "microphone stand with holder" is P2,295.00. The same
could have been bought from the suppliers participating in the re-canvass anywhere from P195.00
to P804.00, enabling the government to save by more than 50%. Similarly, a "10 in. diameter
electronic bell" was bought from ASM Marketing for P525.00 per unit, compared to the selling prices
of participating suppliers in the re-canvass, ranging from P185.00 toP245.00 only, showing more
than 50% difference.
In the acquisition of various office supplies and equipment by Panabo High School from Red Lion
Marketing in the total amount of P111,912.35, as shown in the undated purchase order issued by
accused Oani and the corresponding Sales Invoice of Red Lion Marketing dated March 10, 1989 the
price of one steel safe wasP11,600.00. After the re-canvass, it was discovered that similar items may
be bought from reputable suppliers in Davao City from P7,800.00 to P8,620.00 only. Likewise, a unit
of "steel cabinet combination four drawers" purchased from Red Lion Marketing for P11,000.00 was
sold by reputable suppliers anywhere from P5,000.00 toP6,000.00 only. Again, a "steel cabinet four
drawers," sold for P4,400.00 by Red Lion, was quoted by bona fide suppliers from P2,250.00

to P2,750.00. This rate of overpricing very well applies to other items in the said purchase order and
sales invoice.
In the subsequent purchase of various school supplies in the total amount of P37,686.00 on or about
December 26, 1989 again, from ASM Enterprises, enumerated in its Sales Invoice dated December
22, 1989, we find further inflated prices. Thus, while the 500 pieces of "long brown folder" were sold
by ASM Enterprises at P2.25 each, other reputable suppliers in Davao City were selling the same
from P1.50 to P1.90 each, as of March 21, 1990. In the same vein, ASM Enterprises sold 300 boxes
of "Venus Yellow Enamel Chalk" to Panabo High School forP28.50 per box. After the re-canvass, it
was found out that the same item may be bought for P25.00 per box. Again, ASM Enterprises sold to
Panabo High School 10 dozens of "Max Staple Wire No. 10" for P79.80 per dozen, while other
suppliers were selling them at P37.00 to P39.00 per dozen, for a difference of more than 50%. 32
In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,33 the Court emphasized that
By its very nature and characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to protect the public
interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open competition. Another selfevident purpose of public bidding is to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the
execution of public contracts. Public bidding of government contracts and for disposition of
government assets have the same purpose and objectives. Their only difference, if at all, is that in
the public bidding for public contracts the award is generally given to the lowest bidder while in the
disposition of government assets the award is to the highest bidder.34
In a public bidding, there must be competition that is legitimate, fair and honest. The three principles
of a public bidding are the offer to the public; an opportunity for competition; and a basis for exact
comparison of bids.35 A contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and
the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it.36
In the present case, the petitioner purchased the fire extinguishers and office and school supplies
without the benefit of a public bidding, in gross and evident bad faith, resulting in the considerable
overpricing of the fire extinguishers and the supplies, to the gross prejudice of the government.
In sum then, the decision of the trial court is in accord with the law and the evidence.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Cost against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172873

March 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for
cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense
importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because
of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values
the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a
crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.1 Due process commands that no man shall
lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of convincing the factfinder of his guilt.
To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the trier of fact the
necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue.2
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.3
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.4
On appeal is the Decision5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006 affirming in
toto the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 103 finding appellant
Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations before the RTC with possession and sale of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), to wit:
Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused not
being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in her/his/their possession and control, zero point zero three (0.03)
grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. Q-03-114257
That on or about the 2nd day of January, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did,
then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in

the said transaction, zero point zero three (0.03) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges read in Filipino,
a language known and understood by him.9 On motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were
consolidated for joint trial.10Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera) were
presented by the prosecution:
PO1 Roy testified that on January 2, 2003, at about 2:00 p.m., he was on duty at Police Station 9
where he made a pre-operation report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted on the herein
appellant that same afternoon.11He then proceeded to Brgy. San Vicente, Quezon City with PO3
Rivera for the operation.12 At a point near Jollibee, they met the informant who, upon seeing the
subject appellant, went with him to meet PO1 Roy.13 After being introduced to the appellant as a
buyer of "piso" worth of "shabu", appellant immediately produced a sachet containing the alleged
drug. When appellant received the marked MONEY amounting to P100.00,14 PO1 Roy raised his
left hand, at which point his back-up officer, PO3 Rivera appeared and immediately arrested the
appellant.15 The appellant was immediately brought to the Police Station for investigation, while the
two sachets of "shabu" and aluminum foil discovered on the said appellant were brought to the
Crime Laboratory for examination.16
PO3 Rivera testified that he was the back-up officer of PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust
operation conducted against the appellant in the afternoon of January 2, 2003. 17 In preparation for
the said operation, he conducted a short briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation they
were about to carry out: the place of the operation which is at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the
identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the preparation of the buy-bust MONEY to be
used.18 With respect to the buy-bust MONEY , he prepared oneP50.00 bill, two P20.00 bills and
one P10.00 bill, by making the appropriate marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their
respective serial numbers.19 Later that afternoon, police officers proceeded to the meeting place.
PO3 Rivera positioned himself in a parked vehicle20 about 20 meters from the situs of the
transaction.21He thus had a clear view of the appellant with the informant and PO1 Roy.22 Shortly
thereafter, he saw PO1 Roy make the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the
appellant to arrest him.23 He recovered the marked MONEY from the appellant and proceeded to
frisk the latter.24 Upon conducting the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to
be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to the Police Station for detention, while
the items seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. 25 The two sachets
tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil sheets tested
negative of the aforementioned substance.26
Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during their
respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the buy-bust
operation.27

The defense presented the testimonies of Joaquin Artemio Marfori, Arsenia Morales and the
appellant:
Appellant denied the charges against him.28 He testified that he is a resident of Dolores, Quezon
where he worked in a fertilizer store.29 He was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents
who live at Cruz na Ligas.30 As his mother did not give him enough money for his fare back to
Quezon, he sidelined as a parking attendant at Philcoa in order to earn the balance of his bus
fare.31 However, sometime that afternoon, two male persons in civilian clothes suddenly approached
him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as policemen and poked their guns at them. 32 The
said policemen handcuffed them and proceeded to frisk them. 33 He averred that nothing was found
on him and yet the policemen still brought him to the police station. 34 He denied the allegation made
against him that he sold, much less possessed, the "shabu" subject of this action.35 He further
testified that in the tricycle on the way to the police station, PO1 Roy took out a plastic of "shabu"
from his (PO1 Roys) pocket and once at the station, the said policeman showed it to the desk officer
and claimed that the plastic sachet was found on the appellant.36
He likewise denied having received the buy-bust money and claimed that the P50.00 bill and the
two P20.00 bills, totaling P90.00, were given to him by his mother for his bus fare to Quezon. 37 He
disclaimed any knowledge of the P10.00 bill.38 He further testified that he personally knew PO3
Rivera prior to the arrest, since his first cousin and PO3 Rivera had a quarrel which he had no
involvement whatsoever.39 He noted the fact that it was PO3 Rivera who arrested him. 40
Witness Joaquin Artemio Marfori testified that he is the employer of the appellant in his agricultural
and poultry supply store in Babayan, Calamba, Laguna.41 He further stated that he allowed the
appellant to go on vacation on December 12, 2003 to celebrate the New Year with his family in
Manila.42 However, the appellant failed to report back for work at the start of the New Year.43
Finally, witness Arsenia Morales (Arsenia) corroborated the testimony of her son that she gave
him P90.00, consisting of one P50.00 bill and two P20.00 bills as bus fare back to Laguna where he
worked.44 Thinking that her son was already on his way home, she was surprised to receive a call
from her daughter informing her that her son, the appellant, was arrested for possession and sale of
"shabu".45
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On April 29, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No.
Q-03-114257 for violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for drug pushing [of] zero point zero
three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is
hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
(P500,000.00) pesos.

The Court likewise finds the accused ROLDAN MORALES y Midarasa GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-114256 for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. [No.] 9165 for
drug possession x x x of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride and is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of
Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Month to Thirteen (13) Years and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos.
The sachets of shabu subject of these cases are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru Dangerous
Drugs Board for proper disposition after this decision becomes final.
SO ORDERED.46
The trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person
who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust
operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003. 47 The trial court found that from the
evidence presented, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the following: (1) the fact of
the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003 at the parking lot of Jollibee
Philcoa which led to the arrest of the appellant; and (2) the corpus delicti, through the presentation in
court of the two sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be
methylamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant. 48
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, there was no instigation that took place. 49 Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by
the police officers to apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. 50 The
appellate court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti.51 Stripped of non-essentials, the CA summarized the antecedent facts of the case as
follows:
PO1 Eduardo Roy prepared a pre-arranged report on the buy-bust operation to be conducted
against appellant at Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City upon an informants tip that appellant was
selling "shabu" in the said area. On the other hand, PO3 Armando Ragundiaz Rivera recorded the
briefing, summary, identification of appellant and the buy-bust money to be used in the operation
consisting of one (1) fifty peso bill, two (2) twenty peso bill[s] and one (1) ten peso bill. PO1 Roy who
acted as the poseur-buyer and PO3 Rivera as his back-up proceeded to University Avenue corner
Commonwealth Avenue, Barangay San Vicente, Quezon City together with the informant.
PO1 Roy and the informant met appellant at the parking lot of Jollibee restaurant while PO3 Rivera
positioned himself at the side of a parked car where he can easily have a clear view of the three.
After PO1 Roy was introduced by the informant to the appellant as a buyer of "shabu", the latter
immediately produced a sachet containing the said prohibited drugs and handed the same to him.
PO1 Roy raised his left hand as the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consummated.
Thereafter, PO3 Rivera went to the area, introduced himself as a police officer and frisked appellant
from whom he recovered the marked money and a matchbox, where the suspected "shabu" was

placed, and two (2) aluminum foils. They informed appellant of his constitutional rights and brought
him to the police station while the two (2) small transparent heat sealed sachets containing the
suspected prohibited drugs and paraphernalia were turned over to the crime laboratory for
examination, and which [was] later, found to be positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride
(commonly known as "shabu").52
Thence, the CA rendered judgment to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.53
Appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal.54 In our Resolution dated July 12,
2006, we resolved to accept the case and required the parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs simultaneously, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice. 55 Both parties
adopted their respective appellants and appellees briefs, instead of filing supplemental briefs. 56
Our Ruling
Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has not been
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 57 In support of his contention, appellant alleges
that the arresting officers did not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and
paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust operation. 58 Appellant hence posits that
this created serious doubt as to the items and actual quantity of shabu recovered, if at all.59
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of the two
arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu.60
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal
throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 61 On the basis
of such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal.62 However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and
substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.63 After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence
presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.64

On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously
aware of being in possession of the drug.65 Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.66
With respect to corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Partoza,67 we held that the identity of the corpus delicti was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. In the said case, the apprehending policeman did not mark the seized drugs after
he arrested the appellant in the latters presence. Neither did he make an inventory and take a
photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant. There was no representative
from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the
operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof.
Hence, we held in the afore-cited case that there was no compliance with the statutory safeguards.
In addition, while the apprehending policeman admitted to have in his possession the shabufrom the
time the appellant was apprehended at the crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of
proof on how the seized items were handled from the time they left the hands of the said police
officer.
We declared in People v. Orteza,68 that the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of RA 9165 implied a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of
the corpus delicti:
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure
in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the
Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.

More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to
when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized
drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the
accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
Likewise, in People v. Obmiranis,69 we acquitted the appellant due to flaws in the conduct of the postseizure custody of the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from the appellant, together with the
failure of the key persons who handled the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it
was offered in evidence in court.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed. The
records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their
mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law. The procedural lapse
is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police officers presented by the prosecution,
namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.
PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant. Moreover,
he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of adherence to the
procedural mandate of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony, to wit:
Fiscal Jurado
x x x You mentioned that you gave the pre-arranged signal, what is that?
Witness
A- Raising my left hand.
Q- And what happened next?
A- My back up PO3 Rivera came.
Q- What [did] your back up do when you raised your hand?
A- He arrested Morales.
Q- What were you doing when he arrested Morales?
A- I put the informant away from the scene.
Q- And what happened next after that?
A- We brought him to the police station.
Q- How about the shabu, what did you do with it?

A- We brought it to the crime lab.

Q- How did you send it to crime lab?
A- Shabu and paraphernalia recovered by my companion from the suspect.
Q- How many items were sent to the crime lab?
A- 2 shabu and paraphernalia.
Q- What are the paraphernalia?
A- Foil, sir.
Q- How many foil?
A- I cannot recall.
Q- What happened to the accused in the police station?
A- He was investigated.
Q- Do you know the accused?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- What is his name?
A- Roldan Morales.
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to
identify the said items?
Witness
A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu"
Atty. Mosing
I will object because that would be leading on the part of the prosecution because he could
not identify on what shabu.

Court
That question is overruled.
Fiscal Jurado
I am showing to you an item, would you be able to identify?
Court
Fiscal showing several shabu.
WITNESS
A- This one.
Fiscal Jurado
Q- There is another plastic sachet?
Witness
A- Recovered.
Q- How about these two?
A- I was not the one who confiscated that.
Q- What happened to the said item submitted to the crime lab?
A- Positive, sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Jurado
xxxx
Q- How about the specimen forwarded to the crime lab?
Witness
A- My companion brought that.
Q- What was your participation in the case?

A- Poseur buyer.
xxxx
Atty. Mosing
xxxx
Q- After the arrest you brought the suspect and the items to the station?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Did you not make a list of items you have confiscated in this case?
A- No, we turned it over to the investigator.
Q- You have presented the buy bust MONEY a while ago, was that buy bust money
suppose to be turned over to the investigator?
A- No, inquest. Upon request, I was the one who received it. 70 (Emphasis supplied)
The testimony of the other arresting officer, PO3 Rivera further confirms the failure of the
buy-bust team to observe the procedure mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165:
Court
Q- Where did you position yourself?
Witness
A- Parked vehicle.
Fiscal Jurado
Q- What did you notice?
Witness
A- The confidential informant introduced our poseur buyer to the suspect and after a few
conversation I waited and I saw the pre-arranged signal. And when he raised his left hand
that is the signal that the transaction is consummated.
Q- After he made that signal, what did you do?
A- I rushed to the area and arrest[ed] the suspect.

Q- Who was the person you took x x x custody [of]?

A- Roldan Morales
Q- And what did you do with him?
A- Because he ha[d] a marked money I got hold of it and arrest[ed] him.
Q- And what did you do with him?
A- I frisked him.
Q- And what was the result of your frisking?
A- A box of match which I was able to recover [containing] another suspected shabu.
Q- Where did you find that on his body?
A- Front [pocket of] pants.
Q- How about the match?
A- The same.
Q- What else did you find?
A- Aluminum foil.
Q- And after you recovered that evidence, what did you do with the accused?
A- We informed him of his constitutional rights and brought him to the station.
Q- How about the items you recovered?
A- Delivered it to the crime lab for examination.
Q- What else did you deliver [to] the crime lab?
A- Request, sir.71 (Emphasis supplied)
Other than PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera, the prosecution did not present any other witnesses.
Hence, the investigator, referred to by PO1 Roy in his testimony as the one who took
delivery of the seized items, was not identified nor was he presented in court. More
importantly, the testifying police officers did not state that they marked the seized drugs
immediately after they arrested the appellant and in the latters presence. Neither did they
make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the

appellant. There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the operation and
who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and be given copies thereof. None
of these statutory safeguards were observed.
Even PO1 Roy, the poseur-buyer, was not certain as to the identity of the confiscated shabu,
to wit:
Fiscal Jurado:
Q- If the said sachet and paraphernalia will be shown to you, how would you be able to
identify the said items?
Witness
A- I could not recall "pare-pareho yung shabu". 72
The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items
collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that
were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of RA 9165 is
not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the siezed items are properly preserved by the apprehending team, 73 these
conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was offered by the testifying police
officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the apprehending
policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative74and the other witness,
PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug
operations by the PNP.75 In fine, there is serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the
same drug recovered from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.
1avvphi1

Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the person
who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending presentation in
court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its
cause.
1avvphi1

In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. There
was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus,
since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree
of proof required for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we
resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant
Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTEDbased on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report
to this Court the action taken hereon within five days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173472

February 26, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ELMER PERALTA y DE GUZMAN alias "MEMENG", Appellant.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about how the courts may be assured that the integrity of seized prohibited drugs is
preserved from the time of their seizure to the time of their laboratory examination and presentation
in court as evidence in the case.
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that the District Drug Enforcement Group (DDEG), Southern
Police, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, received reports of accused Elmer D. Peraltas drugpushing activities at 21 Zero Block Mill Flores, Barangay Rizal, Makati City.
At about 11:30 p.m. of July 21, 2002 the DDEG staged a buy-bust operation with SPO1 Alberto
Sangalang as poseur-buyer. An informant introduced Sangalang to accused Peralta as they entered
his house. The informant told Peralta that Sangalang was a Dance Instructor (DI) in need of shabu
for himself and for fellow DIs so they could endure long nights. Sangalang gave Peralta a
marked P500.00 bill for a sachet of shabu.
At a signal, Sangalang told his informant to go out and buy cigarettes. On seeing the informant come
out of the house, the police back-up team rushed in. They arrested accused Peralta, took the
marked MONEY from him, and brought him to the police station. Meanwhile, the sachet of shabu
was marked "AS-1-210702" and taken to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for testing.
The contents of the sachet tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
The prosecution presented Sangalang. He alone testified for the government since it was thought
that the testimonies of the other police officers would only be corroborative.1 The prosecution also
dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist after the parties stipulated on the existence and
due execution of Chemistry Report D-332-02, which showed that the specimen tested positive for
shabu.2
For his part, appellant Peralta denied having committed the offense charged. He claimed that he
went to bed at 7:00 p.m. on July 21, 2002. At about 11:30 p.m. someones knocking at the door

awakened him. Shortly after, four police officers forced the door open and barged into the house.
They handcuffed Peralta, searched his house, and then brought him to the Southern Police District. 3
At the time of the arrest, Noel "Toto" Odono4 (Toto) and the spouses Apollo5 and Charito dela Pena
were conversing near accused Peraltas house. Suddenly, they heard a commotion and saw several
men forcibly enter it. Those men searched the house and arrested him.
Meanwhile, Toto related what he saw to Sgt. Eligio Peralta, Jr. (Sgt. Peralta), accused Peraltas
brother. Sgt. Peralta hurried to his brothers house but found him already handcuffed. The sergeant
repeatedly asked the police officers why they were arresting his brother without a warrant but he got
no response. He followed the arresting team to the Southern Police District where he learned that
his brother had been caught selling shabu.6
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati City charged accused Peralta before the Regional Trial
Court7 (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case 02-2009 with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision8 dated June 20, 2003, rejecting accused Peraltas defense of
denial. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer life
imprisonment and pay a fine ofP500,000.00. Peralta appealed to this Court but, pursuant to the
Courts ruling in People v. Mateo,9 his case was referred to the Court of Appeals (CA) for adjudication
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00165.10 On April 27, 2006 the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC.11
The CA gave credence to the testimony of Sangalang who, it found, did not deviate from the regular
performance of his duties and was not impelled by ill motive in testifying against Peralta. Also, the
appellate court pointed out that the prosecution presented and identified the sachet of shabu in
court. Finally, the CA said that accused Peraltas denial is a weak defense which cannot prevail over
positive identification.
Accused Peralta seeks by notice of appeal12 this Courts review of the decision of the CA.
The Issue Presented
The key issue here is whether or not the prosecution presented ample proof that the police officers
involved caught accused Peralta at his home, peddling prohibited drugs.
The Courts Ruling
The elements of the sale of illegal drugs are a) the identities of the buyer and seller, b) the
transaction or sale of the illegal drug, and c) the existence of the corpus delicti. With respect to the
third element, the prosecution must show that the integrity of the corpus delicti has been preserved.
This is crucial in drugs cases because the evidence involvedthe seized chemicalis not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and can easily be tampered with or substituted. 13
In Malillin v. People14 the Court held that the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the
seized prohibited drugs. It must present testimony about every link in the chain of custody of such

drugs, from the moment they were seized from the accused to the moment they are offered in
evidence.
But here the prosecution failed to show the chain of custody or that they followed the procedure that
has been prescribed in connection with the seizure and custody of drugs. To begin with, the
prosecution did not adduce evidence of when the sachet of shabu was marked. Consequently, it
could have been marked long after its seizure or even after it had been tested in the laboratory.
While the records show that the sachet bore the markings "AS-1-210702," indicating that Sangalang
probably made the marking, the prosecutor did not bother to ask him if such marking was his.
Sangalang identified the seized drugs in a manner that glossed over the need to establish their
integrity. Thus:15
Fiscal Lalin:
Q: You stated that you would likewise recognize the sachet of shabu subject matter of the
sale transaction between you and alias "Memeng"?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I have here with me a brown envelope containing the specimen subjected to laboratory
examination, will you kindly examine the contents of this brown envelope and tell us whether
you find inside Exhibit "E" the sachet of shabu which is the subject matter of the sale
transaction that transpired between you and one alias "Memeng"?
A: This is the sachet of shabu that I was able to purchase from Memeng.
Q: Meaning, this is the sachet of shabu which alias "Memeng" sold to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Although the Court has repeatedly reminded the prosecutors concerned to present evidence which
would show that the integrity of the seized drugs has been preserved from the time of their seizure to
the time they are presented in court, such reminder seems not to have made an impact on some of
them. Public prosecutors need to ask the right questions to the witnesses.
The Court of course trusts the competence of most public prosecutors. Still, it would probably help to
remind the others to ask the following questions or substantially similar ones that will aid the court in
determining the innocence or guilt of the accused:
Q. You said that you received from the accused a sachet containing crystalline powder that
appeared to you to be "shabu. Would you be able to identify that sachet which appeared to you to
contain shabu?
Q. Showing to you this sachet containing what appears to be crystalline powder, what relation does it
have, if any, to the sachet that you said you received from the accused?

Q. This sachet has a marking on it that reads "AS-1-210702." Do you know who made this marking?
Q. Who made it?
Q. What do these letters and numbers represent?
Q. When did you make this marking on the sachet?
Since the seizing officer usually has to turn over the seized drugs to the desk officer or some
superior officer, who would then send a courier to the police crime laboratory with a request that the
same be examined to identify the contents, it is imperative for the officer who placed his marking on
the plastic container to seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that usually cannot be removed
without leaving a tear on the plastic container. If the drugs were not in a plastic container, the police
officer should put it in one and seal the same. In this way the drugs would assuredly reach the
laboratory in the same condition it was seized from the accused.
Further, after the laboratory technician has tested and verified the nature of the powder in the
container, he should seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal had been broken. In
this way, if the accused wants to contest the test made, the Court would be assured that what is
retested is the same powder seized from the accused.
The prosecutor could then ask questions of the officer who placed his marking on the plastic
container to prove that the suspected drugs had not been tampered with or substituted when they
left that officers hands. The prosecutor could ask the following or substantially similar questions:
Q. What did you do if any to ensure that the powder in this sachet is not tampered with or substituted
when it left your hands?
Q. What did you use for sealing this sachet?
Q. When did this sachet leave your hands?
Q. To whom did you give it?
Q. For what reason did you give it to him?
And once the crime laboratory technician is presented, the prosecutor could ask him the following or
substantially similar questions:
Q. Did this plastic container with powder in it which you brought today have any marking on it when
you received it for examination?
Q. In what condition did you receive the plastic container? (Or: Was the plastic container opened or
sealed when you received it?)
Q. Did you notice any sign that the plastic container or its contents may have been tampered with?

Q. What did you do if any to ensure that the powder in this sachet is not tampered with or substituted
after you finished examining it?
Q. And where was this sachet stored pending your retrieval of it for the purpose of bringing it to court
today?
Q. Will you please examine it and tell us if it has been tampered with from the time it left your hands
for storage.
If the sealing of the seized article had not been made, the prosecution would have to present the
desk officer or superior officer to whom the seizing officer turned over such article. That desk officer
or superior officer needs to testify that he had taken care that the drugs were not tampered with or
substituted. And if someone else brought the unsealed sachet of drugs to the police crime laboratory,
he, too, should give similar testimony, and so on up to the receiving custodian at the crime laboratory
until the drugs reach the laboratory technician who examined and resealed it.
Here, the police arrested Peralta and seized the sachet of shabu from him on July 21, 2002 and
made the request for testing on July 22, 2002. Since the prosecution did not present evidence that
the sachet had been marked shortly after seizure and that its integrity had been preserved by proper
sealing, the prosecution failed to prove the third element of the crime: the existence of the corpus
delicti.
The fact that the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of Chemistry Report D-33202 has no bearing on the question of chain of custody of the seized drugs. The stipulation only
proves the authenticity of the request for laboratory examination of the drugs submitted to the
laboratory (not that it was the same drugs seized from accused Peralta) and the results of the
examination made of the same, nothing more.16
1avvphil

Under the circumstances, reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties is
not enough for a conviction. Once challenged by evidence of flawed chain of custody, as in this
case, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence. 17 Likewise,
while the defense of denial on its own is inherently weak, the conviction of an accused must rely on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of his defense. 18
In sum, the Court finds the evidence in this case insufficient to sustain the conviction of accused
Peralta of the crime of which he was charged.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated April 27, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00165 and ACQUITS accused-appellant Elmer Peralta y de
Guzman alias "Memeng" for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179213

September 3, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
NICOLAS GUTIERREZ y LICUANAN Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed in the present appeal is the April 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 01991 affirming that of Branch 267 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case
No. 12514-D finding Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan alias Nick (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Appellant was charged with illegal sale of 0.05 gram of shabu and
illegal possession of paraphernalia "fit or intended for smoking . . . or introducing any dangerous
drug into the body" by two separate Informations, both dated June 19, 2003, reading:

First Information
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nicolas Gutierrez y
Licuanan with the crime of violation of Section 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165 (SC-AM 99-1-13), committed
as follows:
On or about June 16, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Michael P. Espares, a police poseur-buyer, one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing five centigrams (0.05 grams) [sic] of white
crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.1 (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
Second Information
The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan
with the crime of violation of Section 12, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, committed as follows:
On or about June 16, 2003 in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, without having been duly authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control the following paraphernalias fit
or intended for smoking, consuming, administering or introducing any dangerous drug into the body,
to wit:
a. one (1) unsealed transparent plastic sachet containing traces of white crystalline
substance marked as exh-B;
b. one (1) pair of scissors marked as exh.-C; and
c. one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing five (5) empty transparent plastic sachets
marked as exh-D.
xxxx
specimen marked as exh-B was found positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.2 (Underscoring supplied)
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.3 The trial court, after trial, acquitted appellant of the
charge subject of the second Information (illegal possession of paraphernalia), hence, this Decision
shall dwell only on the review of appellants conviction of selling shabu.
From the testimonies of three members of the team which conducted a buy-bust transaction that
spawned the filing of the Informations PO1 Michael Espares (PO1 Espares), 4 SPO3 Leneal Matias

(SPO3 Matias),5 and PO1 Allan Mapula (PO1 Mapula),6 the following version of the prosecution is
gathered:
At around 5:00 p.m. on June 16, 2003, while on duty at the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig City
Police Force, SPO3 Matias received information via telephone from a concerned citizen that a
certain alias "Nick," later identified to be appellant, was peddling shabu along San Agustin Street,
Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On the instructions of SPO3 Matias, PO1 Espares and PO1 Mapula
proceeded to, and surveilled, the area and confirmed the information.
SPO3 Matias thus formed a buy-bust team, which he headed, with PO1 Espares as poseur-buyer,
and PO1 Mapula and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 Familara) as members. Five marked twenty-peso
bills were given to PO1 Espares as buy-bust MONEY . The team thereafter went to the target area
and met with a confidential asset who was to assist them in the operation.
While the other members of the team were strategically positioned, the asset, accompanied by PO1
Espares, approached appellant and asked him "Pare, meron ka ba diyan? Bibili kami. Bibili ako ng
piso." Apparently not having heard the entire utterances, appellant replied, "Magkano ba bibilhin
mo?" (How much are you buying?), to which PO1 Espares replied "Piso lang, eto pera" at the same
time tendering the buy-bust MONEY which appellant took and placed in his right front pocket.
Appellant then drew from his pants back pocket a black plastic case, opened it and took one plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance which he handed to PO1 Espares. PO1 Espares
thereupon executed the pre-arranged signal, apprehended appellant, and confiscated the black
plastic case which appellant was holding. The case yielded a pair of scissors, an unsealed plastic
sachet containing traces of white crystalline substance, and five empty plastic sachets.
Heeding the pre-arranged signal, the other members of the team closed in to assist PO1 Espares
who then marked all the seized items including the plastic sachet containing the substance subject
of the sale. Appellant was brought to the police station wherein the confiscated items were
surrendered to an investigator.
Appellant, for his part, presented the following version:7
At about 7:30 p.m. on June 16, 2003, while he was at home having dinner with his wife Josephine,
daughter Jennifer and her husband, someone kicked open the door of their house. Four armed men
in civilian clothes immediately entered, handcuffed and frisked him, and confiscated his wallet. On
asking them what his offense was, he was simply told to explain at the police station. Jennifer, too,
asked the armed men what the offense of appellant was, but she received no answer.
He was thereafter brought to the Pariancillo police precinct where a police officer showed him a
plastic sachet and threatened that a case would be filed against him unless he paid P20,000. He
failed to pay, however, hence, he was detained and subsequently charged.
Appellants wife Josephine and daughter Jennifer corroborated appellants tale on the circumstances
surrounding his arrest.8

Appellants neighbor Jose de Guzman, who also took the witness stand, stated that at about 7:45
p.m. on June 16, 2003, he saw appellant come out of his house handcuffed and escorted by four
persons who all boarded an owner-type jeep.9
By Decision of January 18, 2006,10 the trial court convicted appellant of illegal sale of shabu. As
reflected earlier, appellant was exonerated of the charge of illegal possession of paraphernalia.
Thus, the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proven the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court, acting as a Special Drug Court in the abovecaptioned case, hereby finds NICOLAS GUTIERREZ y LICUANAN, GUILTY as charged and is
hereby sentenced in Criminal Case No. 12514-D for Violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 9165, to
suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 500,000.00)
In so far as Criminal Case No. 12515-D for Violation of Section 12, Republic Act No. 9165,
considering that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused NICOLAS GUTIERREZ y
LICUANAN of the said crime, the latter is hereby acquitted thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In convicting appellant of illegal sale of shabu, the trial court found that the prosecution sufficiently
established the corpus delicti consisting of the buy-bust money paid to appellant and the shabu
purchased from him. It added that appellants defense of frame-up was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction by Decision of April 30,
2007,11 hence, the present appeal.
Appellant argues that he was a victim of an invalid warrantless search and arrest. He maintains that
he was merely having dinner with his family when four unidentified armed men barged into their
house. He cites an inconsistency in the testimonies of PO1 Espares and SPO3 Matias that he claims
destroys their credibility, viz: PO1 Espares declared that the pre-arranged signal at the buy-bust
operation was that he would light a cigarette, while SPO3 Matias stated that PO1 Espares was to
flick the sachet containing shabu.12
The Solicitor General counters that since appellant was caught in flagrante in a buy-bust operation,
the police officers were not only authorized but were also obligated to effect a warrantless arrest and
seizure, adding that frame-up is a common and standard line of defense which appellant failed to
support with clear and convincing evidence.13
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,14 the elements necessary in a prosecution for the illegal
sale of shabu are: the identity of the buyer and the seller; the object and the consideration; and the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is proof that the transaction or
sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or substance
of the crime which establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.15

In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense and its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.16 Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti.17 The "chain of custody" rule performs this function as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 18
Section 1 (b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 19 which implements
R.A. No. 9165 defines "chain of custody" as follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plants source of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment at each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court and destruction. Such record of movements and custody of the seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item,
the dates and times when such transfers of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and
use in court as evidence, and the final disposition. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Malillin v. People,20 the Court explained how it expects the chain of custody or "movement" of the
seized evidence to be maintained:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
1awph!1

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. (Underscoring supplied)
The Court finds that the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the
allegedly seized shabu. That the defense stipulated on these matters, viz: that the specimen exists,
that a request has been made by the arresting officers for examination thereof, that a forensic
chemist examined it, and that it tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing
on the question of chain of custody. These stipulations, which merely affirm the existence of the
specimen, and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof, were entered into
during pre-trial only in order to dispense with the testimony of the forensic chemist and abbreviate

the proceedings. That such is the intention of the parties is clear from the additional stipulations that
the forensic chemist had no personal knowledge as to the source of the alleged specimen; and that
the defense was reserving its right to object to the pieces of evidence marked by the
prosecution.21 Clearly, the stipulations do not cover the manner the specimen was handled before it
came to the possession of the forensic chemist and after it left her possession.
To interpret the stipulations as an admission that appellant was the source of the specimen would be
to bind him to an unceremonious withdrawal of his plea of not guilty a reading not supported by the
records which creates a dangerous precedent.
The nagging question, therefore, remains whether the object evidence subjected to laboratory
examination and presented in court is the same object allegedly seized from appellant.
While alleged poseur-buyer PO1 Espares testified on the marking and eventual turnover of the
allegedly seized sachet of substance to the investigator, no explanation was given regarding its
custody in the interim from the time it was turned over to the investigator to its turnover for
laboratory examination. Such want of explanation bares a significant gap in the chain of custody of
the allegedly seized item. Having merely substantially echoed the testimony of PO1 Espares, SPO3
Matias and PO1 Mapula did not fill in this gap.
And what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the chemist to the
investigator and its presentation in court, the records do not show.
The Court made it clear in Malillin that the chain of custody rule requires that there be testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the object seized was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched it would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. The totality of the prosecution evidence does not meet this standard. It bears no ACCOUNT
of the precautions taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the object and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession thereof.
1avvphi1

The Court reiterates that on ACCOUNT of the built-in danger of abuse that a buy-bust operation
carries, it is governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from
the general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of persons under criminal
investigation22 and of the accused facing a criminal charge23 are safeguarded. In People v. Tan,24 the
Court expressed this concern as it recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations,
the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which
sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in the pockets or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is
great." Thus, it exhorted courts to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is
made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.
At this juncture, the Court notes another lapse of the members of the buy-bust team their failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21, Paragraph 1 of Article II of R.A. No.
916525 with respect to custody and disposition of confiscated drugs. There was no physical inventory

and photograph of the shabu allegedly confiscated from appellant. There was likewise no
explanation offered for the non-observance of the rule. Coupled with the failure to prove that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted, the buy bust teams disregard
of the requirements of Section 21 is fatal.
It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be
seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty
or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only
where nothing on record suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is
irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. 26
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant, Nicolas Gutierrez y Licuanan, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City
who is ORDERED to cause the immediate release of appellant unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to inform this Court of action taken within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133265

May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE MING KHA alias ALFONSO GO and KIM QUE YU alias ALFONSO QUE, accusedappellants.
PUNO, J.:
On May 16, 1997, around 5:00 in the afternoon, members of the Central Police District, Batasan
Station No. 6 intercepted a van carrying nine (9) sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
near Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. The police arrested the driver of the van, Que Ming
Kha alias Alfonso Go (Go), and his companion, Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que (Que).
Go and Que were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with violation of Sec. 15,
Article III in relation to Sec. 2(e), (f), (m), Article I of R.A. 6425 as amended by P.D. 1683, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, in an information that reads as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of May, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring together, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly transport or distribute
253.8609 kilograms of white crystalline substance known as "SHABU" containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regular drug.
1wphi1.nt

CONTRARY TO LAW."1
Go and Que were found guilty of the charge and were given the death sentence. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Que Ming Kha (a.k.a.
Alfonso Go or Que Beng Kha) and King Que Yu (a.k.a. Alfonso Que) GUILTY as principals
beyond reasonable doubt of transporting in large scale 253.8609 kilos and

methamphetamine hydrochloride, a.k.a. shabu, in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as

amended, (R.A. 6425), and they are hereby sentenced to DEATH.
In case their sentences on appeal are commuted, it is advised that they be ordered deported
after service of sentence as they are both in the Philippines illegally.
Inasmuch as the bulk of the shabu involved in this case has already been destroyed at the
San Lazaro Crematorium in Manila on July 21, 1997 in the presence of the Secretary of
Justice Teofisto Guingona, the Director of the Dangerous Drugs Board, Manuel Supnet, the
Vice-Mayor of Quezon City Herbert Bautista, prosecutor Luis Maceren, defense counsel
Godwin Valdez, a representative of the NBI, the PNP Chemists and other officials, the
remaining shabu retained for purposes of evidence and other related paraphernalia of
contraband are ordered confiscated in favor of the Government and destroyed pursuant to
law upon finality of this decision.
The Khia Pride (sic) van, color blue with Plate No. UPN 595 is ordered forfeited in favor of
the State. For this purpose, the Philippine National Police officer in custody of said van is
hereby ordered to transfer and surrender said vehicle to the Clerk of Court Mercedes
Gatmaitan of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to be used for official purposes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Bureau of Immigration." 2
The case is now before us on automatic review.
From the prosecution evidence, it appears that on May 16, 1997, Chief Inspector Gilbert Dela
Fuente, Head of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, Station 6, Central Police District,
received a phone call from an informant that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595
which was being used in the transport of shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City. Dela Fuente immediately dispatched the three teams to monitor the van. Team
3, composed of team leader Police Inspector Raul Espejon and team members PO3 Justo
Curameng, SPO1 Joselito Velasquez and PO3 Jovencio Villacorte, positioned themselves at Don
Antonio Avenue, Barangay Holy Spirit. Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team spotted the
blue Kia van on the opposite side of the street going toward the direction of Commonwealth Avenue.
Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson Manok, the van hit a seven-year
old boy. The van sped away, leaving its young victim behind. A concerned motorist picked up the boy
and rushed him to the hospital. Espejon, in the meantime, reported to Dela Fuente that they have
spotted the blue Kia van. They followed the van after it sped away and intercepted it at
Commonwealth Avenue Zuzuarregui Street. The members of the team alighted from their vehicle
and approached the van. They introduced themselves as police officers to the driver and passenger
of the van. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat while Que sat on the passenger's seat.
Espejon informed Go that he just committed the crime of reckless imprudence and asked for his
driver's license. The police peered through the window of the van and noticed several sacks placed
on the floor at the back of the van. The sacks have Chinese markings and had a logo which looked
like the head of a pig. One of the sacks was open and they noticed that it contained several plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance. The police also asked for the identification of Go's
companion. The latter handed his driver's license which revealed his name as Kim Que Yu. The
police handcuffed Go and Que, confiscated their driver's license and their cellular phones found at
the front seat of the van, and brought them to Police Station No. 6 for investigation. PO3 Curameng
drove the van to the police station. They passed by the Kabayan Center to check on the condition of
the boy who was hit by the van. Upon reaching Police Station No. 6, the monitoring team turned over
the suspects and the seized articles to the desk officer. Dela Fuente informed Superintendent
Hercules Cataluna, Chief of the Central Police District, about the incident. The police inspected the

contents of the van in the presence of Superintendent Cataluna and several officials of Barangay
Holy Spirit. They counted nine sacks, eight of which were sealed and one open, revealing several
plastic bags which contained white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. 3 The arresting
officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white
crystalline substance.4 Upon examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.5
Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the back of the van.
Go stated that two months prior to his apprehension, he came to Manila from Cebu and was
employed as driver by a certain Ah Chai. On May 16, 1997, Ah Chai instructed him to meet with him
at Ever Gotesco in Commonwealth Avenue. Go took a taxicab from Ah Chai's residence in Pasig to
their meeting place. After waiting for some time, Go saw Ah Chai arrive, driving the blue Kia van. Go
took over the wheel but relied on Ah Chai for the direction. Suddenly, a boy crossed the street,
prompting Go to swerve to the left. But the van still hit the boy. Ah Chai lost no time in picking up the
boy to bring him to the hospital. He hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver to bring them to the
nearest hospital. Before he left, Ah Chai instructed Go to watch over the van and assured him that
he would return shortly. Curious onlookers, meanwhile, gathered around the scene of the accident.
Then, a car pulled over and a man in civilian clothes approached him. The man introduced himself
as a police officer. He asked Go several questions, but since he was having difficulty with the
language, he remained silent. The man slapped him several times because of his refusal to answer.
While he was being interrogated by the police officer, he saw a taxicab stop in front of them and his
friend from China, Alfonso Que, alighted from the cab. Que asked him what happened and offered to
help him. Go related to him in Chinese the events that transpired before he arrived. Que talked with
the police officer in Go's behalf. Que told Go that the police officer invited them to the police station
for interview. Go agreed after being assured that nothing bad would happen to them. Go rode with
the police officer while Que drove the van to the police station. When they reached the police station,
Go was made to stay in a small room and his hands were handcuffed. Que, meanwhile, continued to
talk with the police officers outside. Later, Que entered the room. His hands were also handcuffed.
He was furning mad. Que asked him about the contents of the van. But Go denied any knowledge
about the cargo. After they were interrogated by the police officers, they were brought to the Criminal
investigation Division of the Central Police District where they were detained. Go denied any
involvement in the commission of the offense. He also said that he did not own any of the cellular
phones confiscated inside the van.6
Que, on the other hand, testified that he runs his own business together with his cousin, Lorenzo
Que. They buy and sell corn, soya beans and other hog feeds. On May 16, 1997, after taking an
early lunch, he went to see his cousin at 12th Avenue, Caloocan City. From Caloocan, he took a
jeepney to Novaliches to see a certain Mr. Chua of Liberty Farm to offer him some of their products.
But since Mr. Chua was not at his office at the time, Que proceeded to Uniwide in Novaliches. From
there, he took a taxicab going to Fairview. He wanted to visit his friend, Henry Co, and offer him a
business proposal. He instructed the taxi driver to take a short cut at Sauyo Road, Que, however, did
not reach his destination. While they were traversing Don Antonio Avenue, Que saw his friend from
China, Alfonso Go who seemed to be in trouble. He noticed a small crowd gathered around him and
a man was talking to him. He got off the taxicab and approached Go. He asked him what happened.
Go told Que that the van he was driving had sideswiped a boy and his employer brought the boy to
the hospital, but the latter has not returned. Go told him that the name of his employer was Ah Chai.
The policeman invited them to go to the police station. The police officer requested Que to drive the
van because he wanted Go to ride with him in the car. Upon reaching the police station, he handed
the key to a police officer. The policeman told him to stay in the office while Go was locked inside a
small cell. They were told to wait for a while until Go's employer comes back from the hospital. After
waiting for quite some time, a police personnel came in and reported that they found sacks of shabu

inside the van. The police handcuffed Que. He protested. He denied any knowledge about the
contents of the van. But he was nonetheless placed inside the cell with Go. 7 The police later brought
Que and Go to the Batasan Police Detachment. Que testified that he did not see Espejon at the
scene of the accident. He only saw him at the Batasan Police Detachment when he interrogated Go.
He belied the testimony of the police officers who testified before the court. Que stated that from
Batasan Police Station No. 6, they were transferred to Criminal Investigation Division of the Central
Police District where they were detained.8
To corroborate Que's testimony, the defense also presented other witnesses who were allegedly at
the scene of the accident at the time of the apprehension of Go and Que.
Pedro Loreto, a tricycle driver, testified that on May 16, 1997, around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
he took a passenger to Don Antonio Avenue in Quezon City. When they got to Don Antonio, he was
a crowd gathered in front of Andok's Litson Manok. After his passenger got off the tricycle, he tried to
see what the commotion was all about. He saw a blue Kia van parked in front of his tricycle. Then he
saw a Chinese man carrying a young boy. The Chinese and the boy boarded his tricycle and the
former instructed him to bring them to the hospital. He brought them to Malvar Hospital along
Commonwealth Avenue. The Chinese paid him P100.00 and then alighted from the tricycle together
with the boy. Loreto went back to ply his route. When asked to identify the person who brought the
boy to the hospital, he said that the man was not in the courtroom. He, however, identified Alfonso
Go as the driver of the van.9
Fermin Dagumang testified that on May 16, 1997, around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he took a
tricycle to Commonwealth Avenue. When he alighted in front of Andok's Litson Manok at Don
Antonio, he saw a blue van parked nearby. The driver of the van was short and stocky and Chineselooking. Then he noticed a crowd gathered in front of the store. He went closer and he saw a child
lying on the road. A tall skinny person who looked Chinese took him into his arms. The man, at that
time, was looking for a vehicle to bring the child to the hospital. Dagumang then left the scene.
Dagumang said that the man who carried the boy was not in the courtroom. 10
Elmar Cawiling, the seven-year old boy who was hit by the van, also took the witness stand. He
stated that on May 16, 1997, after the van hit him, a small, Chinese-looking man immediately picked
him up and brought him to the hospital. When asked if it was Alfonso Go who brought him to the
hospital, he replied in the negative.11
Go raised the following assignment of errors in his Brief:
"1. The lower court [sic] was so full of bias and prejudice against appellant that he was
incapable of rendering a fair, just and correct judgment in the case.
2. The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the policemen who testified
for the prosecution that they were tailing the Kia Pregio van when it hit the 7-year old
ambulant vendor, Elmar Cawiling; that after hitting the boy, the van sped away; that the
policemen chased the van until they overtook it at the corner of Zuzuarregui Avenue; and
that when they overtook the van they found appellant Que Ming Kha and his co-accused Kim
Que Yu inside the van.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the shabu was the product of illegal search and
seizure, hence not admissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
4. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Que Ming Kha 'distributed' or 'transported'
shabu within the meaning of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425." 12

Que, on the other hand, cited the following errors:

"1. Appellant was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased court.
2. Testimony of the prosecution witnesses is plainly self-serving, concocted and full of
discrepancies.
3. Discovery of the drugs was accidental and not the result of monitoring or surveillance by
the police.
4. Testimony of actual eyewitnesses was disregarded while that of police officers who were
latecomers to the scene was credited.
5. Eleven reasons given by the trial court as grounds for its decision are products of bias and
prejudice.
6. Owner of shabu is Ah Chai, a person entirely different from appellant Alfonso Que.
7. Fact of warrantless search sustains defense apart from violating constitutional rights of
Que.
8. Presumption of innocence must prevail because an honest analysis of the evidence
clearly shows innocence or, at the very least, reasonable doubts."13
We reverse the decision of the trial court in so far as it found accused-appellant Que guilty of the
charge.
In People v. Pagaura14 we made the cautionary warning that "the court must be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually heavy penalties for drug
offenses x x x. In our criminal justice system the overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. x x
x" In the case at bar, no less than the Solicitor General himself entertains doubt on the guilt of
Que and recommends his acquittal. When the prosecution itself says it failed to prove Que's guilt,
the Court should listen and listen hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
We fully agree with the Solicitor General that "persistent doubt exists on the full veracity of the
prosecution's theory as regards his (Que's) participation in the crime."15 Eye contact with the
evidence of the prosecution against Que will establish that it is incredible as it goes against the grain
of our natural experience and expectation. Right from the start, the prosecution story cannot but
raise the quizzical eyebrow. According to the story, five (5) days before the apprehension of the
accused, the policemen had already gathered detailed data about the Kia Pregio van that would be
used in moving a big quantity of shabu in Quezon City. They knew exactly its model, plate number,
color, etc. Despite the wide time lead, the prosecution does not explain its failure to flush out the true
owner of the van who could well be the drug lord in the case at bar. Certainly, it was not too difficult
to discover his identity from the van's registration papers with the LTO and thereafter monitor the
vehicle's movement. Instead, the policemen meandered around the city, hoping they would
encounter the van by chance. We cannot be made to believe that our policemen catch drug
syndicates by using the calculus of chance.
Equally unexplainable in the prosecution story is the reaction of the policemen when they spotted the
van transporting the shabu which they have been hunting for five (5) days. They knew it was

carrying shabu of big quantity. They ought to suspect that its passengers pose a clear danger to their
lives. Yet, nothing in the records shows that PO1 Raul Espejon and PO3 Jesus Curameng called for
reinforcement when they first saw the van. They just serenely tailed the van until it bumped an ice
cream-on-sticks vendor. Again, such an act of throwing caution to the wind strains the seams of
credibility of the policement-witnesses.
More astonishing is the hit and run story peddled by the prosecution. Don Antonio Avenue, the place
where the van swiped Elmar Cawiling, a 7-year old ambulant vendor, is just a few yards away from
the main Commonwealth road. The street intersects a main road and is a bustling place especially at
5:00 p.m. or after office hours. On both sides of the street can be found commercial establishments
like banks, pharmacies and eating places while the giant Ever Gotesco mall stands across
Commonwealth Avenue. To compound the traffic jam in the area, numerous tricycles that ply the
nearby subdivisions parks operate in the corner of Commonwealth Avenue and Don Antonio Avenue.
Given the usual traffic mess in the area, it is inconceivable that the van could speed away after
swiping the vendor Cawiling. Indeed, there is no credible evidence that there were no vehicles in
front of the van that could have impeded its movement. The defense version that the van stopped
after hitting Cawiling and that it did not move as people surrounded it is more worthy of credence as
it accords with the traffic situation in the venue of the accident.
Similarly, the prosecution story on how the accused were arrested and the van brought to the police
station defies reason. To repeat, the policemen declared that they have been on the alert for the van
carrying shabu for about five days. When by chance they spotted the van, they followed it until it
sped away after sideswiping Cawiling. They gave the van a hot pursuit and overtook it after a one
kilometer chase. Again, the expectation is that confronted with a dangerous drug syndicate, the
apprehending officers, with ready guns, would order the driver and passenger of the van to go down
with upraised hands, search them for weapons, handcuff them and then inspect the van for the
suspected shabu. The evidence, however, does not show that policemen Espejon and Curameng
followed this standard police procedure for their own safety.
1wphi1.nt

To be sure, it is critical to ascertain whether the van sped away or whether it remained stationary
after hitting the vendor Cawiling. The pieces of evidence on this issue are hopelessly at odds. The
testimonies of policemen Espejon and Curameng tend to establish that the van with Go and Que
inside sped away and they intercepted it after a kilometer long chase. In contrast, Que declared that
he was just passing by Don Antonio Avenue on board a taxi when he saw his friend Go in the middle
of the street after the accident. He alighted to find out Go's problem. At that time, the van was
already parked by the streetside. As Go was unfamiliar with Tagalog, Que interpreted to him the
questions of the policeman. Later, Go and the van were brought to the police station for
investigation. He agreed to accompany Go who had communication problems. In the station, the van
was found to be carrying shabu. He was arrested together with Go. Only disinterested witnesses
could clear the fog of evidence on this important factual issue. None of the disinterested
witnesses, namely, Cawiling, the boy vendor, Loreto, the tricycle driver who brought Cawiling
to the hospital, and Dagumang, the passenger of Loreto, corroborated the prosecution story
that the van carrying Go and Que sped away after sideswiping Cawiling. Consequently, the trial
court erroneously calibrated the evidence against Que and in favor of the prosecution.
We fully concur with the following analysis of the defense evidence made by the Solicitor
General, viz:
"Elmar Cawiling, the ambulant vendor sideswiped by the van, testified that it was not
accused-appellant Kim Que Yu who picked him up but another 'Chinese looking man.' Pedro
Loreto, driver of the tricycle who brought Elmar Cawiling to the hospital, corroborated the
testimony of the latter. Pedro Loreto further testified that there were no police officers at

the scene when the accident happened, until the time he brought the boy to the
hospital along with a 'Chinese looking man.' He also identified appellant Que Ming Kha
as the other person inside the van who was seated at the driver's seat. Loreto was later
asked if the other Chinese man, who brought the boy to the hospital, was in the courtroom to
which he politely said 'no.' The defense claims that appellant Kim Que Yu arrived at the
scene only after the tricycle carrying the boy to the hospital had left.
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x the records will show that the defense testimonies sufficiently establish that the other
man in the van, aside from the driver, is not Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que, but a certain Ah
Chai whom the driver, Appellant Que Ming Kha, identified as Chiang Lai On. Further,
verification from the records of Malvar Medical Foundation, to where the boy, Elmar Cawiling
was brought, reveals that it was Chiang Lai On who brought the boy there as shown by his
driver's license No. 96-215658. Thus, Kim Que Yu alias Alfonso Que could not have been the
owner of the illegal contraband as there were only two Chinese looking men seen inside the
van when the accident happened. Appellee cannot see its way clear to concur with the
conviction of Kim Que Yu which might result in the forfeiture of his life, when persistent doubt
exists on the full veracity of the prosecution's theory as regards his participation in the
crime. Que had nothing to do with the loading and transport of the shabu. Not one
reliable eyewitness pointed to him as having been with Go inside the van when it hit
Elmar Cawiling. Not one witness saw him get off the van when the accident happened.
Not one credible eyewitness testified that Kim Que Yu was seen at the vicinity of the
bumping of the child at the time of the accident until shortly before the police arrived.
On the contrary, the undisputed civilian eyewitnesses confirmed Kim Que Yu's
story that he just chanced upon the accident and that he got off the taxicab where he was
riding when he saw his fellow Fookienese in some kind of trouble with a crowd of curious
onlookers milling around the accident scene. The testimony of disinterested
eyewitnesses shows that when Que arrived, the injured child had already been brought to
the hospital. Que did not see him. The police who arrived even later than Que did not see the
accident victim. Much less did they see the accident itself. As will be shown later, the
testimonies of the policemen who were the only prosecution witnesses on the
accident are shot through and through with discrepancies and obvious fabrication.
The eyewitnesses who corroborated the testimony of Que were Elmar Cawiling, the boy
victim of the accident; Pedro Loreto, the tricycle driver who drove Cawiling to the hospital;
and Fermin Dagumang, the passenger of the tricycle who got off to give way to the accident
victim.
It is beyond dispute that they were at the scene of the accident. There is no reason to doubt
the truth of their testimony, especially when it bears the hallmarks of being spontaneous,
straightforward, categorical and remains consistent." 16
The judgment of the trial court convicting Que despite the paucity of the prosecution evidence can
only be attributed to the racial bias of the trial judge against Chinese. The trial judge unblushingly
revealed this racial prejudice in his decision itself when he wrote: 17
"The Chinese in this country ever since the Spanish regime are known to buy people. By
default and other reasons, they are lording it over our land economically despite Dr. Jose P.
Rizal, Andres Bonifacio, and others. They are known to be cheapskates or kuripot, but, not
when they want to attain certain things. Since the large contraband involved here belongs

clearly to a criminal syndicate, such syndicate of Chinese ruffians would have spared no
amount to pollute our justice system as indeed the illegal entry and stay of Alfonso Go and
Alfonso Que have shown, together with their contemptuous disregard of our penal laws on
falsification and use of aliases and our tax laws by their non-payment of any tax since 1987."
Even the Solicitor General denounced the relentless prejudice of the trial judge, viz:18
"The judge from the very start attempted to conduct trial even if there was no preliminary
investigation (May 23, 1997 hearing). In his own words 'an exculpatory existence has to be
proved in court (May 27, 1997 hearing).' Only after being reminded of the requirements of
due process did he postpone arraignment so that the preliminary investigation could be
conducted.
During arraignment, the judge ignored the unfamiliarity of appellant Que Ming Kha with
English or Tagalog.
Contrary to the familiarity with Tagalog and Visayan, respectively, to enable the
understanding of the highly technical terms in an arraignment (July 15, 1997 hearing).
Up to the end of trial, this prejudice against one he wrongly believed was an undocumented
alien namely Kim Que Yu colored the court's judgment.
The manner and attitude of the judge in the aforesaid proceedings bespeaks of his partiality.
His prejudgment or hasty conclusions does (sic) not speak well relative to the utmost
circumspection he should exercise in the discharge of his duties to preclude suspicion on his
impartiality (Jarquete vs. Boncuaras, 60 SCRA 217; Yanuario vs. Paraguay, 71 SCRA 11).
The unfortunate bias of the judge against the Chinese is expressed in the decision. The
judge presumed an accused as guilty because he is Chinese. The accused is prejudged
guilty because of his nationality and his status as an illegal overstaying alien."
More need not be said.
Every accused in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. It is the prosecution
that has the burden of proving his guilt and it is required that his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. This Court has ruled time and again that it is only when the mind is satisfied that the crime
has been committed by the person on trial that the judgment should be for conviction. 19 If the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with their
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.20 The all too clear reason for the age-old ruling is the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its duty to overcome the presumption of innocence. Such is the case at bar with respect to
Que. His conviction cannot be rooted on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
accorded to the police officers who made the apprehension. This presumption cannot be used
against Que when the Solicitor General himself concedes that their testimonies are 'obvious
fabrications." Appellant Que cannot rot in jail on a sentence ofreclusion perpetua on the basis of
these "obvious fabrications."
We now come to the appeal of accused-appellant Go. It has been established that Go was driving
the van that carried the contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of
transporting a regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Section 15, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,transport or distributed any regulated drug."
To exonerate himself, Go claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the
back of the van. We are not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such
case, the lack of criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability.
Thus, Go's contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs inside the van cannot
constitute a valid defense. Mere possession and/or delivery of a regulated drug without legal
authority is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.21
Go further argued that the search made on the van was illegal and therefore the shabu discovered
from that search is inadmissible as evidence. We do not agree.
The Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not
absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.22 The search made in the case at bar falls under the fourth exception. We held in People
vs. Doria:23
"Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and
hand and its discovery inadvertent."
The facts show that while the van was traversing Don Antonio Avenue in Quezon City, it accidentally
hit a seven-year old ambulant vendor. The van stopped and the owner got off to bring the boy to the
hospital. A police officer who witnessed the accident approached the van to apprehend the driver for
reckless imprudence. As he stood near the van, he saw through the lightly tinted window of the van
several sacks placed at the back of the van. One of the sacks was open, revealing several plastic
bags containing white crystalline substance which the police suspected to be shabu. Clearly, the
prohibited substance was within the plain view of the police officer who was in a position to be near
the van at the time. The substance is therefore not a product of an illegal search and not
inadmissible as evidence.
We now discuss the penalty that should be imposed on the guilty appellant. Section 15, Article III of
the Dangerous Drugs Act imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) for the offense.
The law thus prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Under Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, in such case, when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances,
the lesser penalty shall be applied. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in this
case, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on Go.24

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds accused-appellant Que Ming Kha alias Alfonso Go GUILTY as
charged. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant Kim
Que Yu alias Alfonso Que is ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
order his immediate release and to report to this Court his compliance with this order within five (5)
days from notice hereof. The remaining shabu retained for purposes of evidence and other related
paraphernalia are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and destroyed in accordance with
law.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156685

July 27, 2004

NAZARIO N. MARIFOSQUE, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
assails the decision dated September 23, 2002 and the Resolution dated January 3, 2003 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17030 finding petitioner Nazario Marifosque guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct bribery, defined and penalized under the second paragraph
of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Petitioner was charged with direct bribery in an Information which reads:
That on or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused a public officer being a qualified member of
the Police Force of Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National Police, taking advantage
of his official/public position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to his office,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously demand, obtain and/or receive directly
from Yu Su Pong1 and Hian Hian Sy2 the total amount of FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (P5,800.00) Philippine Currency in consideration for his recovery from

alleged robbers, eighteen Shellane gas filled cylinder/s tanks, to the damage and prejudice
of the aforementioned victims in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon, Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio Sy,
went to theoffice of Captain Alberto Salvo, Chief of the Intelligence and Operating Division stationed
at the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Region 5, to report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the
gasoline station of her father, Yu So Pong, and the alleged extortion attempt by petitioner, Police
Sergeant Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of the lost items. Captain Salvo and his
men set up a plan to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy prepared the pay-off money in the
amount of P4,800.00 and listed down the serial numbers of the bills. The pay-off was scheduled at
7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden Grace Department Store which was owned by Yu So Pong.
At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men arrived at the target area and strategically
positioned themselves outside the Golden Grace Department Store to await the arrival of the
suspect. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on board a tricycle. He went inside the
store and demanded the MONEY from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu So Pong. The latter handed to him
the marked MONEY , which was wrapped in a newspaper. When petitioner stepped out of the
store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-arranged signal, whereupon the arresting operatives swooped down
upon the suspect and arrested him.
Hian Hian Yu Sy testified that petitioner demanded the amount of P7,200.00 but she bargained for
P4,800.00 only because that was all she had at the time. She proposed that petitioner return the
following morning to pick up the balance.
By way of defense, petitioner Marifosque testified that in the morning of October 13, 1990, a police
asset came to his house and reported that he witnessed a robbery at the gasoline station of Yu So
Pong. Petitioner went to the gasoline station of Yu So Pong and relayed to him the information.
Thereafter, petitioner and Yu So Pong proceeded to the police station to report the robbery to the
desk officer, PFC Jesus Fernandez, who then dispatched petitioner and a certain Pat. Garcia to
conduct an investigation. As they were leaving the police station, the asset approached petitioner
asking if he could get P350.00 per cylinder tank as his reward. Petitioner relayed the message to Yu
So Pong, who said he was amenable "if that [was] the only way to recover the cylinders and to
apprehend the robbers."4 Based on information furnished by the asset, the police investigators
proceeded to the house of Edgardo Arnaldo in San Roque Legazpi City, where they found the stolen
gas tanks. The group loaded the gas tanks into the vehicle. Meanwhile, Arnaldo arrived. Petitioner
did not arrest him at that time because he promised to lead them to the other stolen cylinder
tanks.5 The group returned to the police station where petitioner made a written report of the
recovery of the gas tanks.
Elmer Arnaldo testified that he worked as an asset of the Legazpi City police force and occasionally
received rewards from the police for any information of the criminal activities. On October 13, 1990
at around 4:00 in the morning, he went out to buy bread and saw three individuals stealing gas
cylinder tanks in the nearby gasoline station. He later visited petitioner and reported to him the

robbery. He went back to his house to feed the chickens. Sometime thereafter, he dropped by the
police station to discuss with petitioner the reward of P350.00 per cylinder tank recovered. Petitioner
gave him 1,000.00 and told him to return at 6:00 p.m. for the remainder. At 7:00 p.m., he and
petitioner went to the store of Yu So Pong to collect the balance of the reward MONEY . Petitioner
went inside the store and Arnaldo, who was left outside, saw a woman giving him a folded
newspaper. Suddenly, armed men apprehended the petitioner, so he ran away.
On September 23, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision convicting petitioner of direct
bribery, the dispositive portion of which reads:6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and considering that the agreed act, which did not
constitute a crime, was executed, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
NAZARIO MARIFOSQUE Y NUEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct
Bribery, defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 210 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended. The accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of 3 years 6 months and 5 days of Prision Correccional medium and maximum periods as
the Minimum and 7 years, 8 months and 9 days of Prision Mayor minimum and medium
periods as the Maximum considering that there is no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance and a fine in the amount of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). The
accused shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.7
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner interposes the present appeal raising
the following issues:
I
THE ACT OF PETITIONER RECEIPT OF THE SUMS OF MONEY FOR DELIVERY TO
HIS ASSET DOES NOT CONSITUTE AN OFFENSE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 210 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE PETITIONER GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF DIRECT BRIBERY. 8
In the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses do
not demonstrate with certainty that the receipt of the alleged "bribe money" constitutes the act
punishable by the offense as defined by the Revised Penal Code. He draws attention to the following
findings of fact by the appellate court, namely: (1) that he was not the one who asked for reward
from private complainant Yu So Pong but the asset; and (2) that Hian Hian Yu Sy had no direct
knowledge of the alleged transaction, i.e., the demand for money in consideration of the

return/recovery of twenty-one Shellane gas tanks, between private complainant Yu So Pong and the
accused.
In the second assigned error, petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt because there was no competent evidence to prove that the amount was
really intended for him and not for his asset. He anchors his defense on the fact that: (1) he merely
relayed to Yu So Pong the assets request for a reward money; and (2) Yu So Pong was agreeable
to the request. He further contends that the act of receiving money for the asset is not one of those
punishable under the law as direct bribery.
Petitioner cannot feign innocence and profess good faith since all the indicia point to his guilt and
malicious intent.
First, petitioner did not introduce his asset or mention his name to Yu So Pong or his daughter at the
time of the illegal transaction. His claim that he previously gave P1,000.00 to his asset, which
purportedly represented a partial payment of the reward money, was not corroborated by his asset.
When he was arrested and interrogated at Camp Ibalon, he made no attempt to present his asset to
explain and justify his receipt of the reward money. Instead, he accepted his arrest and investigation
with an air of resignation, which is characteristic of a culprit who is caught red-handed. Captain
Calvo, one of the arresting CIS officers, testified that petitioner attempted to give back the money to
Yu So Pong when they were about to arrest him.9 This was a clear showing that he was well aware
of the illegality of his transaction. Had he been engaged in a legitimate deal, he would have faced
courageously the arresting officers and indignantly protested the violation of his person, which is the
normal reaction of an innocent man. Instead, he meekly submitted to the indignity of arrest and went
along the eventual investigation with the docility of a man at a loss for a satisfactory explanation.
Second, petitioners solicitous and overly eager conduct in pursuing the robbery incident betrays an
intention not altogether altruistic. On the contrary, it denotes a corrupt desire on his part to obtain
pecuniary benefits from an illegal transaction. At the time petitioner was notified by his asset of the
robbery incident, he was no longer on duty, having been assigned to the night shift the day before.
He was too overzealous to meet with Yu So Pong although the case was already assigned to
another police investigator. His justification that he wanted to encourage the victim to pursue the
case against the robbers rings hollow and untrue. It is clearly an afterthought. As shown in the
testimony of prosecution witness Hian Hian Yu Sy, petitioner met with Yu So Pong for no apparent
reason than to demand money. There was no mention of any attempt by him to investigate, much
less encourage the victims to file charges against the malefactors. More telling is petitioners
persistence in obtaining the monetary reward for the asset although the latter was no longer
complaining about the P1,000.00 he supposedly received earlier, thus:
Pros. Agcaoili:
Since the asset was not complaining at the time, you should not have gone back
anymore to Yu So Pong?
Accused Marifosque:

Why would I not go back? My purpose was to encourage him to pursue the matter. If
he would not pursue this matter, then we would be the laughing stock of the thieves
we arrested and then we cannot charge them.
Q. So Mr. Witness, you went to Yu So Pong after you received the P1,000.00 without any
intention to receive additional amount for the asset, am I right?
A: No, maam. That was not the purpose. In fact, Yu So Pong had told me earlier to see him
again in order to prepare for the cash and to see if an additional amount would be needed for
my asset.10
While petitioner supposedly supports the "reward system," yet he denied that he previously gave
incentives to the assets for the recovery of stolen items, to wit:
PJ:
Sometimes you would ask for reward for your assets?
A: I myself voluntarily give them a reward.
Q: That is not the question. The question is, in the past when you would recover stolen
articles, would you ask the owner of the articles to give some incentive or tip to your assets?
A: That has not happened, your Honor.
PJ:
Next question.
Pros. Agcaoili:
And, in fact, Mr. Witness, you did not give any incentive to your asset on that incident
that happened in the house of Yu So Pong which is the subject matter of this case?
A. For that particular case alone, Mr. Yu so Pong gave me something and I gave it to my
asset.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Pros. Agcaoili
In fact, Mr. Witness, you said that these tips were just given as an incentive?
A I would be the one to give the incentives to my asset. But in that particular instance, the
P1,000.00 which Mr. Yu So Pong gave me, I turned it over to my own asset.

Q To your own assessment, Mr. Witness, is P1,000.00 not enough to serve as an incentive to
your asset?
A I do not know whether P1,000.00 is enough or not. The fact, is, that was the amount I got
from Yu So Pong which I gave to my asset.
PJ:
Was the asset complaining that was not enough?
A. No, Your Honor.11
Third, the conduct of the petitioner during the recovery of the stolen articles leaves much to be
desired. He did not apprehend Edgardo Arnaldo or invite him for investigation although the cylinder
tanks were found in his possession. His flimsy excuse that the latter promised to deliver additional
cylinder tanks is unworthy of credence considering that, as a police officer with years of experience,
he should have known that the proper action, under the circumstances, was to at least invite him to
the police precinct for investigation. Curiously, the prime suspect Edgardo Arnaldo turned out to be
the brother of petitioners police asset who, we recall, directed the police officers to the location of
the stashed articles. This strange coincidence may well indicate a conspiracy between the petitioner
and the thieves to steal from the victim and later cash in on the recovery of the lost items.
In the final analysis, this case boils down to an issue of credibility. In this regard, the prosecution
witnesses gave clear and straightforward testimonies. The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving full
weight and credence to their version of the events. Petitioners conviction must be affirmed.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer.
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer within the contemplation of Article 203 of the
Revised Penal Code, which includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Philippine Government, or shall perform in said government or any of its branches, public duties as
an employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or class." At the time of the incident, petitioner
was a police sergeant assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He directly received the
bribe MONEY from Yu So Pong and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the recovery of
the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving money was connected with his duty as a police
officer.
The instant case falls within the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, which
is quoted hereunder:

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of
another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding
to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does
not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty
provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the
officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not
less than twice the value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain
from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine
not less than three times the value of the gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the
penalty of special temporary disqualification.
While the Sandiganbayan imposed the correct prison term in applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the amount of the fine is erroneous. Paragraph 1 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to paragraph 2 thereof, provides that if the act does not constitute a crime, the fine shall not
be less than three times the value of the amount received. Evidence shows that petitioner received
an aggregate amount of P5,800.00.12 He should therefore be ordered to pay a fine not less than 3
times its value. Accordingly, a fine of P18,000.00 is deemed reasonable.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 17030, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct
Bribery and imposing upon him the indeterminate prison term of 3 years, 6 months, and 5 days of
prision correccional, as minimum, to 7 years, 8 months, and 9 days of prision mayor, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the fine is increased to P18,000.00.
In addition, petitioner shall suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986

NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON. BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as
Acting Presiding Justice and HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C.
KALLOS, as Associate Justices,respondents.
Guillermo B. Bandonill for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon,
Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery, sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto mayor with
temporary special disqualification for eight years and one day and a fine of P2,000.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the judgment
of conviction. The Court dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for lack of
merit." 1 However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Court reconsidered its resolution and gave
due course to the petition. 2
The facts of this case are as follows:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet,
Branch IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979
directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC
Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79 entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to make a
return within thirty (30) days from said date. 3 The labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez,
a building contractor and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and the other
judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with interest, as the balance of their work contract. 4
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent a notice to the Commercial
Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. 5 The
bank agreed to hold the ACCOUNTS . For one reason or another, Manipon did not inform the labor
arbiter of the garnishment nor did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under
execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the
garnished ACCOUNT . Manipon told Dominguez that the MONEY could not be withdrawn.

However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the Office of the National Intelligence
and SecurityAuthority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the
withdrawal so they will have something for the New Year." 6 Dominguez interpreted this to mean that
Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez agreed and they
arranged to meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer
to NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon
by paying him with marked MONEY the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able to put
up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent
powder. 7
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as
planned. Manipon showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto Flora and
Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. 8 Then Dominguez
prepared a withdrawal slip for P2,500.00. 9 As soon as Dominguez received the MONEY from the
teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P 700.00 in marked bills and handed the total
amount of P l,000.00 to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over to his car and
drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked down Session Road. Moments later, PC and
NISA operatives accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket of Manipon and
thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet
light test and found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after executing a certification relative
to the money recovered, he refused to give any statement. 10 He filed his sheriff's return unsatisfied
on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days. 11
Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having demanded
and received P l,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to the
latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his official duty.
However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct
bribery under the Revised Penal Code. 12
Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty. 13
In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of direct bribery, in
not giving credence to the defense theory that there was novation of the money judgment and in
admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given
in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer. 14 The promise of a public officer to perform an act or to
refrain from doing it may be express or implied. 15
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of
the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order issued
in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that Manipon garnished the

bank ACCOUNTS of Dominguez at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979
after which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon collected from Dominguez on December
28, 1979 was not a bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under execution to
which the judgment creditorsheaded by Longog Tabek had agreed.
Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the NISA office on December 27, 1979,
Dominguez requested Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay for the time
being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P 1,720. 00 to be paid after the New Year. 16 So
he visited Longog Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to the lesser
amount because he needed money badly. 17 His arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all
verbal. At that time he found no reason to have some written memorandum for his own protection.
At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00 Manipon made a move to hand him a
temporary receipt but Dominguez brushed it aside and said he was in a
hurry. 18
Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he
and Flora had levied execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act which the
latter had openly resented.19
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt whatsoever in the Court's mind that
Manipon is guilty of the crime charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement that would modify a final judgment, no
one took the bother of putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us believe that there
was no need for it because he trusted Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that
Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if there was really an agreement to alter
the judgment, why did he not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the labor arbiter
who had issued the order of execution? Manipon could not give satisfactory explanations because
there was no such agreement in the first place.
The temporary receipt 20 adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, is a
last-minute fabrication to provide proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the
judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe that Dominguez was not interested
in getting said temporary receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show that he
had partially complied with his legal obligation.
The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no help either to the defense. Flora is
Manipon's co-sheriff and is therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several occasions on the
witness stand, answered with obvious hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness. While
he claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other creditors, he could not present any
authority that would allow him to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in their
behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names. 21

Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked with irregularities. As early as
November 9, 1979, he had already garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he
did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for the payment by the bank of the
garnished amount could be made and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment under
execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous
exhibits and court proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not informing the labor
arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC
concerning the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on February 20, 1980 although by
its express terms, it was returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. 22 Clearly, Manipon had
planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during the preliminary investigation. 23 That
affidavit contained two annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared on December
28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it in his office and found it only several weeks after
he had made the affidavit. 24 This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually no temporary
receipt at all at the time of payment on December 28 and that it was concocted by the defense as a
last-ditch effort to make the authorities believe that what had transpired was not a payoff but a
legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard, the prosecution witnesses have
acquitted themselves welt The Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their
version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the crime of direct bribery has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the P1,000.00 was illegally seized because
there was no valid March warrant and therefore inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this
jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, and 3)
seizure of evidence in plain view. 25
In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on December 28,1979, NISA SubStation Commander Colonel Luisito Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some
operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning the planned entrapment. He had
earlier received word from Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected that
afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking MONEY from Dominguez. 26 As Colonel
Sanchez earlier testified, part of the MONEY to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment was to
be given to the accused 27 for agreeing to lift the order of garnishment. After the briefing which lasted
from ten to fifteen minutes, they an headed for the Comtrust BANK .
NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the BANK so that he could observe
what transpired inside the bank. 28 He testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked MONEY to
Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the MONEY from
Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing his right
hand on his head to indicate that the money had changed hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez

left the bank, Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed suit. As Manipon
walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast
to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast pocket. 29
Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC operatives approached Manipon and
his two companions. After Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P l,000.00
from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained amazingly silent and voiced no protest. 30
The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would therefore fall within the first exception.
The search was made as an incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our pronouncement
in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated in Alvero v. Dizon 76 Phil. 637, to wit:
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or
property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the
case.
The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm
from the person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent
the person arrested from destroying evidence within his
reach. 31
Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need not be discuss here.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner-accused Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 30, 1981 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-65952 July 31, 1984
LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the
preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or transaction"
so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner who
was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National

Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the required
amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half thereof. The
entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
7393 which reads as follows:
The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an
Assistant City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as
the Investigating Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA
versus THOMAS N. TAN, docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified
Theft, taking advantage of his official position and with grave abuse of
authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
demand and request from Thomas N. Tan the amount of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency, and actually
received from said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in consideration for a
favorable resolution by dismissing the abovementioned case, wherein
said accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such
Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.)
EDGA
RDO
C.
LABEL
LA
Special
Prosec
utor
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, as Principal in the Information, for Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations,
and which was fully recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)

shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the
National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region.
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the effect
that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and not on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence. This claim is not meritorious not only because it is not for Us to review
the factual findings of the court a quo but also because a reading of its decision shows that it
explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the competence of the witnesses
who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner
can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. On
this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) ...
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct
Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as
amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense
of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly
solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or
promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before
him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal
complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his
office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct
Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as
used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business
transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or
administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise,
the Act would have so stated in the "Definition of Terms", Section 2 thereof. But it did
not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose and
object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and other party
wherein the public officer would intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it
a transactionbecause this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions and
this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan to
have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been reproduced
herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right
to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the
petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two (2) years ofprision correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75160 March 18, 1988
LEONOR FORMILLEZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Petition for review of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The records of the case disclose that petitioner Leonor Formilleza has been with the government
service for around 20 years. She was the personnel supervisor of the regional office of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte since October 1, 1982. Her duties include the
processing of the appointment papers of employees.
On the other hand, a certain Mrs. Estrella Mutia was an employee of the NIA from February, 1978 up
to March, 1985. Her appointment was coterminous with a project of the NIA. On December 31, 1983,
her appointment wag terminated. This notwithstanding, she continued working for the NIA pursuant
to the verbal instructions of the regional director of the Administration.
Mrs. Mutia testified that she took steps to obtain either a permanent or at the least a renewed
appointment; that when she approached the regional director about the matter she was advised to
see the petitioner who was to determine the employees to be appointed or promoted; and that the
petitioner refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were given some money.
On February 27, 1984, Mrs. Mutia reported her problem to the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
authorities in the province. The PC officials told her that steps were to be taken to entrap the
petitioner. The entrapment equipment consisted of marked paper money bills worth P100.00. The
PC officials concerned were colleagues of the husband of Mrs. Mutia in the PC.
The first attempt to entrap the petitioner was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as
the petitioner did not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.
The second attempt was on February 29,1984, this time with results. That morning, the petitioner
and Mrs. Mutia met in their service bus on their way to work. The two women supposedly agreed to
meet at the canteen later that morning at 9:00 o'clock. Thereafter, Mrs. Mutia notified the PC
authorities who were to arrange the entrapment. The PC soldiers involved in the arrangement were
Identified as Sergeants Eddie Bonjoc, Efren Abanes and Ignacio Labong.
Everyone who was to participate in the entrapment was ready. Mrs. Mutia went to see the petitioner
in her office after which the two of them proceeded to the canteen. Some of their officemates Mrs.
Florida Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano joined them in the canteen. They occupied two
squareshaped tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of the table with Mrs. Mutia
seated at her left, Mrs. Dimaano at her (the petitioner's) right and Mrs. Sevilla at the right of Mrs.
Dimaano. Sergeants Bonjoc and Labong sat at another table while Sergeant Abanes was alone in
still another table. The latter brought along a camera in order to take photographs of the entrapment.
The marked MONEY was folded altogether.
Mrs. Mutia maintains that after they had finished taking their snacks, she handed the
marked MONEY bills under the table with her right hand to the petitioner who received the same
with her left hand. At that moment, Sergeant Bonjoc approached the petitioner and held her hand
holding the MONEY bills. Sergeant Abanes brought out his camera and took photo. graphs of the
sequence of events. He was able to take seven photographs. 1
The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers despite her objections to the entrapment. She was
brought to the PC crime laboratory in the locality where she was found positive for ultra-violet

powder. In the presence of the corporate counsel of the NW the petitioner denied accepting any
bribe MONEY from Mrs. Mutia.
The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9634.
Arraigned on January 1 0, 1985, the petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and went to trial on May
13, 1985.
In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution argued that the entrapment arranged
by the PC operatives was n because the petitioner was asking MONEY from Mrs. Mutia in
consideration for having the appointment papers of the latter facilitated. On the other hand, the
petitioner maintains her innocence that there was no entrapment; the scenario was but a scheme
set up by Mrs. Mutia and her husband's colleagues in the PC. The petitioner denies having accepted
the supposed bribe money.
The Sandiganbayan relying on the theory of the prosecution observed in a decision promulgated on
July 14, 1986, 2 as follows
Upon consideration of the evidence. We find the p petitions version credible.
Two days before the entrapment, Mrs. Mutia complained to the PC authorities about
the inaction of the on her appointment papers due to her failure to give Mm money.
She executed a sworn statement to that effect, ... It was the PC who planned the
entrapment and supplied the marked money. Sgt. Efren Abanes who dusted the
money bills with fluoresence powder and who was a member of the entrapment
team, witnessed the delivery and receipt of the money by the accused and the
complainant and he saw how the folded money was handed by Mrs. Mutia with her
right hand underneath the table and received by the with her left hand. That was also
how Mrs. Mutia described the manner she delivered the money to the accused the
money bills were rolled winch she handed to with her right hand underneath the
table. Although Sgt. Abanes had a camera with him to photograph the entrapment,
he could not prematurely expose the camera to allow a shot of the actual giving of
the money lest the notice his presence and intention and thereby thwart the
operation. But after the money had been delivered and received, he immediately took
out his camera and snapped pictures, one of them depicting the accused held by
Sgt. Bonjoc and Labong on the left hand ..., and another showing the accused also
held on the left hand by one of the PC men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia,
drinking from a glass ...
The fact that Mrs. Mutia's husband is a PC -An himself does not detract from the
credibility of Sgt. Abanes who took part in the Sgt. Abanes entrapment, took pictures,
and testified about the incident in court. Sets. Abanes Bonjoc and Labong were not
the only public authorities privy to the operation. Capt. Pedro Pates was the one to
whom Mrs. Mutia reported the accused demand for money; it was he who broached
the Idea of entrapping the accused; and it was Mador Fernando Pace who supplied
the money and caused it to be marked with powder. It is inconceivable that an these
commissioned and non-commissioned officers had lent themselves to take part in an

unholy cabal of falsely incriminating a female government employee on the mere

urging of one of their associates.
Just as unreasonable is the insinuation that Mrs. Mutia had inveigled the accused to
the canteen and resorted to the insidious machination of planting money in her hand
in a simulated entrapment simply because she thought the accused was not helping
her in her application for appointment to a regular item.
Mrs. Florida Sevilla's presence on the same table with the complainant and the
accused may be conceded. But her testimony that she did not see anything that took
place between the complainant and the accused before the PC operative pounced
upon the accused, and the latter angrily asked the complainant what she was trying
to do to her, does not improve the cause of the defense. As portrayed by the
accused, she was at the head of the rectangular table with the complainant at her
left: Mrs. Dimaano at her right, and Mrs. Sevilla next to Mrs. Dimaano. Since the
money, according to the complainant and Sgt. Abanes was handed to and received
by the accused underneath the table, it is not surprising that Mrs. Sevilla who was
two seats away from the accused did not see it. 3
The respondent court ruled that the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct Bribery as
defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as
defined under Article 211 of the same code. Citing the case of People v. Abesamis, 4 the respondent
court was of the opinion that she could be convicted for Indirect Bribery under the Information for Direct
Bribery to which she pleaded and entered into trial inasmuch as it is the allegation of facts rather than the
denomination of the offense by the provincial fiscal that determines the crime charged.
Thus, the respondent court found the petitioner guilty of Indirect Bribery and sentenced her to four
months ofarresto mayor, suspension from public office, profession or calling, including the right of
suffrage, and public censure.
On August 23, 1986, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant Petition for
Review. The thrust of the Petition is that the conclusions reached by the Sandiganbayan are not
supported by the evidence. Moreover, the petitioner disputes the applicability and/or correctness of
the ruling of this Court in People v. Abesamis relied upon by the respondent court.
As instructed by this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Comment on the Petition.
In opposing the Petition, the Solicitor General maintains that only questions of law may be raised in
the instant case and the respondent court did not commit any error of law. The Solicitor General also
stresses therein that the findings of fact made by the Sandiganbayan are supported by the evidence
on record and deserve full faith and credit. The Solicitor General adds that the question of credibility
is addressed mainly to the trier of facts, in this case, the Sandiganbayan.
The parties submitted subsequent pleadings in support of their stand. Thereafter, the case was
deemed submitted for decision.
We find merit in the Petition.

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating
from the Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. 5 Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions. 6 Simply stated, one way 7 through which a
decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor
General cites the case of Peaverde v. Sandiganbayan 8 in support of this view.
Going now to the question of law raised in the instant Petition, We believe that the ruling in People v.
Abesamis, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, is authority for the view that the allegation of
facts, not the denomination of the offense by the prosecutor, determines the crime charged. Anent
the argument on the correctness of the ruling, the petitioner had not succeeded in showing any
cogent basis for reversing or modifying the same.
The remaining argument that the judgment of conviction is not supported by the evidence raises a
question of fact inasmuch as the resolution of the issue would require this Court to sort out and reexamine the evidence presented in the trial. Invoking the ruling of this Court in Peaverde v.
Sandiganbayan, the Solicitor General moves for the denial of the Petition. The Solicitor General
adds that the credibility of witnesses is a matter better left to the appreciation of the trial court, in this
case, the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition of this character.
The general rule admits exceptions, one of which is when the findings of fact made by the trial court
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the
case. This observation was made by this court in Peaverde v. Sandiganbayan, cited by the Solicitor
General, to wit
With respect to the allegation that there was error on the part of respondent
Sandiganbayan in concluding that petitioners conspired in the commission of the
offense, suffice it to say that the basis of its finding was the credibility of witnesses.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, in relation to Section 2, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are entitled to
great respect and only questions of laws (sic) may be raised to the Supreme Court.
Besides, well settled is the rule that the findings of (the) trial court on credibility of
witnesses will not be disturbed unless much findings overlook certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered might affect (the) results of (the) case. 9
We believe that the exception to the general rule calls for application in this case.
The fundamental axiom underlying a criminal prosecution is that before the accused may be
convicted of any crime, his guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, if there are
substantial facts which were overlooked by the trial court but which could alter the results of the case
in favor of the accused, then such facts should be carefully taken into account by the reviewing
tribunal.

In the case before Us, there are substantial facts and circumstances Which appear to be favorable
to the accused but which were not carefully considered by the Sandiganbayan. The failure to do so
is most unfortunate considering that the Sandiganbayan is the first and last recourse of the accused
before her case reaches the Supreme Court where findings of fact are generally conclusive and
binding.
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code 10 is
that the public officer concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. There must be a
clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical
receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient
to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will
encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical
custody some gift, money or other property.
Did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money?
The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was
accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. Against the evidence of the pro
petition that the money was handed to petitioner by Mrs. Mutia under the table is the assertion of
petitioner that it was when she stood up that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand
which she did not know to be money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away. 11 An
examination of the seven photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the
money shows that the petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This
corroborates petitioner's story. There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her
position immediately after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the case
according to the version of the prosecution. 12 None of the photographs show the petitioner in the process
of appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of the seven photographs that were
taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the operation.
As the petitioner was admittedly handed the money, this explains why she was positive for ultraviolet powder. It is possible that she intended to keep the supposed bribe money or may have had
no intention to accept the same. These possibilities exist but We are not certain.
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in
the canteen with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the
petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the PC agents whose Identities petitioner
possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that
petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the
petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner
would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see
the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under
the table or when, as petitioner said it was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs.
Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two (2) men approached
petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying
to do to me?" 13 The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.

Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty
is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon a
given matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the accused in a
criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
With all these circumstances taken into account altogether, We are left at a loss as to the guilt of the
accused. Overlooked by the Sandiganbayan, these facts and circumstances make out a good case
for the petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the guilt of the petitioner in Criminal Case No. 9634 has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
9634 is hereby SET ASIDE. The petitioner Leonor Formilleza is hereby ACQUITTED on the basis of
reasonable doubt. We make no pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Macario C. Ofilada, Jr. for petitioner.
Gil Venerando R. Racho collaborating counsel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

+.wph!1

In an Information dated July 22, 1980 and filed with the City Court of Angeles City, Branch I,
docketed thereat as Criminal Case No. CAT-326, petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of the Philippines, was charged with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official, allegedly
committed as follows:
t.hqw

That on or about the 17th day of December, 1979, in the City of Angeles, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then an applicant for probation after he was convicted of an offense by a competent
court, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant,
Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of P100.00 in a paper bill
with Serial Nos. BC530309, under circumstances that would make the said City
Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo liable for bribery.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the said information and, after trial, the City Court
inits decision of May 15, 1981 found the petitioner guilty of the crime of corruption of a public official,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
t.hqw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Gregory Pozar guilty of the offense of
Corruption of a Public Official as charged in the Information, and the Court pursuant
to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences
the accused Gregory James Pozar to an imprisonment of three (3) months and one
(1) day of Arresto Mayor, and hereby censures him for his actuation in this matter,
with costs against the accused.
The one hundred peso bill is hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals (now In termediate Appellate Court) and
subsequently, the appellate court affirmed the same in toto. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied on October 19, 1982 and on December 21, 1982, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review of the decision of the respondent court, relying on the constitutional precept that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." (Article
IV, Sec. 19), and that the State, having the burden of establishing all the elements of the crime with
which the accused is charged, must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
has failed to present and establish the required quantum of proof against the accused petitioner,
hence he is entitled to an acquittal. .
The evidence for the prosecution are stated in the decision of the respondent court, thus:

t.hqw

The prosecution presented as its witnesses Mr. Ricardo Manalo, Mrs. Primitiva
Francisco and Mr. Danilo Ocampo. Upon the other hand, the defense placed on the
witness stand appellant himself and his counsel Atty. Reynaldo Suarez.
Ricardo Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he
started working at the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know
appellant because the latter had gone to said office in connection with his application
for probation; that at about noontime of December 17, 1979, appellant came to the
office looking for Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo and since the latter was out at the
time, appellant gave him a closed envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery
to the latter; that two days later, he gave the envelope to Ocampo who opened the
same in his presence; that the envelope contained some official papers connected
with appellant's application for probation and attached thereto was a hundred peso
bill; that Ocampo then remarked: 'This s something bad that the opening of the
envelope was done on December 19, 1979; that Ocampo kept the envelope and its
contents, including the one hundred peso bill, but within a week's time gave them to
him with instructions to give the same to appellant but the latter never came to the
office and so he returned them to Ocampo; that although he later saw appellant

about two weeks after December 17, 1979, when the latter came to the office to sign
some papers, he never mentioned to appellant the one hundred peso bill (pp. 2-16,
t.s.n., September 16, 1980)
Manalo further declared that at the nine the envelope with the one hundred peso bill
was given to him by appellant for delivery to Ocampo, he already had an inkling or
knowledge that the Probation Office will recommend for the grant of appellant's
application for probation because he was the one who makes the final typing of a
post, sentence investigation report and before said final typing Ocampo usually talks
to him, so that he knows whether the recommendation was for a grant or denial of an
application (pp. 16-19, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).
Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation
Office, declared that she knows appellant because the latter was one of the
applicants for probation in 1979 and she was the one assigned to investigate
appellant's case; that as Assistant Probation Officer in the Investigation of
applications for probation and in the case of appellant, she requested him to submit
certain pertinent documents required by their office, such as barangay, police and
court clearances, residence certificate, etc.; that she prepared appellant's postsentence Investigation Report (Exhs. "B" to "B-5") that she first saw appellant on
December 7, 1979, when she interviewed him on his social and personal history and
his version of the offense, among others; that she gave the list of documents which
are to be submitted to the office; that the second time she saw appellant was on
December 21, 1979 but appellant was out at the time and when she saw that he was
in his car that broke down in front of the Pampaguena she tried to can him but the
car left as she was about to reach the place (pp. 2-21, tsn, January 26, 1981).
Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21,
1979, the latter was asking person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk
with Probation Officer, Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter; that she then prepared a draft
of the Post-Sentence Investigation report and thereafter had a conference with
Ocampo who told him not to delete the bribery incident from the report; that it was
first from Manalo and later from Ocampo that she became aware of the bribery or
more accurately corruption of a public official committed by appellant (pp. 21-25,
t.s.n., January 26, 1981).
The third prosecution witness was complaint himself Danilo Ocampo, who declared
that he has been the Probation Officer of an Angeles City, Probation Office since
1977 and that his employees thereat were Ricardo Manalo, Primitiva Francisco and
Ramon de Leon; that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1979, he
received a closed letter envelope from his clerk. Manalo, at the Probation Office at
Merlan Building, Angeles City, Manalo informing him that the same came from
appellant; that he opened the envelope on the presence of Manalo and found that
the same contained xerox copies of the passport (Exh. "D") and visa (Exh. "D-1") of
appellant and inserted with said documents. was a hundred peso bill with Serial No.
BC530309 (Exh. "A-l"); that the envelope given him by Manalo was addressed to him

Mr. Danilo Ocampo, Probation Officer, in handwritten for that he could not, however,
produce said envelope the same having been misplaced that he kept the one
hundred peso bill as the same was an evidence against appellant; that when he met
Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, appellant's counsel at the Angeles City Court on January 14,
1980, he told the latter about the envelope received from appellant containing the
passport, visa and the one hundred peso bill inserted with said documents and
intimated to the lawyer that the client should not have inserted said one hundred
peso bill (pp. 46-57, t.s.n. September 16, 1980).
Ocampo further declared that the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was prepared
by Mrs. Francisco who conducted the investigation; that the first time he saw
appellant was on December 10, 1979, when the latter was seeking permission to go
to Baguio City and being a foreigner, he required him to submit to his office copies of
the latter's passport and visa; that the second time he met appellant was in March,
1980, when the hearing of appellant's application for probation was conducted at
Branch I of the Angeles City Court; that he never required appellant to give money,
so that when he saw the one hundred peso bill (Exh. "A") in the envelope handed
him by Manalo, he was very much surprised; that he intended to confront appellant
but was unable to do so but was able to inform Atty. Suarez, appellant's lawyer, about
the matter when he met him at the City Court; that at the time the envelope
containing the documents and money was handed to him on, December 19, 1979,
the Post-Sentence Investigation Report was not yet finished and that the same was
submitted to the City Court by Mrs. Francisco on February 5, 1980; that the fact that
appellant enclosed a one hundred peso bill in the envelope was mentioned in said
report (pp. 60-73, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).
Ocampo further testified that at the time of the hearing of appellant's application or
petition for probation, the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the City Court held a
conference in the court's chamber with appellant's counsel the trial fiscal and himself,
during which they discussed the bribery incident mentioned in the report; that the
presiding judge of Branch I, after some clarifications regarding the incident in
question, suggested that coplainant should lodge a complaint against appellant and
the all should conduct the corresponding preliminary investigation to determine
whether there was a prima facie case (pp. 75-76, 82-86, t.s.n., September 16, 1980).
Finally, Ocampo declared that he approved the Post-Sentence Investigation Report
recommending the granting of appellant's application for probation, notwithstanding
the bribery or corruption incident mentioned in said report, because appellant's act
was not yet a disqualification under the law, as he was still presumed innocent until
he is found guilty by the court (pp. 90-91, t.s.n. December 8, 1980).
The appealed decision tersely cited the evidence for the defense in the following manner:

t.hqw

The evidence for the defense is that the one hundred peso bill the accused-appellant
placed in the envelope delivered to the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to

take care of the expenses in the xerox copying or reproduction of documents that
may be needed by the Probation Office. (p. 7, CA Decision).
Considering that the findings of fact in the decision of the respondent court which affirmed the
decision of the trial court, do not mention nor indicate the circumstances surrounding the incident
and the filing of the information against the petitioner other than the admitted fact that the one
hundred peso bill was placed in the envelope together with the visa and passport of the petitioner
which he handed on December 17, 1979 to Mr. Ricardo Manalo and which the latter in turn handed
on December 19, 1979 to Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo, in fairness to the petitioner, We quote
hereunder the decision of the trial court which recited the said circumstances that led to the filing of
the Information against the petitioner, to wit:
t.hqw

From the evidence presented, the following facts appear to the court to be
indubitable; That the accused was convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical
Injuries, and the crime of Oral Defamation of the City Court of Angeles City, Branch
1, and the said accused was sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto
Menor and to pay a fine of P50.00 and to pay the complaining witness the amount of
P500.00 as moral and exempt damages. After he was sentenced, he, on November
28, 1979 filed an Application for Probation. That after filing the application for
Probation, the accused, together with his lawyer Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, went to the
Probation Office purposely to inquire for the requirements need for his client's petition
for probation. Unfortunately, Atty. Suarez and his client did not reach the Probation
Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of the Probation Office, whom
they reached, and they were re. requested to come back to the office regarding their
inquiry inasmuch as the Probation Officer was not in the office. Later, Atty. Suarez
called through the telephone the Probation Office, and, on that occasion he was able
to talk with the Probation Inspector, Mrs. Primitiva Francisco. He was inquiring from
Mrs. Francisco the necessary documents regarding the application for probation of
his client and Mrs. Francisco suggested that he would come over the office in order
to give him all the necessary information. The lawyer just instructed Mrs. Francisco to
give a list of the requirements to Mr. Pozar, the accused, who was then in the, Office
of the Probation Officer, and accordingly, Mrs. Francisco handed to Mr. Pozar a list of
the documents needed in his probation (see Exhibit E for the prosecution, and
Exhibit 3 for the defense). It also appears that all the re. requirements listed in the list
given by Mrs, Francisco were given to Mrs. Francisco, and at times to Mr. Manalo.
The person who conducted the investigation was actually Mrs. Francisco. On
December 10, 1979, Pozar had an occasion to see the Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo
Ocampo, and in that meeting, aside from the fact that he was asking permission from
the Probation Officer to go to Baguio, the Probation Officer required him to furnish
the Probation Office the xerox copy of his visa, and his I.D. picture, inasmuch as it
was explained to him these were needed, he being a foreigner. On December 17,
1979 Mr. Pozar went to the Probation Office looking for the Probation Officer, and
when the Probation Officer was not there, he handed to Mr. Manalo an envelope
address to the Probation Of officer and asked and requested Mr. Manalo to give the
same to Mr. Ocampo. It was on December 19,1979 when Mr. Manalo handed the
envelope given by Mr. Pozar to Mr. Danilo Ocampo, and when Danilo Ocampo

opened it in the presence of Mr. Manalo, he found enclose in the envelope a xerox
copy of the applicant's passport, xerox copy of his visa, and attached also with the
same document was a one hundred peso bill It would seem that Mr. Ocampo asked
Mr. Manalo to keep the one hundred peso bill and return it to Mr. Pozar, but when Mr.
Pozar did not arrive to the office, Mr. Manalo gave it back to Mr. Ocampo Mr. Danilo
Ocampo kept the one hundred peso bill but made it a point that this incident
regarding the receiving of the one hundred peso being be included in the postsentence investigation report which was being prepared by Mrs. Francisco. At that
time when the one hundred peso bill was given, the post-sentence investigation
report was not yet finished. The record shows that the same was submitted to the
court only on February 8, 1980. At the hearing of the application for probation in
March 1980, when the Presiding Judge of City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, noted
and saw from the report the alleged incident of the accused's giving the one hundred
peso bill he called for a conference and in that conference, he suggested that the
manner should be investigated by the Office of the City F'iscal Acting upon such
suggestion Danilo Ocampo formally filed an Information Sheet against the accused
Gregory Pozar (Exhibit 2). It is also a fact admitted by the defense that after the one
hundred peso bill was handed and the Probation Officer was not able to return the
same, he informed Atty. Suarez at the sala of City Court Branch II sometime on
January 14, 1980. (pages 8-9)
As stated earlier, petitioner was found guilty of the offense of Corruption of Public Official as defined
and penalized in the Revised Penn Code as follows:
t.hqw

Art. 212. Corruption of Public Officials. The same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed
upon any person who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or
presents as described in the preceding articles.
The preceding Articles of the Revised Penal Code are Articles 210 and 211 which define and
penalize the offenses of direct bribery and indirect bribery, and they provide as follows:
t.hqw

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. Any public officer who will agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another, shag suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value
of the gift and not more than three times such value, in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, ff the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer
the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph, and if said shall not have
been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more than
twice such value,

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public
officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer
the penalties of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
less than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall
suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to
assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts, or any other
persons performing public duties.
Art. 211. Indirect Bribery. The penalties of arresto mayor, suspension in its
minimum and medium periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
It is well to note and distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery. In both crimes, the public officer
receives gift. While in direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of
the gift or present, in indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exist. In direct bribery, the offender
agrees to perform or performs an act or refrains from doing something, because of the gift or
promise in indirect bribery, it is not necessary that the officer should do any particular act or even
promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered to him by reason of his office. (The
Revised Penal Code by Luis P. Reyes, 1975 Ed., p. 332).
In the case at bar, We find that the Information against the petitioner charged that the accused "did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the
City Probation Officer, the sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with serial No.
BC530309, under circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo
Ocampo, liable for bribery.
The trial court found the accused guilty of the offense of Corruption of a Public Official as charged in
the Information and pursuant to Article 212, in relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code,
sentenced the accused to an imprisonment of three (3) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor
and public censure. This is erroneous. The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime
of Corruption of Public Official as consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent
appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the
trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one hundred
peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official. (See The Revised Penal
Code by Justice Ramon Aquino, 1976 Ed., Vol. II, p. 1168, citing the cases of Uy Matiao, 1 Phil. 487;
Camacan 7 Phil. 329; Tan Gee, 7 Phil. 738; SyGuikao 18 Phil. 482; Te Tong, 26 Phil. 453; Ng Pek 81
Phil. 562; Ching, CA-G.R. No. 439-R, July 31, 1947). Attempted corruption of a public official is
punished withdestierro and is cognizable by inferior courts (See Revised Penal Code by justice
Aquino, Vol. II, 1976 Ed., citing the cases of Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617; Santos y
Bautista, 87 PhiL 687; Dalao v. Geronimo, 92 Phil. 1942; Ng Pek 81 Phil. 562).

Be that as it may, the crucial point is whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt that the one hundred peso bill was given to bribe and corrupt the City Probation Officer or that
it will be used to defray expenses in xeroxing or copying of whatever documents needed by the
Probation Office in connection with petitioner's application for probation then pending in said office.
The evidence on record disclose that the petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer,
Primitive Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information
( complaint) Court decision, Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances from the Police,
the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence certificate, and told to report once
a week on Mondays. (Exhibit "E"). This was on December 7, 1979.
Aside from these documents, the Probation Officer required of the petitioner on December 10, 1979
when the latter was asking permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and
passport. Mrs. Francisco to testified that the petitioner was asking permission from her to leave for
Baguio. And according to the petitioner, "during all the time he was applying for probation, he made
more or less 12 visits in the office as he was directed to report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning. He reported for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there
unscheduled for conference and clarification of the various re. requirements he needed. During all
the time he went there, he met Manalo, Mrs. Francisco and Mr. Ocampo himself. Mrs. Francisco and
Mr. Ocampo interviewed him He submitted all the requirements to the Probation Officer; at times, he
submitted them directly to Mrs. Francisco, and at other times to Mr. Manalo, and also to Mr.
Ocampo. Other than those listed in the list given by Mrs. Francisco, he was required to submit xerox
copy of his passport, his visa and his pictures. He explained that he gave the requirements to the
person who was interviewing him, primarily Mrs. Francisco, of the documents needed. Later, he
submitted to the office xerox copy of the original He likewise submitted his two passports, and later
xerox copy of his passports. When Mrs. Francisco was asking for the original, which documents are
in the possession of his lawyer at his office, he had to return to get the originals." (Decision of Trial
Court, p. 5). Petitioner's travail is, therefore, quite evident.
From the foregoing, We can fairly deduce that the procedure for processing petitioner's application
for probation in the Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut And since
the accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures, there
is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing and
advancing the expenses for whatever documentation was needed further to complete and thus
hasten his probation application, was understandably innocent and not criminal.
In fine, the facts and circumstances on record amply justify and support the claim of the defense as
against the conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the decision of the trial court and
quoted with approval in the appealed decision under review. The Government's own evidence as
indicated in the Post-Sentence Investigation Report that the giving of the one hundred pesos
( P100.00) was done in good faith, is vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There being no
criminal intent to corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the
crime charged. We hold and rule that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. There is not that moral certainty required to convict him. Even the complainant
himself, the Probation Officer, filed the complaint only on the suggestion of the presiding judge of the

Angeles City Court during the hearing on petitioner's application for probation, the complaint having
been filed in the City Fiscal's Office on June 10, 1980 after a lapse and delay of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
REVERSED. The accused petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

1wph1.t

Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Abad Santos, J., took no part.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
1. As stated by the Solicitor General the pretension of the petitioner that he was confused with
respect to the requirements and/or processing of his application for probation pending before the
complaining witness Probation Officer Danilo Ocampo of Angeles City, is incredible. As early as
December 7, 1979, about ten (10) days before December 17, 1979 (the delivery of the P100 peso
bill inside a closed letter envelope petitioner was already interviewed by Mrs. Primitiva Francisco,
Assistant Probation Officer of the Probation Office of Angeles City, who gave him the list of
documents to be submitted to the office. Hence, petitioner already knew then what papers were
required of hint
2. His claim that the P100 peso bill contained in the aforesaid closed letter envelope was for xerox
copies of other documents that may be required of him by the Probation Office, is belied by the
aforesaid fact that as early as December 7, 1979, Assistant Probation Officer Francisco already gave
him the list of documents that he should submit to the Probation Office, and that on December 10,
1979, Probation Officer Ocampo also required him to submit xerox copies only of his passport and
visa as he was a foreigner, in connection with his request for permission to go to Baguio City.
3. If, as he alleged, the P100 bill was intended for xerox copies of other documents that may be
required of him, he should have, as stated by the Solicitor General in his comment and
memorandum, given the same to the clerk Ricardo Manalo of the Probation Office, with instructions
that the same should cover whatever xerox copies of other documents may be needed. Or he should
have attached or clipped the P100 bill to a note addressed to Probation Officer Ocampo that the
said MONEY is to cover expenses for xerox copies of other documents that may be required of
him.
4. Petitioner could have just given the P100 bill to his lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Suarez, with instructions
that the same should be paid for whatever xerox copies of other documents that may be required of
him in connection with his application for probation.
5. Petitioner saw Assistant Probation Officer Francisco on December 21, 1979; but on said date
petitioner did not bother to ask either Assistant Probation Officer Francisco on December 21, 1979;

but on said date petitioner did not bother to ask either Assistant Probation Officer Francisco or the
Probation Clerk Ricardo Manalo, whether the P100 bill was spent for xerox copies of other
documents. He went there that day, December 21, 1979, precisely to reiterate his request for
permission to leave for Baguio City and Assistant Probation Officer Francisco advised him to talk to
Probation Officer Ocampo whom he did not even try to see that day, December 21, 1979.
6. Petitioner could not presume that his application for probation would be favorably acted upon
because he was still then being subjected to an investigation by Assistant Probation petition Officer
Francisco who submitted her post-sentence report to the City Court only on February 5, 1980. Said
report included the statement about the bribe MONEY . Probation Officer Ocampo had to
recommend in March, 1980 approval of petitioner's application for probation; because at that time he
had not yet filed the complaint with the City Fiscal's Office for corruption of public officer against
petitioner who, as stressed by Probation Officer Ocampo, was presumed innocent until adjudged
guilty of such corruption,
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. P-88-256 October 11, 1990

RINA V. CHUA, complainant,
vs.
EDGARDO D. NUESTRO, Deputy Sheriff, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6,
Manila, respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
Complainant Rina V. Chua filed an administrative charge against the respondent for allegedly
delaying theenforcement of the writ of execution in her favor after demanding and getting from her
the sum of P1,500.00. Asked to comment thereon, the respondent denied the charge. The case was
referred for investigation, report and recommendation to Judge Bernardo P. Pardo of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila who, after hearing, found as follows:
At the hearing, we find duly substantiated by the testimony of complainant Rina Chua
and her husband and counsel Atty. Victorians R. Yabut, Jr. that on September 12,
1988 when the court in Civil Case No. 124401 issued a writ of execution, they asked
respondent Deputy-Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro to immediately enforce the writ of
execution against the defendant and that for the purpose, they agreed to give
P1,000.00 to the. respondent aside from the expenses which might be necessary in
carrying out the said execution. Respondent received the amount of P1,000.00 on

September 12, 1988; that the next day, September 13, 1988, they saw the
respondent talking with counsel of defendant and that the respondent was hesitant in
proceeding to carry out the writ of execution and that as it was nearing lunch time,
respondent even asked for an additional amount of P500.00; consequently, in the
afternoon of the same day, respondent defuty sheriff went to the premises in
question and when he arrived there, he was told by the neighbors that there was a
call from the judge and that he returned the call to the judge who told him not to
proceed because a supersedeas bond was filed. Nevertheless, he found the
premises locked and at the insistence of the complainant, they broke the padlock and
he, together with complainant and Atty. Yabut, entered portion B of the premises, and
that later, counsel for defendant arrived and showed them the Official Receipt of
payment of the supersedeas bond and so he discontinued the execution
proceedings.
While we cannot fault the sheriff for his hesitance to immediately carry out the writ of
execution because the defendant still had time to file supersedeas bond to stay
execution, we find duly proved by preponderance of evidence that the respondent
Deputy Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro received the amount of P1,500.00 from the
complainant and her lawyer as a consideration for the performance of his work. This
amount is distinct from the sheriffs fee and expenses of execution and was not
intended for that purpose. It was indeed a bribe given and received by respondent
deputy sheriff from the complainant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we find the respondent deputy sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro
guilty of direct bribery for receiving an amount of P1,500.00 in consideration of the
execution of the writ of ejectment against the defendant in Civil Case No. 124401 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that he be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement rights, if any. It is also recommended that
appropriate directive be issued to the City Prosecutor of Manila after preliminary
investigation to charge complainant Rina Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. with
corruption of public official under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, it is
recommended that another directive be issued to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to investigate Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. for appropriate disciplinary
measure for the same act of corruption of public official.
Agreeing with the above findings and recommendation, the Court Resolved to (a) DISMISS
respondent Deputy Sheriff Edgardo D. Nuestro from the service with forfeiture of retirement
privileges, if any; (b) DIRECT the City Prosecutor of Manila to investigate and, if warranted, charge
complainant Rina V. Chua and Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut with corruption of a public official under Art.
212 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) REFER this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the investigation of Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut on the same charge.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Paras and Feliciano, JJ., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165111

July 21, 2006

ROBERTO E. CHANG and PACIFICO D. SAN MATEO, petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On appeal is the July 2, 2004 Decision and August 23, 2004 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan1 finding herein petitioners Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico D. San Mateo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and sentencing each of them to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from Six (6) Years and One (1) Month as minimum to Fifteen (15) Years as
maximum and perpetual disqualification from public office.
Petitioner Roberto Estanislao Chang (Chang) was the Municipal Treasurer of Makati who was
tasked to, among other things, examine or investigate tax returns of private corporations or
companies operating within Makati, and determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of Income Tax
assessed on them and collect payments therefor. Petitioner Pacifico D. San Mateo (San Mateo) was
the Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division, Makati Treasurer's Office.

By Information dated June 20, 1991, petitioners were, along with Edgar Leoncito Feraren (Feraren),
a Driver-Clerk also of the Makati Treasurer's Office, charged before the Sandiganbayan to have
willfully, unlawfully and criminally demanded and received the amount of One Hundred Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P125,000) from Group Developers, Inc. (GDI) through its employee Mario Magat
(Magat) in consideration of the issuance by petitioners of a Certificate of Examination that it had "no
tax liability" to the Municipality, albeit it had not settled the assessed deficiency tax in the amount
of P494,000.2 Thus the Information read:
That on or about June 19, 1991, in Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused ROBERTO ESTANISLAO CHANG, a public officer being the
incumbent Municipal Treasurer of Makati, Metro Manila and as such is tasked among others,
to examine or investigate corporate tax returns of private corporations or companies
operating within the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, to determine their compliance
and/or insufficiency of Income Tax Assessments thereon, and to collect payments
corresponding thereto, while in the performance of his official duties as such found Group
Developer's Inc., to be owing the municipality in the form of tax liabilities amounting to Four
Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Pesos (P494,000.00), conspiring and confederating with
Pacifico Domingo San Mateo, Chief of Operations,Business Revenue Examination, Audit
Division, Municipal Treasurer's Office, Makati, Metro Manila, and Edgar Leoncito Feraren,
Driver-Clerk, Municipal Treasurer's Office, Makati, Metro Manila, who are both public
officials, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally demand the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00) from the said corporation, through
Mario Magat, an employee of said corporation, in consideration of the issuance of a
Certificate of Examination that it had "no tax liability" to the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, which he in fact issued to the said corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the latter
has not paid any amount out of the P494,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gathered from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version:
By virtue of Letter-Authority No. M-90-245 dated June 18, 1990 issued by the Office of the District
Treasurer (District IV), Makati Treasurer's Office examiners Vivian Susan C. Yu and Leonila T.
Azevedo conducted an examination of the books of ACCOUNTS and other pertinent records of
GDI covering the period from January 1985 to December 1989 in order to verify the true and correct
amount of tax due from its business operations.3
The examiners found that GDI incurred a tax deficiency inclusive of penalty in the total amount
of P494,601.11, the details of which follow:
Deficiency in the payment for business taxes in 1986 to 1990
Deficiency in the payments for Mayor's Permit & Garbage Fee
Surcharge Interest

P271,160.00
14,730.00
208,711.11

Total Amount Due

P494,601.114

The Office of the Treasurer thus issued an Initial Assessment Notice5 dated January 25, 1991 to GDI
for it to pay the tax deficiency within four days from receipt.
No word having been received by the Office of the Treasurer from GDI, it issued a Second
Assessment Notice6dated February 14, 1991, reminding GDI to settle the amount due within three
days from receipt.
The assessment notices were personally received by Mario Magat (Magat), Chief Operating Officer
of GDI, in April 1991. Magat thereupon referred the matter to the ACCOUNTING Department which
informed him that the computations and worksheets requested from the municipal auditors to enable
it to validate the assessment7 had not been received.
Magat was later able to talk via telephone to San Mateo who had been calling GDI's ACCOUNTING
Department and requesting for someone with whom he could talk to regarding the assessment.
On May 15, 1991, Magat and San Mateo met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club. 8 Chang later
joined the two, and the three agreed that if GDI could pay P125,000 by the end of May 1991, the
assessment would be "resolved."9
On May 29, 1991, San Mateo went to Magat's office at GDI to pick up the check for the settlement of
GDI's deficient tax liability. When Magat handed over to San Mateo Interbank MANAGER'S Check
No. 30171560310in the amount of P125,000 dated May 29, 1991 payable to the Municipal Treasurer
of Makati, San Mateo refused to accept the same, he uttering that Magat may have misunderstood
their agreement as the money would not be going to the Municipality. Magat thereupon asked if
Chang knew about the matter and San Mateo replied that that was the agreement as understood by
Chang. Magat then informed San Mateo that he still had to consult with the top MANAGEMENT of
GDI because what he understood was that GDI was settling the correct amount of taxes to the
Municipality.11
After consultation with the MANAGEMENT of GDI, Magat repaired on May 30, 1991 to the offices
of San Mateo and Chang at the Makati Treasurer's Office during which he was told that the payment
was to absolve GDI from its tax liability and if no payment is made, they would find ways to close
GDI.12
On June 6, 1991, Magat met again for lunch with San Mateo and Chang at the Makati Sports Club.
Magat tried to convince the two that GDI wanted to pay the correct amount of tax to the Municipality.
He was advised by San Mateo and Chang, however, that GDI had only two options: pay
the P494,601.11 to the Municipality or P125,000to them.13
Magat thus consulted with Victor Puyat, president of GDI. Referral of the matter to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was considered.14
On June 12, 1991, Magat met with then NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco who advised him to
file a complaint with the NBI. On even date, Magat thus gave a sworn statement 15 before the NBI.

After the lapse of several days, Magat contacted San Mateo and asked him if their position was still
the same to which the latter replied in the affirmative, he adding that if no payment was made, GDI
would be closed. Magat thereafter told San Mateo that he would deliver the P125,000 on June 19,
1991 at the Makati Sports Club.16
On the morning of June 19, 1991, Magat informed the NBI that the payment was to be made that
day around lunchtime. The NBI immediately formed a team to conduct an entrapment. On the
request of the NBI, Magat brought hundred peso bills to be added to the boodle MONEY to be
used in the entrapment operation. The genuine as well as the boodle money and the brown
envelope where the money was placed were then laced with fluorescent powder.17
A few minutes before 11:30 a.m. of June 19, 1991, Magat together with some NBI operatives, arrived
at the Makati Sports Club. Two of the NBI agents went with Magat to the restaurant and pretended to
play billiards while Magat occupied one of the tables.18
At 11:30 a.m., San Mateo arrived and joined Magat at his table. The two took lunch after which San
Mateo stood up and watched those playing billiards. At 12:00 noon, Chang and his driver Feraren
arrived and joined Magat at the table. After Chang and Feraren were through with their lunch, Magat
told Chang and San Mateo that GDI was ready to pay and asked them if they could give him the
Certificate of Examination showing that GDI had no more tax liability to the municipality. Chang
thereupon handed to Magat the Certificate of Examination 19 issued to GDI with an annotation reading
"NO TAX LIABILITY INVOLVED," following which Magat gave Chang the brown envelope. Chang
then passed the brown envelope on to his driver Feraren who in turn passed it on to San Mateo who
opened it and peeped at its contents. At that instant, the NBI agents announced that they were being
arrested.20
After their arrest, Chang, San Mateo and Feraren were brought to the NBI headquarters where their
respective hands were tested and found positive for fluorescent powder.21
The defense, on the other hand, proffered the following tale:
On the invitation of GDI through one of its ACCOUNTING clerks and a certain Atty. Villarosa, San
Mateo met with Atty. Villarosa for lunch in April 1991 during which the latter requested for a reduction
of the tax liability of GDI as it was experiencing FINANCIAL difficulties. San Mateo turned down the
request.22
In the first week of May 1991, San Mateo met for lunch with Magat, on the latter's invitation at the
Makati Sports Club. At said meeting, Magat reiterated the request of Atty. Villarosa but San Mateo
just the same turned it down.23
On May 29, 1991, Magat invited San Mateo to repair to his office at GDI, he advising him that there
was already a check in the amount of P494,610.11. San Mateo did go to Magat's office where he
was given a white envelope containing a manager's check payable to the Municipal Treasurer of
Makati in the amount of P125,000. He did not accept the check, however, as he did not have
authority to accept any payment less than that which was due from GDI. 24

Magat later went to San Mateo's office at the Municipal Treasurer's Office and tried to convince him
to accept theP125,000 check but to no avail.25
On June 17, 1991, Magat called on San Mateo at the latter's office and conveyed Puyat's invitation
to Chang for lunch on June 19, 1991 at the Makati Sports Club. San Mateo in turn relayed the
invitation to Chang through the latter's driver, Feraren. 26
On June 19, 1991, Magat, San Mateo, Chang and Feraren met for lunch at the Makati Sports Club.
After lunch, San Mateo saw a brown envelope being tossed and suddenly placed in front of him. As
he held the brown envelope, several persons shouted "Arestado kayo, NBI ito." The NBI operatives
got hold of the brown envelope27 and apprehended San Mateo, Chang and Feraren while Magat
disappeared.28
The Sandiganbayan, by the assailed Decision29 of July 2, 2004, convicted herein petitioners San
Mateo and Chang and acquitted Feraren, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico
D. San Mateo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the violation of sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019
and are hereby sentenced to each suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six
(6) years and one (1) month as minimum to fifteen (15) years as maximum and to each
suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office.
Anent accused Edgar L. Feraren, judgment is hereby rendered finding him NOT GUILTY for
the violation of sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby ACQUITTED. Consequently, the personal bail bond posted
by accused Edgar L. Ferraren is hereby ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order
issued against the same accused is hereby revoked and declared functus officio.30
Hence, the present petition, faulting the Sandiganbayan to have gravely erred in:
I.
. . . HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED AND
THAT THEELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE UNDER SECTION 3 (B) OF RA 3019 HAVE
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
. . . HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS IN
COMMITTING THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE LACK OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
III.

. . . HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF PETITIONER ROBERTO E. CHANG TO TAKE THE

WITNESS STAND TO REBUT THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION, IS FATAL TO HIS CAUSE, OVERLOOKING THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER, WHO IS ENTITLED TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION, CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY.
IV.
. . . NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THEIR GUILT NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.31 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners argue that the elements of the offense for which they were charged were not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the presence of fluorescent powder in their hands, petitioners claim that it was the result of
involuntary contact when Magat tossed to them the brown envelope.
At all events, petitioners claim that the circumstances surrounding the supposed pay-off fail to show
community of purpose or design which is the critical element of conspiracy.
Maintaining their innocence, petitioners proffer that what transpired was not an entrapment but an
instigation, which is an absolutory cause in criminal prosecution. They point out that when Magat
went to the NBI on June 12, 1991, "no date, time or place was as yet known to them for purposes of
the planned entrapment, leading to no other conclusion except that all the activities on . . . June 19,
1991, the day of the supposed pay-off in the amount of P125,000, were all orchestrated by . . .
Magat so as not to lose face with the NBI."32
Finally, petitioners proffer that the failure of Chang to testify does not imply guilt, he being entitled to
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The petition fails.
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction
between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law.

Peligrino v. People33 restates the elements of the above-quoted offense as summed up in Mejia v.
Pamaran,34 to wit: (1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a
share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection
with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
From a review of the records of the case, this Court finds that all the above-stated elements were
satisfactorily established by the prosecution.
Petitioners were undisputedly public officers at the time of the commission of the offense. The
prosecution, as reflected in the above statement of its version, not only established creditably how
the offense charged was committed. It established just as creditably how petitioners conspired to
commit the crime.
Upon the other hand, the defense failed to overturn the evidence for the prosecution.
Petitioners' disclaimer of having demanded or requested anything from GDI to settle its assessed
deficiency tax does not persuade in light of, among other things, San Mateo's willingness and
interest to meet in April, first week of May and May 29, 1991 by his own account, with the officials of
GDI outside his office, despite the receipt in April 1991 by Magat of the First and Second Deficiency
Assessment Notices giving GDI four and three days, respectively, from receipt to settle the
assessed deficit taxes; the admitted refusal of San Mateo to accept the check dated May 29, 1991
for P125,000 which was payable to the order of the Municipality; and petitioners' handing over to
Magat the Certificate of Examination dated May 28, 1991 on which was annotated "NO TAX
LIABILITY INVOLVED." San Mateo's justification behind such refusal that he had no authority to
accept an amount less than the assessment amount is too shallow to merit belief, he being the
Chief of Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurer's Office, who
had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way to negotiate the settlement of the assessed
deficiency tax.
As to petitioners' argument that what transpired on June 19, 1991 was an instigation and not an
entrapment, the same fails.
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of
the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is
induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal
intent. In entrapment, the mens reaoriginates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve
to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the
crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. 35
From the evidence for the prosecution, it was clearly established that the criminal intent originated
from the minds of petitioners. Even before the June 19, 1991 meeting took place, petitioners already
made known to Magat that GDI only had two options to prevent the closure of the company, either to
pay the assessed amount ofP494,601.11 to the Municipality, or pay the amount of P125,000 to
them.

Respecting the failure of Chang to testify, it bears noting that the evidence for the prosecution did
establish beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy as it did his and San Mateo's guilt.
The burden of the evidence having shifted to him, it was incumbent for him to present evidence to
controvert the prosecution evidence. He opted not to, however. He is thus deemed to have waived
his right to present evidence in his defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The challenged Sandiganbayan decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146217

April 7, 2006

ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ALFREDO S. LIM as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and JEAN MARY PASCUA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions2 dated 28 August 2000 and 4 December 2000 of
the Sandiganbayan. The 28 August 2000 Resolution ordered the suspension from office for 90
days of petitionerAnuncio C. Bustillo ("petitioner")3 pending the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
23076 for falsification of official documents. The 4 December 2000 Resolution denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
In 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor ("OSP") charged petitioner, then incumbent mayor of
Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, and his daughter Rowena Bustillo (collectively referred to as "accused"),
in the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Official Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code ("RPC") in Criminal Case No. 23076. The Information alleged:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO and ROWENA G. BUSTILLO of the crime of Falsification of Official
Documents, defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about September 6, 1991, in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, a public officer, being then
the Municipal Mayor of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, committing the crime herein charged in relation to,
while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with accused ROWENA G. BUSTILLO, his daughter, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously make it appear in official documents that municipal FUNDS totalling
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) were expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy
Lumber when, in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased
from Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo. 4
The accused were charged of falsifying three vouchers5 in which the name of the original payee was
erased and replaced with "Estigoy Lumber." Rowena Bustillo received the payments covered by the
vouchers.
The accused sought to quash the Information on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked
jurisdiction over petitioner and that, at any rate, the Information did not charge an offense. The
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.6 The accused apparently did not appeal this ruling.
In May 1998, the Sandiganbayan arraigned the accused who entered "not guilty" pleas. Trial
ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, it moved for petitioners suspension from
office pendente lite under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019") or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195. Petitioner sought an extension of
time to Comment on the motion. The Sandiganbayan granted the extension. However, despite the
extension, petitioner still failed to file his Comment.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its Resolution of 28 August 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions motion and
suspended petitioner from office for 90 days. The Sandiganbayan held:
While the Information charges Falsification of Official Document[s,] it was clear from the wordings of
the same, that the accused is being charged or indicted for a fraud involving public or
government FUNDS . Thus it says:
"x x x willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make it appear in official documents that municipal FUNDS
total[l]ingP30,000.00 were expended for the purchase[] of lumber from Estigoy Lumber, when in
truth and in fact, x x x said lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a single
proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustil[l]o x x x"
At the risk of being tautological, the Court once again states what has been repeatedly held by the
Supreme Court in many cases that upon determination of the validity of the information, it becomes
mandatory for the court to issue the suspension order. In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to
the validity of the information accused having to respond to the Motion for Suspension Pen[den]te
Lite, it behooves upon this Court to issue immediately the suspension order in consonance with the
imperious mandate of the law.7

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan denied his motion in the Resolution of 4
December 2000.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari alleging that:
A. [THE] SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
FINDING THAT THE INFORMATION AGAINST PETITIONER IS VALID.
B. [THE] SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
IT ORDERED THE SUSPENSION OF PETITIONER BECAUSE SECTION 13 OF R.A. 3019
MANDATES THE SUSPENSION OF AN ACCUSED PENDENTE LITE CHARGED WITH
OFFENSES DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER TITLE 7, BOOK II OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE YET THE CHARGE OF "FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS" FALLS UNDER
TITLE 4, BOOK II OF THE SAME CODE, HENCE, EXCLUDED AS BASIS OF SUSPENSION
FROM OFFICE.
C. [THE] SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED AND LIKEWISE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE 90-DAY SUSPENSION OF [PETITIONER FROM OFFICE]. 8
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Whether the Information filed against the accused is valid; and
2. Whether petitioners suspension from office pendente lite finds basis in Section 13 of RA
3019.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Validity of the Information in Criminal Case No. 23076
Petitioner contends that the Information filed against him and his co-accused is invalid because it
failed to allege the element of gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or that the
"integrity of the [falsified] document was tarnished." Petitioner also invokes the findings of Special
Prosecutor II Francis Ilustre, Jr. ("Ilustre") of the OSP who recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against the accused.9
Petitioners contentions are futile.
The Sandiganbayan already settled the question of the Informations validity when it denied the
motion of the accused to quash the same. That ruling had long become final. Thus, petitioner can no
longer resurrect this issue.

At any rate, the allegation of intent to gain, the party benefited or prejudiced by the falsification, or
tarnishing of a documents integrity, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of official
documents. Such charge stands if the facts alleged in the Information fall under any of the modes of
committing falsification under Article 17110 of the RPC. Here, the Information alleges that petitioner, a
public officer, conspiring with a private individual (Rowena Bustillo), "feloniously ma[d]e it appear in
official documents that municipal FUNDS totalling [thirty thousand pesos] (P30,000.00) were
expended for the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber when, in truth and in fact, as both
accused well knew, said lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a single
proprietorship owned by accused Rowena G. Bustillo." This falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171
which makes it punishable for anyone to "[cause] it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate," as the accused allegedly made it appear
that Estigoy Lumber delivered the pieces of lumber to the municipality of Bunawan when it did not.
Nor can petitioner rely on Ilustres recommendation to dismiss the complaint against the accused.
Then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto disapproved Ilustres recommendation, paving the way for the
filing of Criminal Case No. 23076.
Petitioners Suspension Finds Basis in Section 13 of RA 3019
Petitioner next contends that he was illegally suspended from office because the offense of
falsification of official documents is found in Title 4, Book II and not in Title 7, Book II of the RPC.
Petitioner further asserts that this offense does not involve "fraud or property." Thus, petitioner
concludes that his suspension finds no basis in Section 13 of RA 3019. 11
The contention is similarly without merit.
Section 13 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public FUNDS or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode
of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Suspension from office is mandatory12 whenever a valid Information charges an incumbent public
officer with (1) violation of RA 3019; (2) violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC; (3) any offense
involving fraud upon government; or (4) any offense involving fraud upon public FUNDS or
property. While petitioner correctly contends that the charge filed against him and his co-accused

does not fall under Title 7, Book II but under Title 4, Book II of the RPC, it nevertheless involves
"fraud upon government or public FUNDS or property."13
As used in Section 13, the term "fraud" is understood in its generic sense, 14 that is, referring to "an
instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation." 15 The
Information alleges that petitioner and his co-accused "feloniously ma[d]e it appear in official
documents that municipal FUNDS totalling [thirty thousand pesos] (P30,000.00) were expended for
the purchase of lumber from Estigoy Lumber when, in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew,
said lumber were actually purchased from Rowena Woodcraft, a single proprietorship owned by
accused Rowena G. Bustillo." This suffices to classify the charge as "involving fraud upon
government" as contemplated in Section 13.
1avvphil.net

Petitioner does not dispute that the official documents he and his co-accused are charged of
falsifying are vouchers. As used in government, vouchers, like daily time records, 16 are official
documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, especially if, as here, receipt of
payment is acknowledged. Thus, falsifying these official documents invariably involves "fraud upon x
x x public funds x x x."
On Petitioners Claim on the Merits of Criminal Case No. 23076
Petitioner includes in this petition a claim that based on the evidence presented during the trial, he
and his co-accused did not commit falsification because it was Estigoy Lumber that delivered the
lumber to the municipality of Bunawan. Petitioner asserts that Rowena Bustillo merely received
payments as representative of Estigoy Lumber. Thus, the alterations in the vouchers were meant to
reflect the truth.17
Petitioner raises this contention in the wrong proceeding. The only relevant inquiry in this appeal is
whether petitioner was charged under a valid Information for any of the offenses covered in Section
13 of RA 3019. The Court cannot expand the scope of this review and pass upon the merits of the
governments case against petitioner. That would not only be procedurally improper but also
preemptive of whatever judgment the Sandiganbayan will render in Criminal Case No. 23076.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 28 August 2000 and 4
December 2000 of the Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. 153526 October 25, 2005
FLORANTE SORIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Florante
Soriquez seeks to annul and set aside the Sandiganbayans (Fifth Division) Resolution 1 dated March
6, 2002, denying his demurrer to evidence in Criminal Case No. 23539 entitled "People vs. Florante
Soriquez, et al.," and Resolution2dated May 20, 2002, denying his motion for reconsideration. The
prohibition aspect of the petition aims at prohibiting the respondent court from taking further
proceedings in the same criminal case.
In an Information filed with the anti-graft court and raffled to its Fifth Division, petitioner, in his
capacity asProgram Director of Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation-Project MANAGEMENT Office (MPRPMO), along with nine others, were charged with Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Specifically, petitioner and his coaccused were indicted for having allegedly conspired, through evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence, in allowing the contractor, Atlantic Erectors, Inc., to deviate from the plans and
specifications of the contract in connection with the construction of the Pasig-Potrero River Diking
System, popularly known as the Megadike. This breach of contract allegedly resulted in the collapse
of the Megadike, thereby causing damage and undue injury to the government. In its precise words,
the Information3 alleges, as follows:
That on or about February 29 to June 15, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused public officers from the Department of Public Works and Highways, namely, Florante
Soriquez, Program Director MPR-PMO, Romeo P. Mendoza, Rey S. David, Ulysis Maago, Juan M.
Gonzales and Gil A. Rivera, all Supervising Engineers, MPR-PMO, and private individuals, Ariel T.
Lim, CEO, Alberto Teolengco, Neil Allan T. Mary and Remigio Angtia, Jr. of Atlantic Erectors, Inc.,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, while accused public officers were
performing their administrative and official functions and acting in evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to
the government in the following manner: accused public officers of the DPWH, by reason of their
respective official functions, did consent, allow and/or permit the contractor, Atlantic Erectors, Inc.,
represented by aforenamed accused private individuals, to disregard and/or deviate from the plans
and specifications of Contract Package No. 25 in constructing the Transverse Section of the PasigPotrero River Diking System (popularly known as the Megadike) in violation of the material provision
of said contract, and thereafter allow the contractor to collect and receive P38,289,708.61, despite
the violation, and which breach of contract caused the collapse of substantial portion of the
transverse dike, thereby causing prejudice and damage to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, petitioner, as accused below, entered a plea of "Not Guilty". In the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented its lone witness in the person of Atty. Mothalib Onos, Chairman of the FactFinding Investigation Panel of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thereafter, the prosecution formally
offered its documentary evidence and rested its case.

Instead of going forward with defensive evidence, petitioner, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence (Motion to Dismiss),4 thereunder substantially alleging that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is grossly insufficient to warrant his conviction, hence, he is entitled to an acquittal.
In the herein first assailed Resolution dated March 6, 2002 (Promulgated March 7, 2002), the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denied petitioners demurrer "for lack of merit". Says the respondent
court in its denial Resolution:
In sum, the arguments of herein accused may be summarized as follows: that there is no proof that
there was a faulty construction; that even assuming that there was faulty construction, there is no
proof that Atlantic Erectors, Inc., the company where accused-movants come from, is the only author
of the faulty construction to the exclusion of the other contractors; that the findings mentioned in the
Fact-Finding Report are evidentiary in nature but no physical evidence was ever presented by the
prosecution necessitating the acquittal of herein accused; that the evidence on record is hearsay as
the investigators who personally conducted the investigation on the alleged faulty construction were
not presented as witness; that the construction of the megadike was not tainted with bad faith
because during the construction of the same, various groups were monitoring the construction,
including herein prosecution witness, Atty. Onos; that there is no evidence showing previous plan to
defraud the government as, in fact, Atlantic Erectors, Inc. manifested its willingness to reconstruct
the breached section of the megadike using the same plan free of charge, but the DPWH did not
accept the offer and instead reconstructed the same using a different design; that the Fact-Finding
Report is bias; that the information is admittedly erroneous insofar as to the amount paid by the
government to the contractor which is P38,289,708.61, the truth being that only P17,183,619.61 was
duly paid by the government; that the filing of the case is tainted with political color.
In its "CONSOLIDATED COMMENT/OPPOSITION TO ACCUSEDS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE,"
dated December 3, 2001, the prosecution admits that the cause of the breach was not due to faulty
construction or deviation from the plans and specifications, but due to faulty design; that his
conclusion was strengthened when the contractor offered to repair the damaged portion of the
megadike free of charge.
In his "REPLY TO THE COMMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR" dated
December 18, 2001, accused Soriquez belies having participated in the defective construction of the
megadike because, according to him, he was not tasked to directly supervise every phase of the
construction. Likewise, accused added that the amount of P17,183,607.99 representing the
contractors first progress billing was duly paid to the contractor after a verification and certification of
the work accomplished.
As borne out by the records, accused Soriquez was one of the officials of the Department of Public
Works and Highways who recommended the approval of the design of the transverse dike without
which recommendation the Secretary could not have approved the defective design plan for the
megadike (pp. 5-6, Exhibit "10"). On the other hand, his co-accused were the ones responsible for
the construction work in Contract Package-25 (otherwise referred to as the transverse dike) being
the contractors of the megadike in question (Exhibit "C"). They even manifested their willingness to
reconstruct the breached section of the megadike using the same plan, free of charge (pp. 18-19,
TSN, June 11, 2001).

All of the above shows that, at this point in time, the evidence presented by the prosecution creates
a prima faciecase against herein accused, which, if uncontradicted, may be proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge against him (Salonga vs. Pao, 134 SCRA 438; Bautista vs.
Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587). Mere declaration that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
uncorroborated, inconsistent, incredible or hearsay is not sufficient. It is, therefore, absolutely
necessary for herein accused to present their countervailing/exculpatory evidence.
In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but his motion was likewise denied by same court in
its subsequent Resolution of May 20, 2002, and accordingly set the case for the reception of
defense evidence.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, faulting the respondent court, as follows:
1. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED ACCUSED-PETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE A FINDING THAT
ONLY A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION.
2. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE.
3. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER THE WELLENTRENCHED DOCTRINE THAT THE PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS
OWN EVIDENCE AND NOT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE.
4. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING ACCUSEDPETITIONERS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE WHEN IT RELIED HEAVILY ON THE DOCTRINE
LAID DOWN IN THE CASES OF SALONGA VS. PANO, 134 SCRA 438 AND BAUTISTA VS.
SARMIENTO, 138 SCRA 587, WHICH, WE BELIEVE, ARE INAPPLICABLE, HAD ALREADY BEEN
ABANDONED AND SUPERSEDED BY SUBSEQUENT DOCTRINES TO THE CONTRARY.
In essence, re-echoing the very same arguments advanced by him before the respondent court,
petitioner claims that the latter gravely abused its discretion when it denied his demurrer to evidence
despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. He
argues that the prosecution failed to establish his participation in the alleged conspiracy to violate
the contract for the construction of the Megadike, adding that the very observation of the respondent
court itself that only a prima facie case was established against him all the more warrants the
dismissal of the charge and his acquittal therefrom.
We are not persuaded.
A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the
evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make
out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a

demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there iscompetent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.5
Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3 paragraph (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The provision reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
In order to be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the
following elements must concur: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and (3) his action has caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or
has given any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.6
Here, it is undisputed that petitioner is a public officer as in fact he is an official of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and Program Director of the Mt. Pinatubo Rehabilitation
Project MANAGEMENT Office (MPR-PMO). The first element required for the commission of the
offense is thus clearly extant.
The second element enumerates the different modes by which the offense may be committed.
These three modes, i.e., manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence, are
distinct and different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes would suffice.
The use of the three phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence" in
the same Information does not mean that it thereby charges three distinct offenses but only implies
that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes provided by the law.7
In Criminal Case No. 23539, the Information alleged "evident bad faith" or "inexcusable negligence"
as the modes by which petitioner and his co-accused allegedly committed the crime. The
prosecution was able to prove that petitioner was one of the officials of the DPWH who
recommended the defective design plan of the Megadike. It was upon his recommendation that the
design plan was eventually approved by the DPWH Secretary. Such act of petitioner may have
constituted evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence inasmuch as this design plan proved to be
defective. Likewise, the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution (such

as the notice of award to Atlantic Erectors, the contract between DPWH and Atlantic Erectors, the
disbursement vouchers8) disclosed the role played by petitioner in allowing the contractor to infringe
the material stipulations of the contract that caused the eventual collapse of the Megadike. As
correctly held by the respondent court, the prosecutions evidence established a prima facie proof of
petitioners guilt.
The third element of the offense penalized in Section 3 (e) is satisfied when the questioned conduct
causes undue injury to any party, including the government, or gives any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference. Proof of the extent or quantum of damage is thus not essential, it being
sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received can be perceived to be substantial enough and
not merely negligible.9
Again, the prosecutions evidence satisfactorily demonstrated that petitioner allowed Atlantic
Erectors to collect and receive the net amount of P12,697,197.61 10 despite the breach of contract
committed by it. Indubitably, the government suffered undue injury and losses.
Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner, it would,
therefore, be premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecutions evidence
failed to establish petitioners participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime. Likewise,
the Court cannot, at this point, make a categorical pronouncement that the guilt of petitioner has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As there is competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for the crime charged, it behooves petitioner to adduce evidence on his behalf to
controvert the asseverations of the prosecution. Withal, respondent court did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case against petitioner warranting his having to
go forward with his defensive evidence.
The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution as
to establish a prima case against an accused is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
Unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer to evidence may not be
disturbed.11
Petitioner implores this Court to review the evaluation made by respondent court on the sufficiency
of the evidence against him. Such a review cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition which is not available to correct mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions or to
cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact. It should be noted that an order denying a demurrer to
evidence is interlocutory and, thus, not appealable. When such an adverse interlocutory order is
rendered, the remedy is not to resort to certiorari or prohibition but to continue with the case in due
course and when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.12 Of course, this rule is not absolute and admits of exceptions, as when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion. 13 In the
present case, however, the Court is not inclined to agree with the petitioner that the respondent
courts denial of his demurrer to evidence is erroneous or tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Finally, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court except where: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference

made is manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want
of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.14
A perusal of the pleadings and annexes would reveal that none of the above exceptions obtains in
this case. There is no showing that the conclusion made by the respondent court on the sufficiency
of the evidence of the prosecution is manifestly mistaken or grounded entirely on speculation and
conjectures. No capricious exercise of judgment exists that would warrant the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition. Clearly, the denial of petitioners demurrer was made
by the respondent court in the due exercise of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 154182

December 17, 2004

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

The pivotal issue in this petition is whether a public official charged with violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
for unlawful intervention, in his official capacity, in the issuance of a license in favor of a business
enterprise in which he has a pecuniary interest may be convicted, together with his spouse, of
violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of such interest.

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to
annul and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337
convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary
interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia.
The indictment reads:2
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby
accuses EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA TEVES of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as
follows:
That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while
in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and
confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the appropriate business
permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of
one Daniel Teves, said accusedEdgar Y. Teves having a direct FINANCIAL or
pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually
owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded "not guilty." Pre-trial and trial were
thereafter set.
The petitioners and the prosecution agreed on the authenticity of the prosecutions documentary
evidence. Thus, the prosecution dispensed with the testimonies of witnesses and formally offered its
documentary evidence marked as Exhibits "A" to "V."3
On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the
prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. 4 On 29 July 1998, the
Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibits "A" to "S" of the prosecutions evidence but rejected Exhibits "T,"
"U," and "V."5 It also denied petitioners demurrer to evidence,6 as well as their motion for
reconsideration.7 This notwithstanding, the petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were,
nonetheless, dispensing with the presentation of witnesses because the evidence on record are
inadequate to support their conviction.
On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision8 (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and
Teresita Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve
years as maximum; and (3) ordering the confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in
the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of the Government,

as well as perpetual disqualification from public office. 9 The conviction was anchored on the finding
that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said business enterprise on the grounds that
(a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his pecuniary interest in said
cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the "owner/licensee" of the cockpit; and (c)
since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their property
relations as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal
partnership of gains. Hence, the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have
pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code(LGC) of 1991, and thus falls under the prohibited
acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a
business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on or about 4
February 1992 for not being well-founded.
On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari10 seeking to annul
and set aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan.
At first, we denied the petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.11 But upon petitioners motion for
reconsideration,12 we reinstated the petition.13
The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting
them. In the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official
capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But
they were convicted of having a direct FINANCIAL or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which is essentially
different from the offense with which they were charged. Thus, the petitioners insist that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC
of 1991. The variancedoctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should
not prevail over their constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them.
Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia
Cockpit in 1992 was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since Mayor Teves was the
cockpit operator and licensee in 1989, said interest continued to exist until 1992. It also presumed
that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor Teves and his wife, and that their pecuniary
interest thereof was direct. But under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, any interest
thereon is at most inchoate and indirect.
Also assigned as glaring error is the conviction of Teresita Teves, who is not a public officer. In the
information, only Mayor Teves was accused of "having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the
operation of the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Negros Oriental." His wife was merely

charged as a co-conspirator of her husbands alleged act of "while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, willfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing] the issuance of the
appropriate business permit/license to operate" the said cockpit arena. Teresita Teves could not be
convicted because conspiracy was not established. Besides, the Sandiganbayan had already
absolved the petitioners of this offense.
On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), insists
that the uncontroverted documentary evidence proved that petitioner Edgar Teves had direct
pecuniary interest over the cockpit in question as early as 26 September 1983. That interest
continued even though he transferred the management thereof to his wife Teresita Teves in 1992,
since their property relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains. The existence of
that prohibited interest is by itself a criminal offense under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991. It is
necessarily included in the offense charged against the petitioners, i.e., for violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law, which proscribes the possession of a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction in connection with which the person possessing the
financial interest intervenes in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or
any law from having any interest. The use of the conjunctive word "or" demonstrates the alternative
mode or nature of the manner of execution of the final element of the violation of the provision.
Although the information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the
other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. There was, therefore, no
violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature or cause of the
accusation against them in view of the variance doctrine, which finds statutory support in Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is not totally devoid of merit.
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from
having any interest.
The essential elements set out in the afore-quoted legislative definition of the crime of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction;

3. He either
a. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest; or
b. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by any law.
There are, therefore, two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law. The first mode is if in connection with his pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction, the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity. The second mode is
when he is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
We quote herein the Sandiganbayans declaration regarding petitioners culpability anent the first
mode:
[T]hat portion of the Information which seeks to indict the spouses Teves
for his causing the issuance of a business permit/license to operate the Valencia cockpit
on or about February 4, 1992 is not well-founded.
Mayor Edgar Teves could not have issued a permit to operate the cockpit in the
year 1992 because as of January 1, 1992 the license could be issued only by the
Sangguniang Bayan. He may have issued the permit or license in 1991 or even before that
when he legally could, but that is not the charge. The charge is for acts committed in
1992.14 [Emphasis supplied].
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the
business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not wellfounded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan
could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section
447(3)15 of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that
has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits.
Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding
officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,16 under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not
even a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken
part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in
the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. 17
A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the absence of a
finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan
correctly absolved the petitioners of the charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to
belabor this point.
The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft
Law based on the second mode. It reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor
Teves had a pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the LGC of 1991.

The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental,
of causing, "while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring
and confederating with his wife the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate
the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves." The last part of the
dispositive portion of the information states that "said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct
financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned
and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves."
A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an
allegation of the second element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or indirect "financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction." Not by any stretch of imagination can it
be discerned or construed that the afore-quoted last part of the information charges the petitioners
with the second mode by which Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree
with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the issuance of the license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for possession of pecuniary interest prohibited
by law.
However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor
of Valencia, Negros Oriental,18 owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration
of cockpit filed on 26 September 198319 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon
City, as well as in his renewal application dated 6 January 1989 20 he stated that he is the owner and
manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he divested himself of his ownership over the
cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist
continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. 21 His affidavit22 dated 27 September 1990
declaring that effective January 1990 he "turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita
Z. Teves for the reason that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due
to other work pressure" is not sufficient proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the
cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred to Teresita Teves effective January
1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct.
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he
would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they
remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be
presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And
Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be
owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and
is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any
local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local
government unit.[Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law,
which is possession of a prohibited interest. But can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering
that it was not charged in the information?
The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a
cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or
transaction, whether or not prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.
On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited
interest in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.
It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is
necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged necessarily includes the offense

proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby warranting the conviction of
petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.
The next question we have to grapple with is under what law should petitioner Edgar Teves be
punished. It must be observed that Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law is a general provision, it being
applicable to all prohibited interests; while Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 is a special provision, as
it specifically treats of interest in a cockpit. Notably, the two statutes provide for different penalties.
The Anti-Graft Law, particularly Section 9, provides as follows:
SEC. 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public official or private person committing any of
the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of this Act shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen
years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of
the Government of any prohibited interest.
On the other hand, Section 514 of the LGC of 1991 prescribes a lighter penalty; thus:
SECTION 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions or Possessing Illegal
Pecuniary Interest. Any local official and any person or persons dealing with him who
violate the prohibitions provided in Section 89 of Book I hereof shall be punished with
imprisonment for six months and one day to six years, or a fine of not less than Three
thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or both such
imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.
It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and
another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized
if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior
to the general statute.23 Or where two statutes are of contrary tenor or of different dates but are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail
over the other.24
Conformably with these rules, the LGC of 1991, which specifically prohibits local officials from
possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and which, in itself,
prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the Anti-Graft Law, which penalizes
possession of prohibited interest in a general manner. Moreover, the latter took effect on 17 August
1960, while the former became effective on 1 January 1991. Being the earlier statute, the Anti-Graft
Law has to yield to the LGC of 1991, which is the later expression of legislative will. 25
In the imposition on petitioner Edgar Teves of the penalty provided in the LGC of 1991, we take
judicial notice of the fact that under the old LGC, mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit
was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 4126 thereof. Such possession became
unlawful or prohibited only upon the advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January
1992. Petitioner Edgar Teves stands charged with an offense in connection with his prohibited
interest committed on or about 4 February 1992, shortly after the maiden appearance of the
prohibition. Presumably, he was not yet very much aware of the prohibition. Although ignorance

thereof would not excuse him from criminal liability, such would justify the imposition of the lighter
penalty of a fine of P10,000 under Section 514 of the LGC of 1991.
Petitioner Teresita Teves must, however, be acquitted. The charge against her is conspiracy in
causing "the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center." For this charge, she was acquitted. But as discussed earlier, that charge also
includes conspiracy in the possession of prohibited interest.
Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of
proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct
evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to
show community of criminal design.27
Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. 28 For a spouse or any
person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there
be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design.
Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have
performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to
be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the
crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators.29
Section 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, the provision which applies to private individuals, states:
SEC. 4. Prohibitions on private individuals.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official
to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or
caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law.
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31
December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet
prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred
the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who
thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. Thus, in her sworn applications for
renewal of the registration of the cockpit in question dated 28 January 1990 30and 18 February
1991,31 she stated that she is the Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager of the said cockpit. In her
renewal application dated 6 January 1992,32 she referred to herself as the Owner/Licensee of the
cockpit. Likewise in the separate Lists of Duly Licensed Personnel for Calendar Years 1991 33 and
1992,34 which she submitted on 22 February 1991 and 17 February 1992, respectively, in compliance
with the requirement of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission for the renewal of the cockpit
registration, she signed her name as Operator/Licensee.

The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to
commit the violation of the Anti-Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If ever
she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public
official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. Prudence, however, dictates that
she too should have divested herself of her ownership over the cockpit upon the effectivity of the
LGC of 1991; otherwise, as stated earlier, considering her property relation with her husband, her
ownership would result in vesting direct prohibited interest upon her husband.
In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt.35 The burden of proof is upon the
prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either
responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was
proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan, First
Division, in Criminal Case No. 2337 is hereby MODIFIED in that (1) EDGAR Y. TEVES is convicted
of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possession of pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of
the Local Government Code of 1991, and is sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000; and (2) TERESITA
Z. TEVES is hereby ACQUITTED of such offense.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
--SPECIAL DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Plaintiff,
-

Criminal Case No. 26558

For: PLUNDER

versus

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,

Former President of the
Republic of the Philippines,

PRESENT:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, PJ,
Chairperson

JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA,

CHARLIE "ATONG" TIU HAY SY ANG,
EDWARD S. SERAPIO,
YOLANDA T. RICAFORTE,
ALMA ALFARO,
JOHN DOE also known as
ELEUTERIO RAMOS TAN or MR. UY,
JANE DOE also known as
DELIA RAJAS,
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, Accused.

VILLARUZ, JR., and

PERALTA, JJ.

PROMULGATED:
September 12, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 as amended was approved on July 12, 1991, creating and
introducing into our criminal legal system the crime of "plunder". This law penalizes public
officers who would amass immense wealth through a series or combination of overt or
criminal acts described in the statute in violation of the public trust. RA No. 7080 or the
Anti-Plunder Law was a consolidation of Senate Bill no. 733 and House Bill No. 22752.
The Explanatory Note of Senate Bill No. 733, quoted in the case ofEstrada v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 555), explains the
reason behind the law as follows:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and
economic treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment,
committed thru a series of acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and
secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons, here and
abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of
public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire
nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described
crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up
with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities
of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to
succumb to the corrupting influence of power.
The majority opinion in the above-cited case, penned by Honorable Justice Josue N.

Bellosillo, further explained the rationale behind the Anti-Plunder Law in this manner:
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of
graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to milk
the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight
the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and economically
catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the
moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try mens souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion
generated by petitioners ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a
wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by
responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment. [Emphasis
Supplied]
The present case is the first of its kind to be filed charging the highest official of the land, a
former President, among others, of the offense of plunder. Needless to state, the
resolution of this case shall set significant historical and legal precedents.
Throughout the six years over which the court proceedings in this case unfolded, this
Court confronted numerous novel and complicated legal issues (including the
constitutionality of the plunder law, propriety of house arrest, among others), heard
lengthy testimonies from several dozens of witnesses from both sides and perused
voluminous documentary evidence and pleadings from the parties. Considering the
personalities involved and the nature of the crime charged, the present case aroused
particularly intense interest from the public. Speculations on the probable outcome of the
case received unparalleled attention from the media and other sectors of society. Indeed,
the factual and legal complexities of the case are further compounded by attempts to
sensationalize the proceedings for various ends.
However, this Court is ever mindful of its imperative duty to act as an impartial arbiter: (a)
to serve the interest of the State and the public in punishing those who would so severely
abuse their public office and those private individuals would aid them or conspire with
them and (b) to protect the right of the accused to be only convicted upon guilt proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the decision of this Court follows, upon no other
consideration other than the law and a review of the evidence on record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
AND THE PROCEEDINGS
__________________________

This case for plunder commenced with the filing on April 4, 2001 of the Information which
is quoted hereunder:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and
penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused,
business associates and persons heretofore named, by taking advantage
of his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly
enrich himself in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or
less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts,
described as follows:
(a)
by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many
instances, so-called "jueteng money" from gambling operators in
connivance with co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte
and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among
other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTYFIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), more or less, in consideration
of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in their
illegal "jueteng" activities; and
(b)
by misappropriating, converting and miusing for his gain and
benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRRED THIRTY MILLION
PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise
tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in
conspiracy with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan
a.k.a Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as
witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among other witnesses; and
(c)
by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to
purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the
Belle Corporatiion in the aggregate gross value of One Billion Eight
Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Fifty
Seven Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of
collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect and
receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 189,700,000.00), as commission from

said stock purchase; and

(d)
by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION
TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P 3,233,104,173.17) comprising his
unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his
account name "Jose Velarde" with Equitable PCI Bank;
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Various motions were filed by accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (FPres.
Estrada), Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (Jinggoy Estrada), and Edward S. Serapio (Serapio).
Accused Serapio filed his Urgent Omnibus Motion (a) to Hold in abeyance the issuance of
warrant of arrest and further Proceedings; (b) to conduct a determination of probable
cause; (c) for leave to file accuseds motion for reconsideration and /or reinvestigation;
and (d) to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges against
accused Serapio dated April 6, 2001. While accused FPres. Estrada filed three (3)
motions; (1) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, dated April 9, 2001, (2) Position Paper
Re: Probable Cause (ex abundante ad cautelam) dated April 9, 2001 which was joined by
accused Jinggoy Estrada, and (3) Motion to (a) remand the case to the Ombudsman for
preliminary investigation consistent with the Honorable Supreme Courts Resolution in
G.R. No. 147512-19 (Joseph E. Estrada v. Hon. Aniano Desierto, et al.); and (b) hold in
abeyance judicial action in the case particularly the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
steps leading thereto until after the conduct of a proper preliminary investigation, dated
April 11, 2001.
In a Resolution promulgated on April 16, 2001, the Court directed the prosecution to
submit to the Court not later than April 18, 2001 the required affidavits, counter-affidavits,
and supporting evidence as well as other supporting documents accompanying the
Information, which were needed to determine the existence of probable cause for the
issuance or non-issuance of a warrant of arrest. As directed, the prosecution filed on April
18, 2001 its Manifestation and Compliance.
On April 19, 2001, the prosecution filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to admit Amended
Information, which is quoted hereunder:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a. "ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a.
"JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
TanOR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE
ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17],
more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR Aseries of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
as follows:
(a)
by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG
ANG, JOSE Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b)
by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusingDIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
(c)
by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL
GAIN AND BENEFIT,the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR
LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE
AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED

SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE

OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
[P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS
OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES
OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00],
MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME
PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d)
by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,
SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESSTHREE BILLION TWO
HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On April 20, 2001, the Court in its Minute Resolution granted and admitted the
prosecutions Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information dated April 18, 2001.
On April 25, 2001, the Court promulgated its Resolution which stated:
xxx
xxx
xxx the Court finds and so hold that probable cause for the offense
of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants for the arrest of accused
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie
"Atong" Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.
No bail is fixed for the provisional liberty of the accused for the reason that the
penalty imposable for the offense of plunder under RA No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of RA No. 7659, is reclusion perpetua to death.
Director General Leandro R. Mendoza, Chief of the Philippine National Police,
shall implement the warrant of arrest upon service to him by Mr. Edgardo A.
Urieta, Chief of the Sheriff and Security Services Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Once arrested, all the accused shall undergo the required processes and be
detained at the PNP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City subject to, and
until, further orders from this Court.
On the 25th day of April 2001, on the basis of the said resolution, the Court issued an

Order of Arrest and Hold Departure Order for all the named accused in the present
information. The Philippine National Police (PNP) submittd its Report of Compliance dated
April 25, 2001 which stated:
1.
That in compliance with the Order of Arrest issued by the Honorable
Court in the above captioned criminal case, accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, both residence of no. 1 Polk Street, North Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila voluntarily surrendered to the undersigned on 25 April 2001 at
about 3:00 oclock PM at said residence in the presence of their counsels.
2. That right after their surrender, they were brought inside Camp Crame, Quezon
City for the required processes and pending further orders from this Honorable
Court they shall be kept in Camp Crame;
A Compliance/Return of Warrant of Arrest was also filed on April 26, 2001 by P/Chief
Superintendent Nestor B. Gualberto.
As to accused Serapio, the PNPs Report of Compliance reads in part:
2. That one of the accused named therein, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, surrendered
to the Chief, Philippine National Police, through the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 25, 2001 at about
9:45 PM where the required processes were administered to him and pending
further orders from this Honorable Court he shall be kept in Camp Crame;
The Court, in its Minute Resolution dated April 26, 2001, set the arraignment of the
detained accused on May 3, 2001 which was cancelled due to the different motions filed
by the accused. Accused Jinggoy Estrada filed his Motion to Quash or Suspend dated
April 24, 2001 and a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001. Among other
motions, accused FPres. Estrada filed his Motion to Quash dated June 7, 2001 and
accused Serapio filed his Motion to Quash (Re: Amended Information dated April 18,
2001) dated June 26, 2001. In its Resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Court denied all the
aforesaid motions to quash and accused Jinggoy Estradas Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated April 30, 2001. The Courts Resolution dated July 9, 2001 was sustained by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the Decisions rendered in Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002).
On July 10, 2001, the Court denied the motion to defer filed by accused FPres. Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada and proceeded with the arraignment of accused FPres. Estrada,
Jinggoy Estrada, and Serapio under the Amended Information. The accused having
refused to enter a plea, the Court entered a plea of not guilty for all the three (3) accused.
Petitions for Bail / House Arrest
With the detention of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in Camp Crame on
April 25, 2001, both accused filed on the same day an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Place on
House Arrest.
The Court on June 9, 2001, issued a Resolution denying accused FPres. Estradas Urgent

Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest and issued an Order for the confinement of
accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada at Fort Sto. Domingo, Sta. Rosa, Laguna,
subject to the need for their continued confinement at the Veterans Memorial Medical
Center (VMMC) where they were then confined. In view of the said resolution, accused
FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, on June 13, 2001, filed an Omnibus Motion (Re:
Resolution promulgated on June 9, 2001) pressing in the alternative a Motion for
Detention in Tanay, Rizal.
On March 17, 2004, FPres. Estrada filed a Motion to Modify Custodial Arrangement dated
March 17, 2004 and, on March 30, 2004, the counsel de officio of accused FPres. Estrada
filed a Manifestation dated March 29, 2004 informing the Court, among others, that the
said accused was willing to have his property in Tanay, Rizal placed under the control and
supervision of the Court and the Philippine National Police for the duration of his
detention.
On July 12, 2004, the Court issued a joint resolution granting FPres. Estradas motion to
modify Custodial Arrangement dated March 29, 2004 subject to the conditions imposed by
the Court. Accused FPres. Estrada filed a Compliance and Acceptance of Conditions on
July 13, 2004. Since then, accused FPres. Estrada has been detained in his property at
Tanay, Rizal.
When the Court ordered the arrest and detention of the accused in these cases, accused
Serapio filed his petition for bail on April 27, 2001. Accused Jinggoy Estradas petition for
bail was included in his Very Urgent Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2001.
Accused Serapios Petition for Bail was deferred indefinitely as prayed for by the said
accused while, on August 14, 2001, accused Jinggoy Estrada filed an Urgent Second
Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons dated August 16, 2001 which the prosecution
opposed. On December 20, 2001, the Court issued its Resolution denying accused
Jinggoy Estradas Urgent Second Motion for Bail for Medical Reasons.
Considering the denial of the said motion for bail for medical reasons, accused Jinggoy
Estrada, on April 17, 2002, filed an Omnibus Application for Bail dated April 16, 2002. After
hearing, the Court issued a Resolution on March 6, 2003 which granted accused Jinggoy
Estradas Omnibus Application for Bail. The prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 13, 2003 was denied in this Courts Resolution dated April 30, 2003. The
aforesaid Resolutions granting bail to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada were upheld by the
Honorable Supreme Court in a Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 158754, People vs.
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (August 10, 2007).
As to accused Serapio, the Courts Resolution dated September 12, 2003 also granted
accused-movant Serapios Urgent Petition for Bail dated April 27, 2001. The Court fixed
the amount of bail of accused Serapio and Jinggoy Estrada at Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) each which was to paid in cash.
While the case was already in the trial stage, on January 4, 2002 the counsels for the
accused Estradas wrote a letter to the Acting Presiding Justice requesting for a re-raffle of
the cases against the accused, citing as grounds the continuing uncertain composition of
the justices handling the cases against the accused Former President, et al., at that time.
The prosecution filed its Opposition to Request for Re-Raffle On January 9, 2002 and its
Comment/Suggestion on January 10, 2002 that a Special Third Division be constituted to

be composed of the present Presiding Justice, the only remaining member of the Third
Division to which the case was raffled, and two other Sandiganbayan Justices who are not
retirables within the next three (3) years. Justice Anacleto Badoy, the Chairman of the
Third Division, was due to retire on October 2002, while Justice Ilarde, the other member,
retired on November 27, 2001. On January 11, 2002, the Sandiganbayan En Banc issued
its Resolution 01-2002 recommending to the Supreme Court that the cases against
accused FPres. Estrada, et al., be referred to a Special Division. The Supreme Court on
January 21, 2002 promulgated its Resolution Creating the Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hear, try and decide with dispatch the Plunder Case and all
related cases filed or may hereafter be filed against accused FPres. Estrada, and those
accused with him, until they are resolved, decided and terminated. In the Special Division
of the Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court retained, as Junior Member, the present
Presiding Justice who was then the only remaining member of the Third Division to which
the Plunder Case was raffled, and designated the then Presiding Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario, as Chairperson, and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval as Senior Member.
This was not the first time that a Special Division of the Sandiganbayan was constituted to
try a case. A Special Division was previously constituted to try and decide the AquinoGalman cases in that composition of the said Division was also maintained until the case
was decided notwithstanding the subsequent changes in the composition of the Division
due to promotions and/or retirement of its members.
During the same year, the counsel de parte of accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy
Estrada all withdrew their appearances. The Court on March 1, 2002, in order to protect
the rights and interest of the accused, appointed the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and
those who have been recommended by the Board of Governor of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, to represent accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada as counsel de
oficio, namely, Former Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan Manuel Pamaran, Atty.
Prospero Crescini, Atty. Irene Jurado and Atty. Manuel Malaya. The PAO lawyers
mentioned their duration as counsel de oficio, hence, (Ret.) Presiding Justice Pamaran
and the private practitioners represented accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada up
to the time the prosecution rested its case and submitted to the Court its Formal Offer of
Evidence. However, before the presentation of the evidence for the defense, accused
FPres. Estrada, in a Letter dated September 1, 2004, informed the Court that he have
decided to re-engage the services of the members of his original de parte panel of
lawyers.
Upon conclusion of the presentation of prosecution evidence and after the Court have
ruled on the offer of evidence of the prosecution, accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and Serapio filed their respective motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence. In a Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the Court granted accused FPres.
Estradas Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case Nos. 26905 and
26565 while it denied the same motion of all the accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 for
lack of merit. Subsequently, the Demurrer to Evidence of accused FPres. Estrada was
filed. In its Joint Resolution dated July 12, 2004, the Court resolved to deny FPres.
Estradas Demurrer to Evidence in Criminal Case No. 26905 but granted the Demurrer to
Evidence of FPres. Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26565.
After the presentation of the evidence for accused FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada,
accused Serapio manifested that he opted not to present his own evidence but adopted
the evidence presented by FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada. The said accused then
formally offered their evidence. The Court issued its resolution on the formal offer of

evidence for accused FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and Serapio. On the other hand,
the prosecution manifested that it was not presenting any rebuttal evidence but formally
offered additional evidence and tendered excluded evidence in its Supplemental Formal
Offer of Exhibits [Re: Exhibits Identified, Presented, and Marked during the Cross
Examination of Defense Witnesses] with Tender of Excluded Evidence dated March 29,
2007. The Court issued its Minute Resolution dated April 19, 2007 on the said additional
offer of evidence of the prosecution.
In an Order dated May 9, 2007, the Court gave the parties a period of time to file their
respective memoranda and scheduled the Oral Summation requested by accused FPres.
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada on June 15, 2007. After the Oral Summation, the case was
submitted for decision.
Incidentally, on November 10, 2006, the National Bureau of Investigation filed its Return of
"Alias" Order of Arrest, informing the Court that one of the accused in this case, Atong Ang
was extradited from the United States of America and was already under the custody of
the said agency. At his arraignment, accused Atong Ang refused to enter a plea and the
Court entered a plea of not guilty for the said accused.
On January 24, 2007, when the case was scheduled for Pre-Trial only for accused Atong
Ang, the prosecution and the said accused, assisted by his counsel, manifested in open
court that they had executed a Plea Bargaining Agreement. The Courts Resolution dated
March 14, 2007 approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement entered into by the parties.
On March 19, 2007, during accused Atong Angs re-arraignment, the said accused
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of Corruption of Public Officials under Article 212 in
relation to Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, the Court rendered its
decision against accused Atong Ang sentencing said accused to "two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional minimum, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum, and to pay the amount of P25,000,000.00 to the
Government as his civil liability". Accused Atong Ang immediately filed a Petition for
Probation (with Motion to Deduct Period of Preventive Imprisonment from the Term of
Imprisonment and to Post Bail Pending Resolution thereof) which the Court granted in a
Resolution dated May 25, 2007. Accused Atong Ang is now under probation.
STATEMENT OF THE STIPULATIONS
OF THE PARTIES AT PRE-TRIAL
________________________________
After the arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was conducted which led to the
issuance of the Amended Pre-Trial Order dated June 14, 2001, quoted in part hereunder:
When this case was called for pre-trial on September 3, 2001, accused JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA appeared, assisted by
counsels, Atty. Jose B. Flaminiano, Atty. Cleofe Villar-Verzola, Atty. Rene A. V.
Saguisag and Atty. Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun. Accused Edward S. Serapio
likewise appeared, assisted by his counsels, Atty. Sabino Acut, Jr. and Atty. Martin
Israel L. Pison. The People was represented by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto,
Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert
E. Kallos, Ombudsman Prosecutor III Antonio T. Manzano and Humphrey T.

Monteroso.
The accused Estradas and Edward S. Serapio submitted their WAIVER OF
APPEARANCE dated September 3, 2001 stating as follows:
Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Edward S. Serapio hereby
waive their appearance during the pre-trial and the trial of this case subject to the
conditions that:
a. whenever his/her/their name/s/are mentioned at any stage of the
proceedings of this/ these case/s whether in testimonial or
documentary evidence, such name/s refer/s to his/her/them; and
b. whenever his/her/their appearance shall be require by the Court at
any time, they will appear, otherwise warrant/s shall issue for their
arrest.
The aforementioned three (3) accused verbally manifested in open Court that they
fully understand and agree with their conditions contained in their Waiver of
Appearance.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The prosecution, the accused Estradas and accused Serapio agreed to stipulate
on the following facts, as proposed by the prosecution to wit:
1. That accused Joseph Estrada (Estrada for short) took his oath of
office as President of the Republic of the Philippines on 30th June
1998, [cf. Proposal No. 1(For all specifications) of accused
Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense dated 01
August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada is married to Dra. (now Senator)
Luisa P. Ejercito; [cf. Proposal No. 2 (For all Specifications) of
accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the defense
dated 01 August 2001];
3. That accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Jr. (Jinggoy for short) is
the son of accused Joseph Estrada; [cf. Proposal No. 3 (For all
Specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts
of the defense dated 01 August 2001;
4. Edward S. Serapio is a lawyer and a former professor of law at the
Ateneo de Manila University School of Law; [cf. Proposal No. 1 of
accused Atty. Edward Serapios Request for Stipulation of Facts
and Admission of Documents dated 01 August 2001;
5. On April 29 1999, Atty. Serapio was appointed by President Joseph
Estrada as Presidential Assistant for Political Affairs with the rank
of Undersecretary. [cf. Proposal No. 2 of accused Atty. Edward

Serapios Request for Stipulation of Facts and Admission of

Documents dated 01 August 2001;
6. He accepted such appointment. [cf. Proposal No. 2. 1 of
specification of accused Atty. Edward Serapios Request for
Stipulation of Facts and Admission of documents dated 01 August
2001.
The other stipulations of facts proposed by the accused Estradas and admitted by
the prosecution were:
1. That From 1998-2001, Mr. Luis "Chavit" Singson was elected
Governor of the province of Ilocos Sur; [cf. Proposal No. 6 (For all
Specifications) of accused Estradas Proposed Stipulation of Facts
of the defense dated 01 August 2001];
2. That the amount of P40 Million was withdrawn by a person
representing herself to be accused Alma Alfaro from Land Bank of
the Philippines-Shaw Branch on 28th August 1998; [cf. Proposal
No. 5 of specification (b) of accused Joseph E. Estrada and Jose
"Jinggoy" Estradas Stipulation of Facts and Admission of
Documents dated 01 August 2001.
The accused Estradas proposed and the prosecution admitted the following
stipulation of facts:
1. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Rodolfo
"Bong" Pineda; [cf. Paragraph 13 of the Prosecutions Additional
Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
2. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows "Atong" Ang; [cf.
Paragraph 17 of the Prosecutions Additional stipulation of Facts
dated 01 August 2001];
3. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Lucio Co; [cf.
Paragraph 23 of the Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts
dated 01 August 2001];
4. That accused Joseph Estrada personally knows Mr. Jaime
Dichaves; [cf. Paragraph 24 of the Prosecutions Additional
Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
5. That accused President Estrada is a close and childhood friend of
Carlos A. Arellano; [cf. Paragraph 1 Re: Belle case of the
Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August
2001];
6. That accused President Estrada appointed Carlos A. Arellano as
Chairman of the Social Security System on July 1, 1998; [cf.
Paragraph 2 re: Belle case of the Prosecutions Additional

Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];

7. That Carlos A. Arellano was appointed by accused President
Estrada as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Social
Security System; [cf. Paragraph 3 re: Belle case of the
Prosecutions Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August
2001];
8. That accused President Estrada knew of the existence of Belle
Corporation; [cf. Paragraph 7 re: Belle case of the Prosecutions
Additional Stipulation of Facts dated 01 August 2001];
Proposed Stipulation of Facts of the prosecution admitted by accused Serapio:
1.
That Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (hereinafter the
"Foundation") has a huge fund of more than P211 Million.
The only issue that was raised by the parties for resolution is whether or not
accused JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, JOSE "Jinggoy" P. ESTRADA and
ATTY. EDWARD S. SERAPIO are guilty of the offense charged in the Amended
Information.
The accused Estradas raise also the issue of whether or not the allegations in the
information would constitute the crime of plunder as defined by R.A. No. 7080.
(COMMENT ON, AND MOTION TO CORRECT PRE-TRIAL ORDER DATED
SEPTEMBER 13, 2001, filed by accused Estradas on September 21, 2001)
The evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense in support of, or in denial, of
the speculations of the predicate acts adverted to in each of the paragraphs are discussed
hereunder in seriatim:
EVIDENCE PRESENTED:
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH A OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
____________________________
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL
INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT,
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ATONG
ANG, JOSE Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND
JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
The alleged co-conspirators of accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada named
in this paragraph (a) are: Charlie "Atong" Tiu Hay Sy Ang (Atong Ang), Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte (Ricaforte) and Edward S. Serapio. The paragraph also

refers to unidentified co-conspirators by the usual "Jane Does" and "John Does".
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The principal witness of the prosecution in this first specification of the predicate acts of
plunder is Former Ilocos Sur Governor Luis "Chavit" C. Singson. He testified extensively
on the charge that FPres. Estrada accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the above-mentioned
amount through the monthly remittance to him of seems of money collected from
operations of illegal gambling, commonly known as "jueteng", based in the different
provinces of the country allegedly in consideration of the prosecution or unimpeded
operation of said illegal gambling.
The gist of the testimony of Singson relative to paragraph (a) of the Amended Information
is set forth hereunder:
GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON (Gov. Singson) was 61 years old,
married, a businessman, and a resident of Mabini Street, Poblacion, Vigan, Province of
Ilocos Sur at the time he took the witness stand as prosecution witness. The examination
of the witness was done by Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo under the control and
supervision of the Ombudsman who was present. The counsel de oficio of accused FPres.
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada, (Ret.) Justice Manuel R. Pamaran, objected to the
appearance of the Solicitor General, which the Court noted. [TSN dated July 17, 2002, pp.
166-167] The testimony of Gov. Singson was presented to corroborate the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Maria Carmencita Itchon, Emma B. Lim and the Equitable PCI
Bank Branch Managers where Ricaforte opened accounts, and to prove that accused
FPres. Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada, Atong Ang, Ricaforte, Serapio and the other accused, in
conspiracy with one another, amassed and accumulated ill-gotten wealth for principal
accused FPres. Estradas benefit while he was the 13th President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P4,097,804,173.17), part of which was derived from:
(1) the collection of jueteng protection money from November 1998 to August
2000, in the amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Million Pesos (P545,000,000.00)
more or less and the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00)
also from the said illegal gambling protection money; and
(2) misappropriation, diversion and conversion for his personal gain as benefit
public funds in the amount of One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos
(P130,000,000.00) more or less, representing a portion of the Two Hundred Million
pesos (P200,000,000.00) Tobacco Excise Share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under Republic Act No. 7171.
Gov. Singson was also presented by the prosecution to prove that Jinggoy Estrada and
Serapio conspired with and/or acted as co-principals by indispensable cooperation of
FPres. Estrada in the running of the illegal numbers game of jueteng and in the receipt by
FPres. Estrada of jueteng protection money; that accused Jinggoy Estrada regularly
collected jueteng protection money every month from January of 1999 to August 15, 2000,
as an indispensable part of the amassing and accumulating ill-gotten wealth by principal
accused FPres. Estrada and as part of the series and/or combination of overt or criminal
acts constituting the crime of plunder; that Serapio conspired with FPres. Estrada and the

other accused in receiving the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) which came
from jueteng operations and in hiding and/or laundering the same through the banking
system and that Serapio was the personal lawyer of FPres. Estrada and that in
furtherance of the conspiracy he set up various juridical entities to mask and/or hide
various illegal proprietary and business interests of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson would
also identify certain documents, checks, pictures and other facts relevant to the foregoing,
which tend to prove the combination and/or series of overt and criminal acts, constitutive
of the crime of plunder (and to oppose the petition for bail of Jinggoy Estrada. Gov.
Singsons testimony was also offered to prove the illegal use of alias). [TSN dated July 17,
2002, pp. 168-174]
Gov. Singson testified that he was called by FPres. Estrada at his house in Polk Street,
Greenhills, on August of 1998. Gov. Singson was then the Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Sur. Gov. Singson went to Polk Street in the evening. He was assisted by a security guard
towards the kitchen where he found Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada talking how to expand
the operations of jueteng, an illegal numbers game, in the provinces where there was yet
no jueteng protection money. Shortly, Bong Pineda arrived. Gov. Singson heard FPres.
Estrada told Bong Pineda that starting on that day not to bring money at his house
because it was very obvious. Gov. Singson did not know Bong Pineda very much but he
saw Bong Pineda in Congress when he was investigated regarding jueteng. The jueteng
money would protect jueteng operator from being arrested. FPres. Estrada then instructed
Bong Pineda to give the money to Atong Ang or to Gov. Singson because the latter was a
Governor so it would not be obvious if he brought money to FPres. Estrada. [TSN dated
July 17, 2002, pp. 178-187]
According to Gov. Singson, the day after the aforementioned meeting, Atong Ang started
meeting with the jueteng operators in his office near the municipal hall of San Juan. [Ibid,
p. 188] Atong Ang and the operators were bargaining how much protection money from
each province will be given to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 193] After the final talk, they started
collecting jueteng protection money, specifically from August of 1998. [Ibid, p. 203]
Gov. Singson knew FPres. Estrada for almost thirty (30) years before August of 1998.
FPres. Estrada was not yet a mayor but a movie actor as Gov. Singsons mother was a
producer. [Ibid, p. 191] Gov. Singson first met Atong Ang at the cockpit and gambling
places. He had known Atong Ang for a long time even when FPres. Estrada was still the
Vice President. According to Gov. Singson, Bong Pineda was a close "compadre" of
FPres. Estrada while his son, Jinggoy Estrada, was Bong Pinedas godson by marriage.
[Ibid, p. 197]
Gov. Singson claimed that he was present in not all but several meetings of Atong Ang
with the jueteng collectors. He was present when there was an agreement on the three
percent (3%) of total collections in every province, as fixed by Atong Ang. [TSN dated July
22, 2002, pp. 12-13] Jueteng money was delivered to FPres. Estrada initially every end of
the month, starting September of 1998 and later every 15 th and at the end of the month.
[Ibid, p.14]
On October of 1998, Gov. Singson and Atong Ang brought the jueteng protection money
of about Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00) for the said month to FPres. Estrada at his
house, in No. 1 Polk Street in Greenhills, but FPres. Estrada and Atong Ang had a nasty
quarrel about the sugar allocation request of Atong Ang which was denied by FPres.
Estrada. Gov. Singson brought home the said P9,000,000.00 but, the following day,

FPres. Estrada called him up asking him to pay F.P. Estradas obligations which went on
until the said amount was consumed and Gov. Singson was instructed by FPres. Estrada
to continue the collection of the jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 26, 22-23]
Gov. Singson continued the collection as instructed by FPres. Estrada, still with the help of
Atong Ang, from November of 1998 until August of 2000. The amounts of money collected
from jueteng during the said period were listed in the ledger per month and per province.
The ledger also listed the expenses paid for using the jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp.
24-27]
Every fifteen (15) days, Gov. Singson himself delivered protection money to FPres.
Estrada in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) or a total of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) every month. Emma B. Lim delivered once the jueteng money to
FPres. Estrada in Malacaang. The protection money was delivered usually in cash but
sometimes in check. Chavit Singon presented to this court two (2) sets of ledger. The first
set consisted of nine (9) pages covering the month of November of 1998 up to July of
1999 (Exh. W7 to Exh. E8). The September 1998 and October 1998 collections were not
reflected in the said ledger since the ledger was done only after FPres. Estrada and Atong
Ang quarreled in October 1998. The second set of ledger covered the months of August of
1999 to August of 2000 (Exh.A-4 to Exh. A-4-d). [TSN dated July 22, 2002, p. 27-31]
Gov. Singson prepared the pages of the first set of ledger (Exh. W7 to E8) with the help of
Emma B. Lim and Ma. Carmencita Itchon and on the following year, Ricaforte joined them.
[Ibid, pp. 35-36]
The pages of the second set of ledgers starting August of 1999 to August of 2000 [Exhibit
A-4 and submarkings] were prepared by Ricaforte under the supervision of Gov. Singson
who also checked the said ledger. [Ibid, pp. 36-37]
Ricaforte was introduced to Gov. Singson by FPres. Estrada before his birthday on April
19, 1999. She was designated by FPres. Estrada as auditor because FPres. Estrada was
strict with money. Gov. Singson was thankful for Ricafortes designation because he did
not want FPres. Estrada to distrust him. [Ibid, p. 40] Gov. Singson considered Ricaforte as
the employee of FPres. Estrada with respect to the jueteng collections because not only
was she introduced to Singson by FPres. Estrada, the latter also told Singson to give her
Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80, 000.00) monthly salary.
Ricaforte held office at LCS Building owned by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 42-43] Gov.
Singson did not know Yolanda Ricaforte or her husband Orestes Ricaforte before April of
1999. Gov. Singson identified Ricaforte from a picture (Exh. A-6-b-1) where she was
seated beside Menchu Itchon, the assistant of Gov. Singson. The picture was taken during
the wedding of Raquel, the daughter of Gov. Singson where FPres. Estrada and his wife
Senator Loi Ejercito stood as wedding sponsors. [Ibid, p. 45-48]
According to Gov. Singson, the jueteng collections were placed in a scratch paper as they
came every fifteen (15) days, at the middle and the end of the month or five (5) days after
the end of the month. When all the collections had arrived, the list was finalized and then
transferred to the computer. The ledgers were prepared upon instructions of FPres.
Estrada because the latter was strict with money. [Ibid, pp. 37-40, 41-42]
Gov. Singson explained in detail the entries on the left hand portion of the ledger for

November of 1998 up to July of 1999. In the province of Ilocos Sur, the total collection for
fifteen (15) days was Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P750,000.00), in the
province of La Union for 15 days, Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) total
collection, while in Bulacan for 15 days, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) total collection
(Exh. W7) of protection money for FPres. Estrada. The entries for the other provinces were
similar. On the left side column were the names of the provinces, the middle column
pertained to the number of days, i.e., whether for 15 or 30 days and the right column, the
total amount of collections of jueteng protection money, in order that jueteng operators will
not be "arrested" or apprehended. There was one (1) collector for three (3) provinces.
[Ibid, pp. 53-54]
In the second set of ledger (Exh. A-4 to A-4-d) Ricaforte gave a code name for every
province below the title "Theme". The number of days, either 15 or 30, under the title
"days" and the total amount of protection money for FPres. Estrada below the title "points"
were indicated in the ledger. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]
Gov. Singson narrated that when FPres. Estrada was still the Vice President, they were
already collecting jueteng money but not in all provinces. When FPres. Estrada assumed
the presidency, he called Gov. Singson and Atong Ang to start jueteng collections in
provinces without protection money. Atong Ang talked to certain persons in the said
provinces so that the collection of protection money could start. Every province had a
collector but sometimes there was one collector for three (3) provinces. The collections
were submitted to Gov. Singson but sometimes they would get the money from the house
of the collectors. The jueteng collections which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to
operate for FPres. Estradas own benefit was at the national level, meaning nationwide.
They did not interfere with jueteng operations at the lower level. Before there were
"Kangaroo" type of jueteng operations or "Guerilla Type". They did it on their own and they
did not pay protection money. When the jueteng operators gave protection money to
FPres. Estrada, they were not apprehended anymore although there were instructions to
the contrary which were for show or for record purposes only. [Ibid, pp. 59-64]
There were local officials who did not allow jueteng like Governor Lina in Laguna. He
changed the Provincial Commander several times but jueteng still continued. In the other
places the protection money for jueteng given to the local officials was different from that
given to the higher levels. [Ibid, pp. 65-66]
In Exhibit A-4, ULAC stands for Bulacan and the figure 1.00 means One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) for fifteen (15) days, as protection money for FPres. Estrada. If the
number of days was blank it meant 15 days, otherwise the number 30 was indicated.
In the ledger (Exh A-4-C up to A-4-I) covering the periods of January of 2000 up to August
of 2000, the same figures appeared but the code names of the provinces were replaced
by their original names as instructed by FPres. Estrada who was confused with the code
names. Under the sub-title "amount", the total amount of protection money given to FPres.
Estrada was reflected. For instance, in Ilocos Sur, the amount of 500 meant Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 67-68]
The other entries were similar, except for the substitution of the code names with actual
names of the provinces. For instance, the amount of protection money given to FPres.
Estrada corresponding to Ilocos Sur entered as 500, was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00). For the province of Bulacan the number of days was blank and the figure

1,000 was entered. This means that for Bulacan for 15 days the total protection money
given to FPres. Estrada was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). According to Gov.
Singson, the collections were delivered in exact amount so they removed the zeroes in
the ledger so as not to lengthen the entries. [Ibid, pp. 69-70]
The two boxes of entries at the right bottom of the ledger marked as Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l,
reflected the expenses to show where some of the money collected went. [Ibid, p. 70] The
first entry (Exh. W7-1) showed that Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) went to "Jimpol",
which referred to then Secretary Jimmy Policarpio. The latter confirmed to Gov. Singson
this receipt of the said amount from Bong Pineda which Secretary Policarpio, then a
political liaison officer for Congress, would use for the media. [Ibid, pp. 74-75] In the ledger
for November of 1998, the entry 300 Goma (Exh W7-2) means that Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) was given to the Office of the Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP). [Ibid, pp.74-76] Gov. Singson himself brought the money at first to General
Lastimoso, the Chief of the PNP but he refused to receive the money. Later Atong Ang
identified the persons from PNP who will pick up the money and help them in the
operation. Gov. Singson called up FPres. Estrada to inform him that Lastimoso refused to
receive the money. Gov. Singson was worried Lastimoso may not coordinate with them.
One time, Gov. Singson was called to Malacanang and he met General Lastimoso there
and FPres. Estrada told the latter to coordinate with Gov. Singson about the operation of
jueteng. General Lastimoso expressed the need to coordinate with the Regional
Commanders to apprehend jueteng operations for show only ("kunwari"). [Ibid, pp. 77-80]
The entry "November 1998, 5.00, AS Sunday" (Exh W7-3) means that the amount for Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) protection money was given to FPres. Estrada, whose
code name was "Asiong Salonga" on a Sunday. Gov. Singson himself gave the money to
FPres. Estrada. The next entry "1.000 Jing" (Exh W7-4), would show that One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was given to Jinggoy Estrada, whose code name was "Jing".
According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada was the collector of protection money for the
Province of Bulacan which should be Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for every
month but Jinggoy Estrada kept the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) and remit to Gov.
Singson only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) or One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) for
every 15 days. [Ibid, pp. 80-82]
Atong Ang told Gov. Singson that Jinggoy Estrada got One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
and Jinggoy Estrada confirmed it but when they told FPres. Estrada about it, he instructed
them not to give Jinggoy Estrada money and he will be the one to give money to Jinggoy
Estrada. Gov. Singson removed the name of Jinggoy Estrada from the list and they kept it
a secret from FPres. Estrada that Jinggoy Estrada was taking jueteng money because
Jinggoy Estrada will get angry too if he was not given a share. Jinggoy Estrada was then
the Mayor of the Municipality of San Juan. Jinggoy Estrada collected money from the
Province of Bulacan at the later part of January of 1999. [Ibid, p. 82-85]
The entry "500 JD" (Exh W7-5) means that Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
went to Jude Estrada, a son of FPres. Estrada. Jude confirmed to Gov. Singson that he
received the said amount of jueteng protection money from Atong Ang who reported that
to Gov. Singson. The entry "1.800 ad check" (Exh W7-6) refers to One Million Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,800,000.00) covered by a bad check, part of jueteng
money, which bounced. This was PCI Bank Check No. 0019063 (Exh. F8) given to Gov.
Singson by one Celso De Los Angeles. The entry "17.300 total expenses" (Exh. W 7-7)
represents the Seventeen Million Three Hundred Pesos (P17,300,000.00) the amount of

total expenses for the month of November of 1998. The total expenses every month were
entered in the ledger (Exh. X7 to E8, and Exh. A-4 to A-4-d. [Ibid, pp. 85-92])
In the entry for December of 1998 (Exh. X7), the first entry "5.00, AS" (Exh. X7-1) shows
the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada
from the collection of jueteng protection money. The ledger for January 1999 bearing as
first entry "6.00 cash January 2, AS" (Exh Y7-1), reflected the Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) cash from the same source given personally by Gov. Singson to FPres.
Estrada. The entry "3.00 check, February 1, 1999, AS" (Exh. W7-2) shows that Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) in check was given to FPres. Estrada on February 1, 1999
as part of protection money. [Ibid, pp. 93-95] Another entry "5.00 check, February 1, 1999
AS" (Exh Y7-3), refers to the Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) Check given by Gov.
Singson to FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection money. This check (Metrobank Check
No.0000917, Exh G8-1) was deposited in the account of Paul Boghart, who was
mentioned during the impeachment trial at the Senate as a foreigner assisting in the "PR"
of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 93-97]
The entry "3.500 cash, January 19, AS" (Exh. Y7-4) pertains to Three Million Five Hundred
Pesos (P3,500,000.00) cash from the protection money given by Gov. Singson to FPres.
Estrada on January 19 (1999). The entry "5.00, February 18, AS" (Exh. Z 7-1) refers to the
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. on February 18, 1999
from the same protection money. Gov. Singson explained that the entry "400 tax" (Exh Z 72) at the right hand portion of Exhibit Z7, refers to the Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) which he got for reimbursement of the expenses that he paid or would pay
but were not recorded in the ledger. In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), April 1999
(Exh. B8), May 1999 (Exh. C8), June 1999 (Exh. D8), July 1999 (Exh. E8), and August 1999
(Exh A-4) there were similar entries of "tax" which were also intended for the same
purpose. Gov. Singson called them "butal". Gov. Singson had the permission of FPres.
Estrada that all amounts less than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) were considered
"butal" which Gov. Singson kept for reimbursement of expenses which FPres. Estrada
would ask Gov. Singson to pay. If the total amount collection was Four Million Two
Hundred Pesos (P4,200,000.00), Gov. Singson got Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) of the said collection as "butal" and included the same in the ledger as
"tax". [Ibid, pp. 98-101]
In the ledger for February 1999 collection appears a handwritten entry "+ 4.00 capitol
February 3, 1999". This entry pertains to the Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00)
"kickback" which FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give him on February 3, 1999 out
of the Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) allotted for the repair of the capitol of Ilocos
Sur. This P4 Million was added to the "total to date" of the collection which consequently
amounted to Thirty Eight Million Pesos (P38,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 102-103]
In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh. A8), the first entry "5.00, 4/6/99, AS" (Exh. A8-1) shows
that Five Mllion Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that Gov. Singson gave FPres. Estrada on April 6,
1999. Gov. Singson wrote on the ledger "AS", i.e. Asiong Salonga, the code name of
FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 103]
Regarding the entry "500 3/23 c/0 Malou AS" (Exh A8-2), Gov. Singson explained that
Malou Florendo, the Secretary of FPres. Estrada, coordinated with Gov. Singson by
telephone for the delivery of the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres.
Estrada. Emma B. Lim delivered the money as Gov. Singson was in the province when

FPres. Estrada called up Gov. Singson to tell him he needed money very badly. [Ibid, pp.
104-106]
On April 1, 1999, Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) were given by Gov. Singson to
FPres. Estrada from jueteng protection money as shown by the entry "5.00 4/1/99 AS"
(Exh B8-1). The next entry, "1.00, William Gatchalian" (Exh "B8-2), refers to the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to William Gatchalian upon instruction of
FPres. Estrada. Gatchalian had a Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) check but
FPres. Estrada won only Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) in their mahjong game,
so FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to give to Gatchalian the change of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) charged to the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson gave
Gatchalian the said amount through a Metrobank Check No. 0001066 (Exh H 8 and H8-1).
[Ibid, pp.106-109]
The entry in Exhibit B8 which reads "200 Jerry and Len" (Exh B8-3) reflects the One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) each given to then Secretary Lenny De Jesus
and Secretary Jerry Barican, or a total amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00), as "balato" as instructed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110]
Senator Tessie Oreta and Sonny Osmena were also given One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) each or a total of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in Cebu aboard the
Presidential Yatch "Ang Pangulo" as shown by the entry "2.00 Tessie and Sonny" (Exh.
B8). Gov. Singson gave the said sums of money to the Senators, which he funded through
the jueteng protection money, in the form of Metrobank Check No. 0001081 (Exhs. I 8 and
I8 -1 and Metrobank Check No. 0001082 (Exhs. J8 and J8-1) upon instruction of FPres.
Estrada, as their "balato" for the winning of the latter in "Mahjong". [Ibid, pp. 112-114]
The amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) was given by Gov. Singson to FPres.
Estrada from the jueteng protection money on each of the following dates as shown by the
entries in the ledger: (1) May 1, 1999 ("5.00 5/1/99 AS" Exh. C8-1); (2) May 18, 1999
("5.00 5/18/99 AS" Exh. C8-2); (3) June 1, 1999 ("5.00 6/1/99 AS" Exh. D8-1); (4) June
18, 1999 ("5.00 6/18/99 AS" Exh. D8-2); (5) July 31, 1999 ("5.00 7/1/99 AS" Exh. E8-1);
and (6) July 19, 1999 ("5.00 7/19/99 AS" Exh. E8-2). From May 1, 1999 to July 19, 1999,
the total amount of money given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada would amount to
Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) based on the ledger. [Ibid, pp.115-118]
The entry reading "123,000 total to date" (Exh E8-3) represents the total amount of One
Hundred Twenty Three Million Pesos (P123,000,000.00) that remained as of July 1999.
[Ibid, pp. 118-119]
After July 1999, particularly on August 1999, FPres. Estrada called Gov. Singson,
Ricaforte and Serapio to a meeting at Mandaluyong. Gov. Singson was instructed by
FPres. Estrada in the presence of Ricaforte and Serapio to turn-over all the balance of the
money from jueteng to the account of Ricaforte. Gov. Singson was keeping most of the
above-mentioned P123,000,000.00 in the bank and the others in cash in his office
because FPres. Estrada would ask for money from time to time. Gov. Singson turned-over
the aforementioned balance of the jueteng money partly in check and partly in cash in the
office of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte and Serapio were there with the Former President.
[Ibid, pp.119-123]
Part of the aforesaid P123,000,000.00 was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001360

(Exh K8 and K8-1) of Gov. Singson in the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) [Ibid, p. 123]. The second and third checks (Exhs A-2b and A-7-c) were PCI Bank checks in the account name of William Gatchalian each in the
amount of Thirty-Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00) or a total of Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson narrated that the amount of Sixty-Two Million Pesos
(P62,000,000.00) from the jueteng protection money was lent to William Gatchalian. Out
of this transaction, FPres. Estrada earned Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) such that
William Gatchalian paid a total of Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 124125]
Gov. Singson presented Metrobank Check No. 0001332 with account name Governor Luis
"Chavit" Singson, in the amount of Forty-Six Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P46,350,000,00) payable to William Gatchalian (Exh L8 and L8-1). This check, according
to Gov. Singson was part of the jueteng protection money lent to William Gatchalian. The
rest of the P62,000,000.00 were in cash and covered by other checks. [Ibid, pp. 126-127]
The Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) earned from the loan by FPres. Estrada was
taken as advance by the latter before due date of the P70,000,000.00 of Gatchalian. For
this reason, the P8,000,000.00 was not anymore added to the balance of
P123,000,000.00 of jueteng money. [Ibid, pp. 127-130] The advance of P8,000,000.00
was covered by Metrobank Check No. 0001388 with the account name Governor Luis
"Chavit" Singson (Exhs. M8 and M8-1). During the impeachment trial at the Senate, it
turned out that the P8,000,000.00 was deposited in the account of Senator Loi Estrada
[Ibid, pp. 130-131,139]
The fourth check which covered part of the total balance of P123,000,000.00 jueteng
protection money was a Far East bank Check in the amount of Thirty-Four Million Six
Hundred Forty Two Thousand Four Hundred Forty Two Pesos (P34,642,442.00) payable
to the order of Fontain Bleau, Inc. (Exh B6). [Ibid, p. 124] According to Gov. Singson, the
Far East Bank check payable to the order of Fontaine Bleau, Inc. was paid by Fontana to
Fontaine Bleau, Inc. which was a casino owned by FPres. Estrada and built with the use
of jueteng protection money. The bulk of the P123,000,000.00 were turned-over by Gov.
Singson in the form of checks. The cash amounted only to Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P800,000.00) only. [TSN dated July 24, 2002, pp.8-9]
In the second set of ledger covering the months of August 1999 to August 2000 (Exh A-4)
are found the following entries: (1) "3.00 AS 9/6 8 oclock a.m." (Exh A-4.1) and (2) "5.00
AS 8/16/99" (Exh A-4.2). The entries represent the two (2) Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) given by Gov. Singson to FPres. Estrada on September 6 at 8 oclock in
the morning and on August 16, 1999 or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as
part of jueteng collection. [Ibid, pp. 10-13]
The other entries in the said ledger are: (1) "16.310 August 1-15" (A-4-3); (2) "13.150
August 16-31" (Exh. A-4-4); (3) "29.460 total for August" (Exh. A-4-5); (4) "15.200
expenses" (Exh. A-4-6); (5) "14.260 subtotal" (Exh. A-4-7); (6) ".260 tax" (Exh. A-4-8); (7)
"14.000 total to date" (Exh. A-4-9). Gov. Singson explained that the entries mean (1) that
the total collection for August 1-15, 1999 amounted to Sixteen Million Three Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (P16,310,000.00); (2) that from August 16-31, 1999 the total collection
was Thirteen Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P13,150,000.00); (3) that the
total collection for the whole month of August 1999 was Twenty Nine Million Four Hundred
Sixty Thousand Pesos (P29,460,000.00) which all went to FPres. Estrada. The expenses

for the said month reached Fifteen Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P15,200,000.00). The said amount of expenses was deducted from the total collection for
the same month. The remainder, described as "subtotal", amounted to Fourteen Million
Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P14,260,000.00). Of the latter sum of money, Two
Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P260,000.00) was treated as "butal" and taken by Gov.
Singson to be used as reimbursement for expenses which Gov. Singson was requested
by FPres. Estrada to pay. The balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) was
deposited in the bank for President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 14-18]
The "tax" entries in the ledger, starting Exhibit Z to Z-7, covered the amounts less than
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were treated as "butal" that remained with Gov.
Singson to reimburse him for expenses which were not recorded in the ledger but should
be deducted from the money of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 19-21]
Gov. Singson mentioned that he personally gave or handed to FPres. Estrada even if
Malou Florendo, FPres. Estradas secretary, was around. Gov. Singson either left the
money beside FPres. Estrada or behind the latters chair. FPres. Estrada would count the
money by the bundle [Ibid, pp. 22-23]. The Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) delivered
by Emma B. Lim to Malou Florendo not to FPres. Estrada personally was confirmed by
the latter to have been received by him. Emma B. Lim delivered the money to the
Malacaang Palace because of the changes in the instructions given by FPres. Estrada.
[Ibid, pp. 23-24]
The net balance of Fourteen Million Pesos (P14,000,000.00) for August 1999 was
deposited by Ricaforte at Equitable PCI Bank. The same was done to the net monthly
balances for September 1999, October 1999, November 1999, December 1999, January
2000, February 2000, March 2000, April 2000 and May 2000. [Ibid, pp. 25-27]
The other entries in the second set of ledger for September 1999 and October 1999 as
follows: (1) "AS 11:30 am/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-a-1); (2) "10/29 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-b1"); (3) 10/14 AS/258 5.000 (Exh A-4-b-2), mean that Gov. Singson whose code name
was "258" gave FPres. Estrada, referred to as "AS", which stands for Asiong Salonga Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on each of the following dates: (a) in September 1999 at
11:30 in the morning; (b) on October 29, 1999; and (c) on October 14, 1999.
In the November 1999 ledger (Exh A-4-c), the following entries appear (1) "11/30 laptop
comp./print.105,850" (Exh. A-4-c-1) (2) "11/30 2 Starex 800 each/258 1.600" (Exh. A-4-C2); (3) "11:30 AS/258 12p.m PG5.000" (Exh. A-4-C-3); (4) "11/15 AS/258 at 4p.m 5.000"
( Exh. A-4-C-4 ), and (5) "11/08 Jimpol 2.400".
Gov. Singson explained the foregoing entries in the November 1999 ledger as follows: On
November 30, 1999, the amount of P105,850.00 was used to buy the laptop computer
with printer of Ricaforte. On November 30, 1999, Gov. Singson purchased Two (2) units of
Starex at Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos each or a total amount of One Million Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00). One unit of Starex went to Ricaforte and was
registered in her name. The other was left in their office. At 12:00 noon on November 30,
1999, Gov. Singson brought Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to FPres. Estrada in his
house at P. Guevarra St. at Greenhills as part of jueteng protection money. At that time,
Guia Gomez, one of the most loved of FPres. Estrada, resided at the said house. Gov.
Singson also gave Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to former FPres. Estrada on
November 15, 1999 at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon. On November 8, 1999, the amount of

Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00) was given by Bong Pineda to
Secretary Jimmy Policarpio, as confirmed by both of them to Singson. During the prior
months, only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) per month were given to Policarpio, as
shown by the ledger, but this was increased by Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00) because Policarpio told Gov. Singson that the Media was costly
("Magastos"). [Ibid, pp. 30-39]
The ledger for December 1999 (Exh. A-4-d), contains the following entries: (1) "12/30
AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-d-1) and (2) "12/04 AS/258 5.00" (Exh A-4-d-2). According to Gov.
Singson the aforesaid entries show that he gave to FPres. Estrada, as part of Jueteng
protection, the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on December 30, 1999 and
another Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on December 4, 1999. [Ibid, pp.39-41]
The ledger for January 2000 (Exh A-4-E) contains the following entries: (1) "1/31/00 AS at
PR 5.000" (Exh A-4-E-1); and (2) "1/15/00 AS at Pr 5.000". According to Gov. Singson
"PR" stands for Presidential Residence and "AS" for Asiong Salonga, that he gave to
FPres. Estrada the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) twice, one on January
31, 2000 and the other January 14, 2000, at the Presidential Residence. [Ibid, pp.41-43]
According to Gov. Singson, he was ordered by FPres. Estrada to give to him Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the jueteng collection every fifteen (15) days of the month. All
the jueteng collections were for FPres. Estrada. The total amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) were given to him every month plus the expenses ("gastos") and the
remainder or the rest of the collection were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada in the
name of Ricaforte. A total amount of Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos
(P216,000,000.00) were deposited in the bank for FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 43-44]
Gov. Singson agreed at first that he would not earn anything from jueteng, provided that
the share of Ilocos Sur from the excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 amounting to billions of
pesos would be released to them for their projects. Gov. Singson testified that, after the
One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) were taken from him, the release of
the funds did not continue. The Former President did not comply with the agreement. [Ibid,
pp. 44-46]
In the ledger for February 2000 (Exh A-4-F), the following entries appear: (1) "AS/258
5.000" (Exh A-4-F-1); and (2) "2/17/00 AS 258 5.000" (Exh A-4-F-2). Gov. Singson testified
that these entries mean that he gave to FPres. Estrada, Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) as part of jueteng protection money in an unspecified day in February of
2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) of the same money on February 17,
2000. [Ibid, pp. 48-49]
The ledger for March 2000 (Exh A-4-G), bears the following entries: (1) "3/16/00 AS/258
5.000" (Exh A-4-g-1); and (2) "4/3/00 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-G-2). According to Gov.
Singson the entries mean that he gave Five Million Pesos (P5 Million) on March 16, 2000
and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) on April 3,2000, both as part of jueteng
protection money. [Ibid, pp. 49-50] Gov. Singson explained that "258" was his code name
which he had been using even in their radio communication and that later, FPres. Estrada
would kid him with his code name when they played mahjong. [Ibid, p. 52]
In the April 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-H), the entry "4/14/00 AS/258 5.000" appeared twice,
(Exh A-4-H-1) because according to Gov. Singson he gave Five Million Pesos

(P5,000,000.00) twice, one in the morning and another in the afternoon on the same day,
April 14, 2000, or a total of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) from jueteng protection
money collection, because FPres. called him up twice on the said date as his birthday on
April 19, 2000 was nearing. [Ibid, pp. 53-54]
At the ledger for May 2000 (Exh A-4-i), the first entry also at the right hand portion was
"5/31 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-1) and next entry was "5/13 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-i-2).
Gov. Singson explained that the entries meant that he gave Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) on May 31, 2000 and another Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) to
FPres. Estrada on May 13, 2000, both part of the jueteng protection money. Gov. Singson
also mentioned that the entries sometimes were not in chronological order, but they were
for the same month. [Ibid, pp. 55-56]
The June 2000 ledger (Exh A-4-j), the entry at the right hand portion reads: "6/30 AS/258
3.300", and the next entry is "6/15 AS/258 5.000" (Exh A-4-j-2). According to Gov.
Singson, these means that he gave to FPres. Estrada Three Million Three Hundred
Thousand (P3,300,000.00) from jueteng protection money collection on June 30, 2000,
and Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the same collection, on June 15, 2000. [Ibid,
pp. 56-57]
The succeeding ledgers for July 2000 (Exh A-4-k) the following entries appear: (1) "7/14
AS/258 2.650" (Exh. "A-4-k-1) and (2) "8/12 AS/258 3.600" (Exh.A-4-k-2). Gov. Singson
explained that the entries mean respectively that he gave the amount of Two Million Six
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P2,650,000.00) on July 14,2000 and Three Million Six
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,600,000.00) to FPres. Estrada as part of jueteng protection
money collection. [Ibid, pp.57-58] To the question of why the amounts were less than
P5,000,000.00 on the said occasions, Gov. Singson replied that it so happened that those
were the only cash in his possession when the requests for money were made and that
they stopped jueteng collection because Atong Ang started with "Pick 2" and later "Bingo 2
Balls" which according to FPres. Estrada would have a semblance of legality. [Ibid, pp. 5960]
The ledger for the month of August 2000 (Exh.A-4-L) contains the entry "8/16 AS/258
3.050" (Exh. A-4-L-1). Gov. Singson testified that he gave FPres. Estrada on August 16,
2000 the amount of Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P3,050,000.00) as part of
protection money collected from jueteng. [Ibid, pp. 62-63] According to Gov. Singson the
President was very strict with money and so they had an auditor and he checked the
ledger monthly so that they could not make any kickback ("Kupit") from the jueteng
collection. [Ibid, pp. 63-64]
Gov. Singson testified that the jueteng collector for Bulacan on November and December
1998 was Jessie Viceo. In January 1999 the jueteng collector for Bulacan was Jinggoy
Estrada as shown by the ledger where he was identified as "Jing" who got One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) (Exh. W7). Viseo and Jinggoy Estrada were friends so the latter
supervised the jueteng collection in Bulacan, although he was residing in San Juan. When
FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson not to give money to Jinggoy Estrada and so that
the latter will not get mad at him, Gov. Singson and Jinggoy Estrada agreed to keep it a
secret from the FPres. that Jinggoy Estrada managed the jueteng collection in Bulacan
and that out of the total monthly collection of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) from
Bulacan, Jinggoy Estrada gave only Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to Gov. Singson
and he retained One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). The money was either picked-up

from the office or house of Jinggoy or the latter sent the money to Singson. The secret
arrangement started in November 1999 and lasted until the end of August 2000. [Ibid, pp.
69-70] However, the arrangement did not appear in the ledger because they will be
scolded by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 71] When asked whether Jinggoy Estrada personally
collected the jueteng money, Gov. Singson replied that it was Jinggoy Estrada and Jessie
Viceo who talked with each other, sometimes they got the jueteng money from the office
of Jinggoy Estrada or sometimes the latter sent it to the office of Singson, but Gov.
Singson knew that Jinggoy was in charge of the jueteng collection. The secret
arrangement came about because jueteng collection in Bulacan was a problem from the
start as there were delays or sometimes the checks paid by Jessie Viceo bounced. Viceo
agreed to the arrangement because he was a close friend of Jinggoy Estrada. [Ibid, pp.
71-72] Gov. Singson knew Viceo personally because he would see Viceo in the cockpits
which the latter frequented. [Ibid, p. 74]
Gov. Singson considered the biggest among the expenses charged to the "Tax" the One
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) given to Laarni Enriquez whom
Gov. Singson described as the most beloved or favorite of FPres. Estrada [Ibid, p. 75].
According to Gov. Singson, he was assessed, like other persons who attended the
birthday party of Laarni, the aforesaid P1,200,000.00 as his share in the price of the
necklace birthday gift amounting to Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for Laarni.
Jaime Dichaves collected the said amount from Gov. Singson after the party. Gov.
Singson paid by check which was deposited in the account of Laarni at PSBank. [Ibid, pp.
76-81] It was Congressman Mark Jimenez who pinpointed the guests who would share
(P1,200,000.00) each for the gift for Laarni after they had just finished playing mahjong
with FPres. Estrada during the party. [Ibid, p. 84] Gov. Singson charged the P1,200,000.00
as "tax" in the jueteng collection because it was "a big amount of money". [Ibid, pp. 87-88]
In the early part of the year 2000, FPres. Estrada instructed Gov. Singson to transfer Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of jueteng money to Serapio. The instruction
was given by FPres. Estrada to Gov. Singson in Malacaang Palace in the presence of
Ricaforte and Serapio. According to Gov. Singson, Serapio said "Ako na ang bahalang
magpa-ikot-ikot" which Gov. Singson took it to mean that Serapio would see to it that the
Two Huundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) jueteng money would not be traced
before it reached him. FPres. Estrada checked Gov. Singson in April 2000 when FPres.
Estradas birthday was approaching, whether the money was so transferred. The transfer
of funds was confirmed to Gov. Singson by both Ricaforte and Serapio. The jueteng
money delivered to Serapio initially amounted to One Hundred Twenty Three Million
Pesos (P123,000,000.00) but it was increased later to Two Hundred Sixteen Million Pesos
(P216,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 88-94]
Gov. Singson testified that Serapio was the trusted lawyer of FPres. Estrada who formed
fake corporations for FPres. Estrada which Serapio would narrate to Gov. Singson when
they often see each other in Malacaang Palace. Serapio was introduced to Gov. Singson
in 1999 after the birthday of FPres. Estrada.
Gov. Singson delivered jueteng money to FPresident Estrada in a black bag, like an
attach case. He delivered money at the houses of FPres. Estrada, particularly once at P.
Guevarra Street, twice or thrice or four times or five times at Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 95-98]
Atty. Kenneth S. Tampal of the office of the Senate Legal Counsel brought the black bag
referred to by Gov. Singson which was marked as Exhibit "MMM" at the Senate

Impeachment Proceedings and the set of ledgers for the period beginning August 1999 to
August 2000 (Exhibits A-4 to A-4-l). The bag was a leatherette attach case with two (2)
combination locks numbered 000. [Ibid, pp. 103-105] According to Atty. Tampal, the
exhibits are in the custody of the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel. [Ibid, p. 110]
Gov. Singson testified that the abovementioned black bag (Exh. O8) was one of the black
bags which they used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada in Malacaang Palace. [Ibid, p.
113] The said black bag can contain five or even six million pesos. [Ibid, pp. 115, 118] He
would leave the bag with money and brought with him the bag without money. The bag
contained two (2) combination locks. The combination of both was "000" although he
change it to "419", representing the birthdate of FPres. Estrada, April 19, at the time he
delivered money in Malacaang Palace to FPres. Estrada, but the latter asked him to
revert to "000" combination because FPres. Estrada could not open the lock. [Ibid, pp.
118-119] There were four (4) pieces of this type of bag. [Ibid, pp. 115-116]
The bills placed in the bag were in One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) denomination. Many
times Singson himself delivered the jueteng money to FPres. Estrada in Malacaang
Palace. To go to the Presidential Residence (PR), he passed through the main gate where
there were guards. At first, the Secretary would call to give the guards instruction not to
inspect the bag. Later on, the guards came to know Gov. Singson and allowed him to
enter without inspecting the bag. Jueteng money was either delivered to Gov. Singsons
office or picked-up by Gov. Singson, or his driver or his security or the people in his office.
[Ibid, pp. 121-124]
The total amount of money Gov. Singson collected from jueteng operations for FPresident
Estrada starting November 1998 to August 2000 was Five Hundred Forty Million Pesos
(P540,000,000.00) more or less, according to Gov. Singson.
Gov. Singson personally delivered about Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to
FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, p. 124-125]
In the ledger for March 1999 (Exh AAAAAAAA), the entry "Bicol15 1.100" means in the
Province of Bicol for fifteen (15) days the protection money collection for FPres. Esrada
was One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,100,000.00). In the ledger for the
month of November 1998 (Exh. W7), there was an entry "1.500 Anton and 2.500 Anton".
According to Gov. Singson, the entry was made because Atong Ang told him the amounts
of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) and Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), or a total of Four Million Pesos
(P4,000,000.00), collected from Bicol were recorded / listed in the name of Presidential
Assistant Anton Prieto. Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada knew about
it and the latter so confirmed to Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 125-127]
While jueteng protection money collection started in September 1998, the ledger started
only in November 1998 when Gov. Singson alone was asked to continue the jueteng
collection. [Ibid, pp. 128-129]
In the July 2000 ledger (Exh. A-4-k), the total amount of jueteng collection and the total
amount of expenses were the same so the balance at the end of the month was zero
because "Pick 2" replaced jueteng, as Gov. Singson, Dante Tan and FPres. Estrada
discussed in Malacaang and in his new home at New Manila called "Boracay". "Pick 2"
was the brainchild of Dante Tan and "Bingo 2 Ball" was the brainchild of Atong Ang. [Ibid,

pp. 129-132] In "Boracay", Bong Pineda told Dante Tan, Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada
that "Pick 2" may be hard to be understood by the people because there will be 75
numbers. [Ibid, p. 134]
In August 2000, "Pick 2" started and, in September 2000, before his departure for the
United States, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to hasten the start of "Bingo 2 Balls".
Atong Ang called Gov. Singson when he was in Malaysia in September 6, 2000 and told
him that FPres. Estrada would like to rush the start of "Bingo 2 Balls". Gov. Singson
replied that was nice and asked that Atong Ang reserve Ilocos Sur for him. However, the
following day the son of Gov. Singson informed him that the other half of the franchise was
given to his political opponent, Eric Singson, whom he defeated in the election. Eric
Singson was his distant relative. [Ibid, pp. 138-141]
According to the son of Gov. Singson, Atong Ang told him that he had the provincial
commander transferred and the Chief of Police replaced. His father could not do anything
to stop "Bingo 2 Balls" as it was decided by FPres. Estrada and his political career was
finish. Gov. Singson talked with Atong Ang when he was in Malaysia and told him that they
should wait for FPres. Estrada to return. FPres. Estrada returned from the United States
on September 13, 2000. Gov. Singson also arrived from Malaysia the following day. The
following day, Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada over the phone why the franchise was
given to his political enemy. Gov. Singson told him that all the mayors will be
embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he had nothing to do with it. Gov. Singson
thought that FPres. Estrada was fooling him. He told FPres. Estrada that it was a matter of
pride, that all his mayors were getting embarrassed. FPres. Estrada replied that he did not
care, so Gov. Singson told him "Kung dahil lang dyan pagkatapos ng lahat bibitawan mo
ako, bibitaw na rin ako sa iyo". [Ibid, pp. 142-146]
Gov. Singson then asked his lawyers to prepare his affidavit because he knew that his life
would be in danger if he would part ways with FPres. Estrada, who was very powerful and
Gov. Singson had no evidence. Gov. Singson then called Ricaforte and asked her to fax to
him the ledger. Ricaforte asked if they were going to Malacaang. Gov. Singson knew that
Ricaforte did not know yet what was happening. After she faxed the ledger from her house
to Gov. Singson, the latter asked his lawyer to continue with the preparation of his
affidavit. Gov. Singson said he prepared the affidavit so that if anything happened to him it
would be known who was responsible. When asked if he was threatened, Gov. Singson
replied that he knew FPres. Estrada and the men around him so he knew that his life was
in danger. [Ibid, pp. 146-150]
The first set of ledgers was faxed to Singson, while the second set (Exhs. A-4 to A-4-1)
was in the possession of Ricaforte which she produced during the impeachment
proceedings. The prosecution would have the latter subpoenaed fom the Senate.
Everyone that Gov. Singson consulted gave the same comment. Nobody will believe Gov.
Singson because FPres. Estrada was the most popular President elected. Gov. Singson
talked with Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that his family got One
Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) from him and that Jinggoy Estrada got
part of the said money. Gov. Singson also told Jinggoy Estrada that jueteng money all
went to his father and that Jinggoy Estrada also had a part of it. Jinggoy Estrada told Gov.
Singson, they would fix it. [Ibid, pp. 147-155]
Nothing happened so Gov. Singson talked with JV Ejercito, another son of FPres. Estrada.
JV Ejercito asked Gov. Singson not to come out and that he will talk with his father. Again

nothing happened so Gov. Singson approached Secretary Ronnie Zamora and showed
him the ledger. The latter reacted that the ledger was a serious matter, "Delikado ito".
Zamora asked Gov. Singson not to come out and he told Gov. Singson that he would see
FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then went to see Former Secretary Edgardo Angara at the
latters GMA Farm in Batangas and showed to him the ledger. Secretary Angara asked
Gov. Singson not to come out publicly because the ledger was a serious matter and even
they, the cabinet members may be affected. After that first meeting in Batangas, Chavit
Singon saw Secretary Angara at the Philippine Plaza and he latter told Gov. Singson that
it was alright as he was able to talk to FPres. Estrada. Secretary Angara, according to
Gov. Singson, told FPres. Estrada that Gov. Singson was a big help to them in politics and
that he was just asking for a small favor. Secretary Angara also asked FPres. Estrada not
to embarrass Gov. Singsons mayors. This matter might be known by the media.
Secretary Angara informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada got mad and replied "Sinong
tinakot nya?" Before Secretary Angara left, he told FPres. Estrada that he saw Gov.
Singsons jueteng ledger and he found it a ground for impeachment. FPres. Estrada
appeared surprised ("Nagulat") but did not say anything. Secretary Angara assured FPres.
Estrada, he will first talk with Gov. Singson and fix it. For the third time, Gov. Singson saw
Secretary Angara at New World Hotel. He asked Gov. Singson to give him until the end of
September 2000 because the FPres. was a "macho" and would not easily give in.
However, Gov. Singson replied that he was already decided because his mayors kept on
calling him. Incidentally according to Gov. Singson, these political enemies were operating
the "Bingo 2 Balls". [Ibid, pp. 156-164]
After Secretary Angara, Gov. Singson also approached Congressman Mark Jimenez, who
said after he met with FPres. Estrada, General Lacson and Secretary Ronnie Zamora that
"Bingo 2 Balls" will not stop in Ilocos Sur but that Gov. Singson should lie low first. Gov.
Singson replied that he had decided already to come out and he informed his mayors that
he will expose the anomalies involving FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson talked with Jimenez
over the phone when he was then at Holiday Inn on October 3, 2000. There was a
conference of the Mayors League in the Philippines. Gov. Singson left Holiday Inn
together with twenty-two mayors. According to Gov. Singson, armed men followed him at
about 11:30 that evening at San Marcelino Street and that his vehicle was blocked by
three cars and one motorcycle, all passengers by which were fully armed by armalite. Two
of the cars were TMG cars and the other, a civilian red car. Gov. Singson told the mayor
with whom he was talking over the phone that they should all go to San Marcelino, behind
Jai-Alai because of an emergency. His driver was instructed by Gov. Singson not to open
the door of his vehicle. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 11-19]
PAOC men signaled Gov. Singson to get out of his vehicle, a bullet-proof Ford Super Van
but he refused. He went out of the van after the mayors arrived one after another. The
PAOC team told Gov. Singson that they received information that he had a blinker that,
although he did not use it, mere possession was already a violation and that they wanted
to bring this to Crame and after he suggested that he be given a ticket of the volation but
he instead asked that they go to the police precincts at the United Nations Avenue. Only
the two TMG Officers went to the police precinct with Gov. Singson who rode in his own
van. There were media people at the police precinct. When asked why he was being
harassed although he was influencial to the FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson replied to the
media that he will expose the anomalies of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 20-26]
The following day the incident was published in the newspapers and shown on television.
The group of FPres. Esrada tried to settle with Singson. JV Ejercito was the first to call

repeatedly (every two minutes) to ask Gov. Singson to return the call of FPres. Estrada,
Gov. Singson called the latter who asked that they talk because he was confused with the
problems of the Abu Sayyaf and the First Lady. Gov. Singson replied he had already given
his word. They talked for the second time and then third time, it was FPres. Estrada
himself who called. The next person to call was Atong Ang who was pleading to Gov.
Singson to fix the matter. Gov. Singson brought up the P130 Million from the excise tax
which Gov. Singson said was taken by Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang
promised that the said amount will be returned to Gov. Singson and that the "Bingo 2
Balls" will be given to Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson informed him that it was too late. Atong
Ang called Gov. Singson about twenty (20) times [Ibid, pp. 27-37]
After Atong Ang, Former Secretary Alfredo Lim called to convince Gov. Singson to settle
and to see FPres. Estrada. Alfredo Lim asked Gov. Singson to proceed with the press
conference but he should put the blame on Atong Ang and that they will take care of Atong
Ang. Alfredo Lim gestured with his right fist thumb down. Gov. Singson understood this to
mean that Atong Ang will be killed. Gov. Singson did not agree because he might be
implicated. He asked them to look for a good reason. [Ibid, pp. 38-42)
The next to call Gov. Singson was Jinggoy Estrada. The latter and Gov. Singson talked on
October 8, 2000. Jinggoy Estrada also sent many emissaries to talk with Gov. Singson.
That evening Gov. Singson went to Cardinal Sin at his San Miguel Residence. Gov.
Singson explained to Cardinal Sin the situation and left to him the evidences so that in
case anything happens to Gov. Singson, he would know who will be responsible. Gov.
Singson saw the Cardinal with his sisters. Cardinal Sin told Gov. Singson to go ahead that
he will pray for Gov. Singson and that God will be with them. [Ibid, pp. 42-26]
Gov. Singson returned to his house at 10:00 oclock in the evening where Jinggoy Estrada
called him and sent emissaries again to Gov. Singson. At 12:00 midnight Jinggoy Estrada
and some friends of his arrived at Gov. Singsons house in Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
Jinggoy Estrada pleaded to Gov. Singson until 3:00 oclock the following morning. Gov.
Singson told Jinggoy Estrada that it was too late because his press conference will
happen in a while and all that the Estradas could do was to deny what Gov. Singson will
reveal at the press conference. He further said to Jinggoy Estrada that he will not mention
the latters name. [Ibid, pp. 46-51]
Gov. Singson proceeded with his press conference on October 9, 2000 at Club Filipino.
He gave the two reasons: first, FPres. Estrada insulted him and wanted him killed so he
was not a true friend anymore; and second, he already had the evidence and they will kill
him even if he did not pursue his planned press conference. It was better for him to be
killed with honor and to show how corrupt the government was under the Estrada
Administration. According to Gov. Singson, FPres. Estrada wanted to replace jueteng with
"Bingo-2-Balls" because he will earn more, about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) a
day. Gov. Singson explained how much FPres. Estrada would receive from "Bingo 2
Balls". [Ibid, pp. 51-59]
Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada owned the "Boracay Mansion" in New
Manila. He identified this property through a computer generated picture (Exh. P 8). [Ibid,
pp. 60-67] Gov. Singson also described the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St.,
Greenhills which he had visited frequently as well as the house of the FPres. in P.
Guevarra Street which was just 2 to 3 kilometers away from Polk Street. [Ibid, pp. 68-72]

Gov. Singson testified as to the other properties of FPres. Estrada like Fontainbleau, Inc.,
a casino. A check (Exh. V6) payable the order of Fonteinbleau, Inc. was among the checks
turned over to Ricaforte. Gov. Singson helped put up the said casino for FPres. Estrada.
However, his name does not appear as an incorporator of the said company in its Articles
of Incorporation (Exh. 22). According to Gov. Singson, the shares in the company were
distributed as follows: five percent (5%) to Butch Tenorio, the President of the casino;
twenty-five percent (25%) for Gov. Singson; seventy percent (70%) for FPres. Estrada
which were placed in the names of Jaime Dichaves and his classmate Susie Pineda. [Ibid,
pp. 72-76]
To prove his close relationship with FPres. Estrada, Gov. Singson mentioned that Jacob, a
son of the FPres. Estrada by Laarni Enriquez, was his baptismal godson while FPres.
Estrada stood as sponsor (in the wedding with his two children, Racquel and Randy).
[Ibid, pp.76-78]
On cross examination, Gov. Singson was confronted with his testimony during the Senate
impeachment trial, contained in the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings
held on December 13, 2000 at pages 234 and 235 (Exh. 28-Serapio and submarkings). In
the said testimony, Gov. Singson did not mention that Serapio was present when he
turned over to Ricaforte the jueteng protection money, partly in cash and partly in check.
[TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 147-150] Gov. Singson insisted that Serapio was present
but he was being confused by the Senators sympathetic to FPres. Estrada. It appears,
however, that Singson was not asked during impeachment proceedings who were present
during the aforementioned turn-over of jueteng protection money. [Ibid, pp. 150-151] Gov.
Singson also testified that he did not know if Ricaforte withdrew the amount in cash. Gov.
Singson was only told by Ricaforte that she gave the Two Hundred Million Pesos
(P200,000,000.00) to Serapio. [Ibid, pp. 153-156 Gov. Singson also admitted that the
P200,000,000.00 were transferred to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. [Ibid, p. 156] and
that he likewise testified before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on October 17, 2000,
as shown by the transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing of that Committee (Exh.
29 and submarkings). Ibid, pp. 158-159]. Gov. Singson acknowledged that he had came
across the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. (Exh 1-Serapio and submarkings). The said foundations Certificate of Incorporation
was dated November 17, 2000, and that the Articles of Incorporation was dated February
15, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 167-168] Gov. Singson saw for the first time during his crossexamination the certification of the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI Bank that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. maintained an account in the total amount of Two Hundred
Three Million One Hundred Thirty-Six Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-One Pesos and
Twenty Seven Centavos (P203,136,931.27) (Exh 17; 17-a-Serapio). [Ibid, p. 169]
EMMA BARBON LIM (Emma Lim) worked for Gov. Singson since July 1987 as Liaison
Officer at the latters private office in LCS Building, San Andres corner Diamante Street,
San Andres Bukid, Metro Manila. LCS stood for Luis Chavit Singson. Emma Lim did
personal errands for Gov. Singson, like collecting jueteng money from different persons for
FPres. Estrada pursuant to the instructions of Gov. Singson.
As early as January 1999, Emma Lim was already receiving deliveries of jueteng money.
Gov. Singson told her to take care of the money that she was receiving because it was not
the money of Gov. Singson but of FPres. Estrada. She started collecting jueteng money
sometime in April 1999. She personally went to the person from whom she collected the
money. She knew that it was jueteng money because Gov. Singson told her so and that it

was also confirmed by Ricaforte.

She also knew that it was jueteng money because there was an instance that Ricaforte
scolded her for opening an envelope. Ricaforte told her that it was strictly confidential and
it was intended for FPres. Estrada. Emma Lim also personally delivered jueteng money to
Malacaang.
According to Emma Lim, Ricaforte was the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. This
was how she was introduced by Gov. Singson to her and how she introduced herself
when she reported at the LCS Office. Ricaforte also held office in the same address.
Emma Lims other co-employee was Menchu Itchon. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, pp. 12-17]
Witness testified that she collected jueteng money from Undersecretary (USec) Anton
Prieto, Jinggoy Estrada and Bong Pineda.
USec Anton Prieto was the Presidential Assistant for Bicol Affairs. He was the one in
charge of jueteng collection in the Bicol Area. Witness met Prieto personally and he
introduced himself to the witness as such. Every time he called the office, he always said
that he was an Undersecretary in Malacaang.
Sometime on April 1999, Emma Lim met Prieto at the lobby of Dusit Hotel Nikko in Makati.
Usec Prieto handed to her a sealed mailing envelope which she brought to their office at
LCS Building. Emma Lim called Gov. Singson who asked her to open the envelope to
know how much she received. The envelope contained a post dated check (Exh F 7, F7-1 to
F7-5) in the amount of P1,190,000.00. Emma Lim deposited the check (Exh G 7, G7-1 to G74) in the account of Gov. Singson at the Metrobank, Ayala Center Branch on April 7, 1999.
Three days after the check was deposited, the New Accounts Department of the
Metrobank Ayala branch informed Emma Lim that the check was dishonored because the
signature was different. The check was returned through Usec Prietos messenger.
Emma Lim usually deposited the PNB Naga Branch checks from Prieto in the Account No.
0963011682260 of Gov. Singson. The deposit slips (Exhibits I7 to Q7 and submarkings)
listed the deposits.
At one time, Ricaforte scolded her for opening the envelope because it was strictly
confidential and that it was for FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte took the check from the Emma
Lim. [Ibid, pp. 17-56]
Ricaforte first reported at the LCS building on April 16, 1999. She introduced herself as
the accountant-auditor of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also introduced her as such.
Emma Lim collected jueteng money twice from Bong Pineda, who was in charge of the
jueteng collections in Pampanga because Gov. Singson told her so.
Sometime on January 2000, upon instruction of Gov. Singson, Emma Lim and Gov.
Singsons driver Faustino Prudencio went to the house of Bong Pineda at No. 2 Albany
Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila to pick-up money. At Pinedas
house, Pinedas secretary, Marty, asked her to enter an office room to wait for Bongs
brother Romy Pineda. When Romy Pineda arrived, he placed a shopping bag on top of

the table and asked Emma Lim to count the contents. The money was P5,000,000.00 in
P1,000 denominations. After counting the money, they returned the money inside the
shopping bag and Mr. Pineda made her sign a half sheet of bond paper evidencing that
she received the money. Emma Lim then kept the money inside the vault at the LCS office
and informed Gov. Singson that she had picked up the money.
The second time Emma Lim collected money from Bong Pineda was sometime on
February 2000. They were on their way home after collecting money from Jinggoy
Estrada. Menchu Itchon called her and told her that Gov. Singson wanted her to drop by
the house of Mr. Bong Pineda to pick-up money. Emma Lim proceeded and Marty again
ushered her to the office room. Romy Pineda arrived. He opened what appeared to be a
bookshelf and came out with a red Salvatore Ferragamo shopping bag (Exhibit R 7)
containing P5,000,000.00. The money was in P1,000 bills and in 5 bundles containing
P1,000,000.00 each. Romy Pineda asked her to sign a paper that she received the
amount. She kept the money in the vault assigned to her at the LCS office. She informed
Gov. Singson that she received the money from Bong Pineda, and Gov. Singson told her
that he will pass by for it. [Ibid, pp. 58-80]
She collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada three times. These were sometime in
January, February 2000 and March 17, 2000.
For the first collection, Gov. Singson called her up at the LCS office and told her to call the
office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to inquire if she can pick up what was to be picked up.
The staff of Jinggoy Estrada who answered the phone told her to go there after lunch.
Witness left the office at 1:00 oclock with the driver of Gov. Singson and proceeded to the
office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
When she arrived at the office, the staff at the receiving section gave her a sheet of paper
where she wrote her name and office. The bodyguard of Jinggoy Estrada arrived and
handed to her something which was wrapped in a magazine and sealed with scotch tape.
The bodyguard told her not to count the money because there were many people around.
She then brought the package back to the LCS office and kept it in the vault. She called
Gov. Singson and told him that she already picked up the money from Jinggoy Estrada.
When Gov. Singson arrived, witness counted the money in his presence and it was
P1,000,000.00 which she turned over to Gov. Singson.
Sometime in February 2000, she again collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada.
Gov. Singson called her up and instructed her to call up the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She
was able to talk to Jinggoy Estradas secretary Josie and was told to go to their office after
lunch.
Josie ushered her inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada was there.
Witness greeted him a good afternoon and he smiled. Josie asked her to sit in front of her
table which was about 4 to 5 meters away from Jinggoy Estrada. Josie took up a paper
bag from under her table and placed it on top of the table. She asked the witness to count
the contents. The witness counted that there were ten (10) bundles of P1,000.00 bills.
Each bundle had 100 pieces and the total amount was P1,000,000.00. She then asked
permission to leave. After coming from the office of Jinggoy Estrada, they proceeded to
the house of Bong Pineda.

She collected jueteng money for the third time from Jinggoy Estrada on March 17, 2000.
She again went to the office of Jinggoy Estrada after lunch after contacting Josie. When
she arrived there, she was ushered inside the office of Jinggoy Estrada. She can no
longer remember the number of staff inside the office. It was Josie who told her to sit
down in front of the table of Jinggoy Estrada. Jinggoy Estrada took out a check from his
wallet and gave it to her saying, "Sabihin mo kay Gob tseke na lang." Emma Lim then kept
the check inside her bag. The amount was P1,000,000.00 with United Overseas Bank
Philippines, San Juan Branch as the drawee bank. The witness deposited the check to the
account of Gov. Singson at Metrobank, Ayala Center. The deposit slip (Exhibit S 7) was
presented.
According to the witness, the check was personalized because it bore the picture of
Jinggoy Estrada at the background. Emma Lim had seen this kind of check of Gov.
Singson. [Ibid, pp. 82-111] Emma Lim maintained her testimony notwithstanding that she
was shown a certification dated December 11, 2000 issued by Isabelita M. Papa,
Executive Vice President of United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, stating that Mr. Jose
P. Estrada, also known as Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada, never had a current or checking
account with the said bank. [TSN dated July 10, 2002]
She knew that the money she kept in the vault assigned to her were jueteng collections
because Governor Singson and Ricaforte told her so. [TSN dated July 1, 2002, p. 81]
On July 3, 2002, Emma B. Lim continued her direct examination and testified that she
personally met FPres. Estrada when she delivered jueteng money to Malacanang. As
instructed by Gov. Singson, she was fetched by Singsons driver, personal aide and
security guard at Singsons office at LCS. She boarded the Ford Expedition when they
passed by the LCS office.Singson called to ask Emma Lim to double check the money
inside the car if it was Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Gov. Singsons driver Faustino
Prudencio, personal aide Jemis Singson and security guard Frederico Artates were inside
the car too when she bundle count the money. They proceeded to the residence of FPres.
Estrada at Polk Street, Greenhills. However, Artates and Jamis Singson were informed by
the security guards that Malou Florendo and FPres. Estrada were not at home. They
waited outside and decided to take their lunch in a restaurant in Greenhills. They brought
the black bag containing the money with them at the restaurant. Gov. Singsons personal
aide was holding the bag. Driver Faustino Prudencio received instruction from Singson for
them to proceed to Malacanang. It was already 1:00 oclock, after lunchtime in 1999
during the Maslog book scam in Malacanang. She recalled it because her companion
warned her not to open the bag because "Baka ma-maslog ka ". In that incident, Maslog
was caught bringing money inside Malacanang. Emma Lim was dropped-off at the circle
inside Malacanang. She carried the black bag containing P5,000,000.00. Emma Lim
introduced herself to the security guard as Emma from the office of Governor Gov.
Singson and told him Malou Florendo was expecting her. The amount of P5,000,000.00
was in One thousand (P 1,000.00) peso bills. [TSN dated July 3, 2002, pp. 190-207] The
security guard allowed her to enter, without passing the bag through the x-ray. The guard
was not strict and pointed to her the Presidential Residence. There was another security
guard in front of the house and Emma Lim gave the same introduction and that Malou
Florendo was expecting her. Emma was allowed to enter. She was met by Malou inside
the residence, Emma Lim saw FPres. Estrada, wearing a cream polo. Emma Lim handed
the black bag to Malou Florendo. Emma Lim and FPres. Estrada were within each others
view. Malou placed the black bag beside an office table. Emma Lim heard Malou told Gov.
Singson over the phone that she was already there. Emma Lim left for the LCS office.

[Ibid, pp. 242-261] Emma Lim described the black bag as rectangular with numbered
combination lock. The width was about 8 inches, the length, 18 inches and the height was
12 inches. It was made of canvass or synthetic material. Emma demonstrated in court that
she could carry a bag of similar size with P 5,000,000.00 inside. Five bundles of bills
weighed four (4) kilos and eight (8) grams. [Ibid, pp. 263-279,280] The bag weighed 2
kilos and 6 grams. The bag and its contents weighed 7 kilos and 4 grams. [Ibid, p. 288]
On cross-examination, Emma Lim testified that she worked for Gov. Singson since 1987.
She started living at LCS Office since 1989 until she got married in 1996. She did not pay
rent just like the other employees of Singson. She was not related to Singson. Her brother
Roy Barbon worked as driver for Singson between 1990 and 1992. She did not feel
beholden to Gov. Singson because she worked for her salary. She did not owe him a debt
of gratitude but it should be the other way around because she got embroiled in this
trouble because of jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 296-308]
Emma Lim attended a dinner at Malacaang Palace on February 16, 2001. [TSN dated
July 17, 2002, pp. 75-77] She was appointed at John Hay Development Corporation
during the term of President Arroyo. She received Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00) per
board meeting. Emma Lim also worked as liaison officer of Gov. Singson for overseas
workers. [Ibid, pp.87-88] She knew that she was collecting jueteng money because Gov.
Singson said so and Ricaforte comfirmed. Further the money delivered was bundled by
millions and no money of that amount arrived their office when Gov. Singson was not yet a
collector. [Ibid, p. 99]
MARIA CARMENCITA ANCHETA ITCHON (Itchon), a Certified Public Accountant,
testified that she was hired by Gov. Singson to be an accountant of Fountain Bleau
Incorporated (later renamed Fontain Bleau Incorporated) on February 19, 1999. According
to Itchon, the said corporation, which was set-up to build a casino in Clark Air Base,
Pampanga, was owned by former President Estrada. Witness knew that this was owned
by Estrada because Gov. Singson said so and it was confirmed by Mrs. Ricaforte. [TSN,
June 17, 2002, pp. 115-118]
She allegedly knew that Fontain Bleau Incorporated got its funding from
the jueteng collections of FPres. Estrada because Gov. Singson would always tell her to
wait for the jueteng collection of FPres. Estrada every time she asked for funds. [Ibid, pp.
119-122]
As Accountant, she was the one who made the listings of the pre-operation and expenses
of Fontain Bleau and during that time she was the Accountant, she already
received jueteng collections for FPres. Estrada.
Itchon further testified that she received jueteng collections, amounting to a total of around
Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) in cash and check, about six (6) times. She received
these jueteng collections from the messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and former San Juan
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells. After receiving the collections, she would inform
Gov. Singson and then either Gov. Singson took the collection from her or they turned it
over to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
Itchon identified Fontain Bleus original Certificate of Incorporation (Exh. P 6) and the
Articles of Incorporation and By Laws attached (Exh. P6-1), which were in her possession.
These incorporation documents showed the date of Fontain Bleaus registration with the

Securities and Exchange Commission (April 5, 1999), the names of its incorporators, and
its office address at the 2nd Floor, LCS Building, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Itchons sketch
of the office was marked as Exh. Q6. [Ibid., pp. 123-124,132-137]
Itchon averred that before she personally met Yolanda Ricaforte at the office in LCS,
Ricaforte used to call their office and introduced herself as the Accountant Auditor for
FPres. Estrada. As early as March 19, 1999, Singson told Itchon that she would be
working with Yolanda Ricaforte, the Accountant of FPres. Estrada. Ricaforte began to
report for work in the same office as Itchon on April 16, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 129-132, 138-141]
Singson and Ricaforte told Itchon that Ricaforte will be her [Itchons] immediate
supervisor. Ricaforte checked Itchons entries in her journal. Ricaforte signed the check
that Itchon prepared for payment for the supplier of Fontain Bleau and Ricaforte brought
Itchon every time she went to the Pampanga office.
Itchon proceeded to narrate how in the course of their work she and Ricaforte became
close and had many conversations including among others how FPres. Estrada came to
appoint Ricafortes husband Orestes Ricaforte as undersecretary of Tourism and how
FPres. Estrada gifted Orestes with the Black Lexus that Yolanda and Itchon usually used
in traveling to the Pampanga office. Itchon had photographs of gatherings she attended
with Ricaforte (Exh. A-6-vvvvv). [Ibid, pp. 143-152]
Itchon knew Ricaforte to be the AccountantAuditor of FPres. Estrada in Fontain Bleau
Incorporated and for jueteng collections because Ricaforte reported directly to FPres.
Estrada. Itchon then narrated how on June 15, 1999, she and Mrs. Regina Lim (one of the
incorporators of Fontain Bleau) brought Ricaforte to Malacaang at around 3:30 p.m. They
brought her there because Ricaforte said she would report to FPres. Estrada. Before
going to Malacaang, Ricaforte took their records of Fontain Bleau, got Itchons journal
and the list of expenses and then Itchon briefed her regarding their expenses. [Ibid, pp.
155-162]
Itchon also testified that Ricaforte also reported to FPres. Estrada by phone, sometimes
using the landline in the office and sometimes using her [Ricafortes] cell phone. Itchon
knew that the calls were made to FPres. Estrada because she was around when Ricaforte
was making calls, and Ricaforte would ask her to keep quiet because she was calling the
President. The calls were made inside the LCS office.
Itchon explained that she knew that the cell phone number of Ricaforte was 09189021847 because the number was originally issued in Itchons name. The cell phone was
supposed to be hers. When they were in Fontain Bleau, they bought cell phones and the
application form for the number was under Itchons name. Itchon was the one who
assigned it to herself. But when the cell phones came, Itchon testified that Ricaforte took
the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 and the number 0918-9021849 originally assigned to
Ricaforte went to Itchon. Itchon also testified that Ricaforte called up Estrada in her
presence about five times.
Itchon prepared a summary of the calls (Exh. R6 with submarkings) made by Ricaforte.
Itchon explained that these were the summary of phone calls of Ricaforte to FPres.
Estrada at the presidential residence; to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or Jingle Bells, to Mr.
Edward Serapio, to Governor Singson and to Mr. Romy Pineda, the brother of Bong
Pineda. She took the information from the fifteen (15) Statements of Account of Ricaforte

for her cell number 0918-9021847. The phone billings of Ricaforte particularly with
reference to cell phone no. 0918-9021847 were with Itchon. [Ibid, pp. 163-175]
Itchon averred that she prepared or came up with a summary of calls made by Mrs.
Ricaforte upon the advice of her lawyer Atty. Pablito Sanidad because when she and Mrs.
Ricaforte testified in the Senate Blue Ribbon Hearing Committee, Mrs. Ricaforte testified
that she seldom or never called up President Joseph Estrada, Mr. Jinggoy Estrada, Atty.
Edward Serapio, Governor Singson and Mr. Romy Pineda. Itchon also testified that when
she prepared the summary based on the entries on the particular phone billings, she
found out several phone calls to those persons mentioned. [TSN, June 19, 2002, pp. 8-12]
Fifteen (15) Statements of Account (Exhs. S6, S6-1 up to S6-14) issued by Smart
communications were also identified by Itchon purporting to be statements of account of
Cell phone No. 0918-9021847. The Statements of Account covered the billing period
ending July 1999 and billing period ending August 31, 2000. The billing statements of
account were received by Itchon from the company for her to pay. The cell phone bills
were being paid by Fontain Bleau, but when Fontain Bleau ceased to exist, the phone bills
were paid by Ricaforte with money from jueteng collections. [Ibid, pp. 15-18]
Itchon affirmed that she was present during Mrs. Ricafortes phone call to the presidential
residence in five instances. During these times, Mrs. Ricaforte was at the LCS office and
Itchon was either beside her or in front of Mrs. Ricafortes office table. Itchon pointed out
in the sketch (Exh. Q6) she prepared where she was during the five times when the calls
were made in her presence.
The number or numbers Ricaforte called up were 736-8855 and 736-8858. Itchon testified
that she knew that the numbers pertain to the numbers in the Presidential Residence
because they had office records and she also tried calling the number. When she dialed
the numbers she asked if it was the PMS. The answer was it was the Presidential
Residence. When asked why Itchon checked and called the numbers in the first place,
she answered that when she checked Mrs. Ricafortes cell phone bills, she found out that
the numbers were there so she tried calling to check whether it was the Presidential
Residence.
When asked what was the nature or gist of the conversation from the end of Mrs.
Ricaforte when she called up the Presidential residence, Itchon answered that Mrs.
Ricaforte said: "Malou, this is Yolly. Is the President already calling for me? If he needed
me, just call me on the cell phone." According to Itchon, Malou was the secretary of
FPres. Estrada and Itchon knew this because it was Mrs. Ricaforte who told her. [Ibid., pp.
18-23]
According to Itchon, there were also calls made to former San Juan Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada and, in her summary, Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twenty-four (24)
times. On at least five occasions, Itchon testified that she was present when Ricaforte
called up Jinggoy Estrada while they [Itchon and Ricaforte] were both in the LCS office.
Itchon distinctly remembered two dates of Ricafortes phone calls to Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada (a) August 16, 1999 when Ricaforte called up Jinggoy in his residence because
that was the first call of Ricaforte when she started concentrating as the accountantauditor of former President Estrada in his "jueteng" collections; and (b) November 15,
1999 because Ricaforte called up Mayor Jinggoy several times as they were waiting for

Mayor Jinggoys jueteng collection from which they would get their salaries.
The cell phone number of Jinggoy Estrada was 0917-526-0217 and his landline number
was 724-4736. Itchon knew that these numbers pertain to Jinggoy Estrada because she
got the numbers from Gov. Singson. She got the number because she wanted to check
the cell phone bills of Ricaforte because there were times that she remembered that
Ricaforte had been calling the number of Jinggoy Estrada which Itchon was not aware of.
[Ibid, pp. 23-28]
Based on Itchons as well as the phone billings, Ricaforte called up Atty. Edward Serapio
six (6) times at cell phone No. 0918-9012071. Itchon also got the number of Atty. Serapio
from Gov. Singson. Based on the Smart Communications phone billings, Ricaforte called
up Atty. Serapio on March 23 and 24, 2000, and April 3, 12, 13, and 14, 2000. (Exh.
S6 with submarkings) [Ibid., pp. 29-35]
According to Itchons summary, Mrs. Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson 209 times at cell
phone nos. 0917-8387171 and 0918-9002443. Itchon was present several times when
Ricaforte called up Gov. Singson. Itchon knew that these numbers pertained to Gov.
Singson because she was familiar with these cell phone numbers. [Ibid, pp. 37-38]
Itchon also testified to calls made by Ricaforte to a certain Romy Pineda, the brother Bong
Pineda, whom she knew was a jueteng lord. Itchon testified that Ricaforte called up Romy
Pineda in his landline number, 722-7366. Based on the Summary that Itchon prepared,
Ricaforte called up Romy Pineda twice. [Ibid, pp. 38-39]
Itchon further testified that Fontain Bleau, Inc. was not able to operate because Fontain
Bleau could not comply with PAGCORs requirement for a 200-room hotel accommodation
so it was not issued a license to operate.
After the non-issuance of the license to operate, Fontain Bleau entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with RN Development Corporation on July 19, 1999 (Exhs.
T6, T6-1 to T6-2). The Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") stipulated that RN Development
Corporation will reimburse all the pre-operations expenses of Fontain Bleau and that
Fontain Bleau will have a 10% share from the casino that will be established by RN
Development Corporation. Itchon was present during the signing of the MOA. She
identified the signatures of the witnesses to the MOA; namely, a certain Pax who was
introduced to Itchon as Atong Angs sister (Exh. T6-2-c) and Yolanda Ricaforte (Exh. T6-2d). Itchon testified that she came to know Atong Ang during the negotiation of the MOA
and that Atong Ang was present during the signing.
As far as Itchon knew, the pre-operational expenses of Fontain Bleau was around Sixty
Five Million Pesos (P65,000,000.00). This was reimbursed by RN Development
Corporation to Fontain Bleau pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. Itchon brought
with her a copy of RN's deposit slip and their first payment in the amount of Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. U6) and testified that the depositors signature therein was
Emma Lims, one of the secretaries in the LCS office. Itchon also had a photocopies of the
second check that RN paid to Fontain Bleau in the amount of Thirty Four Million Six
Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two Pesos (P34,640,442.00) (Exh. V 6)
and of the acknowledgement receipt (Exh. V6-1) signed by Ricaforte and Atty. Manuel
Singson, as Director and Corporate Secretary, respectively of Fontain Bleau. Itchon
further testified that Ricaforte got the originals of these documents but Itchon had them

photocopied for her record before Ricaforte took the originals.

Since Fontain Bleau was unable to operate, all the employees of Fontain Bleau in the
Pampanga office were terminated. It was only Itchon and Mrs. Ricaforte who were
retained. [Ibid, pp. 39-58]
In August 1999, Ricaforte already concentrated on being the accountant-auditor of FPres.
Estrada in his "jueteng" operation and then Itchon was told by Gov. Singson to help
Ricaforte. Nothing happened to Fontain Bleau anymore. Itchon allegedly knew that in
August 1999, Ricaforte concentrated in the jueteng collection because Itchon was there
when Gov. Singson briefed Ricaforte regarding the collection of the jueteng operation and
she [Ricaforte] was given the code name "Madam Auring" by Gov. Singson. [Ibid, pp. 5860]
Itchons testimony then detailed how she participated in the "jueteng" collections. She was
tasked to receive the "jueteng" collections that were brought to the office. There were also
times when Itchon or Emma Lim were called by Ricaforte to help compute and count the
money turned over to Ricaforte such as double checking through a calculator. Collections
that Itchon received were brought by messengers of Mr. Anton Prieto and sometimes by
the messengers of Gov. Singson who picked up the jueteng collections from Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada. Itchon knew Prietos messenger because when the messenger came,
the checks were inside the white envelope with markings "Menchu/Emma" and then the
messenger introduced himself as messenger of Anton Prieto. Itchon was also present
when Gov. Singson was giving instructions to his messengers to get jueteng collections
from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Gov. Singsons messengers were Mr. Jamis Singson and
Edward Iverra. Each collection was One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per collection in
cash. She remembers these collections from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada on two (2) occasions
because it was from there that they (Ricaforte, Lim, Itchon and Iverra) took their salary.
According to Itchon, these jueteng collections came in around 15th and 30th of the month.
From the time that they started concentrating on the jueteng collection for the former
President on August 1999, Itchon received these collections about six (6) times, covering
the period August 1999 to August 2000. The total collections she received after August
1999 was around Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). With respect to the Seven Million
Peso collections that she received, there were times when Gov. Singson took the
collection directly from her and there were times when Gov. Singson instructed her to turn
over the collection to Ricaforte. As Accountant of Fontain Bleau, she also received six (6)
collections, for the period February 1999 to July 1999. All in all Itchon averred she
received twelve (12) collections. [Ibid, pp. 61-66]
Itchon also testified that Emma Lim was the secretary of Governor Singson and also a coemployee at the LCS Office. Since Emma Lim was also helping in the jueteng collections,
she also received salary from Ricaforte. [Ibid, pp. 71-72]
On cross examination, Itchon explained that the name of the former President allegedly
did not appear in the Articles of Incorporation of Fontain Bleau because of his public
position and because the source of its funds was illegal [TSN, June 24, 2002, pp. 19-20].
Emma Lim, Jamis Singson, Edward Iverra and sometimes Ricaforte collected jueteng
money from Jinggoy Estrada. Jamis Singson turned over to Itchon the jueteng collection
about once or twice in 2000 between January to August 2000. Itchon testified that they
helped Gov. Singson count Five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00) from the jueteng

collections sent through the messengers and some from the collections of Gov. Singson
himself and placed the said amount of money in a black bag to be brought to FPres.
Estrada but she admitted she did not see the delivery to President Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 2330, 101]
Itchon and the others at the office would allegedly wait for the call of Ricaforte to Jinggoy
every pay day because their salaries would come from Jinggoys jueteng collection. Itchon
was only present around five (5) times that Ricaforte called Jinggoy, although Ricaforte
called Jinggoy 24 times. (Ibid, pp. 39-46) Itchon also mentioned during her crossexamination that Gov. Singson was reimbursed for the jueteng money advanced to
Fontain Bleau when the latter was acquired by RN Development Corporation. RN
Development Corporations partial payment in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) was deposited in the account of Fontain Bleau by Ricaforte and
Ricaforte thereafter returned to Singson the said amount through a Metrobank check
payable to Singson. (Exhs. X6, X6-1, X6-2) [Ibid, pp. 125-127; TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 2526]
According to Itchon, the use by Ricaforte of the cell phone no. 0918-9021847 in the name
of Itchon was proven by the cell phone number declared by Ricaforte in the bank where
she deposited money (Ibid, p. 19). She admitted that she and Emma Lim were appointed
by President Arroyo as Director of John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation on
September 2001. (Exh. 26, 26-a to 26-c-1) [TSN, June 26, 2002, pp. 51-56]
On redirect, Itchon referred to the acknowledgement receipt dated March 12, 1999 (Exh.
Y-6) for the advance rental of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) as well as the landscape
plan of said company (Exhs. E7, E7-1 to E7-6) as proof that that original name of Fontain
Bleau was spelled Fountain Bleau Holding, Inc. [Ibid, p. 100]
Smart Communications billings identified by Itchon were marked as Exhs. X 6, X6-1 to X6-2
[Ibid, pp. 101-105]. Itchon also brought to court the journal (Exhs. A7-1 to A7-5) and
computerized list (Exh. B7, B7-1 to B7-3) of the pre-operation expenses of Fountain Bleau
amounting to Sixty Five Million (P65,000,000.00) which were reimbursed by RN
Development Corporation. She also presented the computerized list of said expenses with
specifics (Exh. C7, C7-1 to C7-4) and some of the checks of Gov. Singson which were used
to pay the expenses of Fountain Bleau from March 3, 1999 to June 20, 1999 (Exh. D 7, D71 to D7-95) The funds of Fountain Bleau were taken by Gov. Singson from jueteng
collections. The check covering part of the reimbursement to Fountain Bleau in the
amount of Thirty Four Million Six Hundred Forty Thousand Four Hundred and Forty Two
Pesos (P34,640,442.00) was marked as Exh. V6 (with submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 106-117]
VICENTE RAGIL AMISTAD (Amistad) was a Philippine National Police (PNP) officer
stationed at Vigan City Police Station, assigned to former Gov. Singson since 1989 until
the time of his testimony. On three (3) occasions in 1999 and 2000, Amistad was
instructed by Gov. Singson to go to the house of Bong Pineda at Albany Street, Northeast
Greenhills and received from Romy Pineda, Bong Pinedas brother, the followings sums of
money: Seven Million Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,750,000.00); Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) and Three Million Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P3,250,000.00).
Amistad would bundle count, place the money in a plastic bag and bring it to Gov. Singson
at LCS building, after signing a receipt prepared by Romy Pineda. [TSN, September 16,
2002, pp. 15-56]

Amistad also testified that upons instruction of Singson, he went to the office of then
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor of the Municipal Hall of San Juan in 1999. After
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada called up someone, he [Jinggoy] asked Amistad to go down and
get what Jinggoy would give him in front of the Municipal Hall. At the ground floor, the
security guard of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada gave him a package wrapped in a newspaper
with scotch tape, which he brought to Gov. Singson at LCS Building. Amistad testified that
he was was scolded by Gov. Singson because the money inside the package was short.
Gov. Singson called up Jinggoy and informed the latter about the shortage. The following
day Amistad was informed by Gov. Singson that the shortage of Jinggoy was already
given to him.
JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) was the personal aide of Gov. Singson, who was
not related to him. Jamis Singson knew FPres Estrada and Gov. Singson to be close
friends who played mahjong and drank together. Jamis Singson was constantly with Gov.
Singson when he delivered jueteng money to FPres Estrada. [TSN, September 18, 2002,
pp. 25-31] Jamis Singson saw Gov. Singson counting the jueteng money before he placed
them in a black bag which he would carry.
Jamis also testified that in March 1999, he, Artates and driver Prudencio went to the
house of Bong Pineda. Artates went inside the house and when he went out, he was
carrying a shopping bag full of money. Jamis then transferred the money to a black bag
which Gov. Singson used to deliver money to FPres. Estrada. Jamis described the black
bags measurements and how it was opened from the top with a combination (lock) ( Exh.
"08"). The money totalled Five Million Pesos (P 5,000,000.00 ) in five (5) bundles of One
Million Pesos ( P1,000,000.00 ) each. They proceed to LCS Building in San Andres to pick
up Emma Lim as instructed by Gov. Singson. Inside the vehicle, Emma Lim counted the
money. [Ibid, pp. 68-81] They went to the Polk Street house of FPres. Estrada but the
latter was not home. While having lunch at a restaurant, Emma Lim received a call from
Gov. Singson instructing them to go to Malacaang. Emma Lim alighted from the vehicle
with the black bag and entered passing through the guard house in going to the
Presidential residence. They waited outside. Emma Lim asked to be fetched later and she
was no longer holding the black bag. [TSN, ibid, pp. 83-90]
Jamis also testified to one occasion in the middle of 1999 when he himself was instructed
by Gov. Singson to collect money from the house of Bong Pineda. That time Jamis
received Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) in a shopping bag from Romeo "Romy"
Pineda. Romy made Jamis sign a blue book and then Jamis brought the money to Gov.
Singson in the latters office. [Ibid, pp. 91-101]
Jamis also testified he collected jueteng money from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada twice on Gov.
Singsons instructions. For the first occasion, on or about October 1999 Jamis went to the
office of then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada at the second floor Municipal Hall of San Juan at
around 4pm to 5 pm. Inside the said office, Jinggoy Estradas bodyguard Nestor showed a
sando plastic bag to Jinggoy Estrada and after that Jamis saw Jinggoy pointing to him
[Jamis]. Jamis brought the plastic bag, which Jamis subsequently saw contained an
indeterminable amount of money, to Singson at the latters office. [Ibid, pp. 105-121]
The second time Jamis collected jueteng money from Jinggoy Estrada was immediately
after the first time, in the evening.Thus, Gov. Singson instructed Jamis to proceeed to the
house of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada in Greenhills. At Mayor Jinggoys house, Jamis again
received a plastic sando bag from "Nestor". Jamis brought the bag to Gov. Singsons

office and handed it to Menchu (Ma. Carmencita) Itchon as Gov. Singson instructed.
Jamis identified Menchu in Court. He said she was the companion of Ricaforte in the
office. [Ibid., pp. 121-132]
ATTY. DAVID JONATHAN YAP (Atty. Yap), the Senate Legal Counsel, testified that he
acted as the Deputy Clerk of the Senate Impeachment Court. Among others, his office
was in charge of receiving all documents and pleadings relating to the impeachment trial.
He was in charge of marking the Exhs. requested by the parties and keeping them in
custody. He brought to this Court in compliance with a subpoena a fifteen (15)-paged
document marked in this case as prosecutions Exhs. "A-4" to "A-4-L" [TSN, September
25, 2002, p. 63] He identified his signatures that he affixed on the Exhibits on December
7, 2002. He testified that he saw Yolanda Ricaforte when she brought those documents to
the Senate Impeachment Court in compliance with a subpoena dated December 5, 2000
(Exh. E) issued by Chief Justice Davide. Atty. Yap was present when Ricaforte took her
oath on the witness stand on December 7, 2000 He identified Ricaforte from a photograph
(Exh. A6-V5-1). The Original documents were placed in a vault inside his office, where they
had been kept and deposited since they were turned to him during the impeachment trial,
except only when they were sent over to the Sandiganbayan as requested. [Ibid., p. 77]
Atty. Yap was at the back of Yolanda Ricaforte at the Senate Impeachment Trial when she
gave her testimony that the ledger she brought is an ordinary "listahan." [TSN, Senate
Impeachment Trial, p. 144; see also TSN of these cases,September 25, 2002, pp. 78-79]
EDELQUINN DE GUZMAN NANTES (Nantes) was the Branch Manager of Equitable-PCI
Bank, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch on September 1, 1999. Nantes knew Yolanda Ricaforte
because the latter was a client of the bank. Ricaforte told Nantes that she [Ricaforte] was
in the real estate and fish pond business.
Nantes personally attended to Ricaforte when the latter opened checking and savings
account with the branch on September 1, 1999. She asked Ricaforte to fill up all the
required documents for opening current and savings accounts such as the signature cards
for Current Account No. 0107-00638-9 and Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. (Exhs. A6, A-6-a and A-6-b) [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 67-72]
Ricaforte opened one checking account, one savings account, seven special savings
accounts and a PCI Emerald Fund. The initial amount of deposit in the savings account
was Seventeen Million Two hundred Five Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000.00) as shown by
the deposit slip for Savings Account No. 0517-042227 (Exh. A-6-aa). The Seventeen
Million Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P17,210,000.00) was in check payable to
cash. The Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) was deposited in the checking account No.
0107-001638-9 (Exh. A-6-bb) and the balance of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five
Thousand Pesos (P17,205,000) was deposited in the savings account. [Ibid, pp. 80-85]
There were deposits made on the savings account of Ricaforte after the initial deposit.
Nantes presented and identified the deposit slips and the statement of accounts of
Ricaforte (Exh. A-6 and submarkings) which were: Deposit Slip dated September 1, 1999
(Exh. A-6-aa) with the amount of Seventeen Million Two Hundred Five Thousand Pesos
(P17,205,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-cc) with the amount of
Three Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,700,000.00); Deposit Slip dated
September 29, 1999 (Exh. A-6-dd) with the amount of One Million Six Hundred Ninety
Seven Thousand Pesos (P1,697,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September 7, 1999 (Exh. A-

6-ee) with the amount of Ten Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,400,000.00);
Deposit Slip dated September 15, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ff) with the amount of Five Million Seven
Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P5,775,000.00); Deposit Slip dated September
17, 1999 (Exh. A-6-gg) with the amount of Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P750,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-hh) with the amount of Nine
Million Fifty Thousand Pesos (P9,050,000.00); Deposit Slip dated October 19, 1999 (Exh.
A-6-ii) with the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P6,650,000.00);
Deposit Slip dated November 4, 1999 (Exh. A-6-jj) with the amount of Six Million Nine
Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P6,930,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 16, 1999
(Exh. A-6-kk) with the amount of Four Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P4,600,000.00); Deposit Slip dated November 19, 1999 (Exh. A-6-ll) with the amount of
One Million Seven Hundred Eleven Thousand Pesos (P1,711,000.00); Deposit Slip dated
December 7, 1999 (Exh. A-6-mm) with the amount of Nine Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand
One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P989,150.00); Deposit Slip dated January 10, 2000 (Exh. A-62) with the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00); and a deposit slip (Exh. A-6-3)
with the amount of Two Million Four Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,460,000.00).
Bank statements reflected withdrawals (Exhs. A-6-nn to A-6-zz) from the savings account
for the period September 30, 1999 to October 31, 2000. [Ibid, pp. 87-97]
With respect to the Current Account No. 0107-00638-9, witness identified the specimen
signature card (Exh. A-6-a and A-6) to show that the initial deposit slip was Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-bb). [Ibid, p. 98]
Ricaforte signed in the presence of Nantes the Authority to Debit and Transfer Funds
(Exh. A-6-G) which allowed funds to be automatically transferred from savings to current
account to cover checks issued. [TSN dated May 27, 2002, pp. 11-16]
The initial deposit for the First Special Savings Account No. 0157-90392-6 was Seventy
Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00) as shown by the Special Savings Passbook (Exh. A-6-S 3)
of Ricaforte dated December 2, 1999. The account was closed on April 13, 2000. It had a
balance of Seventy One Million Three Hundred Ninety Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy
Five and Eight Centavos (P71,390,875.08) which was transferred to Ricafortes regular
Savings Account. [Ibid, pp. 22-24, 43]
In the Second Special Savings Account covered by Special Savings Passbook No.
392093 dated February 7, 2000 (Exh. A-6-X3) showed the initial deposit of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was taken from the regular savings account. A withdrawal of the
whole amount of Ten Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Six
Pesos and Fifty Seven Centavos (P10,113,836.57) was made on April 13, 2000 reflected
in the Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-ZZZ). [Ibid, pp. 49-60]
The Third Special Savings Account was opened on March 29, 2000 for Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The money was taken from her regular
Savings Account No. 0157-04427-0. The amount of Two Million Five Hundred One
Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Six Pesos and Sixty Six Centavos (P2,501,666.66) was
withdrawn from the special savings account as shown by the certified true copy of the
Credit Advice dated April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-C4). [Ibid, pp. 84, 93-95]
The Fourth Special Savings Account No. 3157-00073-9 covered by the Special Savings
Passbook No. 392178 (Exh A-6-E4) had an initial deposit of Nine Million Seven Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P9,700,000.00) as found in the deposit receipt dated April 5, 2000 (Exh
A-6-D4). On April 13, 2000, the Special Savings was cancelled and preterminated. The
amount of Nine Million Seven Hundred Three Thousand (P9,703,000) was credited to
Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0. [Ibid, pp. 115-124]
The Fifth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-G4) which was opened on May 29, 2000
under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte had an initial deposit of Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). The initial deposit was withdrawn from her regular
Savings Account. The Special Savings was closed on September 4, 2000 and the amount
of Two Million Five Hundred Fifty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Eleven Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P2,559,411.20) was credited to her Regular Savings Account 0157-04227-0.
[Ibid, pp. 128-129, 135, 138]
The Sixth Special Savings Account (Exh. A-6-L4), under the name of Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
was opened on May 4, 2000 for One Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,900,000.00). The account was closed on September 4, 2000 as per Debit Advice
dated September 4, 2000 (Exh. A-6-P4) for the matured Special Savings Account worth
Two Million Twenty Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Nine Pesos and Eighteen
Centavos (P2,022,429.18). [Ibid, pp. 147153]
The Seventh Special Savings Account No. 3157-00088-7 dated June 1, 2000 (Exh. A-6Q4) was worth Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in cash. The account was closed on
September 4, 2000 and the proceeds were credited to the Regular Savings Account No.
0157-04227-0. The balance (Exh. A-6-T4) then was Two Million Thirty Five Thousand
Thirty Five Pesos and Ninety One Centavos (P2,035,035.91). [Ibid, pp. 156, 166]
The PCI Emerald Fund was in the amount of Six Million Six Hundred Sixteen Thousand
Six Hundred Seventy Six Pesos and Nineteen Centavos (P6,616,676.19) (Exh. A-6-U 4 and
Exh. A-6-V4). The fund was then rolled-over monthly as evidenced by the Confirmation
letter (Exh. A-6-Z4) dated December 6, 2000. It was again rolled-over several times until it
was redeemed on June 5, 2002. [Ibid, p. 168, 176 -193]
The first four Special Savings Accounts were all debited on April 13, 2000 and Ricaforte
purchased a Cashiers Check payable to Cash for Ninety One Million Pesos
(P91,000,000). The Application for Cashiers check (Exh. "A-6- R5") was signed by
Ricaforte as purchaser. The Cashiers check (Exh. A-6- S5 and Exh. A-6-U5) was cleared
and accepted by Equitable PCI Bank, Makati Pacific Star Branch, based on the dorsal
portion of the check.
The last three Special Savings Accounts (Special Savings Account Nos. 3157-00077-1,
3157-00080-1, and 3157-00088-7) were closed on September 4, 2000 and all the
proceeds were credited to the regular savings account, and then invested in the PCI
Emerald Fund for Six Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P6,600,000.00). [Ibid, pp.
168, 206-207]
Nantes met Ricaforte more than twenty times and identified the latter through a picture
shown by the prosecution. (Exh. A-6-V5) [TSN, May 29, 2002, pp. 16-20]
The current account balance is at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) (Exh. A-6-W 5) and
that of the Savings Account is One Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Seven Hundred
Thirty Six and Sixty Nine Centavos (P197,736.69) (Exh. A-6-X5). The last withdrawal from

the savings account was made on October 5, 2000 for automatic transfer to the current
account in the amount of Seventy Nine Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four and Eighty
Centavos (P79,664.80). The last deposit was on October 4, 2000, through a credit
memorandum of Thirty Seven Thousand Twenty Nine Pesos and Seventeen Centavos
(P37,029.17) which represented the interest of the PCI Emerald Fund. After October 5,
2000 there were no more counter transactions, only the entry of interest earned and
withholding tax. [Ibid, pp. 23-27]
ROSARIO SALUDO BAUTISTA (Bautista) is the Senior Branch Manager of the
Equitable, PCI Bank, Diliman, Matalino Branch. Bautista personally attended to Yolanda
Ricaforte who was a walk-in client of the branch on November 19, 1999. Ricaforte opened
a savings account and used her California drivers license and passport for identification.
The duly accomplished specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-z) was presented to show the
existence of the savings account. It was personally accomplished by Mrs. Ricaforte in the
presence of Bautista. The initial deposit of Mrs. Ricaforte was Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) in cash. [TSN, May 29, 2000, pp. 93-96]
Ricaforte returned to the branch on November 22, 1999. She opened a combo account
and closed the savings account she opened on November 19, 1999. The combo account
was Savings Account Number 0288-02037-0 and Current Account Number 0238-00853-0.
As a new account, Bautista required Mrs. Ricaforte to accomplish signature cards (Exh. A7 and A-7-a). When the combo account was already opened, Ricaforte presented for
deposit two (2) checks totaling Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). Each check (Exh.
A-7-B and A-7-C) was payable to cash for Thirty Five Million Pesos (P35,000,000.00). The
drawer was William T. Gatchalian and the drawee bank was PCI Bank, main office in
Makati City.
Ricaforte told Bautista that the money came from the proceeds of the sale of a prime
property sold to Mr. Gatchalian. As precautionary measure, the branch of Bautista
checked with the drawee bank PCI Makati and they learned that Gatchalians account was
a good account.
There were additional deposits made to the account. One deposit made on November 23,
1999 was a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Governor Luis Gov. Singson dated November
22, 1999 for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) payable to cash. The drawee bank was
Metro Bank, Ayala. The second check deposit made was on December 16, 1999 payable
to cash with PNB, Naga Branch as drawee bank. The check (Exh. A-7-i) was dated
December 9, 1999. The check was deposited and subsequently cleared.
On December 2, 1999, Ricaforte deposited Three Million Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P3,050,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-7-d). The cash was in big bills, P1,000 and P500
denominations. Ricaforte explained to Bautista that the amount came from other accounts
in other banks because she planned to transfer all her other accounts to Equitable,
Diliman, Matalino Branch. Another cash deposit (Exh. A-7-f and Exh. A-7-aa) was made
on January 28, 2000 for One Million Pesos. [Ibid, pp. 100-130]
Ricaforte also opened a special saving account number 3288-00079-3 in the amount of
Seventy Million Pesos (P70,000,000.00). The initial deposit was taken from Ricafortes
savings account (Exh. A-7-j). The account was opened with passbook number 394979
(Exh. A-7-bb) and the specimen signature card (Exh. A-7-cc). The account has already

been closed. [Ibid, pp. 132-135]

On February 24, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte again transferred Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000)
from her ordinary savings account to a special savings account deposit (Exh. A-7-w) with
Account Number 3288-00087-4. Ricaforte also accomplished a specimen signature card
(Exh. A-7-dd) for the Special Savings Account.
On April 13, 2000 Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a Sevety Seven Million Peso (P77,000,000)
cashiers check against her special savings deposit account. She accomplished an
application form (Exh. A-7-l) for the transaction. Ricaforte had to accomplish a deed of
undertaking (Exh. A-7-n) because the cashiers check was payable to cash. The cashiers
check (Exh. A-7-ee) was deposited on April 25, 2000 at the Pacific Star Branch of
Equitable PCI Bank in Makati. The name and account number were not indicated on the
check. [Ibid, pp. 148 -159]
Mrs. Ricaforte always dealt with Bautista as the Bank Manager for her transactions.
Bautista identified Ricaforte as the one wearing red (Exh. A-6-vvvvv-1) when shown a
group picture. Bautista also identified the girl beside Mrs. Ricaforte as Mrs. Itchon, one of
the witnesses in the impeachment proceedings. Aside from the personal visits of Mrs.
Ricaforte, Bautista also called her on cell phone no. 0918-9021847 or home landline
9518854 whenever there was a maturity or an updating of interest. [Ibid, pp. 162-168]
At the time of Bautistas testimony, the balance in the account of Ricaforte was around
Two Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,200,000.00). It is still earning interest.
SHAKIRA CASTRILLO YU (Yu) was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank, Pedro GilRobinsons Branch since it opened on August 1999. Yu knew Yolanda T. Ricaforte as she
was one of their depositors. Ricaforte told Yu that she was connected with Fil-East Travel
and Tours which is located at the second floor of the Manila Midtown Hotel. Ricaforte first
opened a Regular Savings Account, participated in the Reverse Repurchase Agreement
and subsequently opened a Special Savings Account.
Ricaforte opened the Regular Savings Account on January 6, 2000. It was Ms. Evelyn
Ponce, the Cash Operations Officer who attended to her as Yu was not around. Yu
brought with her the specimen signature card (Exh. A-8-P) for Savings Account No.
027602029-3 and the New Accounts Record (Exh. A-8-Q) which were filled out by
Ricaforte. [TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 85-92]
The initial deposit (Exh. A-8-Q-3) of the Regular Savings Account was Six Million Pesos
(P6,000,000.00) in cash (Exh. A-8-R). When witness asked Ricaforte where the initial
deposit came from, Ricaforte said it was proceeds of a sale of a property. [Ibid, pp. 97100]
Other deposits made to the Regular Savings Account were the following: a check deposit
amounting to Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand (P2,965,000) with Governor
Luis Chavit Singson as drawer; a cash deposit of One Million Five Hundred Forty
Thousand Pesos (P1,540,000) deposited on January 25, 2000 and a One Million Three
Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,340,000) check deposit (Exh. A-8-D) with Governor
Singson as drawer (Exh. A-8-D-1). [Ibid, pp. 101-112]

On January 31, 2000, Ricaforte told Yu that she wanted to earn higher interest so witness
advised her to participate in the Reverse Repurchase. Ricaforte asked Yu to debit her
Regular Savings Account for about Eight Million Nine Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P8,900,000.00) (Exh. "A-8-P"). On February 29, 2000 Ricaforte informed Yu that she did
not want the Reverse Repurchase and she wanted a bank product that earned a higher
interest with passbook as documentation. The Certificate of Participation without
Recourse (Exh. A-8-F) was then paid on February 29, 2000 in the amount of Eight Million
Nine Hundred Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos and Eighty Two Centavos
(P8,940,752.82).
Yu then advised Ricaforte to open a Special Savings Account. They took out her
participation in the Reverse Repurchase for P8,900,000.00 plus interest and Ricaforte
asked them to debit more or less One Million Fifty-One Thousand Pesos (P1,051,000.00)
from her Regular Savings Account because she wanted her Special Savings Account to
be in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). The specimen signature card of
the Special Savings Account and the Credit Memo (Exh. A-8-G) under the account name
Yolanda Ricaforte for the Account No. 276-90238-5 dated 2/29/2000 were shown as
evidence of the existence of the account. The three signatures appearing in the card
belonged to Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte signed in front of Yu.
Subsequently, Ricaforte withdrew her Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) plus interest
from the Special Savings Account and transferred the amount to her Regular Savings
Account. The Special Savings passbook of Mrs. Ricaforte (Exh. A-8-H) contained the
entry Out of Return P10,019,555,55. [Ibid, 113-120]
On April 13, 2000, Ricaforte applied for a cashiers check in the amount of Eleven Million
Pesos (P11,000,000) debited to her Regular Savings Account. The application for
Cashiers check (Exh. A-8-I), the receiving copy of the Cashiers check, the Letter of
Undertaking and Cashiers check (Exh. A-8-T) were all presented. The Application for
Cashiers Check stated that the Cashiers Check is allowed to be payable to cash except
that the bank will not be held responsible for the loss thereof or a demand for a refund or
replacement. It is no longer allowed starting around July or August 2000.
Ricaforte instructed Yu to transfer Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) from her
Regular Savings Account on May 23, 2000 to her Special Savings Account to earn higher
interest. A Special Savings Account Passbook (Exh. A-8-L) was issued to Mrs. Ricaforte
which credited the Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to the Special Savings
Account. [Ibid, pp.120-127]
At present, the outstanding balance of the Special Savings Account is more or less Six
Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00). The regular Savings Account has an
outstanding balance of more or less Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos
(P69,800.00).
After being shown a photograph, Yu identified Yolanda Ricaforte as the person wearing
maroon or red in the picture (Exh. A-6-Z5). Yu was able to talk to Mrs. Ricaforte over the
phone around six (6) times. She used the cell phone number indicated in the records.
[Ibid, pp. 128-132]
VERGEL LEJARDE PABILLON (Pabillon) knew a person by the name of Yolanda
Ricaforte because Ricaforte opened regular Savings Account No. 0193-61496-8 and

Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 with Equitable PCI Bank T.M. Kalaw Branch
on February 8, 2000 while Pabillon was still manager of the branch.
Ricaforte mentioned to Pabillon that she was connected with a certain company under the
name of Phil. East Travel and Tours located at Ramada Hotel, Mabini. She handed her
California Drivers license as identification card and signed the specimen signature cards
about one foot away from the witness.
Pabillon brought the Individual Account Record (Exh. A-9-C) and the signature cards
signed by Mrs. Ricaforte as evidence of the Account. The initial deposit made were in the
form of a PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of Ten Million Seven
Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven Pesos and Seventy-Eight Centavos
(P10,007,777.78) and One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,400,000.00) in cold
cash. Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) of that amount was placed in the Special
Savings Account and Four Hundred Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Seven
Pesos and Seventy Eight Centavos (P407,777.78) was placed under the Regular Savings
Account. [TSN, June 5, 2002, pp. 98-109]
On April 13, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and informed the witness that she
needed Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) in the form of managers check, payable to
cash, to be taken out from the existing Special Savings Account No. 02193-6-15050-3.
The managers check dated April 13, 2000 payable to cash was presented (Exh. A-9-B).
Ricaforte had to sign a Purchasers Undertaking bearing her name as purchaser. (Exh. A9-F) [Ibid, pp. 113-127]
Mrs. Ricaforte opened a third account, Special Savings Accounts No. 02-193-15177-1, in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). A debit memo (Exh. A-9-G)
showed the transfer of the P500,000 from the regular Savings Account 0193-64196-8 to
the special savings account.
On August 31, 2000, Mrs. Ricaforte went to the bank and requested for another Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Peso (P250,000.00) managers check payable to her to be
deducted from Special Savings Account No. 02193-15177-1. A bank document which
served as a registered copy of the issuance of the managers check was presented. (Exh.
A-9-H) [Ibid, pp. 128-129]
Pabillon identified Ricaforte from a group photograph (Exh. A-6-B5) [Ibid, pp. 133-134]
The witness availed of the early retirement offered by Equitable PCI. He testified in the
impeachment trial even if he was already supposed to go on early retirement because he
just wanted to tell the truth regarding what transpired to the opening of the account of Mrs.
Ricaforte. [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 54-56]
EDGARDO LIM ALCARAZ (Alcaraz) was the branch manager of Equitable PCIBank,
Scout Albano branch for almost three years. He met Yolanda Ricaforte because she was
one of their clients. She opened three accounts with the bank on March 2, 2000 and he
was the one who personally attended to her. These were savings account and current
account under the automatic transfer facility and a special savings account.
Alcaraz testified on documents to show that Yolanda Ricaforte opened these three

accounts, such as the individual account record which showed information about
Ricaforte, her special instructions and the summary of the accounts that she opened. The
other documents pertained to the specimen signature cards signed by Ricaforte for
Checking Account No. 5732-01-975-7, Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3 and Special
Savings Account No. 5733-00721-0. Ricaforte submitted her local drivers license and her
California drivers license for identification. She told witness that she was engaged in the
prawn business in Iloilo. Alcaraz contacted Ricaforte two or three times using the numbers
she wrote in the account record. He also had a calling card from Ricaforte (Exh. A-10-F).
[TSN, June 10, 2002, pp. 79-84]
The initial deposit in cash for the savings account opened by Ricaforte was One Million
Nine Hundred Ninety Five Thousand (P1,995,000.00). The initial deposit for Checking
Account 5732-01-975-7 was Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The initial deposit for
Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0 was Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000). Copies of
the deposit slips (Exhs. A-10-G, A-10-H, A-10-I) [Ibid. pp. 97-99]
On April 12, 2000, Ricaforte pre-terminated the special savings account. This is shown by
its passbook (Exh. A-10-J). A credit memo (Exh. A-10-L) showed that Ricaforte requested
that the proceeds of the special savings account be credited under the Savings Account
No. 5733-15154-3.
On the same day, Mrs. Ricaforte applied for a managers check in the amount of Three
Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) payable to bearer. The application form for managers
check (Exh. A-10-C), the proof sheet copy of the managers check (Exh. A-10-K) and the
copy of the check were presented (Exh. A-10-M). [Ibid, pp.102-108]
As of the time of Alcaraz testimony, the regular savings account still existed with an
outstanding balance of One Hundred Three Thousand Pesos (P103,000.00). The
checking account was still active with an outstanding balance of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00). With respect to the checking account, Ricaforte issued a check in the amount
of P500,000.00 on March 12, 2000. Since the accounts are automatic transfer accounts,
the funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to the checking
account. [Ibid, pp. 100-101]
EMMA AVILA GONZALES (Gonzales) had been the Branch Manager of Equitable
Savings Bank, Isidora Hills Branch for more than three years up to time she testified in
this Court. Gonzales knew a person by the name of Yolanda Ricaforte who was one of the
clients of the bank.
She first met Ricaforte on March 15, 2000 when she opened a special savings account
with the branch. She walked into the bank, approached the witness and told her that she
wanted to open an account and that she was a valued client of other branches of
Equitable Savings Bank. The specimen signature card (Exh. A-11) and deposit slip (Exh.
A-11-A) were shown to prove the opening of the special savings account. The initial
deposit was Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) cash, in ten bundles of five
hundred (500) peso bills. Ricaforte said she was a businesswoman but did not specify the
kind of business she was engaged in. With respect to the initial deposit of Ricaforte, the
account is still outstanding. The original copy of the Equitable Special Savings Passbook
No. 123727 (Exh. A-11-I) shows the outstanding balance to be Five Hundred Ninety Three
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and Thirty Two Centavos (P593,496.32) as of
June 10, 2002. The difference in the amount was the interest earned from the time it was

opened. There was no movement of the fund except for the interest. [TSN, June 10, 2002,
pp. 162-169, June 17, 2002, p. 10]
Ricaforte also opened Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 (Exh. A-11-H and Exh.
A-11-D) amounting to Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00). The initial deposit was an
MBTC (Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.) Ayala Branch Check No. 1070. It was payable in
cash and the drawer was Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson. It was cleared after three days.
The account was pre-terminated on April 14, 2000. The withdrawal slip (Exh. A-11-E)
showed that the amount withdrawn was Seven Million Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred
Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P7,019,736.11). Ricaforte received the payment in
the form of a Cashiers check (Exh. A-11-F) payable to cash in the amount of Seven
Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and cash in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Seven
Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). The dorsal portion of the
Cashiers check showed that it was deposited in Equitable Banking Corporation, Makati
Pacific Star. On the other hand, the amount of Nineteen Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty
Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11) cash was used to open regular Savings
Account No. 0770009375 (Exh. A-11-I). The latest bank statement (Exh. A-11-J) showed
that the account still existed but the balance was no longer Nineteen Thousand Seven
Hundred Thirty Six Pesos and Eleven Centavos (P19,736.11). [TSN, June 10, 2002, pp.
172-189]
Witness was able to verify the phone number given by Mrs. Ricaforte because when she
called the number, Mrs. Ricaforte answered the phone. [TSN, June 17, 2002, pp. 11-13]
ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO (Fortuno) was the Bank Operations Officer
of Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred
that he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign
telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of
the records of deposits; and other transactions which transpired in their branch.
Fortuno brought with him documents relating to the deposit of six (6) cashiers/managers
checks in the total amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) to the Pacific
Star Branch and the transfer of these funds from cashiers checks to the account of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation in the 100 Strata Branch of Equitable PCI Bank. [TSN
dated September 27, 2002, p. 127]
He identified an Acknowledgement Letter [Exh. I9, with sub markings; Exh. 16-a (Serapio)]
dated April 25, 2000 addressed to Atty. Edward Serapio from Beatriz L. Bagsit, who was
then Division Head of the Makati Area. The letter acknowledged receipt of six (6) checks
for deposit on a staggered basis and on various different dates to the account of Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Ortigas Strata Branch. The checks were as
follows:
(1)
PCIBank Managers Check NO. 573-000035822 dated April 12, 2000 for P3
Million (Exh. A-10-m);
(2)
PCIBank Managers Check No. 019L-000061146 dated April 13, 2000 for
P11 Million (Exh. A-9-b);

(3)
Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No. 0226-00949 dated April 13, 2000 for
P11 Million (Exh. A-8-t);
(4)
Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No. 0238-000941 dated April 13, 2000 for
P77 Million (Exh. A-7-ee);
(5)
Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No.107-013064 dated April 13, 2000 for
P91 Million; (Exh. A-6-r5)
(6)
Equitable Bank Cashiers Check No.6720-00042 dated April 14, 2000 for P7
Million; (Exh. A-11-g)
Fortuno also identified the passbook for Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 (Exh. J 9, with
sub markings) which was opened on April 25, 2000. A bearer account is an account
wherein there is no name mentioned in the account. According to Fortuno, the six (6)
managers checks were the managers checks that were deposited on April 25, 2000 in
the bearer account for the total amount of Two Hundred Million (P200,000,000.00).
According the witness, the instruction in the letter was to deposit the funds on a staggered
basis and they can do so if they first deposit all the checks simultaneously for the threeday clearing.
On the basis of debit memos, managers check applications, detailed report transaction
and deposit slips or receipts, the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was
gradually withdrawn from the bearer account and transferred to the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation from April 27, 2000 to May 11, 2000.
The six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No. 0279-04225-5 of which fourteen
(14) withdrawals in Managers Checks (Exh. K9 to X9, with sub markings) were made in
various amounts and these withdrawals were further divided into twenty-eight (28)
deposits into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Each withdrawal was divided into two
deposits, as shown by the Account Information Slips, Deposit Receipts and Detailed
Report for Transfers and Debit/Credit Memos (DRTM) (See Exhs. K9 to X9, with sub
markings) brought by the witness. [Ibid, pp. 32-96]
The bearer account was closed on November 14, 2000 as evidenced by the Fund
Transfer Memo (Exh. Z9), and contained the interest for Ninety Seven Thousand Three
Hundred Ninety Two Pesos (P97,392) which was transferred to the account of the
Foundation. [Ibid, pp. 97-98]
AIDA TUAZON BASALISO (Basaliso) was the operations officer of Equitable PCIBank,
Ortigas-Strata 100 Branch since July 1997. She brought with her bank documents on the
accounts of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation maintained at the Equitable PCIBank,
Strata-Ortigas Branch including the inter-branch deposits from the Equitable PCIBank,
Pacific Star Branch for the total amount of P200 million to the Account No. 0192-85835-6
in the name of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
The signature card for Savings Account No. 0192-85702-3 (Exh. A10) of the Treasurer-in
trust has the signature of Mr. George Go, the former Chairman of the Board of the bank.
The list of Contribution (Exh. B10) also had the signature of the treasurer, Mr. George Go.

The two documents were given to Basaliso by Catherine Mercado, someone who usually
transacted business at the branch.
Witness also identified the Signature Cards of the Savings and Checking Accounts of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. On the signature cards (Exh. C10) pertaining to the
Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6, the signatures of Mr. Raul De Guzman, Mr. George
Go, Mr. Edward Serapio and Mr. Danilo Reyes, Ms. Mila Reforma appear. Two signature
cards were needed for the same account because the corporation consisted of five (5)
signatories.
The signature cards (Exh. D10 and Exh. D10-1) for current Account No. 0142-62890-2
showed the signatures of the same five persons.
She identified the Secretarys Certificate (Exh. E10) showing that the Corporate Secretary
was Edward S. Serapio, the Certificate of Incorporation with SEC Registration No.
2000002526 (Exh. F10) and the Articles of Incorporation (Exh. G10) and the by-laws (Exh.
H10).
Witness also testified on a debit memo (Exh. I10) dated April 20,2000 in Savings Account
No. 019285702-3 amounting to One Hundred Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and
Ten Centavos (P100,201.10) and credited (Exh. I10-2) to 014262890-2 the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the opening of the checking account of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation and a Credit Advice (Exh. I10-1) to Savings Account No. 019285835-6
amounting to Ninety Thousand Two Hundred One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P90,201.10)
to open the savings account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
Basaliso also testified on "no book cash deposits" made to the savings account of the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. No book meant that the deposit was made by the
depositor without bringing his savings passbook. DRTM (Detailed Report of Transfer Debit
and Credit memos) (Exhs. J10 to R10) were presented to show the transactions. The
following deposits were made: Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) total deposit on April
27, 2000, Six Million Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P6,725,000.00) and
Eight Million Two Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P8,275,000.00) on April 28,
2000, Five Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Pesos (P5,108,000.00) and Nine Million
Eight Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Pesos (P9,892,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) on May 2, 2000, Three Million Ninety One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P3,091,450.00) and Six Million Nine Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P6,908,550.00) totaling Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) on May 3, 2000, Six
Million One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Pesos
(P6,118,225.00) and Eight Million Eight Hundred Eighty One Thousand Seven Hundred
Seventy Five Pesos (P8,881,775.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) on
May 4, 2000, Five Million Nine Hundred Thirty Six Thousand Pesos (P5,936,000.00) and
Nine Million Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P9,064,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) on May 8, 2000, Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) and Eight Million
Pesos (P8,000,000.00) totaling Fifteen Million Pesos on May 9, 2000, Seven Million Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P7,250,000.00), Seven Million Three Hundred Ninety
Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P7,399,800.00), Nine Million Three Hundred
Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P9,375,000.00), Nine Million Four Hundred Forty Nine
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos (P9,449,400.00), Nine Million Six Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P9,600,000.00) and Eleven Million Nine Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Eight
Hundred Pesos (P11,925,800.00) totaling to Fifty Five Million (P55,000,000.00) on May

10, 2000, Six Hundred Thirty Four Thousand Pesos (P634,000.00), Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), Three Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,800,000.00), Five Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P5,200,000.00), Nine Million
One Hundred Thirty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos (P9,139,280.00), Nine
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P9,500,000.00), Nine Million Eight Hundred Thirty
Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P9,836,500.00) and Nine Million Eight Hundred
Eighty Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos (P9,889,720.00) totaling about Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) on May 11, 2000. There was also a credit memo made on
November 14, 2000 amounting to Ninety Seven Thousand Three Hundred Ninety Two
Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P97,392.50) (Exh. S10). Bank statements pertaining to the
periods April 1-28, 2000 up to December 2000, except statements for July, August and
October were presented.
At the time of Basalisos testimony, the current account of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation with a balance of Eight Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P8,600.00) (Exh. T10)
was dormant. The Savings Account No. 0192-85835-6 was inactive with a balance of Two
Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three
Centavos (P207,001,883.53) (Exh. U10).
Witness also testified that any two persons out of the five signatories of the Foundation
were authorized to transact regarding the accounts. Based on record, the amount of Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was deposited into the account without a single
centavo being lost. The passbook [See Exh. U10,36(Serapio)] had a balance of Two
Hundred Seven Million One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos and Fifty Three
Centavos (P207,001,888.53) because it already earned interest. There were no
withdrawals from the Savings and Current Account from the time they were opened. [TSN
dated October 2, 2002 and October 7, 2002]
ATTY. CECILIO ALEJANDRO VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) is the assistant Corporate
Secretary of PAGCOR. Witness brought with him the Minutes No. 36 of PAGCORs
Regular Board Meeting dated September 5, 2000, under Agenda Item No. 002646 of the
Best World Gaming and Entertainment Corporation Cancellation of Quick Pick bingo and
conduct of PAGCORs Two Balls Bingo Games (Exh. S15). Witness brought with him pp.
28-30 with referred to Item Agenda No. 002646. Villanuevas testimony was offered
corroborate the testimony of Gov. Singson that the consultancy firm of Atong Ang will
receive 6% of the gross income from Bingo Two Balls.
On cross examination, witness testified that he has no personal knowledge whether the
Bingo 2 Balls was actually implemented. [TSN dated December 2, 2002 and TSN dated
December 4, 2002]
MARIANITO MANIGBAS DIMAANDAL (Dimaandal) was the Assistant Director of the
Malacaang Records Department since 1993. Dimaandal identified the appointment
papers of Atty. Serapio as Presidential Assistant for Political affairs, Office of the
Presidential Adviser for Political Affairs (Exh. V10) and Mr. Orestes Ricaforte as
Undersecretary, Department of Tourism (Exh. W10) and the assumption into office by Ms.
Yolanda Ricaforte to the PCGG representing the San Miguel Campo Creo Group (Exh.
X10).
Witness also brought a Certification (Exh. Y10) issued by the Office of the President that
the phone numbers 736-8856 and 736-8858 were in fact the telephones assigned to and

connected to the presidential residence during the incumbency of FPres. Estrada.

On December 16, 2002, Dimaandal was recalled to the witness stand. He further
presented and identified the Appointment of Edward S. Serapio as Member Ad Interim of
the Judicial and Bar Council representing the Private Sector dated July 1, 2000 (Exh. I 17)
issued by FPres. Estrada; a Memorandum to All Heads of Office and Units signed by
Former Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora (Exh. J17); and a Memorandum to All Heads
of Office and Units from the Office of the President dated April 29, 1999 (Exh. K 17 with
submarkings) with the subject title "Special Instructions to the Presidential Assistant for
Political Affairs" and with the contents read as follows: "Be informed that I have given
special instructions to Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Presidential Assistant I for Political Affairs,
to undertake, in addition to his regular duties and responsibilities, the following functions:
1) provide prompt objective and independent advice on any legal question, matter, or
issue which may be of special concern to the President; 2) update the President on recent
developments in law or jurisprudence on such subjects, areas, or issues which the
President may so specify; 3) study and review documents, deeds, contracts, memoranda
or other papers which the President may opt to refer to him for study and review; 4)
coordinate with various units of the Office of the President, Departments, and other
agencies and instrumentalities of the government on any legal matter which the President
may refer to him; and 5) perform other duties and responsibilities as may be directed by
the President. Atty. Serapio will be directly reporting to the President on any of the
foregoing matters. For your information and guidance."
On March 31, 2003, witness Dimaandal was again recalled to the witness stand. He
presented and identified copies of Proclamation No. 145 dated July 17, 1999 (Exh. X 19),
Proclamation No. 194 dated October 11, 1999 (Exh. Y19), Proclamation No. 202 dated
October 21, 1999 (Exh. Z19), Proclamation No. 205 dated October 25, 1999 (Exh. A20),
Proclamation No. 225 dated January 30, 2000 (Exh. B20), Proclamation No. 234 dated
January 28, 2000 (Exh. C20), Proclamation No. 273 dated April 23, 2000 (Exh. D20),
Proclamation No. 355 (Exh. E20), Administrative Order Nos. 28, 29, 32, 50, 59, 69, 73, 87,
89 (Exhs. F20 N20), Memorandum Order Nos. 82, 88, 89 (Exhs. O20-Q20) and
memorandum Circular No. 45 (R20) . These documents were signed by FPres. Estrada
and his signatures were marked accordingly. [TSN dated October 7, 2002; December 16,
2002; and March 31, 2003]
SALVADOR ROSAL SERRANO (Serrano) was the Vice-President of Security Bank
Corporation and the head of its Centralized Operation and Control Division. [TSN dated
November 25, 2002] He was responsible for the day to day operations of one hundred
nineteen (119) branches of the Security Bank Corporation; supervised the record keeping
and accounting of the branch transactions; ensured the compliance of their branches to
bank policies and procedures; supervised the safekeeping of all documents of all branch
transactions; and issued certified true copies of documents in relation to the original
documents kept by the bank.
Serrano was called by the prosecution to corroborate the testimony of prosecution witness
Gov. Singson that he issued a check payable to cash from funds of jueteng protection
money to accused FPres. Estrada and that the said accused, in turn, delivered the check
to Mr. Paul Bograd who subsequently deposited the check to his account at the Security
Bank Corporation; and to identify and authenticate the documents he was subpoenaed to
bring.

Serrano identified a microfilm copy of Metro Bank Check No. 0000917 for the amount of
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) that was deposited through Security Bank Corporation
on February 2, 1999. The maker of this check was Gov. Singson and which check was
deposited to Account No. 061-0-14636-7 whose account holder was Paul Gary Bograd as
evidenced by a deposit slip of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs. N 14; N14-1; N14-2; N14-3;
O14; O14-1; O14-2; and O14-3).
Also presented was a statement of account showing that an amount of Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000) was credited on February 2, 1999 to the account of Paul Gary Bograd
(Exhs. P14 and P14-1). Serrano also identified the specimen signature card of Paul Gary
Bograd showing that the latter was a depositor in their bank and that he [Bograd] held the
Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Security Bank Corporation (Exhs, Q 14; Q14-1; and Q14-2).
PATRICK DEE CHENG (Cheng), an employee of CITIBANK for 12 years, became the
Branch Banking Head of CITIBANK on November 2001. [TSN dated October 7, 2002 and
TSN dated October 9, 2002] As banking head, he had overall supervision and
responsibility for all the branch banking operations of CITIBANK in all of its six (6)
branches.
Cheng presented and identified the following:
(1) deposit slip (Exh. Z10, with sub markings) dated October 4, 1999 for the
account of Luisa P. Ejercito ("Mrs. Ejercito") under Account No. 166820 covering
the deposit of Metrobank Check No. 00138 (See Exh. M8 as original and Exh.
A11 as micro film copy) dated September 29, 1999 by Gov. Singson in the amount
of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) and another check in the amount of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000);
(2) Account Opening Form (Exh. B11) for Account No. 166820 of Mrs. Ejercito;
(3) Hold-all-Mail Agreement (Exh. C11, with sub markings) dated March 9, 2000 of
Mrs. Ejercito which designated Ms. Lucena Baby Ortaliza to be her authorized
representative;
(4) deposit slip (Exh. D11, with sub markings) of William T. Gatchalian dated August
20, 1999 with Account No. 8131201377 for Forty Six Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P46,350.000.00) which covered the deposit of Metrobank
Check No. 000132 dated August 21, 1999 of Gov. Singson in the amount of
P46,350,000.00;
(5) certified copy of the microfilm of the Metrobank Ayala Center Branch Check
NO. 000132 (See Exh. E11, with sub markings) dated August 21, 1999 drawn by
Gov. Singson, payable to William Gatchalian in the amount of P46,350,000;
(6) Relationship Opening Form Personal (Exh. F11, with sub markings) of Mr.
William T. Gatchalian; and
(7) Signature Card (Exh. G11, with sub markings) of Mr. William T. Gatchalian for a
Peso Checking Account with Account No. 8131201377 opened on March 13,

1996.
MELCHOR SUAREZ LATINA (Latina) is head of Remedial Management, Globe
Telecommunication in charge of terminated accounts. [TSN dated October 9, 2002]
He brought with him a certification (Exh. H11) October 4, 2002 issued by Atty. Melchor S.
Latina, and subscribed before Atty. Gilbert Escolo that Globe Cellular Phone No. 09175260217 was registered in the name of Jinggoy Estrada. The certification was supported
with the Service Agreement for Cellular Mobile Phone Service (See Exh. H 11-1, with sub
markings) executed by the applicant Jinggoy Estrada and the supporting documents
required in connection with the subscription of cell phone; specifically, a photocopy of
Jinggoy Estradas drivers license (Exh. H11-2) and statement of his Philippine National
Bank Visa (Exh. H11-3) as proof of billing. The cellular phone issued to Jinggoy Estrada
has already been cut-off since December 15, 2000 based on Globe Telecom records (Exh.
H11-4).
ATTY. OSWALDO CHONG SANTOS (Atty. Santos) was a partner of the De Borja Santos
Law Firm during the time of the impeachment proceedings against the accused Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. [TSN dated January 6, 2003 and TSN dated January
8, 2003]
In a letter dated December 22, 2000, the De Borja Santos Law Firm was requested by the
Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation regarding
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. (Exhibit A-12-a)
Atty. Santos testified that the commissioned law firm of which he was a member started
conducting research and investigation on the alleged foundation on December 28, 2000.
They gathered available documents pertaining to the Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from
the Records Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On January 5,
2001, witness Santos then went to the corporate address of the subject foundation
indicated in the SEC documents (Exh. V17) that the investigating team gathered which was
at 15th Floor, Strata 100 Building, Emerald Avenue, City of Pasig. He found out from his
inquiries that the said office address was occupied by the law firm of De Borja Medialdea
Bello Guevarra and Jerodias. Atty. Santos clarified that his partner named De Borja was
not the same person indicated in the aforementioned law firm and that the witness had no
idea if they were related. Thereafter, the witness contacted the phone number of the
subject foundation indicated in the SEC documents that the investigating team had but got
the response that the phone number belonged to the aforesaid law firm and not to the
subject foundation.
The witness then presented and identified a copy of the Report (Exh. A12) of the
investigating team on the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. He said that the original
copy was submitted to the Prosecution Panel of the House of Representatives and he
attested as to the truth of the contents of the report. Atty. Santos mentioned that the said
report stated that the law firm occupying the supposed corporate office of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, Inc. "used to be the law firm of the Acting Corporate Secretary Atty.
Edward S. Serapio".
Atty. Santos also identified the SEC documents that the investigating team had gathered
which were previously produced and identified by prosecution witness Atty. David
Jonathan Villegas Yap. These SEC documents were as follows: a Certificate of Corporate

Filing / Information dated December 28, 2000 pertaining to the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
dated February 17, 2000 with SEC Reg. No. A20002526; a Covering Sheet of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.; the Articles of Incorporation of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc.; a Certificate of Filing of the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc. dated April 3, 2000; another Covering Sheet of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, Inc.; and the Amended By-Laws of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
(Exhs. T17, U17 V17, W17 with submarkings, X17, Y17 and Z17with submarkings)
The witness testified on cross examination that the Erap Muslim Foundation, Inc. was duly
organized and obtained a juridical personality in accordance to law. The Amended ByLaws of the subject corporation, which was approved by the SEC, allegedly provided that
the members of the Board of Trustees were not entitled to receive allowances or honoraria
in the performance of their duties. Atty. Santos was not, however, familiar to the Minutes of
the Organizational Meeting of the Board of Trustees held on March 22, 2000 (Exh. 4Serapio); the Community Tax Certificate (Exh. 5-Serapio) of the foundation; and the
Mayors Permit (Exh. 6-Serapio) as well as the Business Permit (Exh. 9-Serapio) of the
foundation. He qualified that he verified from the Office of the Bureau of Permit of Pasig
City that the foundation had registered its Business License though he did not see the
Mayors Permit of the foundation and mentioned the same in the report. Atty. Santos
likewise admitted that he did not come across documents relating to the operations of the
foundation but testified consistently on matters pertained the report. (Exhs. 7-Serapio, 8Serapio, 10-Serapio to 15-Serapio, and 21-Serapio to 27-Serapio, inclusive of
submarkings)
CAROLINA SANTIAGO GUERRERO (Guerrero) is the Branch Manager of PS Bank
Murphy Branch, Quezon City. She brought with her a deposit slip (Exh. A13) processed on
December 23, 1999. The deposit involved a Metrobank Ayala Center Check No. 001547
(Exh. N8) issued by Luis Chavit Singson in the amount of One Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000). The check was deposited to the account of Laarni
Enriquez with Account No. 0180409000-3. The account statement for the month of
December 1999 (Exh. C13, with sub markings) of Laarni Enriquez showed that the amount
of One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000) was credited to her account
on December 24, 1999.
The signature card (Exh. B13) showed that the account was opened on July 18, 1996. The
card contained Enriquezs address as 95 8th Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and her
description as Filipino, 55", 34 years old, brown, medium built and tiny mole on the right
cheek.
Guerrero further testified that the biggest single check deposit of Ms. Enriquez in the
particular savings account was made on August 4, 1998 for P40 Million. This was shown
through a bank statement of account (Exh. D13) brought by the witness. The subject
account was already closed as shown by the December 27, 2000 bank statement. The
address given in the statement had changed to 771 Harvard Street, Wac-wac Subdivision,
Mandaluyong. (TSN dated October 30, 2002, pp. 6-28)
DR. ROGELIO V. QUEVEDO (Dr. Quevedo) was, at the time of his testimony, the Head of
the Legal and Carrier Business of Smart Communications, Incorporated. The prosecution
offered his testimony to corroborate the Itchons testimony regarding the Smart cellular

phone numbers used by Atty. Serapio and Ricaforte.

Dr. Quevedo identified a Certification signed by him that Smart Cellular Phone Nos. 09189012071 and 0918-9021847 were registered in the names of Atty. Edward Serapio and
Fontain Bleu, Inc., respectively. (Exh. G12) [TSN dated October 28, 2002, p. 74]
With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9012071, witness identified the application
form accomplished by an Edward S. Serapio of the De Borja Medialdea Bello Guevarra
Serapio Law Office (Exh. H12), Certification regarding mobile phone number, phone model,
INEI and ICCID (Exh. I12), Official Receipt No. 82116771 (Exh. J12), Sales Invoice No.
A0161625 (Exh. K12), Account Summary dated March 6, 1999 (Exh. L12), photocopy of
Statement for Atty. Serapios Philippine National Bank Visa Card (Exh. M 12), photocopy of
Atty. Serapios Citibank card (Exh. N12), Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. O12), Customer
Address Inquiry (Exh. P12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. Q12), Service Disconnection
document showing termination of the account upon request of the customer on December
20, 2000 (Exh. R12) and Certification Account Memo Inquiry (Exh. S12). [Ibid., pp. 75-90]
With respect to Smart Cellular Phone No. 0918-9021847, Dr. Quevedo presented and
identified the application form of Fontain Bleau, Inc. for two (2) cellular phones for Yolanda
Ricaforte and Maria Carmencita Itchon showing that the number 0918-9021847 was
issued to Itchon while the number 0918-9021849 was issued to Ricaforte (Exh. T12),
Customer Inquiry Menu (Exh. U12), Customer Address Inquiry (Exh. V12), Account
Maintenance Inquiry (Exh. W12), On Line Aging Information (Exh. X12) and audio recording
for the voice mail of 0918-9021847 by a certain "Yolly" (portion of TSN marked as Exh.
Y12). [Ibid., pp. 91-115] Dr. Quevedo further testified that the account for 0918-9021847
had already been disconnected.
II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
The following are the witnesses for the defense under paragraph (a):
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA (FPres. Estrada) took the
witness stand on March 22, 2006, March 29, 2006, April 5, 2006, April 19, 2006, April 26,
2006, May 24, 2006, May 31, 2006, June 7, 2006, June 14, 2006, June 21, 2006 and
June 28, 2006. At the outset, FPres. Estrada denied that Gov. Singson was his close
friend because he had only one close friend, the late actor Fernando Poe, Jr. Gov.
Singson was just an ordinary friend and a political ally to him. He seldom saw Gov.
Singson when he was a Mayor of San Juan. Although he admitted that they sometimes
went out, as they had common friends.
FPres. Estrada stated that all allegations in specification (a) of the Amended Information
were lies, as he did not receive a single centavo from any form of illegal gamling, even
when he was still a mayor and he never conspired with jueteng lords. As mayor of San
Juan, his policy ws to make San Juan jueteng free so he directed the Chief of Police of
San Juan to go all out against all forms of gambling. He even personally raided all gamling
dens and had all indulging in jueteng and other forms of gamling arrested and jailed.
However, their wives and children came to him and explained that their husbands could
not find other jobs. He promised to put up a livelihood program for them. (TSN, April 5,
2006, morning session, pp.20-26)
FPres. Estrada also cited national artist Nick Joaquins book "Joseph Estrada and other

Sketches" (Exh. 457), particularly the article in the said book "Erap In a New Role" (Exh.
457-a), which narrated an incident when he padlocked a gambling den when he was still
mayor. (Exhs.457-a-1; and 457-a-2) [TSN, April 5, 2006, pp.35-36]
FPres. Estrada asserted that his policy against gambling had not changed, even when he
was a senator, Vice President and President. However, he realized when he was a mayor
that jueteng which was a gambling for the poor was illegal and its collectors were
harassed while the casino for the rich was legal. He delivered his first privilege speech at
the senate on November 25, 1987 (Exh. 458) where he advocated the legalization of
jueteng in order that the government through PAGCOR could earn Twelve Million Pesos
(P 12, 000,000.00) everyday or Three Hundred Sixty Million Pesos (P 360, 000,000.00) a
month which could be used to provide essential services for the poor instead of the
enrichment of the police and illegal operators. Although when he was Vice-President and
appointed by President Fidel V. Ramos as Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission, jueteng was not part of his mandate but he was to go against kidnapping,
carnapping and illegal drugs. As President, he appointed Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma as
Chairperson of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and asked her to study
how to legalize jueteng. She retired only after less than two (2) months to take care of her
sick husband. Later it was assigned to her successor Rosario Lopez, who begged off as
she was new on the job. Chairperson Alice Reyes of PAGCOR took over and finished the
study.
Chairperson Reyes reported to former FPres. Estrada that the answer to jueteng was
Bingo-2-Balls and that if jueteng was to be legalized the government could earn no less
than Five Billon Pesos (P5,000,000,000.00). The study of jueteng showed that from
Regions I to V only the collectors, cabos and runners numbering one hundred fifty
thousand (150,000) benefit from jueteng whereas if jueteng is legalized, the jueteng
cobradors will became members of the SSS or GSIS, they would have decent jobs,
ceased to be harassed and victims of extortion. First Lady Loi Ejercito woud have funds to
provide dialysis machines for the poor. The legalization of jueteng will minimize if not
totally eradicate corruption among police officials and local government officials (Ibid,
pp.43-48) According to Alice Reyes, the Presidential social funds could be augmented if
jueteng was to be legalized. However, FPres. Estrada told Reyes that instead the Mayors
and governors social fund should be created because these local officials are besieged
with requests for medicines, funerals, bills, bills for tuition fees etc. [Ibid, pp.47-50]
FPres. Estrada instructed Chairperson Reyes to implement right away the Bingo-2-Balls.
There was a dry-run in Bulacan and it was very successful. It earned Twenty Four Million
Pesos (P24, 000,000.00) in less than three (3) weeks in a few towns in Bulacan.
Unfortunately, the jueteng lords who were against it caused trouble and it was stopped.
There were allegations that FPres. Estrada was receiving jueteng money. [Ibid, pp.53-54]
FPres. Estrada denied that in August 1998 he had a meeting with Atong Ang at the kitchen
of his residence at Polk Street, Greenhills, which was allegedly witnessed by Gov.
Singson who arrived later, followed by Bong Pineda. From the start, FPres. Estrada had
told Ang to distance himself from the former President, Ang never stepped into his house
nor in Malacaang except during the wedding of his daughter where he did not even see
Ang. Bong Pineda too had never stepped into his house. Gov. Singson only fabricated the
alleged meeting. His testimony in the impeachment that he saw Bong Pineda when he
arrived at Estradas house and the testimony in this trial that Pineda arrived later were
conflicting. [Ibid, pp.55-62] FPres. Estrada also belied the testimony of Singson that he

told Bong Pineda that he should not be the one to bring the jueteng money because it
would be very obvious. FPres. Estrada denied that he entered into any transaction
regarding any illegal form of gambling specially jueteng. [Ibid, pp.57-70] He admitted that
Bong Pineda was his "kumpadre". The father of the wife of his son Jinggoy, Precy, was a
friend of Bong Pineda. They were from Pampanga. The family of Precy, not the Estradas,
got Mrs. Pineda, the wife of Bong, as principal sponsor at the wedding of Jinggoy and
Precy. He wondered why Bong Pineda was not presented by the prosecution as witness
when Singson kept on referring to him. [Ibid, pp.70-74]
On the delivery to him of jueteng money, FPres. Estrada denied Singson delivered jueteng
protection money to him at his house at Polk Street, the Presidential Residence in
Malacaang and at P. Guevara Street. He also denied that Emma Lim delivered jueteng
money to his Secretary Malou Florendo at Malcaang and that contrary to the testimony
of Emma Lim, it was hard for anybody, including his dentist, to enter the Presidential
Residence in Malacaang without passing through the strict security check. He never
heard of Emma Lim except during the impeachment trial. He never asked Singson to pay
his obligations, as he did not have any debt, nor did he ask Singson to buy any appliance
for him. He refused gifts like appliances which he would just raffle off during Christmas. He
had never seen Carmencita Itchon, who he learned was a relative of Singson. Emma Lim
and Carmencita Itchon were rewarded for testifying against him at the trial with their
appointment as member of the Board of Directors of Camp John Hay [Poro Point
Development Corporation, now Poro Point Management Corporation] (Exh. 459-A-2, 459A-3) He emphatetically stated that he did not receive a single centavo of jueteng money.
[TSN, April 5, 2006, afternoon session, pp.3-19]
FPres. Estrada denied any knowledge of the ledgers of jueteng money testified to by
Singson. He stated he had not seen said ledgers, he had nothing to do with them and he
could not understand them. He first saw the ledgers on television during the impeachment
trial. Acording to him, Singson only fabricated the ledgers; like the documents pertaining to
the excise tax. [Ibid., pp.24-35, 46, 49, 52-55]
FPres. Estrada also called a lie the testimony of Singson that he instructed Singson to pay
Mr. Paul Bograd Five Million Pesos (P 5, 000,000.00) from the jueteng money. He did not
ask Singson to keep money from him, so he could not order Singson to pay Paul Bograd
and he did not owe the latter anything. [TSN, April 19, 2006, p.14] He explained that the
check for P1,200,000.00 (Exh. N8) which Singson allegedly gave as birthday gift for Laarni
Enriquez was actually intended for his son Jacob and his two siblings, specifically,
P1,000,000.00 for Jacob, the godson of Singson and P100, 000.00 each for Jacobs two
(2) siblings, as Christmas gift. The check was dated December 22, 1999 whereas the
birthday of Laarni was September 22, 1999, Former President Estrada was surprised at
the big amount and he thought that Singson was trying to ingratiate himself to him. [TSN,
April 19, 2006, pp.15-16]
FPres. Estrada also belied the claim of Singson that he advanced the Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00) interest from the Sixty-Two Million Pesos (P62, 000,000.00) of jueteng
money lent to Wlliam Gatchalian. He denied too that he ordered Singson to lend the said
amount of money to Gatchalian because he did not ask Singson to keep any money for
him. [Ibid., pp.23-25]
Regarding Yolanda Ricaforte, former President Estrada admitted he knows Yolanda, who
is the wife of the Former Tourism Attache in Tokyo, Orestes Ricaforte. Orestes met him

when he arrived at the airport for a speaking engagement for Overseas Filipino Workers in
Tokyo. He met Orestes again after four (4) or five (5) years when he, then already the
Vice-President, had a speaking engagement with the Filipino community in Los Angeles.
There Orestes introduced his wife Yolanda to FPres. Estrada. He met Yolanda again
during the oath-taking of Orestes as Undersecretary of Tourism. He appointed him
Undersecretary as he promised if he would become President when they were in Los
Angeles. He also appointed Yolanda as director of Campo Carne as requested by Orestes
because their income was not enough as they had two (2) children studying in Los
Angeles. [Ibid., pp.27-30]
FPres. Estrada however denied that Yolanda at any time was his employee. He seldom
saw Yolanda after the oath-taking of her husband. He did not approve her auditor for
jueteng as claimed by Singson. He had nothing to do with the money deposited by
Yolanda, as he did not have in his possession any bank documents. [Ibid., pp.30-33]
Regarding the testimony of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Former President Estrada
testified that even before he became mayor and when he was a mayor, he was giving
scholarships to poor deserving students, since he believed that education would give
them the opportunity to rise above poverty. His number one program as mayor was to put
up the first municipal high school, which as cited by national artist Nick Joaquin in his
book (Exhs. 457 and 457-A-3), was the project closest to his heart as it will offer free
education to the needy young. He said that 60% of elementary graduates could not afford
to go to high school and thereby they could become a potential trouble group. This is the
root cause of criminality and he would rather spend money on free high school than spend
it to enlarge the municipal jail. [Ibid., pp.33-35]
Former President Estrada also established the Movie Workers welfare Foundation
(MOWELFUND) when he was still an actor (Exh. 460). The MOWELFUND sent to the
United States to study film making seven (7) scholars who were shown in The Evening
Post, June 1, 1981 edition (Exh. 461). He also put up the ERAP Foundation in 1988 to
give scholarship to poor but deserving students. ERAP is the acronym of Education
Research and Assistance Program. It was registered with the SEC as shown by its Articles
of Incorporation (Exh. 462) The incorporators of the Foundation were: former Senate
President Joverto Salonga; former President Estradas brother-in-law, Raul P. de Guzman,
former Vice-President of the University of the Philippines and member of its Board of
Regents; Mr. Anthony Dee, former owner of China Banking; Mr. Dee K Chong, member of
the Board of Directors of China Banking; Mr. Manuel Zamora, a businessman and bar
topnotcher; Mr. Antonio Abacan, now President of Metrobank; Mr. Ronald Allan Poe, also
known by his screen name Fernando Poe, Jr.; Mr. Iigo Zobel of Makati; Mr. Carlos
Tuason, a former Chairman of the Philippine Sports Commission and a cousin of Mr. Jose
Mike Arroyo; Mr. Danny Dolor, a businessman; Mr. Hermogenes Tantoco, a big fishpond
owner in Malolos, Bulacan; and Mdme. Maria Clara Lobregat former City Mayor of
Zamboanga (Exh. 462-B). According to the memorandum of Executive Director of the
ERAP Foundation, Jing Ancheta (Exh. 463), for school year 1988-1989 to 2005-2006, a
total of 6,574 availed of the scholarship of the said Foundation, of which 2,512 graduated,
2,251 discontinued and 811 then currently enrolled. There were scholars from Cordillera
Administrative Region. (Exh. 464); National Capital Region (Exh. 464-A); Regions I to XIIb
(Exhs. 464-B, 464-C, 464-D, 464-E, 464-F, 464-G, 464-H, 464-I, 464-J, 464-K, 464-L, and
464-M); ARMM (Exh. 464-N); CARAGA Region (Exh. 464-O). The list of schools attended
by the scholars and the attachment to the memorandum of Mr. Ancheta which was a
Report of the e-Cares Program of Fr. Larry Faraon, dated March 19, 2006 re: Students

and Profile were marked as Exhs. 463-C and 465 (with submarkings) respectively. [TSN,
ibid, pp.43-58]. According to Former President Estrada, the seed money for the
foundations came from his salary as mayor. He said that from the time that he was a
mayor, then Senator, Vice-President and President, he never received a single centavo
from his salary. They all went to the Foundations. [Ibid, p.60]
FPres. Estrada testified that he devoted his salaries as public official to scholarship for the
poor because without them, there would be no Erap. The poor patronized his movies and
supported him in his political career. He solicited donations for his scholarship programs
but donors wanted to remain anonymous. He put up the ERAP Muslim Youth Foundation
because it was his campaign promise for the people of Mindanao. In the Mindanao State
Colleges, in Marawi City, he promised to send one hundred (100) Muslim Youth yearly to
Australia and America. When he was elected President, he spoke on January 25, 1999 of
his project Muslim Youth Foundation in Smokey Mountains (Exh. 466) and in Angelicum
College in Sto. Domingo Church at Quezon City during the launching of the Educational
Reentry, Agenda for the President to the Poor (Exh. 467 and 467-a). To comply with this
promise, he asked his brother-in-law, Dr. Raul de Guzman to put up the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, whose articles of Incorporation was duly registered with the SEC (Exh.
252 [also Exhs. G10, W17 to W17-6 of Prosecution]) [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.11-24]
Aside from Dr. de Guzman, the other incorporators of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
were Professor Danilo Reyes of the University of the Philippines (UP) who had a Masteral
and Doctorate Degree in Pulic Administration at UP, another UP Professor, Mila Reforma,
Mr. George Go, one of the owners PCI-Equitable Bank, and Atty. Edward Serapio, a
valedictorian of the Ateneo de Manila College of Law and a bar topnotcher. The latter was
introduced to him in 1999 by then Secretary Lito Banayo of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. He appointed Serapio as Presidential Assistant on Political Affairs because he
was impressed by his bio-data. Serapio is not that close to him as he dealt with Serapio
on an official and professional level. He denied that Serapio established a fictitious
("kalokohan") corporation for him. He described Serapio as an ex-seminarian, a scholar, a
very respectable person, very conservative, very professional, a family man and of
unquestionable integrity [Ibid., pp.24-28]. Former President Estrada was automatically the
Chairman Emeritus of the foundations that he established. He was the number one fundraiser but he is not a signatory to the checks of the foundation. The seed money of the
foundation came from his salary. He sponsored an Erap Golf Tournament which raised
P27,000,000.00, some part of which went to MOWELFUND and most of it to the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation. Funds were also raised from Valentines Ball at Manila Hotel
and from solicitations from his businessman friends and classmates. [Ibid., p.29]
Regarding the meeting allegedly attended by him, Singson, Ricaforte and Serapio where
he instructed Singson to give to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, through Serapio,
jueteng money in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200, 000,000.00. former
President Estrada claimed that no such meeting took place. He only learned from Atty.
Serapio that Singson gave P200,000,000.00 to the foundation which he said came from
an anonymous donor. He ordered Atty. Serapio to return the money to Singson because
his immediate reaction was that it was jueteng money. The Former President Estrada
emphatically stated: "Im sure its from jueteng." [Ibid., p.34] He knew because Singson
had been offering this to him a long time ago. According to Serapio he did not know it was
jueteng money and that he received the money in good faith. When the former President
told Serapio to take all possible means to return the money, Serapio replied that he would
consult the Board of Trustees first. Former President Estrada did not know what happened

after that because rallies and the impeachment started. (Ibid, pp.34-36). He learned later
that the money was intact at the Equiatble-PCI Bank and that it earned interest, per bank
certification (Exh. 257-C) and passbook (Exh. 257, 257-A and 257-B). At the time of the
testimony, the money based on the aforesaid documents amounted to P 213, 000,000.00.
(Exh. 257-B) [TSN, ibid, pp.41-45] Dr. Raul d Guzman informed him that the scholarship
was continuing but the foundation could not send scholars to the US but only to the
universities in the Philippines. One of the scholars, Janice Halim Negrosa was in the
courtroom, at the time of this testimony of the former President [Ibid., p.46]. He was happy
with the continuation of the scholarship because it was his vow to help the poor who
supported him in his election as Mayor, Senator, Vice-President and President. [Ibid,
pp.47-48] He established two (2) foundations, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation and the
Erap Para sa Mahirap Foundation to emphasize the assistance to our Muslim brothers,
the true pure-blooded Filipinos who defended us from foreign invaders. It was impossible
to use the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation for money laundering because he was not a
signatory to the checks of the foundation. Its treasurer was the Chairman of the bank who
would not allow his name to be used in money laundering. If the Foundation would be
dissolved, all its assets would go to the government. [Ibid., pp.50-55; and Exh. 252-C]
In support of his policy to go after illegal gambling, former President Estrada cited the
memorandum and verbal directives that he issued to the PNP to implement this policy. In
a memorandum dated August 3, 1998 (Exh. 132) of Acting PNP Chief Roberto Lastimoso
pertaining to the aforesaid directives, he reported that he conducted 1,600 operations
resulting in the arrest of 807 suspects, confiscation of P320,039.70 in cash and jueteng
paraphernalia, the filing of 253 cases in court with 13 cases still under investigation. The
report gave the statistics of illegal gambling for the semester 1998 and informed the
former President that he [Lastimoso] gave an ultimatum to all PRO Directors to pursue the
anti-illegal gambling campaign without end, until finally stopped and eradicated. Another
report of the PNP Acting chief stated in part:
"Dear President Estrada: This pertains to our compliance with the presidential
directive dated August 14, 1998, regarding the resurgence of illegal gambling
operations in the country. Please be informed that the directive was sent to all
PNP Regional Directors to identify, find, arrest and file charges appropriate in
Court against individuals who are using the name of President Estrada, or
supposed connection with his office to promote these illegal activities, and to come
up with rigid measures and tangible results and immediately stop all forms of
illegal gambling, particularlyjueteng and masiao." (Exh. 134) [TSN, April 26, 2006]
On October 7, 2000, Former President Estrada issued a Memorandum to the Secretary of
Inetrior and Local Government, the Director General of PNP that pending review of
PAGCORs Bingo-Two-Ball which was in the meantime suspended, they were directed to
intensify anti-jueteng operations to prevent unscrupulous individuals from taking
advantage of the situation. (Exh. 468) He also issued another memorandum to the
incoming Director General Panfilo Lacson reiterating his directive against illegal gambling
and requiring periodic and timely reports on all actions relative thereto. (Exh. 469) [TSN,
ibid., pp.56-64]
On the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was used and humiliated by the former
President and ordered killed by the latter, the former President testified that on the
contrary, it was Singson who used his name specifically in jueteng collections and Singson
made it appear that he could influence him, that Singson was close to him, and that

Singson joined his state visits even if he was not invited. Singson was accosted by the
Traffic Management Group (TMG) because he was illegally using sirens and blinkers, as
testified to by TMGs General Paredes. [Ibid, pp.65-66]
According to Former President Estrada, Singson leveled the serious accusations against
him because of his mounting problems. Singson had only two (2) sources of income, the
tobacco excise tax under R.A. No. 7171 and jueteng. Singson could not liquidate his cash
advance from the tobacco excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. He told Singson that he could
not help him because COA was an independent constitutional body. Singson was also
against Bingo-2-Ball which was already conceptualized because he would lose his source
of income. [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.64-69] Former President Estrada was informed that
Singson talked to then Secretary Alfredo Lim seeking his intercession to seek a meeting
with Former President Estrada so that jueteng would not be legalized or that if legalized
(through Bingo-2-Ball) the franchise be given to him, otherwise it would mean his
[Singsons] political death. Former President Estrada refused to talk with Singson and told
Secretary Lim to talk to Chairperson Alice Reyes. Singson approached also other persons
aside from Secretary Lim and Senator Edgardo Angara. Senator Angara told FPRes.
Estrada that Singson went to see him on a Sunday asking help about jueteng and Bingo2-Ball. He told Senator Angara to tell Singson not to talk to him but to Chairperson Alice
Reyes. Angara mentioned that Singson threatened to expose him but he said he had
nothing to hide and if Singson wanted so, to let him do it. Former President Estrada then
immediately had the accusations investigated as he had confirmed that for a long time,
Singson had already been using his name, specifically in jueteng collection. He was hurt
by the accusations of Singson as he was turned from being a President, with the biggest
mandate in a clean election, into a prisoner because of a big lie started by one person,
Governor Singson. Moreover his son Jinggoy and Atty. Serapio were also detained for two
(2) years when they knew nothing about jueteng [TSN, April 26, 2006, pp.69-77.]
JOSE "JINGGOY" ESTRADA was elected Vice Mayor of San Juan in 1988 and Mayor of
San Juan in 1992. [ TSN, November 17, 2004, pp. 15-16.]
Mayor Jinggoy stated that he first got to know Gov. Singson, whom he considered as an
acquaintance, during the presidential campaign of his father, FPres. Estrada, in the 1998
elections. At that time, Gov. Singson supported FPres. Estrada and hosted a lunch for
FPres. Estradas entourage when they campaigned in Ilocos Sur. After the presidential
campaign, he said he met Gov. Singson only occasionally. [Ibid., pp. 16-17]
Mayor Jinggoy denied the testimony of Gov. Singson that he was the collector for jueteng
protection money in the province of Bulacan starting January 1999 to August 2000.
Witness also stated that he has never been called "Jingle Bell" nor had he received or
heard communication where he was called "Jingle Bell". Witness also denied the
statement of Gov. Singson that a certain Jessie Viceo was the collector of jueteng
protection money in the province of Bulacan from January 1999 to August 2000, because
witness had never been a collector or protector of jueteng. However, Mayor Jinggoy
admitted that he came to know Jessie Viceo when the latter was running for congressman
since Viceo was also aligned with their political party during the time witness was
assigned to campaign for his father in the province of Bulacan. After that, witness stated
that he met Viceo three times in social functions. Again, witness considered Viceo as an
acquaintance. [Ibid., 18-22]
Mayor Jinggoy also denounced for being untrue the allegation that as collector of jueteng

protection money in Bulacan, he collected Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) monthly of

which One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was retained by him and the other Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was sent to Gov. Singsons office or was picked up by Gov.
Singsons aides from witness office in the municipal hall of San Juan or from witness
residence. [Ibid., p. 22]
He further added that he had never used a personalized check with his picture printed on
the check as testified to by Emma Lim who allegedly deposited such check drawn against
the United Overseas Bank of the Philippines, San Juan Branch to Gov. Singsons account
with Metro Bank Ayala Branch. Mayor Jinggoy presented a certification to prove that he
does not maintain a current account with the said bank. [Ibid., pp. 25-26]
Witness also denied the testimony of prosecution witnesses Vicente Amistad and Jamis
Singson who both claimed to have collected/received jueteng protection money from the
witness. With respect to the statements of Jamis Singson, Mayor Jinggoy asserted they
were untrue since he did not have a security aide named Nestor. Further, the testimony of
Jamie Singson that on other occasion, the latter got protection money from witness
residence at Polk St., Greenhills is also not true because he does not live in Polk St. but in
97 Kennedy St., North Greenhills. [Ibid., pp. 26-28]
As regards the rest of the testimony of Gov. Singson, Mayor Jinggoy also stated that
following were totally untrue: that in his conversation with Gov. Singson, witness confirmed
that he received a part (or Fifteen Million Pesos) of the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos
that came from the tobacco excise funds because witness was never involved nor did he
know anything about it; that before the press conference held on October 9, 2000 at the
Club Filipino, witness tried to dissuade Singson from making the expose because at that
time witness was in Australia watching the Sydney Olympics. [Ibid., pp. 29-32] Witness,
however, admitted that three weeks before he left for Australia, Singson called him up
before meeting him at the Kamayan, EDSA where witness was having dinner with his
basketball team to ask if witness can convince his father or Atong Ang to give Singson the
franchise of Bingo 2 Ball and not to his (Singson) political enemies, to which Mayor Jingoy
replied that he will try to talk to Atong Ang. Witness also denied the allegation that he
called up Gov. Singson at midnight of October 8, 2000, on the eve of the press conference
where according to Gov. Singson, witness told Gov. Singson that "baka naman isama mo
pa ako dito, Governor", because witness was then shooting a movie with Judy Ann
Santos. [Ibid., pp. 34-39, 102]
Bong Pineda was an acquaintance of Jinggoy Estrada. He denied having known Orestes
Rusty Ricaforte and Yolly Ricaforte, while he admitted having known Bonito Singson
whom he met once or twice. [Ibid., 65-68]
Jinggoy Estrada testified that the Municipality of San Juan maintained a current account
with the Philippine National bank and Land Bank and not with the United Overseas Bank.
He, himself maintained a personal account with United Coconut Planters Bank. [Ibid., pp.
86-88]
Mayor Jinngoy knew Atong Ang personally, whose real name was Charlie and he first
come to know him even before the 1998 presidential elections. He testified that he did not
know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan, Victor Tan Uy, or a Jojo Uy, and a yatch by the name of
Escalera. [Ibid., 99-104]

ALICIA PEREZ LLAMADO REYES (Reyes) was the Chairperson and Chief Executive
Officer of PAGCOR since January 2, 1987. She was appointed by Former President
Corazon C. Aquino, reappointed by Former President Fidel V. Ramos, and again
reappointed by Former President Joseph E. Estrada. [TSN, March 7, 2005]
The witness testified that Atong Ang proposed to her the operation of Bingo Two Balls
sometime in the year of 2000. She welcomed the idea since Atong Ang successfully
handled the Jai-Alai operations of PAGCOR. Witness Reyes then suggested for a written
proposal from Atong Ang. In a Letter dated September 1, 2000 addressed to the Director
of PAGCOR Jose Rodriguez III (Exh. 286), Atong Ang proposed the feasibility of the Bingo
Two Balls. The proposal was duly approved for negotiation by the Board of Directors of
PAGCOR in a Memorandum dated September 5, 2000 (Exh. 287 with submarkings).
Witness Reyes added that the proposal had the confirmation of FPres. Estrada who even
told her to "study the proposal and if it will displace Jueteng then he [was] all for it". For
the purpose of implementing the initial operation of Bingo Two Balls, the officers of
PAGCOR called a meeting in Paraaque Casino and invited several personalities
knowledgeable in number gaming operations in the Philippines. Gov. Singson did not
attend the meeting since the latter was not interested according to Atong Ang. The
operation of Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos Sur was nonetheless offered to three relatives of
Gov. Singson.
Among the conditions for the operation of Bingo Two Balls was the drawing of winning
numbers in public and that no payments will be made "under the table". It was agreed that
23% of the total revenue will be remitted to PAGCOR and 77% of the total revenue will
inure to the benefit of the operators. The Bingo Two Balls nationwide operation was
estimated to gain P50 to 65 Million of sales a day. Atong Ang was supposed to be given a
management fee of 8% but was reduced to 7% and then to 5%. The management fee was
finally recommended to be reduced at 2% by the head of the Bingo Department of
PAGCOR in a Recommendation Letter dated November 30, 2000 (Exh. 290).
The dry-run operation of Bingo Two Balls lasted for 20 days particularly in the Province of
Bulacan. According to witness Reyes, PAGCOR got P24 Million from the initial operation
of Bingo Two Balls from the Province of Bulacan alone. FPres. Estrada then ordered for
the suspension of the operation of Bingo Two Balls allegedly because of adverse publicity
and criticisms from the press.
On cross examination, witness Reyes clarified that there was no written agreement for the
dry-run operation of the Bingo Two Balls and that the conditions set forth in the initial
operation was not final. She also stated that the P24 Million that was remitted to PAGCOR
represented the 23% share that was agreed upon and that part of this share was remitted
to the Social Fund of the Office of the President. The 77% share of the income was
returned to the operators.
On re-direct examination, the witness testified that the Social Fund of the Office of the
President was created during the term of Former President Aquino. During her
administration, this fund was utilized mostly for building school houses which policy was
also adopted during the administration of Former Presidents Ramos and Estrada.
ATTY. EMILIA SAMONTE PADUA (Padua) was the Managing Head of the Entertainment
and Bingo Department of PAGCOR since July of 1996 to June of 2001. She managed,
supervised, and controlled the nationwide commercial bingo operations and bingo

derivatives, such as Quick-Pick Games and Bingo Two Balls. [TSN, March 9, 2005]
The witness testified that her department reviewed and evaluated the Bingo Two Ball
Project Proposal of Atong Ang to PAGCOR. The said project proposal was approved for
an initial operation and that the Officer-In Charge for the project was Jose Rodriguez III
while the Consultant of the project was the Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc.
of which Atong Ang was the General Manager. Atong Ang also served as the Marketing
Agent of PAGCOR for the project and, as such, he identified the operational areas and the
pre-qualified applicants. The Bingo Two Ball Project was partially implemented from
September 18, 2000 to October 7, 2000 in the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, CAR,
Cordillera Administrative Region, Albay, Bicol, Cavite, Marinduque, Lucena, Batangas,
Northern and Southern Luzon, and in Visayas. PAGCOR allegedly attained its financial
goals and objectives in the organizational stage of the project. Witness Padua presented
and identified PAGCORs Share Based on Reported Sales Quota (Exh. 288) prepared by
the consultancy group of Atong Ang to corroborate the success of the initial operation of
the Bingo Two Balls Project.
Based on a Memorandum dated November 14, 2000 (Exh. 290) approved by the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR, the 20-day operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project aggregated a
gross sale of P106,206,661.00 and that P24,427,532.00 was collected by PAGCOR which
represented its 23% share. The consultancy group of Atong Ang gained 2% from the 23%
share of PAGCOR. Though there was no written agreement between PAGCOR and the
consultancy group of Atong Ang as regards the payment of the latters 2% share, the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided that the consultancy group of Atong Ang was
entitled to such share.
Witness Padua also testified that among the objectives of the Bingo Two Ball Project were
to eradicate the illegal number games such as Jueteng and to create employment
opportunities. However, the said project was ordered suspended by the Office of the
President because of adverse criticisms and questions of legality from the public.
On cross examination, witness Padua admitted that there was no bidding conducted by
PAGCOR in awarding the operation of the Bingo Two Ball Project to Prominent Marketing
Consultancy Group, Inc. She explained that since Atong Ang also headed the Power
Management Corporation which successfully handled the Jai-Alai Operations of
PAGCOR, the Board of Directors of PAGCOR decided to engage the services of the
Prominent Marketing Consultancy Group, Inc. of Atong Ang to handle the Bingo Two Ball
Project. The witness further testified that some of the appointed operators of the Bingo
Two Ball Project were reputed as Jueteng Operators but qualified that she only knew them
as such after the initial operation of the said project.
On re-direct examination, witness Padua testified that assuming the Bingo Two Ball
Project was not suspended and a contract was perfected between PAGCOR and the
operator the contract would nonetheless pass the review and approval of the Office of the
Government Corporate Council (OGCC) and the Office of the President.
SENATOR ALFREDO SIOJO LIM (Sen. Lim) was appointed as the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on January 8, 2000. [TSN, March
14, 2005]
On October 7, 2000, Sen. Lim read in the newspaper the alleged attempted ambush on

the life of Gov. Singson and discussed the issue with Congressman Luis "Baby" Asistio
during their breakfast meeting at the Manila Yacht Club. Thereafter, Sen. Lim and Baby
Asistio visited Gov. Singson at his residence in Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Governor
Casimiro Ynares, Jr. later arrived and joined their conversation. According to Lim, Gov.
Singson related to them the details of the attempted plot against the life of Gov. Singson
on the late evening of October 3, 2000. On said date, members of the Traffic Management
Group (TMG) armed with long rilfes and not wearing proper uniforms, accosted the
vehicle occupied by Gov. Singson along San Marcelino Street, for beating a red light and
having a blinker on top of his vehicle. Gov. Singson initially refused to alight from his
vehicle and got down only when the mayors that he just had a meeting with arrived on the
scene. Singson argued with the TMG Officers and refused to be brought to Camp Crame.
The dispute ended when the TMG Officers finally agreed that they will no longer force
Gov. Singson to be brought to Camp Crame since the blinker of the vehicle of Gov.
Singson was surrendered to them.
Gov. Singson allegedly said that Atong Ang and Ping Lacson were the persons
responsible for the attempted ambush on his life, and that both conspired to have him
killed because Gov. Singson was against the Bingo Two Balls gaming proposal of Atong
Ang and that there was an arrangement for the raising of campaign funds for the
presidential candidacy of Ping Lacson. Sen. Lim further related that Gov. Singson also
implicated FPres. Estrada on the alleged attempted ambush on his life on the theory that
Atong Ang and Ping Lacson will not have the courage to have him killed without the
approval of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson also grumbled about the awarded franchises for
the operation of the Bingo Two Balls in Ilocos by Atong Ang to the political opponents of
Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson also mentioned that FPres. Estrada did not help him sort out
his problems with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Sen. Lim further testified that on the following day, October 8, 2000, he and Congressman
Baby Asistio went to the Malacaang Palace and met FPres. Estrada. The witness relayed
to FPres. Estrada the sentiments and allegations of Gov. Singson. FPres. Estrada denied
Gov. Singsons accusations that he had something to do with the attempted ambush and
that he would initiate an investigation on the matter. FPres. Estrada said that Gov. Singson
was his good friend and that he was with Lim in Cebu City and Cagayon de Oro during the
alleged incident. As to the issue regarding the Bingo Two Ball Project of Atong Ang, FPres.
Estrada said that he was convinced by PAGCOR that it could triple its proceeds as
compared to the operations of Jai-Alai. FPres. Estrada would also trigger an investigation
regarding Gov. Singsons allegation that Atong Ang had planned to divert the proceeds of
the Bingo Two Ball Project of PAGCOR. Witness Lim added that FPres. Estrada admitted
that he left Gov. Singson to explain to COA because he had no control and supervision
over the said constitutional body.
The witness also refuted the testimony of Gov. Singson that he conveyed the impression
to Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada gave the signal to kill Atong Ang. Witness Lim
claimed that his thumbs down gesture to Gov. Singson meant that FPres. Estrada would
have Atong Ang ordered investigated and not to have the latter killed.
On cross examination, witness Lim testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the
purchase of shares from Bell Corporation by GSIS and SSS; as to the matters regarding
the Ilocos Sur Excise Taxes; and as to the Jueteng collection ledger of Yolanda Ricaforte.
VIOLETA SUAREZ DAMITAN (Damitan) was the Executive Assistant of the Erap Muslim

Youth Foundation employed by Raul P. De Guzman on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 278). [TSN,
March 16, 2005] She was responsible, among others, for the safekeeping of the records
of the said corporation such as the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, and the records
of applicants to the scholarship program of the foundation.
Damitan testified that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation provided scholarship education
programs to the less privileged Muslim youth Filipinos. The applications and
recommendations filed were reviewed by the Screening Committee and approved by the
Board of Trustees of the foundation.
Damitan presented and identified the credentials and pertinent records of Sittie Shahani
Laminero who was one of the applicants granted a scholarship program by the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation (Exhs. 295, 296, 297 and submarkings). She likewise presented
and identified several documents enumerating and showing other grantees of the said
scholarship program, namely, Salvador Ongay Domona, Sohayle Hadji Abdul Rachman,
Janice Halim Negrosa, Roque Santos Morales, and Ahmad Robert (Exhs. 279, 280, 298,
299 and submarkings). The witness further presented and identified a Minutes of the
Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation on July 21, 2000 to
show the appointment of the other employees of the foundation and the accounts of the
scholarship program (Exh. 274 and submarkings).
SALVADOR ONGAY DOMONA [TSN, March 16, 2005], JANICE HALIM
NEGROSA [TSN, March 30, 2005], ROQUE SANTOS MORALES [TSN, March 30,
2005] and H. SOLAYHE A.A. MARANGIT [TSN, March 28, 2007], all similarly testified
that they were granted scholarships by the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Witness
Domona applied and was admitted for the scholarship program on the year 2003; witness
Negrosa applied and was admitted to the said program on the year 2004; witness Morales
applied and was admitted to the same program on the year 2004 and witness Marangit
applied and was admitted to the same program in 2004. These witnesses also presented
and identified their respective credentials and pertinent documentary evidence. (see also
Exhs. 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, and submarkings)
ATTY. CARINA JAVIER DEMAISIP (Demaisip) was appointed Assistant Corporate
Secretary of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. on January 1, 2004 (Exh. 277). She
assisted the release of funds and prepared the minutes of the meetings of the Board of
Trustees of the foundation. [TSN dated March 30, 2005 and TSN dated April 4, 2005]
Demaisip testified that Raul P. De Guzman solicited her services for the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation sometime on July of 2003 which was after the incarceration of Atty.
Edward S. Serapio, the Corporate Secretary. The foundation was located at the 4 th Floor of
VAG Building in Greenhills, Ortigas Avenue. The witness then identified several minutes of
the meetings approved by the Board of Trustees of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation
(Exhs. 279, 281, 312, and submarkings) and corroborated the testimony of witness Violeta
S. Damitan regarding the approved and awarded scholarship programs by the foundation
(Exh. 313 and submarkings). She also testified that among the reasons why the
foundation had no scholars for the years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, except for Salvador
O. Domona, were because of (a) the ineffectiveness of the Board of Trustees brought by
the charges against FPres. Estrada, (b) the lack of funds to operate the foundation due to
the freeze orders, and (c) the failure of the institutions to comply with the requirements of
the scholarship program. The funds of the foundation became available on November 11,
2003. Hence, the foundation started releasing checks only thereafter although some of the

applications for the scholarship program were already reviewed and approved before the
availability of the funds.
MARIA LOURDES LOVERO FLORENDO (Florendo) was an Executive Assistant in the
Office of the Vice President and the Confidential Secretary of accused FPres. Estrada.
[TSN, April 20, 2005 and April 25, 2005]
Florendo testified that she did not know and had never met on any occasion Emma Lim.
The witness said that she was shocked when she read from the newspaper that Emma
Lim allegedly gave her a black bag containing P5,000,000.00 at the Presidential
Residence. She refuted the statements that Emma Lim gave during the Impeachment
Trial on December 11, 2000 that the latter went straight to her and handed a black bag
which contained P5,000,000.00; that Emma Lim was not required at the guardhouse of
the Presidential Residence to have her black bag examined in the X-Ray Machine; that
there were no furniture or sala sets at the right side of the entrance of the Presidential
Residence; that witness Florendo received the black bag and placed it near a table and
that she talked to Gov. Singson and told him that "they already arrived"; and that Emma
Lim went out running towards her vehicle after giving the black bag to witness Florendo
(Exh. 320-C and submarkings).
NORMAN DELOS SANTOS BORDADORA (Bordadora) was a reporter of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer since July of 1996. He testified that he was the author of an article in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer Newspaper entitled "Chavit, I Have Never Been Into Jueteng"
which was published on May 21, 2005 (Exh. 335). The source of the contents of his article
was allegedly Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson whom witness Bordadora had interviewed
through a cellular phone which was not recorded. The witness clarified that he interviewed
Gov. Singson on the alleged jueteng involvement of Archbishop Cruz and not on the
jueteng expose in the year 2000. [TSN, June 22, 2005]
ATTY. JOSEPH QUION ORSOS (Orsos), P/SUPT. ARTURO LACSINA
PAGLINAWAN (Paglinawan),P/SUPT. RODOLFO SANTOS AZURIN,
JR. (Azurin), POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR NOEL BIACA VALLO(Vallo), P/SUPT.
ELISEO DECENA DE LA PAZ (Dela Paz), JONIRO FORMILLEZA FRADEJAS(Fradejas)
and RENATO MENDOZA PAREDES (Paredes), all testified to matters related to the
October 3, 2000 traffic incident involving Gov. Singson and the Traffic Management Group
("TMG").
Orsos, a Police Officer and the Chief of the Legal Services of the TMG, presented and
identified a Roster of Troops dated October 3, 2000; a Disposition of Personnel as of
August 28, 2000 dated October 31, 2000; a Memorandum dated October 4, 2000
regarding the apprehended motor vehicle of Gov. Singson; and another Memorandum
dated October 4, 2000 (Exh. 360) regarding the traffic violation of the driver of Gov.
Singson. He admitted he had no personal knowledge of the incident. [TSN, July 13, 2005,
Exhs. 358-61 with submarkings] Paredes, Director of the TMG, identified a Memorandum
dated October 4, 2000 signed by him and previously marked as Exh. 360. [TSN dated
August 17, 2003] Paglinawan, Chief of the General Assignment Section of the Western
Police District, testified that there were no records in the WPD that Gov. Singson filed a
case in relation to the October 3, 2000 incident. [TSN, July 18, 2005] Azurin, Chief of the
Special Operations Division of the TMG, testified that, on October 3, 2000, he was called
by Vallo for assistance in some misunderstanding with Gov. Singson. He also testified to
what happened after they proceeded to the WPD headquarters in UN Avenue and related

that the agents of the TMG Group were wearing proper uniform but admitted that he
himself was not in proper uniform. Azurin testified that the blinker and siren found in the
vehicle of Gov. Singson were confiscated for violation of a Memorandum dated July 14,
1998 issued by the Office of the President. [TSN, July 18, 2005, and Exh. 362 with
submarkings] Vallo, Chief of the Operation Task Force Limbas of the TMG, testified to the
TMGs spotting of an accelerating vehicle (Gov. Singsons), the chase and the accosting
of the vehicle for a traffic violation. Dela Paz, Police Chief Superintendent of the Philippine
National Police, identified his signature in a Memorandum sent to relevant offices
pertaining to the use of blinkers [TSN, August 8, 2005, Exh. 364] Fradejas, Executive
Assistant II of the Traffic Engineering Center of the Metro Manila Development Authority,
identified a Certification pertaining to the DPWH Phase I installation of traffic lights in
Metro Manila. [TSN dated August 8, 2005, Exh. 384]
DR. GEMMA BAULA DAVID (David) had been the dentist of FPres. Estrada since the
latter was still a Senator. David testified that she provided dental treatments to FPres.
Estrada at the latters residence in No. 1 Polk Street, Greenhills, and at the Presidential
Residence in Malacaang. The witness related that, every time she visited FPres. Estrada
at his residence in Greenhills as well as in the Presidential Residence in Malacaang for
the scheduled dental appointment, she had to pass the strict security protocols conducted
at the entrance of both locations. She further related that at there was a walk-through
metal detector at the Presidential Residence in Malacaang. [TSN, May 30, 2005]
MARICHU ANDUEZA VILLANUEVA (Villanueva) was a Journalist of the Philippine Star
Newspaper and a member of the Malacanang Press Group. She authored the article
entitled "Palace Backs Ping on Anti-Jueteng Drive" in the June 17, 2000 issue of the said
newspaper which was based on a press conference she attended in Malacaang Palace
on June 16, 2000. [TSN, September 26, 2005; Exh. 415 and submarkings]
ATTY. RICARDO VILLANUEVA PUNO, JR., a practicing lawyer, testified that he joined
the government as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson on or about March 16,
2000 and stayed in that position until January 20, 2001. In such position, he would only
speak of information that he was authorized to disseminate to the public or the media at
that particular time. His position gave him the privilege of being present at discussions on
policies, which included Presidential meetings. [TSN, October 3, 2005]
To the best of his recollection, the policy of the FPres. Estrada then was always to fight
illegal gambling. That has been the declared policy even during the tenure of the witness
as Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson. He had a general recollection of this
policy, but he had no specific recollection of the times it was actually mentioned.
He could not recall specifically a press conference held on June 16, 2000, although he
saw the June 17, 2000 issue of the Philippine Star attached to the subpoena [Exh. 415],
but there was a time when he held a series of briefings for media at 2:00 p.m., and it was
probably during one of those briefings that the points in the article were raised. The article
referred to a drive by the then Director General of the Philippine National Police
against jueteng. The question asked of the witness at the time was probably, whether
FPres. Estrada in fact prescribed jueteng reduction. It was very clear that it was in fact the
policy at that time, based on their previous conversations. The article, however, referred to
the drive allegedly initiated by then PNP Director Panfilo Lacson. Up to the time that the
witness left in January 2001, he could not remember any reversal of that policy. He would
not know, however, if jueteng continued despite the campaign against it, because his

office as Press Secretary was not monitoring the situation.

ATTY. HILARIO PAUL HAVOC RAGUNJAN, JR. was a commissioned Notary Public who
notarized the Letter dated May 28, 2005 of Rodolfo Q. Pineda (Exh. 331) addressed to the
Chairman of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the House of the House of
Representatives, Hon. Mario Z. Almario. Witness Ragunjan, Jr. testified that he personally
knew the affiant of the letter but had no personal knowledge as to the contents of the said
letter. [TSN, June 6, 2005]
MARIBETH ANG ESCOBAR, Officer-in-Charge of the United Overseas Bank (UOB) San
Juan Branch, testified on a Certification dated June 28, 2002 addressed to Atty, Irene
Jurado issued by Ms. Elma Gutierrez, who was no longer connected with UOB. Witness
had been the OIC of UOB San Juan since Ms. Gutierrez resignation. (TSN, November 22,
2004, p. 48)
The said Certification stated: "This is to certify that based on our records from 1999 up to
the present, we have no current account listed under the name of the client Mayor Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada." She verified the facts stated in the Certification by personally checking
the records on file in their system and there was no reading of an account under the name
of Senator Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, upon receipt of the subpoena. (Ibid., p. 54)
Escobar also testified that she was not aware and has not seen any check with photo of
the client on the face of the check. She has never processed a customized check but has
seen one with the logo of a company like Sunlife. Witness stated that the Certification was
issued based on the letter dated June 28, 2002 of Atty. Irene D. Jurado to the Manager of
UOB San Juan. (Ibid., pp. 54-58)
Witness testified that although the certification stated only that Jose Jinggoy Estrada had
no current account, her verification of their their records showed that there was no Jose
Jinggoy Estrada on the list of active accounts of UOB San Juan, as well as in the dormant
accounts. Similarly, the Municipality of San Juan had no account with the UOB San Juan,
more so the Municipality of Marikina. (Ibid., pp. 94-98)
ROSEMARIE J. SAN GREGORIO, Community Affairs Officer II of the Municipal
Government of San Juan, testified that she didnt know personally a lady by the name of
Emma Lim, but has seen her testify before the Impeachment Court on television. She
remembered particularly the testimony of Emma Lim because Emma Lim mentioned the
name of her officemate, Josie, who was with the witness when they were watching the
proceedings in the television along with Lauro Quirino, who was their receptionist in the
Mayors Office. Witness remembered that among the testimony of Emma Lim was that
she went to the Municipal Office to collect money. Witness stated that she and Josie
Ramos were surprised and amazed with Emma Lims testimony since she [Emma Lim] did
not go to the Mayors Office. Josie Ramos was the one handling papers for the signature
of the Mayor. [TSN, November 24, 2004, pp. 26-42]
JOSEFINA QUIAZON RAMOS worked as one of the secretaries in the Office of the
Mayor, Municipality of San Juan for 1998 to 2001, preparing documents for signature of
then Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Witness Ramos corroborated the testimony of Rosemarie
San Gregorio that Emma Lim did not go to the Office of then Mayor Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada in January, February and March 2000 to pick up allegedly jueteng money from the

Office of the Mayor.

Ramos described as untrue the testimony of Emma Lim that Emma Lim talked to Ramos
and was asked to sit in front of Ramos table in the Office of the Mayor on February and
March 2000. Witness stated that Emma Lim never went to the Office of the Mayor in San
Juan. Witness was surprised when Emma Lim mentioned her name during the
impeachment trial, and that she told this to Mayor Estrada who called her up after Emma
Lim testified. Mayor Estrada was also surprised and told her that "what is that woman
saying, that woman is a liar". [TSN, December 6, 2004]
SUSAN MACALLA AVILES was the Social Secretary of Ms. Guia Gomez and a resident
of No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan, Metro Manila. She testified
that, as social secretary, she was the one who received guests, entertained them and was
the one who would call to serve the visitors coffee or juice at the house of Guia Gomez at
No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. Aviles asserted that Gov. Singson
never went to the house at P. Guevarra. [TSN, December 1, 2004, p.16-17] She clarified
that the house on P. Guevarra and Ibuna were one and the same because their address
was No. 1 Ibuna Street corner P. Guevarra Street, San Juan. (Ibid., p.44)
NOEL ISRAEL BUENDIA was previously a security guard assigned at the residence of
Guia Gomez at No. 1 Ibuna corner P. Guevarra Streets, San Juan, from February 26,
1998 up to 2002, and as such, was stationed at the gate along Ibuna St. from 6:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. and the one assigned in the front and in-charge of asking visitors. During his
assignment at Guia Gomezs residence, Buendia testified that he did not see Gov.
Singson go there. [TSN, December 1, 2004]
CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO (Cong. Asistio) testified that he was at San
Francisco, California on July 24, 2000 as part of the official Philippine Delegation
accompanying then President Joseph E. Estrada in his state visit to the United States of
America, and that it was there that he saw Gov. Singson, at the lobby of the Fairmont
Hotel where they stayed, telling him of the latters problem that FPres. Estrada did not
want to see him. Cong. Asistio, together with Gov. Singson, went to the room of FPres.
Estrada, and Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the COA for the
relief of the Auditor assigned in his province to which FPres. Estrada replied that he might
get into trouble as the Chairman of the COA is a constitutional appointee and suggested
that Gov. Singson instead talk to then Executive Sectary Ronaldo Zamora to resolve his
problem.
Witness also testified that after returning from the U.S. and prior to the expose or press
conference made by Gov. Singson in October 2000, he received a call from the latter
asking him if they could meet it Manila Peninsula, and, at the same time, Gov. Singson
told him of his problem and his grievances (sama ng loob) against FPres. Estrada,
including placing his political opponents in positions of power in his province, such as, the
relief of the Provincial Commander and conferring on his brother, Bonito, who is his mortal
enemy, a position regarding jueteng.
Cong. Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the
period late August to September 2000, they mainly talked about the state of the Ilocos Sur
provincial leadership and occasionally Gov. Singsons suspicions regarding Atong Angs
designs to corner bingo two balls and ease him out. According to Cong. Asistio, Gov.
Singson is worried that his continued provincial leadership will be affected by the

developments. Cong. Asistio also testified they never talked about jueteng, or receipt of
jueteng monies or the alleged receipt of money from R.A. 7171 since according to him, he
knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial and he thinks that these are mere
figments of Gov. Singsons imagination.
Cong. Asistio also testified that he, together with Mayor Lim, went to the house of Gov.
Singson to persuade the latter not to push through with the press conference.
Cong. Asistio also testified that in his visits to Malacaang during the time of FPres.
Estrada, at least three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang
was banned by the FPres. Estrada from entering Malacaang. [TSN, October 11, 2004
and October 13, 2004]
ATTY. ESTELITA D. CORDERO (Cordero) testified that she was a close friend Mrs. Lydia
"Honey Girl" Singson, sister of Gov. Singson, and worked as a legal consultant for Mrs.
Honey Girl Singson when the latter was appointed as Director General of the Technology
and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) until October 12, 2000. [TSN, November 8, 2004,
pp. 9, 11-12, 14]
Cordero testified that in October 2001, members of the Save Ilocos Sur Alliance (SISA)
visited her in her office and requested her to go over several audit reports (1999 to 2000,
SAO Special Report 1999) of the province and to find out if there is any basis for filing any
action against responsible public officials of the province. [Ibid., p. 38] After going through
the documents, witness Cordero, together with members of SISA and other concerned
citizens, decided to file criminal complaints against Gov. Singson and other responsible
officers of the province who did some anomalous transactions to the detriment of the
province. [Ibid., pp. 44-45]
Witness thought that the testimony of Emma Lim in the impeachment trial were all lies
because from the statement of Gov. Singson, he did not have anything to do with jueteng
and the delivery of the money. Thus, witness claimed that all of these were fabricated
statements on the part of Emma Lim. [TSN, November 10, 2004, pp. 26-28]
Witness Cordero also testified that Gov. Singson was the jueteng lord in their province and
neighboring provinces, and all matters relating to jueteng, such as, employment, people,
operations were under the control of Gov. Singson. [Ibid., pp. 29-30]
BRIG. GEN. RODOLFO DOCTOR DIAZ, a retired military officer, was assigned as the
Commanding Officer of the Presidential escorts, one of the major units of the Presidential
Security Group, in 1998 when FPres. Estrada assumed office. He testified that he was
familiar with the private residence of FPres. Estrada in No. 1 Polk Street. Quezon City.
According to Gen. Diaz, only the First Familys vehicles were allowed to park in the
garage. Only five vehicles could be accommodated there and usually the cars parked
there were the Presidents primary and secondary car, as well as an SUV and two more
cars. Witness also detailed the security measures followed in Polk Street. In Polk Street,
visitors were never allowed to park their cars inside the garage. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp.
50-56]
The witness did not see Atong Ang either at No. 1 Polk Street or in Malacanang since the
President has been elected. He had seen Mr. Jaime Dichaves twice; Mr. Baby Asistio,

once or twice. He did not see Governor Singson in No. 1 Polk Street [Ibid., pp. 81-83]
RICARDO GREY GOLPEO, General Manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) from February 2000 to February 2001, testified that he and then PSCO
Chairman Rosario Lopez were summoned by FPres. Estrada to Malacaang in March
2000. On that occasion, FPres. Estrada informed them that jueteng had become a big
problem to him and wanted to know if the PCSO can do something to fight jueteng. The
witness replied that they will study the instruction of the President. Chairman Lopez
instructed witness to personally handle the matter. At the time the witness left PCSO, he
testified that the PCSO had not come up with a suggestion to the President on how to
eradicate jueteng. [TSN, April 11, 2005, pp. 11-17, 19, 30)]
DANILO DELA ROSA REYES was a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. and the Acting Treasurer of the said foundation. He was
also an Associate Professor at the National College of Public Administration and
Governance in the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman and the Vice President for
Educational Services for the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation
Reyes testified that the "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation was duly established in 1988
and had 14,000 recipients of scholarships as of the year 2000. Among the Incorporators of
the said foundation was FPres. Estrada. The "Erap Para sa Mahirap" Foundation,
however, encountered financial constraints so the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc.
came into existence.
Reyes related that Raul P. De Guzman, a brother-in-law of FPres. Estrada, invited him to
join in establishing a foundation for the poor and deserving Muslim students in line with
the vision of FPres. Estrada of developing a new generation of Muslim leaders. He then
identified the documents related to the registration of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. (Exhs. 251 to 255, 262 to 271, inclusive of submarkings) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. was duly
organized in accordance with law and had conducted its business upon incorporation for
bona fide purposes as stated in its Articles of Incorporation (Exh. 252) and Amended ByLaws (Exh. 255). The original Members of the Board of Trustees were: Prof. Mila
Reformina, Dr. Raul P. De Guzman, Atty. Edward S. Serapio, Dr. Danilo Reyes, and Mr.
George L. Go, who later resigned.
The word ERAP affixed to the name "Muslim Youth Foundation" was allegedly an acronym
for "Education, Research, and Assistance Program". The funding of the said foundation
was provided by the Erap Golf Cup, which donated the amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00); the contributions of the Board of Trustees in the amount of P20,000.00
each; and a Two Hundred Million Peso (P200,000,000.00) donation from a donor which,
according to Serapio, would like to remain anonymous. The amount of Ten Million One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,100,000.00) was deposited with the UCPB and eventually
transferred to Metrobank while the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) was
deposited with Equitable PCI Bank. The Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) was the
source of the foundations operating expenses and for minimal scholarship program during
the time material in this case.
According to Reyes, the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. had (four (4) scholars for MA
in Islamic Studies in the University of the Philippines for school year 2004-2005. For the
second semester of that school year, the foundation added four (4) more scholars for

Masters Degree, two in the University of the Philippines and the other two in the Philippine
Normal University. The scholars were only given Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) per
semester. Reyes explained that the foundation was in hiatus for three (3) years because
its funds were frozen by a court order and that they conducted meetings after the
recuperation of Dr. De Guzman who got sick, and after the release on bail of Atty. Serapio.
Reyes also testified as to the appointment papers of the employer of the foundation, such
as the Executive Assistant, the Assistant Corporate Secretary and the Utility Messenger.
The office address of the foundation was transferred from Pasig to the VAG Building in
San Juan. [TSN, February 21, 2005; February 23, 2005; and March 2, 2005]
EUGENE MACAMASBAD, a Police Senior Inspector with the Philippine National
Police, brought with him the documents required in the subpoena addressed to Gen.
Arturo Lomibao of the PNP or his authorized representative. He produced a certified true
copy of a Memorandum Circular 2000-003, certified by Celia Redison (Exh. 365). As to
the memorandum dated July 19, 2000 which was subpoenaed, the same could not be
located as shown by a certification dated 29 July 2005 issued by the Deputy Chief of the
PACER. (Exh. 380) [TSN, August 1, 2005, pp. 60-69] The witness came to Court and
produced the above documents only upon verbal instruction from his officers. He was not
the records custodian and he did not have any knowledge about records being maintained
by their office. [Ibid., pp. 70-72, id.]
SEN. EDGARDO ANGARA, a lawyer and a senator when he testified in Court, knew Gov.
Singson. They were compadres, being godfathers at the wedding of Singsons niece. In
September 2000, Gov. Singson made an unexpected visit at Senator Angaras farm to
request that the witness talk to President Estrada about the 2-balls game. Gov. Singson
told the witness that the franchise for the said game in Ilocos Sur was given to his political
opponent and he was losing face with his supporters. Gov. Singson wanted the franchise
to go to him or if it cannot be granted, that the game of 2-balls not be allowed altogether in
Ilocos. The witness replied that he would go down to Manila and call the President to relay
Gov. Singsons message. [TSN, June 1, 2005, pp. 13-15]
Sen. Angara remembered Gov. Singson saying that the franchise was given to Eric
Singson. Gov. Singson even mentioned a list of of jueteng payoffs and that one of the
beneficiaries was the President. When Sen. Angara mentioned to FPres. Estrada Gov.
Singsons request regarding 2-balls and statements regarding jueteng, the President
denied that he was a recipient of any payoff, saying he had nothing to do with it [2-balls]
but that it was Atong Angs jurisdiction [Ibid., pp.16 and 24]
After Sen. Angara relayed the answer of the President, Gov. Singson asked the witness to
talk to Atong Ang and the witness said he will try. When the witness was able to talk to
Atong Ang and repeated Gov. Singsons request, Atong Ang replied he will study it or that
he will have to consult PAGCOR. The witness denied having told Gov. Singson "Grabe to.
Huwag kang lumabas at akong bahala kay Presidente dahil baka pati kaming
mga Cabinet members maaapektuhan nito." [Ibid., pp. 17-18, 24-25] Witness saw the list
of payoffs shown by Singson, but he did not read it. [Ibid., pp. 30, 43]
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information

With respect to the alleged acts of receiving or collection of sums of money from illegal
gambling, commonly known as "jueteng", in the form of share or percentage, the Court
finds credible material portions of Gov. Chavit Singsons testimony insofar as they are
corroborated by independent and competent evidence.
The Court concedes that Gov. Chavit Singson did not have the purest of motives in
exposing the jueteng collections which he testified were done for the benefit of FPres.
Estrada. Undoubtedly and by his own admission, he resented not being given the
franchise for the Bingo Two Balls, the government sanctioned numbers game, in his home
province of Ilocos Sur. He feared the demise of his political career as the said franchise
was given to his political opponents, Eric Singson and his brother Bonito Singson, to the
embarrassment of the mayors who were affiliated to him. Gov. Chavit Singson was
disappointed to say the least that Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, JV Ejercito, the other son of
FPres. Estrada, Secretary Edgardo Angara, Secretary Alfredo Lim, friends like Luis Asistio
and Mark Jimenez, whom Gov. Chavit Singson approached to intercede to FPres. Estrada
to help him secure the franchise, were unsuccessful. Gov. Chavit Singson was also
displeased that FPres. Estrada would not use the Office of the Presidency to help him with
his trouble with the Commission on Audit which was demanding his liquidation of the Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) share of Ilocos Sur in the excise taxes collected
under RA No. 7171. The Court will not cite the alleged attempt on the life of Gov. Chavit
Singson in the evening of October 3, 2000 considering the contradictory evidence on this
matter consisting of the testimony of the enforcement officers on the incident.
The acts of collection of jueteng protection money for FPres. Estrada from various
provinces nationwide per month as well as the payments to him and to various persons
from such sums of money with his approval or acquiescence were methodically detailed in
two sets of ledgers: the first set covering the period beginning November 1998 to July
1999 (Exh. W7 to E8), and the second set for the period starting August 1999 to August
2000 (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l). The first set of ledgers were personally prepared by Gov. Chavit
Singson, aided by Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, while the second set of ledgers
were prepared by Yolanda Ricaforte, under the supervision of Gov. Chavit Singson and
also with the help of Lim and Itchon. Insofar as the collection of jueteng money is
concerned, Emma Lim and Carmencita Itchon, by their own admission performed similar
roles as Yolanda Ricaforte except that the latter received double the amount of the
monthly salary of Lim and Itchon by virtue of her "supervisory" status.
The accused would have this Court dismiss the ledgers as hearsay and/or mere
fabrications. However, there are circumstances which lend credibility to the said ledgers.
The first set of ledgers (Exh. W7 to E8) was faxed by Ricaforte to Singson just before Gov.
Chavit Singson made his expose while the second set of ledgers (Exh. A-4 to A-4-l) was in
the possession of Ricaforte, which she produced during the Senate Impeachment
proceedings, as testified to by Atty. David Jonathan Yap, the Senate Legal Counsel.
Yolanda Ricaforte was closely associated to FPres. Estrada, being the wife of Orestes
Ricaforte, who was appointed by FPres. Estrada as Undersecretary of Tourism. Ricaforte
opened several accounts in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank with unusually
huge deposits and investments in multiple of millions of pesos during the period covered
by the second set of ledgers.
Per testimony of Nantes, in Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, Ricaforte opened a savings
account, a current account, seven special savings account and a PCI Emerald account. In

the Savings Account No. 0157-04227-0 alone, after the initial deposit of P17,205,000.00
on September 1, 1999, she deposited from September 7, 1999 to January 10, 2000, a
staggering total amount of P57,712,150.00. The initial deposits for each of the seven (7)
Special Savings Accounts were: P70,000,000.00 (December 2, 1999); P10,000,000.00
(February 7, 2000); P2,500,000.00 (March 29, 2000); P9,700,000.00 (April 5, 2000);
2,500,000.00 (May 29, 2000) P1,900,000.00 (May 4, 2000); and P2,000,000.00 (June 1,
2000). The deposit in the PCI Emerald Fund was P6,616,676.19 (December 6, 2000).
According to Rosario S. Bautista, in Diliman-Matalino Branch, Ricaforte opened on
November 19, 1999 a combo account: Savings Account No. 0288-02037-0 and Current
Account No. 0238-00853-0 with an initial deposit of P70,000,000.00 covered by two (2)
PCI Bank Checks payable to cash each in the amount of P35,000,000.00, drawn by
William T. Gatchalian. Additional deposits were: a check (Exh. A-7-h) issued by Gov.
Chavit Singson on November 22, 1999 for P1,000,000.00; another check dated December
9, 1999 with PNB Naga as drawee bank (Exh. A-7-j); cash deposit of P3,050,000.00 (Exh.
A-7-d) on December 2, 1999; and cash deposit of P1,000,000.00 on January 28, 2000.
In the Pedro Gil-Robinsons Branch, according to Shakira C. Yu, Ricaforte opened on
January 6, 2000, a Regular Savings Account with an initial deposit of P6,000,000.00.
Other deposits consisted of: (1) check drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson for P2,965,000.00;
(2) cash deposit of P1,540,000.00 on January 25, 2000; and check drawn by Gov. Chavit
Singson in the amount of P1,340,000.00.
In the T.M. Kalaw Branch, Pabillon testified that Ricaforte opened Regular Savings
Account No. 0193-61496-8 and Special Savings Account No. 02193-15050-3 on February
8, 2000, with the initial deposits in PNB Managers Check (Exh. A-9-A) in the amount of
P10,007,777.78 and cash of P1,400,000.00.
In the Scout Albano Branch, Alcaraz testified that Ricaforte opened on March 2, 2000
three accounts with initial deposits as follows: Savings Account No. 5733-15154-3,
P1,995,000.00; Special Savings Account No. 5733-0721-0, P2,000,000.00; and Checking
Account No. 5732-01-975-7, P5,000.00.
In Isidora Hills Branch, Gonzales testified that Ricaforte opened on March 15, 2000,
among others, Special Savings Account No. 077090498-6 with the initial deposit of
P7,000,000.00 in the form of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. Check drawn by Gov.
Chavit Singson payable to cash.
Bank officials, such as Salvador R. Serrano, Patrick Dee Cheng, and Carolina S.
Guerrero, testified to the existence of checks paid by Chavit Singson which landed in the
accounts of persons associated with FPres. Estrada: (1) Metrobank Check No. 0000917
of Gov. Chavit Singson for P5,000,000.00 which was deposited on February 2, 1999 in
Account No. 061-0-14636-7 of Paul Gary Bogard at Security Bank; (2) Metrobank Check
No. 00138 drawn by Chavit Singson on September 29, 1999 in the amount of
P8,000,000.00 deposited in the account of Mrs. Luisa P. Ejercito; (3) Metrobank Ayala
Center Check No. 000132 drawn by Gov. Chavit Singson payable to William Gatchalian in
the amount of P46,350,000.00; (4) Metrobank Check No. 001547 issued by Gov. Chavit
Singson in the amount of P1,200,000.00 which was deposited in the Account No.
0180409000-3 of Laarni Enriquez on December 23, 1999.

The Erap Muslim Youth Foundation

The paper trail of the P200,000,000.00 deposited for the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
Inc. incontrovertibly established that the said sum of money came from jueteng collections
through the cashiers / managers checks purchased by Ricaforte using the deposits in the
accounts that she opened in the different branches of Equitable PCI Bank described
above, as follows: Cashiers Check for P91,000,000.00, Scout Tobias-Timog Branch, April
13, 2000 (Exh. A-6-S); Cashiers Check for P77,000,000.00, Diliman-Matalino Branch,
April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-7-ee); Cashiers Check for P11,000,000.00, Pedro Gil-Robinsons
Branch, April 13, 2000 (Exh. A-9-B); Managers Check for P3,000,000.00, Scout Albano
Branch, April 12, 2000 (Exh. A-10-K); and Cashiers Check for P7,000,000.00, Isidora Hills
Branch, April 14, 2000.
Antonio Fortuno, Bank Operations Officer of Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star Branch,
testified that the aforementioned six (6) checks were deposited in Bearer Account No.
0279-04225-5. From the said bearer account, fourteen (14) withdrawals in Managers
Checks (Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings) were made in various amounts. Each withdrawal
was divided into two deposits or a total of twenty eight (28) deposits of various amounts
into the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, as shown by the Account Information Slips,
Deposit Receipts, and Detailed Report for Transfers and Debit / Credit Memos (DRTM)
(Exh. K9 to X9 with submarkings).
Fortuno identified the Acknowledgement Letter (Exh. I9) dated April 25, 2000 addressed to
Atty. Serapio from Beatriz Bagsit, Division Head of Makati Area, acknowledging receipt of
the said six (6) checks for deposit on staggered basis and on different dates to the
account of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. at Ortigas-Strata Branch.
Aida T. Basaliso corroborated the testimony of bank officer Fortuno as to the inter-branch
deposits at Equitable PCI Bank Strata Ortigas Branch in Savings Account No. 019285835-6 of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, Inc. from the Pacific Star Branch of the
same bank in the amount of P200,000,000.00 on staggered basis.
The slew of bank documents, involving mind-boggling amounts of money and
authenticated by competent and credible bank officers, convinces the Court that collection
of jueteng money for FPres. Estrada indeed took place and the entries in the ledger were
not manufactured by Gov. Chavit Singson.
Payments or disbursements of the jueteng protection money to persons related to or
closely associated with FPres. Estrada belie his denial that the funds accounted for in the
ledgers belong to him. Indeed, the Court cannot see why Gov. Chavit Singson would
make such large and substantial payments in the form of checks drawn from his
Metrobank account, to personalities such as William Gatchalian, Laarni Enriquez, Loi
Estrada, or other intimate associates of FPres. Estrada unless the money belonged to
FPres. Estrada and the funds were being disbursed according to his instructions. The
evidence does not show why Gov. Chavit Singson would choose Ricaforte to take over the
supervision of the jueteng collection and let her deposit millions of pesos into Ricafortes
accounts in the different branches of the Equitable PCI Bank when Ricaforte had no prior
association nor relation to Gov. Singson and that the latter had his own trusted associates.
As admitted by the accused, it was FPres. Estrada who had a long standing and close
relationship with Ricaforte and her husband. This fact would explain Ricafortes vital
participation in the preparation of the second set of ledgers. The said ledgers were

prepared and later produced before the Senate by Ricaforte and not by Gov. Singson.
The first set of ledgers show that P72,500,000.00 of jueteng money were handed to
FPres. Estrada, alias "Asiong Salonga" from November 1998 to July 1999. Based on the
second set of ledgers, the total amount of jueteng money that FPres. Estrada received
was P112,800,000.00 from August 1999 to August 2000. For the entire duration or period
covered by the 2 sets of ledgers of the total amount of P185,300,000.00. was handed by
Gov. Chavit Singson to FPres. Estrada bi-monthly. The balance, after these amounts were
given to FPres. Estrada and the deduction of expenses, were deposited by Ricaforte in
her bank accounts. Based on the two (2) sets of ledgers the total jueteng collections for
FPres. Estrada from November 1998 to August 2000 amounted to P545,291,000.00. The
P200,000,000.00 of these sums of money found their way into the account of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation.
With respect to Jinggoy Estrada, according to Gov. Singson, he was the "Jing" listed as an
expense in the ledger for P1,000,000.00. It was Gov. Singsons testimony that FPres.
Estrada (after discovering that entry) forbade Gov. Chavit Singson from giving any further
share in the jueteng protection money to Jinggoy Estrada and that it will be up to FPres.
Estrada to give Jinggoy Estrada a share. For this reason, Gov. Chavit Singson and
Jinggoy Estrada hid the fact that Jinggoy Estrada was the collector for the Province of
Bulacan and that the latter was receiving P1,000,000.00. To begin with, the prosecutions
theory that Jinggoy Estrada had to keep his participation in the jueteng collection a secret
from his own father belied the allegation that Jinggoy Estradas participation in the jueteng
scheme was that of a principal or a conspirator. The grant of bail to Jinggoy Estrada was
anchored on this fact advanced by Gov. Singson in his very own testimony. Although
prosecution witness Gov. Singson, and the other witnesses who were under his employ,
testified that there were instances that they collected or received money from Jinggoy
Estrada, there was no testimony to the effect that they saw Jinggoy Estrada subtracted his
share from jueteng collections or in any other way received a share from the jueteng
collections. This Court further found it difficult to believe that Jinggoy Estrada, who was
not even a resident of Bulacan, was the collector for Bulacan. Gov. Singson associates
Jinggoy Estrada with Viceo allegedly from Bulacan. Who is Viceo? Why was Viceo not
charged if it was true that jueteng collections from Bulacan came from him before they
passed the hands of Jinggoy? There was no evidence at all that the money Jinggoy
Estrada turned over to Gov. Singson or the latters representatives was part of the jueteng
protection money collected from Bulacan or that he received funds from a certain Viceo.
The prosecution did not also rebut the bank certification presented by the defense that
Jinggoy Estrada did not have an account with the United Overseas Bank. The certification
disproved the testimony of Emma Lim that the deposit slip in the amount of P1,000,000.00
said to be part of jueteng money was turned over to her by Jinggoy Estrada in the form of
a personalized check with his photograph, from his account at the United Overseas Bank.
The gaps in the prosecutions evidence as to Jinggoy Estrada create uncertainty in the
mind of the Court as to the participation of Jinggoy Estrada in the collection and receipt of
jueteng money. This Court had already brushed aside prosecutions reliance on the
telephone calls and billing statements for such calls between Ricaforte and Jinggoy
Estrada to prove that he was a jueteng collector for Bulacan, for being highly speculative.
The Courts ruling remains firm to this day.
With respect to Serapio, neither Gov. Chavit Singsons testimony nor the ledger entries
proved that Serapio was involved in any way in the collection or disbursement of jueteng

protection money. Certainly, Serapios involvement appears to have begun and was
limited to the funds of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Serapio is being charged with
"laundering" or concealing a portion of the jueteng protection money in the amount of
approximately P200,000,000.00 which was deposited in the account of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation.
To this Courts mind, while the P200,000,000.00 was clearly illegally amassed wealth, the
evidence on record is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Serapio was
aware that the questioned funds were in fact amassed from jueteng protection money
collections and that the fact of the unusually large amount of the deposits into the
foundations account was with criminal intent on the part of Serapio to "launder" or conceal
the illegal nature of the funds to serve the purpose of the acquisition or amassing of illgotten wealth by FPres. Estrada. The only evidence presented on this point is the
uncorroborated testimony of Gov. Chavit Singson that Serapio was present during the
meeting wherein FPres. Estrada instructed the transfer of the amount of P200,000,000.00
to the foundation. The Court has reservations as to the credibility of Gov. Singsons
assertion in this regard because Gov. Singson failed to mention Serapios presence on
that occasion during his testimony at the Senate Impeachment trial. Neither can the Court
consider from the single fact alone that he arranged the staggered deposit of the said sum
of money to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation that he had a criminal intent to conceal illgotten wealth in furtherance of the accumulation of such wealth by the principal accused.
More so, this Court is not prepared to conclusively rule that the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation is not a legitimate foundation or that it was set up purely to hide his illegally
amassed wealth. The incorporation papers and business permits of the Foundation are
authentic and regular. The personalities behind the said foundation appear to be wellrespected academicians. Fortunately or unfortunately, the public revelation of the nature of
the P200,000,000.00 as part of jueteng protection money collected for FPres. Estrada
came too soon after the organization of the Foundation. The Court is not in a position to
ascertain with moral certainty if this controversy preempted any legitimate charitable
activities it could have undertaken soon after its incorporation as it was explained by
defense witnesses or whether it was as the prosecution asserted a money laundering
entity. Premises considered, it is difficult to presume any criminal intent on the part of
Serapio to conceal or launder jueteng protection money in order to contribute to the
amassing and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by FPres. Estrada in connection with the
transfer of the P200,000,000.00 to the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, notwithstanding
that the evidence on record demonstrate indisputably that the said sum of money form
part of ill-gotten wealth obtained though the predicate acts charged in sub-paragraph (a)
of the Amended Information.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH B OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
[P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR inCONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma

Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES;
I. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
GOVERNOR LUIS "CHAVIT" CRISOLOGO SINGSON also testified to prove the second
charge in the amended Information involving the diversion of excise taxes under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7171. [TSN dated July 29, 2002, pp. 78-80] According to Gov. Singson,
Ilocos Sur was not getting its rightful share as a beneficiary of the excise tax. He reminded
FPres. Estrada of his campaign promise that he would release all the funds to Ilocos Sur
in advance, amounting more or less to Four Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) including
interest. FPres. Estrada promised to comply but he said that because of the huge election
expenses he hoped that Gov. Singson would help. Since, Gov. Singson was afraid not to
get the funds, he said: "Why not?" when FPres. Estrada asked: "How much?" Gov.
Singson replied "Maybe Ten Percent (10%) of what you can release." FPres. Estrada
instructed Gov. Singson to prepare his request and he will approve it. Gov. Singson
brought the request addressed to Secretary Diokno of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). FPres. Estrada wrote a marginal note on the request addressed to
the DBM with instruction to approve it. The original of the letter was submitted to Secretary
Diokno. Gov. Singson produced in court a Xerox copy with the original stamp mark of
receipt dated 8/7. The marginal note reads: "Aug. 3, 98. To Secretary Ben Diokno, Please
see if you can accommodate the request of Governor Singson" (Exh. Q 8 and
submarkings). [Ibid, pp. 81-96]
According to Gov. Singson, Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang kept on following up the
release of the money from DBM. A notice of funding check issued (Fund 103 dated August
25, 1998) (Exh. R8) was received by Gov. Singson. Gov. Singson immediately informed
Jinggoy Estrada and Atong Ang. The latter told Gov. Singson that the President needed
One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). Gov. Singson was surprised
because their agreement was only ten percent (10%). Atong told him there will be billions
of pesos, so they should be the first one to deliver to FPres. Estrada and thus be the
strongest and more influential (to the Former President). Gov. Singson then caused the
preparation of a Provincial Board resolution appropriating the sum of Two Hundred Million
Pesos (P200,000,000.00). The Board approved the appropriation of One Hundred
Seventy Million Pesos (P170 Million) for the flue curing barn and Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) for infrastructure. Atong Ang gave Gov. Singson three (3) names to
whom the money would be sent, which they did. Landbank Vigan transferred One
Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) to Landbank Mandaluyong which
credited the accounts of the three (3) persons named by Atong Ang as follows: Account
No. 0561043-38, Alma Alfaro, August 27, 1998, P40,000,000.00; Account No. 0561-044597, Delia Rojas, August 28, 1998, P50,000,000.00; and Account No. 0561-0446-00,
Eleuterio Tan, August 28, 1998, P40,000,000.00. The total amounted to P130,000,000.00.
The above data were contained in a certification of Landbank Branch Head Ma. Elizabeth
Balagot (Exh. S8). [Ibid, pp. 96-108] Gov. Singson did not personally know Delia Rajas,
Alma Alfaro or Eleuterio Tan. In a photograph (Exh. V8), Gov. Singson identified Jojo Uy as
the Eleuterio Tan who showed up at the bank to withdraw the money. Jojo Uy, according
to Gov. Singson was very close to FPres. Estrada. [Ibid, pp. 109-110]
Gov. Singson narrated that Atong Ang called him up from his mothers house and asked

Gov. Singson to go there where they will wait for the money. Gov. Singson went to the
house of Atong Angs mother at 10:00 oclock in the morning and waited there until 3:00 to
4:00 oclock in the afternoon. When the money arrived, Gov. Singson noticed that Atong
Ang left some money in the house. Atong Ang and Gov. Singson boarded Atong Angs
vehicle, and Gov. Singsons vehicle with the security and driver followed them. At the
corner near the house of FPres. Estrada at Polk St., Atong Ang asked Gov. Singson to
alight from his vehicle so that it would not be obvious to the people in the vicinity. Gov.
Singson alighted from the vehicle and saw Atong Angs car entered inside the house of
FPres. Estrada. Atong Ang was the one driving the car. After 15 to 20 minutes, Gov.
Singson followed Atong Ang to the house of FPres. Estrada. Gov. Singson then met the
First Lady, Dr. Loi Estrada who thanked Gov. Singson, saying "Chavit, thank you very
much we really needed it." Gov. Singson took the money which he and Atong Ang
brought. [Ibid, pp. 111-114] When FPres. Estrada came out, Gov. Singson asked him how
much Atong Ang gave him. FPres. Estrada answered Seventy Million Pesos
(P70,000,000.00). Gov. Singson informed him that the total amount was One Hundred
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres Estrada got mad at Atong Ang who
explained that he gave Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to Dr. Loi Estrada, and
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to Jinggoy Estrada. Atong Ang found it hard to
explain the remaining Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00). [Ibid, pp. 114-116]
Gov. Singson frequented the house of FPres. Estrada. At one time, the latter asked him
again to make a request for the excise tax allocation which he will approve. Gov. Singson
explained that the release of the money must be continued in big amount so that they
could cover up the One Hundred Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00). FPres. Estrada
agreed but he did not give the billions promised. Hence, Gov. Singson could not cover up
the (P130,000,000.00). When told by Gov. Singson that the Commission on Audit (COA)
was "pestering" them, FPres. Estrada asked Gov. Singson to cover it up in the meanwhile.
The amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) out of the One Hundred Thirty Million
Pesos (P130,000,000.00) was paid to the supplier of the flue curing barn which were
delivered by the supplier and inaugurated by FPres. Estrada as shown by the pictures
taken on that occasion (Exhs.T8 and U8). The flue curing barn was needed by the tobacco
farmers to save time and money. [Ibid, pp. 116-121]
Gov. Singson referred to the inaugural speech of FPres. Estrada where the latter stated
"walang kama-kamaganak, walang kai-kaibigan, walang kumpa-kumpadre". Gov. Singson
said after what happened that it would mean even friends should pay to FPres. Estrada.
[Ibid, pp. 122-124]
Gov. Singson demonstrated in Court, from the witness stand up to the door of the
courtroom and back in more or less twenty (20) seconds, that he, who had smaller built
than Atong Ang, could carry a box containing Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) in
demonetized bills from the Central Bank in One Thousand Pesos (P1, 000.00)
denomination each. There were twenty bundles of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) per
bundle inside the box. The distance between the witness stand and the door of the
courtroom was thirteen (13) meters. [Ibid, pp. 124-135] The box carried by Gov. Singson
weighed more than ten (10) kilos and five bundles of cash amounting to P5,000,000.00
weighed 4.8 kilos. [Ibid, pp. 172-173]
JAMIS BATULAN SINGSON (Jamis) further testified that he, Gov. Singson, his escort
Federico Artates, and Driver Faustino Prudence, left the office of Gov. Singson on August
31, 1998 to fetch Atong Ang in his office at Pinaglabanan. They all proceeded to the house

of the mother of Atong Ang. Gov. Singson and Atong Ang went inside the house while the
rest waited outside. Later, Atong Ang, Gov. Singson and William Ang, the brother of Atong
Ang, went out. Gov. Singson instructed them to accompany William to Westmont Bank,
Shaw Boulevard. Jamis, Artates, William Ang and the driver of Atong Ang rode the
Mitsubishi Van owned by Atong Ang. William Ang went inside the bank and after 3 hours
came out with Jojo Uy and two security guards carrying two boxes each or a total of four
(4) boxes. Jojo Uy was a family friend of Atong Ang, whom Jamis often saw in the office of
Atong Ang. Jamis identified Jojo Uy in a photograph (Exh. V8). Each of the boxes were
brown in color, with a length of more than ten (10) inches, height of twelve (12) inches and
thickness of eight (8) to ten (10) inches. [TSN dated September 18, 2002, pp. 38-55]
Jamis and Artates each brought two (2) boxes inside the vehicle and went back to the
house of the mother of Atong Ang, with an armored van following them. The four boxes
were brought inside the house where Gov. Singson and Atong Ang were seated on a sofa.
After lunch, Jamis saw the men of Atong Ang loading something in the vehicle of Atong
Ang.
Gov. Singson boarded the car of Atong Ang and instructed Jamis to just follow them to
FPres. Estradas house at Polk Street in Greenhills, but they were instructed by Gov.
Singson to wait at the corner. William Ang earlier informed them that the boxes contained
money for FPres. Estrada. Jamis did not actually see the money. After an hour, Gov.
Singson asked to be fetched from FPres. Estradas house. [Ibid, pp. 59-68]
MARIA ELIZABETH GOZO BALAGOT testified that she was the Manager of Land Bank
Vigan Branch from August 3, 1998 to December 31, 2000 and had over-all supervision
and control of the accounts of said Branch.
According to witness Balagot, on August 27, 1998, Land Bank Vigan Branch received a
Facsimile of Inter-Office Debit Advice (Exh. L18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998
from Land Bank Malacaang Branch with instruction to credit Current Account No.
04021045-70 of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). Land Bank Vigan Branch complied with the instruction
and correspondingly sent an Inter-Office Credit Advice (Exh. M18 and submarkings). Later
in the afternoon of August 27, 1998, authorized (Exh. N18) representatives from the Office
of the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, namely, Maricar Paz and Marina Atendido,
presented Check No. 0000097650 (Exhs. O18 and P18 and submarkings) dated August 27,
1998 in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) issued to
the order of Luis "Chavit" Singson accompanied by an Accountants Advice for Local
Check Disbursement (Exh. Q18 and submarkings) dated August 27, 1998.
Witness Balagot confirmed that on August 27, 1998, the Provincial Administrator of Ilocos
Sur called up Land Bank Vigan Branch requesting for encashment of the One Hundred
Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that had been credited to the account of the
province. She asked for three (3) days for encashment as a matter of bank policy but
since the Provincial Administrator told her the money is immediately needed, she
suggested for them to apply for a demand draft payable and encashable in Land Bank
Makati Branch. Maricar Paz advised witness Balagot that the demand drafts should be
payable to Delia Rajas, Alma Alfaro, Nuccio Saverio, and Eleuterio Tan, although she was
not given the reason why the drafts had to be issued in their names. She never received
any call from FPres. Estrada instructing her as to the said names.
On August 28, 1998, witness Balagot called up Gov. Singson to inform him that Delia

Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were trying to deposit their demand drafts in Westmont Bank and
the governor responded that it was okay with him. She made a second call to the
governor in the afternoon to inform him of the presence of Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan
in Land Bank Shaw Branch and they were insisting that the checks be encashed there.
Witness Balagot informed the governor that she could not accept the encashment at the
said branch, but Gov. Singson told her to do what they wanted. She testified that she
called the governor instead of Maricar Paz because she knew for a fact that the one giving
instructions to Maricar Paz was the governor himself.
Witness Balagot then advised Land Bank Shaw Branch to cancel the demand drafts and
the amounts covered will just be coursed through the individual accounts by inter-branch
transaction. Witness Balagot then prepared an Inter-Branch Transaction Advice for
Eleuterio Tan (Exh. Z18) and Delia Rajas (Exh. Y18) and credited the amount of Forty Million
Pesos (P40,000,000,00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) to their respective
accounts. The cancelled demand drafts were returned to Land Bank Vigan Branch with a
Memorandum (Exh. A19) dated August 31, 1998. The demand draft issued to Nuccio
Saverio, on the other hand, was encashed in Land Bank Makati Branch.
Witness Balagot also identified and affirmed her Sworn Affidavit (Exhibit B19 and
submarkings) dated November 6, 2000 relative to the foregoing facts. [TSN dated January
20, 2003 and TSN dated January 22, 2003]
MARIA CARIDAD MANAHAN RODENAS was the cashier at Land Bank Shaw Branch.
She testified that she knew a person by the name of Alma Alfaro as the authorized
representative of valued clients, Mrs. Catalina Ang and Yolanda Uy, and as an account
holder of the branch. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 13-16] According to witness Rodenas,
Alfaro claimed to be an employee of Power Express and that Power Express was owned
by Catalina Ang. [TSN, November 11, 2002, pp. 21-25]
Witness Rodenas testified that on August 27, 1998, she assisted Alma Alfaro open her
own savings account with the branch with an initial deposit of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) (Exh. H13). Alfaro presented her school ID (Exh. F13-2) and SSS card (Exh. F131) as valid IDs and personally accomplished the signature card (Exh. G13). Alfaro indicated
her business address to be c/o Power Express and residence address as Capt. Savy
Street, Zone IV-A, Talisay, Negros Occidental. After complying with requirements, Alfaro
told witness Rodenas that Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) coming from Land Bank
Vigan Branch will soon be credited to her account. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 16-27]
True enough, Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) from Land Bank Vigan Branch was
credited online to Alfaros newly created account. When Alfaro told witness Rodenas that
she wanted to withdraw the money right away, the latter told Alfaro to just come back the
following day as she will still have to prepare the money. Witness Rodenas then requested
from Land Banks Greenhills Cash Center the amount of Forty Six Million Pesos
(P46,000,000.00) to cover the amount needed by Alfaro as well as to cover other
withdrawals for the day as shown by the Fund Transfer Request (Exh. I13).
When Alma Alfaro returned to the bank on the following day, she proceeded to withdraw
Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh. J13) in cash from her account. [TSN, November
4, 2002, pp. 27- 43] In that same afternoon, Alma Alfaro asked witness Rodenas to help
her two friends, whom she introduced as Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas, with their demand
drafts. Delia Rajas brought two demand drafts, Demand Draft No. 099435 in the amount
of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) (Exh. L13) and Demand Draft No. 09936 in the

amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) (Exh. K13). Eleuterio Tans Demand
Draft, on the other hand, was in the amount of Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) (Exh.
M13).
Witness Rodenas testified that Tan and Rajas asked that they be accommodated in Land
Bank Shaw Branch because they considered it too risky to encash their demand drafts in
the cash department in Buendia, Makati and thereafter to bring it back to Mandaluyong
since they were from Mandaluyong. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 136] After examining
the demand drafts presented, witness Rodenas advised Rajas and Tan that she could not
accommodate their request because Land Bank Shaw Branch was not the paying unit of
the drafts and that she did not have the amount with her at that time. Due to their
insistence, however, witness Rodenas conferred with Elizabeth Balagot and Lawrence
Lopez, the Branch Manager and Branch Accountant of Land Bank Vigan Branch, who told
her to just cancel the demand drafts and let Rajas and Tan open accounts with their
branch so that they could credit the amounts online. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 44-51]
Eleuterio Tan presented two IDs (Exh. N13) and accomplished a specimen signature card
(Exh. O13) and cash deposit slip (Exh. P13) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00). Witness
Rodenas identified Eleuterio Tan in a picture (Exh. F9). Delia Rajas also presented two IDs
(Exh. Q13) and accomplished a specimen signature card (Exh. R13) and deposit slip (Exh.
S13) for One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).
Witness Rodenas sent the cancelled demand drafts by facsimile to Land Bank Vigan
Branch and after sometime the Vigan Branch credited online the proceeds of the demand
drafts to the newly created accounts of Tan and Rajas. The original of the demand drafts
were later returned to the Vigan Branch. [TSN, November 11, 2002, p. 133] Tan and Rajas
then accomplished withdrawal slips (Exh. T13 & Exh. U13) to withdraw Forty Million Pesos
(P40,000,000.00) and Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00), respectively. Thereafter,
Eleuterio Tan filed three (3) applications for cashiers check (Exhs. W13, V13 & X13) causing
Land Bank Shaw Branch to issue THREE (3) cashiers checks (Exhs. W 13-1, V13-1 & X13-1)
in his name in the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) each. The three (3)
cashiers checks were later deposited at Westmont Bank, Mandaluyong Branch to
Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7. [TSN, November 4, 2002, pp. 52-91]
SPO2 FREDERICO APENES ARTATES was a policeman since 1988. At the time of his
testimony, he was assigned at the Vigan City Police Station but detailed to Gov. Singson
as security escort.
Witness Artates testified that on August 31, 1998, he was in the office of Gov. Singson at
the LCS Building in San Andres Bukid, Manila, together with Gov. Singson, Jamis Singson
and driver Faustino Prudencio. According to him, Gov. Singson instructed them to go to
the apartment of Atong Angs mother and while there they accompanied William Ang,
Atongs brother to Westmont Bank at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City where they got
four (4) boxes of cash from the said bank and returned back to the house of Atong Angs
mother and later on proceeded to FPres. Estradas house at Polk Street. He described
each of the boxes to be 10 inches in length, 12 inches in height 15 inches in width [TSN,
September 25, 2002, pp.90-107]. [TSN dated September 25, 2002]
ILONOR ANDRES MADRID testified that she was the Chief of License Section,
Operations Division, Land Transportation Office. Madrid presented and identified
certifications dated January 2, 2001 (Exh. I11) and December 6, 2000 (Exh. D9) pertaining

to the data in the drivers license of Victor Jose Tan Uy, and identified computer generated
photographs of Victor Jose Tan Uy (Exhs. J11 & D9-1). [TSN, October 9, 2002, pp. 127-148]
GWEN MARIE JUDY DUMOL SAMONTINA was the Assistant Vice-President and Head
of Records and Information Management Center of the Social Security System (SSS)
since January 1998. She was the official records custodian of the SSS and in-charge of
ensuring that all records received by the branches were archived.
Witness Samontina brought with her the Social Security Form E-1 (Exh. V 11-1 and sub
markings) filed by Delia Ilan Rajas. This form showed that her address was No. 48
Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and SSS number was 33-2365508-7.
Witness also brought several SSS Form R-1 and R1-A filed by the employers of Rajas
with SSS namely (1) Admate Company, Inc., (2) Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc.
(3) Jetro Construction and Development Inc., (4) Power Management and Consultancy
Inc. The forms (Exhs. W11, X11, & Y11, and sub markings) filed by Admate Company, Inc.
showed the company address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
The first R1-A Form filed on December 8, 1994 showed Rajas as the only employee. The
R1-A Form filed on May 6, 1998 showed that Rajas as listed as one of the employees.
The forms were accomplished by the employers representative and treasurer, Yolanda A.
Uy. The forms submitted by Energetic Security and Specialists, Inc. (Exhs. Z11 and A12, with
sub markings) showed the business address to be No. 46 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. The forms showed that Charlie T. Ang and Delia Rajas appeared as
employees. The forms were accomplished by Ma. Rosanie U. Ang. The Form R-1 (Exh.
B12, with sub markings) of Jetro Construction and Development, Inc. filed on October 9,
1990 showed that it had two employees. This document was accomplished by Yolanda
Ang. Its Form R1-A (Exh. C12, with sub markings) filed on March 15, 1995 showed that it
had 18 employees, including Delia Rajas. The address is still No. 46 Calbayog Street,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and it was prepared by Yolanda A. Uy. The forms (Exhs. D 12,
E12 & F12, with sub markings) of Power Management and Consultancy Incorporation were
received by SSS on June 8, 2000. It had an office address at 188 Captain Manzano
Street, Corner N. Domingo, San Juan, Metro Manila. Among the officers listed were
Charlie T. Ang, Nerissa S. Ang, and William T. Ang. Delia Rajas appeared as one of its
employees. [TSN, October 23, 2002, pp. 25-60]
II. EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
During his testimony, accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA vehemently denied that he asked Gov. Singson to give him part of Ilocos Surs
share on the tobacco excise tax imposed by Republic Act No. 7171; that when he was
approached by Gov. Singson regarding the said share of his province, he told Singson to
make a formal request, and that Singson already had a prepared request (Exh. Q) to
which FPres. Estrada wrote his marginal note addressed to then Budget Secretary
Diokno, stating: "Please see if you can accommodate".
FPres. Estrada explained that he could not have alluded to his election expenses because
contributions to his 1998 Presidential Campaign were overflowing; that he rejected many
contributions which kept pouring in as it was the case with a very popular candidate like
him; that he even asked his party treasurers to distribute campaign funds to their
candidates for Mayor, Congressman and Governor, that Gov. Singson got a big share of
the campaign funds, that Gov. Singsons testimony on the percentage he allegedly asked
for was a lie as he would not take away funds intended for farmers and that in fact during

his term as President he rejected an offer of Fourteen Million Dollars (US $14,000,000) for
him to sign a sovereign guaranty; that he did not know Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan or Mr.
Uy, and Delia Rajas, that being the President, he could not have conspired with Delia
Rajas whom he heard was a cook; that he met Charlie "Atong" Ang sometime in 1993 or
1994, when the latter was introduced to him by his friend, Jojo Antonio; that he was not
that close to Ang; that Atong Ang never went to his house at Polk Street, Greenhills, San
Juan to deliver money from the excise tax as testified to by Gov. Singson; that the garage
in his house could not accommodate Atong Angs vehicle since the Presidential Car was
parked there and there were security arrangements if he was at home and that Gov.
Singson was merely passing the blame to him because he would not help Gov. Singson
with his problem with the Commission on Audit. [TSN, March 22, 2006, pp. 63-113]
On March 29, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified that Atong Ang did not go to his residence at
Polk Street, Greenhills nor at Malacaang except when Atong Ang attended the wedding
of his daughter; that in the reenactment at the Bangko Sentral, it was shown that One
Thirty Million Pesos (P130,000,000.00) in bills could not fit into four (4) boxes contrary to
the testimony of Gov. Singson, and that the weight of the said sum of money was
equivalent to two and one half sacks of rice which could not be carried by one person.
FPres. Estrada disclaimed any knowledge of Prosecutions Exhibits "A19", "X18" and "Y18"
and also Landbank check dated August 27, 1998 for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00)
and Gov. Singsons September 3, 1998 letter to Elizabeth Balagot, Landbank Manager of
Vigan Branch in Ilocos Sur. He also testified that the Notice of Funding Check Issued,
Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno addressed
to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, [Exh. R8] did not reach the Office of the President.
According to FPres. Estrada, he did not know, nor have seen, Alma Alfaro, the person
mentioned in the certification that inter-branch deposits made by the provincial
government of Ilocos Sur from August 27 to 28, 1998, particularly on August 27, 1998 to
Account No. 0561-0445-38 in the name of said Alma Alfaro in the amount of Forty Million
Pesos (P40,000,000.00). He said that he saw her for the first time only during the
Impeachment Trial. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.42-49] He also did not know, nor have
seen, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, the owners of the bank accounts at Land Bank Shaw
Branch who were recipients of the online credit from Land Bank Vigan Branch on August
28, 1998 in the amounts of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) and Forty MiIlion Pesos
(P40,000,000.00) respectively [TSN, ibid, pp.50-51]. The persons shown in the
photographs marked as prosecutions Exhibits "F", "G9", and "T8" were not known to him.
He was able to identify the photograph marked as Exhibit "U8" which was the inauguration
of the flue-curing plant in Ilocos Sur, which he later on learned was a mere show-off
("pakitang tao") because the project did not push through.
FPres. Estrada likewise denied any knowledge of prosecutions exhibits presented to
identify Victor Jose Uy (a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan) (Exhs. "N9", "N13", "T11" & "J"); Delia Rajas
(Exhs. "V", "W", "H", "H13", "Y", "Y-3", "Z11", "A12", "B12-4", "C12", "D12" & "Q13") and Alma
Alfaro (Exhs. "F12" & "F13"). [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.59-68,79,80]
FPres. Estrada likewise disclaimed any knowledge of prosecutions exhibits regarding the
P130,000,000.00 excise tax share of Ilocos Sur [Exhs. H13, I13, J13, K13, M13, L13, O13, P13-1,
R13, S13, E13, U13, V13, V13-1, W13, W13-1, X13, X13-1, Y13, Z13, M17, N17, O17, P17, Q17, R17, S17, L18,
M18, N18, O18, P18, Q18, R18, S18, T18, B19, Z18. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp.76-95]

FPres. Estrada also belied Gov. Singsons testimony of that he ordered Gov. Singson to
cover up his unliquidated cash advances by countering that Gov. Singson tried to cover up
his own cash advances as the Commission on Audit was already going after him and he
wanted to pass the blame to FPres. Estrada. [TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 98-100] When he
learned about the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) excise tax share of
Ilocos Sur, he instructed then Justice Secretary Artemio G. Toquero to investigate the
matter. Secretary Toquero, in turn, referred the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). After one week, NBI Regional Director Carlos Saunar submitted a
report through a Memorandum dated October 20, 2000 (Exh. 199) to Secretary Toquero.
Director Saunar also submitted to FPres. Estrada a December 12, 2000 letter (Exh. 201);
another document (Exh. 204) addressed to Secretary Toquero on the subject Governor
Luis Chavit Singson, et al. for malversation of public funds Twenty Million Pesos (P20,
000,000.00) and for violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019; an affidavit of
Agustin D. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202) and to which is an attached letter dated December 3,
2000 of Agustin T. Chan, Jr. (Exh. 202-D) with attached certification (Exh. 206-C)
demanding that Gov. Singson settle his outstanding cash advance in the amount of One
Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) and Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00)
under Check Nos. 98397 and 42364 dated December 29, 1999 and March 19, 1999,
pursuant to paragraph 9.1 and 9.3.3.3 of COA Circular No. 97-002 and Section 89 of P.D.
No. 1445; an affidavit of Elizabeth Arabello dated January 12, 2001 (Exh. 205); a
document entitled "WP, item Singson cash advances" (Exh. 208), which details the
unliquidated cash advances of Gov. Singson at year end 1999 amounting to One Hundred
Thirty Five Million Five Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Eight Hundred Eighteen Pesos
and Seventeen Centavos (P135,584,818.17); and NBI Disposition Form, Subject Results
of Evaluation and Evidence in Support of COA Reports on the provincial government of
Ilocos Sur for the years 1997 and 1998 (Exh. 198), stating that the amount of Four
Hundred Thirty Five Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Eight
Pesos (P435,190,298.00) was spent by Gov. Singson on the Tomato Paste Plant which
COA found to be a non-functioning and non-operational project and to have incurred the
loss of more than Twenty Million Six Hundred Fifty-five Thousand and Seventy-four Pesos
(P20, 655, 074.00) as of June 30, 1998 [TSN, March 29, pp.106-131] and that there were
ELEVEN (11) other cases of unsettled, unliquidated or dissolved cash advances of Gov.
Singson which included the One Hundred Seventy Million (P170,000,000) unliquidated
cash advances for the purchase of equipment for the Tobacco Flue Curing Plant involved
in this case. [TSN, ibid, pp.143-144]
FPres. Estrada narrated that Director Saunar informed him that the case against Gov.
Singson was clear and should be filed right away with the Office of the Ombudsman.
Director Saunar gave him a copy of the complaintaffidavit of the NBI (Exh. 200, 200-N,
200-0, 200-P, 200-Q) recommending the filing of the appropriate charges against Gov.
Singson and other Ilocos Sur provincial officials among others for the non-delivery of the
supplier NS International, Inc. of the equipment for the flue curing barn and re-drying plant
in the amount of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) (Exh. 200-R).
[TSN, March 29, 2006, pp. 7-18] However, Gov. Singson was granted immunity from
criminal prosecution and Gov. Singson was able to pass on the case against FPres.
Estrada by implicating the latter as the one who ordered him and testifying against him.
[TSN, ibid, pp.19-25]
The last time FPres. Estrada talked to Gov. Singson was when he stopped over at San
Francisco USA for a speaking engagement on his way to an official visit to Washington he
was surprised that Gov. Singson who was not a member of his delegation fetched him at

the airport. After his speaking engagement, he went up to his room where Congressman
Asistio and Gov. Singson had a big problem with the COA in Ilocos Sur because the
provincial auditor did not want to cooperate with him. Gov. Singson asked FPres. Estrada
to help transfer the said auditor, which request he refused because COA is an
independent constitutional body. Gov. Singson insisted that FPres. Estrada call the COA
Chairman to interfere in his behalf. He reminded Gov. Singson that he should not look
after himself but he should protect the name of the Office of the President. Gov. Singson
then abruptly stood up and grudgingly left. FPres. Estrada came to know of the name of
the COA provincial auditor during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing and he was
Atty. Agustin Chan who testified at the hearing and demanded that Gov. Singson liquidate
his cash advances. Later, FPres. Estrada read from the newspaper that Chan was
ambushed and killed in a town in Ilocos Sur. [TSN, ibid, pp.31-44]
ATTY. AGATON S. DACAYANAN was the State Auditor of the Commission on Audit
(COA) assigned at the Province of Ilocos Sur for the years 1995 to 1999. He examined,
audited and settled all accounts of the Province of Ilocos Sur based on the documents
submitted by, and gathered from the Provincial Accountant, Provincial Treasurer, Budget
Officer and other officials who have access to the financial transactions of the provincial
government. He submitted Annual Audit Reports at the end of every year.
Witness Dacayanan then presented and identified the Annual Audit Reports for the years
ended December 31, 1995 (Exh. 187 and submarkings); December 31, 1996 (Exh. 188
and submarkings); December 31, 1997 (Exh. 189 and submarkings); and, December 31,
1998 (Exh. 190 and submarkings). [TSN dated September 20, 2004, TSN dated
Septebmer 22, 2004 and TSN dated September 29, 2004]
BONIFACIO M. ONA was Director III of COA and the Officer-In-Charge of its Special Audit
Office. Witness Ona testified that one of his duties as OIC of the Special Audit Office was
to transmit the Report prepared by their audit teams to the different auditing units and as
such he had the chance to review as to its form the Special Audit Report for the Province
of Ilocos Sur for the period 1999 (SAO Report No. 99-31) (Exh. 191 and submarkings),
which he presented to the Court by virtue of a subpoena duces tecum, and after which he
transmitted the same to the Governor of Ilocos Sur. [TSN dated October 4, 2004]
ELVIRA JAVIER FELIX was State Auditor IV of the COA. Witness testified that she was
the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial Auditors Office from October 5, 2001 to July 31,
2002, and she presented and identified Annual Audit Reports for the Province of Ilocos
Sur for the years ended December 31, 2001 (Exh. 192 and submarkings), and December
31, 2002 (Exh. 193 and submarkings).
Witness Felix also presented and identified copies of the Annual Audit Reports of the
Province of Ilocos Sur for the years ended December 31, 1999 (Exh. 194 and
submarkings) and December 31, 2000 (Exh. 195 and submarkings) which she secured
from the Provincial Auditors Office, and which were prepared during the term of then
Provincial Auditor Atty. Agustin Chan who was killed in an ambush on October 4, 2001.
[TSN dated October 4, 2004 and TSN dated October 6, 2004]
ELIZABETH M. SAVELLA was an Auditor of the Corporate Government Sector of the
COA. Savella testified that she was assigned previously with the Special Audit Office of
the Commission of Audit and was designated in 1999 as the Team Leader of a Special
Audit Team that conducted a special audit of the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period from

1996 to 1999. Being the Team Leader, witness Savella was the one assigned to
consolidate all the audit findings submitted by the team members to come up with the
audit report. The said audit report was SOA Report No. 99-31 (Exh. 191 and
submarkings).
Witness stated that the scope of the audit was the financial transaction and operation of
the Province of Ilocos Sur for the period 1996 to 1999. They looked, particularly, into the
utilization of R.A. 7171 funds and the utilization of the PNB loan specifically the
implementation of the Tomato Flue Curing Plant Project, stating that the audit aims to
evaluate the regularity of the implementation of the provinces projects. [TSN dated
October 6, 2004 and TSN dated October 11, 2004]
CONGRESSMAN LUIS A. ASISTIO testified that he knows Gov. Singson and met him
several times. He said that on July 24, 2000, he accompanied Gov. Singson to see FPres.
Estrada at his room at the Fairmont Hotel at San Francisco, California where Gov.
Singson requested FPres. Estrada to call the Chairman of the Commission on Audit to ask
for the relief of the Auditor assigned to his province to which FPres. Estrada declined.
Asistio clarified that in the many meetings he had with Gov. Singson during the period late
August to September 2000, they never talked about alleged receipt of monies from R.A.
7171 and he knew of these issues only during the Impeachment Trial. He thinks that these
are mere figments of Gov. Singsons imagination since they never talked of anything
except the provincial leadership.
Gov. Singson also did not mention the name of accused Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. He
added that Gov. Singson at one time went to his house when there was an ongoing rally at
Makati prior to the press conference and told him that he (Gov. Singson) does not
consider FPres. Estrada as his friend anymore.
Asistio added that he watched the Impeachment Trial against FPres. Estrada and thinks
that it is a farce because in all their conversations, Gov. Singson never mentioned about
R.A. 7171 nor talked about jueteng, except probably when he said "kunin na nilang lahat
huwag lang yung liderato".
Asistio stated that in his visits to Malacaang during the time of FPres. Estrada, at least
three times a week, he never saw Atong Ang there because Atong Ang was banned by
FPres. Estrada from entering Malacaang. [TSN dated October 11, 2004 and TSN dated
October 13, 2004]
CARLOS P. SAUNAR was Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. In
October 2000, he was the Chief of the Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, assuming the
position from 1997 or 1998 up to July 2001, and as such was tasked to investigate the
public disclosures made by then Gov. Singson as per instructions of then NBI Director
Federico Opinion, who was, in turn, directed by then Justice Secretary Artemio G.
Tuquero in a Memorandum dated October 10, 2000 (Exh. 199 and submarkings).
In the conduct of their investigation, Saunar and his team of investigators secured
documents from the COA, such as, the Audit Reports of the Provincial Government of
Ilocos Sur and the Schedule of Unliquidated Cash Advances, and subpoenaed the
concerned public officials and employees of the Province of Ilocos Sur. [TSN, October 13,

2004, pp. 67-69]

After evaluating the reports and evidence, witness submitted an Evaluation Disposition
Form (Exh. 198 and submarkings) dated 16 October 2000 which made mention of 11
cases (Annex A of Disposition Form) (Exh. 198-B) of irregularities that were assigned to
different teams for investigation. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 80, 84]
The result of Saunars investigation on the P170,000,000.00 alleged unliquidated cash
advances of Governor Singson and some other cash advances was contained in a
Revised Report of Investigation which became the subject of a Complaint-Affidavit (Exh.
200 and submarkings) dated 10 January 2001 signed by Carlos S. Caabay, then acting
Director, NBI, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Witness explained that the Revised
Report of Investigation traced the P170,000,000.00 from its source up to its liquidation.
[TSN, October 13, 2004, p. 96]
Saunar testified that they made a record check and searched, as requested by the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee, for the whereabouts of accused Alma Alfaro, accused Eleuterio
Tan and accused Delia Rajas but failed to locate them. [TSN, October 13, 2004, pp. 107110] The NBI filed two (2) other cases involving cash advances of the Gov. Singson with
the Office of the Secretary of Justice, one of which is contained in a case transmittal (Exh.
201 and submarkings) dated 12 December 2000 addressed to Honorable Artemio G.
Tuquero relating to the P100,000,000.00 cash advance of Gov. Singson and supported by
a Report of Investigation dated 12 December 2000 (Exh. 201-B). The other case
transmittal (Exh. 204 and submarkings) they filed with the Department of Justice on
December 14, 2000 was in connection with the cash advance of Gov. Singson in the
amount of P20,000,000.00, and supported by another Report of Investigation dated 14
December 2000 (Exh. 204-B). In all the investigations conducted by the NBI on the cash
advances of Gov. Singson, Saunar said that they prepared an analysis, "WP-Singson
Cash Advance" (Exh. 208 and submarkings) (WP stands for working paper), and that
based on the working paper, Gov. Singson had accumulated cash advances of Three
Hundred Five Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P305,600,000.00) between the
period January 1997 to January 2000. From this total, the amount of P170,015,181.83
appears to have been settled, leaving a balance of unliquidated cash advances of Gov.
Singson of P135,584,818.70 as of January 2000. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 53-54]
The amount of P163,663,636.27 as appearing in the working paper, which was also the
subject matter of the complaint-affidavit filed with the Ombudsman (Exh. 200), is
supposed to be the amount that was the settlement of the cash advance of
P170,000,000.00 less 30% withholding tax supposed to be remitted to the BIR. The
P170,000,000.00 pesos came from the P200,000,000.00 representing the share of the
Province of Ilocos Sur from the excise taxes collected pursuant to R.A. 7171 that was
released by the DBM. The P170,000,000.00 was then cash advanced by Gov. Singson
from the account of the Province of Ilocos Sur in LBP Vigan Branch, wherein a certain
Marina Atendido deposited the amount of P40,000,000.00 in favor of the account of Alma
Alfaro at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch through an inter-branch accommodation. The
same was withdrawn in cash by Alma Alfaro. [TSN, October 25, 2004, pp. 57-63]
As to the remaining P130,000,000.00, four (4) demand drafts were applied for by Maricar
Paz, one of which was issued in favor of Luccio Saberrio in the amount of P40,000,000.00
which was withdrawn in LBP Makati, where the amount of P35,000,000.00 was deposited
to another savings account (the account number is indicated in the demand draft) in the

same LBP Makati while the P5,000,000.00 was cashed. The second demand draft
pertains to another P40,000,000.00 pesos in favor of Eleuterio Tan which was negotiated
at the LBP Shaw Boulevard Branch but was cancelled, and in lieu of this, the
corresponding amount was wire transferred from LBP Vigan to LBP Shaw Boulevard. The
two remaining demand drafts pertain to Delia Rajas, one in the amount of P20,000,000.00
and the other in the amount of P30,000,000.00, and were negotiated in LBP Shaw
Boulevard but were also cancelled, the corresponding total amount of P50,000,000.00
was then wire transferred and deposited to the account of Delia Rajas in LBP Shaw
Boulevard. [TSN, October 25, 2004,, pp. 64-70]
Saunar reiterated that they conducted an in-depth investigation of the expose made by
Gov. Singson, which includes alleged violations on the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices,
malversation of public funds and violation of R.A. 4200, pursuant to the memorandum
issued by the Secretary of Justice. However, their investigation so far has not reached the
point of illegal jueteng or illegal gambling. They did not conduct an in-depth investigation
on the activities of Mr. Atong Ang and FPres. Estrada because they have not reached that
point where the evidence would show that they have participated. [TSN, October 25,
2004, pp. 102-104]
However, they already filed a complaint-affidavit dated January 10, 2007 which referred to
the One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos (P170,000,000.00) that was cash advanced by
Gov. Singson based on the evidence they gathered so far in their investigation.
Saunar further testified that on November 2000, Director Opinion directed him to
accommodate interviews on the result of their investigation in connection with the
P170,000,000.00 alleged cash advance of Gov. Singson which was done in his office
when he was still the Chief of the NBI Anti-Graft Division, and the result of which appeared
in a VCD. [TSN, November 3, 2004, pp. 18, 26-27]
[TSN dated October 13, 2004, TSN dated October 25, 2004, TSN dated October 27, 2004
and TSN dated November 3, 2004]
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP) OCULAR INSPECTION
On May 25, 2005, the Court conducted another ocular inspection at the Money Museum
of the BSP upon the request of the accused Estradas. The Court observed that if the
P130,000,000.00 were all in P1000.00 denominations and divided into 130 bundles with
each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P1000.00 peso bills amounting to P1 Million
pesos, only a maximum of 20 bundles amounting to P20 Million pesos would fit in a box
(Exh. X-Ocular Inspection), with an inner or interior dimensions of 12 inches width, 10
inches height and 15 inches length which measurement was given by prosecution
witnesses Artatez and a certain OJ Singson during their testimony. Thus, the P130 Million
pesos would fit in 6 and boxes.
If the P130,000,000.00 were in P500.00 denominations and divided into 260 bundles with
each bundle consisting of 1000 pieces of P500.00 bills amounting to P500,000.00, the
P130,000,000.00 pesos would fit in 13 boxes.
A Certification issued by the BSP that the P1,000,000.00 pesos in P1000.00 bills would
weigh about just under a kilo has already been submitted by the accused in the previous

hearing. [TSN dated May 25, 2002, pp. 10-11]

FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information
With respect to the predicate act of divesting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of
the tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur, this Court finds that
indeed an amount of P130,000,000.00 out of the P200,000,000.00 share in tobacco
excise taxes of the Province of Ilocos Sur was withdrawn from the provincial coffers and
misappropriated and misused to the damage and prejudice of the said province.
The evidence presented before this Court establish beyond doubt that Gov. Singson
initiated the process that eventually led to the allocation and release of funds by the
national government to the Province of Ilocos Sur of the amount of P200,000,000.00 from
the excise tax imposed pursuant to Republic Act No. 7171. As chief executive of the
Province of Ilocos Sur, Gov. Singson personally handed a letter to FPres. Estrada
requesting the release of Ilocos Surs share in the tobacco excise taxes [Exh. Q 8] to pin
him on his campaign promise to the people of Ilocos Sur during the 1998 Presidential
Elections. FPres. Estrada, through a marginal note on Gov. Singsons letter, endorsed the
request to then Sec. Benjamin Diokno of the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) [Exh. Q8-1]. The DBM released the amount of P200,000,000 to the Province of
Ilocos Sur as its share in tobacco excise taxes as shown in the Notice of Funding Check
Issued, Fund 103 dated August 25, 1998 signed by DBM Sec. Benjamin Diokno and
addressed to the Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur [Exh. R8]. Gov. Singson forthwith
caused the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur to enact a Resolution appropriating
the sum of P200,000,000.00, of which P170,000,000.00 was intended for flue-curing
barns and P30,000,000.00 for infrastructure. Gov. Singson caused the release of
P170,000,000.00 from the said fund as shown by the Authorization he issued to Maricar
Paz and Marina Atendido, employees of his office to officially transact with Land Bank
Vigan Branch, in behalf of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Sur dated August 27, 1998
[Exh "N18"], Check No. 0000097650 dated August 27, 1998 issued to the order of Luis
"Chavit" Singson in the amount of P170,000,000.00 [Exhs. O18 and P18], and an
Accountants Advice for Local Check Disbursement dated August 27, 1998 [Exh. Q18]. This
amount, however, was broken down into smaller amounts and deposited/transferred to the
accounts of individuals identified with or known associates of Atong Ang, namely Alma
Alfaro, Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan, as shown by a certification of Land Bank Vigan
Branch Manager Ma. Elizabeth Balagot [Exh. S8], Demand Draft Application Nos. 656 and
712 in the name of Delia Rajas [Exhs. R18 and S18], Demand Draft Application No. 734 in
the name of Eleuterio Tan [Exh. T18], and Demand Draft Application No. 722 in the name of
Nuccio Saverio [Exh. U18], and the four demand drafts issued pursuant thereto [Exhs. V 18,
K13, L13 and M13]. A fifth demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson was inexplicably
cancelled albeit the amount covered by it was deposited in the account of Alma Alfaro
through an Inter-Branch Deposit Accomodation Slip [Exh. X 18] as instructed by Maricar Paz
to Land Bank. The demand drafts issued to Delia Rajas and Eleuterio Tan were similarly
cancelled and the amounts of P40,000,000.00 and P50,000,000.00 covered by the
demand drafts were deposited in the accounts of Eleuterio Tan and Delia Rajas,
respectively, at Land Bank Shaw Branch. Alma Alfaros P40,000,000.00 was withdrawn by
her in cash a day after it was deposited in her account at Land Bank Shaw Branch on
August 27, 1998 [TSN, November 4, 2003, pp. 27-43]. On the other hand, Tan and Rajas
withdrew on the same day P40,000,000 and P50,000,000, respectively, from their

accounts and Tan used the proceeds to buy Three (3) cashiers check in the amount of
P30,000,000 each or a total of P90,000,000 [Exhs. W13-1, V13-1 & X13-1]. The Three (3)
cashiers check were deposited in Savings Account No. 2011-00772-7 at Westmont Bank,
Mandaluyong Branch [Ibid, pp. 52-91]. The P40,000,000.00 originally covered by the
demand draft in the name of Gov. Singson which was cancelled and subsequently
withdrawn by Alma Alfaro was not shown to have been deposited at Westmont Bank. Who
profited from this sum of money? The Court can only surmise given the dearth of even the
prosecutions evidence on what happened to the money after it was received by Alma
Alfaro. Significantly, it appears that of the P170,000,000.00 appropriated by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Sur for flue-curing barns only the amount of
P40,000,000.0 went to the supplier of the flue-curing barn, Nuccio Saverio who encashed
his demand draft at Land Bank Makati Branch. Saverio could collect only the said amount
in view of the testimony of Gov. Singson that he delivered only one module of flue curing
barns costing P40,000,000.00.
According to Jamis Singson and Artates, they accompanied William Ang, the brother of
Atong Ang, to Westmont Bank to withdraw money but they just waited outside the bank.
They helped carry the four (4) boxes to the vehicle when William and the security guards
brought the said boxes outside the bank. Thereafter, they joined William transport the
boxes to the home of Catalina Ang, and later to the residence of FPres. Estrada at Polk
Street. Jamis and Artates were told by William Ang that the boxes contained money for
FPres. Estrada.
The prosecutions evidence that only the amount of P90,000,000.00 was deposited in
Westmont Bank created a loophole in the impression given by the testimony of Gov.
Singson that he and Atong Ang were supposed to bring the P130,000,000.00 withdrawn
from Westmontbank to the residence of FPres. Estrada. The Court can only speculate that
this could have been the reason why during the Ocular Inspection at the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP) the amount of P130,000,000.00 could not fit the four (4) boxes
described by Gov. Singson and the other prosecution witnesses.
There are also gaps in the prosecutions evidence on the alleged delivery to FPres.
Estrada of the diverted funds or a portion thereof. It was not established how much cash
was allegedly stashed in the boxes that came from Westmont Bank and which were
unloaded/reloaded at the house of Catalina Ang or how much cash was in the boxes
allegedly brought to FPres. Estradas house. No one testified that he saw cash being
handed to FPres. Estrada, Sen. Loi Estrada or Jinggoy Estrada. Serious doubts are
engendered by the bare testimony of Gov. Singson, the prosecutions star witness, who,
by his own account, did not even touch the boxes of money, nor count the money inside
the boxes that arrived at the home of Catalina Ang and allegedly reloaded for delivery to
Polk Street. Gov. Singson did not also see the alleged turnover of the money by Ang to
FPres. Estrada, Dr. Loi Estrada or Mayor Jinggoy as he stayed at the corner of Polk
Street, so many meters away from the highly fenced and gated house of FPres. Estrada.
The Court finds it queer that Gov. Singson would stay only at the corner of the street
where FPres. Estradas residence is located instead of accompanying Ang to witness the
delivery of money that, according to him, was important to him and his constituents in
Ilocos Sur. Only Atong Ang could have credibly testified on the alleged delivery of money
but the prosecution did not present him as a witness, despite his plea of guilt to a lower
offense and his admission that he partook of P25,000,000.00 of the P130,000,000.00 of
the excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This Court could not admit without corroborating
evidence Gov. Singsons bare testimony that FPres. Estrada purportedly got mad that

Atong Ang gave him only P70,000,000.00 and that Atong Ang had given P20,000,000.00
and P15,000,000.00 to Dr. Loi Estrada and Mayor Jinggoy respectively. In this Courts
view, certain details of Gov. Singsons testimony on this point are rather incredible and farfetched. Gov. Singson had not offered any explanation why and how Atong Ang had the
temerity or the guts to divide the money among FPres. Estrada and the members of the
First Family and decide by himself the amount of their respective shares without prior
clearance of FPres. Estrada, then the highest executive official of the land.
Furthermore, the record is bereft of evidence to confirm Gov. Singsons testimony that
FPres. Estrada was interested in the diversion of tobacco excise taxes or that there was
an agreement between Gov. Singson and FPres. Estrada that 10% of any amount
released to the Province of Ilocos Sur would be turned over by Gov. Singson to FPres.
Estrada. Gov. Singsons statements that Atong Ang and Mayor Jinggoy kept following up
the release of the money and that Atong Ang informed Gov. Singson that FPres. Estrada
wanted not just 10% but P130,000,000.00 of the P200,000,000.00 are likewise
uncorroborated. Regarding the testimony of Gov. Singson implicating Jinggoy Estrada in
the commission of the predicate act mentioned in sub-paragraph (b), the Honorable
Supreme Court early enough had clarified the import of the charge against accused
Jinggoy Estrada under the Amended Information in this manner:
xxx
xxx
xxx Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting,
receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur, which Act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner (Jinggoy Estrada) but instead names other conspirators of the Former
President. [Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, supra,
p. 553]
The recent decision in People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Special Division) and
Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada (G.R. No. 158754, promulgated August 10, 2007) which upheld
this Courts Resolution granting bail to Jinggoy Estrada, has explained the essence and
import of the above-quoted ruling:
Obviously hoping to maneuver around the above ruling so as to implicate
individual respondent for predicate acts described in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and
(d) of the Amended Information, petitioner now argues:
It should be emphasized that in the course of the proceedings in the
instant case, respondent Jinggoy Estrada waived the benefit of the said
ruling and opted, instead, to participate, as he did participate and later
proceeded to cross examine witnesses whose testimonies were clearly
offered to prove the other constitutive acts of Plunder alleged in the
Amended Information under sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d".
We disagree.
At bottom, the petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded "benefits" to respondent
Jinggoy that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were
extended, as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched,
something not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoys participation, if that
be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs "b", "c", and "d", did not

change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling
in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. NO. 148965, upon the inculpatory
acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the
Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal
jargon, the Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, right guaranteed an accused under the Constitution. In fine, all that the Court
contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended
Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed
individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that might be
given to the Amended Information.
The mere fact that FPres. Estrada endorsed Gov. Singsons request for release of funds
to the then DBM Secretary for review does not indicate any undue interest on the part of
FPres. Estrada in the grant of Gov. Singsons request. The tenor of the marginal note itself
was simply for the DBM Secretary to "see if [he] can accommodate the request of
Governor Singson." Finally, not a scintilla of evidence links FPres. Estrada to any of the
obscure personalities who withdrew the P130,000,000.00, namely, Delia Rajas, Alma
Alfaro, and Eleuterio Tan and to any of the official bank documents that made possible the
diversion and misappropriation of the aforesaid public funds.
In sum, the paper trail in relation to the P130,000,000.00 diverted tobacco excise taxes
began with Gov. Singson and ended with Atong Ang. This Court does not find the
evidence sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that FPres. Estrada or any
member of his family had instigated and/or benefited from the diversion of said funds.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH C OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN
AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE
THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN
DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT

NAME "JOSE VELARDE

Under paragraph (c) of the Amended Information, accused FPres. Estrada was charged
with the crime of plunder, for having willfully, unlawfully and criminally acquired, amassed
or accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P189,700,000.00
representing commissions or percentages by reason of the purchase of shares of stock of
Belle Corporation by SSS and GSIS.
The gravamen of this specific charge is whether FPres. Estrada, unjustly enriched himself
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic
by receiving a commission of P187 Million as consideration for the purchase by SSS and
GSIS of Belle Shares. Even if the Prosecution is able to establish that FPres. Estrada
used his official position, authority, relationship and influence and directed, ordered and
compelled Carlos A. Arellano (then President of the SSS) and Federico C. Pascual (then
President of GSIS) for SSS and GSIS to buy Belle shares with money of the GSIS and
SSS which are held in trust by the said institutions for the millions of employees of the
government and the private sector, such fact alone does not constitute an overt or criminal
act, the commission of which would warrant a conviction for plunder. Prosecution must
establish that, in consideration of the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares,
FPres. Estrada received the amount of P189,700,000.00 as commission.
In discharging its burden of proof that FPres. Estrada directed, ordered and compelled, for
his personal gain and benefit, the GSIS to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stock more or
less, and the SSS to purchase 329,855,000 shares of stock more or less, of the Belle
Corporation in the amount of more or less One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine
Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos
(P1,102,965,607.50) and more or less Seven Hundred Forty Four Million Six Hundred
Twelve Thousand And Four Hundred Fifty Pesos (P744,612,450.00), respectively, or a
total of more or less One Billion Eight Hundred Forty Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy
Eight Thousand Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,847,578,057.50), the
prosecution presented its principal witnesses in the persons of Arellano, Pascual, Ocier
and Capulong.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
WILLY NG OCIER (Ocier) was the Vice Chairman and Director of Belle Corporation on
June 24, 1999. He testified that SSI Management, a company created by Roberto Ongpin
was the Selling stockholder of Belle shares totaling 650,000,000. [TSN January 9, 2002,
p.94] Roberto Ongpin, in his personal capacity, originally gave an option to Mark Jimenez
to purchase these 650,000,000 shares of Belle [Ibid., pp. 67- 68] because Roberto Ongpin
at that time granted (sic) to transform Belle Corporation into the foremost gaming
company in the Philippines, and he wanted somebody to help him "acquiring (sic) licenses
to do Jai-Alai and to do Super Sabong, Bingo, Casino, etc., etc." [Ibid. pp. 71 and 72] and
Mr. Roberto Ongpin whom he held in high regard, told him that Mark Jimenez was a very
close friend of FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 84] The option was given as an incentive for Mark
Jimenez as a favor to Roberto Ongpin. [Ibid. p. 88] Mark Jimenez was not able to exercise
the option because Ongpin was ousted from the Board of Belle on June 15, 1999. [Ibid. p.
90]
After a meeting of the Board of Directors of Belle Corporation on July 20, 1999 (Exh. P),
when Dichaves asked Ocier about the option given by Ongpin to Mark Jimenez and if the

option can be given to him, Ocier told Dichaves that the option cannot be given anymore
because of the fact that the shares are intended to be sold in light of a recent call for
unpaid subscription. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 17] The Board of Director of Belle
Corporation decided to make a call for payment of unpaid subscriptions to raise money to
address the debt problem of the Corporation. [TSN, October 1, 2001, p. 79] When asked
what can be done in relation to the Belle shares, Ocier explained to Dichaves that he
needs the latters help in selling the Belle shares to cover for the 75 per cent unpaid
subscription and the two of them basically agreed to divide the work wherein Ocier would
contact his foreign brokers to sell the shares and Dichaves will contact his local
counterparts or contacts if he can sell the shares locally. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18]
Ocier further testified that overtime (sic) the market was not very strong, so the foreign
brokers took quite a while to make decisions about their action of buying Belle shares. [Id.]
In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, Ocier testified that Dichaves confirmed to him
that there was a good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares
and when he asked when the shares can be transacted he was assured by Dichaves that
the latter had taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him
that the Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding
Pascual of GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid. p. 19]
After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be
pushing through but that Dichaves wanted to take up a matter of condition that was
proposed for the transaction to push through which was to the effect that Ocier will have to
give a commission for the transaction to push through. [Ibid .pp. 20-21] Ocier testified that
since the shares involved was approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of
Belle at that time at about P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was
almost Two Billion Pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) and the commission that Jaime was asking
for amounted to Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00). [Ibid. p. 23]
When asked to whom the commission should be given, Ocier answered that according to
Dichaves, the condition was being imposed by FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 26] When asked
for his reaction to the information conveyed by Dichaves that it was FPres. Estrada that
imposed the condition, Ocier testified that his reaction was that he felt that it was quite a
big amount of commission to be paid and that normally, in real estate and stock
transactions, commissions range between three (3) to five (5) percent only and he told
Dichaves that he finds that quite high [Ibid. p. 34], to which Dichaves answered that "that
was the condition." [Ibid. p. 36] When asked what his answer was to the answer of
Dichaves that that was the condition, Ocier answered that he was constrained to agree
because Dichaves told him that "that was the only way for the transaction to push
through." [Id.] Ocier further testified that on October 21, 1999, Belle shares totaling
447,650,000 were sold by SSI Management to GSIS and SSS through Eastern Securities
Development Corporation [Ibid. p. 39; Exh. Q; Q-1; Exh. T] while other Belle Shares were
sold through other brokers. [TSN dated January 14, 2002, p. 20]
CARLOS ALMARIO ARELLANO (Arellano) was appointed Chairman and President of
SSS on July 1, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 49] The transaction
with Belle was initiated on October 6, 1999. He got a call from FPres. Estrada and was
told: "Gusto ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa
stock market. [Ibid. pp. 75- 77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an instruction
for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction, he asked the people in the Investment
Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in

the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the
SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]
As far as the Investment Committee was concerned, they agreed that Belle is still possible
investment for the SSS. [Ibid. p. 94] In answer to the instruction of the President he said
"Opo, opo." [Id.] He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to
see the President at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacaang, he saw FPres. Estrada with
Jaime Dichaves. While he was there he approached the FPres. who stood up and took
him aside and asked whether this time, he had followed FPres. instructions to buy Belle
shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin." [Ibid. pp. 97, 104]
He did not immediately buy the Belle shares because he felt that it was not the proper
timing and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the proper
time. [Ibid. p. 102] When he answered this to the Former President, he recalled that the
reaction of the Former President was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107]
Upon receiving these instructions, he still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p.
115] After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and he repeated
"Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na. [Ibid. p. 124] As far as he was concerned, it was more
serious than previous orders given to him. [Id.] On October 21, the SSS implemented the
transaction. [TSN dated November 7, 2001, p. 110]
FEDERICO CALIMBAS PASCUAL (Pascual) was the President of GSIS in 1999, testified
that he had a meeting with FPres. Estrada on September 6, 1999 and in that meeting, he
was instructed by the FPres. Estrada to buy Belle Shares. It was only in October 9, 1999
when he ordered his people to buy Belle Shares because First: he was hoping that the
President was not serious in his September 6, 1999 instruction and he was hoping the
President would forget his instruction. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 20] Second, because
he was not very comfortable with Belle because some people are of the opinion that Belle
Shares, because the corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, is "speculative
flavor." [Id.]
In another telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada on October 9, 1999, he felt that the
President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there
was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24]
In the telephone call, he was asked by FPres. Estrada "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle"
to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa head office at papa-aralan ko." [Ibid. pp. 56-57]
When he returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1999, he learned that GSIS had
purchased 351,000,000 Belle Share worth P1,100,000,000.00 as shown by the
investment committee confirmation report.
On cross-examination, he testified that his purpose in executing his affidavit was to
remove from the minds of the doubting public that he benefited from the Belle Shares.
[Ibid. p. 48; Exh. O to O-4] The alleged money making that intervened or supervened in
the purchase of Belle Shares was not included in his affidavit because the purpose was to
show how GSIS purchased shares of Belle on the instruction of the Former President.
[Ibid. p. 54] The purchases of Belle Shares were made when he was abroad. FPres.
Estrada gave him the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to
buy, that was the chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74] He authorized the purchase of Belle
Shares only if Belle was a qualified share. [Ibid. p. 69] If he did not make that call to the
people in GSIS about the Former Presidents instruction, there was probably no possibility
of GSIS acquiring Belle Shares during that period of time beginning October 13 to October

21. [Ibid. p. 77] Except for the instruction, there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous
about the transaction and he does not know whether somebody benefited from the
purchase of Belle Shares that took place between October 13 to 21. [Ibid, p. 83]
RIZALDY TADEO CAPULONG (Capulong) was the Deputy Chief Actuary and Assistant
Vice-President of the Securities Trading and Management Department of the Social
Security System (SSS). He headed the Actuary Department which was responsible in
making long term and short term projections of the revenues and expenditures of SSS. As
AVP of the Securities Trading and Management Department, Capulong was in charge of
providing research and operational support to top SSS offices with regard to equities and
investment.
Capulong testified that he made the recommendation which cost the SSS
P1,300,000,000.00 because per his research, evaluation and verification, it was a
profitable transaction. He had gone into the validity and legality of the acquisition of the
Belle Shares and he was convinced that they were all proper, legal and beyond reproach.
He signed the recommendation and submitted it for approval of the Executive
Management Committee and then for the approval of the Social Security Commission.
Capulong clarified that it was an approval for allocation not for funding. For SSS to be able
to acquire shares of their corporation, it was necessary that there was an approval for an
allocation. SSS had the amount of money but it was not reserved for Belle transactions
even with the approval of the recommendation. The money will only be identified and
allocated at the time of transaction. [TSN dated February 6, 11, 13, and 18, 2002]
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
REYNALDO PASTORFIDE PALMIERY (Palmiery) was the Senior Executive VicePresident and the Chief Operating Officer and Member of the Board of Trustees of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Palmiery was the Chairman of the
Investment Committee of the GSIS in 1998 to 2000. The Investment Committee discusses
the new proposals for investment which were elevated by the Corporate Finance Group of
the GSIS. The process is that the Finance Corporate Group first studies and evaluates
stocks which are not yet qualified and accredited to be purchased and elevates this to the
Investment Committee for discussion, and if it is approved by the Investment Committee
then it is elevated to the board for approval.
Palmiery testified that the GSIS had been trading all Belle Shares in 1993. The first
acquisition of GSIS then was about 18 million shares, or 5% of the outstanding stocks of
Belle Corporation, and that the GSIS booked an aggregate trading gain of
P145,859,195.95 on the purchase of Belle Shares alone (Exh. 236 and submarkings).
Palmiery then presented and identified a Joint Counter-Affidavit which the members of the
Investment Committee filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. He confirmed the
statement contained in the last paragraph of the joint affidavit that the Investment in Belle
Shares was made solely on the basis of the compliance with the law and GSIS internal
guidelines. Palmiery was not aware of any phone call made by FPres. Estrada to Pascual.
He further explained that the acquisition of the Belles Shares was pursuant to the directive
of General Manager Pascual. Palmiery related that he received a call from Pascual and
instructed him to review and study the prospects of Belle Corporation with the end
objective to purchase shares of stock of the said corporation up to the limit allowed under

the existing guidelines of GSIS. The evaluation was pursued and approved.
On cross-examination, Palmiery admitted that under GSIS Resolution No. 284 series of
1992, General Manager Pascual was given the sole authority to trade in stocks listed or
traded in the two (2) major stocks exchange, and under GSIS Resolution No. 273, he was
granted the continuing authority to buy Belle Shares. Resolution No. 273 was then
amended in 1998 by the GSIS providing for the continuing authority for the President and
General Manager as well as the Executive Vice President and the Senior Vice President
for Corporate Finance to purchase and sell stocks traded in the Stocks Exchange at
prevailing prices.
On re-direct examination, Palmiery testified that when General Manager Pascual called
and instructed him to purchase Belle Shares the number of shares to be purchased was
specified to be within the limits of the GSIS Guidelines which was the number of shares
equivalent to one board seat or 10% of the outstanding shares whichever is higher. [TSN
dated December 13, 2004 and TSN dated January 24, 2005]
HON. HERMOGENES DIAZ CONCEPCION (Conception) was a Retired Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Concepcion testified that he was familiar with the Belle Resources and Shares of Stocks,
and confirmed the veracity and accuracy of the statement in paragraph 10 of his Affidavit.
With respect to the acquisition that took place on October 13 to 21, 1999, witness
Concepcion explained that the President/General Manager of the GSIS has full authority
to buy and sell shares listed in the stock exchange of the amounts within the boundary set
forth by the Board of Trustees. So, the President buys and sells these securities without
the Board knowing what he did because decisions have to be made sometimes on the
spot in order to get a better margin. Paragraph 16 (2) of the Counter-Affidavit was
checked with the records of the GSIS, the Committee in charge of the investment, and the
amounts made by the GSIS on these shares, P145,859,195.94, was furnished to them.
Witness Concepcion explained that during the period from 1993 to 2000, the GSIS would
buy shares then sell them, buy shares then sell them, and by that process, the GSIS
made P145 Million as profit or actual gain. Witness also stated that paragraph 16 (9)
which refers to the purchase of 351,878,000 shares was based on the records of the
GSIS.
Concepcion also testified that then President and General Manager Federico Pascual
never told them that FPres. talked to him nor discussed to the witness the alleged
directive or pressure brought upon him by FPres. Estrada. There was no need to ask
Federico Pascual why he bought shares because there is the presumption that our
functions are regularly performed. [TSN dated December 8, 2004]
MERCEDITAS GARCIA GACULITAN (Gaculitan) was the Corporate Secretary of the
Social Security Commission (SSS). Gaculitan testified that before these investments in
Belle Resources Corporation were made prior approval of the investment by the
Commission en banc were obtained since all purchases and all investments are required
to be approved or passed upon by the Social Security Commission. [TSN dated
December 13, 2004]
Accused FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA testified on his own

defense. The relevant portions of his testimony are set forth below.
The purchase of Belle Shares according to accused FPres. Estrada
In the Memorandum for FPres. Estrada, the defense stated that under this indictment, the
Prosecution incur the bounden duty to prove:
1. accused Estradas acts constitutive of directing, ordering and compelling
the GSIS and SSS to buy Belle Shares;
2. the purchase were made solely due to the said acts of compulsion by
accused Estrada;
3. the extent and parameter of Estradas acts relative to the questioned
purchases;
4. the alleged profit commission is government fund or money; and
5. damages to the government or People of the Philippines.
The Defense claims that the prosecutions evidence itself shows that (1) the transaction
complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada did not direct, order or
compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) there is no proof that any commission
was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]
To bolster its claim that the purchase of Belle Shares was a perfectly valid transaction, the
Defense pointed to the following portions of Arellanos testimony:
1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular
course of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at
profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the
acquisition of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and
at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone
conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with
the acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body
of SSS.
[Ibid. pp. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 75-76]
The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and
executed an affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case
notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21,
1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last
ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges where he may be detained

without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Ibid. p. 197]

Likewise, the Defense cited the testimony of Capulong who testified that he examined and
audited all the acquisition papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts
covering the acquisition and found them to be in order. Hence he had no objection to, but
on the contrary, approved the payment of the said acquisition. Said witness also testified
that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing illegal or irregular or anomalous in the
SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999 and that it was a legal investment and
a valid investment that is in the list of investment of SSS. That it is not an irregular
investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not ordinary in the sense that in this
case there was a call. [Ibid. p. 198, citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53]
Insofar as the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, the Defense argued that the purchase
by GSIS was in accordance with investment policy and rules.
The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy
and charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle
Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the
testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in
1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had already made
profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his
coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62]
That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascuals
testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated
and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would
be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares.
[TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the price of P3.13
per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased and it was
reported to him by his people that the reason why they bought so much was because
there was a history of profitability and that they already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover
plus and he felt that it was "a good buying afterwards." (sic) [Defense Memorandum, p.
204] Pascual also testified that he had no information if anybody benefited from the
purchase of Belle Shares that took place on October 13 to 21 and admitted that GSIS was
suffering a paper loss because of the purchase. [Ibid. p. 204-205, citing TSN, November
22, 2001, pp. 83-84]
Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres.
Estrada for such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to
directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was
immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the
alleged instruction of the Former President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided
on the purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction
given by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are
qualified, to buy within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206,
citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]
As to Pascuals testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the
purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of
Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out
of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter
did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense

pointed out that, by Pascuals admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding
that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by
anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]
FPres. Estrada testified that he appointed Arellano and Pascual and he knows that Belle
Resources is the developer of Tagaytay Highlands because sometimes, he spends his
weekend in Tagaytay Highlands. [TSN, April 26, 2006 (pm), p. 10-11] He denied that he
instructed or ordered Pascual to buy Belle Shares on September 6, 1999 during a meeting
with him. What he told Pascual was to study and make due diligence if Belle Shares will
be beneficial to the GSIS. To which Pascual answered "Yes" and that he has this
Corporate Finance Group to make the study. As to the testimony of Pascual regarding his
telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, the latter testified that he did not know that
Pacual was abroad and he talked to him not about Belle Shares but about delayed
benefits of GSIS members. [Ibid. pp. 17, 24] He denied ordering Pascual to buy Belle
Shares. [Ibid. pp. 15-17] He claimed there was nothing irregular about his instruction to
Pascual when he only told him to make a serious study and due diligence. [Ibid. p. 22]
As regards Arellanos testimony, FPres. Estrada denied that he ever called Arellano nor
did he order him to buy Belle Shares. He remembers that Mr. Jaime Dichaves told him,
that being one of the members of the Board of Directors, the latter informed him that Belle
Resources are offering their stocks to GSIS and SSS and that Dichaves was looking for
investors, local and foreign and he told Dichaves that it will be upon the study of SSS and
GSIS who will decide whether they are buying or not. [Ibid. p. 25] As regards the
telephone conversation with Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified that they talked in Tagalog
and he said to Arellano to study the offer of Belle Resources and if it will be beneficial to
the government then why not. To which Arellano answered "Yes, sir," that he would refer
the matter to the Investment Committeee to give due diligence. [Ibid. pp. 26-27] FPres.
Estrada denied that he pressured Arellano and said that he noticed that the testimony of
Pascual and Arellano are the same as if they are of the same script. [Ibid. p. 29] FPres.
Estrada stated that Pascual or Arellano, admitted buying Belle Shares and they were the
ones who decided the amount and how much to buy and they did not inform him anymore.
[Ibid. p. 32] As regards the testimonies of Pascual and Arellano, FPres. Estrada testified
that it seems they have only one lawyer. He learned that Pascual and Arellano were called
by then DOJ Secretary Perez and it was the latter who pressured them to testify against
him and they were threatened to be charged with plunder. He also learned that Secretary
Perez gave them a lady lawyer but he does not know the relation of Perez to that lady
lawyer. [Ibid. p. 37] FPres. Estrada testified that after Arellano testified in Court, the latter
called him and apologized because according to him, he could not do anything since he
was threatened by Secretary Perez with the words that if they can send the President to
jail, what more of him? [Ibid. p. 41]
FPres. Estrada also denied knowledge of the alleged conversation and transaction
between Ocier and Dichaves. He testified that Mr. Dichaves was, at that time, one of the
members of the Board of Directors of Belle Resources and a business man. [Ibid. p. 42]
FPres. Estrada cited instances when he was offered commissions but he rejected them
such as the IMPSA and SGS deals. [Ibid. pp. 45-48] His reaction to Arellanos statement
to him that the latter was threatened was to say that he understood because the same
thing happened to him when he was offered by Secretary Nani Perez that he could go to
any country of his choice but he refused. [Ibid. pp. 49-50]

FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (c) of the Amended Information
We find that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that FPres.
Estrada directed and instructed Arellano and Pascual for SSS and GSIS respectively to
buy Belle Shares.
As can be culled from the testimonial and documentary evidence of the Prosecution, the
following circumstances surround the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
On July 20, 1999, Ocier and Dichaves discussed the matter of the sale of the 650,000,000
shares of Belle, in the light of a recent call for payment of unpaid subscription which the
Board of Directors of Belle Corporation decided to address its debt problems. Ocier
explained to Dichaves that he needs the latters help in selling the Belle Shares to cover
for the 75 per cent unpaid subscription. They agreed to divide the task of looking for
buyers of these Belle Shares with Ocier looking for foreign buyers and Dichaves to look
for local buyers. [ TSN, January 7, 2002, p.18]
In a subsequent meeting with Dichaves, the latter confirmed to Ocier that there was a
good chance that GSIS and SSS may be willing to buy the Belle shares as Dichaves had
taken up the matter already with FPres. Estrada and that Dichaves told him that the
Former President had already spoken to Carlos Arellano of SSS and Ding Pascual of
GSIS about the said matter. [Ibid, p. 19]
After a few weeks, Dichaves called Ocier and told the latter that the transaction may be
pushing through but that a commission will have to be paid as a condition for the purchase
to push through. [Ibid. p. 21] As per Ociers testimony, Dichaves told him that it was FPres.
Estrada who imposed the condition. [Ibid. p. 26] Since the shares involved was
approximately 600,000,000 to 650,000,000 and the price of Belle at that time was about
P3.00 per share, the total expected proceeds of the sale was almost Two Billion Pesos
and the commission involved would amount to Two Hundred Million Pesos. [Ibid. p. 23]
Since the payment of the commission was the only way for the transaction to push
through, he was constrained to agree to the payment of the commission. [Ibid. p. 36]
On September 6, 1999, at a meeting with FPres. Estrada, Federico Pascual, President of
GSIS was instructed by the President to buy Belle Shares. [TSN, November 22, 2001, p.
20]
On October 6 1999, Carlos Arellano got a call from FPres. Estrada and was told: "Gusto
ko kayo ni Ding Pascual ay tignan ninyo ang pagbili ng Belle Corporation sa stock market.
[TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 77] He thought that the words "tignan ninyo" was an
instruction for him. [Ibid. p. 80] After the instruction he asked the people in the Investment
Department of SSS to take a look and review the shares of Belle as an investment item in
the portfolio of SSS and also to find out to what extent the SSS can further increase the
SSS position in the said stock. [Ibid. p. 82]
He got a call from FPres. Estrada the week after and he was asked to see the President
at Malacanang. [Ibid. p. 95] At Malacaang he saw FPres. Estrada with Jaime Dichaves.

While he was there he approached the President who stood up and took him aside and
asked whether this time, he had followed FPres. Estradas instructions to buy Belle
shares. He replied: "Tinitignan pa po ng Investment committee namin"; [Ibid. p. 97-104]
When he answered this to the President, he recalled that the reaction of the President
was to tell him "Bilisan ninyo na, bilisan." [Ibid. p. 107] Upon receiving these instructions,
he still did not do anything for a few days after. [Ibid. p. 115]
After several days, he received another call from FPres. Estrada and the latter repeated
"Bilisan mo, bilisan ninyo na." As far as he was concerned, it was more serious than
previous orders given to him. [Ibid. p. 124]
October 9, 1999 while Pascual was abroad, he talked by phone to FPres. Estrada who
asked him "bakit hindi ka pa bumibili ng Belle" to which he replied "tatawag ho ako sa
head office at papa-aralan ko." [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 56-57] He felt that the
President was more serious in his instructions in the sense that, he was away and there
was this telephone call and he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [Ibid. p. 24]
He ordered the purchase of the Belle Shares on the same day. The President gave him
the instructions to buy and he also made instructions to his people to buy, that was the
chain of events. [Ibid. pp. 68; 74]
For the period October 13-21, 1999, GSIS bought 351,878,000 Belle Shares and paid
P1,102,965,607.50 (Exh. N), and the Social Security System (SSS) bought 329,855,000
Belle Shares for P744,612,450.00 on October 21, 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78]
That the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS was the result of the instructions of
the FPres. Estrada is borne out by the following circumstances:
1. The sequence of events beginning from the time Ocier agreed to the
payment of commission, to the instructions transmitted personally and by
telephone calls from FPres. Estrada to Pascual and Arellano, to the actual
purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
2. The haste with which GSIS and SSS bought Belle Shares. In the case of
GSIS, from October 9, 1999 (when the "agitated instructions" were given)
to October 13, 1999 (the date when the first purchases were made) or a
period of 4 days. In the case of SSS, a few days after October 13, 1999,
( the date when the "more serious" order was given by FPres. Estrada to
Arellano) to October 21, 1999 (the date when the purchases were made)
or a period of no more than 8 days. The instructions to buy originated from
FPres. Estrada and cascaded to Pascual and Arellano then to GSIS and
SSS respectively.
3. The obedience to FPres. Estradas instructions despite Arellanos
reluctance to do so because he believed that it was not the proper timing
and the volume that was being considered was too much and not yet the
proper time. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 102] And in the case of Pascual,
his reluctance to buy because he was not very comfortable with Belle
because some people are of the opinion that Belle Shares, because the
corporation is involved in jai-alai and gambling, has speculative flavor.
[TSN, November 22, 2001, Ibid. p. 20]

4. The relationship of Pascual and Arellano to FPres. Estrada, who, being the
appointees and subordinates of FPres. Estrada, cannot refuse the
instruction of their superior.
5. The manner in which the instructions were given. In the case of Arellano,
he felt that the third order was more serious than previous orders given to
him. [TSN, November 7, 2001, p. 124] And, in the case of Pascual,
because he felt that FPres. Estrada was already agitated. [TSN,
November 22, 2001, p. 24]
We find no merit to the claim of the Defense that the prosecutions evidence itself shows
that: (1) The transaction complained of was perfectly valid, since accused FPres. Estrada
did not direct, order or compel SSS and GSIS to buy Belle Shares and (2) There is no
proof that any commission was paid to the accused. [Defense Memorandum, p. 192]
The denial of FPres. Estrada that he instructed Pascual and Arellano to buy Belle Shares
cannot overcome the straightforward and direct testimony of Pascual and Arellano
attesting to the persistent instructions given by FPres. Estrada which is replete with
details. Mere denial by an accused, particularly when not properly corroborated or
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Denial, being in the nature of
negative and self-serving evidence, is seldom given weight in law. Positive and forthright
declarations of witnesses are often held to be worthier of credence than the selfserving denial of the accused. [People v. Quilang, 312 SCRA, 328, 329]
Neither can We give more weight to the claim of the Defense that the purchase of Belle
Shares was a perfectly valid transaction even as it pointed to the following portions of
Arellanos testimony:
1. That the purchase of Belle Shares was a routine transaction in the regular
course of business, for SSS had previously purchased Belle Shares at
profit;
2. What was told by FPres. Estrada to Arellano was simply to initiate the
acquisition of Belle Shares. How many shares he was ordered to buy and
at how much price per share, was never dealt with in the phone
conversation;
3. The above notwithstanding, Arellano proceeded on his own volition with
the acquisition of the 249 Million Belle Shares.
4. The Decision to purchase was exclusively his and the policy making body
of SSS. [Ibid. 193-194, citing TSN, November 8, 2001, pp. 63, 73-74, 7576]
for prefatory to these actions of the SSS were the instructions given by FPres. Estrada to
Arellano and the compliance with said instructions by Arellano. While it is true that the
SSS had previously granted authority for additional investment by SSS in Belle Shares
prior to and up to 1999, it was only in the 1999 purchases that there was an instruction

coming from FPres. Estrada through Arellano to purchase Belle Shares.

The evidence of the Defense show that the 1st Indorsement dated September 29, 1999 re:
proposal to increase by P450,000,000.00 the investment allocation for Belle to total
P1,300,000,000.00 was not signed by Arellano (Exh. 242), contrary to the assertion of the
Defense. [In its formal offer of Evidence on p. 45, Defense claimed that Exh. 247 was
executed by Arellano. Exh. 247 is the same as Exh. 242]
Neither was there any documentary evidence submitted showing the approval by the
Commission of the proposal increasing by 450,000,000 the investment allocation for Belle
to total P1,300,000,000.00.
Likewise, the testimony of Capulong - that he examined and audited all the acquisition
papers and the various confirmation slips and official receipts covering the acquisition and
found them to be in order and hence, he had no objection to, but on the contrary approved
the payment of the said acquisition; that as far as he was concerned, there was nothing
illegal or irregular or anomalous in the SSS purchase of Belle Shares in October 21, 1999
and that it was a legal investment and a valid investment that is in the list of investment of
SSS; that it is not an irregular investment and it is said that it might be somewhat not
ordinary in the sense that in this case there was a call [Defense Memorandum, p.198,
citing TSN, November 14, 2001, p. 53], in fact corroborates Arellanos statement that
indeed there was a call from FPres. Estrada instructing the purchase of Belle Shares.
Moreover, Capulong, in his testimony, stated that Belle Corporation Shares were no longer
qualified stocks since Belle had not declared dividends whether in cash or stock in 1997,
1998 and 1999. [TSN, February 14, 2005, p. 75]
He likewise testified that it was former President and Chairman Carlos A. Arellano who
directly gave the orders to the brokers to purchase Belle Shares in behalf of the SSS and
he (Capulong) had nothing to do directly insofar as the acquisition was concerned since
his participation is merely limited to recommend the increase of the funding for the
acquisition of the shares. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 11]
Capulong further testified that for the month of October, 1999, the SSS bought
389,855,000 shares with a value of P1,031,126,400.00. [Ibid. p. 38] In his subsequent
testimony, Capulong testified that on October 21, 1999, the SSS bought 249,679,000
shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an average price of P3.14/share. [TSN,
February 14, 2005, p. 78] After October 21, 1999, Belle Shares was on a downward trend
going down to the P1.00 level by the year 2000. By October 23, 2001, it went below
P1.00, then it went down to 70 centavos by February 15, 2001. As of February 11, 2002, it
was being traded at 40 to 50 cents. [Ibid. pp. 92-93]
Capulong further testified that out of the 249,679,000 shares which SSS bought on
October 21, 1999 for P784,551,150.00, a total of 96,366,000 shares were sold at an
average selling price of P1.7736/share resulting in a loss amounting to P127,464,710.00.
[TSN, February 18, 2002, pp. 94-95]
The Defense argues that the reason why Arellano testified in the manner he did and
executed an affidavit implicating FPres. Estrada in the instant plunder case
notwithstanding that there was nothing irregular, illegal or anomalous in the October 21,
1999 acquisition of Belle Shares was because his testimonies and affidavit are his last

ditch effort to exculpate himself from possible plunder charges where he may be detained
without bail considering that plunder is a capital offense. [Defense Memorandum, p. 197]
This argument of the Defense are mere allegations and extracted from FPres. Estradas
testimony that Arellano called him up and explained the circumstances behind Arellanos
execution of his Affidavit which are however, uncorroborated.
Neither do we find that the presence of the instruction from FPres. Estrada is negated by
the argument of the Defense that the acquisition by GSIS of Belle Shares, was in
accordance with investment policy and rules.
The Defense sought to establish that the Belle Shares were qualified under GSIS policy
and charter and GSIS may by itself and in accordance with its rules, purchase Belle
Shares without the need of any order or compulsion from anybody as shown by the
testimony of Pascual, the President of GSIS when he admitted that even way back in
1993, GSIS had been purchasing or dealing with Belle Shares and had already made
profits at the extent of around P145,000,000.00 since 1993 up to the present prior to his
coming in as the new General Manager of GSIS. [TSN, November 22, 2001, pp. 61 to 62]
That the purchase was in accordance with the GSIS policy was established by Pascuals
testimony that the trading department under the Corporate Finance Group investigated
and made further inquiries in connection with the shares and concluded that there would
be no violation that could have been committed by GSIS in the purchase of the shares.
[TSN, December 3, 2001, pp. 14 and 15] Pascual further testified that the average price of
P3.14 per share was the worth of the shares around the time it was purchased [TSN,
November 22, 2001, pp. 89-90] and it was reported to him by his people that the reason
why they bought so much was because there was a history of profitability and that they
already had a P1,000,000,000.00 turnover plus and he felt that it was "a good buying
afterwards." (sic) [TSN, November 28, 2001, p. 55]
Nowhere in the argument of the Defense does it establish the absence of the instruction of
FPres. Estrada to Pascual, other than the self-serving denial of FPres. Estrada.
Moreover, as Pascual testified, the GSIS profits in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares.
Furthermore, the fact that GSIS made profits to the extent of around P145,000,000.00
since 1993 did not mean that it made profits from the Belle Shares purchased in 1999. As
testified by Pascual, the actual profit of the GSIS in 1999 did not come from Belle Shares
but from other stocks and there was no contribution to the profit of GSIS from the Belle
Shares acquisition because up to the present they are still holding on to the Belle Shares.
[TSN, November 22, 2001, p. 81] Even the evidence of the Defense shows that as of
December 29, 2000, the value of Belle Shares had gone down to P0.69/share from the
average purchase price of P3.14/share and an allowance for probable loss of
P374,052,750.00 had been set up (Exh. 250, J-12).
FPres. Estradas testimony that he called Pascual to inquire about delayed GSIS benefits
is negated by the fact that after the call to Pascual, the latter gave instructions to buy Belle
Shares. If benefits were being delayed, why would GSIS spend billions of pesos to buy
Belle Shares instead of setting aside these monies to avoid delay in GSIS benefits?
Defense argued that assuming arguendo that there was an instruction from FPres.
Estrada for such purchase, such instruction was not too compelling or irresistible to
directly cause the execution of the purchase suggestion and that such instruction was

immaterial because the GSIS Board which approved the transaction did not receive the
alleged instruction of the President and that in the same vein, the GSIS decided on the
purchase independently, free from any compulsion by an outsider as the instruction given
by Pascual was to the effect that a study be conducted and if the Belle Shares are
qualified, to buy within the range of their authority. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 205-206]
Pascuals testimony that when he talked to FPres. Estrada and the latter asked him why
he had not bought Belle Shares in an agitated tone; that he did not mention the instruction
of FPres. Estrada to others because the instruction was specific to him; that on October 9,
1999 after his telephone conversation with FPres. Estrada, he gave the instruction to
GSIS to buy Belle Shares should be afforded stronger weight and more probative value
than the arguments of the Defense. As stated earlier, the Prosecution has established that
it was the instructions of FPres. Estrada that triggered the instructions of Pascual and
Arellano to GSIS and SSS respectively which caused these agencies, in turn to follow the
usual procedures established for the purchase of the shares which finally culminated in
the purchase of the Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
As to Pascuals testimony that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call him for the
purchase of a (sic) particular shares, the Defense pointed out that as per admission of
Pascual, what he meant by unusual was that FPres. Estrada called him when he was out
of the country. Defense pointed out however, that as testified by FPres. Estrada, the latter
did not know that Pascual was out of the country when he called. [Ibid. p. 209] Defense
pointed out that, by Pascuals admission, the GSIS Board was not pressured into finding
that the Belle Shares were okay, above board, and that they were not pressured by
anybody into concluding the purchase. [Ibid. p. 214, citing TSN, December 3, 2001, p. 93]
We fail to see how the admission of Pascual that it was unusual for FPres. Estrada to call
him to inquire about why GSIS had not purchased Belle Shares in an agitated tone and
the statement of FPres. Estrada that he did not know that Pascual was out of the country
at the time he called Pascual could lead to the conclusion that the GSIS Board was not
pressured into finding that the Belle Shares were "okay," "above board" and that they were
not pressured by anybody into concluding the purchase. The issue was not whether the
GSIS Board was pressured into finding that the Belle Shares purchase was "okay" or
"above board," but whether FPres. Estrada pressured Pascual into ordering GSIS to buy
Belle Shares.
The testimonies of defense witnesses, Justice Hermogenes D. Concepcion, Jr., the former
Chairman of GSIS, and Reynaldo Palmiery, Executive Vice-President of GSIS, did not
disprove that FPres. Estrada gave instructions to Pascual for GSIS to buy Belle Shares
since, as admitted by them, they were not aware of such instructions. Nowhere in the
testimony of Pascual did he state that he informed these people of the instructions of
FPres. Estrada because, as stated by Pascual, the instructions were specific to him so he
didnt want to involve his management anymore. [TSN, November 28, 2001, pp. 9- 10]
The P189,700,000.00 Check No. 6000159271 payable to cash, drawn on
International Exchange Bank with Eastern Securities Corporation as
drawer [Exh. R-R-4]
After the purchase by GSIS and SSS of the Belle Shares, Ocier caused the preparation of
a check by Eastern Securities Development Corporation in the amount of
P189,700,000.00 representing the profit commission to be paid from the sale. [TSN,

January 14, 2002, p. 33-36]

Ocier identified International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated November
5, 1999,payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern Securities
Corporation as Drawer. Ocier testified that the check was prepared so that he can hand
carry and deliver it to Dichaves as per their agreement when he agreed to pay P
200,000,000.00 commission. [TSN, January 7, 2002, p. 49] When asked who was
supposed to get the commission, Ocier answered that according to Jaime Dichaves,
President Estrada was supposed to get the commission. [Ibid. p. 55]
Ocier testified that he delivered the check to the residence of Dichaves in No. 19
Corinthian Gardens, Quezon City [TSN, January 9, 2002, p. 13] and he delivered the
check because he had a pre-arranged appointment with Dichaves wherein he was
supposed to hand the check to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 15] Mr. Dichaves arranged the
appointment because he wanted Ocier to explain in person why the check amount is
P189,700,000.00 when the pre-agreed amount was P200,000,000.00. [Ibid. p. 18] Ocier
explained that he deducted transaction taxes and brokers commissions from the amount
of P200,000,000.00 and rounded the figure to P189,700,000 of (sic) which Dichaves
agreed. Ocier learned later on that the check he delivered to Dichaves was deposited at
Far East Bank to the account which he believes belonged to Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 60]
On cross-examination, Ocier admitted that FPres. Estrada was not present when he had
his conversation with Dichaves on the Belle shares on July 20, 1999. [TSN, January 14,
2002, pp. 20-29] Neither did he talk to FPres. Estrada after the check for P189,700,000.00
(Exh. R) was issued and cleared nor did he inquire from FPres. Estrada whether he
received or was credited in any of his account with the amount stated in the check. [Ibid.
pp. 39-40] Ocier likewise testified that he did not have the opportunity to discuss the profit
commission, nor the receipt of the profit commission nor the Velarde account with FPres.
Estrada despite the fact that he had constant meetings with FPres. Estrada. [Ibid. p. 6061]
When Ocier was asked if he could say that Dichaves was instructed by FPres. Estrada
regarding the profit commission, Ocier answered that he trusts his cousin Dichaves and
whatever the latter tells him he would normally believe. Ocier also testified that the totality
of what he stated in his affidavit about the instruction, or the representation made by
Dichaves was not corroborated or confirmed by FPres. Estrada or anybody else
representing him because it was just between him and Dichaves. [Ibid. pp. 39-45]
Citing Ociers testimony, Defense argues that such testimony on the subject sales and
commission are purely hearsay and does not bind FPres. Estrada. What is clear on the
record is that the commission went to Dichaves as gleaned from Ociers testimony.
[Defense Memorandum, p. 221-222]
In an attempt to establish that there was no evidence that FPres. Estrada received any
percentage or commission from the sale of Belle Shares, the Defense pointed out that
Capulongs testimony indicated that while there was a brokers commission, which was
paid to brokers like Abacus Securities Corporation. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 215-216,
citing TSN, February 11, 2002, pp. 13-16] In the case of the 389,855,000 Belle Shares
bought by SSS for P1,031,126,400.00, the payments went from SSS to the brokers, the
buying brokers. [TSN, February 11, 2002, p. 38[

The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 dated
November 5, 1999,payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00 with Eastern
Securities Corporation as Drawer (Exh. R), was paid as commission in consideration of
the purchase of Belle Shares by SSS and GSIS. While the testimony of Ocier to the effect
that Dichaves told him that it was FPres. Estrada who imposed the condition for the
payment of commission is hearsay insofar as FPres. Estrada is concerned, the said
testimony is admissible as proof that such statement was made by Dichaves to Ocier.
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in
evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible,
it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the accused. [Bon vs.
People, 419 SCRA 103]
As regards the argument that Capulongs testimony indicated that while there was a
brokers commission, this was paid to brokers such as Abacus Securities Corporation and
that the purchase price of P 1,031,126,400.00 for 389,855,000 Belle Shares went from
SSS to the buying brokers, again, we find this argument of the Defense to be unavailing.
The issue is not whether FPres. Estrada received Brokers commission or received the
payment from SSS, but whether he received the commission mentioned by Dichaves to
Ocier as consideration for the purchase of Belle Shares by GSIS and SSS.
Having found that a commission was paid in consideration of the purchase of Belle
Shares by SSS and GSIS, the next issue that this Court must determine is whether the
commission went to FPres. Estrada or Dichaves.
The paper trail for International Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271
First: Far East Bank and Trust Co. (Cubao-Araneta Branch)
In tracking the check (Exh. R), Prosecution presented Ms. Yolanda de Leon, (De Leon),
Senior Manager of BPI (Cubao-Araneta Branch) formerly Far East Bank and Trust Co.
[BPI merged with Far East Bank sometime in 2000] De Leon testified that Dichaves was
one of the valued clients of the Bank and that Jaime Dichaves and Abby Dichavez had
joint current and savings accounts with then Far East Bank and Trust Company in 1999.
The Current Account had the No. 0007-05558-7 and the Savings Account had the No.
0107-38639-9 (C/A No. 0007-05558-7 and S/A No. 0107-38639-9). [TSN, February 4,
2002, pp. 23-24; (Exhs. BB and Z)] She identified the microfilm copy of International
Exchange Bank Check No. 6000159271 [Ibid. p. 39-41; Exh. DD] dated November 5,
1999 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as the check that was deposited to the savings
account of Dichaves on November 5, 1999 as evidenced by the microfilm of the deposit
slip [Ibid. pp. 42-44; Exh. EE] and the bank statement of account for S/A No. 0107-386399 dated November 30, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 48-49; Exh. FF, FF-1]
She testified that on November 9, 1999, the amount of P189,700,000.00 was autotransferred from S/A No.0107-38639-9 to C/A No.0007-05558-7 as appearing in the
Statement of Accounts for S/A No. 0107-38639-9 and C/A No. 0007-05558-7. [Id.; Exh.
FF-2; Exh. GG, GG-1] She also testified that Jaime Dichaves drew a check against C/A
No. 0007-05558-7 in the amount of P189,700,000.00 as evidenced by Far East Bank and
Trust Co. Check No. 3165579, a microfilm copy of which she identified. [Ibid. p. 52-53;
Exh. HH] She testified that at the dorsal portion of the microfilm copy of Check No.
3165579, there appears an account number 160-625015 [Ibid. p. 56; Exh. HH-4] but she
could not identify the bank that the account belongs because the bank indorsement of the

other bank was not clearly visible. She further testified that both C/A No. 0007-05558-7
and S/A No. 0107-38639-9 were closed as of February 29, 2000 and March 31, 2000
respectively. [Ibid. p. 57; Exhs. II and JJ]
On cross-examination, De Leon testified that she had no hand in the preparation of the
Statement of Accounts marked as Exhs. FF, ZZ, II and JJ. [Ibid. p. 84]
The Court finds that International Exchange Bank Check No.
6000159271 dated November 5, 1999 was deposited to Far East Bank and Trust
Co. S/A No. 0107-38639-9 of Jaime Dichaves and auto-transferred to C/A No.000705558-7 of Jaime Dichaves who drew from the latter account, Far East Bank and Trust
Co. Check No. 3165579 for P189,700,000.00.
Second: EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch S/A
0160-62501-5 with the Account Name Jose Velarde
The prosecutions evidence on the deposit of Far East Bank Araneta Check No.
3165579 which was the subject of an inter-bank deposit from EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas
Branch to EPCIB Binondo Branch Account No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde
consisted in the testimony of Ms. Glyzelyn Bejec, the Teller who processed the Deposit
Receipt marked as Exhibit I5. She testified that as of November 8, 1999, she was assigned
to the EPCI Bank Greenhills Ortigas Branch as Customer Service Assistant Teller with
Teller Identification No. 8. Her basis for indicating the number "0160-62501-5" in the
Deposit Receipt was the Account Information Slip which is filled in by the depositor or the
representative of the depositor. [TSN, May 6, 2002, pp. 46-47; 61]
After she was given the Account Information Slip together with the four checks, she first
verified the face of the check as to the date, the amount in words and figures, after which
she stamped the non-negotiable endorsement at the back of each check, and also, she
wrote down the account number indicated on the Account Information Slip given to her.
She wrote down the account no. 0160-62501-5 at the dorsal portion of the check after
which she deposited the checks to the Account No. indicated in the Account Information
Slip. [Ibid. p. 65; 68]
She explained that the deposit process involved first, encoding the account number given
in the Account Information Slip, after which she swiped each check on the check reader
and encoded the amount on each check and after that a deposit receipt was generated.
After she had encoded the account number and the amounts of the four (4) checks that
she processed for deposit the account name that reflected in the computer was "Jose
Velarde." [Ibid. p. 69-70]
The checks that she processed for deposit were forwarded to their distributing for
safekeeping and microfilming the next day. When she was shown the certified copy of Far
East Bank Check No. 3165579in the amount of P189,700,000.00 from the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation, she testified that this was the same check she processed
and she identified the dorsal portion where she wrote Account No. 160-625-015 (sic). Her
other means of identifying the check was her Teller ID no.8 which appears at the check
(Exh U4-1) and she identified the account holder of the check as Jaime C. Dichaves or
Abe (sic) C. Dichaves and she attested that the check is payable to cash. She testified
that the Bank accepts checks even if not endorsed by the depositor she accepted the
check even without endorsement because it was given to her by the Branch Manger for

deposit. [Ibid. p. 72-84]

On cross-examination she testified that she threw away the Account Information Slip
because the deposit receipt had been generated or the transaction has been validated in
the deposit receipt. [Ibid, p. 89]
To corroborate the testimony of Ms. Bejec, the prosecution presented Ms. Teresa
Barcelona, the Branch Manager of the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch during the period
November, 1999. She identified inter-bank deposit receipt dated 8 November 1999 which
was previously marked as Exh. I5 issued by the EPCIB Greenhills-Ortigas Branch for
deposit to account number 0160-62501-5 with the account name Jose Velarde. The
transaction is an inter-bank deposit of four (4) checks to the account of Jose Velarde
maintained at the Binondo Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p. 80] The total amount of the
four (4) checks is P263,292,303.65 of which one check is issued by Far East Bank and
Trust Co. Araneta Branch with Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00.
[Ibid. p. 81; Exh. U4-1]
The person who transacted the inter-bank deposit with the EPCIB Greenhills Ortigas
Branch was Ms. Baby Ortaliza who transacted personally with the witness and it was Ms.
Baby Ortaliza who received the third copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder.
[Ibid. p. 82] This transaction was processed by Teller Glezelyn Bejec as her Teller ID
appears in the deposit receipt. [Id.]
The Defense argued that Bejec stated that the checks were handed to her by the Branch
Manager, Teresa Barcelona and not by the person who made the deposit, and that the
depositor did not appear before her. Not one of the bank personnel or any other witness
presented by the prosecution testified that FPres. Estrada had any participation in the
opening of Current Account No.000110-525495-4 (sic) and Savings Account No. 016062501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde, nor its closing. Not one of the prosecution
witnesses testified as to the source of the funds deposited in the said accounts. Nor was
there any witness who could identify any of the persons who issued the checks deposited
under the said account and under what circumstances the same were issued. In short,
there is no proof that FPres. Estrada "willfully, unlawfully and criminally amassed,
accumulated and acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P 3.2 Million (sic)." Neither is
there proof that this money came from "commissions, gifts, percentages, kickbacks or any
form of pecuniary benefits given to him" as the source of said money have not been
identified or traced. There is no evidence to show that he had enriched himself at the
expense of the Filipino people. [Defense Memorandum, pp. 242-243]
At any rate, Defense argues that the documents submitted as exhibits by the prosecution
only tend to prove what checks were deposited to the said Account No.0160-62501-5 of
Equitable PCI Bank in the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid. p. 242]
The Court finds that the Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check No.
3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00 drawn by Dichaves was deposited to EPCIB S/A
No. 0160-62501-5 account of Jose Velarde as part of the deposit to said account totaling
P263,292,303.65 (Exh. I5; U4-1; 127-L).
The link between FPres. Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account

In discharging its burden of proof to establish that the Jose Velarde Account belong to
FPres. Estrada, the prosecution relied on the following:
1. The testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that she saw Fpres. Estrada
signed "Jose Velarde" on the Debit-Credit instruction for S/A 016062501-5 (Exh. E5);
2. The admission of FPres. Estrada [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23] that
he signed "Jose Velarde" on Exh. E5;
3. The many bank transactions of Baby Ortaliza involving the
personal accounts of FPres. Estrada and his family, the personal
account of Loi Estrada and the Jose Velarde Account;
4. The use of the Jose Velarde Current Account for the purchase of
the Boracay Mansion;
5. The funding that the Jose Velarde Account received from the
Urban Bank Special Trust Account of FPres. Estradas son, Jose
Victor Ejercito; and
6. The customary signing of FPres. Estrada as "Jose."
The signatures of FPres. Estrada as "Jose Velarde" in the Investment
Management Agreement (IMA), Signature Cards, Investment Guidelines,
Directional Letters, and Debit-Credit Authority for EPCIB CA/SA 0160-625015 of Jose Velarde
Clarissa Ocampo testified that after explaining the documents being presented for his
signature, she and Atty. Curato saw FPres. Estrada signed as "Jose Velarde" on the three
(3) copies of the Investment Management Agreement (IMA) [Exh. W4 to Y4 ; TSN
November 13, 2002, pp. 70 -73], two (2) signature cards (Exh. Z4; A5) which he signed
three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 78-80], one (1) copy of the Investment
Guidelines (Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84), two (2) copies of the Directional Letters (Exh. C 5to
D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89), and one (1) copy of the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E 5). [Ibid. pp. 9293] Her testimony regarding the Debit-Credit Authority in particular was as follows:
OMB. MARCELO
Q
After these two exhibits marked as Exhibit C to the 5th power and D to the
5th power were signed by the former President and handed by you to Atty. Curato
what happened next?
A
I was preparing to go and then I recalled that there was an envelope that
was given to me by the banking side which contained the funding medium and so I
looked at it, I pulled out the document inside the envelope, I read it and then I
gave it to the President for signing.
Q

After giving it to the President what happened next?

A
Actually, I explained to him that the letter of instruction which is a debit/credit
authority, I told him that the banking side gave it to me which authorizes the bank
to actually debit or draw 500 Million from his account so I was pointing at the
account number in the debit/credit authority so debit his account draw 500 Million
and credit the same amount to trust for funding of his loan to Wellex sir.
Q

What was his reaction to your explanation?

He was nodding his head sir.

After he nodded his head what happened?

He signed the document and I saw him signed.

OMB. MARCELO
Q

What was the signature affixed by the former President?

He signed as Jose Velarde.

Q
After the former President signed this document as Jose Velarde what
happened, if any?
A
I got the document and then I looked at it and I passed it on to Atty. Curato."
[TSN, November 13, 2002, pp. 92-93]
On May 24, 2006, FPres. Estrada testified as follows:
Q
Ms. Ocampo and Atty. Curato testified before this court that you
signed as Jose Velarde in the documents that you have just identified awhile
ago and you signed as Jose Velarde, what can you say as to that testimony?
A
THAT IS TRUE. "PINIRMAHAN KO PO IYAN DAHIL PO SA PAKIUSAP NI
MR. JAIME DE CHAVES (SIC) NA OKAY NA RAW PO YONG INTERNAL
ARRANGEMENT SA BANGKO AT PARA PALABASIN NA AKO ANG MAY ARI
NG JOSE VELARDE ACCOUNT PARA MASIGURO PO NA YONG KANILANG
PINAUTANG, IPAUUTANG SA WELLEX GROUP OF COMPANIES NI MR.
WILLIAM GATCHALIAN AY SIGURADONG BABAYARAN. AYAW PO NILA
SANANG PAUTANGIN SI MR.GATCHALIAN BAKA HINDI DAW PO
MAKABAYAD SA TAKDANG PANAHON. [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23; Emphasis
Supplied]
William Gatchalian is a big businessman. isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay
may ari ng Wellex group of companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming
partido noong nakaraang 1998 presidential election. [Ibid, p. 25]
Q
Now, you were requested by Mr. Jaime de Chaves (sic) to make it appear
that you own the Jose Velarde account and that there was an internal
arrangement between you and Mr. de Chaves (sic) I ask you now Mr. President,

when did you agree to such request and arrangement?

A
Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi lang po dahil gusto
kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay nakita ko ang
kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung sakaling
hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang mga
kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama
na yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA
WALA NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO
AKO NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis
Supplied]
In the Debit-Credit Authority signed by FPres. Estrada as Jose Velarde for EPCIB S/A No.
0160-62501-5, the following words expressly appear:
. . . my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of
P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my
initial contribution (Exh. E5-3). [Emphasis Supplied]
Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza and the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and the
Jose Velarde Account
To establish the close relationship and trust of FPres. Estrada and his family on Lucena
"Baby" Ortaliza, the prosecution presented REMEDIOS AXALAN AGUILA, Personnel
officer of the Office of the Vice- President (OVP).
She testified that Ortaliza was appointed VP Staff Officer II from January 2, 1996 to June
30, 1998 by FPres. Estrada. Being in the immediate staff of the Vice-President, she has
the trust and confidence of the Vice-President and she can report anywhere, anytime as
may be directed by the Vice-President. [TSN, May 22, 2002, pp. 21-24]
Likewise, the Prosecution presented Linda P. Sison, Presidential Officer VI, Chief
Personnel Data Bank, Office of the President. She testified that Ortaliza was employed in
the office of the President on July 1, 1998 and appointed Presidential Staff Officer VI by
FPres. Estrada. She was assigned to the internal house affairs office which normally
attends to the needs of the President and members of the family. She resigned effective
September 30, 2000 as "Private Secretary VI" in a letter of resignation dated October 4,
2000. [Ibid. pp. 47-48]
To establish that Baby Ortaliza transacted for the bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and his
family the Prosecution presented Salvador Serrano, Vice-President, Centralized
Operations and Control Division of Security Banking Corporation. He identified the
Investment Savings Account Agreement of FPres. Estrada [Exh. C14-C14-8] in the amount
of P10,000,000.00 with Security Bank San Juan Branch where, above the typewritten
name "Joseph E. Estrada" under the word "Conforme" appears the signature of Baby
Ortaliza and he was told by the New Accounts Clerk of the San Juan Branch that Baby
Ortaliza is the representative of FPres. Estrada. [TSN, May 8, 2002, pp. 79-81; 87-90;
128-129]
The witness also identified the purchase of T-Bills by FPres. Estrada evidenced by

Confirmation Sale No. 81046 (Exh. C14-9 to C14-16) value date April 10, 1997 where there
appears the signature of Baby Ortaliza above TS No. 96848. [TSN, May 8, 2002, p. 114]
The Prosecution also presented Ms. Pamela Moran who testified that Ms. Ortaliza was the
only one person transacting the accounts of FPres. Estrada when she was in charge of
the New Accounts Section of the Security Bank San Juan Branch. [TSN, May 15, 2002, p.
146; pp.149-152]
The Prosecution further presented Patrick Dee Cheng of Citibank who testified that in the
Hold-All-Mail Agreement signed by Ms. Luisa P. Ejercito, her designated representative
was Ms. Lucena "Baby" Ortaliza. [TSN, October 7, 2002; pp. 80-83; Exhs. B 11; C11 and
sub-markings]
The Prosecution presented Ms. Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who was Branch Manager of
Urban Bank Greenhills Branch from 1998. [TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 92] She identified the
Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 addressed to Urban Bank Greenhills Branch
(Exh. I19) for issuance of three (3) Managers Checks in the amounts of P42,716,554.22,
P10,875,749.43 and P 54,161,496.52, where the words "Received By: Baby Ortaliza"
appeared. As per the witness, however, it was not Baby Ortaliza who received the check
as she herself gave the Managers Checks directly to the client, Joseph Victor G. Ejercito.
[TSN, March 26, 2003, p. 168]
Having presented evidence that Baby Ortaliza transacted for FPres. Estrada and family
with the Banks where FPres. Estrada and Family had accounts, the prosecution then
presented evidence of the transactions by Ortaliza in relation to the Jose Velarde Account
to establish that FPres. Estrada owns the Jose Velarde accounts.
Thus, the prosecution presented Teresa A. Barcelona who testified that Baby Ortaliza
transacted with her personally for the deposit of P 143,000,000.00 (Exh. M5 and
submarkings) into the Jose Velarde S/A No. 0160- 62501-5 account and it was Baby
Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May
15, 2002, pp. 76-80]
Likewise, Baby Ortaliza transacted with her personally for the deposit of the amount of
P263,292,303.65 [Exh. I5 and submarkings] to the Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5
account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the deposit receipt for the
account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 80-82] Baby Ortaliza also transacted with her for
the deposit of the amount of P40,000,000.00 (Exh. N5 and submarkings) to the Jose
Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy of the
deposit receipt for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 83-85] Baby Ortaliza
transacted with her for the deposit of P163,500,000.00 (Exh.Q 5 and submarkings) to the
Jose Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account and it was Baby Ortaliza who received the copy
intended for the account holder. [TSN, May 15, 2002, pp. 89-92]
The prosecution further presented Melissa P. Pascual former bank Teller of EPCIB Virra
Mall Branch who testified that she personally processed various checks (Exhs. V 15; W15;
X15; Y15; A16, inclusive of submarkings) deposited by Ms. Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde S/A
0160-62501-5.
She was sure it was Baby Ortaliza who deposited these checks because their branch is
so small that everytime she comes to their branch, her voice is too loud so she would

catch her attention. She would see Ortaliza give the checks to her officer which the officer
would give to her for validation, for processing. [TSN, December 9, 2002, pp. 21-23; 35;
37-39]
The purchase of the "Boracay Mansion" for P142 Million from money which
came from the EPCIB C/A-0110- 25495-4 of Jose Velarde
The prosecution presented evidence to show that the purchase of the Boracay Mansion
was initiated by a check No. 0110-714951 dated October 5, 1999 issued by Jose Velarde
from his EPCIB C/A No. 0110-25495-4 in the amount of P 142,000,000.00 payable to Jose
Luis J. Yulo (hereafter Yulo) (Exh. G16) who deposited the same to his BPI C/A No. 03830748-27 which was a joint account with Ma. Carmen L. Yulo. [TSN, December 9, 2002, p.
114-125; Exh. F16] Subsequently, on October 8, 1999, Yulo issued BPI Check No. 0002129
(Exh. U16; T16) from his BPI Current Account which was deposited to the account of St.
Peter Holdings Corporation which, in turn, the latter used to buy three Managers Checks,
one for P86,766,960.00 payable to Vicente AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo Madrigal as
sellers of the Boracay Property (Exh. V16; W16); another for P53,931,535.60 payable to
Mercedes A. Reyes (broker) (Exh. X16) and the third for P1,301,504.40 payable to Vicente
AS Madrigal and/or Gerardo AS Madrigal for payment of documentary stamps (Exh. Y16).
[TSN December 16, 2002, pp. 29-51] To establish that the Boracay Property was, in
reality, owned by FPres. Estrada, Prosecution presented a tag in the carpet indicating the
name: "Pres. J. Estrada" (Exh. H19-H-2) [TSN, March 19, 2003]; a "Locator Slip" which bears
the words "Approved By; MS.LAARNI N. ENRIQUEZ," (Exh. H19) a school correspondence
for FPres. Estradas child with Laarni Enriquez, namely: Ejercito, Ma. Jerika Larize (Exh.
H19-a), and portion of the testimony of Chavit Singson where he mentioned that FPres.
Estradas new house in New Manila was called Boracay. [TSN, July 24, 2002, pp. 129134] However, Jose Luis Yulo, whom the prosecution portrayed as the dummy of FPres.
Estrada in the purchase of the Boracay Mansion was not charged as an accused in this
case which presented a legal issue as to the propriety of attachment covering the said
property during the pendency of this criminal case.
The funding of the Jose Velarde Account from the Urban Bank Account of
Jose Victor Ejercito
The prosecution presented Marie Rose Ancheta Claudio who testified that JV Ejercito was
the owner of Special Account No. (SPAN) 858 with Urban Bank pursuant to a Trust
Agreement executed between JV Ejercito and Urban Bank Trust Dept. [TSN, March 26,
2003, pp. 98-99] Ma. Aileen C. Tiongson testified that Urban Bank Managers Check No.
43222 (Exh. W19) for P75, 000,000.00 came from a pre-terminated placement of SPAN
858. [TSN, April 2, 2003, pp. 20-21] This Urban Bank Managers Check No. 43222 was
subsequently replaced by four (4) Managers Checks Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and
39978 (Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B15-8) in the respective amounts of P70,000,000,
P2,000,000.00, P2,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 (Exhs. B15-2-9).
Subsequently, on January 24, 2000, these four (4) checks were deposited to EPCIB S/A
No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde (Exh. B 15; Exh. 127-N).
Likewise, as mentioned earlier, three (3) Urban Bank Managers Checks for the amounts
of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2),
received by JV Ejercito were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde

(Exh. I5).
Prosecutions Evidence to show that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to
sign as "Jose"
Prosecution presented Marianito M. Dimaandal who identified various official documents
which showed the signature of FPres. Estrada as reading "Jose" instead of "Joseph"
(Exhs. X19 to R20 ). [TSN March 31, 2003, pp.40-47]
Based on the forgoing testimonial and documentary evidence, it is the contention of the
Prosecution that it has established that FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of
EPCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62501-5 and Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 in the
name of Jose Velarde.
The theory of the defense on the Jose Velarde Account
In attempting to prove that the Jose Velarde account was owned by Jaime Dichaves and
not by FPres. Estrada, the defense presented Romuald Dy Tang and Beatriz Bagsit as
their witnesses in addition to FPres. Estrada.
Romuald Dy Tang testified that in 1999, he was connected with EPCI Bank as its SVP and
Treasurer. The Chairman, Mr. George L. Go referred Mr. Dichaves to him because Go told
him that Dichaves wanted to open a current account under an alias instead of his name.
Mr. Dichaves also called him up and told him the same. He knows Mr. Dichaves because
the wife of Jaime Dichaves is the sister of his sister-in-law. In effect, the wife of his brother
and Jaimes wife are sisters. What he knows is Dichaves has a lot of business, substantial
business and one of his major businesses is plaster glass. [TSN, May 4, 2005, pp.11,15,
17, 18]
When he was called by Dichaves over the phone, the latter told him that Mr. Go referred
him to Dy Tang to open an alias account for him. Based on that, Dy Tang told Dichaves to
prepare a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying
that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be
sofor safekeeping. [Ibid. p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August 25, 1999(Exh.
127 to 127 B-1). [Ibid. pp. 20-21] The letter was given to him on the day Dichaves went to
his office to get the signature cards. [Id.] He gave the signature card personally to
Dichaves and he did not see Dichaves sign the signature card because he was late for an
appointment and both of them had prepared for such appointment and so Dy Tang gave
the signature card to Dichaves and told him to return the same. [Ibid, p.22] He opened two
accounts one savings and one current. It was a combo account. The signature card was
returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several
procedures. [Id.] Both he and Betty Bagsit were jointly assisting Mr. Dichaves. Ms. Bagsit
had to assist because if he will be the only one and he travels quite often, Mr. Dichaves
will not have anybody to attend to his account. At that time Betty Bagsit was based in the
Pacific Star branch in Makati and the Jose Velarde Account was a Binondo Account where
the ledgers of the Velarde Account were kept. [Ibid., pp. 26-28] He testified that all the
fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star. [Id.]
In his sworn statement with the Ombudsman on March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327-327-C), Dy
Tang stated that he received a letter from Dichaves advising them that all transaction for
the Jose Velarde account should be coursed through him. He instructed Mr. Ceferino Ang,

Vice President and Manager of Binondo Branch to cause the opening of the account. He
knows Mr. Dichaves personally because he was referred by Mr. George Go to him and
because he is the brother-in-law of Dy Tangs brother. He went to the office to pick up the
forms for the opening of the account sometime in late August 1999. Mr. Jaime Dichaves
opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or another
person. He gave the signature cards for Dichaves to fill up. The accomplished
signature cards were given to him by Mr. Go. He was not present when the
depositor affixed his specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given
to him accomplished by Mr. Go.
Beatriz L. Bagsit came into Equitable Bank as head of Pacific Star branch with rank of
AVP and when they acquired PCI Bank in 1999, she was promoted to 1st VP and the
division head who handled the Makati area. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 63]
She retired from the bank because of politics in the bank and the Jose Velarde case was
coming up. She was the one handling the Jose Velarde account which was being handled
also by Mr. Jaime Dichaves. [Ibid. p. 65] The Jose Velarde account started at Binondo
Branch. It was opened there and when her superiors transferred to Makati, they called her
to handle the account of Jose Velarde and she was introduced to Mr. Dichaves by their
Executive Vice-President, Romy Dy Tang for her to handle the account personally. [Ibid. p.
66]
There is no Jose Velarde who owns an account with their bank. Her basis for saying that
Jose Velarde account belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was
given to her that came from Mr. Dichaves when the account was opened in Binondo.
When the account was opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the
same. The Jose Velarde account was never transferred to Makati. It was just the handling
that was transferred sometime in November, 1999. [Ibid, pp. 68-70]
Based on the letter (Exh. 127) it would appear that the Jose Velarde account belonged to
Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter stating that all
banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. The letter was shown to
her by Mr. Dy Tang in November, 1999. She does not remember the exact date when she
was told by Dy Tang to handle the account of Mr. Dichaves in the name Jose Velarde. She
was first informed about it in Dy Tangs office and after that there was a time when
Dichaves went to Dy Tangs office and that was the time she was introduced to Dichaves.
She first met Mr. Dichaves in January, 2000. After she was introduced to Dichaves, there
were times when he would call her for a transaction and there were times he went to her
office. Sometimes Dichaves will tell her that he will be sending somebody to get the MC
which he wants her to prepare and sometimes he would ask for the balance. [Ibid, pp. 7296] Mr. Dichaves came to her office twice or thrice only. One is when he visited Mr. Dy
Tang, the other one is when he just passed by, just to check the account of Jose Velarde
and he gave her instruction that he will be sending representative to prepare an MC for
him that was after the February 4, 2000 transaction. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 59]
She does not know if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but
she does not know with other branches. The records she had access to regarding the
Jose Velarde Account were the signature card and the copy of the letter. The name
"Dichaves" does not appear in the signature card. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76-84]
She saw the debit-credit authorization on her table and she kept it and did not give it to

anybody. [Ibid. p. 116] After Clarissa Ocampo was presented at the impeachment
proceedings, Clarissa called her and she told Clarissa "Kissa, hindi sa akin galing yong
debit/credit" because Clarissa was asking her if she was at the bank working and she told
Clarissa that the bank was really bleeding and she took the opportunity to tell her "Kissa,
hindi sa akin galing yon. Saan ba galing yon?". [Ibid. p. 118] She testified that Clarissa
was just surprised and asked her "saan ba galing yon?". Where did it come from? She
answered she didnt know but it didnt come from her. Thats all she told Clarissa. After
that there was a follow-up from Atty. Curato asking her if she did not really issue the
authorization and she told him "No talaga eh. Sabi ko, hanapin natin kung saan talaga
galing." She testified that later on, it was confirmed that it came from the Trust
Department. [Ibid. p. 118-119] She testified that the Prefix Number for a Binondo Account
was 0110 but she could not remember the Prefix Number for the Pacific Star Branch. [Ibid.
p. 93] In her computation, the credits to the EPCIB Jose Velarde S/A No.0160-62501-5
totaled P2,168,523,085.00 excluding centavos and credit memos. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p.
98]
The Court finds that the FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner of EPCIB combo
account C/A No. 0110-25495-4 and S/A No. 0160-62501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde.
The eyewitness account of Prosecution witness Clarissa Ocampo that she saw FPres.
Estrada signed the name Jose Velarde in the various documents presented to him and
explained to him was undisputed by FPres. Estrada and constitutes direct evidence that
FPres. Estrada signed as Jose Velarde.
Another direct evidence that FPres. Estrada is Jose Velarde is the admission of FPres.
Estrada that he signed as Jose Velarde in the documents presented to him by Clarissa
Ocampo. One of such documents was the Debit-Credit Authority (Exh. E 5) which read:
"...my SA/CA No.0160-62501-5 maintained with your branch in the amount of
P500,000,000.00 and credit my Trust Account No. 101-78056-1 representing my initial
contribution." Such admission constitutes an admission that he and Jose Velarde are one
and the same person. Being a judicial admission, no proof is required and may be given in
evidence against him (Rule 129, SEC.4; Rule 130, SEC. 26). Being an admission against
interest, it is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything
against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not. [Rufina Patis Factory
vs Alusitain, 434 SCRA 429]
The evidence of the Prosecution which showed that Baby Ortaliza - a trusted person of
FPres. Estrada and who enjoyed the confidence of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito transacted the various personal bank accounts of FPres. Estrada and Loi Ejercito as well
as the Jose Velarde accounts, also constitutes corroborative evidence that the Jose
Velarde Accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada and not by Dichaves, since Baby Ortaliza
has been entrusted by FPres. Estrada to handle his own personal bank accounts and
there is no evidence that Dichaves and Baby Ortaliza are related in any way to each other.
The evidence of the Prosecution that the Boracay Mansion was purchased from funds
coming from the Jose Velarde accounts is yet another corroborative evidence that proved
that the Jose Velarde accounts are owned by FPres. Estrada. The documents found in the
Boracay Mansion show that the beneficial owner of the Boracay Mansion is FPres.
Estrada and is used by Laarni Enriquez whose relation to FPres. Estrada was never

denied.
Likewise, the evidence of the Prosecution which showed that three (3) Urban Bank
Managers Checks for the amounts of P10,875,749.43, P42,716,554.22 and
P54,161,496.52 (Exh. I5-17, I5-18 and O5-2), received by JV Ejercito as well as the four (4)
Urban Bank Managers Checks totaling P75,000,000.00 (Exhs. B 15-2, B15-4, B15-6 and B-158) were deposited to EPCIB S/A No. 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde constitutes
corroborative evidence that, as between FPres. Estrada and Dichaves, it can be inferred
that JV Ejercito, being the son of FPres. Estrada, would contribute to the account of his
father but not if the account were owned by Dichaves in the absence of proof that JV
Ejercito was under obligation to deposit to the said account if the same was owned by
Dichaves.
The evidence of the Prosecution that it was customary for FPres. Estrada to sign as
"Jose" shows that FPres. Estrada would sign as "Jose" and further shows that, to the
naked eye, the signature of FPres. Estrada as "Jose" appearing in the various official
documents signed by FPres. Estrada is similar to the signature of "Jose" appearing in
"Jose Velarde."
As to the reliance of the Defense on the testimonies of Dy Tang and Bagsit to prove that
the Jose Velarde accounts belong to Jaime Dichaves, We find that such reliance is
misplaced.
Dy Tang testified that after Mr. George Go referred Dichaves to him, he told Dichaves to
prepare a letter for records indicating his intention and Dichaves sent him a letter saying
that he is opening an account under the name Jose Velarde and everything should be
sofor safekeeping. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 20] Dy Tang identified the letter dated August
25, 1999. [Ibid. pp. 20-21; Exh. 127 to 127 B-1]
The Letter of Dichaves dated August 25, 1999 reads as follows:
Dear Romy,
May I request that a savings account and a current account be opened with your
Juan Luna branch for Jose Velarde c/o the undersigned.
All other banking transactions of Jose Velarde shall be coursed through the
undersigned.
Very truly yours,

(sgd)
Jaime Dichaves

The Letter of Dichaves does not prove that he is the owner of the Jose Velarde
Account. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the Jose Velarde Account is owned by

Dichaves, why did he not deposit the International Exchange Bank Check No.
6000159271 dated November 5, 1999, payable to cash in the amount of P189,700,000.00
drawn by Eastern Securities Corporation directly to the Jose Velarde Account? If Dichaves
owned the Jose Velarde Account, why did he take the circuitous route of depositing the
International Exchange Bank into his Far East Bank Savings Account, then auto transfer
the amount to his Current Account, then issue his personal check payable to cash for
P189,700,000.00 which was ultimately deposited to the Jose Velarde Account?
It could not be because he did not want evidence to prove that the International Exchange
Bank check was deposited to his account because he, in fact, deposited that check to his
personal account.
The only logical conclusion is that Dichaves did not want evidence to show that the
International Exchange Bank check of Eastern Securities Corporation was deposited to
the Jose Velarde Account because such deposit would confirm that FPres. Estrada, once
proven to own the Jose Velarde Account, received the P189,700,000.00 commission
arising from the purchase by SSS and GSIS of Belle Shares.
Dichaves act of covering the paper trail of the International Exchange Bank check of
Eastern Securities Corporation, albeit unsuccessfully, militates against the claim of the
Defense that Dichaves owns the Jose Velarde Account.
In his Sworn Statement dated March 23, 2001 (Exh. 327), Dy Tang stated that Jaime
Dichaves opened the account but Dy Tang does not know if he opened it for himself or
another person. He gave the signature card for Dichaves to fill up. The signature card was
returned after about a month or so, after a follow up with him and after he followed several
procedures. [TSN dated May 4, 2005, p. 22] The signature card was given to him by
George L. Go already accomplished. He was not present when the depositor affixed his
specimen signature in the said signature card as it was given to him accomplished by
George L. Go.
In the signature card, it appears that it was opened on August 26, 1999 but it was received
only on October 7, 1999. Likewise, the signature card bore the signature "Jose Velarde"
three times (Exh. G19, G19-6).
In his testimony, Dy Tang testified that he doesnt think that it would be Dichaves signing
as Jose Velarde because when Mr. Dichaves called him about his discussion with Mr. Go
to open an account, Dichaves told him that he was going to open an account under an
alias account. [TSN, May 4, 2005, p. 44] Nowhere did Dy Tang testify that Dichaves is the
owner of the Jose Velarde account.
As appears in the signature card, the signature of Jose Velarde is almost identical to the
signature of Jose Velarde appearing on the three (3) copies of the Investment
Management Agreement [Exh. W4 to Y4; TSN November 13, 2002, pp. 70-73], two (2)
signature cards (Exh. Z4 to A5) which he signed three (3) times [TSN, November 13, 2002,
pp. 78-80] one (1) copy of the Investment Guidelines [Exh. B5; Ibid. pp. 82-84]; two (2)
copies of the Directional Letters [Exh. C5 to D5; Ibid. pp. 87-89], and one (1) copy of the
debit-credit authority [Exh. E5; Ibid. pp. 92-93], which FPres. Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde as testified by Clarissa Ocampo and as admitted by him. Under Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, the court is authorized, by itself, to make a comparison of the
disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against

whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
[Cogtong vs. Kyoritsu International Et. Al., GR No. 160729, July 27, 2007]
As regards the testimony of Beatriz Bagsit, her basis for saying that Jose Velarde
accounts belongs to Mr. Jaime Dichaves is that there was a letter that was given to her
that came from Mr. Dichaves when the accounts were opened in Binondo. When the
accounts were opened in Binondo, she was not handling the management of the same.
Based on the letter, she testified that it would appear that the Jose Velarde accounts
belonged to Jaime Dichaves because it was Mr. Jaime Dichaves who issued the letter
stating that all banking transaction of Jose Velarde should be coursed to him. [TSN, April
13, 2005, p. 68-72]
The testimony of Bagsit does not establish that it is Dichaves who owns the Jose Velarde
accounts as her opinion was based simply on the letter issued by Dichaves. As against
the inference that Dichaves owned the Jose Velarde accounts based on the letter of
Dichaves, the Prosecutions evidence showing that FPres. Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde in the various documents given to him for signature must be given more weight to
establish the fact that the Jose Velarde accounts belong to FPres. Estrada.
Moreover, there was a glaring inconsistency in the testimonies of Defense witness Dy
Tang and Bagsit when Dy Tang testified that all the fixed (time) deposits of Dichaves were
moved in the branch of Bagsit in Pacific Star, while Bagsit testified that she does not know
if Dichaves has an account in her area, she thinks there is none but she does not know
with other branches. [TSN, May 4, 2005. pp. 26-28; TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 76]
As regards the statement of Bagsit that the Debit-Credit authority did not come form her
and that later, it was found to have come from the Trust Department, We find the
testimony of Clarissa Ocampo that the Debit-Credit Authority came from Bagsit as being
more credible. First, because the debit-credit authority deals with S/A 0160-62501-5 which
is under the Banking Department and not the Trust Department; and Second, because as
testified by Bagsit, she found the Debit- Credit Authority on her table after it was signed
but she kept it and did not give it to anybody. The Court likewise notes that Bagsit was not
involved with the EPCIB Binondo Branch but she remembers the prefix for Binondo
accounts as No. 0110, yet, she could not remember the prefix for accounts with the Pacific
Star Branch of EPCIB which she headed since 1999.
In the attempt to downplay the effect of FPres. Estrada signing as Jose Velarde in the
Debit-Credit Authority, the defense argued that the said debit-credit authority was not
implemented "precisely because the signature of accused Estrada did not match with that
of the real Jose Velarde (who turned out to be Jaime Dichaves) [Defense Memorandum,
p. 251] and "probably because the bank officers got to realize that accused President
Estrada was not really the owner of the account." [Ibid., p. 263]
Besides being speculative, the arguments of the Defense are mere allegations which are
not supported by its own evidence.
The evidence of the Defense shows that prior to February 4, 2000, the account balance of
S/A 0160-62501-5 of Jose Velarde was P142,763,773.67. (Exh. 127-O) There was
therefore not enough funds in the account to transfer to the Trust Account. Thus, the
Debit-Credit Authority could not be implemented.

Subsequently, a credit memo for P506,416,666.66 was issued in favor of the said Jose
Velarde S/A 0160-62501-5 account. As per the testimony of defense witness, Beatriz
Bagsit, the amount of P 506,416,666.66 represented the principal and interest of a
preterminated placement of S/A 0160-62501-5. The placement was not in the name of
Dichaves but in the name of an account number, i.e. Account No. 0160-62501-5 and
behind that account is Jose Velarde. [TSN, April 18, 2005, p. 37] Eventually the
P500,000,000.00 was withdrawn from the savings account in exchange for an MC
payable to trust. [Ibid. pp. 30, 31]
Consequently, while the funding for the P500,000,000.00 did not come via the debit-credit
authority, nonetheless, the funding of the P500,000,000.00 came from S/A 0160-62501-5
of Jose Velarde.
Moreover, the debit-credit authority was not implemented because Bagsit kept the debitcredit authority and did not give it to anybody. [TSN, April 13, 2005, p. 116]
Neither does the non-implementation of the Debit-Credit Authority which FPres. Estrada
signed as Jose Velarde disprove the fact that FPres. Estrada admitted that S/A 016062501-5 in the name of Jose Velarde is his account when he admitted affixing his
signature on the Debit-Credit Authority as Jose Velarde.
The so-called "internal arrangements" with the bank, involved the use of S/A 0160-625015 which had been in existence since August 26, 1999 as the funding source of the
P500,000,000.00 to be placed in the Trust account for lending to Gatchalian. The fact that
the P500,000,000.00 funding was not effected by a debit-credit transaction but by a
withdrawal of P500,000,000.00 from the said S/A 0160-62501-5 proves that the money
lent to Gatchalian was the personal money of FPres. Estrada through the Jose Velarde
account of which he is the owner. As explained by FPres. Estrada, "William Gatchalian is
a big businessman. Isang malaking negosyante at siya po ay may ari ng Wellex group of
companies at siya rin po ay isa sa tumulong sa aming partido noong nakaraang 1998
presidential election." [TSN, May 24, 2006, p. 23]
FPres. Estrada further testified: "Hindi lang po dahil doon sa internal arrangement. Hindi
lang po dahil gusto kong tulungan si Mr. William Gatchalian kundi higit po sa lahat ay
nakita ko ang kapakanan noong mahigit na tatlong libong (3000) empleyado na kung
sakaling hindi mapapautang si Mr. William Gatchalian, maaring magsara ang kanyang
mga kumpanya at yong mga taong, mahigit tatlong libong (3,000) empleyado kasama na
yong kanilang mga pamilya ay mawawalan ng trabaho. AT INISIP KO RING NA WALA
NAMING (SIC) GOVERNMENT FUNDS NA INVOLVE KAYA HINDI NA PO AKO
NAGDALAWANG ISIP NA PIRMAHAN KO." [Ibid. p. 26-27; Emphasis Supplied]
Moreover, as pointed out by the Prosecution, there was no need for the internal
arrangement since the loan to Gatchalian could have been extended by EPCIB directly
considering that Gatchalian had put up sufficient collateral for the loan.
From the foregoing, the ineluctable conclusion is that the so-called internal arrangement
which allegedly prompted FPres. Estrada to sign the various documents presented to him
by Clarissa Ocampo is a futile attempt to escape the consequence of his admission that
he signed as Jose Velarde which leads to the legal and indisputable conclusion that
FPres. Estrada is the owner of the Jose Velarde Accounts.

THE DAMAGE AND PREJUDICE TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE

As stated earlier, SSS and GSIS used the funds belonging to its millions of members to
buy Belle Shares upon instruction of FPres. Estrada who benefited for his personal gain
from the P189,700,000.00 commission paid in consideration of the purchase of the Belle
shares by SSS and GSIS . The money paid by GSIS and SSS for the Belle Shares are
public funds which belong to the millions of GSIS and SSS members. The amount of
P189,700,000.00 deposited to the Jose Velarde account of FPres. Estrada are public
funds which came from the proceeds of the sale received by SSI Management through
Eastern Securities from GSIS and SSS. The Billions of Pesos that could have otherwise
been used to pay benefits to SSS and GSIS members were diverted to buying Belle
Shares to comply with FPres. Estradas instructions in order that FPres. Estrada could
receive his P187,900,000.00 commission to the damage and prejudice of the millions of
GSIS and SSS members who were deprived of the use of such funds and worse, who
now stand to suffer the loss amounting to millions of pesos since the Belle shares are
presently priced less than their acquisition cost. [From an average price of P3.14 per
share to P0.69 per share as of December 29, 2000 (Exh. 250-J-2) and between P0.40 to
P 0.50 per share as of February 11, 2002]
The Court finds that FPres. Estrada took advantage of his official position, authority,
relationship, connection and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines: a) by
instructing, directing and ordering, for his personal gain and benefit, by way of receiving
commission, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) through its President Mr.
Federico Pascual and the Social Security System (SSS) through its President, Mr. Carlos
Arellano, to purchase shares of stock Belle Corporation, as a consequence of which,
during the period October 13 to 21, 1999 GSIS bought 351,878,000 shares of Belle
Corporation and paid One Billion One Hundred Two Million Nine Hundred Sixty Five
Thousand Six Hundred Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,102,965,607.50) while SSS,
on October 21, 1999, bought 249,679,000 shares at the value of P784,551,150.00 at an
average price of P3.14/share [TSN, February 14, 2005, p.78] or a combined total of at
least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand
Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50); b) by
accepting and receiving, a commission in the amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million
Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos [P189,700,000.00] as consideration for the purchase by
GSIS and SSS of the shares of stock of Belle Corporation pursuant to his instructions
which amount was deposited in the Equitable-PCI Bank S/A 0160-62501-5 under the
account name "Jose Velarde" of which FPres. Estrada is the real and beneficial owner; c)
by depriving the millions of members of GSIS and SSS of the use of public funds in the
amount of at least One Billion Eight Hundred Eight Seven Million Five Hundred Sixteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Seven Pesos And Fifty Centavos (P1,887,516,757.50) for
payment of their benefits in order that he can receive his commission of One Hundred
Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P189,700,000.00) which likewise
constitute public funds for his personal benefit and enrichment thus causing damage and
prejudice to the Filipino people and the Government.
RE: SUB-PARAGRAPH D OF THE
AMENDED INFORMATION
_____________________________
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,

SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF

PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND
AND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER
HIS ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI
BANK.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses to prove the enormous amounts of
deposits to the Jose Velarde Account and the person who transacted with the bank in
relation thereto.
TERESA ARRASTIA BARCELONA was the Manager of Equitable PCI Bank in
Greenhills-Ortigas Branch specifically located at the Ground Floor of the Equitable
Building along Ortigas Avenue corner Roosevelt, San Juan, Metro Manila, which was
within the vicinity of the business and commercial areas of Greenhills.
Witness Barcelona then related and identified twelve (12) Equitable PCI Bank Deposit
Receipts (Exhs. I5and M5 to W5) dated as follows:
1.

October 20, 1999;

2.

November 8, 1999;

3.

November 22, 1999;

4.

November 24, 1999;

5.

November 25, 1999;

6.

December 20, 1999;

7.

December 21, 1999;

8.

December 29, 1999;

9.

January 4, 2000;

10.

May 10, 2000;

11.

June 6, 2000; and

12.

July 25, 2000.

These deposit receipts allegedly show various deposits made to Account No. 0160-625015 under the Account Name Jose Velarde maintained at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo
Branch. The transactions to the said account were allegedly inter-branch deposits or
deposits made from one branch of Equitable PCI Bank for an account maintained at

another branch of the said bank. The aforementioned deposit receipts show that the
deposits to the adverted account were transacted at the Equitable PCI Bank GreenhillsOrtigas Branch.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were allegedly
nine (9) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The total amount of the checks
deposited was P143,000,000.00. The teller who processed the checks was Glyzelyn
Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 8, 1999, four (4) checks were
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account in the total amount of P263,292,303.65. The
checks deposited were as follows: a Far East Bank and Trust Co. Araneta Branch Check
with Check No. 3165579 amounting to P189,700,000.00; an HSBC Head Office Check
with Check No. 0022012 amounting to P20,000,000.00; a Union Bank Head Office Check
with Check No. 034181 amounting to P10,875,749.43; and another Union Bank Head
Office Check with Check No. 034182 amounting to P42,716,554.22. These checks were
likewise processed by Glyzelyn Bejec on November 8, 1999 at 4:01 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, three (3) checks for
the total amount of P40 Million were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks
were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 24, 1999, a check of
P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by
the banks teller Leonora Royo on November 24, 1999 at 9:26 a.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, three (3) checks for
the total amount of P20,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These
checks were processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 20, 1999, three (3) checks for
the total amount of P163,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These
checks were processed by the banks teller Lagrimas Claveria on December 20, 1999 at
4:12 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 21, 1999, a check of
P5,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. The check was processed by
the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated December 29, 1999, two (2) checks for
the total amount of P2,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These
checks were processed by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, seven (7) checks for
the total amount of P70,500,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These
checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on January 4, 2000 at 2:31 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated May 10, 2000, four (4) checks for the
total amount of P23,000,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These

checks were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on May 10, 2000 at 4:30 p.m.
In the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, two (2) checks for the total
amount of P42,945,000.00 were deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. These checks
were processed by the banks teller Joan Mok on June 6, 2000 at 3:39 p.m.
Lastly, in the Equitable PCI Bank Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check of
P40,000,000.00 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account. This check was processed
by the banks teller Glyzelyn Bejec on July 25, 2000 at 11:43 a.m.
It was Baby Ortaliza who personally transacted the above-mentioned checks with
Barcelona whom she identified in a photograph (Exh. X5). Barcelona related that Baby
Ortaliza would hand over the checks to be deposited together with the account information
slip or passbook of Jose Velarde to her and that, after the validation, Barcelona would
hand over a copy of the deposit receipt to Baby Ortaliza. [TSN dated May 13, 2002 and
TSN dated May 15, 2002]
JOANNE GENEVIE RANIAGA MOK was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of
Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since July 1997. She received deposits
and processed withdrawals made with the bank.
Mok related and identified four (4) Equitable PCI Bank deposit receipts which pertained to
various checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5:
Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999 (Exh. N5); Deposit Receipt dated January 4,
2000 (Exh. T5); Deposit Receipt (Exhibit U5) dated May 10, 2000; and Deposit Receipt
(Exhibit V5) dated June 6, 2000. Mok testified that she personally processed the checks
deposited to the said account.
In the Deposit Receipt dated November 22, 1999, there were three (3) checks deposited
with the total amount of P40 Million. In the Deposit Receipt dated January 4, 2000, there
were seven (7) checks deposited with the total amount of P70,500,000.00. In the Deposit
Receipt dated May 10, 2000, there were four (4) checks deposited with the total amount of
P23,000,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated June 6, 2000, there were two (2)
checks deposited with the total amount of P44,945,000.00
Mok further related that she prepared 3 copies of the deposit receipts and that after
processing the deposit receipts she threw away the Account Information slip. [TSN dated
May 20, 2002 and TSN dated October 28, 2002]
GLYZELYN HERMOZURA BEJEC was a Customer Service Assistant Teller of Equitable
PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch. She processed deposit and withdrawal transactions
of the bank.
Bejec related and identified the deposit receipts of Equitable PCI Bank (Exhs. I 5, M5, P5,
R5, S5 and W5) which pertained to various checks she personally processed and credited
to the Jose Velarde Account with Account No. 0160-62501-5. In the Deposit Receipt dated
November 8, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P263,292,303.65. In the Deposit
Receipt dated October 20, 1999, there were nine (9) checks deposited in the total amount
of P163,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated November 25, 1999, there were three
(3) checks deposited in the total amount of P20,000,000.00. In the Deposit Receipt dated

December 21, 1999, the total amount of deposit was P5,000,000.00. In the Deposit
Receipt dated December 29, 1999, there were two (2) checks deposited in the total
amount of P2,500,000.00. Lastly, in the Deposit Receipt dated July 25, 2000, a check was
deposited in the amount of P40,000,000.00.
On cross examination, Bejec testified that there were Account Information Slips when the
checks were presented but she already threw away the said slips. It was the policy of the
bank to throw away the Account Information Slips when the deposit receipt had been
generated. [TSN dated May 6, 13, and 20, 2002]
LEONORA BACSAFRA ROYO was the Customer Service Assistant for new accounts of
Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills-Ortigas Branch since March of 1993. She testified that she
was the teller who processed the Deposit Receipt (Exh. O5) dated November 24, 1999
and that she prepared three (3) copies of the same since it was an inter-branch check
deposit transaction. The deposit receipt shows that an Urban Bank Head Office Branch
Managers Check No. 0000037661 dated November 23, 1999 amounting to
P54,161,496.52 was deposited to the Jose Velarde Account No. 0160-62501-5 maintained
at the Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch. Teresa Barcelona, the branch manager,
handed to Royo for processing the Urban Bank Managers Check as well as the
accomplished account information slip. [TSN dated October 30, 2002]
ANTONIO MARTIN SAGRITALO FORTUNO was the Bank Operations Officer of
Equitable PCI Bank, Pacific Star Branch since January 28, 2002. The witness averred that
he handled the opening of accounts; supervised the investment section; the foreign
telegraphic transfer as well as the domestic telegraphic transfer and the safekeeping of
the records of deposits; and the transactions which transpired in their branch. Witness
Fortuno brought with him to Court the documents contained in the subpoena which he
requested from the PCHC. These documents were the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of
the checks that were deposited to the Jose Velarde account from the PCHC; the nine (9)
deposit slips or deposit receipts that were deposited to the account of Jose Velarde
together with the five (5) cash deposits; and the detailed report of transfers and debit,
credit memos or the DRTM from October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000.
Fortuno related and identified the seventeen (17) microfilm copies of checks that were
deposited to the Jose Velarde account from various banks as well as the deposit receipts
and the DRTMs.
The original of the checks were allegedly returned to the issuing bank after having been
negotiated. The first check deposited to the Jose Velarde account was a cashiers check
from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 000031436 amounting to P20,000,000.00 and
dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. R14; R14-1; and R14-2). Fortuno narrated that this check was
presented to the teller of the bank and then the teller validated the deposit slip which was
attached to the check. The amount of the check was consequently credited to the Jose
Velarde account with an Account No. 0160-62501-5. The witness, however, cannot tell
who purchased this cashiers check. The second check deposited to the Jose Velarde
account was also a cashiers check from PS Bank Head Office with Check No. 000031437
amounting to P20 Million and dated October 18, 1999 (Exhs. S14; S14-1; S14-2; S14-3; and
S14-4). This check allegedly passed the same procedure as the first check before the
amount of the check was credited to the Jose Velarde account. The witness further related
that the Jose Velarde account was maintained at the Binondo Juan Luna branch and that

the deposits were made in the Pacific Star.

The first deposit receipt (Exhs. T14; T14-1; T14-2; T14-3; and T14-4) was dated October 19,
1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the
Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for P20 Million and the
other for P10 Million. The witness specified that this deposit receipt indicated the account
name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 016062501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:55 in the
afternoon; and the checks deposited which were from the Security Bank Corporation Main
Office with Check No. 000363859 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 000363858 for
P10,000,000.00. He added that the checks were dated October 18, 1999.
The second deposit receipt (Exhs. U14; U14-1; U14-2; U14-3; and U14-4) was also dated
October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P30,000,000.00, one for
P20,000,000.00 and the other for P10,000,000.00. The witness specified that this deposit
receipt contained the account name Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star
branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on
October 19, 1999 at 12:53 in the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was
from the Security Bank Corporation Main Office with Check No. 000363857 for
P20,000,000.00, and the other check was from PSB Head Office with Check No.
0000031438 for P10,000,000.00. These checks were dated October 18, 1999.
The third deposit receipt (Exhibits V14; V14-1; V14-2; V14-3; and V14-4) was likewise dated
October 19, 1999. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks
deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P50,000,000.00, one for
P20,000,000.00 and the other for P30,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account
name as Jose Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number
0160-62501-5; the date and time of deposit which was on October 19, 1999 at 12:49 in
the afternoon; and the checks deposited, the first check was from the Global Bank Head
Office with Check No. 0000107383 for P30,000,000.00, and the other check was also
from the Global Bank Head Office with Check No. 00017385 for P20,000,000.00. These
checks were both dated October 18, 1999.
The fourth deposit receipt (Exhibits W14; W14-1; and W14-2) was dated November 3, 1999.
This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde
Account for P5,000,000.00. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose Velarde;
the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the date and
time of deposit which was on November 3, 1999 at 11:03 in the morning; and the check
deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No. 000187472 for
P5,000,000.00. The said check was dated October 26, 1999.
The fifth deposit receipt (Exhibits X14; X14-1; and X14-2) was also dated November 3, 1999.
This deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde
Account for P5,000,000.00. The particulars of this deposit receipt were the same as the
fourth deposit receipt except for the time of deposit, which was at 11:04 in the morning,
and the check deposited which was from Westmont Bank in Ayala Avenue with Check No.
000187471 for P5,000,000.00. The said check was likewise dated October 26, 1999.
The sixth deposit receipt (Exhs. Y14; Y14-1; and Y14-2) was dated December 17, 1999. This
deposit receipt allegedly shows that a check deposit was made to the Jose Velarde

Account for P50,000,000.00. The check deposited was allegedly from Equitable PCI Bank
in Divisoria - M. De Santos branch with Check No. 0783236 for P50,000,000.00.
The seventh deposit receipt (Exhs. Z14; Z14-1; Z14-2; Z14-3; and Z14-4) was dated January 11,
2000. This deposit receipt allegedly shows that there were two (2) checks deposited to the
Jose Velarde Account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65, one for P20,000,000.00 and
the other for P6,325,055.65. Witness Fortuno identified the account name as Jose
Velarde; the branch name as Pacific Star branch; the account number 0160-62501-5; the
date and time of deposit which was on January 11, 2000 at 12:39 in the afternoon; and the
checks deposited, the first check was from Equitable PCI Bank in Divisoria M. De
Santos branch with Check No. 0111-795-117 for P20 Million, and the other check was
from Bank of Commerce in Port Area with Check No. 0030474 for P6,325,055.65. The
Equitable PCI Bank check was dated January 6, 2000 while the Bank of Commerce check
was dated January 11, 2000.
The eight deposit receipt (Exh. A15) was dated January 19, 2000. This deposit receipt with
an account information slip (Exh. A15-1) allegedly shows that a cash deposit of
P25,000,000.00 was made to the Jose Velarde Account. Witness Fortuno testified that the
account name Jose Velarde as well as the account number were specified in the account
information slip.
Last for the deposit receipt (Exh. B15) was dated January 24, 2000. This deposit receipt
allegedly shows that there were four (4) checks deposited to the Jose Velarde Account for
the total amount of P75,000,000.00. The account name Jose Velarde as well as the
account number were specified in an account information slip (Exh. B 15-1) for this deposit
receipt. The four (4) checks deposited (Exhs. B15-2; B15-3; B15-4; B15-5; B15-6; B15-7; B15-8;
and B15-9) were allegedly managers checks from the head office of Urban Bank and all
dated January 18, 2000. Witness Fortuno testified that the first check with Check No.
00039976 was for P2,000,000.00; the second check with Check No. 00039975 was for
P70,000,000.00; the third check with Check No. 00039978 was for P1,000,000.00; and
the fourth check with Check No. 00039977 was for P2,000,000.00.
Fortuno continued on his direct-examination and testified as to the Detailed Report of
Transfers and Credit Memorandums (DRTM) dated October 19, 1999; DRTM dated
November 3, 1999; DRTM dated December 15, 1999; DRTM dated December 17, 1999;
DRTM dated January 11, 2000; DRTM dated January 19, 2000; and DRTM dated January
24, 2000. The witness explained that these DRTM reflects the inter-branch transactions
which were done at the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch. These DRTM allegedly
show the summary of the transactions made particularly to the Jose Velarde Account with
Account No. 0160-62501-5.
The witness testified that the DRTM dated December 15, 1999 (Exhs. C 15 and C15-1)
reflects the summary of four (4) cash deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first cash
deposit was for P25,900,000.00; the second cash deposit was for P37,126,467.83; the
third cash deposit was for P38,325,629.67; and the fourth cash deposit was for
P43,647,902.50. The DRTM dated October 19, 1999 (Exhs. D15 and D15-1) reflects the
summary of four (4) deposits to the Jose Velarde Account. The first deposit was for
P30,000,000.00; the second deposit was for P30,000,000.00; the third deposit was for
P40,000,000.00; and the fourth deposit was for P50,000,000.00. The total amount of
deposits for October 19, 1999 was P150,000,000.00. The DRTM dated November 3, 1999
(Exhs. E15 and E15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) check deposits to the Jose Velarde

Account. Each of these check deposits was for P5,000,000.00 for the total amount of
P10,000,000.00. The DRTM dated December 17, 1999 (Exhs. F15 and F15-1) reflects a
deposit to the Jose Verlarde Account for P50,000,000.00. The DRTM dated January 11,
2000 (Exhs. G15 and G15-1) reflects the summary of two (2) deposits to the Jose Velarde
account for the total amount of P26,325,055.65. The first deposit was for P20,000,000.00
and the second deposit was for P6,325,055.65. The DRTM dated January 19, 2000 (Exhs.
H15 and H15-1) shows a cash deposit to the Jose Velarde Account for P25,000,000.00.
Lastly, the DRTM dated January 24, 2000 (Exhs. I15 and I15-1) reflects a check deposit to
the Jose Velarde Account for P75,000,000.00.
Fortuno claimed that the head of the branch of the bank at the time the foregoing deposits
were made was Beatriz Bagsit. He added that the total amount of cash and check
deposits for the period of October 19, 1999 to January 24, 2000 aggregated to
P481,325,055.65.
On cross examination, Fortuno clarified that the Equitable PCI Bank Pacific Star branch
had no specimen signatures of Jose Velarde. He also admitted that he had no personal
knowledge on any matter relating to the Jose Verlade Account nor does he know the
persons who made the cash and check deposits. He testified that none of the names of
FPres. Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada appear in the deposit slips or checks he exhibited
and identified. [TSN dated November 25, 2002 and TSN dated November 27, 2002]
MICHELLETTE SOLIDUM LEGASPI was the Branch Head of Equitable PCI Bank
Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch on December 19, 1997 until July 26, 2002. The branch was
near North Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan. It was less than 100 meters away from the
Buchanan gate or perpendicular to Eisenhower Street of the subdivision. Polk Street was
one of the streets of North Greenhills where the residence of former President Estrada
was located. [TSN dated December 2, 2002, pp. 39-48]
The Virra Mall Branch was merged with the Greenhills Shopping Center Branch on July
26, 2002. All the bank records and documents of the branch were forwarded to the
warehouse of the head office.
Legaspi brought a Certification (Exhibit T15) dated November 27, 2002, accomplished and
executed by Judy L. Go, Vice-President and Branch Head, Juan Luna Binondo Center,
Equitable PCI Bank which certified that Savings Account No. 016062501-5 and Current
Account No. 011025495-4 were both under the name of Jose Velarde. [Ibid, pp. 49-56]
Legaspi then identified seven (7) Electronic Clearing Systems Reports with attached
documents which were microfilm copies of certain checks. She explained that the
Electronic Clearing systems Report was the summary of all checks received and
processed at Greenhills-Virra Mall Branch and then sent to PCHC for clearing. The
microfilm copies of the checks supported the summary of the Electronic Clearing systems
Report. The documents were handed over to Legaspi by their Legal Department.
The Electronic Clearing Systems Report showed the batch sent by the branch to PCHC
for clearing. The report bore the routing number of the branch and the identification of the
checks that were sent to the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).
For the September 10, 1999 Report (Exhibit U15, with sub markings), ten (10) checks were
processed by the branch. The microfilm copies of the checks bore the Account No.

016062501-5 which meant that the checks were deposited to the said account. Legaspi
explained that the account number was found at the back of the checks. The back of the
microfilm checks also bore a certification from the PCHC that the item was a photocopy of
the original clearing document processed by PCHC.
The following microfilm copies were presented: Allied Bank Check No. 00080546 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080566 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080548 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080542 for P10,000,000.00; Check No. 0080543 for
P10,000,000.00; Check No 0084547 for P5,000,000.00; Check No. 0080544 for
P5,000,000.00; Westmont bank Ayala Branch Check No. 000181135 for P5,000,000.00;
Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 for P5,000,000.00; Far East Bank Check No. 3165562
for P20,000,000.00 with Jaime Dichavez or Abbie Dichavez as account holder.
Attached to the report was a document entitled Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Credit
and Debit memo (U15-12) of Greenhills, Virra Mall Branch as of September 10, 1999. On
the report, an inter-branch transaction on September 10, 1999 was made for Account No
016062501-5 for P90,000,000.00. The report was secured by the banks Legal
Department pursuant to the subpoena.
For the September 30, 1999 Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit V 15, with
submarkings), two checks were deposited to Account No 016062501-1. These were
Equitable Bank Binondo Branch Check No. 0811277 for P8,300,000.00 and Allied Bank
Check No. 0080550 for P20,000,000.00. The dorsal side of the Equitable check bore the
account name Jose Velarde and Account No. 016062501-1.
Another attached document was the transaction journal log report (Exhibit V 15-4) which
showed the two deposits. Reflected on the journal log was the amount P995,371.66
indicating the last balance of the Account as of September 29, 1999. A late Deposit
Transactions Report of the Branch as of September 30, 1999 reflected that the two checks
deposited were late deposit transactions so that they were considered the following day
transactions. A Detailed Report of Transfer and/or Memo of Greenhills, Virra Mall dated
September 30, 1999 also reflected the two checks.
The third Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit W15, with sub markings) presented
was dated October 6, 1999. The details contained the following: Equitable Bank
Managers check in the amount of P300,000,000.00 deposited to Account No. 0160625015. The journal log reported the P300,000,000.00 deposit on October 5, 1999. A detailed
report of Transfer Memo (Exhibit W15-4) of the branch dated October 6, 1999 showed that
a P300,000,000.00 check deposit to Account No. 016062501-5.
The next Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit X15, with sub markings) was dated
November 26, 1999 and showed that three checks were processed by the branch. These
checks were: Equitable Bank Check No. 0811579 for P20,000,000.00, Check No.
0811580 for P20,000,000.00 and Check No. 0811582 for P60,000,000.00. The dorsal
portions of the checks bore the account number 01602501-5 where the checks were
deposited. The Detailed Report of Transaction Memo (Exhibit X15-5) dated November 26,
1999 also showed these three transactions. Since the checks were deposited beyond the
clearing cut-off time, the late deposit transactions report ( Exhibit X15-6) was also
presented.
The Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit Y15, with sub markings) dated November

29, 1999 showed a Westmont Bank check No. 0000187474 deposit for P25 Million which
against bore the account No. 016062501-5. A detailed Report Transfer Memo (Exhibit Y153) was presented to show this interbranch transaction. The late transaction report dated
November 29 for the P25,000,000.00 check deposit was also presented. [Ibid, pp. 51-137]
Electronic Clearing System Report (Exhibit Z15, with sub markings) dated December 1,
1999 showed a Metrobank Magdalena Center Check No. 035400 for P53,000,000.00. The
detailed report transfer (Exhibit Z15-3) reflected that the P53,000,000.00 check was
deposited to Account No. 016062501-5.
The last Electronic Clearing Systems Report (Exhibit A16, with sub markings) dated
December 2, 1999 showed that Equitable PCI Binondo Branch Check No. 0811596 for
P50,000,000.00, Check No. 0811597 for P50,000,000.00 and Allied bank Check No.
0176625 for P20,000,000.00 were processed. Attached were two transaction journals
(Exhibit A16-5) dated December 1, 1999 showing these inter-branch transactions.
Legaspi explained that they were unable to produce the deposit slips representing the
inter-branch deposits made to the account of Jose Velarde because all the documents
pertaining to the Virra Mall branch were forwarded to the warehouse. They were still in the
process of retrieving the other documents pertaining to the deposit slips. [TSN dated
December 4, 2000, pp. 11-23]
Legaspi testified that the transactions were made by Baby Ortaliza whom she identified in
a photograph (Exht X5). [Ibid, pp. 24-30]
On cross examination, Legaspi testified that she was certain that the deposit receipts
were actually accomplished and saw Baby Ortaliza several times transacting at the
branch. [Ibid, pp. 31-34]
MELISSA PORTO PASCUAL was a bank teller of Equitable PCI Bank Greenhills Virra
Mall Branch from April 1, 1999 to January of 2002. She processed cash deposits, check
deposit deposits, withdrawals and encashment during that time.
The witness then related and identified microfilm copies of checks which she claimed that
she personally processed for inter-branch deposits. These checks were: Equitable PCI
Bank Check (Exh. V15-2 and submarkings) No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with
the amount of P80,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check (Exh. V15-3 and submarkings) No.
0080550 dated September 15, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI
Bank Check (Exh. W15-2 and submarkings) No. 0241001331 dated September 13, 1999
with the amount of P300,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X 15-2 and
submarkings) No. 0811579 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00;
Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X15-3 and submarkings) No. 0811580 dated November
23, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00; Equitable PCI Bank Check (Exh. X 15-4 and
submarkings) No. 0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60,000,000.00;
Westmont Bank Check (Exh. Y15-2 and submarkings) No. 0000187474 dated November
27, 1999 with the amount of P25,000,000.00; and Allied Bank Check (Exh. A16-4 and
submarkings) No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P20,000,000.00.
The foregoing checks were deposited by Baby Ortaliza to the Jose Velarde Account with
Account No. 0160-62501-5 which was maintained at Equitable PCI Bank Binondo Branch.
Pascual described the physical appearance of Baby Ortaliza and identified her in a

photograph (Exh. X5).

To corroborate her claim that she personally processed the aforementioned checks,
witness Pascual further related and identified the Electronic Clearing System Report
(Exhs. U15 to Z15-3) dated November 26, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report
dated October 6, 1999; the Journal Report dated October 5, 1999; the Electronic Clearing
System Report dated September 30, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated
November 29, 1999; the Electronic Clearing System Report dated December 2, 1999; and
the Journal Report dated December 1, 1999. [TSN dated December 9, 2002]
LAMBERTO BAJACAN DEL FONSO (Del Fonso) was the Assistant Vice President and
Department Head of the Branch Monitoring and Administration Department of Equitable
PCI Bank since 1997.
Del Fonso identified the bank statements relative to the Jose Velarde Savings Account
No. 0160-62501-5 for the period beginning August 1, 1999 to November 30, 2000 (Exhs.
D19 to D19-13, inclusive of submarkings) and to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4 for the
period beginning August 1, 1999 to October 31, 2000 (Exhs. E19 to E19-14). As to Savings
Account No. 0160-62501-5, he testified that the account was closed on November 13,
2000 (Exh. D19-13). As to Current Account No. 0110-25495-4, witness Del Fonso identified
a transaction for October 6, 1999 (Exh. E19-2) for an automatic transfer of the amount of
P29,304,219.69 from the savings account. On the same day, there was an Inward Check
deposit amounting to P142 million. For the other months, there were either minimal
transactions or none at all.
With respect to the account holder Jose Velarde, Del Fonso testified that he had no
address indicated in the accounts as the same were simply "c/o EBC" or "care of
Equitable Banking Corporation" through its Head Office in Binondo, Manila. He clarified
that this was allowed as a special arrangement, although he did not know and neither had
he met Jose Velarde. [TSN dated January 22, 2003]
RENE COLIN DACIO GRAY was head of the Cash Department of Urban Bank sometime
on January 2000. He presented and identified a Managers Check No. 43222 dated
January 17, 2000 (Exh. W19) issued by Urban Bank Greenhills Branch which totalled
Seventy Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00). Gray related that the Chairman of Urban
Bank, Arsenio Bartolome, asked him to divide this check into four (4) checks - Urban Bank
Check Nos. 39975, 39976, 39977 and 39978 (Exhs. B15-2, B15-4 B15-6 B15-8) all dated
January 18, 2000. [TSN, March 31, 2003, pp. 8-31]
AURORA CHUMACERA BALDOZ (Baldoz) was the Vice-President of the Receivership
and Liquidation Group 2 of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) since
March 24, 1994. As such, she actually administered the receivership, take-over and
liquidation of banks that the Monetary Board orders for closure. She testified that she
became familiar with Urban Bank because it was her group that implemented the takeover of the said bank on April 26, 2000.
Baldoz presented and identified documents relative to Account No. 858 (Exh. M 19) of the
Urban Bank, particularly, the Letter of Authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I 19); Letter
of Authority dated January 29, 2000 (Exh. J19); Letter of Authority dated April 24, 2000
(Exh. K19); as well as Urban Bank Check No. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 in the amount of
P107,191,780.85, and a Signature Card of Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 (Exh. L 19).

Baldoz further identified a Certification (Exh. N19) that she issued to the fact that as
receiver of Urban Bank, PDIC found no bank records showing any account under the
name of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Rowena Lopez,
Peachy Osorio, Joy Melendrez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, and 777. She
further certified (Exh. N192) that Accounts "A/C 858" and "T/A 858" did not appear in the
Registry of Deposits of Urban Bank and were not part of the deposit liabilities of the said
bank. [TSN dated March 24, 2003]
MARIE ROSE ANCHETA CLAUDIO (Claudio) was the Vice-President of Urban Bank and
the Manager of Urban Bank San Juan Branch. She was part of the senior management of
Urban Bank, particularly its business development committee which handled the business
aspect of the bank. As area manager, she was in-charge of supervising four (4) branches
of Urban Bank. On the other hand, as branch manager, she handled the accounts of the
Greenhills branch clients in terms of deposits, loans and other products and it was in the
course of her duties as such that she became familiar with Trust Account No. 858 or
Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858.
Claudio testified that it was Arsenio Bartolome, then the Chairman of Urban Bank, who
asked her to open Trust Account No. 858 and to accept a deposit of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00). The deposit was accordingly processed based on Trading Order No.
776313 (Exh. Q19) dated January 6, 1999. She came to know that the owner of the
account was Joseph Victor Ejercito when she was asked to take hold of a Trust
Agreement (Exh. R19) from the Head Office about two (2) to three (3) weeks after she
accepted the cash. Claudio further testified that the Head Office gave it to her to be given
in turn to the client for signature. She added that she personally delivered the document
along with a signature card to the office of Joseph Victor Ejercito. A few weeks after she
left the documents it in his office, she came back and picked them up and gave them back
tot her Head Office. She also testified that she was familiar with the signature of Joseph
Victor Ejercito because he was a client of the bank.
Also in connection with Trust Account No. 858, Claudio handled the acceptance of all
deposits to the said account through Trading Orders. Thus, she became familiar with
Trading Order No. 035006-A (Exh. S19) dated January 27, 1999 in the amount of Fifty
Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). For effecting withdrawals from the said account, Claudio
explained that trading orders, managers checks and letters of authorities were required.
She added that she was familiar with some withdrawals, particularly those covered by
Trading Order No. 060851 (Exh. T19) dated September 30, 1999 in the amount of Forty
Two Million Pesos Three Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and
Seventeen Centavos (P42,360,899.17) and with maturity value of Forty Million Seven
Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Four Pesos and Twenty Two Centavos
(P42,716,554.22) (Exh. T19-2), which she approved and which was covered by

Managers Check No. 0000034182 dated November 8, 1999 (Exh. I 5-18).

Claudio also identified a withdrawal from the account through Trading Order No. 804490
(Exh. U19) with deal date November 5, 1999 with a maturity value of Ten Million Eight
Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Nine Pesos and Forty Three
Centavos (P10,875,749.43) covered by Urban Bank Managers Check No. 34181 (Exh. I 517) that was processed by branch accountant Aileen Tiongson and which she approved.
Lastly, Claudio identified Trading Order No. 808554 (Exh. V19) with a net maturity value of
Fifty Four Million One Hundred Sixty One Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and
Fifty Two Centavos covered by Urban Bank Managers Check No. 0000037661 (Exh.

O5 with submarkings). Witness Claudio verified that she gave the three (3) managers
checks for withdrawals to Joseph Victor Ejercito. [TSN dated March 26, 2003]
MA. AILEEN CANDELARIA TIONGSON (Tiongson) was the Branch Accountant of Urban
Bank San Juan Branch from December 18, 1999 to March, 2000. Among her duties was
to ensure that all transactions of the bank and all policies in the branch were properly
implemented. Her duties also included checking trading orders prepared by the account
officer for traditional and non-traditional products, facilitating the issuance of certificates of
deposits, and processing the issuance of managers checks for withdrawal transactions.
Tiongson clarified that non-traditional products included trust products or investment
placements under trust agreements.
Tiongson testified that she was familiar with Account No. 858 because she processed
some of the transactions of the client like the issuance of managers check. She added
that she was familiar with Managers Check Bearing No. 43222 (Exh. W 19) dated January
17, 2000 in the amount of P75 Million payable to cash. She added that the source of the
managers check was the pre-terminated placement of Account No. 858. With respect to
the said check, Tiongson testified that the placing of "payable to cash" in a managers
check is not a regular procedure in the bank because a managers check should be
payable to a specified person. [TSN dated April 2, 2003]
GUILLERMO ARAZA BRIONES (Briones) was the Deputy Receiver / Liquidator of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) assigned to Urban Bank at the time it
was under receivership.
Briones testified that as Deputy Receiver, he took charge of all the assets and affairs of
the bank and also acted as custodian of the said records. In such capacity, he came
across Account No. 858 as he was instructed by PDIC Vice President Aurora Baldoz to
look for documents pertaining thereto. He collated the documents and consequently
prepared an inventory list (Exh. V20 V20-4). Briones identified and verified the following
entries therein: (1) entry A-2 as referring to Trading Order No. 020385 (Exh. T19) dated
January 29, 1999; (2) entry A-21 referring to Managers Check No. 43222 dated January
17, 2000 in the amount of seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) (Exh. W19); (3)

entry B-3 referring to Trading Order No. 035006 dated January 27, 1999 (Exh.
S19); (4) entry B-25 referring to Trading Order No. 808554 dated November 22,
1999 (Exh. V19); (5) entry C-22 and C-23 referring to Trading Order No. 060851
dated September 30, 1991 (Exh. P19); (6) entry D-34 referring to Trading Order
No. 804490 dated November 5, 1999 (Exh. B20-3); and entries E-3, E-4, and E5 referring to letters of authority dated November 23, 1999 (Exh. I 19), January
17, 2000 (Exh. J19), and April 24, 2000 (Exh. K19). After collating the documents,
he submitted them to Aurora Baldoz. [TSN dated April 9, 2003]
EMMANUEL ENRIQUEZ BARCENA was the Assistant Vice President for Operations of
the PCHC during the time material in these cases. He assisted the Vice President for
Operations, Arturo M. De Castro, in supervising the check processing operations of the
corporation; he made sure that the checks delivered by the banks were credited to the
clearing account with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) and correspondingly debited
to the accounts of the drawee banks; and he was also responsible for the accuracy of the
reports generated and furnished to the "clearing participants" and BSP to the delivery of
checks by the banks. The witness related that the clearing participants are the commercial

and thrift bank members of the corporation with authority from the BSP to accept demand
deposits and participate in the clearing operations. These banks send local checks to the
clearing house by batches and the clearing house receive these checks and feed the
same in a reader sorter which capture the drawee banks information. Thereafter, the
checks are "sprayed with a tracer bond" and "microfilmed" to identify the source of the
check. The checks are then tallied against the batch control ticket and the net results,
known as the "clearing summary report", are reported to the BSP to serve as basis "for
debiting or crediting the clearing account" of the bank concerned.
The witness then related and identified several checks which were sent to PCHC and
undergone the clearing process. He was particular with the signatures of Arturo De
Castro, the Vice President of PCHC, Francisco Gementiza, the Microfilm Custodian of
PCHC, and Edgar Gamboa, the Assistant of the Microfilm Custodian of PCHC. These
checks were Allied Bank Check No. 0176610 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank
Check No. 0176611 with the amount of P10 Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 0187473
with the amount of P25 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 037661 dated November 23, 1999
with the amount of P54,161,496.52; Far East Bank Gift Check with the amount of
P500,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0176621 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank
Check No. 0176620 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank
Check No. 0176622 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank
Check No. 0176619 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; UCPB
Check No. 018706 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; UCPB
Check No. 018707 dated December 28, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; FEBTC
Check No. 0580312 dated May 8, 2000 with the amount of P3 Million; Allied Bank Check
No. 0209702 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0209706 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No.
0209703 dated May 2, 2000 with the amount of P5 Million; Metrobank Check No.
0830000304 dated June 3, 2000 with the amount of P22,945,000.00; Metrobank Check
No. 3010003358 dated June 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million; Asian Bank Check
No. 0022012 dated November 5, 1999 with the amount of 20 Million; Urban Bank Check
No. 034181 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P10,875,749.43; Urban Bank
Check No. 034182 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P42,716,554.22; Allied
Bank Check No. 0176604 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million;
Allied Bank Check No. 0176601 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176602 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount of
P10 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176605 dated September 30, 1999 with the amount
of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139670 dated October 18, 1999 with the
amount of P30 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0660139681 dated October 18, 1999 with
the amount of P13 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0732114979 dated October 15, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107387 dated October 18, 1999
with the amount of P25 Million; Global Bank Check No. 0107388 dated October 18, 1999
with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385384 dated November 24, 1999
with the amount of P10 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385385 dated November 24, 1999
with the amount of P5 Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0176615 dated November 24, 1999
with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783278 dated December
17, 1999 with the amount of P160 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0783284 dated
December 20, 1999 with the amount of P2 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0783282 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Allied Bank Check
No. 080519 dated December 20, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 006975 dated December 24, 1999 with the amount of P1.5 Million; Westmont
Bank Check No. 0189619 dated December 23, 1999; PS Bank Check No. 031436 dated
October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No. 031437 dated

October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No. 0363859
dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Security Bank Check No.
0363858 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Security Bank Check
No. 0363857 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; PS Bank Check No.
031438 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P10 Million; Global Bank Check No.
0107385 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Global Bank Check No.
0107383 dated October 18, 1999 with the amount of P30 Million; Westmont Bank Check
No. 0187472 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million; Westmont Bank
Check No. 0187471 dated October 26, 1999 with the amount of P5 Million.
Witness Barcena then related and identified in the foregoing manner Equitable PCI Bank
Check No. 0783236 dated December 17, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million; Equitable
PCI Bank Check No. 0111-795117 dated January 6, 2000 with the amount of P20 Million;
Bank of Commerce Check No. 0030474 dated January 10, 2000 with the amount of
P6,925,055.65; Urban Bank Check No. 039975 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount
of P70 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039976 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of
P2 Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039977 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P2
Million; Urban Bank Check No. 039978 dated January 18, 2000 with the amount of P1
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080566 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080454 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080548 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080542 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080543 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080547 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5
Million; Allied Bank Check No. 0080544 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of P5
Million; Westmont Bank Check No. 00181135 dated August 31, 1999 with the amount of
P5 Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780568 dated September 1, 1999 with the amount
of P5 Million; and FBTC Check No. 3165582 dated September 8, 1999 with the amount of
P20 Million.
In another set of documentary evidence for the prosecution, the witness similarly related
and identified Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811277 dated September 26, 1999 with the
amount of P8,300,000.00; Allied Bank Check No. 0080550 dated September 15, 1999
with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 001331 dated September
30, 1999 with the amount of P300 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811579 dated
November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable Bank Check No. 0811580
dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P20 Million; Equitable PCI Bank Check No.
0811582 dated November 23, 1999 with the amount of P60 Million; Westmont Bank
Check No. 0187474 dated November 27, 1999 with the amount of P25 Million; Metrobank
Check No. 0385400 dated November 29, 1999 with the amount of P53 Million; Equitable
PCI Bank Check No. 0811596 dated December 15, 1999 with the amount of P50 Million;
Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0811597 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of P50
Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0176625 dated December 1, 1999 with the amount of
P20 Million.
Witness Barcena continued on his direct examination and related and identified FEBTC
Check No. 3165579 dated November 8, 1999 with the amount of P189,700,000.00; BPI
Family Bank Check No. 0006623 dated July 25, 2000 with the amount of P40 Million;
Equitable PCI Bank Check No. 0742099 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P10
Million; Metrobank Check No. 0091780523 dated August 15, 1999 with the amount of P31
Million; Metrobank Check No. 0385379 dated August 19, 1999 with the amount of P20

Million; Metrobank Check No. 0830416015 dated July 29, 2000 with the amount of P22
Million; and Allied Bank Check No. 0080549 dated August 25, 1999 with the amount of
P20 Million.
Lastly, the witness then presented and identified a Detail List dated November 9, 1999 of
PCHC which contained a listing of incoming checks of the participating bank in Greater
Manila Area.
On cross examination, witness Barcena clarified that the checks forwarded to PCHC
pertained to checks that were not yet acted by the drawee bank as to whether the same
were honored or dishonored. [TSN dated January 13, 2003; TSN dated January 15, 2003;
and TSN dated January 20, 2003]
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
The defense presented BEATRIZ LEGASPI BAGSIT, the Vice President and Division
Head in the Makati Area of Equitable PCI Bank, and ROMUALD DY TANG, Treasurer and
Executive Vice President of Equitable PCI Bank. The gists of their testimonies were
already discussed in relation to sub-paragraph (c) above. FPres. Estrada also denied on
the witness stand that he owned the Jose Velarde account.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Re: Sub-paragraph (d) of the Amended Information
To reiterate, the crime of plunder is committed through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts [or "predicate acts"] described in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended.
The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence that there were numerous deposits of
astoundingly large sums of money into the Jose Velarde account. However, the
prosecution failed to prove the predicate act/s as defined under Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080 through which the said deposits could have been acquired or amassed, except for
the amount of P189,700,000.00, representing illegal commissions from the sales of Belle
shares and the money collected from illegal gambling. It is not per se the accumulation of
wealth which is proscribed by the Anti-Plunder Law. The acquisition of wealth of not less
than P50,000,000.00 must be linked to the commission of overt or criminal acts falling
within the ambit of the said law. All that the prosecution has succeeded in showing is that
the Jose Velarde account is the repository or receptacle of vast wealth belonging to
FPres. Estrada.
RULING OF THE COURT
ON THE CHARGE OF PLUNDER
Elements of the Offense of Plunder
Having reached the foregoing Findings of Fact after a meticulous and laborious study of
the voluminous testimonial and documentary evidence of both the prosecution and the
defense on the four (4) sub-paragraphs of the Amended Information, the Court is now
called upon to apply the Anti-Plunder Law to the facts of this case. The accused are
charged with plunder as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended, entitled "An Act Defining And Penalizing The Crime Of Plunder, As Amended"

(July 12, 1991). Particularly, Section 2 of the said law provides as follows:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties.- Any public officer who,
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill gotten-wealth through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court. The Court shall declare any and ill-gotten
wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and share of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in the
favor of the State. (As to the penalty, this section is amended by Republic Act No.
9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. RA 9346
was signed into law on June 24, 2006. In view of its provisions, the penalty for the
crime of plunder is now reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 2 (a) of RA 9346.
In addition, the convicted person shall be eligible for parole under Act. No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.)
Section 1 (d) of the same statute cited in Section 2 above reads:
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material
possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired
by him directly or in directly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates
and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or
similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversation, mis-use, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/ or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or
instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
promises of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended

to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
RA No. 7080, as amended, enunciates a rule of evidence in Section 4 thereof which is
quoted hereunder:
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. For purpose of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The case of Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, promulgated
November 19, 2001), which upheld this Courts Resolution dated July 9, 2001 denying
accused Former President Estradas Motion to Quash the information in this case,
enumerates the elements of the crime of plunder, as follows:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080 as amended; and
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
The terms "Combination" and "Series" were likewise defined in the above-cited case as
follows:
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at
least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration
provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec.1, par.
(d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belongings to the
National Government under Sec.1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a "series", there must be two (2) or more
overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation , malversation and raids on
the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1).
Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law. (emphasis supplied)

The Charges in the Amended Information

in Relation to Accused
The import of the charges in the Amended Information was carefully discussed by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R.
No. 148965, February 26, 2003, 377 SCRA 538, 553-556], as penned by now the
Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in this wise:
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended
Information vis--vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his
other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the
accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the
crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four
sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A.
No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several
instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection
of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired
with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act
corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting,
receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention
petitioner but instead names other conspirators of the former President. Subparagraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase
shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions from
such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the
"Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall
under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly
committed by the former President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does.
Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name
"Jose Velarde" at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense
under item [6] in the enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired
with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the accused in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity,
petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other
accused with the former President as related in the second paragraph of the

Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that

petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly
committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were
allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President whose design was to
amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted
for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the
Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the
history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was crafted to avoid the mischief
and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law wasenacted in the
aftermath of the Marcos regimewhere charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed
against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies. Government prosecutors
found no appropriate law to deal with he multitude and magnitude of the acts
allegedly committed by the former President to acquire illegal wealth.They also
found out that under the then existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved
different transactions, different time and different personalities.Every transaction
constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all
conspiracyhad to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The
preparation of multiple Informations was a legl nightmarebut eventually, thirty-nine
(39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the same
accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti Plunder Law was
enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the
Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733
xxx

xxx

xxx

. . . In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonalityto help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the
conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the
tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase
shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that
each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is
that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple
conspiracies commonly involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or
"circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing
individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the
"chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much
the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a

"wheel" conspiracy. The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all
the accused, and the rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the
overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth.
Throughout the trial before this Court, the prosecutions task was to establish, with the
required burden of proof, the commission of the crime of plunder by the principal accused
former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada in conspiracy with his co-accused "during the
period from June, 1998 to January, 2001" by " willfully, unlawfully and criminally"
amassing, accumulating and acquiring by himself directly or indirectly ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount of Four Billion Ninety Seven Million Eight Hundred Four Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos ( P4,097,804,173.17), more
or less and thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, through "ANY OR A
COMBINATION OR A SERIES OF OVERT CRIMINAL ACTS, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES
OR MEANS" described in paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information.
After a thorough evaluation of the established facts, we hold that the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt the elements of plunder as follows:
(a) The principal accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, at the time of the commission
of the acts charged in the Amended Information was the President of the Republic
of the Philippines;
(b) He acted in connivance with then Governor Luis "Chavit" Singson, who was
granted immunity from suit by the Office of the Ombudsman, and with the
participation of other persons named by prosecution witnesses in the course of the
trial of this case, in amassing, accumulating and acquiring ill-gotten wealth as
follows:
(i) by a series of acts of receiving bi-monthly collections from "jueteng", a
form of illegal gambling, during the period beginning November 1998 to
August 2000 in the aggregate amount of Five Hundred Forty Five Millionh
Two Hundred Ninety One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) of which was deposited in the
Erap Muslim Youth Foundation; and
(ii) by a series consisting of two (2) acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS
to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or
receiving commission from the sales of Belle Shares in the amount of One
Hundred Eighty Nine Million Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P189,700,000.00) which was deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
In Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377
SCRA 538, 549) the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or collected
money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several
instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist
that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only
one act or offense despite the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted,

nay, "pretzel" interpretation.

In the same case (Jose "Jinggoy" E. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.), it was held:
Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate actsthat of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving
commissions from such purchase from Belle Corporation which became part of
the deposit in the "Jose Velarde" account at the Equitable PCI Bank. These two
predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No.
7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does. (emphasis supplied)
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, who
among the accused benefited from the misappropriation of the excise tax share of Ilocos
Sur and in what amounts, as charged sub-paragraph b. The prosecution likewise failed to
offer evidence on the alleged illegal sources of the numerous deposits in the Jose Velarde
account which belongs to FPres. Estrada, except for the commission received from the
sale of Belle shares to GSIS and SSS and the money collected from illegal gambling. The
Anti-Plunder Law requires the prosecution to prove the series or combination of overt or
criminal acts through which ill-gotten wealth deposited in the Jose Velarde account was
amassed, accumulated or acquired. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden of
proof.
However, the two different series of predicate acts outlined above (particularly, first, the
regular and methodical acquisition of ill-gotten wealth through collections from illegal
gambling and second, the receipt of unlawful commissions from the sales of Belle shares
twice), whether taken separately or independently of the other or in combination with each
other, unquestionably constitute the crime of plunder as defined by Section 2, in relation to
Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended.
The case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001) ruled:
xxx As Senate President Salonga explained, of there are 150 constitutive crimes
charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of them. If a
pattern can be shown by proving for example, 10 criminal acts, then that would be
sufficient to secure conviction.
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting
separate crimes as just one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by
means of a single information because there is a common purpose for committing
them, namely, that of "amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such
overt or criminal acts." The pattern is the organizing principle that defines what
otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the single crime of plunder. (369
SCRA 394, 475-476)
A pattern was established by the carefully planned system of jueteng money collection on
a regular bi-monthly basis from the dfferent provinces nationwide to enrich FPres. Estrada
with the connivance and/or participation of Gov. Singson, Yolanda Ricaforte, Emma Lim,
Carmencita Itchon, SPO2 Artates, Jamis Singson and other jueteng collectors referred to
in the Amended Information as "John Does" and "Jane Does." The Court notes that Gov.

Singson in the course of his testimony mentioned certain persons who collected jueteng
money aside from himself and his employees; namely, Anton Prieto, Bonito Singson, Bong
Pineda, Charing Magbuhos, Celso de los Angeles, Jesse Viceo, Romy Pamatmat and a
certain Sanchez of Batangas. As proven, the collections in "several instances" from illegal
gambling money went way beyond the minimum of P50,000,000.00 set by the AntiPlunder Law. These repeated collections of jueteng money from November 1998 to
August 2000 would fall within the purview of a "series" of illegal acts constituting plunder.
The said series of acts, on its own, would have been sufficient to convict the principal
accused, FPres. Estrada. However, this Court also finds that FPres. Estrada is criminally
liable for plunder for receiving commissions from the purchase of Belle Shares by the
GSIS and by the SSS in grave abuse of his power on two (2) separate occasions as
charged in sub-paragraph (b) of the Amended Information. Clearly, the receipt of these
commissions on two (2) occasions likewise meets the definition of a series of two (2)
similar unlawful acts employing the same scheme to accumulate ill-gotten wealth.
It is unnecessary to indulge in an exposition of whether the two series of acts falling under
sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information, proven in the course of the trial
could have amounted to two (2) counts of plunder. It would be a purely academic
exercise, as the accused cannot be convicted of two offenses or two counts of plunder on
the basis of a single Information, clearly charging him of only one count of plunder,
because that would violate his constitutional rights to due process, given the severity of
the crime charged in this case.
The predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Amended Information,
which formed two (2) separate series of acts of a different nature, were linked by the fact
that they were plainly geared towards a common goal which was the accumulation of illgotten wealth for FPres. Estrada and that they shared a pattern or a common method of
commission which was the abuse or misuse of the high authority or power of the
Presidency. (U.S. v. Hiverly, 437 F3d 752)
In sum, the Court finds that prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the
commission by the principal accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada of the
crime of plunder but not so in the case of former Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Atty.
Edward Serapio.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case
No. 26558 finding the accused, Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER defined in and
penalized by Republic Act No. 7080, as amended. On the other hand, for failure of the
prosecution to prove and establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds the
accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio NOT GUILTY of the crime of
plunder, and accordingly, the Court hereby orders their ACQUITTAL.
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall be applied in accordance with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, accused Former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification.

The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been
under detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
Moreover, in accordance with Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the Court hereby declares the forfeiture in favor of the government
of the following:
(1) The total amount of Five Hundred Forty Two Million Seven Hundred Ninety
One Thousand Pesos (P545,291,000.00), with interest and income earned,
inclusive of the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00),
deposited in the name and account of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation.
(2) The amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Million Pesos (P189,000,000.00),
inclusive of interests and income earned, deposited in the Jose Velarde account.
(3) The real property consisting of a house and lot dubbed as "Boracay Mansion"
located at #100 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City.
The cash bonds posted by accused Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada and Atty. Edward S. Serapio
are hereby ordered cancelled and released to the said accused or their duly authorized
representatives upon presentation of the original receipt evidencing payment thereof and
subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures. Likewise, the hold-

departure orders issued against the said accused are hereby recalled
and declared functus oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185195

March 17, 2010

VIOLETA BAHILIDAD, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 28326, convicting petitioner Violeta Bahilidad and co-accused Amelia Carmela C.
Zoleta of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents.
Acting on a complaint filed by a "Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province" with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the
Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants
and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani
province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from June 1
to July 31, 2003, and submitted the following findings:
1. Release of financial assistance intended to NGOs/POs and LGUs were fraudulently and
illegally made thus local development projects do not exist resulting in the loss
of P16,106,613.00 on the part of the government.
2. FINANCIAL Assistance were also granted to Cooperatives whose officials and members
were mostly government personnel or relative of the officials of Sarangani Province resulting
to wastage and misuse of government fund amounting to P2,246,481.00.2
Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the FINANCIAL assistance
given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Peoples Organizations (POs), and Local

Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount
of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof.
Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation
through falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Thus, the following
Information was filed:
That on January 24, 2002, or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani Province, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking
public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive
Assistant III, all ACCOUNTABLE public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by
reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violeta Balihidad, private
individual, the public officers, while committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of
their respective positions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and
misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in
public funds under their custody, and for which they are ACCOUNTABLE , by falsifying or causing
to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting
documents, making it appear that FINANCIAL assistance had been sought by Women in Progress,
Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in truth and in
fact, the accused fully knew well that no FINANCIAL assistance had been requested by the said
group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive the
aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) through encashment by the accused at the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of
Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit
and despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to the damage and prejudice
of the government and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.
Upon arraignment, accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad pled not guilty to the charges, while
Camanay and Diaz did not appear and remain at large to date. Thereafter, during the pendency of
the case, Constantino died. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to dismiss the
case against him. As regards Zoleta and Bahilidad, they posted bail and the case against them
proceeded to trial.
The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of the following persons:
1. Helen Cailing, a State Auditor IV at the Commission on Audit (COA) and leader of the
Special Audit Team (SAT) of Sarangani Province. Cailing testified that the SAT, composed of
herself and three (3) members, in the course of the audit, discovered that the voucher issued
by the Office of the Vice-Governor to the WIP violated specific COA Guidelines 3.1, 3.2, 3.4,
3.7, 3.10 and 4.4. The guidelines required the monitoring, inspection and evaluation of the
project by the provincial engineer if an infra-project and by the provincial agriculturist if it is a
livelihood project. Cailing further testified that, based on their audit, WIP appeared to be
headed by Zoleta, who was the daughter of Vice-Governor Constantino, and simultaneously
an Executive Assistant III in the latters office.

2. Luttian Tutoh, Region XII Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA),
testified on the certification3 she issued that WIP and Women in Development (WID) were
not registered cooperatives. Tutoh further testified that (1) the certification was based on the
listing prepared by the Assistant Regional Director; (2) the Certification was issued upon the
instruction of the CDA Chairman, who received an inquiry from the Office of the Ombudsman
on whether WIP and/or WID were cooperatives registered with the CDA; and (3) she had not
come across a registered cooperative named WIP.
3. Mary Ann Gadian, Bookbinder II, designated as Computer Operator III at the Office of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani from July 1993 to August 2002, who acted as state
witness, admitted in open court that she took part in the preparation and processing of a
disbursement voucher and its supporting documents involving a cash advance for WIP
sometime in 2002. Gadian, likewise, testified that she saw accused Constantino, Camanay,
Diaz, and Zoleta sign the documents, and she merely followed Zoletas directive and
instructions on the preparation of the disbursement voucher. Gadian further admitted
antedating and changing the date of a January 24, 2002 letter-request from WIP to January
7, 2002 in order to make the letter appear authentic.
4. Sheryll Desiree Jane Tangan, Local Legislative Staff at the Office of the Vice-Governor in
2002, who also acted as state witness, admitted in open court that, upon orders of Zoleta,
she helped prepare and process the request of WIP. Tangan disclosed that she was used to
signing for other persons, as instructed by Zoleta, whenever their office had legal
transactions; in this instance, she forged the signature of Melanie Remulta, the purported
secretary of WIP. Tangan then recounted that she accompanied petitioner Bahilidad to claim
and encash the check for WIP. After encashment, Bahilidad gave her a white envelope
containing the P20,000.00 cash. She noticed Bahalidads uneasiness. She was told by
Zoleta that Bahilidad was merely a dummy for that disbursement. Tangan gave the money to
Zoleta who told her that she would take care of Bahalidad.
The defense presented, as witnesses Bahilidad, Zoleta and Remulta. On the whole, the defense
denied the prosecutions charge of malversation. The witnesses testified that WIP and WID were
registered cooperatives. To support her contention that WIP and WID were legitimate cooperatives,
Bahilidad presented a Certification from Barangay Captain Jose Mosquera containing a list of the
supposed officers of these cooperatives. Bahilidad insisted that the amount of P20,000.00 that she
received from the Office of the Vice-Governor was, in turn, properly distributed by WIP as loans to its
members. Remulta corroborated Bahilidads story on this point. As for Zoleta, she completely denied
knowing Bahilidad.
After trial, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Bahilidad and Zoleta guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, and disposed, as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Amelia C. Zoleta ("Zoleta") and Violeta Bahilidad ("Bahilidad"), are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171[,] par[.] 2[,] and
Article 48 of the same Code and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 14 years[,] 8 months
and 1 day to 16 years[,] 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal. They also have to suffer

perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to pay back the Province of Sarangani
the amount of Php 20,000.00 plus interest on it computed from January 2002 until the full amount is
paid.
No pronouncement is made for or against Constantino, said accused having died during the
pendency of this case, his personal and pecuniary penalties and liabilities were totally extinguished
upon his death. This Court has already ordered the dismissal of the case against him.
Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the other accused, Teodorico Diaz
and Maria Camanay, the case as it pertains to them is in the meantime archived. It shall be revived
when the Court acquires jurisdiction over their person. Let an alias warrant of arrest be then issued
against them.
Costs against accused Zoleta and Bahilidad.4
Hence, this appeal by Bahilidad, questioning her conviction by the Sandiganbayan.
We find for petitioner.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great respect. But when there is
a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
the factual findings of the trial court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of an
accused, considering that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The Court must be
satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court, leading to an accuseds
conviction, must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in
the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. The
Sandiganbayan explained petitioners complicity in the crime, to wit:
The facts taken together would prove the existence of conspiracry. Zoleta, as president of an
inexistent association and a co-terminus employee at the office of her father, [accused Constantino,]
initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and proved the disbursement voucher.
There is no doubt that accused Constantino facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the
questioned voucher. Without the signatures of accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad, the
amount could not have been disbursed on that particular day. When the voucher with its supporting
documents was presented to accused Constantino, Diaz and Camanay for approval and signature,
they readily signed them without further ado, despite the lack of proper documentation and noncompliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the check, Bahilidad, and received the
amount. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signature of Remulta, all lead to
the conclusion that the accused conspired to defraud the government.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence and may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, which

are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal design of
another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.
The circumstances that Zoleta placed her initials on the voucher knowing that there was really no
WIP, that the other accused likewise signified their approval to the disbursement and allowed
payment, and that payee received and encashed the check out of the fund of the provincial
government instead of depositing it, shows that there was connivance between the accused. The
unavoidable conclusion is that the accused were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government
and to camouflage the defraudation by using a dummy organization as a payee. 5
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting
the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the
evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist,
it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product
of intentionality on the part of the cohorts. 6
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation
in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his coconspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over
the other co-conspirators.7 Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for
purposes of conviction.8
1avvphi1

In the instant case, we find petitioners participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral
certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing
or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No.
101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz
certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision;
signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and propriety of the
supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash advances; signature of Moises
Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is
available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the
disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioners signature as the payee. 9
The SAT reported that the check was payable to the alleged Treasurer, Bahalidad, instead of to
Women in Progress; that the check was encashed when it should have been for deposit only; and
that there was also failure of the provincial agriculturist to monitor and submit an evaluation report on
the project.10 Based on this SAT report, the Sandiganbayan particularly pointed to petitioners
indispensable participation in the crime, being the payee of the check, because without her
signature, the check would not have been encashed, and the FUNDS would not have been taken

from the coffers of the provincial government. Other than her being named as the payee, however,
there were no overt acts attributed to her adequate to hold her equally guilty of the offense proved.
There was no showing that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the requirements submitted
for the disbursement of the check. There was no evidence presented that she was instrumental to
the issuance of the check in favor of WIP, nor was there any showing that she interceded for the
approval of the check. Why the check was issued in her name and not in the name of WIP is beyond
cavil, but this was not incumbent upon her to question.
On being informed by Melanie Remulta that WIPs request for FINANCIAL assistance was granted,
petitioner went to the provincial capitol to claim the check, because the check was issued in her
name as the Treasurer of WIP. She later encashed the check and distributed the proceeds to the
different members of WIP. There were acknowledgment receipts dated February 7, 2002, signed by
the different members of the cooperative, in varying amounts of P3,000.00, P2,000.00 and P500.00,
all of which prove that the amount of P20,000.00 was disbursed for the benefit of the members of the
cooperative.11
The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should
have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was
issued in petitioners name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. The Disbursement
Voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) clearly states that she is the WIP treasurer, and the purpose of the
voucher is "to cash advance FINANCIAL assistance from grants and donations for Winds Malugon,
Sarangani as per supporting papers hereto attached." Petitioners action cannot, in itself, be
considered as specious. There was no showing that petitioner had foreknowledge of any irregularity
committed in the processing and disbursement of the check,12 or that the COA Rules required that
the check had to be deposited in the BANK first, or that an evaluation report from the provincial
agriculturist had to be submitted. Evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As
a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from
felonious responsibility.13
All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioners guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an
accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When
guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right. 14
Finally, we reiterate what we have long enjoined:
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in the
government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However, this
objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution passes the test of
moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated to uphold the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 145229

April 20, 2006

ROMEO L. DAVALOS, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before us is this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Sandiganbayan2promulgated on October 6, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 18003, convicting petitioner
Romeo L. Davalos, Sr., of the crime of malversation of public FUNDS and sentencing him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to suffer perpetual
special disqualification, and to pay a fine of P18,000.00 plus costs.
On September 7, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer Reynaldo L. Mendoza filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Information3 charging petitioner with malversation of public FUNDS , allegedly
committed, as follows:
That on or about January 14, 1988, or immediately prior and subsequent thereto, in Boac,
Marinduque, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being then the Supply
Officer of Boac, Marinduque, hence ACCOUNTABLE for public funds and property collected and
received by reason of his official position, with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there,
willfully and unlawfully take, misappropriate and embezzle from said funds the total amount of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00), to the damage and prejudice of the Government.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on January 25, 1993, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not Guilty" 4 and
waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Culled from the records are the following pertinent facts:
On January 14, 1988, petitioner Davalos, as supply officer of the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Marinduque, received from the provincial cashier a cash advance of P18,000.00 covered
by Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. SN-189833-N5 for the procurement of working tools for
a certain "NALGO" project. Petitioners receipt of the amount is evidenced by his signature
appearing in Disbursement Voucher No. 103-880-08.6
On May 5, 1988, petitioner received a demand letter7 from then Provincial Treasurer Timoteo
Magalang giving him until May 16, 1988 to submit a liquidation of the aforementioned P18,000.00
cash advance. This was followed by another letter 8 received by petitioner on May 26, 1988, giving
him this time up to May 31, 1999 to settle his ACCOUNT . But as in the first instance, the second
demand went unheeded.

In a letter dated August 16, 1990, the new Provincial Treasurer, Norma Cabungal, informed the
Provincial Prosecutor of Marinduque of the Commission on Audit's findings on the examination of the
cash ACCOUNTS of the province wherein petitioner was found to have an unsettled cash advance
in the amount of P18,000.00.
During the trial, petitioner testified being, at the time material to the case, the supply officer of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer of Marinduque. His functions, according to him, include taking care
of office properties and purchasing the necessary materials and supplies as needed by their office.
As such, he was also referred to as the procurement officer.
Petitioner admitted receiving the P18,000.00 cash advance intended to purchase working tools for
the "NALGO" project. He, however, denied allegations that he misappropriated the said amount.
He testified, too, that, albeit the purchase order (PO) for the said tools were already approved by the
provincial treasurer and the provincial auditor, the new administration decided to scrap the proposed
transaction. According to petitioner, following the assumption to office of Governor Luisito Reyes, his
office files containing the said PO and the requisition paper were taken and his services terminated
per Governor Reyes' Memorandum No. 88-639dated November 23, 1988. Said memorandum also
stated that "should you apply for the commutation/payment of your unused leave/vacation and
sick/credits, the same may be approved provided it is first applied/charged to your unliquidated cash
advance of P18,000.00." Pressing the point, petitioner stated that he then applied for his terminal
leave and other benefits through the following summary of vouchers which he personally prepared,
but were then disapproved:
1) Disbursement Voucher (DV) dated May 13, 1991, for the commutation payment of the 145
vacation leaves of absence with pay from May 1, 1988 to November 2, 1988 in the amount
of P7, 022.87;10
2) DV dated May 13, 1991, for the payment of accrued terminal leave from November 23,
1988 to January 10, 1990 in the amount of P14, 055.82; 11
3) DV dated May 13, 1991, for the payment of Cash Gift and Year End Benefit in the amount
ofP2,043.00;12 and
4) DV dated May 13, 1991, for the payment of Cost of Living Allowance from June 1, 1988 to
November 22, 1988 in the amount of P1,146.67.13
Petitioner then went on to declare that Gov. Reyes was out to harass him, hence the disapproval of
the above-mentioned vouchers. Despite his belief that he was then no longer obligated to liquidate
his P18,000.00 cash advance, petitioner nonetheless settled his ACCOUNT , as evidenced by OR
No. 198701814 dated January 27, 1995. To prove his point, petitioner presented an undated letter of
the provincial ACCOUNTANT addressed to the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan stating,
among other things, that he had already settled his cash advance of P18,000.0015
When confronted with Governor Reyes' Memorandum regarding his summary dismissal from the
service for abandoning his post for four (4) months since July 15, 1988, and for other acts of

misconduct and other offenses, petitioner merely denied all those charges. As to the charge of
abandonment, petitioner argued that he was entitled to vacation leave and that he had filed an
application for commutation of his leave from May 1, 1988 up to November 22, 1988. He also
brushed aside the charge of malversation and declared that he had already been relieved of
his ACCOUNTABILITIES by the Commission on Audit. He, however, admitted receiving from the
provincial treasurer the two demand letters earlier adverted to dated May 5, 1988 and May 26, 1988
requiring him to submit his liquidation of the P18,000.00 cash advance on the dates respectively
indicated therein.
On re-direct examination, petitioner denied abandoning his office, having, according to him, filed his
application for leave of absence covering the period from May 1, 1988 up to November 22, 1988.
On re-cross examination, petitioner testified being sick during the entire period covered by his leave
application. As regards the purchase of the working tools for which he received the P18,000.00 cash
advance, petitioner declared that he actually made a down payment of P11,000.00. He did not, he
added, return the balance ofP7,000.00 at the time he received his termination paper because he
relied on Governor Reyes' Memorandum purportedly allowing him to offset the P18,000.00 from the
terminal benefits due him. He later stated in his testimony, however, that the reason he did not give
back the balance of P7,000.00 was because he wanted to return the whole amount of P18,000.00.
Petitioner likewise testified that the receipt evidencing the down payment of P11,000.00 for the tools
bought was lost; that he went back to the seller in Manila to secure a copy of the lost receipt and
brought the tools with him in order to return the same, but the irked seller wanted him to maintain the
transaction. As a result, he was able to recover only half of the down payment or P5,500.00. The
other P5,500.00 was retained by the seller to answer for the damages suffered by the latter.
Consequently, he has in his possession P12,500.00 (the remaining original balance of P7,000.00
plus the recovered amount of P5,500.00).
On June 30, 2000, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing him accordingly.
Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused ROMEO L. DAVALOS, SR. GUILTY of
the crime of malversation of public funds defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code and, taking into account the existence of a mitigating circumstance, sentencing the said
accused to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto,
including perpetual special disqualification; (c) pay a fine of Eighteen Thousand (P18,000) ; and (d)
pay the costs.
Hence, this petition.
The crime of malversation of public funds is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, viz:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or
shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing fund or property to personal uses.
The elements essential for the conviction of an accused under the above penal provision are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;

1avvphil.net

2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office;
3. That the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
There can hardly be no dispute about the presence of the first three elements. Petitioner is a public
officer occupying the position of a supply officer at the Office of the Provincial Engineer of
Marinduque. In that capacity, he receives money or property belonging to the provincial government
for which he is bound to account. It is the last element, i.e., whether or not petitioner really has
misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself on.
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when
demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct
evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary16 as long as the accused
cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts.
In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217, supra, of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie
evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to personal uses. The presumption is, of
course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify
any likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be
at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when
the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is

completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at all. 17 In this case,
however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt.
Petitioner does not at all dispute the fact that he did receive a cash advance of P18,000.00 for the
purchase of tools for the "NALGO" project. He also admitted receiving the demand letters of the
provincial treasurer for him to submit a liquidation of the cash advance on two occasions, which he
failed to do. This notwithstanding, he persists on arguing that he cannot be convicted of malversation
of public funds. He harps on Memorandum No. 88-63 issued by then Marinduque Governor Reyes
that he can offset his unliquidated cash advance of P18,000.00 from the commutation of his unused
vacation and sick leave credits to justify his failure to liquidate his cash advance. He also invites
attention to the fact that, even before the approval of his application for the commutation of his leave
credits, he already paid his cash advance of P18,000.00 on January 27, 1995.
Petitioners attempt at rationalization for his failure to liquidate is unacceptable. Memorandum No.
88-63 merely informed petitioner that his application for commutation may be granted provided that
the commutated amount is first applied to his unliquidated cash advance of P18,000.00. Nowhere in
the said memorandum did it state that he is exempted from submitting his liquidation of the same
cash advance. As it is, petitioner failed to liquidate and return his cash advance despite repeated
demands. He was able to return the said amount only on January 27, 1995, that is, after almost
seven (7) years from the last demand. His declaration about making a down payment ofP11,000.00
for the alleged purchase of some tools pursuant to the requisition of the local government is
gratuitous at best. There is nothing on record to support his claim and there is nothing to show that
he turned over the possession of the said tools to the government. Moreover, he admitted retaining
or keeping the balance of P7,000.00 (or P12,500.00 as he later claimed). The only logical conclusion
then is that he misappropriated and personally benefited from the cash advance of P18,000.00. In
Kimpo vs. Sandiganbayan,18 we held:
In malversation of public FUNDS , payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the
offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a
mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender.
Here, the return of the said amount cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance analogous to
voluntary surrender considering that it took petitioner almost seven (7) years to return the amount.
Petitioner has not advanced a plausible reason why he could not liquidate his cash advance which
was in his possession for several years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan in its Criminal Case No. 18003 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto and this petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G. R. No. 149613. August 9, 2005]
PAMELA CHAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Pamela Chan seeks a reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision of August 28, 2001 finding
her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
In November 1989, petitioner was hired as ACCOUNTING Clerk II and assigned at the Regional
Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City, discharging the function of Cashier
or Collection Officer.
Petitioner went on leave from December 7 to 27, 1995. On December 27, 1995 Josephine Daclan,
the auditor from the Commission on Audit (COA) assigned to the NBI, conducted a routine audit
examination of the ACCOUNTABILITY of petitioner. Petitioner being then on leave, the audit was
conducted upon Delza Bas (Bas) who was officially designated by the Regional Director to act as

Collection Officer during her absence. The auditor found that all collections for the period beginning
December 7, 1995 up to the date of the audit, December 27, 1995, were ACCOUNTED for, as
reflected in her Cash Report dated December 27, 1995 signed by Bas.
On January 24, 1996, the same auditor conducted another audit examination. Since petitioner had
already reported for work, the audit covered the period beginning June 15, 1995. The auditor found a
shortage ofP290,228.00 in petitioners cash ACCOUNTABILITY which was reflected in her Cash
Report dated January 24, 1996 on which petitioner affixed her signature. The auditor thus issued
a demand letter to petitioner to restitute the missing funds and explain the shortage. In a parallel
move, she sent a memorandum to the Regional Director requesting that petitioner be immediately
relieved of her assignment as Collecting Officer. Acting on the memorandum, the Regional Director
issued a Special Order replacing petitioner with Gloria Alvarez effective March 1, 1996.
Since it is a standard operating procedure of the COA to conduct an audit examination whenever
an ACCOUNTABLE officer is replaced, an examination was conducted on March 1, 1996. As in the
recently concluded audit, the period covered was from June 15, 1995 up to the date of the audit,
March 1, 1996. The auditor found that petitioner had a cumulative shortage of
cash ACCOUNTABILITY in the amount ofP333,360.00 which was reflected in her Cash
Examination Report dated March 1, 1996, signed by petitioner. Again the auditor issued a demand
letter to petitioner requiring her to explain the shortage incurred, to which petitioner did not respond.
The COA Region VII thus filed a complaint against petitioner for Malversation of Public Funds in the
amount ofP333,360.00 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas) on April 10, 1996. By
Resolution dated February 18, 1997, said office found probable cause against petitioner and
recommended the filing of the corresponding information against her.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsmans Resolution of
February 18, 1997 and for Re-investigation of the case against her on the ground that the entire
amount subject thereof should not be charged solely to her but also to Bas since the amount
consisted, so she claimed, in part of "vales" received by Bas from her and of FUNDS collected by
Bas whenever she acted as collecting officer. The motion was denied by Order dated July 28,
19971 bearing the approval of the Deputy Ombudsman, which order contained the following
recommendation of the Graft Investigation Officer assigned to the case:
This office had ordered COA on June 24, 1996 to conduct a thorough re-audit of the cash
and ACCOUNT of respondent and Delsa Bas covering the period from June 15, 1995 to March 1,
1996 to determine their respective cash ACCOUNTABILITIES .
In his letter-reply dated August 28, 1996 COA Director Santos M. Alquizalas intimated that a re-audit
is not allowed under COA Memorandum 87-511 dated October 20, 1987. As far as COA is
concerned, the audit examinations conducted by State Auditor III Josephine O. Daclan on December
27, 1995, January 24, 1996 and March 1, 1996 is deemed complete, thorough and based on
documentary evidence.

Finding no cogent reason nor sufficient justification to disturb the [February 18, 1997] resolution of
this office sought to be reconsidered, it is respectfully recommended that the instant motion be
denied for lack of merit.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner was thus indicted before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for Malversation of
Public FUNDS allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of March, 1996 and for sometime prior thereto, at Cebu City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Collecting Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), CEVRO, Cebu
City, in such capacity and while in the performance of her official function was in the custody and
possession of public funds, in the total amount of P333,360.00, for which she is ACCOUNTABLE
by reason of the duties of her office, with deliberate intent and with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the said amount of P333,360.00 Philippine Currency, and despite
notice and demands made upon her to ACCOUNT for said public funds, she has failed and refused
and up to the present time still fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
amount aforestated.2 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner at once filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance
and/or Enforcement of a Warrant of Arrest on October 8, 1997 which was denied by the trial court,
Branch 5 of the Cebu RTC, by Order dated October 17, 1997: 3
xxx
The records show that the accused did not submit her counter-affidavit during the preliminary
investigation despite the order of the Ombudsman. She did not also attend the clarificatory
investigation. Thus, the matter sought by herein accused in her Motion For Reinvestigation was
available to her during the preliminary investigation or in the clarificatory investigation.
During the hearing of accused Motion in the afternoon of October 17, 1997 as originally scheduled,
Director Virginia Santiago appeared and she opposed the Motion branding it as a dilatory ploy of the
accused. She argued that accused was already afforded ample chance to controvert the evidence of
the prosecution but she did not make use of it.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby reconsiders its earlier verbal order granting
the accused Motion for Reinvestigation by denying it in view of the objection of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman (Visayas). If the accused believes that she has strong evidence in her favor,
the better trial technique is to go to trial and not to educate his opponent.
xxx
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty."

During the pendency of the case before the trial court, Bas remitted the amount of P60,787.00, while
petitioner remitted P89,760.82 which, to her, satisfied her obligations to the government in relation to
the present case, the balance of P182,812.00 after deducting the total remittances being chargeable
to Bas.4
By Judgment dated June 18, 1999,5 the trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged, with the mitigating circumstance that she had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
As the trial court credited petitioners claim "that during the preliminary investigation, she was able to
remitP150,000.00 to the government" and noted that such claim was not denied by the prosecution,
it held that she had an unremitted balance of P183,360.00. The trial court accordingly sentenced
petitioner to
x x x an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to twelve (12) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed, which is
P183,360.00.
On appeal, the Sandiganbayan, by Decision dated July 4, 2001, 6 affirmed the conviction of petitioner.
It found, however, that the amount totally remitted was P150,547.82, not P150,000.00 as found by
the trial court, hence, it held petitioner to be liable for the unremitted balance of P182,812.18.
The Sandiganbayan accordingly modified the penalty as follows:
x x x imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and
pay the government P182,812.18, the amount malversed, as well as a fine equal to the said amount
malversed by the accused.
In the present petition for review, petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan to have erred:
1. . . . IN NOT UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED OF DUE
PROCESS BY NOT ALLOWING A RE-EXAMINATION AND A RE-AUDIT OF THE ALLEGED
SHORTAGE IN THE AMOUNT OF P333,360.00.
2. . . . IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE EXAMINATION AND AUDIT REPORT PREPARED AND
CONDUCTED BY THE EXAMINING AUDITOR IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
3. . . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BY HOLDING THE ACCUSED LIABLE FOR THE
UNREMITTED COLLECTIONS OF ANOTHER ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER DESIGNATED BY THE
SUPERIOR OF THE ACCUSED.7
Claiming that her right to due process was violated by the denial of her plea for the conduct of a reaudit of her accountabilities, petitioner cites Tinga v. People8 wherein this Court observed:

By that denial of the re-audit, petitioner was, as claimed by him, not given the right to be fully heard
before the charge was filed against him at a time when records were still available and past
transactions still fresh in the memory of all concerned. He was given the chance to defend himself
before the Sandiganbayan, yes, but as said Court itself observed "Tinga continued to pursue his
quest for a re-audit in his honest belief that he had not malversed any government funds. In the
process, many but not all disbursement vouchers were located in the office of the Municipal
treasurer of Bogo, Cebu, x x x." Perhaps, if he had been re-audited and his accountability reviewed,
a different result may have been produced.9 (Underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted observation of this Court in Tinga came about after considering that
[t]he many errors subsequently discovered in the audit examination, even by the Sandiganbayan,
raise the strong probability that had the re-audit/review he had requested been accorded him, the
remaining balance could have been satisfactorily accounted for.10
In the later case of Quibal v. Sandiganbayan11 in which the therein petitioners cited Tinga in arguing
that the Sandiganbayan violated their right to due process when it disallowed a re-examination and
re-audit of their accountabilities, this Court held:
x x x Petitioners' reliance on the Tinga case is misplaced. In said case, we ruled that Tinga was
denied due process when the Commission on Audit refused to conduct a re-evaluation of the
accountabilities of Tinga. The ruling was based on the Court's finding that COA's evaluation of
Tinga's accountabilities was replete with errors x x x12 (Underscoring supplied)
The burden of proof that the subject audit reports contain errors sufficient to merit a re-audit lies with
petitioner. What degree of error suffices, there is no hard and fast rule. While COA Memorandum 87511 dated October 20, 198713 (which, as reflected in the above-quoted Deputy Ombudsmans Order
of July 28, 1997,14 was cited by COA Director Alquizalas when he opposed petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation before the Ombudsman) recognizes that a re-audit may be
conducted in certain instances, it does not specify or cite what those instances are. The pertinent
portion of the said Memorandum15 is reproduced hereunder:
xxx
It has been observed that some officials of this Commission have been authorizing the re-audit of
the cash and accounts of accountable officers who were earlier found short in their cash
accountabilities. Although the conduct thereof may be justified in certain instances on meritorious
grounds, such practice has to be controlled by this Commission in order to protect the interest of the
government.
It is stressed that the audit, conducted on the cash and accounts of accountable officers in the
government is presumed to be complete, thorough and based on documentary evidence and
established auditing and accounting procedures and is done to determine the correctness of the
cash accountabilities of an accountable officer at a particular time. Any accountable officer or
interested person who disputes the propriety of a cash examination or the accuracy of the result

thereof may just have to ventilate the issues raised by him to the proper body or tribunal where the
case is filed and treat the documents in support thereof as evidence for his defense.
In the interest of justice and in order not to delay the prosecution of cases filed with the Tanodbayan,
any request for a re-audit/re-examination of the cash and accounts of accountable officers who were
earlier found short in their cash accountabilities should be submitted to the COA Chairman for
approval, except when the Order, not merely request, comes from the Sandiganbayan.
x x x (Underscoring supplied)
In the absence of specific guidelines then the question of whether re-audit is warranted must be
determined in each case on the basis of equity. In Tinga, petitioners plea for a re-audit was, it bears
repeating, clearly meritorious in view of the finding that the audit involved therein was replete with
errors.
While petitioner alleges that there was a discrepancy in the audit as the reported collections,
specifically for the period of February 12-16, 1996, were P310.00 less than the actual collections
reflected in the receipts,16 said discrepancy, if true, is too minimal, as correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, to merit a re-audit considering the amount of shortage incurred.
Petitioner draws attention to the conflicting findings of the COA, the trial court, and the
Sandiganbayan regarding her total liability as indication that a re-audit was called for. As against the
amount of P333,360.00 demanded by the COA, the trial court found her total liability to
be P183,360.00 and the Sandiganbayan found it to beP182,812.18. These inconsistent findings
were not due to any error in the audits, however. The liability of petitioner as found by the trial court
and the Sandiganbayan was lower than that found by the COA because there were remittances
made while the case was already pending which were deducted from petitioners accountability. On
the other hand, the inconsistency between the findings of the trial court and the Sandiganbayan was
due to their different computations as to the actual amount of remittances, not due to any error in the
audits.
Parenthetically, the existence of any discrepancy of a mathematical nature is belied by petitioners
own assertions. On direct examination, she testified as follows:
ATTY. TORIBIO
Q Now, how much is the total financial or monetary accountabilities of Mrs. Bas adding the
unremitted collections and the vales?
A The total amount is P243,599.00.
Q Now, did Mrs. Bas subsequently make any remittance or partial restitution of her financial
accountabilities?
A After the filing of this case, she made a total deposit of P60,787.00.

Q Where is your proof of that?

A The remittance advices are in the office.
Q What about you, did you make any remittance to the government?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what amount?
A The total amount is P89,761.00.
Q Do you have still any financial or monetary obligation to the government?
A No, sir.
Q After you have remitted this amount of P89,761.00?
A No, sir.
Q So what was the amount left which was unremitted and you now say it is the FINANCIAL
obligation of Mrs. Bas?
A It is P182,812.00.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, by petitioners own reckoning, her liability before any remittances were made was P89,761.00
and that of Bas was P243,599.00. Notably, the total of these amounts, which is P333,360.00, is the
same amount of shortage, as computed by the auditor and reflected in the information.
Petitioner additionally alleges that another error of a different nature was committed. She claims that
the auditor failed to distinguish her liability and that of Bas, which is contrary to law. She thus argues
that Bas should have been charged for the FUNDS actually collected by her everytime she acted
as collecting officer in her stead, as well as for the amounts which she (Bas) received as "vales" from
her.
That the auditor charged to petitioners ACCOUNT the unremitted amounts actually collected by
Bas is not denied by the auditor, she reasoning that only petitioner was the officially designated
Collecting Officer. Thus the auditor declared:
ATTY. TORIBIO
xxx
Q: What I am asking you is whether you actually know that some other person like Bas was
designated as collecting officer?

A: I have no concerned (sic) about that especially if there is no designation of other collecting officer.
Q: But you know from the receipts that Bas was also collecting for the bureau because you are
familiar with her signature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So you admitted now that you know that Bas was acting collecting officer?
A: She was collecting but she is not properly designated. How can I account that collection to
her when she is not recognize (sic) as ACCOUNTABLE officer.
Q: Did you send a memo to that effect to the regional director advising him to put an end to that
practice?
A: I talked to the regional director but he said there is lack of personnel.
COURT:
Q: Was your advise to Atty. Villarin in writing or memorandum?
A: I told him verbally.
Q: Why did you not reduce it into writing?
A: I [f]ound it very repetitive in my part because I already made it official in my audit report.
ATTY. TORIBIO
Q: You have established the fact that even if you discovered shortages committed by the
acting officer, you did not find that acting officer responsible?
A: No, sir. That is why I did not file also a case against the accused. I only made proper
report.18(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner claims, however, that Bas was officially designated in writing as collection officer on the
following dates when she was on maternity leave: (1) October to December 1990, (2) February to
March 1992, and (3) July 19 to September, 1995; and that Bas was verbally designated on certain
occasions by the Regional Director as shown in his July 14, 1997 Certification reading:
This is to certify that during the period February 12-13; 15 and 16, 1996, I have officially
authorized/designated Mrs. DELZA BAS, Clerk III, to act temporarily as Collecting Officer of this
office, in lieu of PAMELA A. CHAN, ACCOUNTING Clerk II & Collecting Officer-designate, who was
then on leave of absence.
x x x19 (Underscoring supplied)

Granted that Bas was given official designation during all the times that she acted as collection
officer, petitioners liability is not, by that fact alone, mitigated. Petitioner could still be held liable for
the amount unremitted by Bas if it can be shown that the latter was under her supervision. As held
in Office of the Court Administrator v. Soriano:20
x x x Amando Soriano was the Officer-in-Charge and ACCOUNTABLE Officer of the defunct Court
of First Instance, Iriga City, Branch XXXIV and as such, he was responsible for all the collections
made by the court. Any loss or shortage resulting from non-remittance, unlawful deposit or
misapplication thereof, whether he has a hand or not, shall be for his account. It is not an excuse
that his designated collection clerk was the one who failed to remit the questioned amount on time
because it is incumbent upon him to exercise the strictest supervision on the person he designated,
otherwise, he would suffer the consequences of the acts of his designated employee through
negligence. In short, by failing to exercise strict supervision on respondent Mila Tijam, he could be
liable for malversation through negligence.21 (Underscoring supplied)
While, in the immediately cited case, it was the ACCOUNTABLE officer himself who made the
designation, unlike in the present case, command responsibility should apply in every case where
the accountable officer has, in fact, the duty to supervise the designated person. That petitioner had
the duty to supervise Bas, she herself so testified:
COURT:
xxx
Q Was there a procedure that after your leave when you returned to work you have to go over
the collection of Bas?
A Yes, sir.
Q So that is the procedure?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that you have to report to the Regional Director that this is the amount collected by
Mrs. Bas when you were absent?
A No, I dont report that to the Director.
Q So, you will not make any written accounting of the amount collected by Bas during your
absence?
A I do it for my ownself. I confer with Bas.
Q Why are you doing that?
A I have to check if she has remitted the amount collected.

Q You are doing that because it was your duty to check the collection of Bas?
A Yes, sir.
Q In short, you were checking the amount collected by Mrs. Bas because you were the one
designated as Acting Cashier?
A Yes, sir.
Q Not Bas?
A Yes, sir.
Q When Bas acted as cashier or collection officer in your absence, she was under you
insofar as Acting Cashier is concerned?
A Yes, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The auditor thus committed no error when she charged to petitioners account the shortage in the
collections actually done by Bas.
Petitioner, nonetheless, could have shown that she was not remiss in her supervision of Bas, by way
of rebutting the disputable presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal use.
Petitioner, however, failed to do so. Not only did she omit to report the shortages of Bas to the proper
authority upon her discovery thereof; she even practically admitted to having assisted Bas in
covering up such shortages. Thus she declared:
ATTY. URSAL
Q- Now I want to show to you these remittances for collections on November 7 and 9, 1995, and for
collection onNovember 15, 1995 which corresponds (sic) to P15,355 and P15,465.00. I want you to
take a look on these remittances and tell me whether, and tell this Honorable Court whether this
Miss Bas did actually remitted (sic) the collections that she made during those dates, that is
remittance Advise 9607 and 9608?
A- Yes, she made these remittances but she borrowed my collections for that day when she
deposited this.
COURT:
Q- What do you mean by she borrowed?

A- My collection sir, she borrowed it from me for her to be able to depose (sic) for these dates.
COURT:
Q- In other words, she could not deposit her previous collection?
A- No, she did not.
COURT:
Q- So, thats why it would appear that what she was depositing was your money collection
she borrowed the money from you?
A- Yes, she only deposited this by January, 1996.
COURT:
Q- And you allowed that?
A- Yes, I allowed this because she promised to pay me the following day but she did not
comply with her promise.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner was thus not merely lax in supervising Bas; she actively assisted her in concealing her
shortages to the extent of lending her public funds for that purpose. Significantly, petitioner
acknowledged the illegality of her own act.
ATTY. URSAL:
xxx
Q- Now, may we know if you have that authority for you to lend this money to [Bas]?
A- No, I dont have that authority but although it is not legal anyway, but then it has been the
usual practice at the office for some of the employees to borrow and to return them
immediately but in the case of Miss Bas she did not comply with her promise.
COURT:
Q- So, who told you it is not illegal?
A- I know it is not proper.
COURT:
Q- Who told you it is not illegal?

A- Its not legal sir, I said, its not legal.

COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY.URSAL:
Q- So, are you aware of the extent of your responsibility as cashier that your prime duty is to
safeguard the funds of the agency and that any shortage of these funds is your
accountability?
A- Yes, sir. I do not think of anything because I trusted my co-employee that she will not let
me down and then she will not put me in trouble.24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To make matters worse, petitioner did not only lend Bas those amounts given on November 7, 9, and
15, 1995. She admittedly extended "vales" to her in the amount of P112,089.18, and to others, also
out of public funds.
ATTY. URSAL:
Q- Now, you said earlier that the amount of P112,118.00 something like that, was exactly made by
Miss Bas as vales, what do you mean by vales?
A- Vale, she will make IOUs.
Q- So in effect, you have extended some sort of credit or loan to Miss Bas out of the fund of
your collection?
A- Yes, because at that time the one who will borrow will return except Miss Bas.
COURT:
Q- Did you charge interest?
A- No, sir.
COURT:
Q- Are you telling the court that it is the practice of your office?
A- Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q- And is it with the knowledge of the director?

A- Sometimes the director himself will borrow and he will return immediately.
COURT:
Q- You mean, the director will borrow your collections?
A- Yes, but he will return immediately.
COURT:
Q- Are you sure of that?
A- Yes, sir. 25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The granting of "vales" had been held in Meneses v. Sandiganbayan26 to be contrary to law,
however:
The grant of loans through the "vale" system is a clear case of an ACCOUNTABLE officer
consenting to the improper or unauthorized use of public FUNDS by other persons, which is
punishable by the law. To tolerate such practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to
conduct a lending operation with the use of public funds.
There is no law or regulation allowing ACCOUNTABLE officers to extend loans to anyone against
"vales" or chits given in exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, the General Auditing Office
(now the Commission on Audit) time and again, through repeated office memoranda and rulings had
warned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by any disbursing officer because such
transactions are really forms of loans (Memorandum Circular No. 570, June 24, 1968, General
Auditing Office).27 (Underscoring supplied)
The alleged acquiescence of petitioners superior, even if true, is not a valid defense. As Ilogon v.
Sandiganbayan28 teaches:
The fact that petitioner did not personally use the missing funds is not a valid defense and will not
exculpate him from his criminal liability. And as aptly found by respondent Sandiganbayan, "the fact
that (the) immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced to the practice of
giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements". 29 (Underscoring
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 132926

July 20, 2001

ELVIRA AGULLO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
Charged with, tried and convicted in Criminal Case No. 13579 for malversation of public FUNDS ,
herein petitioner Elvira Agullo, erstwhile Disbursing Officer of the then Ministry of Public Works and

Highways (MPWH), Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte, now comes before the High
Court to assail the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 16 March 1992, and its
Resolution dated 11 March 1998, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration 2 but reducing the
penalty imposed on petitioner as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Elvira S. Agullo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public FUNDS , defined and penalized under Article
217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. [There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, no evidence having been adduced respecting partial or full restitution of the
amount malversed,] Considering the absence of any aggravating circumstances and
her full restitution by salary deduction, the accused Elvira S. Agullo should be, as she is,
hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of, from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of PRISION MAYOR, as MINIMUM; to [EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL] SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL, AS MAXIMUM, with the
accessory penalties of the law; to pay a fine in the sum of P26,404.26 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer the penalty of Perpetual Special Disqualification
and to pay the costs." (Emphasis ours)
In an information3 dated 30 September 1988, herein petitioner was charged with the crime of
malversation of public FUNDS , committed as follows:
"That on or about the period October 22, 1985 to July 14, 1986, inclusive or within said dates
in the Municipality of Palo, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the disbursing officer of then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways,Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte,
charged with the official custody of public funds thus paid, collected and received by her in
her official capacity, and by reason of which duties she is ACCOUNTABLE thereof, taking
advantage of her official position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
convert and misappropriate for her own personal use and benefit the public funds she had in
her possession in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand Four Hundred Four Pesos and 26/100
(P26,404.26), belonging to the government of the Republic of the Philippines, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter in the aforestated amount.
"Contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, herein petitioner Agullo, assisted by counsel de officio Antonio Manzano, pleaded
not guilty4 to the charge, after which the Sandiganbayan conducted a pre-trial on 11 February 1990
and issued the following Pre-Trial Order:5
"When this case was called for pre-trial, the accused personally and through her counsel
Atty. Antonio Manzano of the CLAO readily entered into stipulations insofar as her official
position in government as well as the fact of audit of her ACCOUNTS are concerned,
including therewith the admission that, in all respects the Cash Production Notice and the
Examination of her Cash and ACCOUNTS which the government marked as Exhibit A was
faithful reproduction of the original, and insofar as the contents thereof are concerned, are

correct. The accused likewise admitted that she had received a letter of demand, said letter
dated July 14, 1986 marked as exhibit B. With this the accused stated that herdefense was
premised on her having suffered a stroke on October 22, 1985 as a result of which the
amount subject of the shortage found in her audit had been lost.
"The accused also indicated that not only had she immediately replied to the letter by various
communications by her or in her behalf protesting the withholding of various amounts due
her by way of salaries on the premise that the loss of the amount subject matter of the
Information was not chargeable to her as a personal liability. The accused has likewise
informed the Court that prior to the incident on October 22, 1985, she had been audited on
May 27, 1985 and, after the incident, on December 23, 1985 although she concedes
she was also audited on July 14, 1986.
"Considering that all the documents necessary for the defense of the accused are still to be
organized, Atty. Manzano is given ten (10) days from today within which to prepare a
proposal for stipulations of facts and, if that is not possible, at least a complete outline of his
case together with the marking of the documents he wishes to present which the prosecution
might not admit as to the substance thereof though the genuineness of the documents
presented might be conceded.
"With the above, the prosecution may now rest its case and the presentation of the evidence
for the defense may take place on April 5 and 6, and May 17 and 18, 1990, at 8:00 o clock in
the morning and 2:00 o clock in the afternoon.
"The setting for tomorrow is cancelled.
"SO ORDERED." (Emphasis ours)
As borne by the records, the charge of malversation against petitioner germinated from an audit
conducted on 14 July 1986 by Ignacio Gerez, Auditing Examiner III, as a result of which a
P26,404.26 cash shortage was discovered on petitioners ACCOUNTABILITY . On the same date,
Gerez informed petitioner of said finding of cash shortage and required the latter, through a letter of
demand,6 to "produce immediately the missing FUNDS ." Further, petitioner was required to submit
within 72 hours from receipt a written explanation of the cash shortage.
In a letter7 dated 25 August 1986, addressed to the Resident Auditor of the MPWH, petitioner
complied with the directive by explaining that the cash shortage was, in effect, due to a "fortuitous
event" where the amount could have been stolen/taken by somebody on the day she suffered a
stroke on 22 October 1985, near the corner of Juan Luna Street and Imelda Avenue, Tacloban City.
In the course of the pre-trial, petitioner Agullo conceded the fact of audit and admitted 8 the findings in
the Report of Cash Examination and the facts set forth in the Letter of Demand. In effect, she
admitted the fact of shortage in the amount stated in the Information. Notwithstanding, petitioner
Agullo, at all stages of the criminal indictment, persistently professed her innocence of the charge
and categorically denied having malversed or converted the public funds in question for her own
personal use or benefit.9

With petitioners admission of the fact of cash shortage, the prosecution then rested its case. 10 For its
part, the defense, in its bid to overturn the presumption of malversation and shatter the prima facie
evidence of conversion, offered the testimony of the following witnesses: petitioner Elvira Agullo;
Rene Briones Austero, Cashier III of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Region VIII; and Engracia Camposano-Camaoy, Barangay Captain of Hinabuyan, Dagame, Leyte.
During trial, the defense offered to present the testimony of witness Austero for the purpose of
proving that an amount equal to P26,722.0511 was withheld from the salary and other compensation
of petitioner Agullo. Further, the defense offered the testimony of witness Barangay Captain Camaoy
for the purpose of establishing that "the accused suffered a heart attack (stroke) on October 22,
1985; that on June 30, 1986, the accused informed her that the accused lost the money for which
she (was being) subjected to criminal prosecution x x x; and that between October 22, 1985 and
June 30, 1986, there had been no demand upon the accused to produce the money for which she
was declared short."12
Additionally, the defense presented the following documentary evidence, 13 all of which were admitted
by the Sandiganbayan:
"Exhibit 1 Letter dated 25 August 1986 by accused to the Resident Auditor MPWH,
Regional Office No. 8, Candahug, Palo, Leyte;
"Exhibit 2 Letter dated 22 August 1987 by accused to Engr. Alfredo P. Torres, Regional
Director;
"Exhibit 3 Medical Certificate dated 05 August 1986, issued by Dr. Juan T. Abando, M.D.,
St. Pauls Hospital, Tacloban City;
"Exhibit 3-A Verified Medical Certificate dated 19 January 1986, issued by Dr. Juan
Abando, notarized on page 02;
"Exhibit 4 Letter dated 26 December 1986 by accused to the Regional Director;
"Exhibit 5 Letter dated 19 February 1987 to the Regional Director by Atty. Eric T. De
Veyra;
"Exhibit 6 Letter dated 15 April 1987 by accused to the Regional Director;
"Exhibit 7 Letter dated 01 September 1987 of Director Alfredo Torres of DPWH to the
Regional Director COA;
"Exhibit 8 Letter of Accused dated 26 November 1987;
"Exhibit 9 Affidavit of accused Elvira Agullo;
"Exhibit 10 Affidavit of witness Engracia Camaoy;

"Exhibit 11 Letter-Request dated 04 May 1988 of accused to the Regional Director;

"Exhibit 12 Certification by Mauricio Pacatang;
"Exhibit 13 Protest of accused against the appointment of Sylvia de la Rosa;
"Exhibit 14 Letter dated 25 February 1987 to the Manager, Employees Compensation
Department, GSIS, Metro Manila;
"Exhibit 15 Initial Approval of the Employees Compensation Department, GSIS;
"Exhibit 16 Hospitalization Claim for payment of accused;
"Exhibit 17 Report of Injury signed and approved by Pablo P. Burgos, Regional
Engineering Coordinator and Head of Office;
"Exhibit 18 Certification issued by PNB Tacloban, thru its Asst. Manager B.L. Telmo;
"Exhibit 19 Memorandum to accused dated 02 April 1984;
"Exhibit 20 Memorandum dated 05 May 1990."
At the witness stand, petitioner Agullo unrelentingly maintained her innocence and vehemently
denied the accusation against her. Thus, according to petitioner, in the morning of 21 October 1985,
she reported for work and prepared an inventory of her cash accountability14 as Disbursing
Officer15 of the MPWH Regional Office, Candahug, Palo, Leyte. On the same day, petitioner received
around thirteen (13) checks in the form of cash advances in her name totaling P26,076.87,16 which
amount represented salaries of MPWH officials and employees.
Around 1:30 PM, petitioner, together with Benjamin Veridiano, driver of MPWH Finance and
Management Division, proceeded to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) Tacloban City Branch, on
board the MPWH official vehicle, to encash the aforesaid checks. Upon encashment of the checks,
petitioner then put the money inside a PNB envelope which she further placed in her bag. From the
PNB, petitioner-- who boarded the official vehicle driven by Veridiano for the purpose of proceeding
further to the MPWH Regional Officefelt dizziness, chest pain and nausea. As a result of her
condition, petitioner Agullo requested driver Veridiano to drop her off at petitioners residence located
at 109 Juan Luna Street-- about half a kilometer away from the PNB. 17
In the morning of the following day, 22 October 1985, petitioner upon realizing that it was then the
third-week payday of the month, and burdened with the thought that she failed to give the salary of
the permanent employees strove to report for work despite her weak physical condition. Petitioner
Agullo testified that she left her residence alone and brought with her the bag containing the money
which she encashed the previous day from the PNB. 18
Upon leaving the house with the money inside her bag, she walked the stretch of Juan Luna Street
and was able to reach almost the corner of Juan Luna and Imelda Avenue 19 a distance of around 50

meters away from her residence20 when she was stricken with deep chest pain21 and experienced
dizziness; her vision blurred and "the right part of (her) body (became) heavy" to the point that she
"could not move anymore." At this point, she collapsed and lost consciousness. 22
In the afternoon of the same day, she found herself in a hospital bed of St. Pauls Hospital located
about a block away from petitioners residence. Upon inquiry, she was informed that a certain Metro
Tacloban Aide by the name of Teresa Lorenzo came to her rescue when she fainted, assisted in
rushing her to the hospital, and informed her family about Agullos dire condition and the unfortunate
event that befell her.23 Petitioner was confined in St. Pauls Hospital for over a week from 22
October 1985 to 01 November 198524 - under the care of her attending physician, Dr. Juan Abando,
who issued the corresponding Medical Certificate pregnant with the following findings:
"X X X Hypertension complicated with Cerebro Vascular Accident (CVA), Rt. Hemiparesis
and Urinary Infection.
"Condition started apparently 20 hrs. before admission as moderate headache and
dizziness, associated with blurring of vision and nausea. Fifteen hrs. prior to admission, she
felt weakness of her right half of her body and slurring of speech. Had history of high blood
pressure taken last April 1985. B/P= 190/120. On admission B/P= was 230/120; PR=
83/min.; RR= 20/min.
"Pertinent findings: conscious, coherent, slurred speech, rt. Hemiplegia.
"Diagnosis: = Malignant hypertension.
= CVA with Right Hemiplegia.
= Urinary Tract Infection."
As to petitioners medical history and physical condition after her stroke, the Sandiganbayan, in its
decision, observed from the records:
"X X X In the past, the accused had likewise suffered a stroke and had undergone medical
treatment. A medical certificate, marked as Exhibits "3" and "3-A", attest(s) to the fact that
she had a history of high blood pressure and had been undergoing treatment for the said
malady. Since her sudden breakdown on October 22, 1985, the right part of her body
became paralyzed and her speech has been impaired. She was advised by her doctor to
undergo physical therapy and to take medicine regularly. She was advised not to report for
work during such time that she was under recuperation. Only on February 2, 1986 did she
start to report for work, although at irregular intervals, until the date of the audit, July 14,
1986."
Striking down the defense as "incredible and without basis," the Sandiganbayan rendered its
assailed decision, convicting petitioner Agullo of the crime of malversation of public funds,
ratiocinating principally that "no evidence has been presented linking the loss of the
government funds with the alleged sudden heart attack of the accused (herein petitioner)."

We do not agree.
By and large, the pieces of evidence presented against petitioner in this case do not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and may not be deemed sufficient to support a conviction.25 Records reveal that
evidence for the prosecution consisted solely of the Report of Cash Examination,26 dated 14 July
1986, which was presented by the prosecution to prove the cash shortage in the amount of
P26,404.26, on petitioner Agullos accountability as Disbursing Officer of the then MPWH. Likewise,
the prosecution presented the Letter of Demand27 dated 14 July 1986 signed by Auditing Examiner
III Ignacio Gerez.
Aside from the aforementioned documents, the prosecution opted not to present a single
witness to buttress its bid for conviction and relied merely on the prima facie evidence of
conversion or presumption of malversation under Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
"ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or propertyPresumption of malversation
X X X "The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses."
Stated otherwise, the evidence for the prosecution, upon which the Sandiganbayan riveted its
judgment of conviction, was limited to documents to wit, the Report of Cash Examination and Letter
of Demand. As could be readily gleaned from the assailed decision, the verdict adjudging herein
petitioner guilty of the crime of malversation was anchored solely on the presumption provided under
Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which prima facie evidence, in turn, was rooted
loosely on the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit; the Report of Cash
Examination and Letter of Demandpieces of evidence which the defense concededly admitted, but
which, to our mind, do not suffice to convict the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has consistently and emphatically ruled
that thepresumption of conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal
Code is by its very nature rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption under the law is not
conclusive but disputable bysatisfactory evidence to the effect that the accused did not utilize the
public funds or property for his personal use, gain or benefit.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would
be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that
when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the
presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the presumption is never deemed to have existed at
all.28
Applying the foregoing principle, the prosecution in the instant case upon whose burden, as in Diaz
vs. Sandiganbayan,29 was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond reasonable doubt that

petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption aforesaid
and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner had used the
funds for personal gain.
Worth noting is that the Sandiganbayan, in its impugned decision, admitted that "conversion or the
placing of malversed government funds to personal uses has, indeed, not been proven in the
case at bar.30"Perhaps realizing such gaping hole, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless leaped into the
conclusion, albeit erroneous, that herein petitioner was just the same guilty of malversation invoking
the prima facie evidence stated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
On this score, the rule of general application is that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are
conclusive on this court. However, such rule admits of settled exceptions, among others: (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on a want
of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record.31
On this matter, the Sandiganbayans conclusion that "there is no evidence to show that the
accused was then carrying the sum of P26,404.26 in her person when she allegedly collapsed at
Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City," is to say the least, without factual basis and not duly supported by
evidence. On the stark contrary, the records are extant, as petitioner Agullo, in fact, testified on the
witness stand that she had the money with her when she suffered a stroke and collapsed on the
streets of Tacloban City on 22 October 1985. Records likewise reveal that the amount of P327.39,
which is the difference between P26,404.2632 and P26,076.87,33 represents the salary of Mr. Alcober,
Jr., Administrative Officer of the DPWH in Candahug, who made a telephone call to petitioner for the
latter to bring the sum of P327.39, together with the payroll.
In the case before us, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly disregarded or overlooked certain evidence
of substance which, to a large extent, bear considerable weight in the adjudication of petitioners
guilt or the affirmation of her constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
Upon thorough scrutiny of the evidence adduced by both prosecution and defense, we hold that
petitioner Agullo has satisfactorily overcome and rebutted by competent proof, the prima
facie evidence of conversion so as to exonerate her from the charge of malversation. To this end,
petitioner presented evidence that satisfactorily prove that not a single centavo of the
missing FUNDS was used for her own personal benefit or gain.
True enough, the evidence adduced by the defense reveals sufficient circumstances to establish the
strongest degree of probability that the public FUNDS subject of the criminal indictment for
malversation was lost during that fateful day of 22 October 1985, where petitioner Agullo suffered a
stroke on the streets of Tacloban City as she was then on her way to the MPWH Regional Office.
In fact, the records though insensate, clearly reveal that the prosecution admitted that petitioner
suffered a stroke on the streets of Tacloban on 22 October 1985. As to the prosecutions allegation
that no evidence exists regarding loss of the public FUNDS , this postulation is belied by the

records as petitioner herself testified on the stand that she had the money subject of inquiry when
she collapsed and lost consciousness as a result of the stroke.
To us, this circumstance coupled with the other peculiarities attendant in the instant case and
further considering the palpable failure of the prosecution to adduce other evidence to clearly
establish conversion "suffice to make the mind uneasy as to Agullos guilt, notwithstanding the
prima facie evidence established by law against herein petitioner, which by no means dispenses
with the need of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 34 After all, mere absence of FUNDS is not
sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of the accused to turn over the funds at any
given time sufficient to make even a prima facie case. Conversion must be affirmatively proved,
either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily follows. 35
Truly, these serve as strong considerations that seriously impair the basis upon which is founded the
legal presumption of personal misappropriation of money or property of ACCOUNTABLE officers
who fail to have forthcoming, such money or property when so demanded by a duly authorized
official.36 Verily, a finding of prima facie evidence of ACCOUNTABILITY does not shatter the
presumptive innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, "certain
facts [have still to be] proved"; the trial court cannot depend alone on such an evidence, because
precisely, it is merely prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guiltybeyond reasonable
doubtof the offense charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce. 37
Notably, the Sandiganbayan, in convicting petitioner, obviously relied more on the flaws and
deficiencies in the evidence presented by the defense, not on the strength and merit of the
prosecutions evidence.38 This course of action is impermissible for the evidence of the prosecution
clearly cannot sustain a conviction "in an unprejudiced mind."39
All told, this Court, through the scholarly ponencia of Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz in People vs. De
Guzman,40 inked in vivid prose the premium accorded to the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, to wit:
"The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to
embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be
an uneven contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines
and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority
and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt
cannot be proved beyond the whisper of doubt."
Hence, in light of the satisfactory explanation proffered by the defense and in view of the impotency
of the prosecutions evidence, petitioners constitutional right to be presumed innocent necessarily
thrives. Corollarily, the prima facie evidence of conversion in the instant case, withers, so to speak,
like a petrified twig wilted in the scorching heat of the noonday sun.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of
respondent Sandiganbayan dated 16 March 1992 and its Resolution dated 18 March 1998, are
hereby REVERSED and SETASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Agullo is hereby ACQUITTED on grounds of
reasonable doubt.

MOREOVER, the DPWH is hereby directed to refund petitioner the sum of Three Hundred
Seventeen Pesos and Seventy Nine Centavos (P317.79) representing the amount overdeducted
from petitioners salary, cost of living allowance and other emoluments.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 103501-03 February 17, 1997

LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:
Through their separate petitions for review, 1 Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta (Tabuena and
Peralta, for short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, 2 as well as the Resolution
dated December 20. 1991 3 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt Of having
malversed the total amount of P55 Million of the Manila International AirportAuthority (MIAA) FUNDS
during their incumbency as General MANAGER and Acting FINANCE Services Manager,
respectively, of MIAA, and were thus meted the following sentence:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum
of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office,
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and
to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount
malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport Authority the sum
of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public
office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporalas minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum and for each of them to pay separately a fine of FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the amount malversed. They shall also reimburse
jointly and severally the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from
public office.
A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant General
Manager of MIAA, has remained at large.

There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of
P55 Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the
principal accused he being charged in all three (3) cases. The amended informations in criminal
case nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760 respectively read:
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, in the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and ACCOUNTABLE for public funds
belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals
against the cash ACCOUNTS of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00)
from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a MANAGER'S check for said
amount in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's
Savings ACCOUNT No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila
International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused
Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was
no outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the
above-mentioned MANAGER'S check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the
same and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds
thereof to their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 16th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, in the City of Pasay. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Gerardo G. Dabao, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Assistant General Manager, respectively, of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for public funds
belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make withdrawals
against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions, conspiring,
confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriate the amount of TWENTY FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00)
from MIAA funds by applying for the issuance of a manager.s check for said amount
in the name of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's
Savings ACCOUNT No. 274-500-354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila
International Airport in Pasay City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused

Tabuena would personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was
no outstanding obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the
above-mentioned manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same
and thereafter both accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to
their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1986, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, in the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, both public officers, being
then the General Manager and Acting Manager, Financial Services Department,
respectively, of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), and accountable for
public funds belonging to the MIAA, they being the only ones authorized to make
withdrawals against the cash accounts of MIAA pursuant to its board resolutions,
conspiring, confederating and confabulating with each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriate the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) from MIAA
funds by applying for the issuance of a manager's check for said amount in the name
of accused Luis A. Tabuena chargeable against MIAA's Savings Account No. 274500- 354-3 in the PNB Extension Office at the Manila International Airport in Pasay
City, purportedly as partial payment to the Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), the mechanics of which said accused Tabuena would
personally take care of, when both accused well knew that there was no outstanding
obligation of MIAA in favor of PNCC, and after the issuance of the above-mentioned
manager's check, accused Luis A. Tabuena encashed the same and thereafter both
accused misappropriated and converted the proceeds thereof to their personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Gathered from the documentary and testimonial evidence are the following essential antecedents:
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the president's office
and in cash what the MIAA owes the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, "Yes, sir, I will do it." About a week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe RoaGimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum dated January 8, 1986
(hereinafter referred to as MARCOS Memorandum) reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction, to wit:
Office of the President
of the Philippines
Malacanang

January 8, 1986
MEMO TO: The General Manager
Manila International Airport Authority
You are hereby directed to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction
Corporation, thru this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00)
PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said Company mentioned
in a Memorandum of Minister Roberto Ongpin to this Office dated January 7, 1985
and duly approved by this Office on February 4, 1985.
Your immediate compliance is appreciated.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND
MARCOS. 4
The January 7, 1985 memorandum of then Minister of Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin
referred to in the MARCOS Memorandum, reads in full:
MEMORANDUM
For: The President
From: Minister Roberto V. Ongpin
Date: 7 January 1985
Subject: Approval of Supplemental Contracts and
Request for Partial Deferment of Repayment of
PNCC's Advances for MIA DevelopmentProject
May I request your approval of the attached recommendations of Minister Jesus S.
Hipolito for eight (8) supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development
Project (MIADP) between the Bureau of Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, as follows:
1. Supplemental Contract No. 12
Package Contract No. 2 P11,106,600.95
2. Supplemental Contract No. 13
5,758,961.52
3. Supplemental Contract No. 14
Package Contract No. 2 4,586,610.80

4. Supplemental Contract No. 15

1,699,862.69
5. Supplemental Contract No. 16
Package Contract No. 2 233,561.22
6. Supplemental Contract No. 17
Package Contract No. 2 8,821,731.08
7. Supplemental Contract No. 18
Package Contract No. 2 6,110,115.75
8. Supplemental Contract No. 3
Package Contract No. II 16,617,655.49
(xerox copies only; original memo was submitted to the Office of the
President on May 28, 1984)
In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA
Development Project aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the
aforecited contracts. In accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances
totalling P93.9 million are to be deducted from said billings which will leave a net
amount due to PNCC of only P4.5 million.
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in
the following stages of approval/evaluation:
Approved by Price Escalation Committee
(PEC) but pended for lack of funds P1.9 million
Endorsed by project consultants and
currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC
and currently under evaluation 66.5 million

Total P99.1 million

There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to
budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet
residual amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to
PNCC due to additional cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.

To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending
escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to
about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has
been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing
MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC
of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9
million.
(Sgd.)
ROBE
RTO V.
ONGPI
N
Ministe
r5
In obedience to President Marcos' verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena, with the help of
Dabao and Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of MIAA funds by means of three (3)
withdrawals.
The first withdrawal was made on January 10, 1986 for P25 Million, following a letter of even date
signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA the depository
branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager's check for said amount payable to Tabuena. The check
was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the cashier of the PNB Villamor
branch counted the money after which, Tabuena took delivery thereof. The P25 Million in cash were
then placed in peerless boxes and duffle bags, loaded on a PNB armored car and delivered on the
same day to the office of Mrs. Gimenez located at Aguado Street fronting Malacanang. Mrs.
Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received
Similar circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on January 16, 1986.
The third and last withdrawal was made on January 31, 1986 for P5 Million. Peralta was Tabuena's
co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager's check for this amount. Peralta accompanied
Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested him to do the counting of the P5 Million.
After the counting, the money was placed in two (2) peerless boxes which were loaded in the trunk
of Tabuena's car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs. Gimenez' office at
Aguado Street. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt, dated January 30, 1986, reads:
Malacanang
Manila

January 30, 198

RECEIVED FROM LOUIE TABUENA THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF FIFTY FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P55,000,000.00) as of the following dates:
Jan. 10 P 25,000,000.00
Jan. 16 25,000,000.00
Jan. 30 5,000,000.00
(Sgd.)
Fe RoaGimene
z
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of
the ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to
support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55
Million was presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and
Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC
by MIAA for the months of January to June of 1986.
The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at
the time of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and
Peralta, in short, was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying
with the MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the
President P55 Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he
(Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the
same belief and so he heeded the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the
release of P5 Million.
With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their
conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors 6 committed by the
Sandiganbayan for this Court's consideration. It appears, however, that at the core of their plea that we
acquit them are the following:
1) the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
2) they acted in good faith.
Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that:
. . . accused . . . conspiring, confederating and other, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the government, take and
misappropriated the amount of . . . .

But it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this
connection, the Court's attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution
(denying Tabuena's and Peralta's motion for reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan
said:
xxx xxx xxx
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55
Million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or
of the PNCC.
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
abandonment, some other person to take such public funds. Having done so,
Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically demonstrated that he is guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of P55 Million of public funds. (Emphasis supplied.)
To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue
that:
1) While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be
committed at the same time.
2) The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where
the amended informations charged them with intentional malversation. 7
3) Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation. 8
We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan" 9 where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accusedpetitioner Cabello whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:
. . . even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a
case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first
mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is
proper. . . .
In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful
or intentional falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence,
thus:

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held
in Quizon vs.Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a
distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it
may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an
information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory
that the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the
present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence
submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification
which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with
criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure
himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In
other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful falsification but which
turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover; Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the
essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being
sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established
to constitute the crime proved. . . .
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the
evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him.
Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be
incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a
charge of criminal intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.
Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et. al., that the aforestated rationale
and arguments also apply to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused
charged with willful malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to
those involved in the present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of
malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of
perpetrating the offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2)
vintage, but significantmalversation cases of "US v. Catolico" 10 and "US v. Elvina," 11 the Court
stressed that:
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non

facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of is innocent.
The rule was reiterated in "People v. Pacana,"
public documents and estafa:

12

although this case involved falsification of

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting.
American jurisprudence echoes the same principle. It adheres to the view that criminal intent
in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction
honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person doing the
act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose. 13 The accused may thus always introduce
evidence to show he acted in good faith and that he had no intention to convert. 14 And this, to our
mind, Tabuena and Peralta had meritoriously shown.
In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS
Memorandum we are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the
P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons
and/or considerations that would buttress his innocence of the crime of malversation.
First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with
the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was
undeniably Tabuena's superior the former being then the President of the Republic who
unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. 15 In other
words, Marcos had a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as
for instance, directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be
carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of a directive coming from the highest official of the land no
less, good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the
MARCOS Memorandum. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of "Any person who
acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose." 16 The subordinate-superior
relationship between Tabuena and Marcos is clear. And so too, is the lawfulness of the order contained in
the MARCOS Memorandum, as it has for its purpose partial payment of the liability of one government
agency (MIAA) to another (PNCC). However, the unlawfulness of the MARCOS Memorandum was being
argued, on the observation, for instance, that the Ongpin Memo referred to in the presidential directive
reveals a liability of only about P34.5 Million. The Sandiganbayan in this connection said:
Exhibits "2" and "2-a" (pages 1 and 2 of the memorandum of Min. Ongpin to the
President dated January 7, 1985) were mainly:
a.) for the approval of eight Supplemental Contracts; and
b.) a request for partial deferment of payment by PNCC for advances made for the
MIAA Development Project, while at the same time recognizing some of the PNCC's

escalation billings which would result in making payable to PNCC the amount of
P34.5 million out of existing MIAA Project funds.
Thus:
"xxx xxx xxx
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of
ifs pending escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's
approval for a deferment of repayment of PNCC's advances to the
extent of P30 million corresponding to about 30% of P99.1 million in
escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.6 million has been officially
recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
funding.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million
out of existing MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess
of the gross billings of PNCC of P98.4 million over the undeferred
portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9 million."
While Min. Ongpin may have, therefore recognized the escalation claims of the
PNCC to MIAA to the extent of P99.1 million (Exhibit 2a), a substantial portion
thereof was still in the stages of evaluation and approval, with only P32.6 million
having been officially recognized by the MIADP consultants.
If any payments were, therefore, due under this memo for Min. Ongpin (upon which
President Marcos' Memo was based) they would only be for a sum of up to P34.5
million. 17
xxx xxx xxx

V. Pres. Marcos' order to Tabuena dated January 8, 1986 baseless.

Not only was Pres. Marcos' Memo (Exhibit "1") for Tabuena to pay
P55 million irrelevant, but it was actually baseless.
This is easy to see.
Exhibit "1" purports to refer itself to the Ongpin Memorandum (Exhibit
"2", "2-a"); Exhibit "1", however, speaks of P55 million to be paid to
the PNCC while Exhibit "2" authorized only P34.5 million. The order
to withdraw the amount of P55 million exceeded the approved
payment of P34.5 million by P20.5 million. Min. Ongpin's Memo of
January 7, 1985 could not therefore serve as a basis for the
President's order to withdraw P55 million. 18

Granting this to be true, it will not nevertheless affect Tabuena's goad faith so as to make him
criminally liable. What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOS Memorandum is
patently legal (for on its face it directs payment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena
acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandable debt and that
it was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC. This belief is supported by defense witness
Francis Monera who, on direct examination, testified that:
ATTY ANDRES
Q Can you please show us in this Exhibit "7" and "7-a" where it is
indicated the receivables from MIA as of December 31, 1985?
A As of December 31, 1985, the receivables from MIA is shown on
page 2, marked as Exhibit "7-a", sir, P102,475.392.35
xxx xxx xxx 19
ATTY. ANDRES
Q Can you tell us, Mr. Witness, what these obligations represent?
WITNESS
A These obligations represent receivables on the basis of our billings
to MIA as contract-owner of the project that the Philippine National
Construction Corporation constructed. These are billings for
escalation mostly, sir.
Q What do you mean by escalation?
A Escalation is the component of our revenue billings to the contractowner that are supposed to take care of price increases, sir.
xxx xxx xxx 20
ATTY ANDRES
Q When you said these are accounts receivable, do I understand
from you that these are due and demandable?
A Yes, sir. 21
Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its
illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact
committed in good faith. 22 Such is the ruling in "Nassif v. People" 23 the facts of which, in brief,
are as follows:

Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee of

R.J. Campos, he inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been falsified
the word "sold" by order of his principal. Had he known or suspected that his
principal was committing an improper act of falsification, he would be liable either as
a co-principal or as an accomplice. However, there being no malice on his part, he
was exempted from criminal liability as he was a mere employee following the orders
of his principal. 24
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the
ordinary", did not comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00
should be made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by
COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation
(Sec. 4, P.D. 1445, "State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan
observed that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no
bills to support the disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of
funds for an unquestionably staggering sum of P55 Million. 25
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)
But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have
the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact
that the MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that
he forward to the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely
cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his
liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal. This follows the
decision in "Villacorta v. People" 26 where the Court, in acquitting therein accused municipal
treasurer of Pandan, Catanduanes of malversation after finding that he incurred a shortage in his
cash accountability by reason of his payment in good faith to certain government personnel of
their legitimate wages leave allowances, etc., held that:
Nor can negligence approximating malice or fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he
made wrong payments, they were in Good faith mainly to government personnel,
some of them working at the provincial auditor's and the provincial treasurer's offices
And if those payments ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not
amount to a criminal offense and he should only be held administratively or civilly
liable.
Likewise controlling is "US v. Elvina" 27 where it was held that payments in good faith do not
amount to criminal appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or improper

evidence. In fact, the Dissenting Opinion's reference to certain provisions in the revised Manual
on Certificate of Settlement and Balances apparently made to underscore Tabuena's personal
accountability, as agency head, for MIAA funds would all the more support the view that
Tabuena is vulnerable to civil sanctions only Sections 29.2 and 295 expressly and solely speak of
"civilly liable," describe the kind of sanction imposable on a superior officer who performs his
duties with "bad faith, malice or gross negligence"' and on a subordinate officer or employee who
commits "willful or negligent acts . . . which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acted under order or instructions of his superiors."

Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and
misappropriated the P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC,
proceeding from the following definitions/concepts of "conversion":
"Conversion", as necessary element of offense of embezzlement, being the
fraudulent "appropriation to one's own use' of another's property which does not
necessarily mean to one's personal advantage but every attempt by one person to
dispose of the goods of another without right as if they were his own is conversion to
his own use." (Terry v. Water Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p, 2d 904,
906, 179 Okl. 106)
At p. 207, Words
and Phrases,
Permanent Edition 9A.
Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal
property to enjoy and control it. The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owner
's right of property, and not the actual damages inflicted. Honesty of purpose is not a
defense. (Ferrera v. Parks, 23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141)
At
page
168, id.
xxx xxx xxx
The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own. They presuppose that the thing has been
devoted to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To appropriate to one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage but every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right.
People vs. Webber,
57 O.G.
p. 2933, 2937

By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal
justification, he became as guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them
and converted them to his own use.
People vs. Luntao,
50 O.G.
p. 1182, 1183 28
We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to
pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of
FIFTY FIVE MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the
money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the
President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos' secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena
had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive the P55 Million
since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision and
control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the
money to the President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS
Memorandum, was not at all affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the
money. Thus, it has been said that:
Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of
malversation.
xxx xxx xxx
Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is
malversation only if the public officer who has custody of public funds should
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds.
Where the payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom the fund had been paid
was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is no criminal
intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly
but not criminally liable. 29
Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to
siphon-out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can
be imputed to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the
execution of the MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious
scheme. In short, no conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the
P5 Million. In the cases of "US v. Acebedo" 30 and "Ang v. Sandiganbayan", 31 both also involving the
crime of malversation, the accused therein were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding of
non-proof of conspiracy. In "Acebedo", therein accused, as municipal president of Palo, Leyte, was
prosecuted for and found guilty by the lower court of malversation after being unable to turn over certain
amounts to the then justice of the peace. It appeared, however, that said amounts were actually collected
by his secretary Crisanto Urbina. The Court reversed Acebedo's conviction after finding that the sums

were converted by his secretary Urbina without the knowledge and participation of Acebedo. The Court
said, which we herein adopt:

No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case,
nor did such conspiracy appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of
the theft committed by the secretary was shown on the part of the appellant in this
case, nor does it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of the crime. If
the secretary stole the money in question without the knowledge or consent of the
appellant and without negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be
convicted of embezzling the same money or any part thereof. 32
In "Ang", accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be
converted into checks drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but
the checks were subsequently dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving
credence to his assertion that the conversion of his collections into checks were thru the
machinations of one Lazaro Guinto, another MWSS collector more senior to him. And we
also adopt the Court's observation therein, that:
The petitioner's alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash
collections into checks may be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar
as a superior officer is concerned but there must be stronger evidence to show fraud,
malice, or other indicia of deliberateness in the conspiracy cooked up with Marshall
Lu. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioner was privy to the conspirational
scheme. Much less is there any proof that he profited from the questioned acts. Any
suspicions of conspiracy, no matter how sincerely and strongly felt by the MWSS,
must be converted into evidence before conviction beyond reasonable doubt may be
imposed. 33
The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally
apply to Peralta in relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he
acted in good faith when he, upon the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal
of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA funds.
This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly
executed order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than
contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries
with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently
lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor
for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. Obedientia est legis essentia.
Besides, the case could not be detached from the realities then prevailing As aptly observed by Mr
Justice Cruz in his dissenting opinion:
We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and
that the Judiciary was independent and fearless. We know it was not: even the
Supreme Court at that time was not free. This is an undeniable fact that we can not

just blink away. Insisting on the contrary would only make our sincerity suspect and
even provoke scorn for what can only be described as our incredible credulity. 34
But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's
basic constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr.
Justice Cruz's words, "is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights
of the accused." 35 While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively
took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta
may not have raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter
as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open
to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the
judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not. 36
Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the Sandiganbayan. At the taking of the
testimony of Francis Monera. then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate Comptroller of
PNCC, Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only
asked six (6) questions on cross-examination in the course of which the court interjected a total
of twenty-seven (27) questions (more than four times Prosecutor Viernes' questions and even more
than the combined total of direct and cross-examination questions asked by the counsels) After the
defense opted not to conduct any re-direct examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10)
questions. 37 The trend intensified during Tabuena's turn on the witness stand. Questions from the court
after Tabuena's cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67). 38 This is more than five times Prosecutor
Viernes' questions on cross-examination (14), and more than double the total of direct examination and
cross-examination questions which is thirty-one (31) [17 direct examination questions by Atty. Andres plus
14 cross-examination questions by Prosecutor Viernes]. In Peralta's case, the Justices, after his crossexamination, propounded a total of forty-one (41) questions. 39
But more importantly, we note that the questions of the court were in the nature of cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. 40 (The insinuating type was best
exemplified in one question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to quote in
length from the transcripts pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta. (Questions from the Court
are marked with asterisks and italicized for emphasis.)
(MONERA)
(As a background, what was elicited from his direct examination is that the PNCC had receivables
from MIAA totalling P102,475,392.35, and although such receivables were largely billings for
escalation, they were nonetheless all due and demandable. What follows are the cross-examination
of Prosecutor Viernes and the court questions).
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q You admit that as shown by these Exhibits "7" and "7- a", the items
here represent mostly escalation billings. Were those escalation
billings properly transmitted to MIA authorities?

A I don't have the documents right now to show that they were
transmitted, but I have a letter by our President, Mr. Olaguer, dated
July 6, 1988, following up for payment of the balance of our
receivables from MIA, sir.
*AJ AMORES
*Q This matter of escalation costs, is it not a matter for a conference
between the MIA and the PNCC for the determination as to the
correct amount?
A I agree, your Honor. As far as we are concerned, our billings are
what we deemed are valid receivables And, in fact, we have been
following up for payment.
*Q This determination of the escalation costs was it accepted as the
correct figure by MIA ?
A I don't have any document as to the acceptance by MIA your
Honor, but our company was able to get a document or a letter by
Minister Ongpin to President Marcos, dated January 7, 1985, with a
marginal note or approval by former President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Basically, the letter of Mr. Ongpin is to what effect?
A The subject matter is approval of the supplementary contract and
request for partial deferment of payment for MIA Development
Project, your Honor.
*Q It has nothing to do with the implementation of the escalation
costs?
A The details show that most of the accounts refer to our escalations,
your Honor.
*Q Does that indicate the computation for escalations were already
billed or you do not have any proof of that
A Our subsidiary ledger was based on billings to MIA and this letter of
Minister Ongpin appears to have confirmed our billings to MIA, your
Honor.
*AJ AMORES

*Q Were there partial payments made by MIA an these escalation

billings?
A Based on records available as of today, the P102 million was
reduced to about P56.7 million, if my recollection is correct, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Were the payments made before or after February 1986, since Mr.
Olaguer is a new entrant to your company?
WITNESS
A The payments were made after December 31, 1985 but I think the
payments were made before the entry of our President, your Honor.
Actually, the payment was in the form of: assignments to State
Investment of about P23 million; and then there was P17.8 million
application against advances made or formerly given; and there were
payments to PNCC of about P2.6 million and there was a payment
for application on withholding and contractual stock of about P1
million; that summed up to P44.4 million all in all. And you deduct that
from the P102 million, the remaining balance would be about P57
million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q What you are saying is that, for all the payments made on this
P102 million, only P2 million had been payments in cash ?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q The rest had been adjustments of accounts, assignments of
accounts, or offsetting of accounts?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This is as of December 31, 1985?
A The P102 million was as of December 31, 1985, your Honor, but
the balances is as of August 1987.
*Q We are talking now about the P44 million, more or less, by which
the basic account has been reduced. These reductions, whether by
adjustment or assignment or actual delivery of cash, were made after
December 31, 1985?

WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And your records indicate when these adjustments and payments
were made?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q You said there were partial payments before of these escalation
billings. Do we get it from you that there was an admission of these
escalation costs as computed by you by MIA, since there was already
partial payments?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q How were these payments made before February 1986, in case or
check, if there were payments made?
A The P44 million payments was in the form of assignments, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The question of the Court is, before December 31, 1985, were
there any liquidations made by MIA against these escalation billings?
A I have not reviewed the details of the record, your Honor. But the
ledger card indicates that there were collections on page 2 of the
Exhibit earlier presented. It will indicate that there were collections
shown by credits indicated on the credit side of the ledger.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your ledger does not indicate the manner of giving credit to the
MIA with respect to the escalation billings. Was the payment in cash
or just credit of some sort before December 31, 1985?
A Before December 31, 1985, the reference of the ledger are official
receipts and I suppose these were payments in cash, your Honor.
*Q Do you know how the manner of this payment in cash was made
by MIA?

A I do not know, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q But your records will indicate that?
A The records will indicate that, your Honor.
*Q Except that you were not asked to bring them?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q At all events, we are talking of settlement or partial liquidation prior
to December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Subsequent thereto, we are talking merely of about P44 million?
A Yes, your Honor, as subsequent settlements.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And they have liquidated that, as you described it, by way of
assignments, adjustments, by offsets and by P2 million of cash
payment?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ AMORES
*Q Your standard operating procedure before December 31, 1985 in
connection with or in case of cash payment, was the payment in cash
or check?
A I would venture to say it was by check, your Honor.
*Q Which is the safest way to do it?
A Yes, your Honor.
"PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q And the business way?

A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You mentioned earlier about the letter of former Minister Ongpin to
the former President Marcos, did you say that letter concurs with the
escalation billings reflected in Exhibits "7" and "7-a"?
WITNESS
A The Company or the management is of the opinion that this letter, a
copy of which we were able to get, is a confirmation of the
acceptance of our billings, sir.
Q This letter of Minister Ongpin is dated January 7, 1985, whereas
the entries of escalation billings as appearing in Exhibit "7" are dated
June 30, 1985, would you still insist that the letter of January 1985
confirms the escalation billings as of June 1985?
A The entries started June 30 in the ledger card. And as of December
31, 1985, it stood at P102 million after payments were made as
shown on the credit side of the ledger. I suppose hat the earlier
amount, before the payment was made, was bigger and therefore I
would venture to say that the letter of January 7, 1985 contains an
amount that is part of the original contract account. What are
indicated in the ledger are escalation billings.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q We are talking about the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A The letter of Minister Ongpin refers to escalation billings, sir.
*Q As of what date?
A The letter is dated January 7, 1985, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.

PROS. VIERNES
Q In accordance with this letter marked Exhibit "7" and "7-a", there
were credits made in favor of MIA in July and November until
December 1985. These were properly credited to the account of
MIA?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q In 1986. from your records as appearing in Exhibit "7-a", there
were no payments made to PNCC by MIA for the months of January
to June 1986?
A Yes, sir.
Q And neither was the amount of P22 million remitted to PNCC by
MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ AMORES
*Q From your records, for the month of January 1986, there was no
payment of this escalation account by MIA?
WITNESS

A Yes, your Honor. But on page 2 of Exhibit "7" there appears an

assignment of P23 million, that was on September 25, 1986.
*Q But that is already under the present administration?
A After February 1986, your Honor.
*Q But before February, in January 1986, there was no payment
whatsoever by MIA to PNCC?
A Per record there is none appearing, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q The earliest payment, whether by delivery of cash equivalent or of
adjustment of account, or by assignment, or by offsets, when did these payments begin?
A Per ledger card, there were payments in 1985, prior to December
31, 1985, your Honor.
*Q After December 31, 1985?
A There appears also P23 million as credit, that is a form of
settlement, your Honor.
*Q This is as of September 25?
A Yes, your Honor. There were subsequent settlements P23 million is
just part of the P44 million.
*Q And what you are saying is that, PNCC passed the account to
State Investment. In other words, State Investment bought the credit
of MIA?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And the amount of credit or receivables sold by PNCC to State
Investment is P23 million?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is there a payback agreement?
A I have a copy of the assignment to State Investment but I have not
yet reviewed the same, your Honor.

*AJ AMORES
*Q As of now, is this obligation of MIA, now NAIA, paid to PNCC?
A There is still a balance of receivables from MIA as evidenced by a
collection letter by our President dated July 6, 1988, your Honor. The
amount indicated in the letter is P55 million.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Any clarifications you would like to make Mr. Estebal?
ATTY ESTEBAL
None, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Viernes?
PROS VIERNES
No more, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
The witness is excused. Thank you very much Mr. Monera. . . . 41
(TABUENA)
(In his direct examination, he testified that he caused the preparation of the checks totalling P55
Million pursuant to the MARCOS Memorandum and that he thereafter delivered said amount in cash
on the three (3) dates as alleged in the information to Marcos' private secretary Mrs. Jimenez at her
office at Aguado Street, who thereafter issued a receipt. Tabuena also denied having used the
money for his own personal use.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS. VIERNES
Q The amount of P55 million as covered by the three (3) checks Mr.
Tabuena, were delivered on how many occasions?
A Three times, sir.
Q And so, on the first two deliveries, you did not ask for a receipt from
Mrs. Gimenez?

A Yes, sir.
Q It was only on January 30, 1986 that this receipt Exhibit "3" was
issued by Mrs. Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So January 30 is the date of the last delivery?
A I remember it was on the 31st of January, your Honor What
happened is that, I did not notice the date placed by Mrs. Gimenez.
Q Are you telling us that this Exhibit "3" was incorrectly dated
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Because the third delivery was on January 31st and yet the
receipt was dated January 30?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was Exhibit "3" delivered actually by Mrs. Gimenez?
A January 31st, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You did not go to Malacaang on January 30, 1986?
A Yes, sir, I did not.
Q Do you know at whose instance this Exhibit "3" was prepared?
A I asked for it, sir.
Q You asked for it on January 31, 1986 when you made the last
delivery?
A Yes, sir.

Q Did you see this Exhibit "3" prepared in the Office of Mrs.
Gimenez?
A Yes, sir.
Q This receipt was typewritten in Malacaang stationery. Did you see
who typed this receipt?
A No, sir. What happened is that, she went to her room and when she
came out she gave me that receipt.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Q What you are saying is, you do not know who typed that receipt?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Are you making an assumption that she typed that receipt?
A Yes, your Honor, because she knows how to type.
*Q Your assumption is that she typed it herself?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Proceed.
PROS. VIERNES
Q This receipt was prepared on January 31, although it is dated
January 30?
A Yes, sir, because I was there on January 31st.
Q In what particular place did Mrs. Gimenez sign this Exhibit "3"?
A In her office at Aguado, sir.
Q Did you actually see Mrs. Gimenez signing this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A No, sir, I did not. She was inside her room.

Q So, she was in her room and when she came out of the room, she
handed this receipt to you already typed and signed?
A Yes, sir.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q So, how did you know this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez?
WITNESS
A Because I know her signature, your Honor. I have been receiving
letters from her also and when she requests for something from me.
Her writing is familiar to me.
So, when the Presiding Justice asked you as to how you knew that
this was the signature of Mrs. Gimenez and you answered that you
saw Mrs. Gimenez signed it, you were not exactly truthful?
A What I mean is, I did not see her sign because she went to her
room and when she came out, she gave me that receipt, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
That is why you have to wait for the question to be finished and listen
to it carefully. Because when I asked you, you said you saw her
signed it. Be careful Mr. Tabuena.
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Was there another person inside the office of Mrs. Gimenez when
she gave you this receipt Exhibit "3"?
A Nobody, sir.
Q I noticed in this receipt that the last delivery of the sum of P55
million was made on January 30. Do we understand from you that
this date January 30 is erroneous?

A Yes, sir, that January 30 is erroneous. I noticed it only afterwards.

This should be January 31st, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ANDRES
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why did you not ask for a receipt on the first and second
deliveries?
A Because I know that the delivery was not complete yet, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So you know that the total amount to be delivered was P55
million')
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Response by Mr. Peralta to the testimony of Mr. Tabuena.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
We are adopting the testimony of Mr. Tabuena and we will also
present the accused, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
"Q From whom did you receive the President's memorandum marked
Exhibit "1"? Or more precisely, who handed you this memorandum?

A Mrs. Fe Roa Gimenez, your Honor.

Q Did you ask Mrs, Fe Gimenez for what purpose the money was
being asked?
A The money was in payment for the debt of the MIA Authority to
PNCC, your Honor.
*Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no
voucher prepared to cover such payment? In other words, why was
the delivery of the money not covered by any voucher?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President,
your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this
particular disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of
the President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation
to another entity?
WITNESS
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the
President.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such
payment was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.

*Q Why not?
A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed,
your Honor.
*Q Before receiving this memorandum Exhibit "1", did the former
President Marcos discuss this maitter with you?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q When was that?
A He called me up earlier, a week before that, that he wants to me
pay what I owe the PNCC directly to his office in cash, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q By "I OWE ", you mean the MIAA?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q And what did you say in this discussion you had with him?
A I just said, "Yes, sir, I will do it/"
*Q Were you the one who asked for a memorandum to be signed by
him?
A No, your Honor.
*Q After receiving that verbal instruction for you to pay MIAA's
obligation with PNCC, did you not on your own accord already
prepare the necessary papers and documents for the payment of that
obligation?
A He told me verbally in the telephone that the Order for the payment
of that obligation is forthcoming, your Honor. I will receive it.
*Q Is this the first time you received such a memorandum from the
President?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And was that the last time also that you received such a
memorandum?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you not inquire, if not from the President, at least from Mrs.
Gimenez why this procedure has to be followed instead of the regular
procedure?
A No, sir.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Why did you not ask?
A I was just ordered to do this thing, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q You said there was an "I OWE YOU"?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Where is that "I OWE YOU" now?
A All I know is that we owe PNCC the amount of P99.1 million, your
Honor. MIAA owes PNCC that amount.
*Q Was this payment covered by receipt from the PNCC?
A It was not covered, your Honor.
*Q So the obligation of MIAA to PNCC was not, for the record,
cancelled by virtue of that payment?
A Based on the order to me by the former President Marcos ordering
me to pay that amount to his office and then the mechanics will come
after, your Honor.
*Q Is the PNCC a private corporation or government entity?
A I think it is partly government, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the former CDCP?

A Yes, your Honor.

*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Why were you not made to pay directly, to the PNCC considering
that you are the Manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a
separate corporation, not an adjunct of Malacaang?
WITNESS
A I was just basing it from the Order of Malacanang to pay PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q Do you know the President or Chairman of the Board of PNCC?
A Yes, your Honor.
"Q How was the obligation of MIAA to PNCC incurred. Was it through
the President or Chairman of the Board?
A PNCC was the one that constructed the MIA, your Honor.
*Q Was the obligation incurred through the President or Chairman of
the Board or President of the PNCC? In other words, who signed the
contract between PNCC and MIAA?
A Actually, we inherited this obligation, your Honor. The one who
signed for this was the former Director of BAT which is General
Singzon. Then when the MIA Authority was formed, all the obligations
of BAT were transferred to MIAA. So the accountabilities of BAT were
transferred to MIAA and we are the ones that are going to pay, your
Honor.
*Q Why did you agree to pay to Malacaang when your obligation
was with the PNCC?
A I was ordered by the President to do that, your Honor.
*Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact
that this was not the regular course or Malacaang was not the
creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming, from the
President, your Honor.

*Q The amount was not a joke, amounting to P55 million, and you
agreed to deliver money in this amount through a mere receipt from
the private secretary?
A I was ordered by the President, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q There is no question and it can be a matter of judicial knowledge
that you have been with the MIA for sometime?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Prior to 1986?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Can you tell us when you became the Manager of MIA?
A I became Manager of MIA way back, late 1968, your Honor.
*Q Long before the MIA was constituted as an independent authority?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And by 1986, you have been running the MIA for 18 years?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And prior to your Joining the MIA, did you ever work for the
government?
A No, your Honor.
*Q So, is it correct for us to say that your joining the MIA in 1968 as
its Manager was your first employment ,with the government?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q While you were Manager of MIA, did you have other subsequent
concurrent positions in the government also?

A I was also the Chairman of the Games and Amusement Board,

your Honor.
*Q But you were not the executive or operating officer of the Games
and Amusement Board?
A I was, your Honor.
*Q As Chairman you were running the Games and Amusement
Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q What else, what other government positions did you occupy that
time?
A I was also Commissioner of the Game Fowl Commission, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q That is the cockfighting?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Here, you were just a member of the Board?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So you were not running the commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Any other entity?
A No more, your Honor.
*Q As far as you can recall, besides being the Manager of the MIA
and later the MIAA for approximately 18 years, you also ran the
Games and Amusement Board as its executive officer?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And you were a commissioner only of the Came Fowl

Commission?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Who was running the commission at that time?
A I forgot his name, but he retired already, your Honor.
*Q All of us who joined the government, sooner or later, meet with our
Resident COA representative?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q And one of our unfortunate experience (sic) is when the COA
Representative comes to us and says: "Chairman or Manager, this
cannot be". And we learn later on that COA has reasons for its
procedure and we learn to adopt to them?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q As a matter of fact, sometimes we consider it inefficient,
sometimes we consider it foolish, but we know there is reason in this
apparent madness of the COA and so we comply?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And more than anything else the COA is ever anxious for proper
documentation and proper supporting papers?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Sometimes, regardless of the amount?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Now, you have P55 million which you were ordered to deliver in
cash, not to the creditor of the particular credit, and to be delivered in
armored cars to be acknowledged only by a receipt of a personal
secretary. After almost 18 years in the government service and
having had that much time in dealing with COA people, did it not

occur to you to call a COA representative and say, "What will I do

here?"
A I did not, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Did you not think that at least out of prudence, you should have
asked the COA for some guidance on this matter so that you will do it
properly?
WITNESS
A What I was going to do is, after those things I was going to tell that
delivery ordered by the President to the COA, your Honor.
*Q That is true, but what happened here is that you and Mr. Dabao or
you and Mr. Peralta signed requests for issuance of Manager's
checks and you were accommodated by the PNB Office at Nichols
without any internal documentation to justify your request for
Manager's checks?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Of course we had no intimation at that time that Mr. Marcos will
win the elections but even then, the Daily Express, which was
considered to be a newspaper friendly to the Marcoses at that time,
would occasionally come with so-called expose, is that not so?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And worst, you had the so-called mosquito press that would
always come out with the real or imagined scandal in the government
and place it in the headline, do you recall that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Under these circumstances, did you not entertain some apprehension
that some disloyal employees might leak you out and banner
headline it in some mosquito publications like the Malaya at that
time?
WITNESS

A No, your Honor.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
I bring this up because we are trying to find out different areas of fear.
We are in the government and we in the government fear the COA
and we also fear the press. We might get dragged into press releases
on the most innocent thing. You believe that?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And usually our best defense is that these activities are properly
documented?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In this particular instance, your witnesses have told us about three
(3) different trips from Nichols to Aguado usually late in the day
almost in movie style fashion. I mean, the money being loaded in the
trunk of your official car and then you had a back-up truck following
your car?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Is that not quite a fearful experience to you ?
A I did not think of that at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
"Q You did not think it fearful to be driving along Roxas Boulevard
with P25 million in the trunk of your car?
WITNESS
A We have security at that time your Honor.
ATTY. ANDRES
Your Honor, the P25 million was in the armored car; only P5 million
was in the trunk of his car.
*PJ GARCHITORENA

Thank you for the correction. Even P1 million only. How much more
with P5 million inside the trunk of your car, was that not a nervous
experience?
A As I have said, your Honor, I never thought of that.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much, Mr. Tabuena. You are excused. . . . 42
(PERALTA)
(He testified on direct examination that he co-signed with Tabuena a memorandum request for the
issuance of the Manager's Check for P5 Million upon order of Tabuena and that he [Peralta] was
aware that MIAA had an existing obligation with PNCC in the amount of around P27 Million. He
affirmed having accompanied Tabuena at the PNB Villamor Branch to withdraw the P5 Million, but
denied having misappropriated for his own benefit said amount or any portion thereof.)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY PROS VIERNES
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court why was it necessary for
you to co-sign with Mr. Tabuena the request for issuance of
Manager's check in the amount of P5 million?
A At that time I was the Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA,
sir, and all withdrawals of funds should have my signature because I
was one of the signatories at that time.
Q As Acting Financial Services Manager of MIAA, you always co-sign
with Mr. Tabuena in similar requests for the issuance of Manager's
checks by the PNB?
A That is the only occasion I signed, sir.
Q Did you say you were ordered by Mr. Tabuena to sign the request?
A Yes, sir, and I think the order is part of the exhibits and based on
that order, I co-signed in the request for the issuance of Manager's
check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena.
PROS VIERNES
Q Was there a separate written order for you to co-sign with Mr.
Tabuena?
WITNESS

A Yes, sir, an order was given to me by Mr. Tabuena.

*PJ GARCHITORENA
Was that marked in evidence?
WITNESS
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What exhibit?
WITNESS
I have here a copy, your Honor. This was the order and it was marked
as exhibit "N".
PROS VIERNES
It was marked as Exhibit "M", your Honor.
Q How did you know there was an existing liability of MIAA in favor of
PNCC at that time?
A Because prior to this memorandum of Mr. Tabuena, we prepared
the financial statement of MIAA as of December 31, 1985 and it came
to my attention that there was an existing liability of around
P27,999,000.00, your Honor.
Q When was that Financial Statement prepared?
A I prepared it around January 22 or 24, something like that, of 1986,
sir.
Q Is it your usual practice to prepare the Financial Statement after the
end of the year within three (3) weeks after the end of the year?
A Yes, sir, it was a normal procedure for the MIAA to prepare the
Financial Statement on or before the 4th Friday of the month because
there will be a Board of Directors Meeting and the Financial
Statement of the prior month will be presented and discussed during
the meeting.
*PJ GARCHITORENA

*Q This matter of preparing Financial Statement was not an annual

activity but a monthly activity?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q This Financial Statement you prepared in January of 1986
recapitulated the financial condition as of the end of the year?
A Yes, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Continue.
PROS VIERNES
Q You made mention of a request for Escalation Clause by former
Minister Ongpin. Did you personally see that request?
A When this order coming from Mr. Tabuena was shown to me, I was
shown a copy, sir. I have no file because I just read it.
Q It was Mr. Tabuena who showed you the letter of Minister Ongpin?
A Yes, sir.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
And that will be Exhibit?
ATTY. ANDRES
Exhibit "2" and "2-A", your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q You also stated that you were with Mr. Tabuena when you withdrew
the amount of P5 million from the PNB Extension Office at Villamor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why was it necessary for you to go with him on that occasion?
A Mr. Tabuena requested me to do the counting by million, sir. So
what I did was to bundle count the P5 million and it was placed in two
(2) peerless boxes.

Q Did you actually participate in the counting of the money by

bundles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Bundles of how much per bundle?
A If I remember right, the bundles consisted of P100s and P50s, sir.
Q No P20s and P10s?
A Yes, sir, I think it was only P100s and P50s.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q If there were other denominations, you can not recall?
A Yes, your Honor.
PROS VIERNES
Q In how many boxes were those bills placed?
A The P5 million were placed in two (2) peerless boxes,
Q And you also went with Mr. Tabuena to Aguado?
A No, sir, I was left behind at Nichols. After it was placed at the trunk
of the car of Mr. Tabuena, I was left behind and I went back to my
office at MIA.
Q But the fact is that, this P5 million was withdrawn at passed 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon?
A I started counting it I think at around 4:30, sir. It was after office
hours. But then I was there at around 4:00 o'clock and we started
counting at around 4:30 p.m. because they have to place it in a room,
which is the office of the Manager at that time.
Q And Mr. Tabuena left for Malacaang after 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of that date?
A Yes, sir. After we have counted the money, it was placed in the
peerless boxes and Mr. Tabuena left for Malacanang.
PROS VIERNES

Q And you yourself, returned to your office at MIA?

WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q Until what time do you hold office at the MIA?
A Usually I over-stayed for one (1) or two (2) hours just to finish the
paper works in the office, sir.
Q So, even if it was already after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, you
still went back to your office at MIA?
A Yes, sir.
PROS VIERNES
That will be all, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Redirect?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No redirect, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Questions from the Court.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Did you not consider it as odd that your obligation with the PNCC
had to be paid in cash?
WITNESS
A Based on the order of President Marcos that we should pay in
cash, it was not based on the normal procedure, your Honor.
*Q And, as Acting Financial Services Manager, you were aware that
all disbursements should be covered by vouchers?

A Yes, your Honor, the payments should be covered by vouchers. But

then, inasmuch as what we did was to prepare a request to the PNB,
then this can be covered by Journal Voucher also.
*Q Was such payment of P5 million covered by a Journal Voucher?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you present that Journal Voucher here in Court?
A We have a copy, your Honor.
*Q Do you have a copy or an excerpt of that Journal Voucher
presented in Court to show that payment?
A We have a copy of the Journal Voucher, your Honor.
*Q Was this payment of P5 million ever recorded in a cashbook or
other accounting books of MIAA ?
A The payment of P5 million was recorded in a Journal Voucher, your
Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the recording was made directly to the Journal?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q There are no other separate documents as part of the application
for Manager's Check?
A Yes, your Honor, there was none.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q After the payment was made, did your office receive any receipt
from PNCC?
A I was shown a receipt by Mr. Tabuena, the receipt given by Mrs. Fe
Roa Gimenez, your Honor. Inasmuch as the payment should be
made through the Office of the president, I accepted the receipt given
by Mrs. Fe Gimenez to Mr. Tabuena.

*Q After receiving that receipt, did you prepare the necessary

supporting documents, vouchers, and use that receipt as a
supporting document to the voucher?
A Your Honor, a Journal Voucher was prepared for that.
*Q How about a disbursement voucher?
A Inasmuch as this was a request for Manager's check, no
disbursement voucher was prepared, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q Since the payment was made on January 31, I986, and that was
very close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any
doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purpose?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, we are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't
think there was any basis, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection
on record.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q As a Certified Public Accountant and Financial Manager of the
MIAA, did you not consider it proper that a check be issued only after
it is covered by a disbursement voucher duly approved by the proper
authorities ?

A Your Honor, what we did was to send a request for a Manager's

check to the PNB based on the request of Mr. Tabuena and the order
of Mr. Tabuena was based on the Order of President Marcos.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In your capacity as Financial Services Manager of the MIAA, did
you not think it proper to have this transaction covered by a
disbursement voucher?
WITNESS
A Based on my experience, payments out of cash can be made
through cash vouchers, or even though Journal Vouchers, or even
through credit memo, your Honor.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q This was an obligation of the MIAA to the PNCC. Why did you
allow a disbursement by means of check in favor of Mr. Luis Tabuena,
your own manager?
A We based the payment on the order of Mr. Tabuena because that
was the order of President Marcos to pay PNCC through the Office of
the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor.
*Q You are supposed to pay only on legal orders. Did you consider
that legal?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, the question calls for a
conclusion of the witness.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering that tire witness is an expert, witness may answer.
WITNESS
A The order of president Marcos was legal at that time because the
order was to pay PNCC the amount of P5 million through the Office of
the President and it should be paid in cash, your Honor. And at that
time, I know for a fact also that there was an existing P.D. wherein the
President of the Republic of the Philippines can transfer funds from

one office to another and the PNCC is a quasi government entity at

that time.
*AJ HERMOSISIMA
*Q Are you saying that this transaction was made on the basis of that
P.D. which you referred to?
A I am not aware of the motive of the President, but then since he is
the President of the Philippines, his order was to pay the PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
*Q As Financial Manager, why did you allow a payment in cash when
ordinarily payment of an obligation of MIAA is supposed to be paid in
check?
A I caused the payment through the name of Mr. Tabuena because
that was the order of Mr. Tabuena and also he received an order
coming from the President of the Philippines at that time, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the
Journals to correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the
same journal?
In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal
Voucher is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper,
you are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of
the transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally
authorize such a movement of money unless it is properly
documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL

With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the

question is misleading because what the witness stated is. . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the
language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching
him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say that. .
.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness
stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was
supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled, may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of
the General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos,
your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate
basis for the movement of money?
A Yes, your Honor, because at that time we have also a recorded
liability of P27 million.
*Q we are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we
are saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate
with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
A Yes, your Honor. The order of Mr. Luis Tabuena was based on our
existing liability of P27,931,000.00, inasmuch as we have that liability

and I was shown the order of President Marcos to pay P5 million

through the Office of the President, I considered the order of Mr. Luis
Tabuena, the order of President Marcos and also the existing liability
of P27 million sufficient to pay the amount of P5 million. Inasmuch as
there is also an escalation clause of P99.1 million, the payment of P5
million is fully covered by those existing documents.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not
asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether
or not this particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to
justify the movement of funds?
WITNESS
When we pay, your Honor, we always look for the necessary
documents and at that time I know for a fact that there was this
existing liability.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to
the question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I
know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your
statement that there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the
order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
WITNESS
A As far as I am concerned, your Honor, inasmuch as we have a
liability and I was shown the Order of President Marcos to pay PNCC
through his office, I feel that the order of the General Manager, the
order of President Marcos, and also the memorandum of Minister
Ongpin are sufficient to cause the payment of P5 million.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to
transfer funds from one department to another, is this not the one that
refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is
concerned?

WITNESS
A Because at that time, your Honor, I have knowledge that the
President is authorized through a Presidential Decree to transfer
government funds from one office to another.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
A I think the liability was duly recorded and appropriations to pay the
amount is. . . . (interrupted)
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are
you just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the
question is?
A No, your Honor.
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA ate covered by
the Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in
the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President?
Or are you telling as you did not read the Decree?
A I was aware of that Decree, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the
Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not
an officer of the MIAA, was he?
A No, your Honor.

*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different officers

and different officials in any company either government or private,
which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it not?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain
him?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one
person can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to
documents and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
A Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
WITNESS
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q In the other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as
Financial Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a
position to tell Mr. Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this
disbursement is not proper and, therefore, I will not sign it"., if in your
opinion the disbursement is not proper?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Therefore, as a co-signatory, you expected to exercise your
judgment as to the propriety of a particular transactions?
A Yes, your Honor.

*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant?
A Yes, your Honor.
*AJ DEL ROSARIO
*Q You admit that the payment of P5 million and P50 million were
unusual in the manner with which they were disposed?
A Yes, your Honor.
*Q Did you submit a written protest to the manner in which such
amount was being disposed of?
A A written protest was not made, your Honor, but I called the
attention of Mr. Tabuena that since this payment was upon the order
of President Marcos, then I think as President he can do things which
are not ordinary.
*Q If you did not prepare a written protest, did you at least prepare a
memorandum for the record that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction?
A I called the attention of Mr. Tabuena that this was an extra-ordinary
transaction and no written note, your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Thank you very much Mr. Peralta, you are excused. . . . 43
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying
his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he
presides. 44 But not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, 45 the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as
possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. 46 Here, these limitations were not
observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to
be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and
Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations supplementing those
made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's questions in length. The "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court,
with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the
observation made in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly
disturbed" with the number of court questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN
was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show
that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common
standard of fairness and impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted

with "numbers" without necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In "US v. De Sisto" (2 Cir., 1961,
289 F 2d 833), for example, a new trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case, indulged in
extensive questioning of defendant and his witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify on
"numbers" to bolster this. It was pointed out in the "De Sisto" case that the judge asked 3,115 questions of
all witnesses, the prosecutor asked but 1,381, defense counsel 3,330. The judge's questions to the
defendant De Sisto totalled 306, the prosecutor's 347, and the defense counsel's, 201. After referring to
these figures, the court stated:

. . . It is indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of

itself determinative. However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous
examination of the defendant himself by the judge, and the repeated belittling by the
judge of defendant's efforts to establish the time that Fine left the pier, we fear that in
its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an
impression of the court's belief in the defendant's probable guilt to permit the jury
freely to perform its own function of independent determination of the facts. . . .
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too
excessive that it cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the
standard employed in a non-jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in
propounding questions to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence. At the risk
of being repetitious, we will amplify on this via some specific examples. Based on the
evidence on record, and on the admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 million was delivered
to the President's Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential directive. One
Sandiganbayan Justice, however, hurled the following questions to Peralta:
AJ DEL ROSARIO
Q: Since the payment was made on January 31, 1986, and that was
very close to the election held in that year, did you not entertain any
doubt that the amounts were being used for some other purposes?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Justice, We are objecting to the
question on the ground that it is improper.
AJ DEL ROSARIO
I will withdraw the question.
PJ GARCHITORENA
What is the ground for impropriety?
ATTY. ESTEBAL

This is not covered in the direct examination, and secondly, I don't

think there was any basis, Your Honor.
PJ GARCHITORENA
Considering the withdrawal of the question, just make the objection
on record.
Nothing from the preceding questions of counsels or of the court would serve as basis for
this question. How then, can this be considered even relevant? What is the connection
between the payment made to the President's office and the then forthcoming presidential
"snap election"? In another instance, consider the following questions of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena:
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Mr. Peralta, are not Journal Vouchers merely entries in the
Journals to correct certain statements of accounts earlier made in the
same journal?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q In other words, really what you are telling us is that, a Journal
Voucher is to explain a transaction was otherwise not recorded.
xxx xxx xxx
*Q Therefore, when you said that a Journal Voucher here is proper,
you are saying it is proper only because of the exceptional nature of
the transactions?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q In other words, as an Accountant, you would not normally
authorize such a movement of money unless it is properly
documented?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
With due respect to the Honorable Presiding Justice, I think the
question is misleading because what the witness stated is . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA

Be careful in your objection because the witness understands the

language you are speaking, and therefore, you might be coaching
him.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
No, your Honor. I am also an accountant that is why I could say
that . . .
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Please be simple in your objection.
ATTY. ESTEBAL
The question is misleading on the ground that what the witness
stated earlier is that the Journal Voucher in this particular case was
supported, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Overruled may answer.
WITNESS
A The transaction was fully documented since we have the order of
the General Manager at that time and the order of President Marcos,
your Honor.
*Q Are you saying the Order of the General Manager is an adequate
basis for the movement of money?
*Q We are not talking of whether or not there was a liability. What we
are saying is, is the order of the General Manager by itself adequate
with no other supporting papers, to justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
You keep flooding us with details we are not asking for. We are not
asking you whether or not there was valid obligation. We are not
asking you about the escalation clause. We are asking you whether
or not this particular order of Mr. Tabuena is an adequate basis to
justify the movement of funds?
*PJ GARCHITORENA

When we ask questions and when we answer them, we must listen to

the question being asked and not to whatever you wanted to say. I
know you are trying to protect yourself. We are aware of your
statement that there are all of these memoranda.
*Q By your disbursement of such amount, you are saying that the
order of Mr. Tabuena by itself is adequate?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q This Presidential Decree which authorizes the President to
transfer funds from one department to another, is this not the one that
refers to the realignment of funds insofar as the Appropriation Act is
concerned?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Under the Appropriation Act. Are payments of debts of the MIAA
covered by the Appropriation Act?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q Tell me honestly, is your answer responsive to the question or are
you just throwing words at us in the hope that we will forget what the
question is?
xxx xxx xxx
*Q Are you telling us that the debts incurred by MIAA are covered by
the Appropriations Act so that the payment of this debt would be in
the same level as the realignment of funds authorized the President?
Or are you telling as you did not read the Decree?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
Mr. Estebal, will you include in your memorandum what are the
Decrees authorizing this movement of funds?
ATTY. ESTEBAL
Yes, your Honor.
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q It is true that President Marcos was the President, but he was not
an officer of the MIAA, was he?

*Q In fact, for purposes of internal control, you have different in

officers and different officials in any company either government or
private, which are supposed to check and balance each other, is it
not?
*Q So that when disbursements of funds are made, they are made by
authority of not only one person alone so that nobody will restrain
him?
*Q These checks and balances exist in an entity so that no one
person can dispose of funds in any way he likes?
*Q And in fact, the purpose for having two (2) signatories to
documents and negotiable documents is for the same purpose?
*PJ GARCHITORENA
*Q In other words, the co-signatories counter check each other?
*Q In your case, you would be the counter check for Mr. Tabuena?
*Q In other words, even if Mr. Tabuena is the Manager, you as
Financial Services Manager and as counter signatory are in a
position to tell Mr. Tabuena, "I am sorry, you are my superior but this
disbursement is not proper and, therefore, I will not sign it.", if in your
opinion the disbursement is not proper?
*Q Therefore, as co-signatory, you are expected to exercise your
judgment as to the propriety of a particular transaction ?
*Q And this is something you know by the nature of your position and
because you are a Certified Public Accountant? 47
How can these questions be considered clarificatory when they clearly border more on
cross-examination questions? Thus, the Dissenting Opinion's focus on the distinction
between the two kinds of trial to justify the Sandiganbayan's active participation in the
examination of petitioners Tabuena and Peralta and witness Monera, with due respect,
appears insignificant to this case. Let it, therefore, be emphasized anew that:
A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the
impression that he is allied with the prosecution. 48
We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the
transaction, but it is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting
attorney. However anxious a judge may be for the enforcement of the law, he should
always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the defendant accused of crime,

and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the purpose of
safeguarding the interests of society. 49
Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at
length. The circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing.
. . . This court, however, has more than once said that the examination of witnesses is the
more appropriate function of counsel, and the instances are rare and the conditions
exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an extensive examination.
It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper questions
by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for
the judge to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a
trial, and it is his duty to see that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to
conduct such examinations. The extent to which this shall be done must largely be a
matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of each particular case, but in
so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an
advocate. . . 50

While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the
discretion of the trial judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this
country the practice of making the presiding judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to
observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure, even at the expense
of occasional delays. . . . The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and
while he has the right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that
justice shall prevail, we can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of
the cause out of the hands of counsel. 51
The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is
believed the instances are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will
justify the presiding judge in entering upon and conducting an extended examination of a
witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will seldom deem such action
necessary or advisable. 52
He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and
prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in
mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in, the examination of
witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses, especially those who are
excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. 53
The impartiality of the judge his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the
advocate of either one side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and
essential rule of special importance in criminal cases. . . 54
Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear
or favor, and to dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is
possible for the court and the parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of onesided or more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false impression in the

minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to strive for the
preservation of the people's faith in our courts. 55
Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as
a minimum guaranty of due process. 56

We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent
in that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape
criminal liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however,
that we render justice on a case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is
presented. Thus, where the evidence warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not
only by the dictates of law but likewise of conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does
not follow that all those similarly accused will necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as
a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the
evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal must also be present in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation
of constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For
the most dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so
that it becomes lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to
bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to
commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated
December 20, 1991 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., cocnur.
Regalado, Bellosillo, and Torres, Jr., JJ., pro hac vice.
Hermosisima, Jr,., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

Last 20 September 1996 in Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 1 this Court erected a barrier to the
constitutionally mandated task to recover ill-gotten wealth and in the punishment of those who dirtied their
hands with it. This the Court did by impliedly granting immunity from civil suit or liability under an
expanded interpretation of the lawyer-client privilege, lawyers who were alleged to have acted as coconspirators or dummies of certain parties in the acquisition of such wealth.
The acquittal decreed by the majority in the cases under consideration places another obstacle to
such recovery and punishment by granting immunity from any criminal liability those who were
ordered by then President Marcos to disburse government funds for alleged payment of obligations.
This is the immediate impression anyone can get from the following sweeping pronouncement in
the ponencia. 2
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the office of the President and bears
the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it
the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is
patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact,
coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without
question. Obedientia est legis essentia. . . .
What this suggests is that no one could disobey then President Marcos, a suggestion made
more eloquent with the quotation of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cruz
in Development Bank of the Philippines v.Pundogar. 3 That dissent cannot be used to justify the
petitioners' "obedience," otherwise, this Court would thus overturn the majority opinion in the said
case and adopt the dissent as the new rule.
Henceforth, all those similarly situated as the appellants or those who could simply provide any
reason for theircompelled obedience to Mr. Marcos can go scot-free. The meaning of EDSA and its
message for history would thus be obliterated. The acquittal then perpetuates a sad day for this
Court a day of mourning for those who fought against the dictatorship and of triumph and joy for
the dictator's collaborators, nominees, associates, and friends.
I cannot join the majority in these cases.
My analysis of the ponencia indicates that the acquittal is based on the following:
1. The accused-appellants merely acted in obedience to an order by
a superior for some lawful purpose; hence, they incur no criminal
liability pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Even granting that the order was not for a lawful purpose, they
acted in good faith.

3. Their basic constitutional right to due process was violated by the

way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves.
I
I shall first take up the third.
The ponencia admits that the appellants did not raise as an issue the Sandiganbayan's violation of
their right to due process; nevertheless, it ruled that such failure is not an impediment to the
consideration of the violation "as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an
appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the
subject of assignments of error or not. 4
I beg to disagree.
First, there is no showing at all that the extensive participation by the Justices of the Sandiganbayan
in questioning the appellants and their witness indicated prejudgment of guilt, bias, hatred, or
hostility against the said appellants. On the contrary, the quoted portions of the questions
propounded by the Justices manifest nothing but a sincere desire to ferret out the facts to arrive at
the truth which are crucial in the determination of the innocence or guilt of the appellants. These
Justices, as trial magistrates, have only exercised one of the inherent rights of a judge in the
exercise of judicial function. What this Court stated eighty-three years ago inUnited States
v. Hudieres 5 needs repeating:
It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole proceedings that the only object
of the trial judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible
to get at the truth as to the facts to which the witnesses were testifying. The right of a
trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any
material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides
is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact
upon which the judgment of the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge
sees that the degree of credit which he is to give the testimony of a given witness
may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question that in
the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or willingness of the witness
to tell the truth. The questions asked by the trial judge in the case at bar were in our
opinion entirely proper, their only purpose being to clarify certain obscure phases of
the case; and while we are inclined to agree with counsel that some of the
observations of the trial judge in the course of his examination might well have been
omitted, there is no reason whatever to believe that the substantial rights of the
defendants were in anywise prejudiced thereby.

That the appellants themselves did not find any impropriety in the conduct of the Justices, or that if
they did they find nothing therein to prejudice their right to due process is best proven by their failure
to assign it as error.
Second, even granting arguendo that the conduct of the Justices constituted such a violation, the
appellants are forever estopped from raising that issue on ground of waiver. This Court would risk an
accusation of undue partiality for the appellants were it to give them premium for their torpor and
then reward them with an acquittal. Such waiver is conclusively proven in these cases. From the
quoted portions of the testimonies of the witnesses for the appellants, it is clear that their counsel did
not object to, or manifest on record his misgivings on, the active participation of the Justices in the
examination (or cross-examination) of the witnesses. Nothing could have prevented the counsel for
the appellants from doing so. Then, too, as correctly pointed out in the ponencia, they made no
assignment of error on the matter.
In our jurisdiction, rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 6
In People v. Donato, 7 this Court made the following statement on what rights may be waived:
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable
right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed
by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by
statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be
against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred
by statute andguaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also

been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property

may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to
secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver. 8
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 9 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two

classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is
interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot
be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to
consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will. 10
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 11 the right to counsel and to remain
silent; 12 and the right to be heard. 13
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill
of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the

presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other
form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can
be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not
be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
In the cases below, the perceived violation, if at all it existed, was not of the absolute totality of due
process, but more appropriately of the right to an impartial trial, which is but an aspect of the
guarantee of due process. 14 I submit that the right to an impartial trial is waivable.
II
I also disagree with the view of the majority that all the requisites of the sixth justifying circumstance
in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code are present. I submit that the 8 January 1986 Memorandum
of President Marcos can by no means be considered a "lawful" order to pay P55 million to the PNCC
as alleged partial payment of the MIAA's account to the former. The alleged basis of such
Memorandum is the 7 January 1985 Memorandum of Trade and Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin,
which even confirms the absence of any factual basis for the order of payment of P55 million:

In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction

Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA
Development Project aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the
aforecited contracts. In accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances
totalling P93.9 million are to be deducted from said billings which will leave a net
amount due to PNCC of only P4.5 million, thus:
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in
the following states of approved/evaluation:
Approved by Price Escalation Committee
(PEC) but pending for lack of funds P 1.9 million
Endorsed by project consultants and
currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC
and currently under evaluation 66.5 million

T o t a l P99.1 million
There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to
budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet
residual amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to
PNCC due to additional cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending
escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to
about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has
been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
fundings.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing
MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC
of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9
million.
If Ongpin's memorandum is given full faith, it is clear that PNCC's "accomplishment billings" for work
accomplished, including accomplishments on the "supplemental contracts" (whose authority therefor
was just sought for), aggregated to P98.4 million. Since there were advances given to PNCC in the
total amount of P93.9 million, the net amount due the PNCC was only P4.5 million.

However, in view of the approval by then President Marcos of Ongpin's request "for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million," only P63.9 million of PNCC's
advances was to be deducted from the accomplishment billings of P98.4 million. The net amount
due thus became P34.5 million. Hence, as pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, if any payments were
due under Ongpin's Memorandum they would only be for that amount (P34.5 million). The Order of
then President Marcos to withdraw has, therefore, exceeded by P20.5 million. Clearly, the order of
payment of P55 million had no factual and legal basis and was therefore unlawful.
III
Not an iota of good faith was shown in the conduct of the appellants.
Being responsible accountable officers of the MIAA, they were presumed to know that, in light of "the
undeferred portion of the repayment" of PNCC's advances in the amount of P63.9 million, the
MIAA's unpaid balance was only P34.5 million. They also ought to know the procedure to be
followed in the payment of contractual obligations. First and foremost there were the submission by
the PNCC of its claims with the required supporting documents and the approval of the claims by the
appropriate approving authority of MIAA. When then President Marcos ordered immediate payment,
he should not have been understood as to order suspension of the accepted budgeting, accounting,
and auditing rules on the matter. Parenthetically, it may be stated here that although President
Marcos was a dictator, he was reported to be, and even projected himself as, a "faithful" advocate of
the rule of law. As a matter of fact, he did not hesitate to issue a decree, letter of instruction, or any
presidential issuance in anticipation of any planned actions or activities to give the latter the facade
or semblance of legality, wisdom, or propriety. When he made the order to appellant Tabuena,
President Marcos must only be understood to order expeditious compliance with the requirements to
facilitate immediate release of the money. There was no way for Tabuena to entertain any fear that
disobedience to the order because of its unlawfulness or delay in the execution of the order due to
compliance with the requirements would cause his head or life. He offered no credible evidence for
such fear. This Court should not provide one for him. That Tabuena served Mr. Marcos until the end
of the latter's regime and even beyond only proved a loyalty not based on fear but on other
considerations.
Moreover, the manner the appellant effected the withdrawal was most unusual, irregular, and
anomalous. He has not shown any evidence that what he did was the usual practice in his office.
What happened in this case showed the appellants' complicity as principals by direct participation in
the malversation of the MIAA's funds. The appellants should, therefore, be thankful to the
Sandiganbayan for holding them liable therefor only through negligence.
I vote then to AFFIRM in toto the assailed decision.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
ROMERO, J., dissenting:

Obedience, rightly directed, is a virtue well-worth cultivating obedience of children to their elders;
obedience to lawful authority by citizens; obedience to the behests of what is highest and finest in
one's self.
Misguided, such as indiscriminate obeisance to questionable mandates, no matter if emanating from
authoritative figures whose slightest whisper and scribbled orders are law, this can lead man to
perdition.
In government, a pliant bureaucracy that is disinclined to resist unethical, immoral, even downright
illegal directives from "above" is easily corrupted and can only bring disrepute to the entire system.
In this context, can subordinate public officials like herein petitioner escape criminal prosecution by
the simple expedient of claiming that they were merely following orders from a superior? This
disquisition will demonstrate that certain requisites are indispensable before anyone can claim
immunity from penal sanctions for seemingly justifiable acts.
This dissenting opinion will narrate the facts for the sake of accuracy for the ponencia seems to have
overlooked or glossed over vital circumstances which make the conclusion embodied herein
irresistible.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (the Code) for
alleged malversation of a total of P55 million from the public funds of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA). The informations filed on three separate dates in 1986 accused them, as
accountable officers, of intentionally withdrawing said amount for the ostensible purpose of paying a
non-existent obligation of MIAA to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), but
which they misappropriated and converted for their personal use and benefit.
In their defense, petitioners claimed they acted in good faith and in compliance with a verbal and
later, a written order from no less than former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In a Presidential
Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated January 8, 1986, the latter allegedly commanded
petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of MIAA, "to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said
Company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Roberto Ongpin to this
Office dated January 7, 1985 . . . ." 1 (The Ongpin Memorandum). On the assumption that MIAA indeed
had a due and demandable debt to PNCC for work done on the airport, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo
G. Dabao and Adolfo M. Peralta, MIAA Assistant General Manager and Financial Services Department
Acting Manager, respectively, made three withdrawals from the account of MIAA with the Philippine
National Bank first, on January 10, 1986 for P25 million, then on January 16, 1986 for another P25 million
and lastly, on January 31, 1986 for P5 million. The three manager's checks covering the withdrawals were
all applied for and issued in the name of Tabuena. Curiously, while the checks were issued by the MIA
extension office of PNB, they were encashed at the Villamor Air Base branch. Each time the cash was
delivered directly to the office of Marcos' private secretary, Fe Roa-Gimenez. The latter issued a
receipt 2 signed by her but only after the last delivery. No PNCC receipt was ever given to petitioners.
On October 22, 1990, the Sandiganbayan's First Division rendered a decision finding petitioners
guilty.

Petitioners raise two issues, namely, that they were charged with intentional malversation (which
they labelled as malversation by direct appropriation) but were convicted of malversation by
negligence, and that they acted in good faith.
As regards the first argument, the variance between the crime charged and that proved by the
prosecution is immaterial, as stated by the ponente.
As regards the second issue, it is argued that good faith is a valid defense in malversation for it
negates criminal intent. Petitioners claim that when they committed the acts complained of, they
were merely following then President Marcos' oral and written directives. They rely on Article 11,
paragraph 6 of the Code which states, inter alia:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
For an act to be justified under the abovequoted provision, therefore, three requisites must concur:
(a) an order must have been issued by a superior; (b) the order must be for a lawful purpose; and (c)
the means used by the subordinate in carrying out such order must itself be lawful. 3
In the case at bar, Tabuena was allegedly ordered by President Marcos to pay the PNCC from
MIAA's fund, thus ostensibly meeting the first requirement but not the others. For there is a
qualification which significantly changes the picture. The payment was to be in cash and immediately
made through the Office of the President. It is to be pointed out that it is one thing to be ordered to
pay a due and demandable obligation; it is another to make such payment to someone other than
the lawful obligee and worse, when the subordinate is forced to breach official channels to comply
with the order.
It must be stressed that Tabuena and his co-accused, Peralta and Dabao, disregarded standard
operating procedures in following the President's order. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, "there
were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills to support the
disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for an unquestionably
staggering sum of P55 Million." Disbursement vouchers are specifically required under Sec. 4 (5) of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), while the certificate of availability of funds is needed
to comply with Sec. 47, Title I-B, Bk. V of the Administrative Code of 1987 4 and Sec. 344 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. 5 To compound the duplicity, the checks, issued by one branch of PNB were
encashed in another all made in cash instead of by crossed check payable to PNCC! Conspicuously,
such cash outlay was made without prior approval or authority of the Commission on Audit. 6 Finally, the
last two payments were made despite the non-issuance of a receipt for the first. In fact, the receipt given
after the delivery of the last installment was not even issued by the PNCC, the legal obligee and avowed
recipient of the money. Instead it emanated from the office of Roa-Gimenez, a complete stranger to the
alleged contract between MIAA and PNCC, who did not even indicate in what capacity she signed it. To
compound the mystery, the money was even delivered to her office, not in Malacaang, but at nearby
Aguado Street. The entire process, done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing

requirements was, in the words of petitioners themselves, an extraordinary transaction," 7 admittedly "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on normal procedure." 8

Disbursement of government funds, especially one as gargantuan as the one made by petitioners, is
a complex process, unlike the basic over-the-counter transaction that they purportedly made it to
appear. Far from being lawful, the payment of the alleged obligation of MIAA to PNCC through the
Office of the President may at best be labelled as irregular. "The term 'irregular expenditure' signifies
an expenditure incurred without adhering to established rules, regulations, procedural guidelines,
policies, principles or practices that have gained recognition in law. Irregular expenditures are
incurred without conforming with prescribed usages and rules of discipline. There is no observance
of an established pattern, course, mode of action, behavior, or conduct in the incurrence of an
irregular expenditure. . . . ." 9
Specifically, disbursement of public funds must conform with the following principles:
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.10
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. 11
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which this special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government. 12
(4) All resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage through
illegal or improper disposition to ensure efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. The responsibility to take care such policy is faithfully adhered
to rests directly with the chief or head of the government agency concerned. 13
(5) Disbursement or disposition of government funds or property shall invariably bear the
approval of the proper officials. 14
(6) Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete documentation.

15

(7) All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be faithfully adhered
to. 16
(8) Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as of sound
management and fiscal administration shall be observed, provided that they do not
contravene existing laws and regulations. 17

Assuming arguendo that petitioners acted in good faith in following the President's order, undeniably,
they were negligent as found by the trial court. The instructions in the President's order should have
sufficed to put any accountable head of an office, Tabuena included, on guard. Why was he being
required to pay MIAA's obligation to the PNCC, if indeed there were any, and not directly to the latter
but through the Office of the President? Why was the entire transaction not coursed through proper
channels, viz., the accounting office? Why was such a huge disbursement to be made in cash,
instead of by crossed check, which is not only safer, faster, and more convenient, but in accord with
auditing requirements?
Obedience to a superior's order does not connote blind obedience. Being the general manager of
such a mammoth organization like the MIAA, he should, at the very least, have exercised ordinary
prudence by verifying with the proper official under him whether the agency had indeed an
outstanding indebtedness to the PNCC before ordering any payment to be made through official
channels. Such routine measures were cavalierly disregarded. The whole process seemed no
different from a petty, personal transaction.
As evidence later revealed, PNCC's receivables from MIAA amounted to P102,475,392.35, the bulk
of which comprised escalation charges. From that time until Corazon C. Aquino assumed the
Presidency, a total of P44.4 million was paid, but only P2 million of this in cash; the rest was set off
or compensated against other debts, or assigned to other creditors. The financial records did not
show that PNCC received any sums of money from MIAA during the period January to June, 1986
when the block payments were being made in quarter millions. Only on September 25, 1986, long
after President Marcos had gone, was an assignment of P23 million actually made by MIAA in favor
of PNCC. 18
Even the Ongpin Memorandum, which is the basis of the Marcos Memorandum, failed to show
where the amount of P55 million cropped up. The former contained, inter alia, the following matters:
(a) it requested the President's approval of Minister Ongpin's recommendations "for eight (8)
supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development Project (MIADP) between the Bureau of
Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly
CDCP, . . . ."; 19 (b) it informed the President that PNCC had collectibles from MIAA only in the amount of
P4.5 million, which is the difference between the accomplishment billings on the MIADP totalling P98.4
million and PNCC's advances of P93.9 million; and (c) it informed the President that PNCC had potential
escalation claims against MIAA in the amount of P99 million, "potential" because they have yet to be
approved by the Price Escalation Committee (PEC).
The only remaining piece of evidence which would show that MIAA owed PNCC anything as of the
date of the Marcos Memorandum is MIAA's balance sheet, 20 which indicates its liability to PNCC as of
December 31, 1985 to be P27,931,000.00. 21 How can petitioners claim to have acted in good faith when
they withdrew the P55 million from MIAA's funds knowing fully well that the amount due PNCC was only a
little over half that amount, as shown by their own evidence?
The ponencia states that ". . . . the good faith of Tabuena . . . . was not at all affected even if it later
turned out that PNCC never received the money."
It is precisely our thesis that Tabuena did not act in good faith in complying with the President's
orders because of the reasons aforesatated, summarized as follows:

(a) The President's order was "out of the ordinary" and "not based on normal
procedure," which would have entailed making an "extraordinary transaction," as
admitted by petitioners themselves. This proves that they were, at the time they
received the order, aware that paying MIAA's supposed P55 million obligation to
PNCC through the Office of the President in cash was questionable.
(b) As the head of MIAA, Tabuena should have been more cautious in disbursing the
funds. He did not even stop to think about the legality of the entire process even
when he did not receive any kind of receipt for the first two deliveries of money worth
P50 million. When he did get a receipt, it was not an official receipt from PNCC, the
legal creditor, but from the President's private secretary. It must also be noted that
the cash was all delivered to Gimenez' office at Aguado St., not to her office at
Malacaang.
(c) Tabuena breached official channels to procure the money. There were no
vouchers nor bills to authorize or support the disbursements. There was also no
certificate of availability of funds. The payment was made in cash without COA's
approval, at a time when the ceiling for cash payments was merely P5,000.00. As
stated earlier, no official receipt from PNCC supported the payment. The entire
process was "done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing
requirements."
As regards the payments to Roa-Gimenez, these were absolutely unwarranted because whatever
"authority" she claimed to have emanated, not from the creditor PNCC but from the President.
Petitioners were required by law to settle their indebtedness with PNCC directly, the party in whose
favor the obligation was constituted. 22 The only instance when such questionable payment could have
been valid was if it had redounded to PNCC's benefit, which was not proved at all in this case. 23 As
creditor, the PNCC was not even bound to accept payment, if any, from the President's private secretary,
the latter being a third person who had no interest whatsoever in the discharge of MIAA's obligation. 24
The ponencia states that the Marcos Memorandum was "patently lawful for no law makes the
payment of an obligation illegal."
This statement is premised on the existence of an established creditor-debtor relationship between
the payor and the payee. In this, case, however, the obligor was being made to pay to a party other
than the legal obligee when no novation of the obligation has taken place. How can such an
arrangement be possibly in accord with law?
The preceding established facts clearly show that petitioners were remiss in discharging their duties
as accountable officers. As correctly observed by the court a quo:
. . .(T)he Ongpin Memorandum could not justify Pres. Marcos' memorandum of
January 8, 1986; this in turn could not justify Luis Tabuena's payment of P55 million
to Fe Roa Gimenez.

. . . (T)he amount which could be payable by Tabuena in his capacity as head of the
MIAA in January of 1986 could not be in excess of P27.931 million until other
claims had been duly approved. This approval, on the other hand, could not come
from the President but from the Price Escalation Committee (PEC) before which,
according to the Ongpin Memorandum itself, these claims for escalation had been
submitted for approval.
The PEC was not shown to have approved these amounts as of the time Tabuena
made any of the withdrawals for P55 million.
xxx xxx xxx
Tabuena says he had properly accounted for the P55 million he had withdrawn from
the MIAA's funds. By this Tabuena means he gave the money to Fe Roa Gimenez,
presumably in representation of Pres. Ferdinand Marcos.
Neither Pres. Marcos, however, nor Fe Roa Gimenez was entitled to receive or issue
acquittance for a debt in favor of the PNCC. Tabuena's claim, therefore, that he
delivered the P55 million to her is not properly accounting for P55 million.
In fact, when we come right down to it, nobody has issued an acquittance in behalf of
the PNCC for the P55 million paid by Luis Tabuena. Since Tabuena says he was
paying P55 million to the PNCC, it was incumbent upon him to show a receipt from or
in behalf of the PNCC. Tabuena has shown no receipt.
Tabuena was not authorized to part with government money without receipt
When Tabuena gave P55 million intended for the PNCC to Fe Roa Gimenez or to
Pres. Marcos, Tabuena was paying government funds to persons not entitled to
receive those funds. He was, therefore, guilty of malversation of those funds.
xxx xxx xxx
Tabuena says he has accounted for the money because he has told us where the
money went. But to account, in the more proper use of the term, injects a sense of
responsibility for the disposition of funds for which one is answerable.
So when one asks if Tabuena has accounted for the P55 million belonging to the
MIAA, the question really is whether accused Tabuena disposed of the sum in a
responsible manner consistent with his duty. The answer must be in the negative.
Payments must be delivered to payees. Payments intended for the PNCC must be
delivered to the PNCC or to someone authorized by the PNCC to accept payments
for it. Neither Pres. Marcos nor Fe Roa Gimenez are shown to have been authorized
to accept money for the PNCC nor to deliver money to the PNCC (or to any creditor
of the MIAA for that matter). In fact, though Pres. Marcos may have been the

Supreme Magistrate of the land and the chief enforcer of the law, the law neither
authorized him to pay for the MIAA nor to accept money for the PNCC.
Accused Tabuena's statement, therefore, that he had presented overwhelming
evidence of the delivery of the P55 million to Pres. Marcos' private secretary does
not prove that he has accounted for that money, that is, that he has properly
disposed of that sum according to law.
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55
million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or
of the PNCC.
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
abandonment, some other person to take such public funds. Having done so,
Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically demonstrated that he is guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of P55 million of public funds. 25
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the findings of fact of the trial court, owing to its enviable
position of having seen the physical evidence and observed the witnesses as they testified. We see
no reason to depart now from this policy.
Tabuena was also personally accountable for the funds in his custody, being the head of a
government agency such as MIAA and discharging fiscal functions as such. In this regard, the
Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Rev. 1993) (The Manual) states, inter alia:
TITLE IV. ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR
GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND
PROPERTY
Government officials and employees, in the discharge of fiscal functions, shall ensure
that all government resources are managed, expended and utilized in accordance
with law, rules and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage thru illegal
or improper disposition.
In the implementation of the above functions, they shall be guided by the following
provisions:
Sec. 26. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND PROPERTY
26.1. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the
possession or custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor
and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.
26.2 Every accountable officer shall be properly bonded in accordance with law.
Sec. 27. RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND PROPERTY

The head of any agency of the government is immediately and primarily responsible
for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency.
Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of the funds or property under the
agency head shall be immediately responsible to him without prejudice to the liability
of either party to the government.
Sec. 28. SUPERVISION OVER ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS
The head of any agency or instrumentality of the national government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation and any other self-governing board or
commission of the government shall exercise the diligence of good father of a family
in supervising the accountable officers under his control to prevent the incurrence of
loss of government funds or property, otherwise he shall be jointly and severally
liable with the person primarily accountable therefor. . . .
Sec. 29. LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTABLE, SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE
OFFICERS FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS
29.1 Every officer accountable for government funds shall be liable for alllosses
resulting from the unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses
attributable to negligence in the keeping of the funds.
29.2 Liability of Superior Officers. A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts
done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
29.5 Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be
civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under order
or instructions of his superiors.
Sec. 30. LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL EXPENDITURES OR USES OF
GOVERNMENT FUNDS
30.1.1 Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation
of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor.
30.1.2 Every expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in violation of law or of
the annual budgetary measure shall be void. Every payment made in violation
thereof shall be illegal and every official or employee authorizing or making such
payment, or taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be

jointly and severally liable for the full amount so paid or received. (Emphasis
supplied)
The ponente points out that our reference to the Manual supports the view that Tabuena was only
civilly liable.
This is a misappreciation of the entire sense of the dissent. It must be borne in mind that said
reference was made after the conclusion was reached that Tabuena was indeed criminally liable for
his acts. It is hornbook knowledge that criminal liability carries with it the civil, specially when, as in
this case, the latter arose from the former. Hence, the statement: "Tabuena was also personally
accountable for the funds in his custody, . . . ."
Sections 29.2 and 29.5 of the Manual, which the ponente uses to illustrate his point, actually
includes exceptions to the grant of immunity from civil liability of a public officer for acts done in the
performance of his official duties: (a) The preceding statement itself says that the acts must be done
"in the performance of his official duties;" (b) Sec. 29.2 exempts him from civil liability, "unless there
is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence;" and (c) Sec. 29.5 states that "he shall
be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and
good customs even if he acted under order or instructions of his superiors." The quoted provisions
have been once more underscored herein.
The ponencia futher states that "(t)here is no showing that Tabuena has anything to do whatsoever
with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum." But very clearly, the admitted facts show that it
was precisely Tabuena who implemented or executed the said Memorandum.
The ponencia cites Acebedo where the accused was acquitted after it was shown that it was actually
the latter's secretary who collected and converted the money. Tabuena's case is starkly different, for
here it was Tabuena himself who personally turned over the money to the President's secretary. It
was done with his full knowledge and consent, the obvious irregularity thereof notwithstanding.
In petitioner Peralta's case, we again yield to the factual findings of the trial court. It said:
. . . . The question is whether or not Peralta properly signed the third application for
the issuance of a Manager's Check drawn against the MIAA's savings account with
the Villamor Office of the Philippine National Bank.
At the time that accused Peralta signed the request for the issuance of a Manager's
Check, he was the Acting Financial Services Manager of the MIAA and all
withdrawals of funds required is (sic) co-signature.
The reason for the designation of more than one co-signatory is not merely useless
ceremony; it is to serve as a counter check for the propriety of the disbursement.
While, indeed, accused Luis Tabuena was the highest official in the MIAA and had
authority to disburse its funds, this authority was not absolute. It had to be for
properly subsisting obligations and the disbursement had to be against funds existing

for that purpose. This is one reason for the need for supporting documentation before
disbursements of funds are authorized. And this is the special need for finance
officers such as Adolfo Peralta, as Financial Services Manager, to be co-signatories
(sic): to ascertain the validity of the obligation and, in this particular instance, the
existence of the balance to be covered by the manager's check the application for
which had been presented for his co-signature.
In this case, Adolfo Peralta speaks of the existence of (the) P27.9 million liability in
favor of the PNCC as justification for his acts herein. True enough, for that amount
was the liability as of December 31, 1985. As finance officer, however, he could not
claim ignorance of the fact that as of January 29, 1986, the date of the application for
a manager's check which he signed, two previous manager's checks worth P25
million each had already been applied for and the total amount of P50 million had
already been withdrawn . . . .
It was only two weeks after these two withdrawals when Peralta, as Finance Services
Manager, participated in the authorization for the disbursement of another P5 million.
This last withdrawal brought up the total of withdrawals to P55 million for the
payment of a P27.9 million obligation.
Thus while it is true, as Adolfo Peralta claims, that there was a liability in favor of the
PNCC, there was no way Peralta could disclaim responsibility for the excessive
withdrawals to the extent of P5 million thereof allegedly to pay that liability. There was
no way Peralta could justify his co-signing the application for a manager's check for
P5 million on January 29, 1986.
The ponente cites a dissenting opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Development Bank of the
Philippines v.Pandogar to uphold his ponencia. Need we remind our respected colleague that the
corroborative value of a dissenting opinion is minimal? Precisely, it supports a position contrary to,
and obviously unacceptable to the majority.
Petitioners were found guilty of malversation by negligence, which is possible even if the charge was
for intentional malversation. This does not negate, however, their criminal liability; it merely declares
that negligence takes the place of malice. Article 3 of the Code provides the rationale when it
explicitly states that "felonies are committed not only by means of deceit but also by means of fault."
The Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioners converted and misappropriated the P55 million cannot
simply be brushed aside upon petitioners' claim that the money was delivered in good faith to the
Office of the President under the mistaken assumption that the President was entitled to receive the
same. They rely on the case ofPeople v. Fabian, 26 which declared that "(g)ood faith in the payment of
public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation." But the very same decision also
cites Article 217 to the effect that malversation may be committed by an accountable public officer by
negligence if he permits any other person to take the public funds or property in his custody. It is
immaterial if petitioners actually converted or misappropriated MIAA's funds for their own benefit, for by
their very negligence, they allowed another person to appropriate the same.

The fact that no conspiracy was established between petitioners and the true embezzlers of the P55
million is likewise of no moment. The crime of malversation, as defined under Article 217 of the
Code, 27 was consummated the moment petitioners deliberately turned over and allowed the President's
private secretary to take custody of public funds intended as payment of MIAA's obligations to the PNCC,
if obligation there was at all. That petitioner Tabuena who was then General Manager of MIAA personally
and knowingly participated in the misfeasance compounds the maleficence of it all. Rank may have its
privileges but certainly a blatant disregard of law and administrative rules is not one of them. It must be
etched in the minds of public officials that the underside of privileges is responsibilities.
As accountable officers, petitioners clearly transgressed administrative and legal bounds. Even on
the pretext of obeying a superior's seemingly legitimate orders, their actuations can hardly be
justified. To rule otherwise would set an alarming precedent where all that public officials who have
unlawfully enriched themselves at the people's expense and those accused of graft and corruption
would have to do to exculpate themselves from any wrongdoing would be to invoke Article 11,
paragraph 6 of the Code, thus gaining instant immunity from criminal prosecution.
Government officials, particularly heads of their agencies who, by virtue of their exalted positions
exude power and authority but pay blind obeisance to orders of those higher up in the bureaucratic
hierarchy regardless of the illegality, impropriety or immorality of such orders, would do well to
internalize this prayer for national leaders delivered by former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga in
Malacanang on November 24, 1996:
xxx xxx xxx
When they begin to think of how much power they possess, help them to know the
many things that are beyond their power the change of seasons, sun and rain,
moonlight and starlight and all the wonders of Your creation;
When they are led to believe that they are exempt from public accountability, help
them to know that they are ultimately accountable to You, the God of truth and
justice and mercy;
xxx xxx xxx
The ponencia makes the final observation that the limitations on the right of judges to ask questions
during the trial were not observed by respondent court; that the three Justices who heard the
testimonies asked 37 questions of witness Francis Monera, 67 of Tabuena, and 41 of Peralta
more than what the prosecutors and defense counsels propounded.
While such numbers unduly disturbed the ponente, it cannot be gainsaid that such action by the
members of the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan was, under the circumstances, not only
necessary and called for, but likewise legally acceptable.
In the first place, even the ponente makes the observation that petitioners did not raise this matter as
error. In other words, they did not feel prejudiced by the respondent court's actuations; nor did they

construe the series of questions asked of them by the Justices as indicative of any unfairness or
partiality violative of their right to due process.
Then, too, it must be noted that there is a difference in the right of a judge in a non-jury system, like
that obtaining in the Philippines, to question witnesses or parties themselves, and that of a judge in a
jury trial. The bulk of jurisprudence used in the ponencia was decided in the United States, where
the jury system is extensively utilized in civil as well as in criminal trials. In this regard, "(i)t has been
noted that the opinion of the judge, on account of his position and the respect and confidence
reposed in him and in his learning and assumed impartiality, is likely to have great weight with the
jury, and such fact of necessity requires impartial conduct on his part. The judge is a figure of
overpowering influence, whose every change in facial expression is noted, and whose every word is
received attentively and acted upon with alacrity and without question." 28
Thus, while a trial judge is expected to be circumspect in his choice of words lest they be construed
as signs of partiality, he "is not, however, required to remain silent and passive throughout a jury
trial;" 29 he should, instead, "conduct a trial in an orderly way with a view to eliciting the truth and to
attaining justice between the parties." 30
Inasmuch as it is the jury which has the burden of meting out justice, it is acceptable for a judge in a
jury trial to "ask any question which would be proper for the prosecutor or defense counsel to ask so
long as he does not depart from a standard of fairness and impartiality." 31 "Questions designed to
clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence, particularly in a non-jury trial, are not improper." 32
The numerous questions asked by the court a quo should have been scrutinized for any possible
influence it may have had in arriving at the assailed decision. The true test for the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of court queries is not their quantity but their quality, that is, whether the defendant
was prejudiced by such questioning. 33To repeat, petitioners did not feel prejudiced by the trial court's
actions; otherwise, they would have raised this issue in the instant petition.
The ponencia states that he is "well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set
a dangerous precedent in that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public
would be able to escape criminal liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith." Our position
has been either misinterpreted or misread for we do not merely speak of "good faith." In fact, our
main thrust is that such a breed of people who enriched themselves at the expense of the public
might handily use as an excuse or a justifying circumstance to escape liability their having obeyed
the "lawful orders" of their superior under Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ponente makes a plea towards the close of his decision, that we should not act impulsively in
the instant case. "In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must
not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers
upon an innocent."
In our opinion, precisely, Tabuena and Peralta are wrongdoers, guilty of acts punishable by law.
Needless to say, under our system of laws, they must be meted out the corresponding penalty. We
draw attention to the fact that nowhere in this dissent do we single out the so-called "malefactors of
the Marcos regime" alone. We addressed ourselves to all who commit venalities at the expense of

the people, as defined and punished by law but who try to justify their actions by invoking the very
law which they violated.
For the reasons stated above, I vote to affirm petitioners' conviction by respondent court.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

I join the Dissenting Opinion of Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero where I find both right and
righteousness happily intersecting each other. I am, however, constrained to write this brief dissent
in view of the impact of the majority decision to our criminal justice system which many perceive
leaves much to be desired.
I
It should be immediately stressed that petitioners were convicted of the crime of malversation by
negligence. The felony was committed by petitioners not by means of deceit (dolo) but by fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Justice J.B.L. Reyes explains the
difference between a felony committed by deceit and that committed by fault in this wise: ". . . In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible." 1
In light of this well-carved distinction, the long discourse of the majority decision hailing petitioners'
good faith or lack of intent to commit malversation is off-line. To justify the acquittal of petitioners, the
majority should strive to show that petitioners did not commit any imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill in obeying the order of former President Marcos. This is nothing less than a
mission impossible for the totality of the evidence proves the utter carelessness of petitioners in the
discharge of their duty as public officials. The evidence and their interstices are adequately
examined in the dissent of Madame Justice Romero and they need not be belabored.
For the same reason, the majority cannot rely on the doctrine of mistake of fact as ground to acquit
petitioners. It found as a fact that ". . . Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million
was a due and demandable debt. . . ." This Court has never applied the doctrine of mistake of fact
when negligence can be imputed to the accused. In the old, familiar case of People vs. Ah
Chong, 2 Mr. Justice Carson explained that ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charge (e.g., in larceny animus furendi, in murder, malice, etc.), cancels the presumption of intent and
works an acquittal, except in those cases where the circumstances demand conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence. Hence, Ah Chong was acquitted when he mistook his houseboy
as a robber and the evidence showed that his mistake of fact was not due to negligence. In the case at
bar, the negligence of the petitioners screams from page to page of the records of the case. Petitioners

themselves admitted that the payments they made were "out of the ordinary" and "not based on normal
procedure."

As aforestated, the cornerstone of the majority decision is its finding of good faith on the part of the
petitioners. Viewed from a more critical lens, however, the evidence cannot justify a finding of good
faith. The violations of auditing rules are too many yet the majority merely winks at them by ruling
that petitioner Tabuena ". . . did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement considering the fact that the Marcos Memorandum enjoined 'immediate compliance'
with the directive that he forward to the President's Office the P55 million in cash." With due respect,
I am disquieted by the mischiefs that will be mothered by this ruling. To begin with, the country was
no longer under martial rule in 1986 and petitioners were under no compulsion to violate our laws. It
also ought to be obvious that the order for immediate compliance even if made by the former
President cannot be interpreted as a green signal by a subordinate official to disregard our laws.
Indeed, no person, not even the President can order the violation of our laws under any excuse
whatsoever. The first and foremost duty of the President is to uphold the sanctity of our laws. Thus,
the Constitution requires the President to take an oath or affirmation where he makes the solemn
pledge to the people: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. . . . 3 To be sure, the need for
petitioners to make an immediate payment is really not that immediate. The facts show that former
President Marcos first called petitioner Tabuena by telephone and asked him to make the payment. One
week after or on January 8, 1986, the former President issued a written memorandum reiterating the
order to pay. Payments were made in three tranches the first on January 10, 1986, the second on
January 16, 1986 and the third on January 31, 1986. Clearly then, it took petitioner one month to comply
with the Order. Given the personnel of petitioner Tabuena in his office, one month provides enough time
to comply with the rules. In any event, petitioners did not request former President Marcos for additional
time to comply with the rules if they felt in good faith that they needed more time. Petitioners shortcircuited the rules by themselves. Nothing in the Marcos Memorandum compelled them to disregard the
rules. The Memorandum merely stated "Your immediate compliance is appreciated". The language of the
Memorandum was as polite as it could be. I fail to discern any duress in the request as the majority did.
II
The determination of the degree of participation that should be allowed to a judge in the questioning
of a witness is a slippery slope in constitutional law. To a certain extent, I agree with the majority that
some of the questions propounded by the justices of the respondent Court crossed the limits of
propriety. Be that as it may, I am not prepared to conclude with certainty that the text and tone of the
questions denied petitioners the right to an impartial trial. Bias is a state of mind which easily eludes
evidence. On the basis of the evidence before us, we cannot hold that we have plumbed the depth
of prejudice of the justices and have unearthed their partiality. The more telling evidence against the
petitioners are documentary in nature. They are not derived from the answers elicited by questions
from the justices which the majority, sua sponte, examined and condemned as improper.
III
Finally, I can not but view with concern the probability that the majority decision will chill complaints
againsts graft pending before the respondent Court. From the majority decision, it is crystalline that

petitioners blindly obeyed the Marcos Memorandum despite its fatal and facial flaws. The majority
even quotes these inculpatory admissions of petitioner Tabuena, viz: 4
xxx xxx xxx
AJ del Rosario
xxx xxx xxx
Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no
voucher to cover such payment? In other words, why was the
delivery of the money not covered by any voucher?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President,
your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena
Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this particular
disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
AJ del Rosario
Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of
the President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation
to another entity?
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the
President.
PJ Garchitorena
Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.
AJ del Rosario
Q Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such
payment was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.
Q Why not?

A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed your

Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ Hermosisima
Q Why were you not made to pay directly to the PNCC considering
that you are the manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a
separate corporation, not an adjunct of Malacanang?
A I was just basing it from the Order of the Malacanang to pay PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact
that this was not the regular course or Malacanang was not the
creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming from the
President, your Honor.
In effect, petitioners' shocking submission is that the President is always right, a frightening
echo of the antedeluvian idea that the King can do no wrong. By allowing the petitioners to
walk, the majority has validated petitioners' belief that the President should always be
obeyed as if the President is above and beyond the law. I cannot accept this dangerous
ruling even if I look at it through the eyes of faith. One of the gospels in constitutional law is
that the President is powerful but is not more paramount than the law. And in criminal law,
our catechism teaches us that it is loyalty to the law that saves, not loyalty to any man. Let
us not bid goodbye to these sacrosanct principles.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
In the main, the majority ruled that Petitioners Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta should be acquitted
because they were merely obeying the order of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to deliver "thru
this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of
MIAA's account" with the Philippine National Construction Company. In their Dissenting Opinions,
Justices Romero, Davide and Puno have shown how weak and unpersuasive this ruling is under
applicable Philippine laws and jurisprudence. I will not repeat their illuminative discussions. Let me
just stress three more points:
(1) The defense of "obedience to a superior's order" is already obsolete. Fifty years ago, the Nazi
war criminals tried to justify genocide against the Jews and their other crimes against humanity by

alleging they were merely following the orders of Adolf Hitler, their adored fuehrer. However, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its Judgment dated October 1, 1946, 1 forcefully
debunked this Nazi argument and clearly ruled that "(t)he true test . . . is not the existence of the order but
whether moral choice was in fact possible."
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution firmly entrenching the principle
of moral choice, inter alia, as follows: 2
The fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.
In the Nuremberg trials, the defendants were military officers of the Third Reich who were dutybound to obeydirect orders on pain of court martial and death at a time when their country was
at war. Nonetheless, they were meted out death sentences by hanging or long-term imprisonments.
In the present case, the accused are civilian officials purportedly complying with a memorandum of
the Chief Executive when martial law had already been lifted and the nation was in fact just about to
vote in the "snap" presidential election in 1986. The Sandiganbayan did not impose death but only
imprisonment ranging from seventeen years and one day to twenty years. Certainly a moral choice
was not only possible. It was in fact available to the accused. They could have opted to defy the
illegal order, with no risk of court martial or death. Or they could have resigned. They knew or should
have known that the P55 million was to be paid for a debt that was dubious 3 and in a manner that was
irregular. That the money was to be remitted in cold cash and delivered to the private secretary of the
President, and not by the normal crossed check to the alleged creditor, gave them a moral choice to
refuse. That they opted to cooperate compounded their guilt to a blatant conspiracy to defraud the public
treasury.
(2) Resurrecting this internationally discredited Nazi defense will, I respectfully submit, set a
dangerous precedent in this country. Allowing the petitioners to walk deprives this Court of the moral
authority to convict any subaltern of the martial law dictator who was merely "following orders." This
ludicrous defense can be invoked in all criminal cases pending not only before this Court but more
so before inferior courts, which will have no legal option but to follow this Court's doctrine. 4
(3) Mercy and compassion are virtues which are cherished in every civilized society. But before they
can be invoked, there must first be justice. The Supreme Court's duty is to render justice. The power
to dispense pardon lies elsewhere. Verily, the Constitution ordains a final conviction by the courts
before the President can exercise his power to wipe away penalty. 5 Such is the legal and natural
precedence and order of things: justice first before mercy. And only he who sincerely repents his sin,
restitutes for it, and reforms his life deserves forgiveness and mercy.
I therefore vote to AFFIRM the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision onvicting the petitioners of
malversation.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
Last 20 September 1996 in Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 1 this Court erected a barrier to the
constitutionally mandated task to recover ill-gotten wealth and in the punishment of those who dirtied their
hands with it. This the Court did by impliedly granting immunity from civil suit or liability under an
expanded interpretation of the lawyer-client privilege, lawyers who were alleged to have acted as coconspirators or dummies of certain parties in the acquisition of such wealth.
The acquittal decreed by the majority in the cases under consideration places another obstacle to
such recovery and punishment by granting immunity from any criminal liability those who were
ordered by then President Marcos to disburse government funds for alleged payment of obligations.
This is the immediate impression anyone can get from the following sweeping pronouncement in
the ponencia. 2
In the case at bench, the order emanated from the office of the President and bears
the signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it
the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is
patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation illegal. This fact,
coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly without
question. Obedientia est legis essentia. . . .
What this suggests is that no one could disobey then President Marcos, a suggestion made
more eloquent with the quotation of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cruz
in Development Bank of the Philippines v.Pundogar. 3 That dissent cannot be used to justify the
petitioners' "obedience," otherwise, this Court would thus overturn the majority opinion in the said
case and adopt the dissent as the new rule.
Henceforth, all those similarly situated as the appellants or those who could simply provide any
reason for theircompelled obedience to Mr. Marcos can go scot-free. The meaning of EDSA and its
message for history would thus be obliterated. The acquittal then perpetuates a sad day for this
Court a day of mourning for those who fought against the dictatorship and of triumph and joy for
the dictator's collaborators, nominees, associates, and friends.
I cannot join the majority in these cases.
My analysis of the ponencia indicates that the acquittal is based on the following:
1. The accused-appellants merely acted in obedience to an order by
a superior for some lawful purpose; hence, they incur no criminal
liability pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Even granting that the order was not for a lawful purpose, they
acted in good faith.

3. Their basic constitutional right to due process was violated by the

way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves.
I
I shall first take up the third.
The ponencia admits that the appellants did not raise as an issue the Sandiganbayan's violation of
their right to due process; nevertheless, it ruled that such failure is not an impediment to the
consideration of the violation "as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an
appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to
correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the
subject of assignments of error or not. 4
I beg to disagree.
First, there is no showing at all that the extensive participation by the Justices of the Sandiganbayan
in questioning the appellants and their witness indicated prejudgment of guilt, bias, hatred, or
hostility against the said appellants. On the contrary, the quoted portions of the questions
propounded by the Justices manifest nothing but a sincere desire to ferret out the facts to arrive at
the truth which are crucial in the determination of the innocence or guilt of the appellants. These
Justices, as trial magistrates, have only exercised one of the inherent rights of a judge in the
exercise of judicial function. What this Court stated eighty-three years ago inUnited States
v. Hudieres 5 needs repeating:
It is very clear, however, from a review of the whole proceedings that the only object
of the trial judge in propounding these questions was to endeavor as far as possible
to get at the truth as to the facts to which the witnesses were testifying. The right of a
trial judge to question the witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any
material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides
is too well established to need discussion. The trial judges in this jurisdiction are
judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance
of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to
propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material fact
upon which the judgment of the case should turn. So in a case where a trial judge
sees that the degree of credit which he is to give the testimony of a given witness
may have an important bearing upon the outcome, there can be no question that in
the exercise of a sound discretion he may put such questions to the witness as will
enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or willingness of the witness
to tell the truth. The questions asked by the trial judge in the case at bar were in our
opinion entirely proper, their only purpose being to clarify certain obscure phases of
the case; and while we are inclined to agree with counsel that some of the
observations of the trial judge in the course of his examination might well have been
omitted, there is no reason whatever to believe that the substantial rights of the
defendants were in anywise prejudiced thereby.

That the appellants themselves did not find any impropriety in the conduct of the Justices, or that if
they did they find nothing therein to prejudice their right to due process is best proven by their failure
to assign it as error.
Second, even granting arguendo that the conduct of the Justices constituted such a violation, the
appellants are forever estopped from raising that issue on ground of waiver. This Court would risk an
accusation of undue partiality for the appellants were it to give them premium for their torpor and
then reward them with an acquittal. Such waiver is conclusively proven in these cases. From the
quoted portions of the testimonies of the witnesses for the appellants, it is clear that their counsel did
not object to, or manifest on record his misgivings on, the active participation of the Justices in the
examination (or cross-examination) of the witnesses. Nothing could have prevented the counsel for
the appellants from doing so. Then, too, as correctly pointed out in the ponencia, they made no
assignment of error on the matter.
In our jurisdiction, rights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. 6
In People v. Donato, 7 this Court made the following statement on what rights may be waived:
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable
right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which
affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed
by constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public
policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to
waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made
solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community
at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by
statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be
against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred
by statute andguaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also

been said that constitutional provisions intended to protect property

may be waived, and even some of the constitutional rights created to
secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver. 8
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 9 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two

classes: (a) those in which the state, as well as the accused, is
interested; and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which
are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot
be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to
consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will. 10
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 11 the right to counsel and to remain
silent; 12 and the right to be heard. 13
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill
of Rights. Section 12(1) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:

. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the

presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it,
nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other
form or manner provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can
be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not
be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial
to a third person with a right recognized by law.
In the cases below, the perceived violation, if at all it existed, was not of the absolute totality of due
process, but more appropriately of the right to an impartial trial, which is but an aspect of the
guarantee of due process. 14 I submit that the right to an impartial trial is waivable.
II
I also disagree with the view of the majority that all the requisites of the sixth justifying circumstance
in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code are present. I submit that the 8 January 1986 Memorandum
of President Marcos can by no means be considered a "lawful" order to pay P55 million to the PNCC
as alleged partial payment of the MIAA's account to the former. The alleged basis of such
Memorandum is the 7 January 1985 Memorandum of Trade and Industry Minister Roberto Ongpin,
which even confirms the absence of any factual basis for the order of payment of P55 million:

In this connection, please be informed that Philippine National Construction

Corporation (PNCC), formerly CDCP, has accomplishment billings on the MIA
Development Project aggregating P98.4 million, inclusive of accomplishments for the
aforecited contracts. In accordance with contract provisions, outstanding advances
totalling P93.9 million are to be deducted from said billings which will leave a net
amount due to PNCC of only P4.5 million, thus:
At the same time, PNCC has potential escalation claims amounting to P99 million in
the following states of approved/evaluation:
Approved by Price Escalation Committee
(PEC) but pending for lack of funds P 1.9 million
Endorsed by project consultants and
currently being evaluated by PEC 30.7 million
Submitted by PNCC directly to PEC
and currently under evaluation 66.5 million

T o t a l P99.1 million
There has been no funding allocation for any of the above escalation claims due to
budgetary constraints.
The MIA Project has been completed and operational as far back as 1982 and yet
residual amounts due to PNCC have not been paid, resulting in undue burden to
PNCC due to additional cost of money to service its obligations for this contract.
To allow PNCC to collect partially its billings, and in consideration of its pending
escalation billings, may we request for His Excellency's approval for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million corresponding to
about 30% of P99.1 million in escalation claims of PNCC, of which P32.5 million has
been officially recognized by MIADP consultants but could not be paid due to lack of
fundings.
Our proposal will allow BAT to pay PNCC the amount of P34.5 million out of existing
MIA Project funds. This amount represents the excess of the gross billings of PNCC
of P98.4 million over the undeferred portion of the repayment of advances of P63.9
million.
If Ongpin's memorandum is given full faith, it is clear that PNCC's "accomplishment billings" for work
accomplished, including accomplishments on the "supplemental contracts" (whose authority therefor
was just sought for), aggregated to P98.4 million. Since there were advances given to PNCC in the
total amount of P93.9 million, the net amount due the PNCC was only P4.5 million.

However, in view of the approval by then President Marcos of Ongpin's request "for a deferment of
the repayment of PNCC's advances to the extent of P30 million," only P63.9 million of PNCC's
advances was to be deducted from the accomplishment billings of P98.4 million. The net amount
due thus became P34.5 million. Hence, as pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, if any payments were
due under Ongpin's Memorandum they would only be for that amount (P34.5 million). The Order of
then President Marcos to withdraw has, therefore, exceeded by P20.5 million. Clearly, the order of
payment of P55 million had no factual and legal basis and was therefore unlawful.
III
Not an iota of good faith was shown in the conduct of the appellants.
Being responsible accountable officers of the MIAA, they were presumed to know that, in light of "the
undeferred portion of the repayment" of PNCC's advances in the amount of P63.9 million, the
MIAA's unpaid balance was only P34.5 million. They also ought to know the procedure to be
followed in the payment of contractual obligations. First and foremost there were the submission by
the PNCC of its claims with the required supporting documents and the approval of the claims by the
appropriate approving authority of MIAA. When then President Marcos ordered immediate payment,
he should not have been understood as to order suspension of the accepted budgeting, accounting,
and auditing rules on the matter. Parenthetically, it may be stated here that although President
Marcos was a dictator, he was reported to be, and even projected himself as, a "faithful" advocate of
the rule of law. As a matter of fact, he did not hesitate to issue a decree, letter of instruction, or any
presidential issuance in anticipation of any planned actions or activities to give the latter the facade
or semblance of legality, wisdom, or propriety. When he made the order to appellant Tabuena,
President Marcos must only be understood to order expeditious compliance with the requirements to
facilitate immediate release of the money. There was no way for Tabuena to entertain any fear that
disobedience to the order because of its unlawfulness or delay in the execution of the order due to
compliance with the requirements would cause his head or life. He offered no credible evidence for
such fear. This Court should not provide one for him. That Tabuena served Mr. Marcos until the end
of the latter's regime and even beyond only proved a loyalty not based on fear but on other
considerations.
Moreover, the manner the appellant effected the withdrawal was most unusual, irregular, and
anomalous. He has not shown any evidence that what he did was the usual practice in his office.
What happened in this case showed the appellants' complicity as principals by direct participation in
the malversation of the MIAA's funds. The appellants should, therefore, be thankful to the
Sandiganbayan for holding them liable therefor only through negligence.
I vote then to AFFIRM in toto the assailed decision.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
ROMERO, J., dissenting:

Obedience, rightly directed, is a virtue well-worth cultivating obedience of children to their elders;
obedience to lawful authority by citizens; obedience to the behests of what is highest and finest in
one's self.
Misguided, such as indiscriminate obeisance to questionable mandates, no matter if emanating from
authoritative figures whose slightest whisper and scribbled orders are law, this can lead man to
perdition.
In government, a pliant bureaucracy that is disinclined to resist unethical, immoral, even downright
illegal directives from "above" is easily corrupted and can only bring disrepute to the entire system.
In this context, can subordinate public officials like herein petitioner escape criminal prosecution by
the simple expedient of claiming that they were merely following orders from a superior? This
disquisition will demonstrate that certain requisites are indispensable before anyone can claim
immunity from penal sanctions for seemingly justifiable acts.
This dissenting opinion will narrate the facts for the sake of accuracy for the ponencia seems to have
overlooked or glossed over vital circumstances which make the conclusion embodied herein
irresistible.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (the Code) for
alleged malversation of a total of P55 million from the public funds of the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA). The informations filed on three separate dates in 1986 accused them, as
accountable officers, of intentionally withdrawing said amount for the ostensible purpose of paying a
non-existent obligation of MIAA to the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), but
which they misappropriated and converted for their personal use and benefit.
In their defense, petitioners claimed they acted in good faith and in compliance with a verbal and
later, a written order from no less than former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In a Presidential
Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated January 8, 1986, the latter allegedly commanded
petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of MIAA, "to pay immediately the Philippine
National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of MIAA's account with said
Company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Roberto Ongpin to this
Office dated January 7, 1985 . . . ." 1 (The Ongpin Memorandum). On the assumption that MIAA indeed
had a due and demandable debt to PNCC for work done on the airport, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo
G. Dabao and Adolfo M. Peralta, MIAA Assistant General Manager and Financial Services Department
Acting Manager, respectively, made three withdrawals from the account of MIAA with the Philippine
National Bank first, on January 10, 1986 for P25 million, then on January 16, 1986 for another P25 million
and lastly, on January 31, 1986 for P5 million. The three manager's checks covering the withdrawals were
all applied for and issued in the name of Tabuena. Curiously, while the checks were issued by the MIA
extension office of PNB, they were encashed at the Villamor Air Base branch. Each time the cash was
delivered directly to the office of Marcos' private secretary, Fe Roa-Gimenez. The latter issued a
receipt 2 signed by her but only after the last delivery. No PNCC receipt was ever given to petitioners.
On October 22, 1990, the Sandiganbayan's First Division rendered a decision finding petitioners
guilty.

Petitioners raise two issues, namely, that they were charged with intentional malversation (which
they labelled as malversation by direct appropriation) but were convicted of malversation by
negligence, and that they acted in good faith.
As regards the first argument, the variance between the crime charged and that proved by the
prosecution is immaterial, as stated by the ponente.
As regards the second issue, it is argued that good faith is a valid defense in malversation for it
negates criminal intent. Petitioners claim that when they committed the acts complained of, they
were merely following then President Marcos' oral and written directives. They rely on Article 11,
paragraph 6 of the Code which states, inter alia:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.
For an act to be justified under the abovequoted provision, therefore, three requisites must concur:
(a) an order must have been issued by a superior; (b) the order must be for a lawful purpose; and (c)
the means used by the subordinate in carrying out such order must itself be lawful. 3
In the case at bar, Tabuena was allegedly ordered by President Marcos to pay the PNCC from
MIAA's fund, thus ostensibly meeting the first requirement but not the others. For there is a
qualification which significantly changes the picture. The payment was to be in cash and immediately
made through the Office of the President. It is to be pointed out that it is one thing to be ordered to
pay a due and demandable obligation; it is another to make such payment to someone other than
the lawful obligee and worse, when the subordinate is forced to breach official channels to comply
with the order.
It must be stressed that Tabuena and his co-accused, Peralta and Dabao, disregarded standard
operating procedures in following the President's order. As observed by the Sandiganbayan, "there
were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills to support the
disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for an unquestionably
staggering sum of P55 Million." Disbursement vouchers are specifically required under Sec. 4 (5) of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 (P.D. No. 1445), while the certificate of availability of funds is needed
to comply with Sec. 47, Title I-B, Bk. V of the Administrative Code of 1987 4 and Sec. 344 of the Local
Government Code of 1991. 5 To compound the duplicity, the checks, issued by one branch of PNB were
encashed in another all made in cash instead of by crossed check payable to PNCC! Conspicuously,
such cash outlay was made without prior approval or authority of the Commission on Audit. 6 Finally, the
last two payments were made despite the non-issuance of a receipt for the first. In fact, the receipt given
after the delivery of the last installment was not even issued by the PNCC, the legal obligee and avowed
recipient of the money. Instead it emanated from the office of Roa-Gimenez, a complete stranger to the
alleged contract between MIAA and PNCC, who did not even indicate in what capacity she signed it. To
compound the mystery, the money was even delivered to her office, not in Malacaang, but at nearby
Aguado Street. The entire process, done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing

requirements was, in the words of petitioners themselves, an extraordinary transaction," 7 admittedly "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on normal procedure." 8

Disbursement of government funds, especially one as gargantuan as the one made by petitioners, is
a complex process, unlike the basic over-the-counter transaction that they purportedly made it to
appear. Far from being lawful, the payment of the alleged obligation of MIAA to PNCC through the
Office of the President may at best be labelled as irregular. "The term 'irregular expenditure' signifies
an expenditure incurred without adhering to established rules, regulations, procedural guidelines,
policies, principles or practices that have gained recognition in law. Irregular expenditures are
incurred without conforming with prescribed usages and rules of discipline. There is no observance
of an established pattern, course, mode of action, behavior, or conduct in the incurrence of an
irregular expenditure. . . . ." 9
Specifically, disbursement of public funds must conform with the following principles:
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.10
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium. 11
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which this special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government. 12
(4) All resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage through
illegal or improper disposition to ensure efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. The responsibility to take care such policy is faithfully adhered
to rests directly with the chief or head of the government agency concerned. 13
(5) Disbursement or disposition of government funds or property shall invariably bear the
approval of the proper officials. 14
(6) Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete documentation.

15

(7) All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be faithfully adhered
to. 16
(8) Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as of sound
management and fiscal administration shall be observed, provided that they do not
contravene existing laws and regulations. 17

Assuming arguendo that petitioners acted in good faith in following the President's order, undeniably,
they were negligent as found by the trial court. The instructions in the President's order should have
sufficed to put any accountable head of an office, Tabuena included, on guard. Why was he being
required to pay MIAA's obligation to the PNCC, if indeed there were any, and not directly to the latter
but through the Office of the President? Why was the entire transaction not coursed through proper
channels, viz., the accounting office? Why was such a huge disbursement to be made in cash,
instead of by crossed check, which is not only safer, faster, and more convenient, but in accord with
auditing requirements?
Obedience to a superior's order does not connote blind obedience. Being the general manager of
such a mammoth organization like the MIAA, he should, at the very least, have exercised ordinary
prudence by verifying with the proper official under him whether the agency had indeed an
outstanding indebtedness to the PNCC before ordering any payment to be made through official
channels. Such routine measures were cavalierly disregarded. The whole process seemed no
different from a petty, personal transaction.
As evidence later revealed, PNCC's receivables from MIAA amounted to P102,475,392.35, the bulk
of which comprised escalation charges. From that time until Corazon C. Aquino assumed the
Presidency, a total of P44.4 million was paid, but only P2 million of this in cash; the rest was set off
or compensated against other debts, or assigned to other creditors. The financial records did not
show that PNCC received any sums of money from MIAA during the period January to June, 1986
when the block payments were being made in quarter millions. Only on September 25, 1986, long
after President Marcos had gone, was an assignment of P23 million actually made by MIAA in favor
of PNCC. 18
Even the Ongpin Memorandum, which is the basis of the Marcos Memorandum, failed to show
where the amount of P55 million cropped up. The former contained, inter alia, the following matters:
(a) it requested the President's approval of Minister Ongpin's recommendations "for eight (8)
supplemental contracts pertaining to the MIA Development Project (MIADP) between the Bureau of
Air Transport (BAT) and Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), formerly
CDCP, . . . ."; 19 (b) it informed the President that PNCC had collectibles from MIAA only in the amount of
P4.5 million, which is the difference between the accomplishment billings on the MIADP totalling P98.4
million and PNCC's advances of P93.9 million; and (c) it informed the President that PNCC had potential
escalation claims against MIAA in the amount of P99 million, "potential" because they have yet to be
approved by the Price Escalation Committee (PEC).
The only remaining piece of evidence which would show that MIAA owed PNCC anything as of the
date of the Marcos Memorandum is MIAA's balance sheet, 20 which indicates its liability to PNCC as of
December 31, 1985 to be P27,931,000.00. 21 How can petitioners claim to have acted in good faith when
they withdrew the P55 million from MIAA's funds knowing fully well that the amount due PNCC was only a
little over half that amount, as shown by their own evidence?
The ponencia states that ". . . . the good faith of Tabuena . . . . was not at all affected even if it later
turned out that PNCC never received the money."
It is precisely our thesis that Tabuena did not act in good faith in complying with the President's
orders because of the reasons aforesatated, summarized as follows:

(a) The President's order was "out of the ordinary" and "not based on normal
procedure," which would have entailed making an "extraordinary transaction," as
admitted by petitioners themselves. This proves that they were, at the time they
received the order, aware that paying MIAA's supposed P55 million obligation to
PNCC through the Office of the President in cash was questionable.
(b) As the head of MIAA, Tabuena should have been more cautious in disbursing the
funds. He did not even stop to think about the legality of the entire process even
when he did not receive any kind of receipt for the first two deliveries of money worth
P50 million. When he did get a receipt, it was not an official receipt from PNCC, the
legal creditor, but from the President's private secretary. It must also be noted that
the cash was all delivered to Gimenez' office at Aguado St., not to her office at
Malacaang.
(c) Tabuena breached official channels to procure the money. There were no
vouchers nor bills to authorize or support the disbursements. There was also no
certificate of availability of funds. The payment was made in cash without COA's
approval, at a time when the ceiling for cash payments was merely P5,000.00. As
stated earlier, no official receipt from PNCC supported the payment. The entire
process was "done with haste and with a total disregard of appropriate auditing
requirements."
As regards the payments to Roa-Gimenez, these were absolutely unwarranted because whatever
"authority" she claimed to have emanated, not from the creditor PNCC but from the President.
Petitioners were required by law to settle their indebtedness with PNCC directly, the party in whose
favor the obligation was constituted. 22 The only instance when such questionable payment could have
been valid was if it had redounded to PNCC's benefit, which was not proved at all in this case. 23 As
creditor, the PNCC was not even bound to accept payment, if any, from the President's private secretary,
the latter being a third person who had no interest whatsoever in the discharge of MIAA's obligation. 24
The ponencia states that the Marcos Memorandum was "patently lawful for no law makes the
payment of an obligation illegal."
This statement is premised on the existence of an established creditor-debtor relationship between
the payor and the payee. In this, case, however, the obligor was being made to pay to a party other
than the legal obligee when no novation of the obligation has taken place. How can such an
arrangement be possibly in accord with law?
The preceding established facts clearly show that petitioners were remiss in discharging their duties
as accountable officers. As correctly observed by the court a quo:
. . .(T)he Ongpin Memorandum could not justify Pres. Marcos' memorandum of
January 8, 1986; this in turn could not justify Luis Tabuena's payment of P55 million
to Fe Roa Gimenez.

. . . (T)he amount which could be payable by Tabuena in his capacity as head of the
MIAA in January of 1986 could not be in excess of P27.931 million until other
claims had been duly approved. This approval, on the other hand, could not come
from the President but from the Price Escalation Committee (PEC) before which,
according to the Ongpin Memorandum itself, these claims for escalation had been
submitted for approval.
The PEC was not shown to have approved these amounts as of the time Tabuena
made any of the withdrawals for P55 million.
xxx xxx xxx
Tabuena says he had properly accounted for the P55 million he had withdrawn from
the MIAA's funds. By this Tabuena means he gave the money to Fe Roa Gimenez,
presumably in representation of Pres. Ferdinand Marcos.
Neither Pres. Marcos, however, nor Fe Roa Gimenez was entitled to receive or issue
acquittance for a debt in favor of the PNCC. Tabuena's claim, therefore, that he
delivered the P55 million to her is not properly accounting for P55 million.
In fact, when we come right down to it, nobody has issued an acquittance in behalf of
the PNCC for the P55 million paid by Luis Tabuena. Since Tabuena says he was
paying P55 million to the PNCC, it was incumbent upon him to show a receipt from or
in behalf of the PNCC. Tabuena has shown no receipt.
Tabuena was not authorized to part with government money without receipt
When Tabuena gave P55 million intended for the PNCC to Fe Roa Gimenez or to
Pres. Marcos, Tabuena was paying government funds to persons not entitled to
receive those funds. He was, therefore, guilty of malversation of those funds.
xxx xxx xxx
Tabuena says he has accounted for the money because he has told us where the
money went. But to account, in the more proper use of the term, injects a sense of
responsibility for the disposition of funds for which one is answerable.
So when one asks if Tabuena has accounted for the P55 million belonging to the
MIAA, the question really is whether accused Tabuena disposed of the sum in a
responsible manner consistent with his duty. The answer must be in the negative.
Payments must be delivered to payees. Payments intended for the PNCC must be
delivered to the PNCC or to someone authorized by the PNCC to accept payments
for it. Neither Pres. Marcos nor Fe Roa Gimenez are shown to have been authorized
to accept money for the PNCC nor to deliver money to the PNCC (or to any creditor
of the MIAA for that matter). In fact, though Pres. Marcos may have been the

Supreme Magistrate of the land and the chief enforcer of the law, the law neither
authorized him to pay for the MIAA nor to accept money for the PNCC.
Accused Tabuena's statement, therefore, that he had presented overwhelming
evidence of the delivery of the P55 million to Pres. Marcos' private secretary does
not prove that he has accounted for that money, that is, that he has properly
disposed of that sum according to law.
On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that accused Tabuena delivered the P55
million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as representatives of MIAA or
of the PNCC.
It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or
abandonment, some other person to take such public funds. Having done so,
Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically demonstrated that he is guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of P55 million of public funds. 25
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the findings of fact of the trial court, owing to its enviable
position of having seen the physical evidence and observed the witnesses as they testified. We see
no reason to depart now from this policy.
Tabuena was also personally accountable for the funds in his custody, being the head of a
government agency such as MIAA and discharging fiscal functions as such. In this regard, the
Manual on Certificate of Settlement and Balances (Rev. 1993) (The Manual) states, inter alia:
TITLE IV. ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR
GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND
PROPERTY
Government officials and employees, in the discharge of fiscal functions, shall ensure
that all government resources are managed, expended and utilized in accordance
with law, rules and regulations and safeguarded against loss or wastage thru illegal
or improper disposition.
In the implementation of the above functions, they shall be guided by the following
provisions:
Sec. 26. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND PROPERTY
26.1. Every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the
possession or custody of government funds or property shall be accountable therefor
and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.
26.2 Every accountable officer shall be properly bonded in accordance with law.
Sec. 27. RESPONSIBILITY FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS AND PROPERTY

The head of any agency of the government is immediately and primarily responsible
for all government funds and property pertaining to his agency.
Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of the funds or property under the
agency head shall be immediately responsible to him without prejudice to the liability
of either party to the government.
Sec. 28. SUPERVISION OVER ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS
The head of any agency or instrumentality of the national government or any
government-owned or controlled corporation and any other self-governing board or
commission of the government shall exercise the diligence of good father of a family
in supervising the accountable officers under his control to prevent the incurrence of
loss of government funds or property, otherwise he shall be jointly and severally
liable with the person primarily accountable therefor. . . .
Sec. 29. LIABILITY OF ACCOUNTABLE, SUPERIOR AND SUBORDINATE
OFFICERS FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDS
29.1 Every officer accountable for government funds shall be liable for alllosses
resulting from the unlawful deposit, use, or application thereof and for all losses
attributable to negligence in the keeping of the funds.
29.2 Liability of Superior Officers. A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts
done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
29.5 Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee shall be
civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are
contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under order
or instructions of his superiors.
Sec. 30. LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL EXPENDITURES OR USES OF
GOVERNMENT FUNDS
30.1.1 Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation
of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor.
30.1.2 Every expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in violation of law or of
the annual budgetary measure shall be void. Every payment made in violation
thereof shall be illegal and every official or employee authorizing or making such
payment, or taking part therein, and every person receiving such payment shall be

jointly and severally liable for the full amount so paid or received. (Emphasis
supplied)
The ponente points out that our reference to the Manual supports the view that Tabuena was only
civilly liable.
This is a misappreciation of the entire sense of the dissent. It must be borne in mind that said
reference was made after the conclusion was reached that Tabuena was indeed criminally liable for
his acts. It is hornbook knowledge that criminal liability carries with it the civil, specially when, as in
this case, the latter arose from the former. Hence, the statement: "Tabuena was also personally
accountable for the funds in his custody, . . . ."
Sections 29.2 and 29.5 of the Manual, which the ponente uses to illustrate his point, actually
includes exceptions to the grant of immunity from civil liability of a public officer for acts done in the
performance of his official duties: (a) The preceding statement itself says that the acts must be done
"in the performance of his official duties;" (b) Sec. 29.2 exempts him from civil liability, "unless there
is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence;" and (c) Sec. 29.5 states that "he shall
be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and
good customs even if he acted under order or instructions of his superiors." The quoted provisions
have been once more underscored herein.
The ponencia futher states that "(t)here is no showing that Tabuena has anything to do whatsoever
with the execution of the MARCOS Memorandum." But very clearly, the admitted facts show that it
was precisely Tabuena who implemented or executed the said Memorandum.
The ponencia cites Acebedo where the accused was acquitted after it was shown that it was actually
the latter's secretary who collected and converted the money. Tabuena's case is starkly different, for
here it was Tabuena himself who personally turned over the money to the President's secretary. It
was done with his full knowledge and consent, the obvious irregularity thereof notwithstanding.
In petitioner Peralta's case, we again yield to the factual findings of the trial court. It said:
. . . . The question is whether or not Peralta properly signed the third application for
the issuance of a Manager's Check drawn against the MIAA's savings account with
the Villamor Office of the Philippine National Bank.
At the time that accused Peralta signed the request for the issuance of a Manager's
Check, he was the Acting Financial Services Manager of the MIAA and all
withdrawals of funds required is (sic) co-signature.
The reason for the designation of more than one co-signatory is not merely useless
ceremony; it is to serve as a counter check for the propriety of the disbursement.
While, indeed, accused Luis Tabuena was the highest official in the MIAA and had
authority to disburse its funds, this authority was not absolute. It had to be for
properly subsisting obligations and the disbursement had to be against funds existing

for that purpose. This is one reason for the need for supporting documentation before
disbursements of funds are authorized. And this is the special need for finance
officers such as Adolfo Peralta, as Financial Services Manager, to be co-signatories
(sic): to ascertain the validity of the obligation and, in this particular instance, the
existence of the balance to be covered by the manager's check the application for
which had been presented for his co-signature.
In this case, Adolfo Peralta speaks of the existence of (the) P27.9 million liability in
favor of the PNCC as justification for his acts herein. True enough, for that amount
was the liability as of December 31, 1985. As finance officer, however, he could not
claim ignorance of the fact that as of January 29, 1986, the date of the application for
a manager's check which he signed, two previous manager's checks worth P25
million each had already been applied for and the total amount of P50 million had
already been withdrawn . . . .
It was only two weeks after these two withdrawals when Peralta, as Finance Services
Manager, participated in the authorization for the disbursement of another P5 million.
This last withdrawal brought up the total of withdrawals to P55 million for the
payment of a P27.9 million obligation.
Thus while it is true, as Adolfo Peralta claims, that there was a liability in favor of the
PNCC, there was no way Peralta could disclaim responsibility for the excessive
withdrawals to the extent of P5 million thereof allegedly to pay that liability. There was
no way Peralta could justify his co-signing the application for a manager's check for
P5 million on January 29, 1986.
The ponente cites a dissenting opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Development Bank of the
Philippines v.Pandogar to uphold his ponencia. Need we remind our respected colleague that the
corroborative value of a dissenting opinion is minimal? Precisely, it supports a position contrary to,
and obviously unacceptable to the majority.
Petitioners were found guilty of malversation by negligence, which is possible even if the charge was
for intentional malversation. This does not negate, however, their criminal liability; it merely declares
that negligence takes the place of malice. Article 3 of the Code provides the rationale when it
explicitly states that "felonies are committed not only by means of deceit but also by means of fault."
The Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioners converted and misappropriated the P55 million cannot
simply be brushed aside upon petitioners' claim that the money was delivered in good faith to the
Office of the President under the mistaken assumption that the President was entitled to receive the
same. They rely on the case ofPeople v. Fabian, 26 which declared that "(g)ood faith in the payment of
public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation." But the very same decision also
cites Article 217 to the effect that malversation may be committed by an accountable public officer by
negligence if he permits any other person to take the public funds or property in his custody. It is
immaterial if petitioners actually converted or misappropriated MIAA's funds for their own benefit, for by
their very negligence, they allowed another person to appropriate the same.

The fact that no conspiracy was established between petitioners and the true embezzlers of the P55
million is likewise of no moment. The crime of malversation, as defined under Article 217 of the
Code, 27 was consummated the moment petitioners deliberately turned over and allowed the President's
private secretary to take custody of public funds intended as payment of MIAA's obligations to the PNCC,
if obligation there was at all. That petitioner Tabuena who was then General Manager of MIAA personally
and knowingly participated in the misfeasance compounds the maleficence of it all. Rank may have its
privileges but certainly a blatant disregard of law and administrative rules is not one of them. It must be
etched in the minds of public officials that the underside of privileges is responsibilities.
As accountable officers, petitioners clearly transgressed administrative and legal bounds. Even on
the pretext of obeying a superior's seemingly legitimate orders, their actuations can hardly be
justified. To rule otherwise would set an alarming precedent where all that public officials who have
unlawfully enriched themselves at the people's expense and those accused of graft and corruption
would have to do to exculpate themselves from any wrongdoing would be to invoke Article 11,
paragraph 6 of the Code, thus gaining instant immunity from criminal prosecution.
Government officials, particularly heads of their agencies who, by virtue of their exalted positions
exude power and authority but pay blind obeisance to orders of those higher up in the bureaucratic
hierarchy regardless of the illegality, impropriety or immorality of such orders, would do well to
internalize this prayer for national leaders delivered by former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga in
Malacanang on November 24, 1996:
xxx xxx xxx
When they begin to think of how much power they possess, help them to know the
many things that are beyond their power the change of seasons, sun and rain,
moonlight and starlight and all the wonders of Your creation;
When they are led to believe that they are exempt from public accountability, help
them to know that they are ultimately accountable to You, the God of truth and
justice and mercy;
xxx xxx xxx
The ponencia makes the final observation that the limitations on the right of judges to ask questions
during the trial were not observed by respondent court; that the three Justices who heard the
testimonies asked 37 questions of witness Francis Monera, 67 of Tabuena, and 41 of Peralta
more than what the prosecutors and defense counsels propounded.
While such numbers unduly disturbed the ponente, it cannot be gainsaid that such action by the
members of the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan was, under the circumstances, not only
necessary and called for, but likewise legally acceptable.
In the first place, even the ponente makes the observation that petitioners did not raise this matter as
error. In other words, they did not feel prejudiced by the respondent court's actuations; nor did they

construe the series of questions asked of them by the Justices as indicative of any unfairness or
partiality violative of their right to due process.
Then, too, it must be noted that there is a difference in the right of a judge in a non-jury system, like
that obtaining in the Philippines, to question witnesses or parties themselves, and that of a judge in a
jury trial. The bulk of jurisprudence used in the ponencia was decided in the United States, where
the jury system is extensively utilized in civil as well as in criminal trials. In this regard, "(i)t has been
noted that the opinion of the judge, on account of his position and the respect and confidence
reposed in him and in his learning and assumed impartiality, is likely to have great weight with the
jury, and such fact of necessity requires impartial conduct on his part. The judge is a figure of
overpowering influence, whose every change in facial expression is noted, and whose every word is
received attentively and acted upon with alacrity and without question." 28
Thus, while a trial judge is expected to be circumspect in his choice of words lest they be construed
as signs of partiality, he "is not, however, required to remain silent and passive throughout a jury
trial;" 29 he should, instead, "conduct a trial in an orderly way with a view to eliciting the truth and to
attaining justice between the parties." 30
Inasmuch as it is the jury which has the burden of meting out justice, it is acceptable for a judge in a
jury trial to "ask any question which would be proper for the prosecutor or defense counsel to ask so
long as he does not depart from a standard of fairness and impartiality." 31 "Questions designed to
clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence, particularly in a non-jury trial, are not improper." 32
The numerous questions asked by the court a quo should have been scrutinized for any possible
influence it may have had in arriving at the assailed decision. The true test for the appropriateness or
inappropriateness of court queries is not their quantity but their quality, that is, whether the defendant
was prejudiced by such questioning. 33To repeat, petitioners did not feel prejudiced by the trial court's
actions; otherwise, they would have raised this issue in the instant petition.
The ponencia states that he is "well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set
a dangerous precedent in that those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public
would be able to escape criminal liability by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith." Our position
has been either misinterpreted or misread for we do not merely speak of "good faith." In fact, our
main thrust is that such a breed of people who enriched themselves at the expense of the public
might handily use as an excuse or a justifying circumstance to escape liability their having obeyed
the "lawful orders" of their superior under Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ponente makes a plea towards the close of his decision, that we should not act impulsively in
the instant case. "In our eagerness to bring to justice the malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must
not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers
upon an innocent."
In our opinion, precisely, Tabuena and Peralta are wrongdoers, guilty of acts punishable by law.
Needless to say, under our system of laws, they must be meted out the corresponding penalty. We
draw attention to the fact that nowhere in this dissent do we single out the so-called "malefactors of
the Marcos regime" alone. We addressed ourselves to all who commit venalities at the expense of

the people, as defined and punished by law but who try to justify their actions by invoking the very
law which they violated.
For the reasons stated above, I vote to affirm petitioners' conviction by respondent court.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

PUNO, J., dissenting:

I join the Dissenting Opinion of Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero where I find both right and
righteousness happily intersecting each other. I am, however, constrained to write this brief dissent
in view of the impact of the majority decision to our criminal justice system which many perceive
leaves much to be desired.
I
It should be immediately stressed that petitioners were convicted of the crime of malversation by
negligence. The felony was committed by petitioners not by means of deceit (dolo) but by fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. Justice J.B.L. Reyes explains the
difference between a felony committed by deceit and that committed by fault in this wise: ". . . In
intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight, the imprudencia punible." 1
In light of this well-carved distinction, the long discourse of the majority decision hailing petitioners'
good faith or lack of intent to commit malversation is off-line. To justify the acquittal of petitioners, the
majority should strive to show that petitioners did not commit any imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill in obeying the order of former President Marcos. This is nothing less than a
mission impossible for the totality of the evidence proves the utter carelessness of petitioners in the
discharge of their duty as public officials. The evidence and their interstices are adequately
examined in the dissent of Madame Justice Romero and they need not be belabored.
For the same reason, the majority cannot rely on the doctrine of mistake of fact as ground to acquit
petitioners. It found as a fact that ". . . Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million
was a due and demandable debt. . . ." This Court has never applied the doctrine of mistake of fact
when negligence can be imputed to the accused. In the old, familiar case of People vs. Ah
Chong, 2 Mr. Justice Carson explained that ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense
charge (e.g., in larceny animus furendi, in murder, malice, etc.), cancels the presumption of intent and
works an acquittal, except in those cases where the circumstances demand conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence. Hence, Ah Chong was acquitted when he mistook his houseboy
as a robber and the evidence showed that his mistake of fact was not due to negligence. In the case at
bar, the negligence of the petitioners screams from page to page of the records of the case. Petitioners

themselves admitted that the payments they made were "out of the ordinary" and "not based on normal
procedure."

As aforestated, the cornerstone of the majority decision is its finding of good faith on the part of the
petitioners. Viewed from a more critical lens, however, the evidence cannot justify a finding of good
faith. The violations of auditing rules are too many yet the majority merely winks at them by ruling
that petitioner Tabuena ". . . did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of
disbursement considering the fact that the Marcos Memorandum enjoined 'immediate compliance'
with the directive that he forward to the President's Office the P55 million in cash." With due respect,
I am disquieted by the mischiefs that will be mothered by this ruling. To begin with, the country was
no longer under martial rule in 1986 and petitioners were under no compulsion to violate our laws. It
also ought to be obvious that the order for immediate compliance even if made by the former
President cannot be interpreted as a green signal by a subordinate official to disregard our laws.
Indeed, no person, not even the President can order the violation of our laws under any excuse
whatsoever. The first and foremost duty of the President is to uphold the sanctity of our laws. Thus,
the Constitution requires the President to take an oath or affirmation where he makes the solemn
pledge to the people: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my
duties as President of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do
justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. . . . 3 To be sure, the need for
petitioners to make an immediate payment is really not that immediate. The facts show that former
President Marcos first called petitioner Tabuena by telephone and asked him to make the payment. One
week after or on January 8, 1986, the former President issued a written memorandum reiterating the
order to pay. Payments were made in three tranches the first on January 10, 1986, the second on
January 16, 1986 and the third on January 31, 1986. Clearly then, it took petitioner one month to comply
with the Order. Given the personnel of petitioner Tabuena in his office, one month provides enough time
to comply with the rules. In any event, petitioners did not request former President Marcos for additional
time to comply with the rules if they felt in good faith that they needed more time. Petitioners shortcircuited the rules by themselves. Nothing in the Marcos Memorandum compelled them to disregard the
rules. The Memorandum merely stated "Your immediate compliance is appreciated". The language of the
Memorandum was as polite as it could be. I fail to discern any duress in the request as the majority did.
II
The determination of the degree of participation that should be allowed to a judge in the questioning
of a witness is a slippery slope in constitutional law. To a certain extent, I agree with the majority that
some of the questions propounded by the justices of the respondent Court crossed the limits of
propriety. Be that as it may, I am not prepared to conclude with certainty that the text and tone of the
questions denied petitioners the right to an impartial trial. Bias is a state of mind which easily eludes
evidence. On the basis of the evidence before us, we cannot hold that we have plumbed the depth
of prejudice of the justices and have unearthed their partiality. The more telling evidence against the
petitioners are documentary in nature. They are not derived from the answers elicited by questions
from the justices which the majority, sua sponte, examined and condemned as improper.
III
Finally, I can not but view with concern the probability that the majority decision will chill complaints
againsts graft pending before the respondent Court. From the majority decision, it is crystalline that

petitioners blindly obeyed the Marcos Memorandum despite its fatal and facial flaws. The majority
even quotes these inculpatory admissions of petitioner Tabuena, viz: 4
xxx xxx xxx
AJ del Rosario
xxx xxx xxx
Q If it was for the payment of such obligation why was there no
voucher to cover such payment? In other words, why was the
delivery of the money not covered by any voucher?
A The instruction to me was to give it to the Office of the President,
your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena
Q Be that as it may, why was there no voucher to cover this particular
disbursement?
A I was just told to bring it to the Office of the President, your Honor.
AJ del Rosario
Q Was that normal procedure for you to pay in cash to the Office of
the President for obligations of the MIAA in payment of its obligation
to another entity?
A No, your Honor, I was just following the Order to me of the
President.
PJ Garchitorena
Q So the Order was out of the ordinary?
A Yes, your Honor.
AJ del Rosario
Q Did you file any written protest with the manner with which such
payment was being ordered?
A No, your Honor.
Q Why not?

A Because with that instruction of the President to me, I followed your

Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ Hermosisima
Q Why were you not made to pay directly to the PNCC considering
that you are the manager of MIA at that time and the PNCC is a
separate corporation, not an adjunct of Malacanang?
A I was just basing it from the Order of the Malacanang to pay PNCC
through the Office of the President, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You agreed to the order of the President notwithstanding the fact
that this was not the regular course or Malacanang was not the
creditor?
A I saw nothing wrong with that because that is coming from the
President, your Honor.
In effect, petitioners' shocking submission is that the President is always right, a frightening
echo of the antedeluvian idea that the King can do no wrong. By allowing the petitioners to
walk, the majority has validated petitioners' belief that the President should always be
obeyed as if the President is above and beyond the law. I cannot accept this dangerous
ruling even if I look at it through the eyes of faith. One of the gospels in constitutional law is
that the President is powerful but is not more paramount than the law. And in criminal law,
our catechism teaches us that it is loyalty to the law that saves, not loyalty to any man. Let
us not bid goodbye to these sacrosanct principles.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
In the main, the majority ruled that Petitioners Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta should be acquitted
because they were merely obeying the order of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to deliver "thru
this Office, the sum of FIFTY FIVE MILLION (P55,000,000.00) PESOS in cash as partial payment of
MIAA's account" with the Philippine National Construction Company. In their Dissenting Opinions,
Justices Romero, Davide and Puno have shown how weak and unpersuasive this ruling is under
applicable Philippine laws and jurisprudence. I will not repeat their illuminative discussions. Let me
just stress three more points:
(1) The defense of "obedience to a superior's order" is already obsolete. Fifty years ago, the Nazi
war criminals tried to justify genocide against the Jews and their other crimes against humanity by

alleging they were merely following the orders of Adolf Hitler, their adored fuehrer. However, the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its Judgment dated October 1, 1946, 1 forcefully
debunked this Nazi argument and clearly ruled that "(t)he true test . . . is not the existence of the order but
whether moral choice was in fact possible."
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution firmly entrenching the principle
of moral choice, inter alia, as follows: 2
The fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior
does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral
choice was in fact possible to him.
In the Nuremberg trials, the defendants were military officers of the Third Reich who were dutybound to obeydirect orders on pain of court martial and death at a time when their country was
at war. Nonetheless, they were meted out death sentences by hanging or long-term imprisonments.
In the present case, the accused are civilian officials purportedly complying with a memorandum of
the Chief Executive when martial law had already been lifted and the nation was in fact just about to
vote in the "snap" presidential election in 1986. The Sandiganbayan did not impose death but only
imprisonment ranging from seventeen years and one day to twenty years. Certainly a moral choice
was not only possible. It was in fact available to the accused. They could have opted to defy the
illegal order, with no risk of court martial or death. Or they could have resigned. They knew or should
have known that the P55 million was to be paid for a debt that was dubious 3 and in a manner that was
irregular. That the MONEY was to be remitted in cold cash and delivered to the private secretary of the
President, and not by the normal crossed check to the alleged creditor, gave them a moral choice to
refuse. That they opted to cooperate compounded their guilt to a blatant conspiracy to defraud the public
treasury.
(2) Resurrecting this internationally discredited Nazi defense will, I respectfully submit, set a
dangerous precedent in this country. Allowing the petitioners to walk deprives this Court of the moral
authority to convict any subaltern of the martial law dictator who was merely "following orders." This
ludicrous defense can be invoked in all criminal cases pending not only before this Court but more
so before inferior courts, which will have no legal option but to follow this Court's doctrine. 4
(3) Mercy and compassion are virtues which are cherished in every civilized society. But before they
can be invoked, there must first be justice. The Supreme Court's duty is to render justice. The power
to dispense pardon lies elsewhere. Verily, the Constitution ordains a final conviction by the courts
before the President can exercise his power to wipe away penalty. 5 Such is the legal and natural
precedence and order of things: justice first before mercy. And only he who sincerely repents his sin,
restitutes for it, and reforms his life deserves forgiveness and mercy.
I therefore vote to AFFIRM the assailed Sandiganbayan Decision onvicting the petitioners of
malversation.
Padilla, Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156427

January 20, 2006

AMANDO TETANGCO, Petitioner

vs.
THE HON. OMBUDSMAN and MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Order,1 dated April 16, 2002, of public
respondent Ombudsman in OMB-CC-02-0151-C which dismissed the Complaint of petitioner
Amando Tetangco against private respondent Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr., for violation of Article
2202 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Also assailed is the Order,3 dated August 1, 2002, denying
the motion for reconsideration.
On March 8, 2002, petitioner filed his Complaint before the Ombudsman alleging that on January 26,
2001, private respondent Mayor Atienza gave P3,000 cash FINANCIAL assistance to the chairman
and P1,000 to each tanod of Barangay 105, Zone 8, District I. Allegedly, on March 5, 2001, Mayor
Atienza refunded P20,000 or the total amount of the FINANCIAL assistance from the City of Manila
when such disbursement was not justified as a lawful expense.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Mayor Atienza denied the allegations and sought the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for forum-shopping. He asserted that it was the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), not the Ombudsman that has jurisdiction over the case and the same case
had previously been filed before the COMELEC. Furthermore, the Complaint had no verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping. The mayor maintained that the expenses were legal and justified,
the same being supported by disbursement vouchers, and these had passed prior audit
and ACCOUNTING .
The Investigating Officer recommended the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of evidence and
merit. The Ombudsman adopted his recommendation.
The Office of the Ombudsman, through its Over-all Deputy Ombudsman, likewise denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Before us, petitioner assigns for resolution a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CHARGE AGAINST RESPONDENT MAYOR

ATIENZA FOR VIOLATION OF ART. 220 OF THE RPC DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIMA
FACIE CASE AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME CHARGED OR, AT THE
VERY LEAST, FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF R.A. NO. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT).4
The sole issue is, did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Complaint?
Petitioner insists that Mayor Atienza illegally disbursed public funds when he gave the
aforementioned financial assistance to the chairman and tanods of Barangay 105 since the
disbursement was not authorized by law or ordinance, which the Ombudsman did not consider when
it dismissed the Complaint of petitioner. According to petitioner, the dismissal by the Ombudsman
was capricious since the evidence on record was clear that the mayor was guilty of graft and
corruption.5
The Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, contends that it did not abuse its discretion and
there was also no probable cause against private respondent for violation of Art. 220 of the RPC. 6
For his part, Mayor Atienza avers that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Ombudsman when it dismissed the Complaint.7
After considering the submissions of the parties, we find that the petition lacks merit. No grave abuse
of discretion is attributable to the Ombudsman.
It is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans determination of
whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. 8 Grave
abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to
evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of
law.9 Thus, we held in Roxas v. Vasquez,10
this Courts consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
In this case, the action taken by the Ombudsman cannot be characterized as arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic. The Ombudsman found no evidence to prove probable cause. Probable
cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with

which he is charged.11 Here, the Complaint merely alleged that the disbursement for financial
assistance was neither authorized by law nor justified as a lawful expense. Complainant did not cite
any law or ordinance that provided for an original appropriation of the amount used for the financial
assistance cited and that it was diverted from the appropriation it was intended for.
The Complaint charges Mayor Atienza with illegal use of public funds. On this matter, Art. 220 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any public officer who shall apply any public fund
or property under his administration to any public use other than that for which such fund or property
were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such
misapplication, any damages or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either
case, the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall be a fine from 5
to 50 percent of the sum misapplied.
The elements of the offense, also known as technical malversation, are: (1) the offender is
an ACCOUNTABLE public officer; (2) he applies public FUNDS or property under his
administration to some public use; and (3) the public use for which the public funds or property were
applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
It is clear that for technical malversation to exist, it is necessary that public funds or properties had
been diverted to any public use other than that provided for by law or ordinance. 12To constitute the
crime, there must be a diversion of the funds from the purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.13 Patently, the third element is not present in this case.
Conformably then with Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman,14 the Investigating Officer may recommend the outright dismissal of a complaint if he
finds the same devoid of merit.15That is exactly what happened in this case. Thus, no abuse of
discretion, much less grave abuse, may be attributed to the respondent Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan1 in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of
public FUNDS defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,
or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before
this Court on petition for review under Rule 45.
Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which
pertinently reads:
That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA
and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the
Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are ACCOUNTABLE for
public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V

of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority,
apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was
found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision 2 dated August 25, 2000
(promulgated on September 27,2000), as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby
acquitted of the crime charged. The cash bond posted by each of the said accused for their
provisional liberty are hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the usual auditing
and ACCOUNTING procedures.
Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of
three thousand pesos, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
She is further imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period of six (6) years.
She shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants sentence by deleting the
temporary special disqualification imposed upon her, thus:
Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25, 2000, is hereby amended to the
effect that the penalty of temporary special disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and
set aside. Hence, the last paragraph of said decision shall read as follows:
Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged and is hereby meted a fine of three
thousand pesos, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She
shall also pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of testimonial evidence and
instead opted to mark in evidence the following exhibits:
EXHIBITS

DESCRIPTION

"A"

Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of

Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from the
Office of the Special Audit Team, COA, dated May 8, 1992,
consisting of nine (9) pages;

"B"

Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of Budget

and MANAGEMENT through Secretary Guillermo N. Carague
to the President of the Sulu State College dated October 30,
1989;

"C"

Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the Year

1989;

"C-1"

The entry appearing in Exhibit "C" which reads: "Purpose

release partial funding for the conversion of 34 Secondary
School Teacher positions to Instructor I items; FUND Source
lump-sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of RA 6688
and the current savings under personal services;"

"D"

Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself dated

November 24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages appearing on
pages 225 to 226 of the record;

"E"

Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez dated

February 9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b of the
records of this case; and

"F"

Prosecutions Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit "E"

dated February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3) pages,
appearing in pages 383 to 385 of the record.4

Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of Evidence, and, with the admission
thereof by the court, rested its case.
The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4) witnesses, namely, accused
Mahmud Darkis, who was the Administrative Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused

Nenita Aguil, the Cashier of the same College; appellant Norma Abdulla herself, who was the
College President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the Department of Budget
and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga City.
The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:
The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary
school teachers to Instructor I items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused
Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); that consequent to
the approval of the said request, was the allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose
of paying the salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers in the amount
of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the "lump sum appropriation authorized on page
370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page 396 of RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act January 1
December 31, 1989)] and the current savings under personal services of said school (Exhibits `B,
`C and `C-1; Exhibit `18, pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that
out of the thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers, only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid
salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28) teachers, who were occupying
Teacher III positions, were no longer entitled to salary differentials as they were already receiving the
same salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A, p. 4, par. 1; Exhibits `1 to `6, inclusive; Exhibit `14-A;
tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 10-11); and
that the amount of P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00 allotment, was
used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals (Exhibits `D and `E; Exhibits `7 to `12,
inclusive; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, p.
13).
Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of the salary differentials of only six (6),
out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twentyeight (28) were already holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III receiving the salary of
Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still holding Secondary Teacher II positions and
therefore receiving a salary lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary differentials (tsn,
hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8, 10 and 11). In fact, the notarized audit investigation report
(Exhibit `A, p. 4, 1st par.) and the Joint Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
(Exhibit `14-a), also point that said act of the accused is justified.
In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction rendered against her, claiming that
the Sandiganbayan erred:
"I
XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL INTENT
DESPITE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
II

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE
THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 220 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE".
The Court grants the appeal.
So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of innocence unless proven otherwise
that appellant came all the way to this Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by
the Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no imprisonment at all. And
recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court, where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor
of an accused.
In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of murder in People vs. Abujan,5 the
Court wrote:
We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and we commiserate with her family.
But with seeds of doubt planted in our minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are
unable to accept the lower courts conclusion to convict appellants. We cannot in conscience accept
the prosecutions evidence here as sufficient proof required to convict appellants of murder. Hence,
here we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this rule more compelling than in a case involving the
death penalty for a truly humanitarian Court would rather set ten guilty men free than send one
innocent man to the death row. Perforce, we must declare both appellants not guilty and set them
free.
Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape in People vs. De Jesus6 on ground of
reasonable doubt, to wit:
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of proceedings on record, we are unable to
accept the lower courts conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental retardation, she showed
unnecessary dependence on her mother when identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching
taints her testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go outside the courtroom
impresses us as significant. We are unable to accept as sufficient the quantum of proof required to
convict appellant of rape based on the alleged victims sole testimony. Hence, here we must fall back
on a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling,
Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of
the charge of rape on reasonable doubt.
The Courts faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes upon it the imperative of
closely scrutinizing the prosecutions evidence to assure itself that no innocent person is condemned
and that conviction flows only from a moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua7:

Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses should always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every
accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has often happened that at the
commencement of a trial, peoples minds, sometimes judges too, would have already passed
sentence against the accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done should
never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof must be closely examined under the
lens of a judicial microscope and only proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to convict.
Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.
We shall now assay appellants guilt or innocence in the light of the foregoing crucibles.
In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
prove criminal intent on her part. When she raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration
before the Sandiganbayan, that court, invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, ruled in
a Resolution8 promulgated on September 17, 2001, as follows:
Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation as it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution
failed to prove, attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the Supreme Court on the matter.
Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful
intent. Hence, dolo may be inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303;
Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935; Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the
Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts
alleged, it is properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and with criminal
intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such presumption. Further, the same court also ruled
that when the law plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law implies the
guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law which he had
violated (State vs. McBrayer, 98 NIC 619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580;
Hermenigildo Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the act is criminal, then criminal intent is
presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).
In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a criminal act was committed by the
accused under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused
did not present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent was present when she committed
the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence, the presumption that the unlawful act of the
accused was done with criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution (Sec. 5[b],
Rule 131).
The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule
131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.
For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this case. Indeed, clear it is from its
very language that the disputable presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent
presupposes the commission of an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is presumed when the victim

dies because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful act. In People vs. Gemoya,9 the Court
held:
The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death, unless the accused proves by
convincing evidence that any of the justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting
circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.
In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People vs. Delim, 10 the Court en
banccategorically stated:
If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
(Emphasis supplied).
Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is found in possession of stolen
goods precisely because the taking of anothers property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People
vs. Reyes,11 the Court held:
Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential
when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may be
presumed from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar, the act of taking the victims
wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind
him sufficiently gave rise to the presumption.
The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of
the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were
entitled to under existing civil service laws. Thus, in a similar case,12 the Court reversed a conviction
for technical malversation of one who paid out the wages of laborers:
There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of
laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which
laborers wages enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.
In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent evidence
that appellants act of paying the terminal leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was
done with criminal intent rests upon the prosecution.
The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in discharging its undertaking to
prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any
single witness at all, not even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the

documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely failed to prove unlawful
intent on the part of appellant.
Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the defense. The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this
responsibility. And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of an
accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. A judgment of conviction must rest
on nothing less than moral certainty. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his
innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. There must be moral certainty
in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this
required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. 13
The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the
prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from
the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this
Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction.
x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, which
expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in
certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a
presumption of criminal intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the
general rule is that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to rebut this
presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such presumption springs must be
a criminal act In the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized as malum
prohibitum, the mere commission of which makes the doer criminally liable even if he acted without
evil intent.14
The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to prove the existence of all the
essential elements of the crime of technical malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, which are:
"1. That the offender is a public officer;
"2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;
"3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance;
"4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which such fund or property has been
appropriated by law or ordinance."15
Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the second and third elements of the
crime charged.16 She argued that the public funds in question, having been established to form part
of savings, had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific purpose.

The Court finds merit in appellants submission.

As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) originally
intended to cover the salary differentials of thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose
employment status were converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the "lump sum appropriation"
authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current savings under personal
services of said school.17
The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:
"K.2 Sulu State College
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, salary standardization, higher
education and secondary education services, including locally-funded project as indicated
hereunder..P 17,994,000
New Appropriations, by Function/Project
Current Operating
Expenditures
----------------------------------Personal
Services

Maintenance
Capital
Total
and Other
Outlays
Operating
------------------------------------- Expenses -----------------------------------

A. Functions

1. General
Administration
and Support
Services

2. Administration
of Personnel

P 1,605,000

608,000

P 1,196,000 P

P 2,801,000

608,000

Benefits

3. Salary
Standardization

57,000

57,000

4. Higher
Education
Services

1,967,000

577,000

2,544,000

5. Secondary
Education
Services

2,636,000

736,000

3,372,000

------------------ -----------------

-----------------

Total, Functions

6,873,000

2,509,000

9,382,000

------------------ -----------------

-----------------

B. LocallyFunded Project

1. Acquisition and
Improvements of
Lands,
Construction,
Rehabilitation or
Renovation of
Buildings and
Structures, and
Acquisition of
Equipment
Total New
Appropriations,
Sulu State
College

------------------ -----------------

8,612,000

8,612,000

------------------ -----------------

P 6,873,000

P 2,509,000

P 8,612,000 P17,994.000

========== ========== ========== ==========

xxxxxxxxx

New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures

(In Thousand Pesos)
A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project
Current Operating Expenditures
Personal Services
Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel
Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency
Personnel
Total Salaries and Wages

4,148
146

4,294

Other Compensation
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances
Cost of Living Allowances

185
1,292

Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums

44

Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions

35

Medicare Premiums

18

Merit Increases

20

Salary Standardization

37

Bonuses and Incentives

511

Others

437

Total Other Compensation

2,579

O1 Total Personal Services

6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical
malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is
therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use

of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34
secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan18 that in the absence of a law or
ordinance appropriating the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of
any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road), the
use thereof for another public purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers working on
projects other than the Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the
DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers
of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of
any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary differentials
only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed decision and resolution
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
appellant ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her. The cash bond posted by appellant for her
provisional liberty, if any, is ordered returned to her subject to the usual auditing and accounting
procedures.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 96025 May 15, 1991

OSCAR P. PARUNGAO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Herminio Z. Canlas for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

May the Sandiganbayan, after finding that a municipal treasurer charged with malversation of
public FUNDS is not guilty thereof, nevertheless convict him, in the same criminal case, for illegal
use of public FUNDS ?
The petitioner, a former municipal treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, was charged with malversation of
public funds allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the month of September, 1980, or sometime subsequent thereto, in
the Municipality of Porac, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of
Porac, Pampanga, hence a public officer having been appointed and qualified as
such, having custody or control of and ACCOUNTABLE for the public funds
collected and received by him by reason of the duties of his office, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with abuse of confidence, take, appropriate and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTYFIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P185,250.00), Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount. (Rollo,
p. 26)
The petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. During the pretrial conference, he admitted that on
September 29, 1980, as municipal treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, he received from the Ministry
of Public Works and Highways the amount of P185,250 known as the FUND for construction,
rehabilitation, betterment and improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road
located in Porac, Pampanga.

The prosecution presented six witnesses and tried to establish that the petitioner misappropriated
the FUND for his personal use because while the fund was already completely exhausted, the
concreting of Barangay Jalung Road remained unfinished.
In his defense, the petitioner accounted for the P185,250 fund as follows:
1. P126,095.59 was disbursed for materials delivered by the contractor under Voucher Numbers 4180-12-440 and 41-80-12-441 for P86,582.50 and P39,513.09 respectively.
2. P59,154.41 was used to pay, upon the insistence of the then Porac Mayor Ceferino Lumanlan, the
labor payrolls of the different barangays in the municipality.
After hearing, the respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting the petitioner of the
crime of malversation of public funds but convicting him of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
The relevant parts of the decision are set forth below:
The Certificate of Settlement (Exh. 5) issued to the accused certified that his money,
property and accountable forms as Municipal Treasurer of Porac, Pampanga for the
period from February 6,1980 to December 31, 1980, have been audited and found
correct. It was signed by Auditor 1 Rolando A. Quibote and approved by Provincial
Auditor Jose C. de Guzman. Being public officers with official duties to perform in the
exercise of the functions of their office, the presumption is in favor of the lawful
exercise of their functions and the regular performance of their duties. (Sec. 5, par.
m, Rule 131, Rules of Court). And quite apart from that presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty which necessarily extends to the correctness of the
said certificate issued in the course of the discharge of such duty, there exists no
serious ground to impugn the aforesaid document in the context of the admission of
prosecution witnesses Homer Mercado and District Engineer Lacsamana regarding
the delivery of materials and the grading thereof on the project site by the contractor,
the findings of investigating NBI Agent Azares, that accused Parungao had submitted
disbursement vouchers and supporting documents from the CRBI barangay Jalung
fund to the Provincial Auditor's Office which were audited and found in order by
Auditor Quibote, and the acknowledgments of Emerenciana Tiongco and auditing
examiner Jose Valencia that the disbursements of P86,582.50 and P39,513.09 under
vouchers 4180-12-440 and 4180-12-441 were duly entered in accused Parungao's
Treasurer's Journal of Cash Disbursements and Cashbook. The foregoing
considerations, and the presumption of innocence accorded to every accused in a
criminal prosecution, would not allow a finding that the accused appropriated the
P185,250.00 fund for his personal use and benefit.
But while the accused could be deemed to have fully accounted for the amount in
question, the fact sticks out from the evidence like a sore thumb that he allowed the
use of part of the funds for a purpose other than what it was intended. The said
amount of P185,250.00 was specifically allotted for the concreting of the barangay
Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Instead of applying it fully to that particular project,
he gave P59,154.41 of it to the municipal mayor of Porac to pay the labor payrolls of

the different barangays of the municipality, resulting in the non-completion of the

project. He thereby violated the following provision of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. (Rollo, pp. 48-49)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this
petition for review. The petitioner raises the following issues:
I. RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND IN AFFIRMING ITS DECISION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF
TECHNICAL MALVERSATION.
II. RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION AND/OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT CONSIDERING IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER
DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE MUTE BUT ELOQUENT PROOF OF HIS INNOCENCE.
(Rollo, p. 14)
The petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of a crime different and distinct from that charged
in the information.
The petitioner is correct. As recommended by the Solicitor General in his manifestation, the Court
grants the petition.
The 1987 Constitution mandates that the accused, in all criminal prosecutions, shall enjoy the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. (Article III, Section 14 [21) From
this fundamental precept proceeds the rule that the accused may be convicted only of the crime with
which he is charged.
An exception to this rule, albeit constitutionally permissible, is the rule on variance in Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included
in that which is proved. (4a)
Section 5 of the same Rule indicates when an offense includes or is included in another:
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.An offense charged
necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,

when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter. (5)
Is the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner of the crime of illegal use of public
funds justified by the rule on variance? Does the crime of malversation of public funds include the
crime of illegal use of public funds, or is the former included in the latter?
To both questions, the Court answers in the negative.
As gleaned from the information, the petitioner, a public officer, was accused of wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and with abuse of confidence, taking, appropriating or converting to his own personal
use, public funds for which he was accountable. The alleged acts constitute malversation of public
funds punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation.
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: . . .
The essential elements of this crime are:
(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds and
property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other persons to take such
public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.
On the other hand, Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, for which the petitioner was convicted,
reads:
Art. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. Any public officer who shall apply
any public fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that
for which such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer
the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from onehalf to the total of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any
damage or embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case,
the offender shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
The essential elements of this crime, more commonly known as technical malversation, are:
(a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and (c) the public use for which the public funds or property were
applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law ordinance.

A comparison of the two articles reveals that their elements are entirely distinct and different from the
other. In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal
use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the latter's personal use. In technical
malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not for his or another's
personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was appropriated by law or
ordinance.
Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation of public funds charged in the information.
Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the information,
and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime of malversation of
public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical malversation.
The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioner had not taken, appropriated nor converted the CRBI
fund for his personal use and benefit. It, however, was of the belief that based on the evidence given
during trial, the petitioner was guilty of technical malversation. What the respondent court should
have done was to follow the procedure laid down in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to detain him. In such case, the
court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the
original case upon the filing of the proper information.(12a)
The Sandiganbayan therefore erred in not ordering the filing of the proper information against the
petitioner, and in convicting him of technical malversation in the original case for malversation of
public funds.
Ordinarily, the Court's recourse would be to acquit the petitioner of the crime of illegal use of public
funds without prejudice, but subject to the laws on prescription, to the filing of a new information for
such offense.
Considering however that all the evidence given during the trial in the malversation case is the same
evidence that will be presented and evaluated to determine his guilt or innocence in the technical
malversation case in the event that one is filed and in order to spare the petitioner from the rigors
and harshness compounded by another trial, not to mention the unnecessary burden on our
overloaded judicial system, the Court deems it best to pass upon the issue of whether or not the
petitioner indeed is guilty of illegal use of public funds.
The petitioner alleged that the amount of P59,154.41, which was actually intended for the concreting
of the Barangay Jalung Road, was used to defray the labor payrolls of the different barangays of the

municipality of Porac and presented documents fully supporting the disbursement. This allegation
was not rebutted by the prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of technical malversation.
However, Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code provides that for technical malversation to exist it is
necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than that
provided for by law or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied. See Palma Gil v. People of the Philippines,
177 SCRA 229 [1989])
The testimony of the prosecution witness Armando Lacsamana, as summarized by the
Sandiganbayan, is as follows:
. . . The Province of Pampanga receives an annual CRBI (Construction,
Rehabilitation, Betterment and Improvement) fund. In 1980, Barangay Jalung, Porac,
was one of the recipients of the fund in the amount of P185,250.00. CRBI funds are
released to the provincial treasurer and withdrawn by the municipal treasurer of the
municipality where a project is to be implemented. With regard to the CRBI fund for
Barangay Jalung, their office, through Engr. Anselmo Fajardo, conferred with the
barangay captain on what project the barangay wanted to undertake. It was agreed
that the fund be utilizied for concreting the barangay Jalung road. (TSN May 9, 1989,
pp. 3-5). The project to be implemented having been determined, their office
prepared a program of work (Exh. 1-10) which included the following supporting
documents:
1. Chart for an item of work (Exh. I-11);
2. Schedule of equipment (Exh. I-12)
3. Schedule of equipment and labor (Exhs. I-13, I-14, I-15);
4. Working schedule for laborers and technical men (Exh. I-16);
5. Schedule of materials (Exh. I-17);
6. Schedule of equipment (I-18);
7. Summary of the project (Exh. I-1 9). (TSN May 9, 1989, pp. 6-7). (Rollo, pp. 38-39)
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utilization of this fund
specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road was merely an internal arrangement
between the Department of Public Works and Highways and the barangay captain and was not
particularly provided for by law or ordinance. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a
public purposepayment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It
is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers' wages enjoy as claims against the employers'
funds and resources. In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the

concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of
illegal use of public funds.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is
REVERSED. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal use of public funds.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached in this case, to the extent that the Court is setting aside the decision of
the public respondent Sandiganbayan. I agree that the Sandiganbayan cannot legally convict
petitioner Parungao for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the
information filed in this case was for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears
from an examination of the elements of the offenses penalized respectively by Articles 217 and 220
of the Revised Penal Code, that malversation of public funds under Article 217 is not necessarily
included in, and does not necessarily include, the illegal use of public funds under Article 220 of the
same Code, and vice versa.
At the same time, I have great difficulty with the position taken by Mr. Justice Gutierrez who, instead
of setting aside the Sandiganbayan decision without prejudice to the filing of an information under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, undertook to determine the merits of the case as if such an
information had in fact been filed. As I understand it, the decision of the Court acquits petitioner
Parungao of the crime of illegal use of public funds for the reason that there appears no law or
ordinance which dedicates the funds involved in this case to "the concreting of the Barangay Jalung
Road:"
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the
utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road is
merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and
highways and the Barangay Captain and was not particularly provided for by law or
ordinance. . . . In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for

the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty
of the crime of illegal use of public fund.
If there was indeed no law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay
Jalung Road, then it appears to me that there was here a violation of the constitutional provision that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law,"
(Article VI [29] [1], 1987 Constitution). If there were no appropriation by law or ordinance stating
(however generally) that P185,250.00 of the CRBI funds shall or may be devoted to the concreting of
the Barangay Jalung Road, then legally no part of the CRBI fund (and not just P59,154.41 [out of the
P185,250.00] which was used to defray labor payrolls of different barangays for different projects)
could be disbursed for that particular purpose.
I would suggest that the People of the Philippines be given an opportunity, in a new prosecution
under an appropriate information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, to prove that
there was in fact statutory authority for the disbursement of the CRBI funds indicating, in terms which
may be more or less general in character, that such funds may be devoted to the concreting of the
Barangay Jalung Road. That possibility appears to be foreclosed by the decision here being reached
by the Court.
Examination of our statute books shows that, prima facie, there was a law appropriating the CRBI
funds (including the P185,250.00 here involved) for the construction or improvement or repair of
barangay roads including the Barangay Jalung Road here involved.
P.D. No. 702, promulgated on 16 May 1975, created the Bureau of Barangay Roads under the
Department of Public Highways. The Bureau of Barangay Roads includes
the Construction, Rehabilitation, Betterment and Improvement CRBI Division which
was given the responsibility for exercising technical supervision over all the activities
relating to construction, rehabilitation, betterment and improvement of feeder roads
and bridges, establish[ing] policy guidelines; extend[ing] consultative services and
set[ting] standards and procedures for construction, rehabilitation, betterment and
improvement works. (Section 4 [3], P.D. No. 702)
Section 5 of this statute provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Appropriations. All national funds appropriated and programmed by the
Department of Public Highways for the
construction, rehabilitation, betterment, improvement and maintenance of barangay
roads and bridges including the shares of provinces, cities, municipalities and the
allocation for the maintenance of farm-to-market or feeder roads and bridges within a
barangay area, from the Highway Special Fund, shall be released to the Department
of Public Highways which shall then sub-allot them to the barangays but construction
and maintenance shall be under the supervision of the Department of Public
Highways through the Bureau of Barangay Roads. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the CRBI fund referred to in the decision of the Court formed part of the "Highway
Special Fund" which in turn formed part of the legislative appropriations pertaining to the Department
of Public Highways "for the construction, etc. of barangay roads and bridges."
In Batas Pambansa Blg. 40, the General Appropriations Act, January 1-December 31, 1980, there
were included in the appropriations for the then Ministry of Public Highways the following items:
Current Operating Expenditures
xxx xxx xxx
3.0. Maintenance and Repair. For maintenance and repair of national roads and
bridges, toll roads, operation of quarries, asphalt and batching plants, aid to
provincial, city, and municipal roads and bridges, and barangay roads and bridges
P1,250,156,000
xxx xxx xxx
3.6. Barangay Roads P397,232,000
xxx xxx xxx
Capital Outlays
5.0. Construction, Rehabilitation and Improvement. For construction, rehabilitation
and improvement of national roads and bridges, aid to provincial, city and municipal
roads and bridges, barangay roads and bridges P810,467,000
xxx xxx xxx
5.4. Barangay Roads and Bridges P239,288,000
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The lump-sum of P397,232,000 for maintenance and repair of barangay roads is broken down into
sub-sums for each of the several Regions: for Region I (which includes Pampanga), the amount of
P55,442,000 was appropriated (General Appropriations Act, CY 1980, p. 366). The lump-sum of
P239,288,000 for construction, rehabilitation and improvement of barangay roads and bridges was
similarly broken down on a region-to-region basis, Region I being allocated the sum of P1,889,040
(Ibid., p. 368-369).
It appears to me that the CRBI fund for barangay roads referred to in the decision of the Court
formed part of the above items of appropriation.

I am aware that the Solicitor General has recommended acquittal of accused Parungao in this case.
However, the Solicitor General did not distinguish between setting aside the decision of the
Sandiganbayan as insupportable under the information actually filed in this case, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, treating this case as ifan information for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code had in fact been filed and acquitting Parungao thereunder on the merits.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it acquits petitioner Parungao on the
merits of an information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which information has
not yet in fact been filed.
In sum, I believe the decision of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside without prejudice to the
right of the Government to file another information this time for violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. As shown above, that there was a violation of Article 220 is clear, at least prima facie,
from the record, even though there was no evil intent (Understood as conversion of public funds
to personal uses) on the part of petitioner Parungao. Such an evil intent is not an element of the
offense of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached in this case, to the extent that the Court is setting aside the decision of
the public respondent Sandiganbayan. I agree that the Sandiganbayan cannot legally convict
petitioner Parungao for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, considering that the
information filed in this case was for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears
from an examination of the elements of the offenses penalized respectively by Articles 217 and 220
of the Revised Penal Code, that malversation of public funds under Article 217 is not necessarily
included in, and does not necessarily include, the illegal use of public funds under Article 220 of the
same Code, and vice versa.
At the same time, I have great difficulty with the position taken by Mr. Justice Gutierrez who, instead
of setting aside the Sandiganbayan decision without prejudice to the filing of an information under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, undertook to determine the merits of the case as if such an
information had in fact been filed. As I understand it, the decision of the Court acquits petitioner
Parungao of the crime of illegal use of public funds for the reason that there appears no law or
ordinance which dedicates the funds involved in this case to "the concreting of the Barangay Jalung
Road:"
Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the
utilization of this fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road is
merely an internal arrangement between the Department of Public Works and
highways and the Barangay Captain and was not particularly provided for by law or
ordinance. . . . In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for

the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty
of the crime of illegal use of public fund.
If there was indeed no law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of Barangay
Jalung Road, then it appears to me that there was here a violation of the constitutional provision that
"[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law,"
(Article VI [29] [1], 1987 Constitution). If there were no appropriation by law or ordinance stating
(however generally) that P185,250.00 of the CRBI funds shall or may be devoted to the concreting of
the Barangay Jalung Road, then legally no part of the CRBI fund (and not just P59,154.41 [out of the
P185,250.00] which was used to defray labor payrolls of different barangays for different projects)
could be disbursed for that particular purpose.
I would suggest that the People of the Philippines be given an opportunity, in a new prosecution
under an appropriate information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, to prove that
there was in fact statutory authority for the disbursement of the CRBI funds indicating, in terms which
may be more or less general in character, that such funds may be devoted to the concreting of the
Barangay Jalung Road. That possibility appears to be foreclosed by the decision here being reached
by the Court.
Examination of our statute books shows that, prima facie, there was a law appropriating the CRBI
funds (including the P185,250.00 here involved) for the construction or improvement or repair of
barangay roads including the Barangay Jalung Road here involved.
P.D. No. 702, promulgated on 16 May 1975, created the Bureau of Barangay Roads under the
Department of Public Highways. The Bureau of Barangay Roads includes
the Construction, Rehabilitation, Betterment and Improvement CRBI Division which
was given the responsibility for exercising technical supervision over all the activities
relating to construction, rehabilitation, betterment and improvement of feeder roads
and bridges, establish[ing] policy guidelines; extend[ing] consultative services and
set[ting] standards and procedures for construction, rehabilitation, betterment and
improvement works. (Section 4 [3], P.D. No. 702)
Section 5 of this statute provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Appropriations. All national funds appropriated and programmed by the
Department of Public Highways for the
construction, rehabilitation, betterment, improvement and maintenance of barangay
roads and bridges including the shares of provinces, cities, municipalities and the
allocation for the maintenance of farm-to-market or feeder roads and bridges within a
barangay area, from the Highway Special Fund, shall be released to the Department
of Public Highways which shall then sub-allot them to the barangays but construction
and maintenance shall be under the supervision of the Department of Public
Highways through the Bureau of Barangay Roads. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the CRBI FUND referred to in the decision of the Court formed part of the "Highway
Special FUND " which in turn formed part of the legislative appropriations pertaining to the
Department of Public Highways "for the construction, etc. of barangay roads and bridges."
In Batas Pambansa Blg. 40, the General Appropriations Act, January 1-December 31, 1980, there
were included in the appropriations for the then Ministry of Public Highways the following items:
Current Operating Expenditures
xxx xxx xxx
3.0. Maintenance and Repair. For maintenance and repair of national roads and
bridges, toll roads, operation of quarries, asphalt and batching plants, aid to
provincial, city, and municipal roads and bridges, and barangay roads and bridges
P1,250,156,000
xxx xxx xxx
3.6. Barangay Roads P397,232,000
xxx xxx xxx
Capital Outlays
5.0. Construction, Rehabilitation and Improvement. For construction, rehabilitation
and improvement of national roads and bridges, aid to provincial, city and municipal
roads and bridges, barangay roads and bridges P810,467,000
xxx xxx xxx
5.4. Barangay Roads and Bridges P239,288,000
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The lump-sum of P397,232,000 for maintenance and repair of barangay roads is broken down into
sub-sums for each of the several Regions: for Region I (which includes Pampanga), the amount of
P55,442,000 was appropriated (General Appropriations Act, CY 1980, p. 366). The lump-sum of
P239,288,000 for construction, rehabilitation and improvement of barangay roads and bridges was
similarly broken down on a region-to-region basis, Region I being allocated the sum of P1,889,040
(Ibid., p. 368-369).
It appears to me that the CRBI fund for barangay roads referred to in the decision of the Court
formed part of the above items of appropriation.

I am aware that the Solicitor General has recommended acquittal of accused Parungao in this case.
However, the Solicitor General did not distinguish between setting aside the decision of the
Sandiganbayan as insupportable under the information actually filed in this case, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, treating this case as ifan information for violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code had in fact been filed and acquitting Parungao thereunder on the merits.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it acquits petitioner Parungao on the
merits of an information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which information has
not yet in fact been filed.
In sum, I believe the decision of the Sandiganbayan should be set aside without prejudice to the
right of the Government to file another information this time for violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code. As shown above, that there was a violation of Article 220 is clear, at least prima facie,
from the record, even though there was no evil intent (Understood as conversion of public funds
to personal uses) on the part of petitioner Parungao. Such an evil intent is not an element of the
offense of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133436

April 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
CONRADO AYUMAN, appellant.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 97-1040 finding Conrado Ayuman, appellant, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. He was
also adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Information charging appellant with parricide reads:

"That on or about April 22, 1997, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength and ascendancy
over Sugar Ray Ayuman, his legitimate son, maul, maltreat and kill the latter by slapping and
hitting the latter on his head, stomach and other parts of the latter's young and tender body
thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic ABDOMINAL injuries, which are fatal injuries and
which caused the latter's death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Sugar Ray Ayuman and his legal heirs."
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
The version of the prosecution was established through the testimonies of Dr. Tammy Uy, Marino
Jalalo, SPO1 Salome Catulong, Ederico Mariano, Angelito Roluna, Grace Songcuya and SPO1
Medel Makalino.
On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman, appellant's wife, rushed her fiveyear old sonSugar Ray to the Emergency Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center (NMMC).
When Ederico Mariano, a nurse, took the child's vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on arrival.
Ederico then asked Ermita what happened to the child. She answered that he was mauled by his
father. Ermita's statement was noted in the emergency room record.2
At about 10:45 in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Salome Catulong of Police Precinct No. 1 of
Cagayan de Oro City, received a phone call from the NMMC informing her that a child died because
he was assaulted by his father. Being in charge of cases involving women and children, she
immediately proceeded to the hospital. Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter of the Sun Star, was
with her. Ermita refused to answer any query from SPO1 Catulong regarding the death of her son.
But when Roluna asked her what happened, she told him that Sugar Ray was mauled by his
father.3 This interview could only be finished the following day when Ermita admitted to him that
appellant used to hurt the child every time the latter left the house or made mistake; that before he
died, appellant kicked him; and that the child informed her he was in pain and vomiting. Roluna
reported this interview in the "Sun Star."
Also on that same day, April 22, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO1 Catulong went to
the Ayuman residence. That was the start of the wake for Sugar Ray. When SPO1 Catulong
interviewed Ermita, she stated that appellant maltreated the boy in order to discipline him and that
appellant started to hit him at the age of four. Upon suggestion of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita agreed
that the body of the child be autopsied.4
On April 23, 1997, Dr. Tomas L. Uy of the NBI, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro City, performed the
autopsy on the body of Sugar Ray. Prior thereto, he learned from Ermita that the child was
maltreated by appellant in their house on April 22, 1997 at about 10:30 in the morning. 5
Dr. Uy's Autopsy Report contains the following findings:

"Pallor, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower extremities. Livor mortis, generalized, back,
buttocks, posterior aspects of the neck and extremities. Areas of post-mortem greenish
discolorations of the abdomen and inferior aspects of the chest are noted.
ABRASIONS: 0.2X0.4 cms. And 0.3X0.6 cm., lower thoracic region of the back, mid-aspect;
3X2 cms., right iliac region, lateral aspect.
HEMATOMAS, violaceous: 2.2X1 cms. Forehead, right side; 1.5X2 cms., 2.5X2 cms.,
1.2X1.6 cms., and 3X0.8 cms., left side of the face; (page 2-A, record) 1.8X1.2 cms., right
elbow region; 4X2.5 cms., dorsum of right hand; 2.4X1.2 cms., left forearm, dorsal aspect,
dista third; 2.5X2.2 cms., lower sternal region of the chest; 6X3 cms., epigastric region of the
abdomen.
HEMATOMA, 6X2 cms., surface of the pericardium, anterior aspect, beneath the sternum.
HEMATOMA, stomach, 5X2 cms., lesser curvature region, anterior aspect.
LACERATED WOUND, 1.5 cms. long, with irregular edges, right lobe of the liver, medial
aspect, overlying the gall bladder, surrounded by a HEMATOMA of 4X3 cms.
RUPTURE, small intestine, ileal region/portion; with irregular edges.
PERITONITIS, generalized, aero-purulent; with extensive intestinal and mesenteric
adhesions; serosal surfaces of the small and large intestines are markedly congested and
covered with patches of foul-smelling yellowish purulent exudates. Peritoneal fluid is heavily
contaminated with fecal matter.
Heart chambers, contain smell amount of dark fluid and clotted blood.
Stomach, contains about 1 tbsp. of yellowish-green bilous substance.
Brain, markedly congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Traumatic abdominal injuries."
On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. Appellant was nowhere to be found. Neither did he report
for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997.6 During the burial, Ermita cried and shouted, "Dong, forgive
your father. Dong, don't leave us." Afterwards, upon invitation of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita, with her
two children, went to the former's office and executed the following statement quoted as follows:
"01. Q - Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth in your
statement now?
A - Yes, I will swear.

02. Q - Please state your name, age, address and other personal circumstances?
A - I am Ermita Ayuman y Mayuela, 36 years of age, married, presently residing at
Pilgrim Compound, Del Pilar/ Magsaysay Street, Cagayan de Oro City and originated
from Manuikan, Zamboanga del Norte, a mother of 3 children, 2 girls and one boy.
03. Q - Why are you here at the police Station at OKK Police Precinct No. 1?
A - I am here to file a criminal complaint against my own husband PO3 Conrado
Ayuman an active member of Cagayan de Oro Central Fire Station, for killing our
only son Sugar Ray Ayuman, 5 yrs. Old, Kinder 2 at Faith Tabernacle situated at Del
Pilar/Magsaysay, Cagayan de Oro City.
04. Q - When and where did this happen?
A - This happened on April 22, 1997 at 10:30 in the morning more or less from our
house at Del Pilar/Magsaysay going to Northern Mindanao Medical Center but died
on arrival at the hospital and the mauling which was done by his father happened in
our house and this the cause of the death of my son.
05. Q - Please narrate shortly the incident.
A - The father of Sugar Ray started mauling him when he was then 4 years old until
the age of 5. His father would kick, box, slap, and beat him even if he just committed
slight mistakes. If Sugar Ray would go out from our room to watch TV at our
neighbor's place his father would be furious and would beat him. And on Monday,
April 21, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., more or less, my husband came home from office to
get something. He called Ray because that time Ray went out from our room, and
immediately slapped him and the head of Ray bumped on the wall. He let Ray get
inside our room, slapped him again and I saw my husband kick Ray many times
hitting his abdomen. I tried to stop him but he would not listen and instead kicked
Ray several times because as what he said 'I must discipline my child because he is
a boy.' He easily gets angry even for slightest mistakes.
06. Q - What else can you say?
A - In that afternoon at past 1:00 o'clock of same day, he came home from his work
to get epoxy to repair his radio, and he saw Ray wiping his hands and suddenly hit
Ray's head and said 'You will go out again as your mother is sleeping.' But that time I
was not yet asleep and I heard everything that he said to the child then looked for a
chain but there was none; he saw a rope and tied the neck of my son to the bed, so
Ray could not go out and even told me not to untie the knot until the child sleeps,
then he left going back to his office.
07. Q - What other things happened?

A - The following day April 22, 1997 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning my husband was
at home from a 24 hours duty before that day. He saw me wiping the hands of Ray
with wet face towel and asked me by saying 'Is Ray having fever? It's because he is
disobedient.' He told the child to stand up by saying 'stand up Ray.' Ray then stood
up and felt nauseated and was about to vomit and told Ray 'Pretentious child he's
just pretending to vomit.' Ray lay down again and I continued wiping him and
massage him with sanitary balm as he felt cold and was sweating and at that time
seemed to have hard time breathing. I could not determine his way of breathing,
sometimes very fast, and then my husband approached Ray and put his clenched fist
on Ray's face and commanded Ray to squat then let Ray stand up and squat with
open hands in front his knees. I told him to stop Ray from squatting, then Ray lay
down again but rose up and vomited and I saw him vomit with blood and I was so
scared so I brought my child to Northern Mindanao Medical Center, and while on our
way on board motorela going to said hospital, Ray was able to say 'Mang, maybe I
will die now' and I told him, 'You won't die "Do" because we will go to the hospital.' At
that time I noticed Ray having hard time breathing and upon arrival at the emergency
room of said hospital the nurse touched his pulse and declared that my son died on
arrival. I could not believe that my son was already dead and did not know what to do
that time. I just embraced him and kept on crying.
08. Q - Did your husband know at that time that Sugar Ray is already dead?
A - Yes, because he was informed by his sibling who accompanied us to the hospital
but my husband that time did not go with us to said hospital and as what I knew from
his sibling that he told his 'manong' (my husband) that Sugar Ray is already dead
and his response was 'bury him' and until now my husband has not yet appeared.
09. Q - I have no more questions, do you have something more to add?
A - No more as of now.
10. Q - Will you sign your statement voluntarily without being coerced or intimidated
by anybody?
A - Yes, I will sign. (Affidavit as translated, pages 185-186, records).
(Signed) ERMITA MAYUELA AYUMAN
(Affiant)"7
Thereafter, SPO1 Catulong and Ermita proceeded to the office of Grace Songcuya, Clerk of Court of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro City. Ermita subscribed and sworn to before
Songcuya the truth of her statement given before SPO1 Catulong.
However, on May 15, 1997, Ermita executed an affidavit retracting what she stated in her sworn
statements. Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor filed with the court a quo the corresponding

Information and eventually issued a warrant of arrest against appellant. SPO1 Catulong arrested
appellant at the Central Fire Station, Cagayan de Oro City.8
Marino Jalalo, testified that he and appellant's family are neighbors. Appellant has three children, two
girls and a boy. But he was particularly violent to his son Sugar Ray. Every time the boy committed a
mistake, appellant would punish him inside a room. About 3 to 4 times a month, appellant would hit
the child with a belt or a stick and he could only cry. Once, Marino heard the child gasping for breath
as if he was being drowned by appellant. At one time, the boy approached Marino and asked for
something to eat, saying "Tatay, did you hear me a while ago?" At that moment, Marino noticed that
the child's head was partly swollen. When asked what happened to him, the child replied, "My face
was pushed down." In the same month and year, appellant locked the child inside a room. Observing
that Marino was around, the child begged him for help.9
The defense presented as its witnesses appellant and his wife Ermita.
Appellant denied killing his son Sugar Ray. He testified that on April 22, 1997, when he came home
at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw his son on bed. His wife was rubbing "sanitary balm"
on him. While he was having breakfast, he noticed that his son was pale, had fever and was
vomiting. So he told his wife to bring the child to the hospital. Initially, she was reluctant because
they had no money, but he insisted. On the same day, he went to Pagadian to borrow money from
his relatives. He returned home on April 27, 1992. Ermita told him that Sugar Ray died because an
unidentified person slapped and kicked him at the Cogon market. At that time, his son was already
buried. The couple then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to "tell the truth." 10
On cross examination, appellant admitted he was strict with his children and disciplined them in a
military way. 11
After hearing the case, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Conrado Ayuman guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide committed by killing his minor son, Sugar Ray Ayuman, aggravated
by treachery, lack of respect due to Sugar Ray's tender age, cruelty and abuse of
confidence, and thereby hereby sentences him to death, to indemnify the heirs of Sugar Ray
Ayuman in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs of this case.
His custodian is hereby also ordered to ship him to the National Penitentiary immediately, or
without delay.
SO ORDERED."
Appellant now raises the following assignments of error:
"I

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE FILED BY
THE COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING HER TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT."12
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that
he is guilty of the crime charged. In fact, there is no evidence directly pointing to him as the culprit.
What the prosecution presented are mere hearsay evidence and "assumption." While SPO1
Catulong testified that Ermita executed a sworn statement on September 22, 1997, however, Ermita
denied its veracity. Her affidavit of desistance tells all.
Appellant likewise maintains that the circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court in its
assailed Decision "do not support any finding of parricide."
For his part, the Solicitor General, in the appellee's brief, maintains that Ermita's affidavit of
recantation is an afterthought and exceedingly unreliable. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence
relied upon by the trial court sustains the conviction of appellant of the crime charged.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, defines and
penalizes parricide as follows:
"Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the
accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The key element here is the
relationship of the offender with the victim.13
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution, specifically on the basis of
circumstantial evidence.
In People vs. Almoguerra and Aton,14 we held:
"Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom a
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The rules on evidence and case law
sustain the conviction of appellants through circumstantial evidence.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all

circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused."
The following circumstances cited by the trial court led us to conclude that the prosecution proved by
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant killed his son, thus:
1. Appellant has the propensity in maltreating his son. He himself testified that he disciplined the
victim by inflicting on him serious corporal punishment akin to "the military approach;" 15
2. Marino Jalalo, appellant's neighbor, testified that whenever the victim committed a mistake,
appellant would bring him in a room and punish him. He often heard the victim crying as he was
being hit by appellant with a belt or a stick. This happened about 3 to 4 times a month;
3. Appellant was at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim to the NMMC where he
was declared dead on arrival;
4. Appellant immediately left after his son was rushed to the hospital by his wife;
5. Ermita admitted to Ederico Mariano, the nurse then on duty when the victim was rushed to the
hospital, that the latter was mauled by his father. This declaration was later entered in the NMMC
emergency room record by the same nurse;
6. Ermita, when interviewed by SPO1 Catulong and Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter, also
admitted to them that appellant has been maltreating his son and mauled him before he died;
7. Dr. Tomas L. Uy who physically examined the victim found abrasions and hematomas all over his
body, as well as lacerated wound of the liver and ruptured intestine, among others. According to Dr.
Uy, Sugar Ray died of "traumatic abdominal injuries." To a layman, Dr. Uy's findings readily show
that the child suffered violent blows on his body.
8. During the interment, Ermita shouted, "Dong, forgive your father."
9. Although Ermita advised appellant that the victim was slapped and kicked by an unidentified
person at the Cogon market on April 21, 1997, however, contrary to a father's natural reaction,
appellant failed to take any action to defend a loved one or report the incident to the police;
10. Appellant did not return home immediately. In fact, he was not present during the wake and the
burial of his own son, conduct so unnatural for a father like him.
The foregoing circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, are as convincing as direct evidence
and as such, negate appellant's innocence. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a
shadow of doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring him to the hospital,
although on the verge of death, for prompt medical treatment. Such a heartless conduct is
condemnable and is extremely contrary to human nature. Every father is expected to love his

children and shower them with acts of affection and tenderness. But appellant belongs to a different
breed. Indeed, he is a tyrant without mercy. His intense apathy to his dying young son is beyond
comprehension.
We have ruled that facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused
but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force,
may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court. 16
But appellant discredits Ermita's sworn statement because she retracted. It bears emphasis that
mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible, as in this case. We look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in
court. The rationale for the rule is obvious: Affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable. There is always the probability that it will later be repudiated. 17 Thus, the trial
court correctly disregarded Ermita's affidavit of desistance. Obviously, she was influenced by
appellant to execute it. Moreover, if it were true that an unidentified person killed their son, why did
appellant fail to report the matter to the proper authorities? There can be no other conclusion,
therefore, than that Ermita's affidavit of retraction is an afterthought, intended to exculpate appellant
from criminal liability.
Appellant, merely denied the commission of the crime and interposed the defense of alibi. Alibi is
inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by disinterested witnesses. Since he was
unable to substantiate his alibi with the testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving
evidence undeserving of any weight in law.18
In his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, appellant insists that the
prosecution failed to prove that he is the father of the victim. While the prosecution failed to present
to the trial court the victim's Certificate of Live Birth, however, both appellant and his wife Ermita
admitted during the hearing that the victim is their son. In People vs. Malabago,19 we ruled that oral
evidence of the fact of filial relationship maybe considered.20
We now resolve the issue of whether the trial court imposed the correct penalty. Under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 5 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is
composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, the trial court
erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of confidence and cruelty.
Outright, we cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in determining the proper penalty
because they have not been alleged in the Information. Also, there are no mitigating circumstances
here.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime,
we impose upon the appellant the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim's
mother and sisters. When death occurs as a result of a crime, appellant should be ordered to pay
the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,21 without need of any evidence or proof of
damages.22 We also award them exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 considering that the

qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of parricide. 23 In People vs.
Catubig,24 we held that exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is
present an aggravating circumstance (whether qualifying or ordinary) in the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 97-1040, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
the sense that appellant CONRADO AYUMAN is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and is ordered to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 139576

September 2, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ROGER or ROGELIO PUEDAN, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By invoking the defense of surprising his spouse in the very act of sexual intercourse with the victim,
the accused admits authorship of the killing. Having waived his constitutional right to be presumed
faultless, he now bears the burden of proving his innocence. Furthermore, his flight negates his selfrighteous proclamation of being the victim of in flagrante adultery. Indeed, if what he claims is true,
he should have reported the incident to the authorities immediately, instead of hiding from them for
over three years.
The Case
Rogelio Puedan appeals the June 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of
Malaybalay (Branch 8) in Criminal Case No. 7482-95, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Rogelio Puedan guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery. In the absence of any other
aggravating and/or a mitigating circumstance, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the sum
of P50,000.00."2
The Information3 dated June 20, 1995, charged appellant in these words:
"That on or about the 21st day of February, 1995, in the morning, at Purok 2, [B]arangay
Paitan, Municipality of Quezon, [P]rovince of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused, with intent to kill [and] by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a sharp bladed instrument
(flamingo), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab
FLORENCIO ILAR, hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following, to wit:
- Multiple stab wounds
which caused the instant[an]eous death of FLORENCIO ILAR, to the damage and prejudice
of the legal heirs of FLORENCIO ILAR in such amount as may be allowed by law." 4
Upon his arraignment on June 9, 1998,5 appellant, assisted by his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty. After
trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions version of the facts
as follows:
"In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar, accompanied by his six-year old
grandson, Reymark Anthony Ilar, went to the house of Luceno Tulo to buy a piglet.
"Luceno Tulo was fashioning out a mortar (for pounding palay) near his house when
Florencio and his grandson arrived.
"Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet from him.
"Appellant Roger Puedan suddenly arrived and stabbed Florencio five (5) times, first in the
abdomen, with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as plamingco. Terrified of what he
witnessed, Luceno fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young Reymark ran back to his
parents house and told his mother, Erlinda Ilar, what transpired.
"Erlinda Ilar ran swiftly to Lucenos place but Florencio was already dead when she arrived.
Florencio was bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the rice paddy.

"The body of Florencio Ilar remained where it had fallen until the arrival of the police later
that day."8(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant contends that he deserves acquittal, because the killing falls under the exceptional
circumstance referred to in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He claims to have surprised his
spouse whom he had caught in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person.
Appellant narrates his version of the facts in the following manner:
"The defense had a different version of the incident that led to the death of Florencio Ilar. To
lay the basis of the questionable character of the deceased[,] [t]he defense presented the
testimony of JENNEFER NADELA, who claimed that she was once a house help in the
residence of the Ilars. During her stay, which lasted only from July 1 to July 30, 1992, the
deceased used to fondle her private parts against her will. The deceased likewise proposed
an amorous relationship with her, in exchange for some MONEY , which she declined.
1wphi1.nt

"Corroborative of the testimony of Nadela, anent the character of the deceased, was the
testimony of witness VINESA QUINTERO. Quinteros father and the deceased were drinking
buddies. Sometime in December 1982, when she took her vacation at her parents house,
her father and Florencio Ilar had a drinking session. When the duo were through drinking,
she washed the drinking glasses of their kitchen. Florencio Ilar, however, followed her inside
the kitchen and without warning embraced and kissed her. Ilar then proposed that they go
outside in exchange for some amount of MONEY . She declined the proposition. The
incident was repeated during the next weekend when her father and Ilar had another
drinking session. The witness likewise averred that she heard one of Florencio Ilars
daughter-in-law, Erlinda, confiding to her mother that Florencio Ilar was a sex maniac, who
was bent on molesting her.
"LEAH PUEDAN, the wife of the accused, admitted having an illicit relationship with the
deceased, Florencio Ilar. The illicit relationship had been going on for two years and was
known in their barangay, except her husband. On February 21, 1995, at about 8:00 oclock in
the morning, Florencio Ilar came to their house, while she was breast feeding her child, and
was looking for her husband, Roger Puedan. When she retorted that Roger was out putting
the carabao in a shade, Florencio then suggested that they have a quick sexual intercourse,
and ordered her to remove her skirt and panty, while also undressing himself. While they
were having sex, Roger suddenly appeared and was stunned by what he saw. Roger then
struck Florencio with his bolo and the two men grappled with each other. She then gathered
her young child and ran away from the house.
"Accused ROGER PUEDAN, testifying on his behalf, averred that Florencio Ilar was one of
the patrons in the ricefields [where] he works. As such patron, Florencio usually [brought] him
wine and pulutan which they partook at his house. On February 21, 1995, at around 8:00
oclock in the morning, he brought his carabao to a shade. Upon his return, he heard some
noises emanating from their bedroom. His curiosity aroused, he went inside the room and
found the already undressed Florencio having sexual intercourse with his wife. Shaken and

dumbfounded by the revelation, he shouted invectives upon the copulating pair and found a
bolo to stab them. The first thrust was parried by Florencio, who grappled for the bolo and
wrestled with him. As they wrestled with each other, they fell to the ground, and his hand was
freed from the grip of Florencio. He then stabbed Florencio and hit him on the stomach. He
then proceeded upstairs in search of his wife, who had already fled." 9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC opined that the prosecution witnesses "were straightforward and candid in relating the
incident."10Moreover, "[n]o motive has been shown, and the court did not find any, why they would
fabricate a story."11 They were able to establish the fact that appellant suddenly stabbed Florencio
Ilar, who was then buying a piglet outside Luceno Tulos house.
One of the investigating policemen, SPO4 Antonio B. Inihao, testified that they found Florencios
body slumped lifeless on a rice paddy near Tulos house. This fact, according to the trial court, belied
the claim of appellant that it was outside his house where he had killed Florencio. The body
remained where it had fallen, unmoved and untouched, until the policemen arrived a few hours later.
It was properly clad in a shirt and a pair of buttoned pants. Had appellant really surprised his wife
having sexual intercourse with him, Florencio would not have had the opportunity to put on and
button up his pants, parry the immediate bolo thrust of appellant then grapple with him.
Appellant thereafter fled and was finally arrested on March 16, 1998, or about three years after the
killing. The trial court observed that his flight was a strong indication of his guilt.
Conformably, the RTC overruled the contention of appellant that the killing should be treated under
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. It further said that treachery qualified the killing to murder.
Hence, this appeal.12
Issues
In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
"I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-appellant, Roger or Rogelio Puedan, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder despite the
clear failure of the prosecution to establish the particulars leading to the stabbing incident." 13
In short, appellant argues that (1) Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code should be applied in his
favor, and (2) treachery should not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.
First Issue
Exceptional Circumstance
By raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his defense, appellant admits that he killed the
victim. This provision reads as follows:
"ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally
married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro. x x x"
By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the constitutional presumption of innocence
and bears the burden of proving the following:
"1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under
18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person.
"2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any serious
physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
"3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he
or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse."14
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised his wife and Florencio
in flagrante delicto,and that he killed the man during or immediately thereafter. However, all that
appellant established was Florencios promiscuity, which was inconsequential to the killing. What is
important is that his version of the stabbing incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing
accounts of Prosecution Witnesses Luceno Tulo, Reymark Anthony Ilar, Erlinda Ilar and Policeman
Inihao.
Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by alleging that Tulo was not at the
crime scene when the stabbing occurred. Without elaborating on the particulars that led to the
incident, appellant claims that Reymark and Erlinda merely underscored the fact that Florencio had
been stabbed. Thus, appellant argues that these witnesses were not able to contradict his defense.
Well-settled is the rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by the trial court, because it had the opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note
their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. For this reason, its findings on such matters,

absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final
and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal. 15
In this case, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses to be credible and convincing. It observed
that Tulo, Reymark and Erlinda were candid and straightforward in relating their versions of the
stabbing incident. Tulo narrated that he was outside his house fashioning a mortar when Florencio -accompanied by his then five-year-old grandson, Reymark -- arrived in order to buy a piglet.
Standing about a meter away, Tulo recounted that appellant suddenly appeared and stabbed
Florencio on the abdomen with a knife. Tulo testified thus:
"Q
Yes, you said that Roger Puedan stabbed Florencio Ilar, did you see him [stab]
Florencio Ilar?
A

That was the time when I turned my head as I was making a mortar.

You mean, that was the time you saw Puedan [stab] Ilar?

Yes.

Q
Now, at the time you were making a mortar, where was this incident [happening], at
your front, at your back or at your side?
A

On my side. (Witness referring to his right side).

How far were you [from] them when this incident happened?

Just more than a meter.

COURT: (to witness)

Q
You mean, while Florencio Ilar was there to buy [a] piglet you continued to work on your
mortar?
A

Yes, Your Honor.

Before Roger Puedan actually stabbed Florencio Ilar, did you see him coming?

He came suddenly, he passed this way.

(Witness pointing to his front side).

Q

He passed by in front of you or by your side?

On my front, as I was making a mortar.

Was he running, walking fast or was walking naturally?

He was walking fast.

Did you hear Puedan say anything when he stabbed Florencio Ilar?

No, Your honor.

What did he use in stabbing Florencio Ilar?

A knife. (plamingco).

Where was Florencio Ilar hit?

On his abdomen.

What was the position of Florencio Ilar when he was stabbed?

He was standing on my side."16

After witnessing the knife thrust, Tulo out of fear immediately ran to his neighbors house. He
explained:
"Q

Now, after you saw this Puedan [stab] Ilar, what did you do?

I ran away.

How many times did you see Puedan stab Ilar?

Only once.

And you said you ran away, towards where?

To my neighbor."17

Minutes later, Tulo with some other people went back to the crime scene and found Florencio
already dead, lying several meters away from the formers house.18
Similarly, young Reymark testified that appellant had stabbed his grandfather Florencio five times.
He testified thus:
"Q

How many times [was he] stabbed by Roger?

Five (5) times.

What instrument did Roger use in stabbing your Lolo?

A knife.

Where did Roger Puedan stab your Lolo, in what place?

In the rice paddies.

COURT: (to witness)

Q

Were you able to see all the incident?

Yes, Your Honor.

You were at the rice paddies also?

Yes, Your Honor.

Why were you there?

Because he asked me to accompany him.

Who asked you?

Lolo."19

There had been no untoward incident between appellant and Florencio immediately before the
stabbing, as shown by Reymarks testimony:
"COURT: (to witness)
Q

Were you and your Lolo able to reach the house of Ceno before he was stabbed?

Yes, Your Honor.

So your Lolo was able to talk with Ceno?

No.

Why?

Because [he] was stabbed.

So he was still walking towards Ceno before he was stabbed?

Not yet.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Did Roger Puedan and your Lolo have a fight before your Lolo was stabbed?

No.

Did they have [an] argument?

No, Your Honor.

Who arrived at Cenos place first, your Lolo or Roger?

Lolo.

Where was your Lolo hit the first time he was stabbed?

On his abdomen."20

Reymark at first stated in his testimony that, before being stabbed, his grandfather had not been
able to talk to Tulo. From the boys statement, appellant concludes that Tulo was not at or even near
the crime scene.21 This inconsistency was clarified when the trial court again questioned Reymark,
who this time stated that his grandfather had indeed been able to see Tulo on that fateful
morning.22 As posited by the prosecution, such inconsistency in the testimony of Reymark may be
explained by the fact that he was very young when the incident happened -- only five years of age -and was still very young when he testified on the witness stand three years later. Nonetheless, it was
established that he and his grandfather were at Tulos place to buy a piglet, that the boy himself saw
his Lolo stabbed by appellant, and that Tulo was there but disappeared immediately after the first
knife thrust.
Even assuming arguendo that Tulo was not at the crime scene, Reymarks testimony is sufficient to
prove that appellant actually stabbed Florencio.
Appellant further alleges that Erlinda, who was the first to arrive at the locus criminis, did not see
Tulo anywhere. This allegation, however, is consistent with the testimony of Tulo that he ran to his
neighbors house right after the first knife thrust.
Furthermore, the physical evidence shows that Florencio lay dead near Tulos -- not appellants -house. Erlinda testified that his body remained unmoved and untouched where it had fallen until the
policemen came.23 In addition, SPO4 Antonio Inihaos testimony on the attendant circumstances
inspires belief. He testified that the body lay 80 meters away from appellants house and only about
15 meters away from Tulos.24 This statement contradicts the claim of appellant that he and Florencio
grappled outside the formers house, where the latter fell and was subsequently killed.
When found, the body of Florencio was fully clothed in a shirt and a pair of pants, all its buttons
intact.25 We agree with the RTC that had the victim been caught by surprise while engaged in the sex
act, he would not have had the opportunity to put on his pants, parry the forthcoming bolo thrusts,
and then grapple with appellant.
Appellants Flight

Further eroding the defense of appellant is the fact that he immediately fled from the crime scene
right after the stabbing incident. He hid for about three years 26 until he was arrested by the
authorities on March 16, 1998.27His flight betrays his defense, because he could have easily relayed
his story to the proper authorities, if he had indeed caught his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto.
Through flight, one impedes the course of justice by avoiding arrest, detention, or the continuance of
criminal proceedings.28 As with self-defense, the exceptional circumstance provided under Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code may not prevail in the face of the flight of appellant from the crime
scene and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident. 29 Flight bespeaks guilt and gives
credence to the version of the prosecution in this case. 30
Second Issue
Treachery
Similarly without merit is appellants contention that treachery did not attend the killing. For treachery
to be present, the means, methods or forms of execution should give the person attacked no
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation. And it must be proven that such means, methods or forms
of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted without danger to appellant. 31
In the present case, the RTC correctly ruled that treachery attended the killing. Appellant came from
nowhere and suddenly stabbed the unsuspecting Florencio five (5) times. He deliberately and
consciously adopted his mode of attack by lunging at the victim with his knife without any warning
whatsoever, giving the latter no opportunity to defend himself.
1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the
accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the
new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue
the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he
wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and

feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot
wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also
caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the
different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise
would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of
murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx

On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately
the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence
in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to
fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning).
He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus
had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused,
then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived
at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a
PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not
able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was
the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and
Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept.
24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock
and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and
abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct.
17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital
as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a
salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of
his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent
Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2

On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in
the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's
wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been
deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if
not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx

The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining
death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article
247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There
is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually
shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or
both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct byproduct of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the abovequoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment to
a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous
provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical
injury, as the case may be is punished only withdestierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused
than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries
other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to
an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make

the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer
to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation
would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting
circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or
omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the
accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a
matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the
General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could
not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for
his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant
shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the
accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is
not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second

paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her
recovery period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellantarresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is
sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he
has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore
ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization
expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48768

December 4, 19471

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CIRILO CORICOR, defendant-appellant.
Crisanto Alba for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes and Solicitor Florencio Villamor for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:
Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Pedro Lego
in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs, having been found by the lower court guilty of murder
committed on September 15, 1941.
The evidence for the prosecution was presented on October 20 and 21, 1941, and the evidence for
the defense on October 21 and 22, 1941. Six witnesses testified for the prosecution and their
testimonies are in substance as follows:
1. Dr. Gregorio Pealosa, 30, identified Exhibit A as written and signed by him which is a certification
of the post-mortem examination he made on the body of Pedro Lego on September 12, 1941, 3 p.m.
He presented Exhibit B, a diagram of a human body, where the wounds mentioned in Exhibit A are
indicated by circles in red pencil. Wound No. 6 was fatal, while Nos. 10, 11 and 12 were serious. The
wounds were caused by a sharp cutting instrument, such as a pointed cutting bolo. Wounds Nos. 5,
6, and 9 could have been inflicted while the victim had his back turned towards the aggressor. Death
certificate Exhibit C was issued by the witness. He performed the autopsy about 15 to 20 hours after
the death of Pedro Lego, which took place at 3 p.m. on September 16, 1941. Exhibit D is a certificate
of the wounds of Catalina Regis who suffered superficial wounds, none of which being serious.

2. Catalina Regis, 38 widow of Pedro Lego. On the morning of September 15, 1941, she was with
her husband in the house of Severino Regis in barrio Lukay, municipality of Alangalang, to attend a
novena for the souls in purgatory. Pedro Lego "came later at 11 a.m. of the same day which was the
last day of the novena. On Monday morning September 15, Cirilo Coricor went to the place." The
witness and her husband had been in the house of Severino "since Friday yet, at 4 p.m." The
accused is the aunt of my husband Pedro Lego." Cirilo arrived at 7 a.m. "to invite us to his house to
give advice to his wife Isabel Regis." Cirilo said: "Tatay Pedro, before you return to Jaro, please pass
by our house to give advice to my wife, because she does not mind me, does not obey me." At 11
o'clock of the same morning, Cirilo returned saying: "I return to invite you again, because I feel
impatient waiting for you at home." After lunch, in which Cirilo partook, he said: "Tatay Pedro, I am
going ahead because you are to take rest for a while as I am afraid that Isabel might go away and
you may not reach her at home." Cirilo went away with the corn which witness and Pedro Lego were
to take with them, to compel them to go to his house." At 3 in the afternoon we went away in the
direction of Jaro and we passed by the house of Cirilo." Question as to their arrival at the house of
Cirilo, the witness answered: "About half past two, I believe , no, I believe after three. Esperanza
Coricor came along with us to the house. When we arrive he offered us places to sit and I sat on a
bench near the door. Cirilo was sitting on the floor and my husband Pedro Lego sat on a bench near
the window, at the side of a post." Cirilo "was cutting roast pig and placing the pieces in a plate.
There was a glass and one liter of tuba in a container of bamboo. At that moment he offered
me tuba and gave me part of the roast pig. I drunk and Cirilo faced Pedro Lego, squatting, put
the tuba in a glass which he placed on a bench, and faced me and took the bolo which was before
me and then placed it in front of himself and then said: "Tatay Pedro, take tuba,' and Cirilo took
the bolo and with it he cut a piece of roast pig. While Pedro Lego was drinking the tuba from the
glass which he lifted to his mouth, Cirilo gave him a thrust with the bolo." He took the bolo from the
floor. The bolo was big and it had a horn handle. Pedro Lego was hit in the abdomen. "My husband
covered the wound with his hand and jumped from the house, and Cirilo pursued him to the other
side of the road, which was an abaca plantation. I went down immediately after them, going to the
road to have a sight of them. They reached the abaca plantation. I could not see them, because they
were screened by shubbery. I heard a noise of blows. My children were shouting and crying. I was
intending to go to the side of my husband, or else flee, but I could not because of my children. When
Cirilo Coricor came out from the abaca plantation, after killing Pedro Lego, I heard him saying:
'Where is Catalina I am going to kill her too.' I felt I was held. When I moved my face I saw her sister
holding him by the hand which was carrying the bolo. When I disengaged myself from him, I took my
son and went running at full speed, but he reached me and stabbed me in the head. I felt dizzy. I
believe he did not stab me with the sharp edge because I was not wounded. I fell down on my back.
He mounted me and attempted to give me a thrust in the abdomen, but I was able to take hold of
the bolo and pushed it up while he was trying to push it down, and then my hands were wounded,
the same as my face. I felt bad due to my wounds and I swooned and said to Cirilo: 'Ay, I am going
to die.' He left me unconscious. When I opened my eyes I tried to stand up. I felt very weak and I
went to the house of Severino Reyes, almost crawling. As soon as I laid down in the room of
Severino Regis I heard Cirilo shouting: 'Where is that Catalina. So she is still alive. I will kill her.'
Cirilo was then in the road. The witness saw him through a cranny. When Cirilo arrived at the house,
he asked whether Catalina Regis went there. Severino and Esperanza told him that Catalina was not
there, and Cirilo went away. The witness was treated by Dr. Pealosa. Her wounds took thirty-three
days to heal. The bolo Exhibit E was the one used by Cirilo.
lawphil.net

At the time of the incident there were in the house of Cirilo, his wife Isabel, Esperanza, and a son
and a daughter of the witness. Esperanza sat down in the same bench with Pedro. Esperanza did
not see when Pedro was attacked by Cirilo because at that moment Esperanza had already gone
down the stairs of the house of Cirilo to return home. The floor of the house was less than one meter
high from the ground. The stairs had only two steps. There was a sleeping room. When Cirilo
requested Pedro Lego and his wife to come to his house, he wanted his uncle to give advice to his
wife Isabel, because he was noticing that she had a paramour, which was Saturnino Caaya. The

witness suspected that Cirilo had a grudge against Pedro Lego, because the latter "sent him away
from our land and he had to transfer to the land of Victorio Alcober" which happened two years
before the incident. Cirilo then said that "we had preferences." At first "he did not talk with us, but
later after our frequent visits to the place we resumed our old friendly relations." The witness saw the
cadaver of her husband "at 3 o'clock in the afternoon." After a few more questions, the witness said
that she saw the corpse saw her husband in the municipal building at seven.
On August 14, "Isabel Regis arrived at our house in Jaro because she has a quarrel with her
husband." Isabel said that Cirilo was jealous of Saturnino Caaya. Isabel remained in the house of the
witness for four days. Cirilo came to take her, but before going out they quarrelled, Cirilo saying:
"You are courageous because these people are riding with you."
3. Dominga Lego, 7. Pedro Lego, her father, was interred in the cemetery. He was killed by Cirilo.
When requested to narrate the incident of the killing the witness answered: "I cannot."
Q. But what did you see, did you not see how the accused killed your father? A. I
did not see.
Q. What did you see? A. Nothing.
Q. What did your father try to do in return? A. He sat down.
Q. After? A. They gave him some drink.
Q. Who gave him some drink? A. Cirilo.
Q. What did he give to drink? A. Tuba.
Q. After? A. He gave him a thrust.
Q. What was your father doing when he was given a thrust? A. Drinking.
Q. Who gave him the thrust? A. Cirilo.
Q. Afterwards, what did your father do upon receiving the thrust? A. He ran.
Q. Where to? A. To the abaca plantation.
Q. And Cirilo, what did he do? A. He pursued my father.
Q. And you, where did you remain? A. I remained with my mother.
Q. Where was your mother when Cirilo pursued your father? A. On the road, in the
middle of the way.
Q. Afterwards, where did you and your mother go? A. We went to the house of
uncle Severino.
Q. How did you and your mother go to the house of Severino Regis? A. I and my
younger brother ran there.

Q. And your mother? A. She was wounded.

Q. When you ran, what did you mother do? A. She was lying on her back; she was
being attacked.
Q. Who was attacking her? A. Cirilo.
4. Zacarias Ladera, 35. As Chief of Police of Alangalang, he learned that Pedro Lego was killed
about half past four on September 15, 1941. He was notified by a chauffeur of a truck. He went to
the house of the accused. Nobody was there. I saw tuba in a container. On the floor there
was tuba and meat. The house was open. On the floor there were stairs of blood. There was
a bayong of corn at the door of the house. On the way from the house to the road there were also
stains of blood. The cadaver was found in an abaca plantation at the other side of the road. It was
about twenty meters from the road. The body was seen with face down. The witness was acquainted
with the accused and his wife and they came to se him on September 10, when they asked for help
in preparing an affidavit to be signed by Isabel Regis. The spouses came accompanied by Victorio
Alcober. The day before, Alcober came to the house of the witness with a pencil draft of an affidavit,
requesting that the affidavit be prepared to be signed by Isabel Regis, because the spouses were
quarrelling and without said affidavit, Isabel Regis would be killed by her husband. The affidavit
stated that Isabel Regis had sexual intercourse with Pedro Lego. A copy of said affidavit is marked
as Exhibit "F." The accused told the witness that he wanted an affidavit to be sure and to have an
evidence that his wife had been the paramour of Pedro Lego. At the time the affidavit of Isabel Regis
was made, the justice of the peace was absent, for which reason it was not sworn to before him. The
witness told Cirilo: "I am afraid you may punish or kill your wife for this affidavit", and Cirilo
answered: "I love my wife much; I only wanted to be sure that my uncle Pedro had sexual
intercourse with her and that is all."
5. Ruperto Aguirre, 37. On October 14, 1941, he saw the accused and his wife in the house of
Cirilo's mother in Granja, municipality of Jaro. The witness was invited by a younger sister of the
accused to apply a domestic medicine to cure the stomachache of a son. Cirilo arrived after 2
o'clock, alone. Isabel, his wife, was already there. At 3 o'clock, when the witness and his wife left,
Cirilo said to the witness: "Mano Perto, this is the last time that we shall see each other." The witness
asked him: "Why are you going to Manila?" The accused answered: "I am going to Manila." "What
for?" "I am going to kill a man." "Who?" "I will not tell the name; you will know it because he will be
from here if he is here or he will be from there if he is there." (On pp. 66 and 67, on crossexamination by the court, the contradictions of the witnesses were put in evidence.)
6. Severino Regis, 30. Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis left the house at 2 o'clock. They were
accompanied by Esperanza Coricor, wife of the witness. Esperanza wanted to ask money from Cirilo
Coricor. That same afternoon he saw again Catalina who was wounded. Cirilo arrived at his house
asking for Catalina, saying that he was going to kill her. The witness told him to go away because
Catalina was not there. The accused, who was holding a bolo, left at once.
Catalina Regis ands Pedro Lego remained in the house of the witness "for just one night."
Ignacio Buales, 50, first witness for the defense testified that on September 15, at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, Isabel Regis came running to his house. She said: "Cirilo wounded somebody." The
witness saw the accused in front of the house of Victorio Alcober. The witness asked him. "Why are
you covered with blood?" The accused answered: "I kill Pedro Lego" "Why?" "Because I caught him
and my wife flagrantly." The witness said: "Then you should not remain here. Where is your bolo? "It
is with Victorio." The bolo was delivered by Sebastian Alcober to the witness who then invited the

accused to present himself to the chief of police. The witness delivered the accused and the bolo to
the chief of police.
Cirilo Coricor, 28, the accused, testified: "On September 15 at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon I went
to distilltuba. After distilling in a distant place, I came to distill tuba from coconut tress near my
house. While I was near a coconut tree, before climbing it, I looked at my house and I saw that the
window of my room was being closed, and I felt apprehensive and then I went there to see what was
happening, and when I was approaching the room I heard low voices or persons. I looked through a
hole into the room and at the moment I saw Pedro Lego raising his body which was over that of my
wife and I saw his penis in erection. I say my wife naked from the chest down. Upon seeing this I felt
bad, as if my chest would explode and I thought that the peace of my home had been violated. Then
I unsheated my bolo. Slowly I went up passing through the kitchen door. My intention was to kill the
two of them inside the room. As I was approaching the door of my room, Pedro Lego came out and I
gave him a thrust, and my wife was able to escape passing through the door of the kitchen. Upon
being wounded, Pedro Lego jumped out of the window, and I pursued him. After passing the
threshold of my house, he faced me and made an attack. He was able to take hold of the blunt edge
of the bolo while I was strongly holding it by the handle. After a while Catalina Regis, Pedro Lego's
wife, arrived there and tried to help her husband, taking hold of the bolo in order to wrest it from me.
Then we were three struggling for the possession of the bolo, and while they were exerting force to
take it, by pulling it towards them, I was in turn pulling it towards me, and at that time the point of
the bolo touched the end of Catalina's nose. Sometimes we stumble down. After stumbling for the
fourth time, Catalina was placed beneath us and the bolo, touched her face. After a while, as
Catalina was hurt, she lost hold of the bolo and ran away and the two of us, Pedro Lego and myself,
remained, and we continued struggling for the possession of the bolo. And he lost hold it and I began
stabbing him. From that place he was able to run to the other side of the road and I followed him and
at that place I finished him, because I could not endure any longer the outrage he did to my home. I
love my wife who I brought to the altar."
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon when the accused left his house, the window of the room was open. He
was the one who opened it in the morning. He remembered seeing it open because he went inside
the room. The accused had been a distiller of tuba for more than two years. He used to make his
distillation at about half past two in the afternoon, the time when he saw the window of the room
being closed. Of the twenty coconut trees from which he used to distill, there still remained eight to
be distilled. It was about four when he approached the house to find out what was happening inside
the room. Two years before, the witness was residing in his land in Jaro. He transferred to Lukay
because of the wrong that Pedro Lego was doing to his wife. One week after his marriage, Pedro
Lego started going to their house while the accused was away in his work. The accused saw Pedro
Lego once sitting on a bench beside his wife. On another occasion he saw him near the door of the
room. The accused heard from neighbors that there was something bad going on between Pedro
Lego and his wife and that Pedro Lego would go to their house when the accused was out. Once, at
about half past eleven, Pedro Lego arrived asking if they had any viand. The accused answered that
they had none. Lego said that he brought viand but left it in the house of an uncle, surnamed
Coricor, and ordered Cirilo to fetch the viand because Pedro wanted to eat with the spouses. The
accused obeyed. When he returned, he saw Pedro Lego and his wife coming out of the room. The
wife went to the kitchen, pretending to do something with the rice she was cooking. Pedro Lego
pretended to be occupied cleaning the altar, and then said that he was looking for a chisel he placed
in the ceiling. The accused then sensed that there was something wrong, as Pedro Lego had no
business to be in the room. As the accused lacked the courage to talk to them, he went to Pedro
Lego's wife and told her: "Inay Taling, please tell Tatay Pindoy that he is doing wrong to my wife and
that in case I should catch them in flagrant copulation I would kill them and I would not recognize him
as my uncle." Catalina answered: "Leave it to me. I will tell him." One week later, Pedro Lego
returned. The accused thought that Lego could not stop making love to his wife. So he again went to
Lego's wife and said; "Inay Taling, we are going away from Jaro to avoid trouble. If I remained here

and uncle Pedro continues his acts and I catch him in the act I would not consider him as my uncle. I
will kill him." That is the reason why the accused and his wife transferred to Alangalang to the land of
Victorio Alcober.
The accused denies having gone to the house of Severino Regis, as testified by Catalina Regis, to
invite Pedro Lego and his wife to come to his house to give advice to his wife in view of the latter's
relations with Saturnino Caaya. The accused remained in his house waiting for the time to proceeds
with the distillation. Regarding his relations with Pedro Lego and his wife the accused said: "Since I
learned that they were doing something wrong to my wife I ceased my friendly relations with them."
The accused does not even know Saturnino Caaya, and he never suspected any man having love
relations with his wife except Pedro Lego. The accused learned that Pedro Lego and Catalina Regis
were in the house of Severino, because his sister Esperanza told him so, and was the one who
invited him to attend the novena. The accused and his wife refused to attend the celebration,
"because I knew that Catalina Regis was the one leading the prayers and her husband Pedro Lego
was there." The accused avoided meeting Pedro Lego, "because I knew what he was doing to my
wife." It is not true that the accused offered roast pig in his house to Pedro Lego and his wife. "We
did not even roast any pig that day." The accused denies having gone to Severino Regis' home to
look for Catalina with the intention of killing her. The fact that Catalina Regis was wounded only
accidentally when she intervened to help her husband by trying to wrest the bolo from the accused
can be shown by the fact that "if the wounds had been inflicted intentionally the wounds a would
have been big." Regarding the written admission of his wife, the accused had it prepared "in order
that my wife would not repeat what she did." On September 3, the accused not consented to let his
wife go to her mother's house to have a massage, promising to return the next day. Several days
passed but she did not return. The accused went to find out the reason for her failure to return. On
September 8, the accused went to her mother's house. He did not find her there and the mother said
that Isabel did not come to her house but to the house of Pedro Lego. The accused requested his
mother-in-law to be the one to take his wife, "because if I would be the one to do it, it is possible that
Pedro Lego would be mad at me." After taking Isabel, her mother told the accused that it took some
time before Pedro Lego consented to her leaving his house on the pretext that the child became sick
and should be cured. The accused brought his wife to Lukay, where he reprimanded her for going to
Pedro Lego's house. The wife answered that she was brought to the house of Pedro Lego in Jaro by
her aunt Catalina. Then the accused said: "I believe you have copulated with your uncle Pedro. Why
should you be there with him?" At first she refused to tell the truth, but upon the insistence of the
accused she could not conceal what happened. Then on September 10, the accused brought his
wife to the chief of police of Alangalang "to be reprimanded and be advised not to do again what she
did." Since the accused and his wife transferred to Lukay, the accused has not been on speaking
terms with Pedro Lego and his wife. The accused and his wife never visited Pedro Lego's house
again nor has the latter visited the former at Lukay. After he killed Pedro Lego he went to the town to
present himself to the authorities. On the way he met Ignacio Buales who asked him why he was
covered with blood and the accused said: "I killed somebody. I had a certainty that Pedro Lego and
my wife were doing something wrong." Since the accused transferred to Lukay, he heard that once,
in his absence, Pedro Lego came to his house. Pedro Lego has a piece of land in Lukay and the
accused heard that Pedro Lego used to go to said place, but the accused never saw him. At the time
the accused peeped into the room of his house he was already carrying the bolo Exhibit E which he
was using for his work. He was also carrying a sickle which had fallen from his waist when he was
pursuing Pedro Lego. The accused did not pay attention as to whether Pedro Lego had his pants on.
He saw his sexual organ, the same as that of his wife, who had the skirts raised. When the accused
went to distill tuba, his wife knew that he had to distill from coconut trees which were located far from
their house. Ever since, the accused was detained, he has not talked with his wife, who failed to visit
him even once. The reason was because "she knows that I was also about to kill her. In fact I gave
her a stab but she was not hit." Neither Pedro Lego nor Catalina Regis knew of Isabel's declaration
Exhibit F. When Isabel left the house on September 3, she brought with her eight-months-old
daughter and left her two-year-old son in the house of her compadre Francisco Serrano.

A careful weighing of the evidence both of the prosecution and the defense leads us to the
conclusion that appellant's version as to the circumstance under which Pedro Lego was killed is the
more credible. That appellant should have gone to the house of Severino Regis to invite Pedro Lego
and his wife to come to appellant's house so as to advise Isabel, because she had a paramour, one
Saturnino Caaya, as testified to by Catalina Regis, appears not to tally with the fact that, according
to the testimony of the accused, not contradicted by the same Catalina Regis, he went twice to her
to complain about the illicit relations between Pedro Lego and Isabel, to the extent that appellant
manifested to Catalina that if he should surprise Lego in flagrant copulation with Isabel, he will kill
them and would forget that Lego is his uncle. If appellant was jealous of nobody else but Pedro
Lego, of whose illicit relations with his wife he had ample evidence, including the written confession
of Isabel, there is no reason for him to recur precisely to Lego to give advice to Isabel. The
suggestion is too illogical to be entertained by a person in his senses, and there is no evidence that
appellant had lost his. It is unbelievable that he should seek advice for his wife to desist from
continuing with an alleged paramour, Saturnino Caaya, who is not even known to him. After
appellant had twice complained to her of the illicit relations between Lego and Isabel, it is hard to
believe that Catalina could have seriously entertained the alleged invitation by appellant to his house
to give advice to Isabel.
Catalina's story to the effect that her husband and herself were regaled by the accused in his house
with roast pig and tuba and does not seem natural. It is a well-known custom among our people in
the barrios to prepare roast pig only on important celebrations of gatherings. Roast pig is considered
a delicacy only proper when there are joyous motives. If Lego and his wife were invited just to give
advice to Isabel, on an unhappy domestic matter, it is incredible that appellant should offer roast pig,
which is only prepared for merry occasions. The fact that Lego and his wife we coming from the
house of Severino Regis, where the novena which took place must have been an occasion for
preparing special dishes, only serves to make more incredible Catalina's story.
We are of the opinion that the circumstances under which Pedro Lego was killed by appellant were
as narrated in the latter's testimony and, accordingly, the appealed decision must be modified, so as
to reduce the penalty to that provided in the following article of the Revised Penal Code.
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally
married person, who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
These rules shall applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living
with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this article.
In applying the above article we feel that we are performing a duty extremely distasteful, because,
with all due respect to a contrary opinion of the majority, the writer can not conscientiously agree
with the philosophy underlying said part of the Revised Penal Code. That philosophy, acceptable
during the immature stages of human evolution, when blind and unreasonable impulses were the

law, when reason was swayed by obscurantism and absurd prejudices, when the Christian and other
humanitarian religions had not yet set he tenets upon which modern civilization and culture have
developed, has absolutely no place in the present stage of human society.
Under that un-Christian, barbarous, inhuman philosophy, the offended spouse is given the
tremendous power to summarily execute two human beings, without the benefit of any hearing, trial,
or court proceeding. Under our laws, under the democratic system of government established by our
Constitution, the authors of the most heinous and abhorrent offenses, such as treason, piracy,
parricide, murder, genocide, mass massacre, the criminals whose misdeeds place them in the
category of moral monsters, are protected by a bill of rights, by an elaborate system of
administration of justice, by a number of fundamental guarantees intended to insure that no the shall
be deprived of the due process of law and that the equal protection of the laws shall be effective to
everybody. Under the savage philosophy in question, those who should happen to be surprised
violating the conjugal fidelity can be killed like vexatious insects or wild animals.
Conjugal fidelity committed by a married woman and her paramour is punished, as adultery, by
article 333 of the Revised Penal Code with from 4 months to 6 years of imprisonment, and the one
committed by a husband and his mistress, as concubinage, by article 334, with imprisonment from 6
months and 4 years and 2 months for the erring husband and banishment for the mistress. Under
article 334, not all cases of conjugal infidelity committed by a husband is punishable. The great
majority of them are left unpunishable. No fiscal will think of prosecuting the husband who should
indulge in sexual intercourse with discreet mistresses or with prostitutes. For such acts of conjugal
infidelity, some punishable with short terms of imprisonment, others with simple banishment, and still
others not punishable at all, article 247, in effect, confers to the offended spouse the power to inflict
the supreme penalty of death. The banishment provided for the killer is intended more for his
protection than as a penalty. Such a twisted logic seems possible only in a paranoiac mind. It is high
time to relegate article 247 to where it properly belongs, to the memory of the sins that humanity
promised to herself never to commit again. The majority of the Court, however, opines otherwise.
For all the foregoing, setting aside the appealed decision, appellant is found guilty of the offense of
having killed Pedro Lego as punished by article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and, accordingly, is
sentenced to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of banishment, and to indemnify the heirs of Pedro Lego
in the sum of P2,000.
Paras, and Pablo, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Briones and Mr. Justice Padilla joined in this decision.

Separate Opinions

BENGZON, J., concurring:

I agree to the application of article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. But I can not assent to the
commentary that it is old-fashioned and unjust. Though it is not this Court's mission to vindicate
legislative measures, it should be observed that similar provisions are founds in the codes of France,
Italy, Belgium, Mexico, Peru, Chile and other South American countries. 1 In some of these the
offended husband is even exempted from all criminal responsibility.
Article 247 was taken from the Spanish Penal Code; it does not fully excuse the husband's misdeed,
but it greatly reduces the penalty, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation. As Groizard explains.
El marido que sorprende a su mujer en adulterio y la mata, o mata a su complice, o mata a
los dos, debe ser siempre justiciable. Todos los elementos constitutivos del delito, en este
hecho concurren. Hay derecho herido: el derecho a la vida; hay ley violada; hayvoluntad en
la accion; hay dao immediato; hay dao mediato, y no concurre ninguna de las
circumstancias que hacen, con areglo a los principios, de todo punto excusable el homicidio.
Pero a su vez, hay que convenir en que la voluntad criminal no se determina en tales casos
con aquella ausencia de exitaciones que constituye el tipo ordinario del dolo, ni mucho
menos con aquella otra calma y fria reflexion que constituye el dolo perfecto; a su vez, hay
que confesar que la causa de la accion surge espontanea y conviolento impetu en el animo
del marido en presencia de la enorme ofensa, que se le infiere, y por tanto, que la
inmoralidad y la repugnancia del delito decoro que la accion criminal le induce; a su vez, hay
que proclamar que la opinion publica, cuando ilega a su noticia la catastrofe, se indigna mas
contra los culpables del aduleterio que contra el culpable del homicido; . . ..
TUASON, J., with whom concur MORAN, C.J., FERIA, and HILADO, JJ., dissenting:
The decision of this Court not only disregards the sensible, realistic rule which gives weight to the
trial judge's findings on matters or veracity; it gives credence to the highly improbable story of the
accused in preference to the prosecution witnesses' version of the killing which is not only
convincing in its natural details, independently of the trial court's well-considered decision, but is
supported by indisputable facts.
Two accounts of the killing are pitted against each other, one given by two eye-witnesses for the
prosecution, the other by the accused himself. They are condensed in the decision. A reading of the
unabridged statements, in the form of questions and answers will convey a more vivid idea of, and,
in their simplicity, inspire an abiding confidence in, the witnesses' truthfulness.
According to the prosecutions' evidence the deceased had been invited by the defendant to his
house and there was suddenly attacked while taking tuba offered by the defendant himself.
Contrasting this testimony, the accused said he caught the now deceased having carnal knowledge
of his (defendant's) wife.
The defendant's testimony is absolutely incredible. It is a fact which no amount of argument can
destroy, that the decedent's wife and children were inside the house at the commencement of the
assault. This is undeniable from the other fact that the wife was seriously wounded, sustaining five
wounds, although there is variance in the proofs as to the defendant's intention to inflict her injuries
(which have deformed her face). It is also a fact that the time of the attack was from 3 to 4 o'clock in
the afternoon. In the face of these facts, the most beastly and daring of swains would not put in his
head the notion of committing the act attributed to the deceased. And it is even more inconceivable
that the defendant's wife had the temerity to yield to Pedro Lego's lust with her husband just around,
likely to show up at any moment, and only five days after she had been made to sign an affidavit in
order, according to the accused, that she should not renew her illicit relations with Lego, or that he

might have proof of her infidelity. When I say that the defendant was just around I am referring to his
own testimony, that before the deceased came to his house he went out to gather coconut saps,
testimony which is beyond doubt a perjury but is granted for the sake of argument.
The lower court's finding that the deceased, his wife and his children were together in the house of
the accused is established by the testimony of the widow, of her seven-year old daughter, Dominga
Lego, and that of Severino Regis. The first of these three witnesses declared that the accused twice
came to the house of Severino Regis and implored Pedro Lego to drop in at his (defendant's) house
and give counsel to his (defendant's) wife, who, the defendant told Lego, paid no attention to and
would not only obey him. The first time the accused came was in the morning and the second time
was shortly after meal. Catalina the accused came was meal. Catalina Regis stated that in the
afternoon the accused reminded the deceased of the necessity that he come right over lest Isabel
Regis would go away. To make sure that the deceased did not fail to come, Catalina Regis further
testified, the accused took upon himself the trouble of carrying some corn which Pedro Lego had put
in a sack to take home to Jaro. This corn with its container was found by the chief of police, after the
killing, on the ground near the steps of the defendant's house. On her part, Dominga Lego testified
that from the house of Severino Regis' wife, and she came to the house of the accused, and that in
that house her father was stabbed by the defendant while she, the witness, was seated on a bench.
A complaint does not build up fabricated story by the testimony of a timid and untutored young tot.
Lastly, Severino Regis stated that Pedro Lego, Catalina Regis, their children and the witness's wife,
Esperanza Coricor, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon went from his house to the house of the
defendant. He added that his wife went along because she wanted to get money from the defendant
who is her brother.
Neither at the time of nor after his arrest did the defendant say to the chief of police that he and
surprised his wife and Pedro Lego. What he told the officer, according to the latter, was "su Corazon
estaba muy apenado, resentido por este affidavit (Exhibit F) y que desde algunos dias antes,
estando todavia en Jaro y estaba el muy resentido."
Ignacio Baales, barrio lieutenant, was notified by the defendant's wife of the tragedy, and soon as
saw the accused in the street. Baales tried to make the court believe that he asked Coricor why he
was splashed with blood and that the accused answered he had killed Pedro Lego "because I am
caught him and my wife in flagrante." But Baales said later that the defendant's statement that he
had surprised his wife with Lego was made to him only in the courthouse on the day of the trial. On
cross-examination the barrio lieutenant said that Coricor's only expression was "nakafijo". The
defendant stated that when Baales asked him why his clothes were spattered with blood he
answered, "I had the certainty that Pedro Lego and my wife were executing illicit acts."
It is apparent that the statement which the accused is said to have uttered when he and Baales met
was the result of an effort to put up something after the barrio lieutenant had stated unwittingly or in
unguarded moment that it was in the courtroom he heard from the defendant's lips of his wife's
unfaithfulness. It looks as if the defense had intended to have this statement taken as having been
made by the accused when he was questioned by the barrio lieutenant shortly or immediately after
the commission of the crime. In any event that the statement stopped short of conveying the idea
that the accused has, as he expressly said at the trial, seen Lego on top of Isabel with Lego's
trousers down and Isabel's skirt up to the waist or chest. The accused went to so far as to say, on
the witness stand, that he had seen Pedro Lego's sexual organ and to describe it. The point is that
the defendant is not a man whom we could except to relate Lego's and Isabel's conduct with subtly
and refinement of words if he had found them in sexual intercourse. Blunt and crude in his speech to
the point of vulgarity, the defendant would have said in unrestrained language what he had seen
instead of indulging in innuendos or expressing what would sound to be a belief or conviction. In
truth it is to be gathered from the tenor of the provincial fiscal's questions to Baales that the latter

had not said to the prosecuting officer "nakafijo" or anything suggesting coitus between Lego and
Isabel.
The chief of police testified that in the defendant's house he found, at about 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, tuba, in a bamboo container, traces of spilled tuba and blood stains on the floor, and small
remnants of meat. This testimony, the veracity of which can not be successfully questioned,
corroborates the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that the deceased and his family
had been invited by the defendant and entertained withtuba and pork meat. The decision refuses to
give credence to the presence of meat saying that the day was not an occasion for roasting a pig.
What Catalina Regis did say was that the accused had a piece of roast pork in a plate which he
could have gotten from his sister or bought elsewhere. It must be recalled that at Severino's house
there had been a feast on the occasion of a prayer said for the soul of a departed relative and that at
the luncheon the accused, according to the evidence, had taken part.
The fact that the chief of police found blood stains only at the entrance of then house is a clear
refutation of the defendant's testimony that he caught the deceased and his wife in the room (which
was on the opposite side of the sala from the entrance of them house) and that there was a struggle
for the possession of his bolo inside the house between him and the deceased. At the same time,
this fact confirms the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution that upon receiving the first stab
in the abdomen the now deceased fled from the house and was pursued by the accused.
It is significant that the defendant's wife and Severino Regis wife, Esperanza Coricor, who is the
defendant's own sister, were not presented as witnesses by the defense. These women made sworn
statements before the justice of the peace on the same day of the crime corroborating Catalina
Regis. Their affidavits were excluded from the record on the objection of defense counsel based on
technical grounds. The exclusion was proper and the statements may not be used as basis of
defendant's conviction, but they should not keep us from pausing before we take the defendant's
grotesque tale without question.
There are other things that point to the killing as a premeditated, cold-blooded affair. Isabel Regis
stated in her affidavit that her husband told her to leave the house as soon as she should see Pedro
Lego and Catalina Regis come. The circumstances under which the affidavit, Exhibit F, was made,
lead one to believe that the accused, in contemplation of his ghastly plan, used pressure on his wife
to confess an alleged adultery. Isabel in another affidavit declared that she was forced by her
husband to admit she had been abused by the deceased and that she consented to sign Exhibit F to
stop him from scolding her. The chief of police thus narrated how the affidavit happened to be
executed:
On September 10, the accused and his wife appeared in his office accompanied by Victor Alcober,
the defendant's landlord. The day before that, Alcober had come with a draft, saying?: "Do the favor
of preparing an affidavit for Isabel Regis, one of my tenants, otherwise she will be killed by Cirilo
Coricor, her husband, as they have been quarrelling (peleando)." It was then that he told Alcober to
fetch Coricor and Isabel Regis. The next day Alcober came back with Isabel and Coricor. The latter
asked him to draw an affidavit. He asked the accused the reason why he wanted an affidavit and
Coricor answered that it was to find out the truth and to have on hand proof that his wife had been
Pedro Lego's mistress. He expressed concern lest the accused would make use of the affidavit to
harm his wife, but the accused assured him: "I love my wife and I am not going to punish her." Upon
this assurance he consented to write down the affidavit on a typewriter. As soon as the affidavit was
written Coricor wanted to take it but the refused to hand it to him. Then he went out to answer the
call of nature and left the paper on his table. When he returned, Coricor, Coricor's wife and Alcober
were gone with the paper.

That the accused conceived the idea of arming himself with this affidavit only five days before he
killed Lego and months after the alleged adultery mentioned therein took place, in Jaro, gives added
reason for the belief that the defendant had long nurtured the idea of doing away with his wife's
uncle.
Even the charge that Lego disrupted the defendant's marriage in Jaro, before the defendant and his
wife moved to Lucay, is not by any means clearly convincing. The dead man's widow branded this
imputation on her husband as a falsehood. She said she had not heard any rumor or gossips to that
effect, and she ought to have known or heard of it if anything like that had happened. The fact is, it
can be seen between the lines that the defendant is a man of nervous and violent temperament.
Conceivably he may have been a victim of an obsession or hallucination about his wife's
faithfulness. No small amount of tragedy has been the result of unfounded jealousy. Not infrequently
is jealousy a disease of the should haunting the imagination. Pedro Lego was not the only object of
defendant's jealousy. He also accused one Calaya of breaking his home though he denied this at the
trial and said he did not know any one by that name.
Whether the defendant's jealousy was founded or imaginary and whether or not jealousy had
anything to do with the murder in question, it can be affirmed with absolute certainty that the
deceased was not guilty of any improper conduct towards the defendant's wife on the day he was
murdered. Indeed, jealousy may just have been a pretext. Note the frenzy with which the affidavit
was made, its proximity to the date of the crime, and the remoteness from that date of the supposed
amorous episode that was the subject of the sworn statement. Did the defendant know that Lego
and his family were coming to attend the prayer five days hence in Severino's house? And was that
the reason why he wanted to have "on hand proof of his wife's infidelity?" That is not implausible.
The defendant's real motive has to be looked for somewhere else. Catalina Regis stated what I
believe was the dominating cause of the defendant's ire. Substantially, she testified that Pedro Lego
had bought a piece of land in Lucay, the scene of the present crime. She said that the accused and
his wife moved from Jaro to Lucay to work on that land. Later the property was given to Severino
Regis, Isabel's brother, and the defendant was dismissed from it by Lego. It was then that Coricor
and his wife moved to Victor Alcober's farm. This incident, according to Catalina Regis, was resented
by the accused and his wife, both of whom charged that Pedro Lego and his wife "had preferences."
For sometime thereafter Coricor and his wife refused to talk with the deceased and the witness,
although in the course of their visits to Lucay the former good relations were restored, at least on the
surface.
The following circumstances bear out the theory that the killing was motivated not by jealousy, much
less defendant's having surprised the accused and Isabel Regis, but by something else. Isabel came
out unscathed. It does not appear, aside from the defendant's gratuituous testimony given in court,
that he went after his wife after he killed Lego to chastise her as he looked for Catalina Regis. On
the other hand, he slashed Catalina Regis several times with his bolo until Catalina was knocked
down and was believed dead. After Catalina, upon regaining consciousness, crawled away to hide,
the accused, still carrying his bolo, upon finding her gone, looked for her apparently intent on
finishing the woman. The defendant's determination to kill not only Lego but also Lego's wife could
not have been due to jealousy or to Lego's having been caught by the accused with the latter's wife.
The charge that Catalina Regis was a party to her niece's fall for Catalina's husband sounds too
ridiculous to deserve attention.
The attitude of the accused in connection with his appeal is all significant as indication of
consciousness of guilt. He was prosecuted for two crimes, that of murder in connection with the
death of Pedro Lego and frustrated murder in relation with his attack against Catalina Regis. He was
convicted of both accusations although the court qualified the latter offense as serious physical

injuries. The accused appealed only from the sentence convicting him of murder and abided by the
decision as to the other crime. This belies defendant's statement that Catalina Regis was wounded
unintentionally on his part when she allegedly intervened to wrest his bolo while he had and Pedro
Lego were grappling with each other. Again, the accused filed a formal motion to withdraw his appeal
from the sentence for murder, although that motion to withdraw the appeal was allowed to be
withdrawn upon insistence of the appellant who got an inkling from a dissenting opinion that his case
might have been decided with modification of the sentence by this court in his favor.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 145993

June 17, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG, Appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In its decision of 16 June 2000, in Criminal Case No. 9621-B, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of
Bian, Laguna, convicted appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of death for having fatally bumped Joseph Galang with an Isuzu Canter Elf truck.
On 12 December 1996, an information1 for Murder was filed against Rufino, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
That on or about July 7, 1996, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Rufino Mallari y Ilag, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation, treachery and with the use of motor vehicle, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously hit and bump with his driven Brand New Isuzu Canter Elf with conduction
sticker number 33 LAB one Joseph Galang, thereby inflicting [on] him mortal wounds on the head
which directly cause[d] his death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That the crime was committed by means of a motor vehicle as a qualifying circumstance.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

At his arraignment, Rufino pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial on the merits, the
prosecution presented as witnesses Liza Galang, Edgar Bawar, and Dr. Erwin Escal; while the
defense presented Rufino himself, Myrna Mallari, Dr. Divina Palarca, and Dr. Escal.
Liza Galang testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 4:00 p.m., her common-law husband Joseph
admonished Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix Mallari not to drive fast while passing by Josephs
house. Rufino and his brothers, who were then hot-tempered, challenged Joseph to a fight. The
latter just ignored the challenge; and, instead he and his own brothers Radi and Manny asked
apology from Rufino.2
Later that afternoon, while Joseph and Liza were watching a basketball game at the barangay
basketball court, Rufino and his brothers, who were then carrying bladed weapons, arrived and
attempted to stab Joseph; but Joseph was able to run away. When they were not able to catch up
with him, Rufino boarded and drove the truck parked near the basketball court and continued
chasing Joseph until the truck ran over the latter, which caused his instantaneous death. 3
Liza further testified that at the time of his death, Joseph was 37 years old. He was a foreman in a
construction firm with a daily income of P350 and also a carpenter and mason with a daily income
of P250. She spent less than P20,000 for the coffin, tomb, funeral, and other expenses during the
wake of Joseph.4
Edgar Bawar, a friend of Joseph, testified that at 6:24 p.m. on 7 July 1996, while Joseph was
watching a basketball game, Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, who were carrying bladed
weapons, arrived and chased Joseph. Joseph ran away, and Rufino pursued him with the truck.
Upon catching up with him, Rufino bumped Joseph, as a result of which the latter died on the spot. 5
Dr. Erwin Escal testified that the cause of death of Joseph, as stated in the Medico-Legal
Report,6 was "[c]rushing injury on the head secondary to vehicular accident." Josephs head was
deformed with multiple skull fractures and lacerations and brain tissue evisceration. 7
The defense had a different story. Rufino testified that on 7 July 1996 at around 6:30 p.m., while he
was driving a truck at a speed of eighty kilometers per hour, with his wife Myrna seated on the
passenger side, he saw Joseph on the road about four meters away from him. Rufino, who was then
on his way to the garage to park the truck, blew thrice the horn. But Joseph went to the middle of the
road and threw stones, which went through the windshield and hit Rufino on the chest. As a result
thereof, Rufino lost control of the truck, and ran over Joseph. Because of fear, Rufino did not alight
from the truck; instead, he proceeded to the municipal hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where he
surrendered and was immediately detained.8
Myrna Mallari testified that prior to the incident in question, she saw Joseph at the basketball court.
He was apparently drunk and was carrying a "balisong." Much to her consternation, he gave her a
dagger look. Myrna reacted by simply crying and going inside her house. She corroborated Rufinos
testimony that while Rufino was driving the truck, Joseph threw stones, which went through the
windshield and hit the chest of Rufino.9 As a result of which, Rufino had chest pains and vomited
blood while in detention.

Dr. Divina Palarca testified that she examined Rufino on 29 October 1996 and found him to be
suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, which possibly could have afflicted him six months prior to its
discovery.10 Dr. Escal confirmed the testimony of Dr. Palarca, as in fact, it was he who diagnosed the
illness of Rufino.11
The trial court gave full credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Liza Galang and Edgar
Bawar that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph. Appreciating the qualifying circumstance of use of
motor vehicle, it convicted Rufino of murder and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty and to
pay the victims heirs P100,000 as compensatory damages; P75,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as
exemplary damages; and costs.12
The case is now before us on automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
In his Appellants Brief, Rufino imputes to the trial court the following errors:
I
IN FINDING THAT THE INCIDENT WHICH KILLED JOSEPH GALANG WAS DONE BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH CRIMINAL INTENT AND MALICE.
II
IN CONSIDERING THE USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE IN
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY.
III
IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.13
We note that in his prayer in the Appellants Brief, Rufino seeks his acquittal of the crime of murder,
or in the alternative, his conviction for homicide only. In his discussion of his first and second
assignments of error, however, Rufino does not seek his acquittal but merely the downgrading of his
crime from murder to homicide on the grounds that no evident premeditation was proved and that
the motor vehicle was merely incidental to the commission of the crime. In his third assignment of
error, Rufino argues that voluntary surrender should have been appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance in his favor, considering that after the bumping incident, he proceeded to the municipal
hall of Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where he was immediately detained.
In its Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the affirmance of Rufinos
conviction but argues that the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion perpetua only
because of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
In view of the diametrically opposed versions of the prosecution and the defense, the resolution of
the present case hinges on the credibility of the witnesses who had come forward to testify. We have
long recognized that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies lies within

the province and competence of the trial court because it has the direct opportunity to observe the
witness attitude, demeanor, deportment, and manner of testifying,14 all of which aid in determining
whether the witness is telling the truth or merely prevaricating. Thus, the trial courts evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect and even finality by appellate
courts15 unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the result or
disposition of the case was ignored, misapplied, misunderstood, or overlooked by the trial court or
when the finding of fact was reached arbitrarily or capriciously.16 We find no cogent reason to disturb
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and its factual findings as to what
actually happened, the same being amply supported by evidence.
Neither the prosecution nor the defense disputes two important facts: one, Joseph died instantly
after he was hit by the truck; and second, the truck was driven by Rufino. There being no question
on the identity of the person responsible for Josephs death, what is left to be resolved is whether
Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph with the truck he was driving.
The antecedent events show that, indeed, Rufino deliberately ran over Joseph. At around 4:00 p.m.
of 7 July 1996, when Rufino passed by Josephs house while driving the truck, he got angry when
Joseph admonished him not to drive at high speed in front of Josephs house. Rufino, already in a
fighting mood, challenged Joseph to a fight, but the latter just ignored it. To put an end to the
argument, Joseph and his brothers apologized to Rufino.
Apparently, Rufino was not appeased by the apology and continued to harbor ill-feelings against
Joseph. Rufino got the chance to vent his anger not long thereafter. At around 5:30 p.m., while
Joseph was watching a basketball game at the basketball court located beside Rufinos house,
Rufino and his brothers Ino and Felix, carrying with them bladed weapons, attempted to stab
Joseph. But before they could do it, Joseph was able to run away. They chased Joseph, but were
unable to catch up with him. Instead of giving up on his evil design, Rufino went back to the
basketball court, boarded the truck parked nearby, and resumed his pursuit of Joseph. Upon seeing
Joseph on the road, Rufino hit him with the truck.
We note that the testimonies of Liza and Edgar were consistent with their respective sworn
statements,17 which they gave to the police investigator in the morning of 8 July 1996. Considering
that less than twenty-four hours had elapsed from the time of the bumping incident, Liza and Edgar
could not have concocted a story to pin down Rufino for the death of Joseph. Thus, there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of the sworn statements and the testimonies of Liza and Edgar.
Moreover, the defense has not shown any reason why Edgar, who corroborated Lizas testimony
about the incident, would perjure himself to pin down Rufino. Absent any evidence showing any
reason or motive for the prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit. 18
In comparison, Rufino and Myrna gave inconsistent testimonies. Myrna wanted the court to believe
that her husband was in no way at fault by stating that Rufino was driving at a slow pace, 19 while
Rufino himself declared that he was driving at a speed of eighty kilometers per hour.20 Myrnas
attempt to cover up the misdeed of her husband is obvious; hence, the integrity of her declarations
becomes questionable.

Rufino himself made inconsistent statements. At first, in the course of the direct examination, Rufino
declared that prior to the bumping incident he saw Joseph pass by his house, walking in a zigzag
manner.21 This testimony was an attempt to give credence to his allegation that Joseph was drunk,
which was why he threw stones at the truck for no reason at all. But when he was asked during his
cross-examination about his altercation with Joseph earlier that fateful day, Rufino made a complete
turnaround and declared that he saw Joseph for the first time at the place where he was run over.22
Moreover, the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna do not inspire belief for being improbable and not in
accord with human experience. It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be credible, it should
come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but should also be credible, reasonable, and in
accord with human experience.23
According to Rufino, he saw Joseph when the truck was four meters away from the latter and he
blew his horn three times. This is altogether unbelievable. At a speed of eighty kilometers per hour, a
four-meter distance could easily be covered by the truck in a split second, and there would be no
time for the driver to blow the horn before the impact. Much less could there be time for a person on
the road to pick up a stone and hurl the same to an oncoming truck. Thus, it is simply impossible that
Joseph was able to hurl a stone at the truck before he was run over.
Neither can we believe Rufinos testimony that he first saw Joseph on the road when the truck was
just four meters away from him. According to Rufino, the road was clear because only Joseph and
the truck he was driving were on the road. He testified as follows:
Q Mr. Witness, when you saw for the first time Joseph Galang along the road, there was no other
vehicle from [the] opposite direction where you were heading?
A None, sir.
Q So that your driven vehicle and Joseph Galang were the only [ones] in that road?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the road could accommodate two (2) ten wheeler trucks?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said likewise that when you first saw Joseph Galang, he was about four (4) meters away
from your driven vehicle?
A Yes, sir.24
From Rufinos own testimony, it appears that his view was unobstructed. He could have seen Joseph
from afar and could therefore have avoided bumping the latter had he really wanted to.
Obviously, the stone-throwing incident was concocted by the defense as a last ditch effort to have
Rufino absolved from his criminal act. Unlike the prosecution witnesses who executed their sworn

statements on the morning after the subject incident, Rufinos sworn statement 25 was executed only
on 15 August 1996, or more than one month after the incident. Thus, Rufino had enough time to
reflect and come up with a plot. Unfortunately for him, the story he concocted is so incredible that we
are not inclined to believe it.
To prove that Rufinos driving ability was adversely affected by his illness, the defense presented a
medical certificate26 stating that Rufino was treated at the Sta. Rosa Community Hospital for "Minimal
PTB, Bilateral with partial collapse of Right Upper Lobe" on 1 November 1996, or almost four months
after the bumping incident. That certificate is not competent evidence to prove that at the time,
Rufino was already suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. But even granting arguendo that Rufino
was already suffering from said illness at the time of the incident, there is no evidence that it had
affected his driving ability to the extent that Rufino was no longer able to control the vehicle he was
driving.
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the trial courts finding that Rufino deliberately bumped Joseph
with the truck he was driving.
Rufinos culpability having been resolved, we now come to the penalty to be imposed. The trial court
imposed the death penalty on the ground that the qualifying circumstance of use of motor vehicle is
present. Rufino, however, argues that the use of a motor vehicle was only incidental, considering
that he resorted to it only to enable him to go after Joseph after he failed to catch up with the latter.
The fallacy of this argument is obvious.
The evidence shows that Rufino deliberately used his truck in pursuing Joseph. Upon catching up
with him, Rufino hit him with the truck, as a result of which Joseph died instantly. It is therefore clear
that the truck was the means used by Rufino to perpetrate the killing of Joseph.
The case of People v. Muoz27 cited by Rufino finds no application to the present case. In the said
case, the police patrol jeep was merely used by the accused therein in looking for the victim and in
carrying the body of the victim to the place where it was dumped. The accused therein shot the
victim, which caused the latters death. In the present case, the truck itself was used to kill the victim
by running over him.
1wphi1

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who kills another "by means of a motor
vehicle" is guilty of murder. Thus, the use of motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder.28 The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the penalty is composed of two indivisible
penalties, we shall apply Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances and there is no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
In the present case, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, which
were alleged in the information, were not proved. What was proved was the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender through the testimonies of Rufino and Myrna, which were not rebutted by the
prosecution.

We have held that for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary.29 A surrender is considered voluntary if it is spontaneous and shows the
intention of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities because he either
acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily
included for his search and capture.30 All these requisites are present in this case.
In view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance and the presence of one mitigating
circumstance,reclusion perpetua, not death, should be the penalty to be imposed on Rufino.
We now discuss the damages to be awarded.
The trial courts award of P100,000 compensatory damages is erroneous because it was without
basis. The records show that the prosecution presented only two receipts, for the amounts
of P9,00031 and P20032representing payment for the casket and funeral services, and the niche,
respectively, or a total of P9,200. Only expenses supported by receipts and which appear to have
actually been expended in connection with the death of the victim should be allowed for actual
damages.33 Hence, the award of P100,000 should be reduced toP9,200.
We sustain the courts award of moral damages but at a reduced rate of P50,000, consistent with
recent jurisprudence. In cases of violent death, moral damages is awarded even in the absence of
proof because an untimely and violent death invariably brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victims family.34In addition, the amount of P50,00035 as indemnity for the death of
Joseph should be awarded to his heirs.
The award of exemplary damages is proper in view of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
use of a motor vehicle. However, the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court should be
reduced to P25,000 pursuant to current case law.
Finally, we note that the prosecution offered the testimony of the victims widow on the age and daily
income of her husband, without supporting the same with documentary evidence.
The rule is that documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages therefore may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) selfemployed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2)
employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. 36
There is no showing that the victim was self-employed or employed as a daily-wage worker with an
average daily income of less than the minimum wage provided under the labor laws in force at the
time of his death. In the absence of such proof, the exception cannot be applied to this case. Hence,
no award for loss of earning capacity can be granted in favor of the victims heirs.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, of Bian, Laguna, in
Criminal Case No. 9621-B convicting appellant RUFINO MALLARI y ILAG of the crime of murder is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. The penalty is reduced from death to reclusion perpetua;
2. The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 is reduced to P25,000, and
the awards of actual and moral damages are reduced to P9,200 and P50,000, respectively;
and
3. Appellant Rufino Mallari y Ilag is further ordered to pay the heirs of Joseph Galang an
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P50,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123819

November 14, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
STEPHEN MARK WHISENHUNT, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in
Criminal Case No. 102687, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Stephen Mark Whisenhunt guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided
for by law, to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P100,000.00 representing actual
expenses for the funeral services and wake for 5 days, P3,000,000.00 by way of moral
damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P150,000.00.
SO ORDERED.2
On November 19, 1993, accused-appellant was formally charged with the murder of Elsa SantosCastillo, under an Information which read:
That on or about September 24, 1993, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Elsa
"Elsie" Santos Castillo by then and there stabbing her with a bladed weapon in different parts
of her body, thereby inflicting upon her mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of her death and thereafter outraged or scoffed her corpse by then and there chopping
off her head and different parts of her body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City and was raffled to Branch 152. On
January 6, 1994, accused-appellant was arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte. He
entered a plea of not guilty.4

The evidence shows that accused-appellant and the deceased, Elsa Santos-Castillo, also known as
Elsie, were lovers. They met at the Apex Motor Corporation where accused-appellant was
the MANAGER while Elsa was the Assistant Personnel MANAGER . Both accused-appellant and
Elsa were married, but they were estranged from their respective spouses. In April 1993, Elsa
resigned from Apex presumably to avoid the nasty rumors about her illicit affair with accusedappellant.5 It appears, however, that she continued her affair with accused-appellant even after she
resigned from Apex Motor Corporation.
On September 23, 1993, Demetrio Ravelo, an Apex employee assigned to drive for accusedappellant, reported for work at 8:30 a.m. at the latters condominium unit at the Platinum
Condominium, Annapolis Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.6 Accused-appellant ordered
him to fetch Elsa at her parents house in Blumentritt, Manila at 10:30 a.m. He found Elsa standing at
a corner near her parents house, wearing a violet-colored blouse with floral prints, and was carrying
three bags --- a paper bag, a violet Giordano bag and a thick brown leather bag with the trademark
of "Mitsubishi." He brought Elsa to accused-appellants condominium unit. 7
At 2:00 p.m., Elsa told Demetrio to go to the Apex office in Mandaluyong to deliver a paper bag to
Amy Serrano, the Personnel MANAGER . He proceeded to the Apex office, and then returned to
Platinum. Accused-appellant asked him to stay because he had to drive Elsa home at 10:00 p.m. He
waited until a little past 10:00 p.m. When he had not heard from accused-appellant, he told Lucy, the
housemaid, that he was going home.8
The following day, Demetrio again reported at accused-appellants unit. At around noon, Lucy asked
if he had seen a kitchen knife which was missing. He then overheard Lucy ask accused-appellant
who told her that the kitchen knife was in his bedroom. Demetrio saw accused-appellant go inside
the room and, shortly thereafter, hand the knife to Lucy.9
At 3:40 p.m., Lucy told Demetrio to buy cigarettes for accused-appellant. He went out to buy the
cigarettes and gave them to Lucy. At 5:00 p.m., accused-appellant told Demetrio to go home. 10
On September 25, 1993, Demetrio reported at the Platinum Condominium at around 8:00 a.m. He
was allowed by accused-appellant to go to Apex to follow up his salary. While he was there, Amy
Serrano asked him if Elsa was still in accused-appellants condominium unit. Although Demetrio did
not see Elsa there, he answered yes. Amy gave him black plastic garbage bags which he turned
over to accused-appellant upon his return to the condominium. The latter then ordered him to drive
Lucy to Cubao and to go home to get some clothes, since they were leaving for Bagac, Bataan. On
the way to Cubao, Lucy told Demetrio that she was going home. He dropped her off in front of the
Farmers Market. Thereafter, he proceeded to his house in Fairview, Quezon City, to pick up some
clothes, then returned to the condominium at around 10:00 a.m. 11
Accused-appellant asked him to check the fuel gauge of the car. He was told to go to Apex to get a
gas slip and then to gas up. At around noon, he went back to the condominium. He had lunch
outside at Goodah, then returned to accused-appellants unit and stayed in the servants quarters. 12
While Demetrio was in the servants quarters watching television, accused-appellant came in. He
asked Demetrio how long he wanted to work for him. Demetrio replied that he was willing to work for

him forever, and expressed his full trust in him. Upon hearing this, accused-appellant shed tears and
embraced Demetrio. Then accused-appellant said, "May problema ako, Rio." Demetrio asked what it
was, and accused-appellant told him that Elsa was dead. Demetrio asked, "Bakit mo siya
pinatay?"13 Accused-appellant answered that he did not kill Elsa, rather she died of "bangungot".14
Demetrio suggested that Elsas body be autopsied, but accused-appellant said that he had already
beheaded her. He asked Demetrio if he wanted to see the decapitated body, but the latter refused.
The two of them went to Shoppesville at the Greenhills Shopping Center and bought a big bag with a
zipper and rollers, colored black and gray.15 Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant seemed
nervous and his eyes were teary and bloodshot.
When they returned to the condominium, accused-appellant asked Demetrio to help him wrap the
body in the black garbage bags. Demetrio entered accused-appellants bathroom and found the
dismembered hands, feet, trunk and head of a woman. He lifted the severed head by the hair and,
when he lifted it, he saw Elsas face. He placed this in a black trash bag. He helped accusedappellant place the other body parts in three separate garbage bags. They packed all the garbage
bags in the bag with the zipper and rollers, which they had bought in Shoppesville. Then, they
brought the bag down and loaded it in the trunk of accused-appellants car. After that, they boarded
the car. Demetrio took the wheel and accused-appellant sat beside him in front. 16
It was almost 2:00 p.m. when Demetrio and accused-appellant left the condominium. Accusedappellant told Demetrio to drive around Batangas and Tagaytay City. After leaving Tagaytay, they
entered the South Luzon Expressway and headed towards Sta. Rosa, Laguna. When they were
near Puting Kahoy and Silangan, accused-appellant told Demetrio to turn into a narrow road.
Somewhere along that road, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car.17
Accused-appellant alighted and told Demetrio to get the bag in the trunk. Accused-appellant took the
plastic bags inside the bag and dumped them by the roadside. Then, accused-appellant returned the
empty bag in the trunk and boarded the car. He called Demetrio and said, "Tayo na Rio, tuloy na
tayo sa Bataan." It was already 6:30 p.m.18
Demetrio drove to the Sta. Rosa exit gate, along the South Luzon Expressway, through EDSA and
towards the North Luzon Expressway. They stopped at a gasoline station to refuel. They then took
the San Fernando, Pampanga exit, and were soon en route to the Whisenhunt family mansion in
Bagac, Bataan.19
Before reaching Bagac, accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to stop the car on top of a bridge.
Accused-appellant told Demetrio to get off and to throw a bag into the river. Later, they passed
another bridge and accused-appellant again told Demetrio to pull over. Accused-appellant alighted
and threw Elsas clothes over the bridge. On the way, Demetrio noticed that accused-appellant took
something from a bag, tore it to pieces and threw it out of the window. When they passed Pilar,
Bataan, accused-appellant threw Elsas violet Giordano bag. As they reached the road boundary of
Bagac, accused-appellant wrung a short-sleeved dress with violet and green stripes, and threw it on
a grassy lot.20

It was about midnight when accused-appellant and Demetrio arrived at the mansion. Demetrio was
unable to sleep that night, as he was scared that he might be the next victim. 21
The next morning, at 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant ordered Demetrio to clean the trunk of the car,
saying, "Rio, linisan mo ang sasakyan para ang compartment hindi babaho."22 At 1:00 p.m.,
accused-appellant and Demetrio started off for Manila. As they passed a place called Kabog-kabog,
he saw accused-appellant take out an ATM card. Accused-appellant burned the middle of the card,
twisted it and threw it out of the window. They arrived at the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue at
2:30 p.m. Demetrio asked accused-appellant if he can get off since he wanted to go home to
Fairview. Before Demetrio left, accused-appellant told him, "Rio, you and your family can go on a
vacation. I will give you money." Accused-appellant then gave Demetrio P50.00 for his transportation
going to Fairview.23
When Demetrio got home, he immediately told his family what happened. His wife told him to report
the incident to Fiscal Joey Diaz. Demetrio and his wife went to the house of Fiscal Diaz in Fairview
to talk to him.24
The following morning, September 27, 1993, Fiscal Diaz, Demetrio, his wife and his brothers went to
the Department of Justice. They were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation, where
Demetrio gave his statement before Atty. Artemio Sacaquing, head of the Anti-Organized Crime
Division.25
Initially, Atty. Sacaguing could not believe what he heard and thought Demetrio was exaggerating.
He dispatched a team of NBI agents, headed by Marianito Panganiban, to verify Demetrios
report.26 Accompanied by Demetrio, the team proceeded to Barangay Polong, Sta. Cruz, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. There, they found a crowd of people gathered around the mutilated parts of a human body
along the road.27 The body parts had been discovered by tricycle drivers. The Sta. Rosa Police,
under Chief Investigator SPO3 Alipio Quintos, was already conducting an investigation. Agent
Panganiban radioed Atty. Sacaguing in Manila that Demetrios report was positive. 28
The mutilated body parts were brought to the Lim de Mesa Funeral Parlor in Sta. Rosa. Two NBI
agents, together with Demetrio, went to the house of Elsas family to inform them of her death. The
NBI agents accompanied Elsas two sisters, Amelia Villadiego and Elida Santos, to the funeral parlor,
where they identified the body parts as belonging to Elsa.
In the morning of September 28, 1993, accused-appellant was arrested by operatives of the NBI as
he drove up to his parking space at Apex Motor Corporation.29 When Atty. Sacaguing approached
and introduced himself, accused-appellant became nervous and started to tremble. 30
Accused-appellant was brought to the NBI in his car. When he arrived there, Atty. Sacaguing
informed him that it may be necessary to impound the car since, based on Demetrios statement, the
same was used in the commission of the crime. Accused-appellant asked permission to retrieve
personal belongings from the car. After getting his things from the car, accused-appellant opened the
trunk to place some items inside. When he opened the compartment, the people around the car
moved away because of the foul stench that emanated from inside. Atty. Sacaguing inspected the
interior of the trunk and found stains on the lawanit board lying flat inside the compartment, which he

suspected to be blood. Thus, he instructed his agents to fetch a technician from the NBI Chemistry
Division to examine the stain.31
During Atty. Sacaguings interview of accused-appellant, he noticed contusions on accusedappellants lower lip and cheek. As standard procedure, and in order to rule out any accusation of
violence on accused-appellant on the part of the NBI agents, Atty. Sacaguing ordered a medical
examination of accused-appellant.32
The Medico-Legal Officer found contusions on accused-appellants left periumbilical region, right
elbow, left and right forearms and right leg.33
That same afternoon, before the close of office hours, accused-appellant was brought to the
Department of Justice for inquest.34 However, accused-appellant moved that a preliminary
investigation be conducted, and signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. Hence, he was detained at the NBI.35
On September 29, 1993, armed with a search warrant,36 the NBI agents conducted a search of the
condominium unit of accused-appellant. They recovered hair strands from underneath the rubber
mat and rugs inside accused-appellants bathroom. 37 In accused-appellants bedroom, they found
bloodstains on the bedspread and covers. They also found a pair of Topsider shoes with bloodstains,
a bottle of Vicks Formula 44 cough syrup, and some more hair strands on the lampshade. 38
Later that day, Demetrio Ravelo accompanied some NBI agents to retrace the route he took with
accused-appellant going to Bataan, with the objective of retrieving the items thrown away by
accused-appellant. They were able to recover a violet bag, one brown sandal and a shirt with violet
and green floral prints,39 which were brought to the NBI office. Amelia Santos Villadiego, Elsas sister,
was summoned to identify the items.40
In the meantime, Caroline Y. Custodio, Supervising Forensic Biologist of the NBI, who conducted
comparative examinations between the hair specimens found in accused-appellants bathroom and
hair samples taken from the victim while she lay in state, found that "the questioned hair specimen
showed similarities to the hair taken from the victim."41
Custodio further reported that the bloodstains on the bed cushion cover, bedspread and Topsider
shoes, all found inside accused-appellants bedroom, gave positive results for human blood,
showing reactions of Group "B".42The bloodstains on the plywood board taken from accusedappellants vehicle were also examined and found to give positive results for human blood showing
reactions of Group "B".43 On the other hand, the examination of blood taken from the victim likewise
showed reactions of Group "B".44
Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez, the Medico-Legal Officer who conducted the autopsy, concluded that the
cause of death of Elsa Santos Castillo were stab wounds.45 Dr. Mendez found one stab wound on
the right breast which penetrated the right lung. He also found two stab wounds under the left breast
which penetrated the diaphragm and abdominal cavity, and also penetrated the right portion of the
liver.46 More particularly, the autopsy yielded the following postmortem findings:

Body in moderately advanced stage of decomposition.

Head, decapitated, level above 4th cervical vertebra; both hands severed cutting completely
the lower ends of both radius and ulna; both legs, disarticulated at knee joints and cut-off
with both patellar bones, missing; both feet, disarticulated at the ankle joints and cut-off; all
soft tissues of both thighs and perineum, removed, exposing completely the femoral bones
and partially the pelvic bone,
Incised wounds: 19.5 cms., left axillary area; 55.0 cms., thoraco-abdominal area, along
median line, with the abdominal incision involving the whole thickness and the thoracic
incision involving the soft tissues and cutting the sternum from the xiphoid process up to the
level of the third cartilage; from the 3rd cartilage up to the lower border of the neck.
Abdominal organs, removed from the abdominal cavity.
Contusions: 26.0 x 16.5 cms., face, more on the left side involving the forehead, temporal,
nasal, orbital and maxillary areas; 25.0 x 11.0 cms., deltoid area, extending down to the
upper 2/3, arm, left.
Incised Wound, 3.0 cms., neck area, along anterior median line.
Hematoma, scalp, massive, temporo-parietal, left.
STAB WOUNDS:
1. 1.8 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely with sharp infero-lateral extremity
and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the mammary area, right; 3.0 cms., from the
anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the soft tissues,
cutting completely the 4th cartilage, right side, into the right thoracic cavity, penetrating the
lower of the right lung with an approximate depth 8.5 cms.
2. 0.8 cm., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented almost vertically, with sharp inferior extremity
and blunt superior extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 1.1 cms., from the
anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards and medially, involving the soft tissues
only with an approximate depth of 2.0 cms.
3. 2.0 cms., elliptical, clean-cut edges, oriented obliquely, with sharp infero-lateral extremity
and blunt supero-medial extremity, located at the inframammary area, left, 2.2 cms., from the
anterior median line, directed backwards, downwards, and from left to right, involving the soft
tissues, into the left thoracic cavity, perforating the diaphragm, into the abdominal cavity,
penetrating the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth 10.0 cms.
Brain, markedly softened and reduced to grayish white, pultaceous mass.
Other visceral organs, putrified,

Stomach is almost empty.

CAUSE OF DEATH: --- STAB WOUNDS.47
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that he stayed home on September 23, 1993 because he
was not feeling well. He denied that he asked Demetrio Ravelo to fetch Elsa. He refuted Demetrios
testimony that accused-appellant asked him to buy cigarettes, or that accused-appellant told him to
go home at 5:00 p.m.. Rather, accused-appellant maintained that he did not see Demetrio at any
time in the afternoon of September 24, 1993.48
On September 25, 1993, accused-appellant alleged that he was feeling better, hence, told Demetrio
that they were to leave for Bagac, Bataan that afternoon. They left the condominium at about 1:00 to
1:30 p.m. and proceeded straight to Bagac. When they arrived at Bagac, accused-appellant went
straight to the kitchen and met his mother, father, aunt and grandmother. Demetrio got the things out
of the car and then asked accused-appellants permission to take the car to go to the town. 49
Accused-appellants mother, Mrs. Nieves Whisenhunt, testified that accused-appellant arrived at
their beach house in Bagac, Bataan on September 25, 1993 at 5:00 p.m. At 7:00 the next morning,
she saw accused-appellant clad in beach attire. Later that day, she and her husband had lunch at
the clubhouse, which was about three to four minutes drive from their house. When they returned
home at 2:00 p.m., accused-appellant and his driver, Demetrio, had already left. 50 This was
corroborated by accused-appellants aunt, Ms. Frances Sison.51
Accused-appellant claimed that he went jet-skiing in the morning of September 25, 1993. He alleged
that the water was choppy and caused his jet-ski to lose control. As a result, he suffered bruises on
his chest and legs. Thereafter, he went home, cleaned up, changed clothes and rested. Later, as he
was going down the stairs, he slipped and extended his arm to stop his fall. He had lunch with this
family. At 1:30 p.m., he and Demetrio left Bagac for Manila.52
According to accused-appellant, he first learned of Elsas death when he was arrested by the NBI on
September 28, 1993.53 He denied having anything to do with her death, saying that he had no reason
to kill her since he was in love with her.54 Sometime during his relationship with Elsa, he claimed
having received in the mails two anonymous letters. The first one reads:
Salamat sa pagpapahiram mo ng sasakyan at driver. Pero masyado kang pakialamero,
Steve. Walanghiya ka. Para kang demonyo. Pinakialaman mo ang di sa yo. Lintik lang ang
walang ganti. Matitiyempuhan din kita. Putang ina mo.55
The second letter says:
Steve,
Ang kay Pedro kay Pedro. Kapag pinakialaman ay kay San Pedro ang tungo. Mahal mo ba
ang pamilya mo? Iniingatan mo ba ang pangalan mo? Nakakasagasa ka na.56

At first, accused-appellant ignored the letters. But when he told Elsa about them, she got very upset
and worried. She said the letters came from Fred, her estranged husband. 57
Ms. Frances Sison, accused-appellants aunt, testified that she and her mother visited accusedappellant at 3:00 p.m. on September 23, 1993. She went inside the bedroom and talked to accusedappellant for about 30 minutes. While they were there, Ms. Sison testified that she did not see
anyone else in the bedroom. She also said the door of the bathroom inside the room was open, and
there was nobody inside. The next day, at 4:00 p.m., she went back to visit accused-appellant.
Again, they went inside accused-appellants bedroom and stayed there for one hour. The door of the
bathroom was open, and she saw that there was nobody inside. The following morning, they passed
by the condominium before proceeding to Bagac, Bataan. They went inside accused-appellants
bedroom and talked to him. As in the last two occasions, Ms. Sison saw through the open door of the
bathroom that there was no one inside.58
Theresa Whisenhunt, accused-appellants sister-in-law, testified that between December 21, 1991
and January 15, 1992, and again from the middle of April, 1992 to May 15, 1992, she slept in the
bedroom subsequently occupied by accused-appellant in the Platinum Condominium; that she
regularly has her menstruation around the end of every month; and that her blood type is "B". 59
On January 31, 1996, the trial court promulgated the appealed judgment, convicting accusedappellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the deceased actual damage, moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorneys fees.60
Accused-appellant interposed an appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court, alleging that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
PRESENT ENOUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT
THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REJECTING, DISREGARDING AND/OR NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED.61
Much of the evidence on accused-appellants complicity was elicited from Demetrio Ravelo, the socalled "prosecution star witness."62 On the premise that accused-appellants guilt or innocence
depends largely on the weight of his testimony, this Court has carefully scrutinized and examined his
version of the events, and has found that Demetrio Ravelos narrative is both convincing and
consistent in all material points.
Before accused-appellant confessed to Demetrio Ravelo what had happened to Elsa Castillo, he first
asked the latter how long he was willing to work for him, and how far his loyalty will go. This was
logical if accused-appellant wanted to ensure that Demetrio would stand by his side after learning
what he was about to reveal. More importantly, Demetrios description of Elsas dismembered body,

as he found it in accused-appellants bathroom, perfectly jibed with the appearance of the mutilated
body parts, as shown in the photographs presented by the prosecution. 63
Likewise, the mutilated body parts, as well as the other items thrown by accused-appellant along the
road to Bataan, were found by the NBI agents as Demetrio pointed, which confirms that, indeed, the
latter witnessed how accused-appellant disposed of Elsas body and personal belongings one by
one.
All in all, the testimony of Demetrio Ravelo bears the ring of truth and sincerity. The records show
that he did not waver even during lengthy and rigorous cross-examination. In fact, the trial court
gave full faith and credit to his testimony, stating:
The Court had opportunity to observe the demeanor of Demetrio Ravelo when he took the witness
stand on several occasions. He was extensively cross-examined by one of the defense counsel and
he withstood the same creditably. Demetrio Ravelo is a very credible witness and his testimony is
likewise credible.64
This Court has consistently ruled that factual findings of the trial court deserve the highest respect.
This is based on the fact that the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the
witnesses who appeared before his sala as he had personally heard them and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 65 Especially, where issues raised involve the
credibility of witnesses, the trial courts findings thereon will not be disturbed on appeal absent any
clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts, or circumstances of
weight or substance, which could have affected the result of the case. 66 Succinctly put, findings of
fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect
since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court. 67
Perhaps more damning to accused-appellant is the physical evidence against him. The findings of
the forensic biologist on the examination of the hair samples and bloodstains all confirm Elsas death
inside accused-appellants bedroom. On the other hand, the autopsy report revealed that Elsa was
stabbed at least three times on the chest. This, taken together with Demetrios testimony that
accused-appellant kept the kitchen knife inside his bedroom on September 24, 1993, leads to the
inescapable fact that accused-appellant stabbed Elsa inside the bedroom or bathroom.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of
our trustworthy evidence.68 For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks
more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.69While it may be true that there was no eyewitness to the
death of Elsa, the confluence of the testimonial and physical evidence against accused-appellant
creates an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence that naturally leads to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellant was the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.
Circumstantial evidence may be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct
evidence is not available, otherwise felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied
proper protection. The rules on evidence and jurisprudence sustain the conviction of an accused
through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than
one circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. 70

In the case at bar, the following circumstances were successfully proven by the prosecution without
a shadow of doubt, to wit: that Elsa Santos Castillo was brought to accused-appellants
condominium unit on September 23, 1993; that on September 24, 1993, accused-appellants
housemaid was looking for her kitchen knife and accused-appellant gave it to her, saying that it was
in his bedroom; that on September 25, 1993, accused-appellant and Demetrio Ravelo collected the
dismembered body parts of Elsa from the bathroom inside accused-appellants bedroom; that
accused-appellant disposed of the body parts by a roadside somewhere in San Pedro, Laguna; that
accused-appellant also disposed of Elsas personal belongings along the road going to Bagac,
Bataan; that the mutilated body parts of a female cadaver, which was later identified as Elsa, were
found by the police and NBI agents at the spot where Demetrio pointed; that hair specimens found
inside accused-appellants bathroom and bedroom showed similarities with hair taken from Elsas
head; and that the bloodstains found on accused-appellants bedspread, covers and in the trunk of
his car, all matched Elsas blood type.
Accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Mendez, did not
examine the pancreas of the deceased notwithstanding Demetrios statement that, according to
accused-appellant, Elsa died of "bangungot," or hemorrhage of the pancreas. Because of this,
accused-appellant insists that the cause of death was not adequately established. Then, he relied on
the controverting testimony of his witness, lawyer-doctor Ernesto Brion, who was himself a MedicoLegal Officer of the NBI for several years, to the effect that the autopsy report prepared by Dr.
Mendez was unreliable and inconclusive. The trial court noted, however, that Dr. Brion was a biased
witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon because he entered his appearance as one of the
counsel for accused-appellant and, in such capacity, extensively cross-examined Dr. Mendez.
Accused-appellant counters that there is no prohibition against lawyers giving testimony. Moreover,
the trial courts ruling would imply that lawyers who testify on behalf of their clients are presumed to
be lying.
By rejecting the testimony of Dr. Brion, the trial court did not mean that he perjured himself on the
witness stand. Notably, Dr. Brion was presented as expert witness. His testimony and the questions
propounded on him dealt with his opinion on the probable cause of death of the victim. Indeed, the
presentation of expert testimony is one of the well-known exceptions to the rule against admissibility
of opinions in evidence.71 In like manner, Dr. Mendez was presented on the stand to give his own
opinion on the same subject. His opinion differed from that of Dr. Brion, which is not at all unusual.
What the trial court simply did was to choose which --- between two conflicting medico-legal opinions
--- was the more plausible. The trial court correctly lent more credence to Dr. Mendezs testimony,
not only because Dr. Brion was a biased witness, but more importantly, because it was Dr. Mendez
who conducted the autopsy and personally examined Elsas corpse up close.
In any event, the foregoing does not detract from the established fact that Elsas body was found
mutilated inside accused-appellants bathroom. This clearly indicated that it was accused-appellant
who cut up Elsas body to pieces. Naturally, accused-appellant would be the only suspect to her
killing. Otherwise, why else would he cut up Elsas body as if to conceal the real cause of her death?
As already stated above, Demetrios testimony was convincing. Accused-appellant attempts to refute
Demetrios statements by saying that he had repeatedly reprimanded the latter for discourteous and
reckless driving, and that he had already asked the latter to tender his resignation. Thus, accused-

appellant claims that Demetrio imputed Elsas death on him in order to get back at him. This Court
finds the cruel treatment by an employer too flimsy a motive for the employee to implicate him in
such a gruesome and hideous crime. Rather than entertain an accusation of ill-motive and bad faith
on Demetrio Ravelo, this Court views his act of promptly reporting the incident to his family and,
later, to the authorities, as a genuine desire to bring justice to the cruel and senseless slaying of Elsa
Santos Castillo, whom he knew well.
Accused-appellant also argues that his arrest was without a warrant and, therefore, illegal. In this
regard, the rule is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.72 In other words, it is too late in the day for
accused-appellant to raise an issue about his warrantless arrest after he pleaded to a valid
information and after a judgment of conviction was rendered against him after a full-blown trial.
Accused-appellant presented in evidence two supposedly threatening letters which, according to
Elsa, were written by the latters husband. There is nothing in these letters which will exculpate
accused-appellant from criminal liability. The threats were directed at accused-appellant, not Elsa.
The fact remains that Elsa was last seen alive in accused-appellants condominium unit, and
subsequently discovered dead in accused-appellants bathroom. Surely, the place where her dead
body was found does not support the theory that it was Fred Castillo who was probably responsible
for her death.
We do not agree with the trial court that the prosecution sufficiently proved the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Abuse of superiority is present whenever there is
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime.73 The fact that the victim was a woman does not, by itself, establish that
accused-appellant committed the crime with abuse of superior strength. There ought to be enough
proof of the relative strength of the aggressor and the victim. 74
Abuse of superior strength must be shown and clearly established as the crime itself. 75 In this case,
nobody witnessed the actual killing. Nowhere in Demetrios testimony, and it is not indicated in any of
the pieces of physical evidence, that accused-appellant deliberately took advantage of his superior
strength in overpowering Elsa. On the contrary, this Court observed from viewing the photograph of
accused-appellant76 that he has a rather small frame. Hence, the attendance of the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not adequately proved and cannot be appreciated
against accused-appellant.
However, the other circumstance of outraging and scoffing at the corpse of the victim was correctly
appreciated by the trial court. The mere decapitation of the victims head constitutes outraging or
scoffing at the corpse of the victim, thus qualifying the killing to murder.77 In this case, accusedappellant not only beheaded Elsa. He further cut up her body like pieces of meat. Then, he strewed
the dismembered parts of her body in a deserted road in the countryside, leaving them to rot on the
ground. The sight of Elsas severed body parts on the ground, vividly depicted in the photographs
offered in evidence, is both revolting and horrifying. At the same time, the viewer cannot help but feel
utter pity for the sub-human manner of disposing of her remains.

In a case with strikingly similar facts, we ruled:

Even if treachery was not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of the
dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under
Article 248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code is "outraging or scoffing at (the) person or
corpse" of the victim. There is no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged
when it was dismembered with the cutting off of the head and limbs and the opening up of
the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The killer scoffed at the dead when the
intestines were removed and hung around Victorianos neck as a necklace, and the lungs
and liver were facetiously described as "pulutan."78
Hence, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by
outraging and scoffing at the victims person or corpse. 79 This circumstance was both alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. At the time of its commission, the penalty for murder was
reclusion temporal maximum to death.80No aggravating or mitigating circumstance was alleged or
proved; hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.81 Therefore, the trial courts
imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correct, and need not be modified.
However, the damages awarded by trial court should be modified. Elida Santos, Elsas sister,
testified that the funeral expenses was only P50,000.00.82 Hence, the trial court erred when it
awarded the amount of P100,000.00. Basic is the jurisprudential principle that in determining actual
damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but
must depend on competent proof and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount of the
loss. Actual damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved with reasonable certainty.83
The award of moral damages in murder cases is justified because of the physical suffering and
mental anguish brought about by the felonious acts, and is thus recoverable in criminal offenses
resulting in death.84 It is true that moral damages are not intended to enrich the victims heirs or to
penalize the convict, but to obviate the spiritual sufferings of the heirs. 85 Considering, however, the
extraordinary circumstances in the case at bar, more particularly the unusual grief and outrage
suffered by her bereaved family as a result of the brutal and indecent mutilation and disposal of
Elsas body, the moral damages to be awarded to them should be more than the normal amount
dictated by jurisprudence. However, the amount of P3,000,000.00 awarded by the trial court as
moral damages is rather excessive. The reasonable amount is P1,000,000.00 considering the
immense sorrow and shock suffered by Elsas heirs.
The award of attorneys fees of P150,000.00 was duly proved, 86 and thus should be affirmed.
Finally, the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo should be indemnified for her death. In murder, the civil
indemnity has been fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00. The grant of civil indemnity in murder
requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of accusedappellants responsibility therefor.87
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, in Criminal Case
No. 102687, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Elsa Santos Castillo actual damages in the
amount of P50,000.00; civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00; and attorneys fees in the
amount of P150,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 100801-02

August 25, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE,
PAUL DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused,
DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision1 dated February 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 finding herein appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, respectively for the killing of
U.S. Col. James N. Rowe and for seriously wounding Joaquin Vinuya.
It appears that appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged with
the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate Informations dated June 20, 1989 in
connection with the shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously
wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After thearrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27,
1989 in Davao City, the prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended
Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas, among the other accused.
The amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 read:
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843 for Murder:

"That on or about the 21st day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and with
the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a
U.S. Army Officer, by then and there firing at him while then on board aToyota car, hitting him on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Col. James N. Rowe in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844 for Frustrated Murder:
"That on or about the 21st day of April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and with
the use of armalite rifles and motor vehicles, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then and
there firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the scalp and body, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of
causes independent of their own will, that is the timely intervention of medical assistance, to the
damage and prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon being arraigned on August 31, 1989, appellant Donato B. Continente, assisted by his counsel
of choice, pleaded "Not guilty" to each of the amended Informations in both criminal cases. On the
scheduled arraignment of appellant Juanito Itaas on October 31, 1989, appellant Itaas, upon the
advice of his counsel, refused to enter any plea. Hence, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not
guilty" be entered in each of the amended Informations in both criminal cases for the said appellant.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on April 21, 1989 at around 7:00
o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy Commander, Joint U. S. Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Initial investigation by the Central Intelligence Service (CIS for
brevity), National Capital District Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil
Meneses, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and time
of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car which was being
driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG Compound along Tomas Morato Street when
gunmen who were on board an old model Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing
Col. Rowe and seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. The car that was used by the gunmen
was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer car when it sped away from the site of the ambush. 2 The same

Toyota Corolla car was later recovered on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary
(PC), North Sector Command, led by PC/Sgt. Fermin Garma, at No. 4 Windsor Street, San
Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.3
Upon further investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential intelligence
information the involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an employee of the U.P. Collegian in
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver. Accordingly, on June
16, 1989, the CIS investigation team proceeded to the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City to
conduct a surveillance on appellant Donato Continente. After accosting appellant Continente inside
the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in Quezon City for
questioning.4 During the interrogation which was conducted by CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico in the
presence of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente
admitted to his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver as a member of the
surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of the CPP-NPA.5 Among the documents
confiscated from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a receipt dated June 16,
1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz, was a letter addressed to "Sa
Kinauukulan". At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear the acronyms "STR PATRC" which
allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team, Regional
Command".6
Another confidential intelligence information established the participation of appellant Juanito Itaas in
the said ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who was a
known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City was arrested in Davao City and
was brought to Manila by Capt. Gil Meneses for investigation. 7 CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico
investigated and took down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed during the investigation
that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in
the presence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights,
that he was one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue on April 21, 1989.8 The said appellant identified
the Toyota Corolla car that the assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray Mitsubishi Galant car
of Col. Rowe.9
Meanwhile, it appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a
certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta reveals that at
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to cross the Tomas Morato
Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG
Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots
emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car at a distance of more or less
one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. Zulueta
returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered
her head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at the gray
car.10 She recognized appellant Juanito Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in
Camp Crame as the person, directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was half
exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm. 11 The shooting incident
lasted for about five (5) seconds only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog Avenue
toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a white Mitsubishi Lancer car.12

Prosecution eyewitness Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi Lancer car as
the same person whom she had encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the
morning of April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of Tomas
Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the
driver of the car, who was then reading a newspaper, when the latter remarked "Hoy pare, ang sexy.
She-boom!" as she was walking along the street toward the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20, 1989,
she saw the same person inside the white Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked along the
side of Tomas Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend practicum in the JUSMAG
Compound. She learned of the identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who is allegedly
a member of the NPA, from the pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame. 13
Prosecution witness Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she had
encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside the JUSMAG Compound. Her
first encounter with appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April 17,
1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia nearby. She mistook the said
appellant for a tricycle driver who was simply walking around the premises. She saw appellant
Continente in the same carinderia again on the following day, April 18, 1989, and she was even
teased by her companions that he was her escort. On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant
Continente for the third time inside the same carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She
came to know the identity of appellant Continente when Continente was presented to her in Camp
Crame for identification. She thought that he was the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the
carinderia near the JUSMAG Compound.14
Joaquin Vinuya testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and assigned to Col.
James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong to report for work in JUSMAG, Quezon City. He drove along EDSA and
turned left upon reaching Timog Avenue in Quezon City. While he was making a right turn at the
intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed four (4) people on board a red
car, two (2) of whom suddenly opened fire at the car that he was driving hitting him in the process.
The shooting incident happened very fast and that he had no opportunity to recognize the persons
inside the red car. Despite the incident, Vinuya managed to drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound.
Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe, who was sitting at the
back seat of the car, was also hit during the shooting incident. 15
Col. James Rowe and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City
for treatment. Subsequently, they were transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga. It
was only then that Vinuya learned of Col. James Rowe's death whose body was already wrapped in
a blanket. Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga for four (4) days for the
injuries he sustained on his head, shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he
was taken back to JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to recuperate. 16
Prosecution witnesses Dr. Walter Divers and Dr. Jose Santiago testified on their respective medical
findings17 on the victims. Dr. Divers confirmed in court the contents of his medical report dated April
21, 1989 which shows that Col. Rowe sustained a gunshot wound on the left side of his head and
abrasions on other parts of his body and that he was pronounced dead upon arrival at the V. Luna
Hospital in Quezon City.18 On the other hand, Dr. Santiago identified the medical report dated April

25, 1989 that he prepared relative to the treatment that he administered on Joaquin Vinuya. The
report shows that Vinuya sustained three (3) superficial injuries on the scalp, on the left shoulder,
and on the back of the left hand which could have been caused by bullets that came from a gun; and
that the wounds could have caused the death of Vinuya without the medical treatment that lasted for
four (4) days.19
For the defense, appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his sworn
statements which are respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989, insofar as the same
establish his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989.
Appellant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August 27 and 28, 1989 in
Davao City; that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and that
subsequently, he was hit and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus, causing him
to loss consciousness.20
Appellant Itaas further testified that he affixed his signatures on his sworn statements dated August
29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the CIS officers and that Atty. Filemon Corpus was not present
during those two occasions. The said appellant admitted having sworn to the truth of the contents of
his said sworn statements before the administering fiscal, but he disclosed that the CIS officers
previously threatened him to admit the contents of the two sworn statements. 21
Appellant Donato Continente testified that he was working as messenger with the U.P. Collegian, an
official monthly publication of the University of the Philippines. He was walking on his way home
inside the U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City from his workplace in Vinzon's Hall in the late
afternoon of June 16, 1989 when four (4) persons blocked his way and simultaneously held his body
and covered his mouth. He asked if they had any warrant of arrest but the persons simply boarded
him inside a waiting car where he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Thereafter, they took his wallet
that contained his NBI clearance, SSS, tax account number (TAN), identification card, two (2)
pictures, and a typewritten certification from "SINAG" where he used to work. 22
Appellant Continente learned that he was taken to Camp Crame in Quezon City only in the following
morning when his blindfold was removed so that he could give his statement in connection with the
killing of Col. James Rowe before a CIS Investigator whom he later identified during the trial as
Virgilio Pablico. Appellant Continente affirmed the truth of his personal circumstances only which
appear on his sworn statement dated June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of the
statements embodied therein. The said appellant claimed that he initially denied any knowledge in
the killing of Col. James Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he (Continente) knew
something about it; that appellant Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the
investigation; that he signed his sworn statement in the presence of Pablico and swore to the truth
thereof before the administering fiscal for fear that something might happen to him while he was
alone; that he signed the last page of his sworn statement first before signing the waiver of his
constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal services was engaged by
the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity to talk with Atty. Manansala who left after he
(Atty. Manansala) signed, merely as witness, the first page of his sworn statement, which is the
waiver of his constitutional rights.23

On rebuttal, prosecution witness Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz testified that he prepared and issued the
receipt for the documents which he confiscated from appellant Continente on June 16, 1989; and
that it is the standard operating procedure in the CIS to put a blindfold on an arrested suspected
NPA member in order to withhold from him the view and location of the entrance, the exit and the
terrain in the camp.24
The testimony of CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico on rebuttal reveals that during the investigation of
appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas, their respective lawyers namely, Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala and Atty. Filemon Corpuz, were present; that appellants Continente and Itaas conferred
with their lawyers before they gave their statements to the CIS investigator; that the CIS investigator
typed only the statements that the appellants had given him in response to his questions during the
investigation; that both appellants were accompanied by their respective lawyers when they were
brought to the fiscal for inquest; and that said appellants were nevertortured nor threatened during
the investigations of these cases.25
The trial court rendered its decision26 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 to 44 on February 28, 1991
finding both appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder. It ruled, thus:
"In assessing the evidence against co-accused Continente, it is undeniable that the yardstick of his
culpability hangs in the validity of the extra-judicial confession he had executed. A close scrutiny of
the document would reveal that the confession is free from any taint of illegality and thus serves as a
basis for his conviction.
The presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed has not been satisfactorily
controverted by the accused.
Circumstances show that Continente's waiver was done with the assistance of a counsel of his
choice. The records indicate that Atty. Bonifacio Manansala was accused's counsel during his
custodial investigation and his arraignment and that his counsel during the trial was a relative of the
aforementioned lawyer. These factors are undeniable evidence of trust reposed upon Atty. Bonifacio
Manansala by the accused.
Continente also admitted on cross-examination that he had read his statement which included the
PAGPAPATUNAY containing his waiver of constitutional rights (TSN 29 August 1990 p. 29). Accused
was raised in Metro Manila and spoke Tagalog, thus would not have any difficulty in comprehending
the questions addressed to him and the information relayed to him with respect to his rights. The
court can not equate that whenever a suspect is taken into custody and is fearful of his safety, the
police authorities had exercised pressure or had threatened if not subjected them to physical abuse.
Moreover, the fact that the accused admitted that his answers were typed as he spoke them (TSN
August 30 1990 p.4) leaves no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The prosecution evidence gathered against accused Itaas cradles on two incriminating points. The
Zulueta testimony and his extra judicial confession working independently, one without the other,

have the force capable of convicting the accused. The interplay of these two valuable evidence
solidifies a ruling of guilt against accused Itaas.
The defense raised by the accused is not sufficient to overrule this Court's determination of guilt
against Itaas.
The testimony of Zulueta has been candid and straightforward, devoid of any material contradiction.
No motive has been imputed to assail the credibility of her testimony. xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

With respect to the extra-judicial confession executed by accused Itaas, the Court finds that such
was made pursuant to the Constitution. Although it may be argued that accused resides in Davao,
the fact that he could understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his testimony and proven by the
proceedings in court where he was answering questions addressed to him in Tagalog militates
against his inability to comprehend his right and its subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused
contests the independence and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground that said lawyer
was a military lawyer. Although the military background of Atty. Corpuz is admitted, this does not
automatically disqualify him to act as lawyer for the accused. Proof of the fact that he failed to render
his duty to safeguard the rights of the accused must be shown before this court nullifies the weight of
Itaas' extra-judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly rings hollow. No medical certificate
had been shown by the accused that he had indeed suffered brutal treatment from his jailers
specially since he had alleged to have been treated by a doctor for his injuries."
Thereafter, the trial court meted out the following penalties on the appellants:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DONATO CONTINENTE y
BUENVENIDA and JUANITO ITAAS y TURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER, and each is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the killing of Col. James Rowe, to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs; and an
imprisonment from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of PRISION MAYOR as MINIMUM to Seventeen
(17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM for the
crime committed against Joaquin Vinuya, and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED."
From the foregoing judgment of the trial court, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas
separately instituted the instant appeal.
On March 15, 1993, appellant Donato Continente filed his Appellant's Brief 27 while appellant Juanito
Itaas filed his Appellant's Brief28 on March 5, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General filed the
Appellee's Brief29 for the People on October 4, 1993. Appellant Itaas filed a Reply Brief 30 on
December 3, 1993.
Appellant Continente raised the following assignments of error by the trial court:

I
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING PROBATIVE
VALUE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONTINENTE.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE BY THE PROSECUTION'S
LONE WITNESS.
III
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONTINENTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
On the other hand, appellant Itaas interposed the following assignments of error:
I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND
APPRECIATING THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF MERIAM ZULUETA.
II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING AND
APPRECIATING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ITAAS.
III
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING TESTIMONIAL
AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT POSING
BESIDE THE AMBUSHER'S AND THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED CARS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED.
V
THE EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY BY THE AUTHORITIES DEPICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
ITAAS AS "THE ROWE KILLER", A "COMMUNIST" AND A MEMBER OF THE

CPP/NPA/NDF/ABB INFLUENCED MERIAM ZULUETA'S IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT.
The principal issues are:
1. Whether or not the waivers of the constitutional rights during custodial investigation by the
appellants were valid; and
2. Whether or not the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta was credible.
The rights of the accused during custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
The rights to remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with. It must appear clear that the accused was initially
accorded his right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in
the presence of counsel. If the waiver complies with the constitutional requirements, then the
extrajudicial confession will be tested for voluntariness,31 i. e., if it was given freely-without coercion,
intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility,32 i.e., if it was consistent with the normal
experience of mankind.
In assailing the validity of their written statements, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas
contend that they were not properly informed of their custodial rights under the constitution as to
enable them to make a valid waiver. The pertinent portion of appellant Donato Continente's written
statement dated June 17, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Donato Continente, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkaka-ambush
at pagpatay kay U.S. Army Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG.
Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod
sa ating umiiral na Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay magbibigay
ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sasabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay maaaring
gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng abogado ayon sa iyong sariling pili habang ikaw ay aking
tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang kakayanang umupa ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng isang
abogado ng gobyerno bilang tumayo na iyong tagapayo at ng sa gayon ay maprotektahan ang iyong
mga karapatan.

Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.

TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo. Nauunawaan ko po.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang siya mong maging tagapayo?
SAGOT: Wala po pero nakapagdesisyon na po ako na ako ay magbibigay ng salaysay kahit na wala
akong nakaharap na abogado.
TANONG: G. Continente, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan, ayon narin sa batas, ay kinakailangang
gawin sa harap ng isang abogado. Payag ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa harap ng
isang abogado ng gobyerno?
SAGOT: Pumapayag po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan
ng iyong mga karapatan, at nauunawaan mo ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.33
On the other hand, the pertinent portion of appellant Itaas' written statement dated August 29, 1989
is quoted, to wit:
01. PALIWANAG: G. Juanito Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkakaambush at
pagpatay kay Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG at pagkasugat ng kanyang driver. Bago kita
simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating
Bagong Saligang Batas. Ito ay mga sumusunod. Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag
magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang
sabihin mo sa salaysay mong ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa anumang
hukuman dito sa Pilipinas. Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng pili at sarili mong abogado
habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang pambayad ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan ng
gobyerno ng abogado na wala kang aalalahaning anumang kabayaran. Ikatlo, karapatan mong
malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang ikaw ay patnubayan?
SAGOT: Wala po pero ako ay nakahandang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap
na abogado.

TANONG: G. Itaas, ayon din sa batas, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan ay kailangan ding
pagtibayin sa harap ng isang abogado, nakahanda ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa
harap ng isang abogado na bigay sa iyo ng gobyerno?
SAGOT: Opo. Nakahanda po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay napagpaliwanagan
ng iyong mga karapatan at nauunawaan mo naman ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.34
Also, the pertinent portion of his (Itaas) supplemental written statement dated August 30, 1989 is
quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman pa rin sa pagkaka-ambush at
pagpatay kay U.S. Colonel James Rowe. Tulad sa nauna mong pagbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala
ko sa iyo na muli ang iyong mga karapatang manahimik, magkaroon ng pili at sariling abogado at
karapatang mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong ito. Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga
karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka pa rin bang magbigay ng salaysay at ipapatuloy ang pagbibigay mo ng
salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka bang lumagdang muli ng isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay
napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan at handa ka ring isuko ang mga karapatan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.35
We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the
beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do
not meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince
a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights. 36 We
emphasized that when the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his
rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own
choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. 37 In other words,
the right of a person under investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part
of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right. 38
In the case of People vs. Jara,39 we declared that:

"This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even
copy it in their own handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."
It must be noted however, that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an
accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written statements contain an explanation as
to the nature of the investigation that is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants in
the ambush on April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while seriously
wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. They also include an advice that the appellants may choose
not to give any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained from the
appellants may be used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they contain an advice that the
appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the
services of a lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both
appellants manifested to CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico their intentions to give their statements
even in the absence of counsel.
Despite the manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico requested for the legal services of
Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for appellant Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for
appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with
Atty. Manansala in his presence for about half an hour before the investigation
started.40 Nevertheless, the appellant (Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even
in the absence of counsel. As proof thereof, the appellant signed 41 the "Pagpapatunay" that contains
an express waiver of his constitutional rights in the presence of Atty. Manansala who also signed the
same as counsel of the appellant.
With respect to appellant Itaas, Atty. Felimon Corpuz testified that his legal services were requested
on two (2) occasions to act as counsel for appellant Itaas after the latter purportedly manifested his
intention to waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel during the investigation. Atty. Corpuz
stated that he conferred with the appellant before the investigations and explained to him his rights
under the constitution and the consequences of waiving said rights. After the explanation, appellant
Itaas decided to sign the "Pagpapatunay", which are entirely written in Tagalog, a dialect which he
understands, in his written confessions respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30, 1989
stating that his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel were explained to him; that he
fully understood the same; and that he was willing to give a written confession even without the
assistance of counsel.42
Appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas likewise impugn their respective written statements.
They allege that the statements appearing therein were supplied by the CIS investigator. CIS
Investigator Pablico however, categorically denied on rebuttal the allegations of the appellants.
Pablico disclosed that during his investigations of the appellants on separate occasions he
simultaneously typewrote his questions to the appellants including their answers thereto which are
done entirely in Tagalog, thus leaving no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer. After
the investigation, he allowed the appellants to read their respective confessions, 43 a fact that was

admitted by appellant Continente.44 Thereafter, the appellants voluntarily affixed their signatures on
every page of their written confessions.
On July 18, 1989 appellant Continente appeared before City Prosecutor Galicano of Quezon City
and affirmed under oath the truth of his statements by affixing his signature on the left hand portion
of every page of his written confession.45 Likewise, appellant Itaas, accompanied by Atty. Corpuz,
affirmed under oath the truth of his statements in his written confessions by affixing his signature on
every page thereof before the administering officer.46
In a desperate attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of his confessions, appellant Continente
claims that he was under pressure to read entirely his written confession before he affixed his
signature thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of the appellant is belied by his own admission that he
was treated fairly during the investigation, thus:
Court: Proceed.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, since the time you were arrested on June 16, 1989 until this time, you said you
were staying in Camp Crame, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And from the time you were arrested up to this time, you were never harmed by anybody in Camp
Crame, that is also correct?
A: No, sir.
Q: In fact, from the time you were arrested when that blindfold was removed, you were treated fairly,
am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.47
There is also no basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that he was tortured into giving a
confession and was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the same before the
administering officer. This Court held that where the appellants did not present evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their
claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions. 48
It has been established by the evidence that Atty. Filemon Corpuz was present during both
occasions that appellant Itaas was being investigated by Investigator Virgilio Pablico in Camp Crame
and even accompanied the said appellant before the administering officer. Appellant Itaas did not
present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim despite the fact that a doctor was
summoned for his check up immediately upon his arrival in Manila after he was previously arrested
in Davao City.49 He did not complain to the administering officer about the threats and torture he

allegedly suffered in the hands of the CIS agents. Neither did he file any criminal nor administrative
complaint against said agents for maltreatment. The failure of the appellant to complain to the
swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he
had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 50 To hold
otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of
torture, without any proof whatsoever.51
The Court also notes that the respective written confessions of appellants are replete with details
which could be supplied only by someone in the know so to speak.52 They reflect spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture
have been applied.53
In particular, appellant Juanito Itaas admitted in his written confession 54 dated August 29, 1989 that
he was an active member of the New People's Army (NPA) and performed different functions mainly
in the province of Davao; that he was one of the two other members of the NPA who were sent to
Manila sometime in March 1989; that appellant stayed in Merville, Paranaque before moving to an
apartment in Santolan, Pasig together with certain Vicky and her husband Ronnie, Onie, Bosyo and
Bernie; that one day before the ambush on Col. Rowe he (Itaas) was told by Ronnie to take part in a
major operation by the NPA; that he (Itaas) was not informed by Ronnie about the identity of their
supposed target; that on the following day, Ronnie and the appellant boarded a dark brown Toyota
car together with certain Edgar and James; that he (Itaas) was seated directly behind the driver
beside Edgar and James while Ronnie sat beside the driver; that they were armed with M-16 rifles
while Ronnie was armed with an ultimax; that after several minutes their car reached a junction
(circle) and was running alongside a dark gray car; that he fired automatic shots toward the dark
gray car only after his companions started firing at the said car; and that after the ambush they drove
back to their apartment in Santolan, Pasig while they were being followed by a back up car allegedly
being occupied by certain Liway, Fred and Eddie. Appellant Itaas also identified in his written
confession55 dated August 30, 1989 the gray Mitsubishi car that they ambushed on April 21, 1989
and the car that they used on the same date of ambush.
On the other hand, the written statement56 dated June 17, 1989 of appellant Donato Continente
reveals that he had been a member of several revolutionary groups before becoming a full fledged
member of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the Political Assassination Team
(PAT) headed by a certain Kit; that the objective of their team was primarily to conduct surveillance
on foreigners and diplomats; that he did not know Col. James Rowe prior to the shooting incident on
April 21, 1989; that his participation in the ambush was merely for having conducted a surveillance
of the vicinity of the JUSMAG in Tomas Morato Avenue in Quezon City; that he gathered certain
data, specifically: the number of people and volume of vehicles around the area, the measurement
of the streets, as well as the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Avenue; that
his surveillance activity was continued by certain Freddie Abella and Taddy who are also members of
the PAT; and that he came to know the identity of the victim of the ambush on April 21, 1989, through
Freddie Abella who informed him two days after the incident.
Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
assistance during their respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized
that both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it

has been ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators,
the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he
never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.57
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to give their
statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to abide
by the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.58 Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the
ascertainment of truth.59 What is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to counsel is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to provide him with the best
defense.60
We agree with the trial court's observation that the retention by appellant Continente of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala as his counsel until the early stages of his case in the lower court and his
subsequent decision to engage the legal services of Atty. Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino
Manansala, who represented the said appellant throughout the proceedings in the absence of the
former bespeaks of the trust he had for the said lawyer. On the other hand, while it is admitted that
Atty. Felimon Corpuz served in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and Separation Board of
the armed forces, such fact is not sufficient to adjudge the said lawyer as biased against the
appellant (Itaas) in the absence of any concrete evidence to that effect. The defense also failed to
adduce substantial evidence to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was short of being a vigilant and
effective counsel for the said appellant.
Moreover, the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta confirms to a large extent the
statements made by the appellants in their written confessions. Zulueta positively identified appellant
Juanito Itaas as among the persons on board a car, directly behind the driver, whose body was half
exposed, while firing at the car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog
Avenue in Quezon City. She also testified that she had seen appellant Donato Continente on at least
three (3) occasions at the carinderia outside the JUSMAG compound. She mistook appellant
Continente for a tricycle driver on April 17, 1989 while the latter was simply walking around the
premises. The second and third encounters with the appellant (Continente) took place on April 18
and 19, 1989 while the said appellant was standing inside the same carinderia.
The defense assails the propriety of the pre-trial identification by Meriam Zulueta of appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas as pointedly suggestive. However, there is no sufficient
evidence on record to show that the appellants were previously indicated by the CIS investigators to
Zulueta that they were the perpetrators of the crime.61 Besides, a police line-up is not essential to a
proper identification of the appellants.62
The defense for appellant Itaas further argues that the so-called "positive identification" of appellant
Itaas by Meriam Zulueta cannot be considered reliable inasmuch as the same was based on a
fleeting glimpse of a stranger. To support its argument, the defense cited cases 63 where the Court

rejected the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses for not being credible, such as: where the
identification of a stranger is based upon a single brief observation made during a startling
occurrence; where the testimony of the witness defies human nature and reason; where there are
serious inconsistencies and glaring omissions in the testimony of the eyewitness; and where the
witness only identified the suspect after he was arrested and the witness was informed by the police
that the suspect was one of the killers.
It should be pointed out that the above rulings of the Court are based on the circumstances peculiar
to each of the abovecited cases that do not exactly obtain in the cases at bench. It is accepted legal
precept that persons react differently to a given situation.64 In the same way, certain witnesses to an
unfolding crime may run or scamper to safety while others would remain transfixed and strive to
identify the perpetrators thereof. As found by the trial court, Zulueta testified in an honest and
straightforward manner that she was about to cross the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the
JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she
heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the gunshots emanated, she saw
persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car. Zulueta returned to the sidewalk to seek for
cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously
looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car. In acting the way she did, Meriam Zulueta was
merely reacting naturally to the crime that was unfolding before her. And while the shooting incident
lasted for only about five (5) seconds, that was all that Zulueta needed under the situation to
recognize appellant Itaas whose body was incidentally half exposed.
The testimony of Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious and material contradictions that
can detract from her credibility. The trial court accorded full faith and credence to her said testimony.
The defense failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper motive that may have impelled
the same witness to falsely testify against the appellants. It is well-settled rule that the evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because
such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are
telling the truth or not.65
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
"ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any
of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an

earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
The trial court erroneously found that the appellants allegedly conspired in the commission of the
crimes charged in the instant criminal cases. While it is clear that the appellants did not even know
each other, the lower court opined that the Alex Boncayao Brigade is such a large organization that
there is great likelihood that the participants of the various stages of the crime are unknown to each
other. To justify its position, it cited the ruling in the case of People vs. Geronimo 66 , thus:
"When the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other
performing another part as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal associations, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the Court will be justified in
concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy."
We disagree. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three (3) requisites: (1) that two or
more persons come to an agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime;
and (3) that the execution of the felony was decided upon. 67 While conspiracy must be proven just
like any criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt, 68 the same need
not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during, and after the commission of the crime.69
The case against appellant Donato Continente is primarily anchored on the written statement 70 that
he gave during the investigation of these cases. The pertinent portions of his written statements are
quoted hereunder, to wit:
T: Ikaw ba'y naging full fledged member ng Partido?
S: Nito pong Oktubre 1988.
T: Sino naman ang iyong kinikilalang puno sa inyong Partido?
S: Ganito po iyon. Mayroon kaming sariling grupo na kung tawagin ay PAT. Ang ibig sabihin nito ay
POLITICAL ASSASSINATION TEAM. Ang aming puno ay tinatawag naming PO o Political Officer.
Ang susunod sa kanya ay ang TL o Team Leader; tapos po ay ang Vice Team Leader; at mga
miembro na nagsasagawa ng activities tulad ng gawaing edukasyon, surveillance at intelligence.
xxx

T: Ano ang mga alam mong objectives ng inyong team?

S: , Ang mga objectives po namin ay magsagawa ng surveillance sa mga foreigner o diplomat.
Kinukuha namin ang plate number ng kanilang mga sasakyan, make, model at kulay nito at ito ay
aming tinitipon.
xxx
T: Nakikilala mo ba itong si Col. James Rowe ng U.S. Army na nagtrabaho sa JUSMAG?
S: Nakilala ko po lamang siya ng mapabalitang patay siya sa ambush sa may malapit sa JUSMAG
noong buwan ng Abril 1989.
xxx
T: Ano ang iyong naging partisipasyon sa pagkakapatay nitong si Col. Rowe?
S: Surveillance po lamang ang aking naging papel dito.
T: Paano mo naman isinagawa itong pag-surveillance kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Nagpunta po ako sa area ng JUSMAG doon sa Tomas Morato Avenue, Q. C. at nagmanman
doon tungkol sa dami ng tao at sasakyang dumadaan tuwing tanghali. Inalaman ko din ang lawak ng
kalsada at layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG. Sa report ko ay sinabi ko na mga anim (6) na
hakbang ang luwag ng Tomas Morato Avenue, madalang ang daan ng tao at sasakyan at ang layo
ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG ay may tatlong poste o apat na poste lamang.
T: Ang pagrereport mo bang ito ay ginawa mo ng verbal lamang?
S: Verbal lamang po.
T: Kanino ka naman nagreport?
S: Kay Ka Freddie Abella po.
xxx
T: Bakit mo natiyak na ang ABB ang nagsagawa ng pag-ambush kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Dalawang (2) araw po matapos ang pag-ambush kay Col. Rowe ay nagkita kaming dalawa ni
Freddie sa aming bahay. Sa pagkikita naming iyon ay ikinuwento niya sa akin ang mga pangyayari.
xxx
It should be emphasized that conspirators are the authors of the crime, being the ones who decide
that a crime should be committed. Strictly speaking, a person may not be considered a conspirator
by his mere subsequent assent or cooperation in the commission of a crime absent a clear showing,

either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that he participated in the decision to commit the
same;71 in which case, his culpability will be judged based on the extent of his participation in the
commission of the crime.
In the case at bench, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal
cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a person may
be considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the following requisites must
concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by
the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. 72
The prosecution failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that appellant
Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush on Col. James Rowe and
his driver on that fateful morning of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose that the
participation of appellant Continente was made only after the plan or decision to ambush Col. Rowe
was already a fait accompli. Continente was merely assigned to the vicinity of the JUSMAG
Compound in Tomas Morato Street, Quezon City, before the shooting incident to gather certain data,
specifically the number of people and volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of the
streets, and the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently,
Continente reported his findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken over the
activity. Significantly, appellant Continente was not even present at the scene of the crime on April
21, 1989.
The error of the trial court in its appreciation of appellant Continente's participation in the crimes
charged lies in its apparent confusion regarding the distinction between a conspirator and an
accomplice. In view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente, the distinction between the
two concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People vs. de Vera, et al. 73 needs to be
reiterated, thus:
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal
design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided
upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime
should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime
should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of the crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform
acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense.
With respect to appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court correctly found that the evidence
against him which consist of his written confession and the straightforward and credible testimony of
prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta, even if taken independently, are sufficient to convict him.
Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in his written confession that he and his companions fired at
the gray Mitsubishi car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street
in Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution witness Meriam Zulueta positively identified appellant Itaas as

one of the persons she saw on board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and place where
Col. Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
The shooting of Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. 74 The evidence
clearly shows that the mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the
commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from the possible
resistance of their victims. Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful
firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya at the corner of
Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon City. Without any warning, appellant Itaas and
his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said place. Hence, the crime
committed for the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
With respect to the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it appears that the
said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on the back portion of the left
hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a felony is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose
Santiago in his testimony, is not sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court
notes that the wounds sustained by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial
wounds.75 The records disclose that Joaquin Vinuya MANAGED to drive the car of Col. Rowe
toward the JUSMAG Compound which is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush. 76 It also
appears that Vinuya was treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base Hospital
in Pampanga after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
recuperate. Hence, the crime committed as against him is only attempted murder.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of murder and
attempted murder for his direct participation in the killing of Col. James Rowe and in the wounding of
his driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is reclusion perpetua for
the murder of Col. James Rowe and the medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of
Joaquin Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the latter case, the maximum of the
penalty to be imposed on appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
the offense, that is, prision correccional.
On the other hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder, the penalty
to be imposed on appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium periods of reclusion
temporal and prision correccional, respectively. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in both
cases, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on appellant Continente as an accomplice to the
crime of murder is the medium period of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision mayor,
while the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant as an accomplice to the crime

of attempted murder is the medium period of prision correccional and the minimum shall be arresto
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as principal and as accomplice,
respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Continente as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of
civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal and as accomplice,
respectively. Appellant Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6) months of prision mayor, as
maximum. Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128900

July 14, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA,
JR., accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232-H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is
quoted hereunder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery as charged in the Information, and there being
no mitigating or any aggravating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 entitled "An Act to Impose The
Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes" and Art. 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet" shall be credited in full
with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., as
accessories, having also been established beyond any reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet" is likewise hereby ordered to pay, unto the heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles
death;
d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three (3) children of Arnulfo B.
Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the widow, Ma. Odyssa "Suzette" Tecarro-Tuadles, as
moral damages;
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
f. Costs.
In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", accused JUANITO NIETO y
NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to pay, jointly and severally, one-third
(1/3) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B.
Tuadles.
In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with Serial Number BER041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5) live bullets, which are presently under the
custody of the Court, be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the
Firearms and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet"
from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.1

On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an amiable game of cards
between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one
by the hand of the other. The victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, a former professional basketball player,
succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the eyes, inflicted with deadly
precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto "Ambet" S. Antonio, a one-time chairman
of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB). It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles
became socially acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when they
both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located along Wilson Street in San
Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such as a dining room, music bar and gameroom.
Often, the two would meet with other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the
second floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or "pusoy dos", ordinary poker or
Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996. Antonio, Tuadles, and a
certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC, had agreed to meet at the club for another poker
session, their third night in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for sometime, Antonio and Tuadles
decided to play "pusoy dos", a game for two (2) players only. They continued playing until morning,
pausing only when either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around 9:00
oclock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. It
is at this point where the prosecution and the defense presented two very different scenarios. The
prosecution alleged and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or
cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very close range, thus
employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. The pivotal evidence presented by
the prosecution was the testimony of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to
how the shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the testimony of accused Antonio
himself, who testified that their argument was caused by Tuadles refusal to pay Antonios winnings.
In the middle of a heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed
Antonios gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that he reached for Tuadles
hand and they grappled for possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles
fell face down to the floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the
trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his only motivation was to
defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the prosecutions eyewitness, averring that SG
Bobis could not have seen the actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto,
who were alerted by Antonios yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had already been shot and
was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an ambulance or check if he was
still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2)
security guards, prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home in

Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to the San Juan Police
Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the San Juan Police Force. They remained at
Antonios residence for several hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned
his lawyer. At around 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, placed
himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities.
Later, the two security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for
the police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and executed his
statement at the police station, a statement which he would repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the crime of murder. Also
charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged
that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a gun, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, by then and there suddenly, unexpectedly, deliberately and
without provocation, shooting Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles on his forehead, right between the eyes,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder, either as principal or
accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its
commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or
assisting the accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender immediately the said
accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false information which tended to deceive the
investigating authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of murder either as principal or
accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take part subsequent to its
commission, with abuse of his public functions and position as a public officer, by concealing or
destroying the effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in order to prevent its discovery, by
then and there removing the laser sight of the gun used in shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to
take steps to preserve the evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the
crime laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
Contrary to law.2
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of "Not Guilty." Accused Antonio
and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and the trial court entered a plea of "not guilty" for both
of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged, imposing on them the
appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for
indemnity and damages, set forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed
separate appeals assailing the trial courts findings and disposition.

Appellant Antonio assails the trial courts judgment on the following assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JOSE
"JIMMY" BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL
DECLARATIONS BUT ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND
WHICH TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES, INCREDIBILITIES,
AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERSION OF
APPELLANT ALBERTO "AMBET" ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON
THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO "ARNIE" TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED
THE COMMISION OF THE IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF P7,200,000.00 AS
COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF ARNIE TUADLES DEATH, DESPITE
INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE MORAL DAMAGES
TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO "AMBET" ANTONIO

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.3
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial courts decision, arguing that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED BY
THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS MURDER4
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN CONVICTING SPO1
HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE RECORD IS SO REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE
REASONABLE DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT SHOWN FAIRNESS
IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK
EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE
ON HAND TILL THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME, QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN DISREGARDING THE
SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA,
JR. SHOWN WITH DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.5
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal first with the issues raised
in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility of the prosecutions sole eyewitness, SG Jose
Jimmy Bobis. Appellant Antonio challenges SG Bobis worth and credibility as an eyewitness on two
(2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities averred that he did not
see the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs leading to the second floor where the
crime took place when he heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern

Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis negated his earlier
statement, this time averring that he had indeed seen appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind,
and with neither warning nor provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter
pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis testimony, according to appellant Antonio, is a sure
sign of the said witness unreliability, incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the
contradictions and inconsistencies between SG Bobis first and second statements and court
testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis reasons for giving the San Juan Police investigators
false information in his first statement, saying that nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against
appellant Antonio. On the other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas
Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change his statement and testimony so that the
murder charge against appellant Antonio would be strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis second statement and court testimony, on the one hand,
contradicted what he previously narrated in his first statement, on the other hand. The question
therefore is: Which is more credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally
considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court,
and whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight.6 Moreover, inconsistencies between the declaration of the
affiant in his sworn statements and those in open court do not necessarily discredit said
witness.7 Thus, the trial court followed precedents in giving more credence to SG Bobis testimony
given in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement which was inconsistent with his
testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis explained the reasons
why he was moved to give false information in his first statement. He had testified that moments
after he saw appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: "Ikaw, wag kang tumistigo,
ha."8 Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac, were allegedly coerced to go to the appellants
house in Quezon City. He also testified that while they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer
instructed him (Bobis), should the police investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say that what
happened was only an accident.9
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say that they were both
outside the club when the trouble started, saying: "kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng
club."10 Bobis stated that he was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police investigator,
appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not see appellant Antonio shoot Tuadles
because he was still ascending the stairs when the gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that time, but also remorse and
confusion. As found by the trial court:

He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of conduct of private security
guards when he did not make a formal report to his superior about the shooting incident of
November 2, 1996 at the Club but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him
to the latters house. This being so, neither was he able to put said accused Antonio under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active service who was with them
at the time and who should have done so, had also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with
him and SG Olac who are just ordinary security guards. ("Dahil po maam, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na
po ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet Antonio mas lalo po kami na
ordinary guard lang po.")
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time. Nevertheless, because accused
Antonio looked: "parang galit pa sila sa amin" he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of
going to the house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.11
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing Tuadles widow crying on
television, he gathered enough resolve and courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at
the EPD. When he testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his declaration that he
witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun from behind and shoot Tuadles three (3) feet
away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he
made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must
be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless his
attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then given an opportunity to explain
them. It is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached. 12
We find no reason to discredit the trial courts finding that the reasons given by SG Bobis sufficiently
explained the conflicting declarations he made in his two (2) sworn statements and in his court
testimony. Therefore, he cannot be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that the
initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their aversion to be
involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon, and this fact has been
judicially declared not to adversely affect the credibility of witnesses.13
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis having given an earlier contradictory statement, his direct
testimony and answers under cross-examination appear clear and convincing. We agree with the
trial court when it held:

But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.

Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict with each other, SG Bobis
had fully explained to the satisfaction of the Court. His lowly station in life had been taken advantage
of by accused Antonio and Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in completely
prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward answers to the gruelling
questions propounded on him and had stuck to his truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses demeanor on the stand. While SG
Bobis was steadfast with his words, accused Antonio and Nieto were evidently recalling from a
script. The other prosecution witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like SG Bobis,
untainted in their testimonies.14
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the findings of the trial court
on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court
was in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and observed his
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 15
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the
most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially
in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial
court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and
which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on
appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.16
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of an
accused would hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
findings of the trial court are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect. 17
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness
in the light of his demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a more
competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. 18

There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was given full faith and credit.
SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto.
The former, a wealthy businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant
Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, who
was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see then Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City
so he (Antonio) could tell his friend, the Vice President, what happened in his own words. 19
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police Force who was close to
appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis lowly station in life, as compared to that of the said
appellants, it is understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one of
intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can fault him for thinking so, that going
against the instructions and dictates of appellant Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very
difficult for him, knowing they were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived threat,
whether real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out and just repeat what appellants
told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies, but he can never run
away from himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by
acceding to their dictates, but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience. He realized he
had to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG Bobis except the statement
that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing evidence to the
contrary deserve full faith and credence.20
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by claiming that the shooting
of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted
in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused admits having killed the
victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden of proof to
establish his plea of self-defense by clear, credible and convincing evidence. 21 To successfully
interpose self-defense, appellant Antonio must clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the attack; and (3) the person defending himself must not have provoked the victim into
committing the act of aggression.22
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events that took place, we shall
discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only for the purpose of determining whether the
requisites of self-defense were attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that
Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun which was on top of a
sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun
against him (Antonio), so he grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare
testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that Tuadles would, so to speak, beat him to
the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows that Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonios loud

invectives, and it would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation. And
even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that Tuadles intended to keep the
gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent the latter from using it against him considering the state
of mind and the foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable scenario since
even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused with anger, his temper short due to three (3)
consecutive sleepless nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him. There is no evidence,
apart from appellant Antonios uncorroborated testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him.
Hence, there is no convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles. For
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. 23 The burden of
proving unlawful aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented incontrovertible proof
that would stand careful scrutiny before any court. Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonios
claim of self-defense cannot be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an extenuating
circumstance.24
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if indeed the latter had
grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles
while in a furious rage. Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a provocation which could
have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in his anger, would not be able to
use it against Tuadles. If ever there was provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio,
not from Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was an accident. He further
argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio, was performing a lawful act with due care, and
without fault or intention of causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of
self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles and provocation coming
from Antonio himself), there is no basis for us to argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing
a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.25
We note that appellant Antonios version of how the shooting took place leaves much room for
conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on the reaction of a person under the
circumstances of a sudden death he may have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of
them even irrational. However, we respect the trial courts findings. The trial court upheld the
prosecutions version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the
natural reaction expected of him would be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a
hospital or get medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio left
Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the floor for several hours. If indeed
he and Tuadles both had their hands on the gun and there was no telling who actually pulled the
trigger, we agree that appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch the gun
barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun to SPO4 Nieto who had no
concern for preserving the fingerprints on the gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed the
gun to Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have proven his
claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his lack of presence and due care.

Appellant Antonios ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the records. First, he denies
that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles who was holding the gun. Then he says that he
cannot recall who fired the gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next,
he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only, he could not indubitably prove that there
was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles. Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles,
but that it was an accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of performing a
lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to escape criminal liability,
he admits having caused the death of the victim. And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the positiveness of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of
the accused is inescapable.26 Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of his evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence for, even if the latter were weak, his invoking selfdefense is already an open admission of responsibility for the killing. 27 As it was, appellant Antonios
testimony is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also doubtful by
itself28 for being ambivalent and self-serving.29
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio claims the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score, we find merit in his claim considering that all the
elements in order that voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he
had not been actually arrested;Second, he surrendered himself to a person in authority; and Third,
his surrender was voluntary. It is of no moment that appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender
to the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case of People v.
Bautista,30 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the
commission of the crime was considered attenuating. There is no dispute that appellant Antonio
voluntarily surrendered to the mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested, hence the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant Antonios favor.31
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of
Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the provocation originated
from the offended party.32However, apart from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not proven
by convincing evidence that he was provoked by Tuadles. He claimed that Tuadles provoked him
when the latter refused or could not pay his winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating
provocation for appellant Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason
to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof that he won and that the
argument arose from Tuadles refusal to pay. His bare testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly,
appellant Antonio is not entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.33
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which the trial court
overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court when it relied on the
testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully examined said testimony, the records of this
petition, and the justifications of the trial court upon which it based its decision.

There is no basis for the trial courts conclusion "that accused Antonio consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself."34 It ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the
basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden attack and the victim
had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71page decision, typed single space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the issue of
treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and
deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
"Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where accused made no
preparation or employed no means, method and form of execution tending directly and specially to
insure the commission of a crime and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may
take."35
"A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the aggressor did not
consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate the homicide without risk to himself." 36
"A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where it did not appear that
the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the
homicide without risk to himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when the latter refused
appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic drinks."37
"The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of alevosia if the mode
adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to
insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered."38
"The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to attack was arrived at on
the spur of the moment."39
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of
execution of the offense was without danger to the offender arising from the defense or retaliation
that might be made by the offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that
such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted by the offender.40 Such
deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent where the attack was the product of an
impulse of the moment.41

The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the killing a murder because of
treachery is not consistent with the decisions of this Court. 42 Conscious deliberation or conscious
adoption of the mode of attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an
established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a person's being guilty of a crime is also
required to prove treachery. The same degree of proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required
before any conclusion may also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as
qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.43 There is no such proof in this case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles spent several hours
having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to
appellant Antonio his alleged winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles
standing face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the defense and even
by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even called out: "Sarge! Sarge!
Sarge!" Just before the shooting, Bobis heard Antonio saying: "Putang ina ka kasi." The argument
precluded the presence of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill
Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,44 where we held that there was no treachery
where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we
pronounced that:
"There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as when a heated
argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was standing face to face with his assailants and
the initial assault could not have been unforseen."45 (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no treachery. In People v.
Chua,46 we reiterated our consistent view that:
1wphi1

"While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was preceded by acts of
appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that indicated an imminent attack and should have
put the deceased on guard."
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned and could have
anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a
heated verbal altercation between Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution
and defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles in the first place. His
criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was
no treachery because treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by the
offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence.47
In People v. Nitcha,48 we held that:

"To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made some preparation to kill the
victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for
the person attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous."
(Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull his gun and shoot
Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with treachery. In passion, the offender loses his
reason and control. In treachery, on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously
and deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-control, cannot
consciously employ a particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the
crime.49 Thus, the killing of Tuadles by appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably considered by the trial court
to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven by convincing evidence 50 is advocated by the Solicitor
General in the Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's contention on the matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with this particular
submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in "pusoy dos". In the beginning, they were
heard laughing and kidding each other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned
into verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence. Hence, Tuadles could
have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio. There is no treachery when the killing results
from a verbal altercation or spat between the victim and the assailant such that the victim must have
been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis testified that he saw Antonio and
Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The
proximate distance of three feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before the fatal shooting
allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself. 51
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
RevisedPenal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should be imposed on appellant
Antonio should be reduced to reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
There being one (1) mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed shall
be the minimum period ofreclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of
the penalty to be imposed shall be the penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of its
periods.52 Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral damages to the heirs of
Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount
of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely on the testimony of the
victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his death, Tuadles was earning

P50,000.00 a month from his construction business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in
the cases of Villa Rey Transit v. CA,53 and People v. Quilaton,54the trial court arrived at the amount of
P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that
the trial court cannot just rely on the sole testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing
its computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre55 and People v. Verde,56 we held that the absence of documentary evidence to
support the prosecution's claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not
preclude recovery of said damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity
computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim's wives. This was reiterated in People v.
Dizon,57 where we held that:
"As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999), the nonpresentation of documentary evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity
did not prevent this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife as to the
earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was earning P200.00 a
day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs.
Verde, the Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the
absence of documentary evidence." (Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should be calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x)

life expectancy

gross annual income - living expenses

(50% of gross annual income)

[P600,000.00 - 300,000.00]

2(80-40)
x

=
3
=

26.67 x P300,000.00

= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss, the Court shall
take into account the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion.58 We agree with appellant Antonio that the trial court's award of moral damages was
excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of
moral damages, each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances. 59 And though moral
damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation to compensate the claimants for actual injury, they
are not designed to enrich the complainants at the expense of the accused. 60
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his family and they will also
be deprived of his love and companionship. No amount of money could ever compensate for their

loss. While the award of moral damages may help ease the emotional and psychological trauma that
they continue to suffer, this Court has not granted so large an amount as moral damages.
Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00 granted by the trial court in this case is
excessive, and the same is therefore reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating
circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages should also be deleted. 61
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto. He argues that the trial
court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The trial court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1)
he failed to arrest appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information tending to deceive the
investigating authorities.62
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the
commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took
part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his
public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the
life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. 63
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of accessories,
one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such
public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the
principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one such public
officer, and he abused his public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of accused
Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the crime committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is concerned, shows that in
the middle of the argument between appellant Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by
shouting, "Sarge! Sarge!" Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs.
Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet
and the cards from the table, which Nieto did. Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told
guards Bobis and Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz van,
including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows Subdivision at around 11:30
o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after,
a certain Atty. Abaya arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto
then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were
seated outside the entrance of the Club when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, Nieto, Bobis and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the San
Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip Cezar, arrived at 6:00
o'clock in the evening. After the police investigated the scene, they proceeded to the police station.
There, Nieto reiterated his instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club.
While Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and dictated to him what
he should answer to the questions of the police investigator.64

The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant Nieto's actuations
immediately after the commission of the crime demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a
police officer in the active service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter
committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed. Unfortunately, he failed to do
what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead, he rode with the offender to the latter's house where
they stayed for more than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:65
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president of the town of Cabiao at
the time the crime was committed, has incurred criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused
to prosecute the crime of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for them to
escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is sufficiently demonstrated in the
records, and he has been unable to explain his conduct in refusing to make an investigation of this
serious occurrence, of which complaint was made to him, and consequently he should suffer a
penalty two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the Code, by virtue of
article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the shooting, appellant Antonio
called him and he immediately went upstairs. He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this
knowledge, he failed to arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter. To
this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape. 66
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided false information to
deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the
investigating officer, in order to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and
thus make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an accessory to the crime, and he
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, we impose on appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years ofprison correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After carefully reviewing the facts
and issues raised therein, we find that the trial court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an
accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was his failure to produce the
laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial. However, such omission does not amount to
concealing or destroying the body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to prevent its
discovery. The laser sight had been surrendered to the police authorities so there was no more need
for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most,
as custodian thereof, he may be made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as alleged in the information
that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or body of the crime to prevent its discovery?

A It's not true, sir.

Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body of the crime and as far
as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I worked for it up to the wee hours of the morning up to
the next morning, I still did it and I gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and
even when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not be the one who will investigate, they got it
from me without proper notice, that they will take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the
fifth, I was asked by Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was even the
investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and I still worked hard, I even
remember
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this policeman is very
hardworking, even the investigation is not with him anymore, but still, he's working and I answered
him, whatever, whatever they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my job.
Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I have not done anything, I have not done
the charges that they filed against me, I was surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an
accessory that is why my youngest child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told him that
it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because according to one of the
witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was handled to you and when that gun reached
Crame, the laser sight was no longer there, answer me, what happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector Cabrera, the laser sight
was there, I immediately made the transmittal for the laboratory and I described what is there,
together with the laser and after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the
second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I was asking for assistance
because I would go out, I will investigate and then I just found out when I was about to submit the
laser to the laboratory, I gave the envelope together with the transmittal and when it was being

received, he checked it and he said "Sgt. Where is the laser sight?" and I said "it's there, attached."
And he said "please look at it."
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was planning to go back right
away but I just said, "okay, I will just cross it" out and I did not erase because I want that I will not
hide anything. It has happened because maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in my
drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake it and I just crossed it out so it can be
read together with my initial and when I came back, I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking.67
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not intentionally conceal or
destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed to prove that he did so with intent to derail the
prosecution of the principal accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory
device attached to the gun, it was not essential to the commission, investigation and prosecution of
the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of the crime, was surrendered to the authorities
and presented as evidence in court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser
sight as part of the evidence did not in any way affect the outcome of the trial, much less prevent the
discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by
the non-presentation of the laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code and jurisprudence,
appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make him liable as an accessory to the crime committed
by appellant Antonio. Even the Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to convict
appellant Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its corpus delicti had been
discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight could not have prevented the discovery of the crime.
The essential instrument of the crime, namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with serial number
BER-041965-7 and black magazine had been preserved and presented as evidence.

Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of the laser sight as this
was not proved by the prosecution. Either way, concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive
for Cartalla to have so committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not make him an accessory
to the crime committed by Antonio, although he may be administratively liable for the loss of a part of
the evidence for the prosecution in this case.68
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 111232-H is
hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto "Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is
likewise found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of HOMICIDE, and is
correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles the following
sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
(3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning capacity;
(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) Costs.
For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil.
In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ "Ambet", appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer
shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-adjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18
unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting
of RolandJohn Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on
October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against
accused was amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said handgun Roland
John Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly
caused the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflictinggunshot
wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Jussi Olavi Leino,
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or
causes independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was set at twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John
Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his
arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.

At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would
present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day was hearing of the
evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He
opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the testimony of
Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were
charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on
all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two
(2) frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to
testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on August 14,
1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would
still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after arraignment of
accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the
petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution then started
to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman,
Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started
at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where
students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in
Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up
a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarias Village,
Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along
Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the rest
of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in going back to her house. She did not want her
parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed
in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they reached the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D."
Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not
bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was
going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?"
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his
upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on

the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and
leave Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a trouble?"
Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came
to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh,
my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut
up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by
accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put some
distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of them
stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness.
Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people looking on
and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a
private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at
#1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a
private security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner
Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer, while driver
Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses
heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was happening, while
Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and looked out to
Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting
on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the
gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's
distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the
control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its
color somewhat white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car
and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw
the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away from
the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene of the
crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took
place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near the scene
of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by
and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmarias

Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas, what
he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook (Exhibit
"B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and
Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of the Makati
police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial
investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control number
566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village Homeowners' Association and were able
to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was registered in the name of
JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number PKX 566, and another
was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with
plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked by
then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately
proceeded to the house of Jose Montao 35 where they found ahead of them the Makati police and
operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montao whether the white
Lancer car registered in the name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate number 566 was the gunman's car.
Mrs. Montao denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaa Enterprises. She averred the
car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City.
Mrs. Montao called up her husband and informed him about the investigation. She also called up Conti
and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the
NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao the
whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July
12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa Enterprises.
Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI agents who
made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montao left his car at the NBI
parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and neighborhood
inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their
office the next day for further investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was
reluctant to divulge any information and even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his
reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night and served him a subpoena,
inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with
Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the
scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car was not white but light gray. A
foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents
exerted every effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a
representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece readily
executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his
knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents informed
SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information from them. Ranin talked to Cadenas in
his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was apprehensive that the
gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas
relented. 42

The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the gunman's
car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where
Montao's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to
look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color of the
gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to
was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin
led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the
gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search
warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search
warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents
drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to implement the
warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search
warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to
the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the house at
that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's car.
After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that the
keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on the
phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured
Ranin that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the
NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and waited for
accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them
that he just came from the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he
was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin
test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the
time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back and
was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house at Dasmarias Village
since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the
following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really
happened at Dasmarias Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that
he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the lineup
composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and

Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53

On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents brought
accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just
been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the
Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him and his
father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was
brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about
five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief
Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of
the house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the
street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not
yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a
request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request
to his father. The men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes,
they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified accused
as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of murder and
double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the
inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security
guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmarias Village.
Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his statement
(Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and
brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would
be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at
the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs,
passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was
going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat
initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also
confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police
Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused, together with Major
Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at
Dasmarias Village by other Makati
policemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him again if
accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado

told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier
prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim
asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown
twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify the gun
gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused, and identified him as the
gunman. Mangubat's statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make
a personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At that
time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director
Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that
since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and they have secured a court order
for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made
in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on-going
investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that identification be made
without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is not
identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office and
remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup
and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat
pointed to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,
located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed
backwards and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central
and lateral incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating
the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine,
tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST FOR RIBS X-RAY #353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign
body (bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the
right. No remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991

Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the

right palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue
swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's head, it
fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and
tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering
of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the
fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of
his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the muzzle
of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He
concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness and
downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on MAUREEN
HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was
bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow.
Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet
entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given a CT scan.
The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several
splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on her
brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the
splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her
very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After
the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was wheeled
to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the
unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A
second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia
lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen
remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen
developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain

abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and all
possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen
was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon
entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the
temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of
Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the brain.
When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet
hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering of
the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead brought
about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the
fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding and
remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was
recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet.
Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she would have
led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary
routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she would
have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have been modified and the same would
have affected her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the hospital, she
ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on said
date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his
house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and
woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could
attest to his presence in his house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmarias shooting when
he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino
Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number
PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmarias Village. He has not
used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not in good running
condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon
invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the
ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati

police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied
by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for
gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he
had earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the statement
he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast.
When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup
formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the
number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room.
As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents
brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the
gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin for
he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the
identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any
stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He
testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing
plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2)
trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and
damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a little off and the
car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street, Quezon city.
After a month, he brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmarias
Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon
City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they
preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from that time on, he
was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the
car and since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of
deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may
have been an overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly
overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense
presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman were married in
the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was
Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3)
children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of the
investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag,

Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never
spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her to be
home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate
with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at
around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their house and informed them
about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the Makati
municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused was
not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman
Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montao that
he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in February
1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the
residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that
Montao's white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at the time of the
incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the
gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters of the car's license plate.
Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked
the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the
gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get
the maid's name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the
court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the
Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched the
latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes,
accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look
around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told
Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was
signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo
puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test
she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 27491, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report, she
noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the shooting
incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues may not be
removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a gun. 102

ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand for the
defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada,
Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed
him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a
statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did
not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture
story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities committed in the
off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity,
Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a
petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases
therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal
counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment would
mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary
investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the
investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor
Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben of
the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the
testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news reports as
having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS
PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of collaborative work
among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news reports where several reporters are
tasked to cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file and
summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the investigation of
the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a
family Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie
Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when Hultman, a
10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman
after going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.

Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" matter that
might involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items marked as
Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He
admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco
was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times, entitled: "NBI
INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain
portions thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in
evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital region,
claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the
police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's
hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not
have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2) newspaper clippings
which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was
entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly
before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"

But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a dancer before
she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside the village
after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the
Palm street gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He just reiterated
previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA
SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the witness
showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car and was
talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that
the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information available
at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified
that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her information were
several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was arrested
at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control number
566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police headquarters upon
invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the investigators
to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and
that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police
investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after
the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer
of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote in the news
item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's
Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114

The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:

Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman said the
day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"

The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman family's
request for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the curtain,"
Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities
will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6".
Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was quoted as
telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde
and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very influential multisectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other crimes in high levels of
government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for
the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming personal
rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and
prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news account which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his
information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
"566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121

Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer,
entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The
portions of said news item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked not to be
identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case
from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as
"resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw
everything that happened in the early morning of July 13. The witness, however,
failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which
appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire
news account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness" picked
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview Mangubat
himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"

Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby
(Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang
ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be
identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S
SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit
"10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's
plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"

US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a

communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an altercation
on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he wrote which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL"
(Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who was killed
in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed men, on board a
white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the
village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight
from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while his companions
identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when
the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the names
of the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which appeared
on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as
follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car on
Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two companions,
Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate No. PDW
566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the Teehankee
family. 129

On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the NBI and they
were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness.
Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police
station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work
in Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told
Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he would no longer require him to sign the
statement he prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also presented as
a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive
perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing
with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores.
Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours
from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still
be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test. She related
that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin
test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They
then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative
result. Thus, she opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation by the
defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a
Constancia 135manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being
unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its
evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution moved in
open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of the
absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their surrebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of
the Order within which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the
defense objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for
additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective
Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes
charged. 138The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or

temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million
Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said
deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four
Centavos (P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent
in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended
party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended parties the
sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for
New Trial, 139alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for decision not
only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right to adduce further
evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE
ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE
THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN
AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS
AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the
crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was
suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned
over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only five
(5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His
senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses
in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most
cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as
"inherently suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime,
whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually
occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the
witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability
in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by
normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-ofcourt identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given
by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did
not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that
Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for
his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive,
supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations
Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the
crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the
shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators.
He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,
before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report
relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification
was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the
crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot
Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal
cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant.
When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied:
"I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148

Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement
the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that
Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he
identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a
tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the
testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on
the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was
acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the
prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in important details," there being
no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the
basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is
unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5)
minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face
end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime
to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If
Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness the
crime. He stresses that when the Dasmarias security force and the Makati police conducted an onthe-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the
afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He
merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the
NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI.
Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he
witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by
appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding
and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the
authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in
the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the
court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as
an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records.
Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture.
The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand.
Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the

fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise
extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense
witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to
identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station.
Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively identified appellant as the
gunman at the Makati police station. He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat.
Baldado returned to his place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant was
the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer ask
him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously
prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police
station, was NOT the gunman. We give more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the
records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat.
Baldado of the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail
officials, gave appellant favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than
a congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not holding
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time.
Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene
of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses
described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant
could not have been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he
overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill
me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the
crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth,
the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was
not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was
negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman:
"Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res
inter alios actawhen he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a
specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's
error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost
automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this
approach especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate court
to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical

errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have likewise
followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial,
we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is
slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted
evidence against the prejudiced party. 161

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of
appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted
mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at
the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison
cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running condition.
Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it
was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said
car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of
appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's
evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove
it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarias Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the color of
the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white
("medyo puti"); 163Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver metallic
gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not
meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the
speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen
Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was
allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on record,
however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established
that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog,
and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this
possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific
experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge
of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in
the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several
factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when
the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the

direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic
Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with
the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined
that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting
may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist
Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours
has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.

III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the
publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on
the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as
no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin
Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect
him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
He claims there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the
courtroom clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance,
he was allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom
on his way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just
like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an
accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded
as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism."173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is
not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the
jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when
he observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that
testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports
based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and
stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal
chance with fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard offcourt evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et

al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and
proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of
publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result
of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant
has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial
judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention of the
court to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the
manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard be hidden. Only
then did he order the start of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the media after they
had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted defense's request, noting that
the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between the defense
lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense
counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion
of the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public
was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the
Supreme Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by spectators
inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also manifested that
he personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his cell from the
courtroom, a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of
policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by public
sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the
spur of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage of the trial by
the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and deny
accused's constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules of
Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the
organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be
ordered only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He
added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He quoted
the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell180 where it was held: "A responsible press is always
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in the criminal
field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms public
property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to cover the
proceedings before the trial proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures
during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to
desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181

4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge gave the
media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media two (2) minutes
to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly admonished to
remain silent, to quietly observe the proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the judge
admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking pictures.

184

Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial
coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the
case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to
appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited
himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we
directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. 186 We found
nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman
and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and
deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant
asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with treachery
and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street
since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It, however, appreciated the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness
Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent
reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were
then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D.
After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going
on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong.
There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The
gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend
himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without
risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was
by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the
shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have consistently

ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute
treachery. 187Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide
for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly
attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to
the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried
to put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her
to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were
gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the
killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the awards of
moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland
Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of
attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman
the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity
for death and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate
or temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity
for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos
and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for
loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate
and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as
actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for
loss of earning capacity of Jussi Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as
moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended parties
the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation.

5. Costs of litigation. 188

The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of damages
recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising
therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177,
and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations,
and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art. 100,
Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential
damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as
above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said
provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all
damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the
act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen by the
defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which
provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the
descendant's inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by
this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
P12,000.00 in the case of People v.Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated October
11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral
damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of
the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the
crime has been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such
damages being "separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of
right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the
sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein exemplary damages are
awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art.
2230) ". . . damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party
suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation,
the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art.
2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased
are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense
P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or
proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an
amount to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the
deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and
awarded by the court as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had
no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent disability
not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give
support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir,
may demand support from the accused for not more than five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by
the court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or
more aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the

discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from

fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability
has been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable
separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now
P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death,
and that these damages may, however, be respectively increased or
lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances,
except items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the
law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the awards for
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind.
We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate or
moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be
given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for moral
damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least
(fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we increase
the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother,
Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code,

Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents by
nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's
death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article
190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the
adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father. During the
trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we
find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and
should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the
circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death for ninety-seven
(97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time,
she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable and remained critical. It
was always touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to
be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings
had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a
downspin. Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23)
doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the
goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving contributions from other people to defray the
medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on
October 17, 1991, at the tender age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the
award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of the
case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or
corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future. The
award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in
the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood,
for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their
families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant
to deter others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the
killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the new Civil

Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against
appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of the
shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore
it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also
affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed
through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off
and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and suffering.
More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a
vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2)
days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night.
The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept
coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father, was
tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt they would
be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to Leino
of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of
injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we
awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a
medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a
fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial,
justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due time;
and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would
have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty
capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly speculative and should
be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in
February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991,
he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his
first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the
foregoing circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to justify a
reasonable assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club
and ultimately become a professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of
earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the
records.

In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the
monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a
month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at
the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she
intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she
continued her studies, what professional career would she (sic) like to
pursue considering her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our
projection is that, certainly she would have been an artist in the
creative side. She would have become an actress or a movie
producer or probably she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in
Sweden, how much would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs
of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school, Maureen took up
a short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the
John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her
first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However,
neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to
compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991),i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos
(P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net
income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this
Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which
would have been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of
deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that
the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased,
and not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.

We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having both morning and
afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses
testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the cases
came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these
circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial court's
award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears
just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no less
than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition
for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits of all
three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to adduce
evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court considered all the
cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases on
August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the murder of
Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against appellant
since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of the proceedings on October 17,
1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's petition for
bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3)
charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one continuing
incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2)
frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He
argued that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of
Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were recommended was
irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to testify on all
three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The
prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing
on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first
witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings conducted by the
trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence relative
to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim for damages.
These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the defense counsels. The
defense never objected that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its
intention was really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.

2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court issued an
Order 211directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main case as
well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution." After
receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file
the defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the trial court's
Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither did it move
for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had witnesses to
present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This
is inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing conducted was only on the
petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for decision was only
his petition for bail, he would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial court, the
defense did not interpose any objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the
defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were
ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously
and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional evidence was not
abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded the
defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to
submit its evidence. The defense presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several
documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed a motion for new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint decision
of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not given a chance to
present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new trial, 213 appellant did
not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their testimonies. Nor was it
shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with reasonable diligence. Appellant's
motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial
court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court,
dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following
amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million
Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three

Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand

Fourty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning
capacity of said deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
and Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery,
for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended
party the following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
pesos as indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred
Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos
as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended
parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million
[P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 86883-85 January 29, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES,
RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO, ROGER BEDAO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR,
JR., JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEAGO and ROGER BENDAO, accusedappellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless foreign
religious minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the
revelling of his executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry, chanting the tune
"Mutya Ka Baleleng", a popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable,
spiritless figure that was gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their
manslaughter, their leader picked up pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them
before horrified spectators. Some ACCOUNTS swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although
they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for their outrageous feat, the gangleader already
earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali 1 was
senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was one of the Italian Catholic missionaries
laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao. 2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted in the
capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who
eluded arrest and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder, 3 Attempted Murder 4 and Arson 5 were accordingly filed against those
responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from
the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato. 6
After trial, the court a quo held
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias
Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines,
Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and treachery, hereby sentences each of them to
a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of
Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali
belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance
fee of P10,000.00 for every day the case was set for trial; moral damages in the sum
of P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as

maximum, and to indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME)

Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of
P19,000.00 representing the value of the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, and minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino Robles the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day
of trial and to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the
order of their respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. 7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago and
Roger Bedao appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero
brothers as well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson
case. Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the
Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy
Lines, Efren Pleago and Roger Bedao, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km.
125, La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private
secretary to the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards.
Plans to liquidate a number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor,
Jr. scribbled on a cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez,
Bantil, Fred Gapate, Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian
priest suspected of having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic
lay leader who is the complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay
leader, while the others are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to
Edilberto Manero's proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest
would be killed in his stead. 8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a
placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as
those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo."
Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same message on a
street cross-sign close to the eatery. 9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with
assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in

the vicinity of Deocades'carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name
was included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had
any qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the
forehead of "Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of
his right ear were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife
from the fray. But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers
were hit. "Bantil" however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo
Gomez. 10Norberto, Jr., ordered his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that
"Bantil" would die of hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistolwhipped him on the face and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their
cohorts relished the unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire
from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back
of his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of
Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the
center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned
the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang
gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you
want me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest.
As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted
Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped
over the prostrate body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually
shattered the head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted
the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight
of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible
assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleago
and Roger Bedao contend that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi
which, if properly appreciated, would tend to establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that
the intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only one (1) gunman,
Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of
the victim despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting
palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused
Roger Bedao alleges that he was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang,

Cotabato, that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment
and arrived in La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they
rushed to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were
joined by their fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded
together to where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place
but that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at
the crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places where accusedappellants were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the offenses and the locus
criminis, 15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court
that no physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty
minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the
place where he allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the
crime. 17 Recently, we ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two
places is merely two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that
they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the
Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist
sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the company of the
Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00
o'clock that same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the
Manero brothers, when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive
declarations that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in
nature, cannot prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively
established, all doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are
therefore removed. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide
to commit it.22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of
the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of
purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as
evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively identified
with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of Reynaldo Deocades

in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985

morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the window near the table where
Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, Elpidio Manero and unidentified
members of the airborne from Cotabato were grouped together. Later that morning, they
all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish their plan and drink tuba. They were seen
again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
that day near the house of Rufino Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles.
They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left
when Edilberto Manero told them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They
followed Fr. Favali to Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the
motorcycle of Fr. Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when
Edilberto Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26

From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent
bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the
attempted murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants
all assumed a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the
fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants
from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27Undoubtedly, these were overt
acts to ensure success of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy.
The appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles.
While accused-appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action
showed a common intent to commit the criminal acts.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter
Geremias whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good
substitute in the murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators expressly agreed. As
witness Manuel Bantolo explained 28
Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were
there other persons who were to be liquidated?
A There were some others.
Q Who were they?
A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that
paper then they will (sic) kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian
and if they could not kill the persons they like to kill they will (sic)
make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian priest
in the event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29
Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?

A All of them in the group.

Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the plan
to kill Fr. Peter?
A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill him
ahead."
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
Q Rudy Lines.
A He also said "yes".
Q What do you mean "yes"?
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What about Efren Pleago?
A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".
Q Roger Bedao, what was his reaction to that suggestion that
should they fail to kill Fr. Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided he
is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades an
example?
A He also agreed laughing.
Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one
is the act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical
Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which
indicates that the deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his family, or that he
disinherited any member thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr.
Peter Geremias of the same congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that
"the religious family belongs to the natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical
person is not entitled to moral damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience

physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral
shock. It is only when a juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation, that moral damages may be awarded.

Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be lawfully
entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never
presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they take the witness
stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should be
satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be awarded
there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr. Tulio Favali
was attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse, exemplary
damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved nor expressly pleaded in the
complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount is
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to the
lawful heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 is awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00;
however, the award of moral damages is deleted.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141080. September 17, 2002]

PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ANECITO
UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad," accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

For the murder of twenty-four-year old Danilo Laurel, ANECITO

UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias "Lapad" was charged and subsequently
convicted by the court a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetuaand ordered
to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
temperate damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
[1]

On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel

left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from Bacolod City, to attend
a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo
asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their personal

necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink
and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to
relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about three (3) meters from
Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked
past him, approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated
by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously,
a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him
with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of
wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo was
being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground
and died before he could be given any medical assistance.
Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to
the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement regarding the killing
incident and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then
in their custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the
police authorities that the man under detention, whom he later identified as
accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo.
Dr. Rene Ortigas, surgical resident of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano
Memorial Hospital, testified that the post-mortem examination showed that
the victim sustained the following injuries: (a) an 8 cm. stab wound, 2nd
intercostal space AAL right directed anteriorly, non-penetrating; (b) an 8 cm.
stab wound, 4th intercostal MAL, directed postero-medially, non-penetrating;
(c) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line, directed
postero-caudially, penetrating diaphragm and right dome of liver causing
massive hemorrhage, sequestered at right hemithorax and abdomen; (d) an 8
cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line left, directed
postero-laterally, non-penetrating; (e) an 8 cm. lacerated wound, antero-lateral
aspect right thigh; (f) a multiple contusion hematoma, postero-medial aspect
left elbow; and, (g) a multilinear abrasion, zygomatic area left face. Dr.
Ortigas opined that wound No. 3 proved to be the only fatal injury which
lacerated the diaphragm and right dome of the liver resulting in massive
hemorrhage.

The defense presented a different picture of the story. Guglielmo Laurel

testified that on the evening of 27 January 1989 he was at the dance hall
when he met accused Anecito Unlagada. He was all by himself. On the same
occasion, according to Guglielmo he also met Danilo Laurel and three (3)
other companions although only Edwin Selda was introduced to him. Soon
after, Danilo and his friends left the dance hall to drink liquor. An hour or so
later, Danilo's group returned to the dance hall. An altercation ensued when
the gatekeeper refused them entry without a gate pass. From his vantage
point of about forty (40) meters away, Guglielmo observed that a rumble
erupted. From a distance, he saw a man, whom he later recognized as
Danilo Laurel, fall to the ground. He however belied having seen the accused
Anecito Unlagada anywhere near the scene of the crime. By his ACCOUNT ,
the melee broke up only when a policeman fired a warning shot in the air and
the protagonists scampered away.
On cross-examination, however, Guglielmo Laurel asserted positively that
accused Unlagada was inside the dance hall before, during and after the
rumble, and stayed there even after a policeman fired a warning shot. This
testimony of witness Guglielmo was corroborated by defense witnesses Jaime
Umbiga and Mariano Salazar.
PO3 Jomarie Sarrosa narrated that at around 11:30 in the evening of 27
January 1989 he was inside his house entertaining some visitors when
suddenly he heard frantic shouts, "fight, fight!" Answering the call of duty, he
took his service pistol, went outside and fired a warning shot in the air to break
up the fight that was going on some fifty (50) meters away. Instinctively, the
protagonists broke up and scampered away. When he went near the place of
the disturbance, he noticed a man with a deformed hand sprawled on the
ground. He however clarified that he described the place as dark because
there were no street lights.
PO3 Sarrosa lifted the prostrate body of the victim and asked a barangay
tanod to stay with the victim as he would call a tricycle to seek emergency
medical assistance. According to him, he caused the incident to be entered
into the police blotter while Pfc. Tady and Cpl. Taal investigated the killing
incident. The investigators informed him the following morning that they

already had a suspect by the name of "Lapad." He volunteered to look for

the suspect since he knew him.
Accused Anecito Unlagada testifying in his defense, recounted that at
around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while he was inside the
dance hall, an altercation ensued near the gate between the gatekeeper and a
group of four (4) individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior, were
eventually allowed to get through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a
gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble
had taken place and that somebody was killed. But he came to learn the
victim's identity only the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo
Patos were brought by a police officer to the Municipal Building for
questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard somebody asking
who "Lapad" was and an alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be
Edwin Selda, pointed to him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito
Unlagada and Lorenzo Patos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against
them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case
against Lorenzo was dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to face the charge of
murder.
The trial court gave full credence to the inculpatory testimony of
prosecution witness Edwin Selda because he was only three (3) meters away
from the victim when the latter was stabbed to death. If it was true, according
to the trial court, that at the Municipal Building Edwin readily identified the
person of accused "Lapad" as the suspect, it was not by reason of any
unlawful suggestion but a spontaneous confirmation of his observation of the
perpetrator as vividly recalled by him.
The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the
testimonies of the defense witnesses negating Anecito's culpability. The trial
court explained that it was highly unusual that the defense witnesses had their
attention focused on the accused all the time since they were there to witness
and enjoy the dance, characterizing their testimonies as a mere ploy
concocted to weave a picture of an innocent man in the person of the
accused.
[2]

Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the ground that it
was error for the trial court to give full faith and credence to the lone and
uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and in finding that the
crime of murder was committed instead of "death caused in a tumultuous
affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
In an attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness, accused-appellant posits
the view that the circumstances of the place, the swiftness of the attack, and
the drunken state of the witness engender serious doubt that the witness
positively identified the malefactor.
At the epicenter of most criminal cases is the issue of credibility of the
witnesses. In the instant case, a thorough review of the records however
reveals no plausible reason to disbelieve the prosecution eyewitness. It will
be recalled that when the fatal stabbing occurred, Edwin was only three (3)
meters away from both the victim and his attacker, as opposed to the defense
witnesses who were standing fifty (50) or so meters away. Edwin's physical
proximity to the main protagonists and the locus criminisafforded him the
unenviable position of observing the ghastly crime at very close range. The
time the accused passed in front of Edwin and when he mercilessly stabbed
Danilo may be a fleeting moment but such was sufficient to make a vivid and
lasting impression of the bearded perpetrator's image specially so since the
victim was a friend and a companion.
Neither can we accommodate accused-appellant's defense of alibi. Basic
is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected when the identity of the
accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness
because alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification. Since no
improper motive has been ascribed to Edwin Selda, it creates the presumption
that no such motive in fact existed. In the absence of any evidence showing
why the prosecution witness would have testified falsely, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive existed and that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit. The findings and conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of the witness being unblemished by arbitrariness and
capriciousness, this Court is bound to accord them great weight and even
finality on appeal.
[3]

[4]

But, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred in convicting him
of murder qualified by treachery and not "death in a tumultuous affray."
"Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251 of The Revised Penal
Code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several
persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous manner, in the course of
which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained. The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of
individuals, one of whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of
the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense
suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The
Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where several persons
not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused
and disorganized manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of
them.
[5]

Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving
himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when suddenly the accused
walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at
the side. There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise, and given no
chance to put up any defense.
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its

medium period which, as correctly imposed by the court a quo, is reclusion

perpetua.
The civil aspect of the case should however be modified in consonance
with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the
heirs of the decedent are entitled to a reduced amount ofP50,000.00 as moral
damages, while temperate damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
of another P50,000.00 should be deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO UNLAGADA y
SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo
Laurel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the reduced
amount ofP50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 110994 October 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRESENCIANO MARAMARA alias "Cresing," accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44,
convicting accused-appellant Cresenciano Maramara of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim's heirs the amount of P10,000.00 as medical and funeral
expenses and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On January 23, 1992, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Romeo C. Sampaga filed with the
Regional Trial Courtan information 2 for murder against accused-appellant, alleging:
That on November 18, 1991, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Calpi, Municipality
of Claveria, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with a handgun one Miguelito Donato,
hitting the latter on the chest, thereby inflicting wound which caused his death.

At his arraignment on March 25, 1992, 3 accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial
commenced thereafter.
The prosecution's version of the killing of Miguelito Donato, as culled from the testimonies of
his younger brotherRicardo Donato 4 and father Regarder Donato, 5 is as follows:
A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association of which
accused-appellant is the president, was held in the yard of accused-appellant's house in Barangay
Calpi, Claveria, Masbate in the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo
Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a friend of accusedappellant, approached Ricardo Donato and boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away
while Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito Donato was about two (2)
meters away from where Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused-appellant took
his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left
breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but somebody struck Ricardo's head
with an iron bar which knocked him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained
consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their son Miguelito.

1wphi1.nt

Regarder Donato, Miguelito's father, immediately went to the crime scene and rushed Miguelito to
the Pio Duran Hospital where the latter died early in the morning of the next day (November 19,
1991). Before Miguelito expired, Regarder Donato asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it
was accused-appellant. 6
Dr. Nora L. Presbitero conducted a post-mortem examination of Miguelito's cadaver and his autopsy
and his autopsy report 7 revealed that aside from a gunshot wound, Miguelito's body bore a 4 cm.
lacerated wound at the left temporal area, a 4 cm. incised wound at the left parietal area and a 5.5 cm.
incised wound at the right iliac area. Dr. Presbitero 8 explained that the three (3) wounds were caused by
blunt and sharp instruments and considered the possibility that all four (4) wounds could have been
inflicted by more than two (2) persons. She also testified that accused-appellant was formerly her patient
whom she diagnosed as suffering from empyema.
The defense had a different story. 9 At about 11:00 in the evening, brothers Ricardo and Miguelito
Donato arrived at the benefit dance and approached the dancing pair of Rowena del Rosario and Dante
Arce. Then Ricardo and Miguelito ganged-up on Dante Arce. Accused-appellant, who was about eight (8)
meters away, rushed to the scene to pacify the trio. Ricardo held accused-appellant's hands at his back
and then Miguelito repeatedly stabbed accused-appellant on different parts of his body. Accusedappellant regained consciousness at the Claveria hospital where Dr. Gil Georga treated him for a few
days, then transferred him to the Pio Duran Hospital. There was no way accused-appellant could have
resisted Miguelito's attack, much less was he capable of inflicting injury on Miguelito, since the stronger
Ricardo was holding accused-appellant's hands and was dragging him away while Miguelito kept lunging
a six-inch bladed weapon at him.
Dr. Gil Georga testified 10 that he attended to accused-appellant at the Claveria Hospital in the early
morning of November 19, 1991. Accused-appellant suffered four (4) penetrating stab wounds on different
parts of his body two on the stomach, one on the left nipple and one on the left arm. Dr. Georga had
to open accused-appellant's abdomen (exploratory laparatomy) to determine what internal organs were
affected. Although he was accused-appellant's attending physician, Dr. Georga never asked the details
of the stabbing incident nor the identity of assailant, as he was purely concerned with the treatment of
accused-appellant's injuries.
On the basis of the prosecution's reconstruction of the events that transpired on that tragic night of
November 18, 1991, on May 27, 1993, the trial court rendered a guilty verdict, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and without any mitigating circumstances
and the existence of treachery in using a firearm in taking the life of Miguelito
Donato, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA to
be served at the National Penitentiary. He is further ordered to pay and/or reimburse
the family of the victim the amount of P10,000.00 as medical expenses and
maintenance during the wake; and the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
to pay the cost of the suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal.
Before us, accused-appellant challenges the findings of the trial court in the hope of securing an
acquittal or, at the least, being held liable only for the death of Miguelito Donato in a tumultuous
affray as defined under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code.
We cannot accept any of accused-appellant's submissions.
In the main, accused-appellant would assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Ricardo and
Regarder Donato whose testimonies formed the principal basis for his conviction. The conflicting
claims of the prosecution and the defense on how Miguelito Donato died is an issue that ultimately
and unavoidably goes into the question of whom to believe among the witnesses. The issue of
credibility requires a determination that is concededly best left to the trial court with its unique
position of having been enabled to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
deportment of witnesses on the stand. 11 In the absence of any showing that the trial court's calibration
of credibility is flawed, this Court is bound by its assessment. 12
Guided by these long standing doctrinal pronouncements, we find no reason to disturb the trial
court's assessment of (1) Ricardo Donato's eyewitness account of how accused-appellant shot
Miguelito Donato and (2) Regarder Donato's recollection of his son Miguelito's dying declaration, as
truthful testimonies coming from credible witnesses. The fact of relationship of prosecution witnesses
Ricardo and Regarder Donato to the victim Miguelito Donato does not necessarily place them in bad
light. Relationship per se does not give rise to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does
it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. 13 While revenge is a normal
reaction in a person who has lost a loved one because of a crime, it does not follow that the revenge
would be directed aimlessly so as to include innocent persons. 14 In fact, family members who have
witnessed the killing of a dear one usually strive to remember the face of the assailant. 15 Such relatives
are naturally interested in implicating only the real culprit, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain
immunity. 16 Thus, where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and
their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 17 We have further ruled that there is absolutely
nothing in this jurisdiction which disqualifies a person from testifying in a criminal case in which a relative
is invoked, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and witnessed the execution of the criminal
act. 18
Regarder Donato's testimony regarding Miguelito's identification of the accused-appellant as his
assailant certainly qualifies as a dying declaration that is worthy of credence. For a dying declaration
to be admissible in evidence, these requisites must concur: (1) that death is imminent and the
declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding
circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to
testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the declaration is offered in a criminal
case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry. 19 The degree and seriousness of the

wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito Donato and the fact that his death supervened shortly thereafter
may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him with the full realization
that he was in a dying condition. 20 The victim Miguelito Donato's dying declaration having satisfied all
these requisites, it must be considered as an evidence of the highest order because, at the threshold of
death, all thoughts of fabrication are stilled. A victim's utterance after sustaining a mortal wound may be
considered pure emanations of the incident. 21

There is no merit in accused-appellant's position that he should be held liable only for death caused
in a tumultuous affray under Article 251 of the Revised Penal Code. It was in such situation that
accused came at the scene and joined the fray purportedly to pacify the protagonists when Miguelito
attacked him causing four (4) stab wounds in different parts of his body two on the stomach, one
on the left nipple, and one on the left arm. Then accused-appellant with his handgun shot Miguelito.

1wphi1.nt

Assuming that a rumble or a free-for-all fight occurred at the benefit dance, Article 251 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato's killer. 22
While accused-appellant himself suffered multiple stab wounds which, at first blush, may lend verity
to his claim that a rumble ensued and that victim Miguelito inflicted upon him these wounds, the
evidence is inadequate to consider them as a mitigating circumstance because the defense's version
stands discredited in light of the more credible version of the prosecution as to the circumstances
surrounding the Miguelito's death.
We do not subscribe, however, to the trial court's appreciation of treachery which, we note, was
discussed only in the dispositive portion of the decision and which was based solely on the fact that
appellant used a firearm in killing the victim Miguelito Donato. The use of a firearm is not sufficient
indication of treachery. In the absence of any convincing proof that accused-appellant consciously
and deliberately adopted the means by which he committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, the Court must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant. 23 And where treachery is
not adequately proved, the accused-appellant can be convicted only of homicide. 24
As accused-appellant is liable for homicide, it is the penalty for homicide that shall be imposed. The
penalty prescribed for homicide is reclusion temporal. 25 There was attendant neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances so that the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed in its
medium period. 26 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant may be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the
offense, that is, prision mayor, as the minimum, and within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
period, as the maximum. 27
As to the damages awarded, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages in lieu of civil
indemnity. Moral damages may not be awarded if there is no legal basis therefor. 28 Nor it may be
imposed in substitution of civil indemnity. "The two awards one for actual damages and the other for
moral damages cannot be dealt with in the aggregate; neither being kindred terms nor governed by a
coincident set of rules, each must be separately identified and independently justified." 29 Consequently,
the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be considered as civil
indemnity. 30
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby MODIFIES the judgment appealed from. The Court finds accusedappellant Cresenciano Maramara guilty beyond reasonable of homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Miguelito Donato without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance. Accordingly, the Court hereby SENTENCES accusedappellant Cresenciano Maramara to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as

maximum, with all its accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Miguelito Donato in the amount of
P10,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
1wphi1.nt

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO,petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986
EDSA Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C.

Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos
loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between
the two (2) groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of
Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons
identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 8647322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 8647617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No.
86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito
Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed
were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as
well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented
twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and
the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies,
the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper ACCOUNTS of
the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was
denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega, both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an
impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula
Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for
their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to
disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned
towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added
"Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to
disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the
police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized. 1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie
Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging
around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si
Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie
Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in
yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing a
yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the
yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and

boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again
pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body.
Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to
pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo
unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which
Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow
Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man
boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and
kicked him even as he was already fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the
left side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory
Iyan. Patayin!" 5Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito
Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo
Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed
him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. 7

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He
sat on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal
Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis,
pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer,
brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to
the Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions,
lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x
4.2 cm., frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left
side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left
suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal
region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior
cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid. 10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and
foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the
following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order
the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward
of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief,
for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several persons, including
Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification,
several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and
offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the
photographs presented by the prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon
City. 13 Gerry Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting
for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his
mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the
Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the
mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused,
Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that
he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard
de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the
maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he
pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in
their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel
Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified
by treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an
accomplice. The court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other
accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and
Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as
follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the
Court finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said
charge;

2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court
finds the Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion
Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum,
to TWENTY (20) YEARS ofReclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court
finds the Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal
for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there
being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds
the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder"
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and
TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS
of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the
said Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder
under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4)
MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5)
MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito
Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs
of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the
costs of suit.

The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard
de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of
these cases shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by
and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry
Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being
detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and
academic. The Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito
Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are
hereby cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by
acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo,
to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege
the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero
and Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to
the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the
instant consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable
Supreme Court for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as
Joselito Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us
for automatic review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED
THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT
THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME
FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF
STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND
INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF
THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED
CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE
DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE CRIME COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN
A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A
CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NONSEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT,
ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D",
"G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING
ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL
GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the
two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are
unreliable, doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of
these two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced
by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police
geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he
mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando
Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to
reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General
Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the
contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his
sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any
reward. 29 He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if
he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony
incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended
during the investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness
stand for being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony
for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony
was correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for
compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses
considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts,
they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony.

Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect
senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts
but disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each
other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of
all petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and
documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the
victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than
one hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and
blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in
Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows,
kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that
Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and
"P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W13." 39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives
who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as
his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint
Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista
is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on
the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the
Luneta starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas
Boulevard, 41 as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his
assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local
newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily
Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for
lack of proper identification by the person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of
the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has
taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can
be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent
witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs,

therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its
exactness and accuracy. 53

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence,
appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper
identification. 54 However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel
for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients
were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the
victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of
the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per
understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent
hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness
stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the
third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the
person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations
of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel
Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in
various belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison
appears only once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two
appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and
Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo 61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the
principal accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death
in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not
composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking
each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous
manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished
by prison mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased,
the penalty ofprision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they
did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons
who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. 62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in
a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the
author thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this
confusion subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later
after said dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual
and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was
no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of
the incident. 64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number 65 and
were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and
excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo
from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when
he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself
against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him
relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried
to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo
pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and
prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof
that the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety
from any defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and
unexpected but it was apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because
he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the
appellate court well found, Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run
away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being
attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito
Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against

Salcedo was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called
"Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing
the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring
about the death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among
the conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the
conspirators is liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986,
Salcedo was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi
Arabia. 69 The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow
and three small children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The
indemnity of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los
Santos are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayoras minimum to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131421

November 18, 2002

GERONIMO DADO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April
22, 1994, of the RegionalTrial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056,
finding petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of
homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso
were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:

That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza,
Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS
with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter
which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial
thereafter followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas 5 and Rufo Alga6 are as
follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three
teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of
petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo
Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who
were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed
with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They
were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms length away from each
other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of
50 meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was
about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his
right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam
his flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter,
petitioner, who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The
victim shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me")7 as he fell on the ground. The victim
turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler
the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo
Balinas saying, "Pare, this was not intentionally done and this was merely an accident." 8
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem
examination conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially
and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter
(Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the
ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding
tissues along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area
through the inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland,
urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding
vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area.
Three (3) pieces of irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body; one,
silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two, copper colored,

embedded in the urinary bladder substance; three, copper colored, embedded in blasted
substance almost on the pelvic floor. Hematoma noted along the penile area.
No other injuries noted.9
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was
the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in
the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor
added that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added that the wound on the
victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately
treated.10
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments
recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet,
thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed
marked "SB-1".
x x x x x x x x x.11
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments
(marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts
of "SB-1" which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet. 12
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber
pistol. He claimed that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves
beneath a big hole from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his
companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing
southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their
enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso
embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot. 13
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be
from their enemies came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken
making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that his purpose in
firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy.14
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo
Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the
expenses incurred for the complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997. 16
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 11, 1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30,
1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of
homicide has become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in
finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso
conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal
wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution
failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: " x x x the
said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE
BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the
latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the
requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language." 20 The words "conspired,"
"confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives
do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and
his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from
the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions. 21 In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To ensure that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must

embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of
the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof. 22
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be
considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement
need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.23
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous
acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the victim.
Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action
and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals particularly
if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should
be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.24
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have
been committed by him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be
determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer
for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly
and personally in the commission of those acts. It becomes important therefore to determine
whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a
5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the
victim must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance
than the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm.25 However, this conclusion is
entirely devoid of basis because no evidence was presented to substantiate said conclusions. What
is decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad,
on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of
said fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and
was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,"26 and not a part of a .45 caliber
bullet.27Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked "A-1". This
refer to the very same Exhibit "A-1"?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of
a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the
bullet, sir.

Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56
mm., and I found out that the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked
SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. PASOK:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45
caliber and that of [an] armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be
bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core
evidenced (sic)marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket
evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column, "Findings and
Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the
lead core of evidenced (sic)copper jacket marked [as] SB-1. My question, you said could be
part of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits
"SB-2" and "SB-3" [are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:

Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber
ammunition, would you say that the same would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket
of a different caliber or ammunition?
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We
cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper
jacket, rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the
evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit "2",
particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not
from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.

Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm.
copper jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper
jacket and the standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and
grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide. 30
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic
fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1",
which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of
petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet
fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the
victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner.
For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right
outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that
said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial
court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances,

it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent
to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the
victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is
dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. 34
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. 35 The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that
the offender has no intention to kill that person.36 Though the information charged the petitioner with
murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying circumstances
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE
and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearm and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information, dated 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, Branch I, with the complex crime of parricide with intentional
abortion, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the accused
Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the
lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging her,
causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the
same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at
the time 8 months on the family way, the accused likewise did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the child while still in its maternal
womb, thereby committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL
ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the
Revised Penal Code, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said woman and
child in the amount as the Honorable Court shall assess.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de officio, pleaded not guilty to the offenses
charged.
After trial the lower court rendered a decision ** dated 9 August 1978, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For
unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty.
Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him
subject to the availability of FUNDS
SO ORDERED.
The accused having been sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, this case is on automatic review
before this Court.
At the trial in the court a quo, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Dr. Juan L.
Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania and Narciso Abuyo.
Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., who was then Rural Health Officer of Talisay, Camarines Norte, testified
that, after passing the Board Examination, he was employed as a Resident Physician of La Union
Provincial Hospital, then as Junior Resident Physician of Bethane Hospital in San Fernando, La
Union and that later, he joined the government service, starting from 1968 up to the time of the trial;

that as a Doctor of Medicine, he had performed about ten (10) post mortem examinations; that he
was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana AbuyoSalufrania that was exhumed from its grave in the Municipal Cemetery of Talisay at around 11:00
o'clock in the morning of 11 December 1974; that his post mortem examination lasted from 12:30
o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day. He reduced his findings of injuries into
writing. (Exhibit "A"), which, together with their probable cause, as testified to by him, are as follows:
Injury

Cause

1) Multiple abrasions
with

"Blunt object or friction by

contusion, left leg,

middle part,

hard object" (tsn., Aug. 20,

posterior

covering an area of

1976, p. 7)

about 2 & 1/2 by 5

inches.
2) Abrasions, 1/2 by 2

Friction on a hard object"

inches, medial side of

the cubi

(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

tal fossa (back left

leg)
3) Multiple pinhead
sized

Hard pinhead sized

material

wounds, right face,

starting

(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 7)

from the side of the

right eye

down to mandibular
bone
(right check)
4) Upper right eyelid

No cause given

more prominent than

the left
eyelid ("the right
upper eyelid a
little bit bulging than
the left
eye "and" sort of
"swollen") (tsn.,
Aug. 20, 1976, pp. 78)
5) Tongue protruding
bet

Usually, the main cause of

ween the lips, about 1

inch teeth

protruding tongue during

line.

death is (by) strangulation.

(tsn., Aug. 20, 1976, p. 8)

6) Deceased is
pregnant

with a baby boy about

7-8
months old (tsn., Aug.
20,
1976, p. 8).
Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification
thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano
Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information
relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of
death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after
the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974.
The other witness for the prosecution was Pedro Salufrania, son of herein appellant and of the
deceased. The lower court's decision states that, by reason of interest and relationship, before
Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, he was
carefully examined by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision
of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of
receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was compelled
and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his father-accused. 1
The lower court found Pedro Salufrania to be determined and intelligent. He convincingly declared
that he was not threatened by any of his uncles on his mother's side to testify against his father,
because it was true that the latter killed his mother. Then, formally testifying as the prosecution's
lone eyewitness, he stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo
quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, in their small house at a far
away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte; that during said quarrel, he saw his father box
his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death;
that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot
where she fell.
Pedro Salufrania further testified that after killing his mother, the accused- appellant went out of the
house to get a hammock; that his brother Alex and he were the only ones who witnessed how the
accused killed their mother because his sister and other brothers were already asleep when the
horrible incident happened; that his brothers Celedonio, Danilo and sister Merly woke up after the
death of their mother and kept watch at their mothers body while their father was away; that their
father arrived early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the
hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the house of his
sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan that from Tigbinan the corpse was
transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.

Continuing his testimony, Pedro Salufrania stated that he is now living with his uncle Eduardo Abuyo
and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened to
kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.
The third witness for the prosecution was Narciso Abuyo, a resident of Gabon, Talisay, Camarines
Norte. He testified that the accused Filomeno Salufrania and his sister, the deceased Marciana
Abuyo, were lawfully wedded husband and wife as evidenced by a marriage contract (Exhibit "C").
He declared that his sister was more or less seven (7) months pregnant when she died; that he first
came to know about his sister's death on 4 December 1974 thru his nephews Pedro and Alex
Salufrania who first informed him that their mother died of stomach ailment and headache; that he
went to Tigbinan to request for the body of his sister so that it may be buried in Talisay, Camarines
Norte and, as intended, Marciana Abuyo was buried in the Talisay Cemetery on 6 December 1974.
Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his
deceased sister went to his house and refused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that
when asked for the reason why, his nephew Alex Salufraa told him that the real cause of death of
their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and
strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his
sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities of Talisay, Camarines Norte,
who investigated Alex and Pedro Salufirania and later, to that of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Norte.
The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the
accused Filomeno Salufrania.
Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania. He declared that Marciana
Abuyo died at around 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 in her house at Sitio
Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo, Camarines Norte; that he happened to pass by said house because his
attention was attracted by the bright light in the fireplace and he saw Filomeno Salufrania boiling
"ikmo" and garlic as medicine for his wife who was about to deliver a child; that he helped the
accused by applying "ikmo" to the different parts of the body of Marciana Abuyo and by
administering the native treatment known as "bantil", that is, by pinching and pulling the skin with two
fingers of his closed fist; that when the condition of Marciana Abuyo worsened, he told Filomeno
Salufrania to go and get Juanita Bragais who is known as a healer but the latter arrived at about
7:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974 and that at that time Marciana Abuyo was already
dead.
Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno
Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974. He further testified that when
he reached the house of the Salufranias, Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped
Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in-law at
Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte.
Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident of Kapagisahan Tigbinan, Labo,
Camarines Norte testified that she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock
in the morning of 4 December 1974 after being called by one of the latter's sons; that she saw

Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was
suffering from an old stomach ailment.
The accused Filomeno Salufrania admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased
Marciana Abuyo; that at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of 3 December 1974, Marciana arrived
home from Talisay where she had earlier stayed for about a week; that she was hungry upon her
arrival, so he allegedly cooked their food and after eating their lunch, he proceeded to his work while
his wife rested in their house; that when he returned home at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that
same day, his wife complained to him of stomach pain and he was told to prepare the beddings
because she was already sleepy; that at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of 4 December 1974, he
was awakened by his wife who was still complaining of stomach pain, and that she asked for a drink
of hot water; that while he was boiling water, Geronimo Villan arrived and assisted him in
administering to his wife the native treatments known as "hilot" or massaging and "banti" that
Geronimo Villan and Francisco Repuya alternately applied "bantil" to his wife but when her condition
worsened, he woke up his children, Pedro and Alex to fetch Rico Villanueva who might be able to
,save the life of their mother; that his children left and returned without Rico Villanueva but the latter
arrived a little later.
Accused-appellant then went on to say that he sent for Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to
cure his wife, since the latter was already dead when he arrived; that after the death of his wife, he
ordered his children to get the hammock of Kaloy Belardo whose house was about two (2)
kilometers away from their house, and upon the arrival of the hammock, he placed the body of his
wife thereon and brought it to the house of his sister Consolacion Salufrania in Tigbinan; that while
the corpse of Marciana Abuyo was at Tigbinan he sent Chiding and his elder son to inform the
brothers and sisters of his wife at Talisay about her death and that Leonila Abuyo and Salvador
Abuyo came; that he informed the Barangay Captain of Tigbinan of the cause of death of his wife;
that upon the suggestion of the brothers and sisters of Marciana Abuyo, especially Salvador Abuyo,
the body of their sister was brought home to Talisay and thereafter buried at the Talisay Cemetery;
that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during
the lifetime of the deceased, they loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania
was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son until
during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his family,
Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.
The case was considered submitted for decision by the trial court on 18 July 1978. As aforestated,
the trial court found the appellant guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced him to the penalty of
death.
The appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF AN INCOMPETENT WITNESS, AND ON INCONSISTENT AND INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE THAT THE ACCUSED IS

ENTITLED TO AN ACQUITTAL UNLESS HIS GUILT IS SHOWN BEYOND ANY REASONABLE

DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS CREDIBLE AND
SUFFICIENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF PARRICIDE WITH INTENTIONAL ABORTION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCREDITING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED.
Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before
he was allowed to testify. Since Pedro was allegedly a child of tender age, being only thirteen (13)
years old when he testified, and only eleven (11) years old when the offense charged occurred, he is
presumed incompetent under Rule 130 Sec. 19 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, which includes
among those who cannot be witnesses:
Children who appear to the court to be of such tender age and inferior capacity as to
be incapable of receiving correct impressions of the facts respecting which they are
examined, or of relating them truly.
Therefore, according to appellant, for failure of the trial court to determine Pedro's competence, the
presumption of incompetency was not rebutted and Pedro's testimony should not have been
admitted. Moreover, appellant stresses that there is no basis for the trial court's finding that Pedro is
intelligent.
Appellant's contention is without merit. The record shows that the trial court determined Pedro
Salufrania's competency before he was allowed to testify under oath. 2 The trial court's conclusion that
Pedro was intelligent and competent is fully supported by Pedro's responsiveness to the questions
propounded to him when he was already under oath:
A. Did you go here in court to testify voluntarily?
Q. Yes, Your Honor.
A. Were you not forced by your uncle to testify in his case?
Q. No, I was not forced by my uncle.
xxx xxx xxx
A. The accused is your father?
Q. Yes, sir.

A. Do you love him?

Q. No, sir.
A. Your father is accused now of crime which carries the penalty of
death, are you still willing to testify against him?
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you say that you don't love your father
A. Because he killed my mother.
Q. And that is the reason why you hate your father now?
A. Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 3, 7,17, Nov. 12, 1976).
Pedro's strong sense of moral duty to tell the truth, even though it should lead to his father's
conviction, shows that he fully appreciated the meaning of an oath, which likewise proves that he
was no longer a child of tender years at the time of his testimony.
Appellant also alleges that, since Pedro changed his answer from no to yes when he was asked
whether he was threatened by his uncle to testify against his father, shows that Pedro was lying and
proves that he did not appreciate the meaning of an oath at all. 3
Again, this contention is without merit, Pedro became confused when the trial court ordered that the
original question be reformed. Pedro's confusion is apparent from the fact that when asked the third
time, he affirmed his first answer,
Q. Isn't it that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will
not give statement before the police?
A. No, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. But later you actually went with your uncle to the police because
you were threatened by him with bodily harm if you will not follow
him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is it true that your uncle threatened you with bodily harm if you will
not give statement to the police?
A. No, sir. (tsn., pp. 6, 7, Nov. 12, 1976)

Appellant next lists the following alleged inconsistencies to discredit the testimony of Pedro. First,
Pedro testified on direct examination that his mother died in the evening of December 3. while on
cross-examination he said that she died in the morning of December 4. It must be noted that he
affirmed twice during cross-examination that his mother died on December 3, just as he had testified
during direct examination. Significantly, he did not mention December 4 as the date when she died,
as appellant would make it appear. Pedro merely answered 'yes' to the question "And isn't it that
your mother died in the early morning on that day (December 4) and not on the evening of
December 3?" 4 Thus, Pedro's answer could have resulted only from a misapprehension of the a
question, and for no other reason.
Second, appellant alleges that Pedro testified on direct examination that he saw appellant leave the
house to get a hammock after strangling the victim and then came back the following morning.
However, upon cross-examination, Pedro testified that appellant left at noon or in the afternoon of
December 4. Moreover, Pedro allegedly testified on re-direct that he saw appellant sleep beside the
dead body of his mother. Again Pedro misapprehended the question propounded to him. Ajudicious
reading of the transcript will bear this out:
Q. When did your father leave to get the hammock?
A. In the afternoon.
Q. That may be when the body was brought to Talisay. When your
father, rather, when you said that your father left to get a hammock so
that your mother may be brought to Tigbinan what time was that?
A. About 12:00 o'clock noon. (Tsn, p. 16, Nov. 12, 1976)
One may discern that the court itself noticed that there was a missapprehension when it commented
"that maybe when the body was brought to Talisay" after Pedro answered "In the afternoon". When
Pedro answered "about 12:00 noon' he must have been referring to the time when appellant carried
his dead wife to Tigbinan. It must be noted that the question was so worded that it could have misled
Pedro to think that what was being asked was the time when appellant brought his dead wife to
Tigbinan. In fact, there is nothing inconsistent with Pedro's testimony that he saw his father leave in
the evening of December 3 and again saw him asleep and thus not noticed appellant's coming back
after securing a hammock and sleeping beside the deceased. Pedro was therefore telling the truth
when he said that, upon waking up, he saw his father sleeping beside his dead mother. By then,
appellant had already returned with the hammock.
Third, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that the corpse was carried to Tigbinan in the
morning of December 4, while on cross-examination, he said it was in the evening. 5 It must be
pointed out that Pedro merely answered "yes" to a question purportedly mentioning the time when the
victim's body was transferred to Tigbinan. The question is as follows: "The corpse of your mother was
brought to the Tigbinan proper when the vigil was had in the evening of December 4, is that right?" It is to
be noted that the question's thrust is whether or not the victim's body was brought to Tigbinan. The time it
was brought was merely incidental. Thus, Pedro may not have paid attention to the part of the question
involving time. Moreover, the phrase "in the evening" may have referred either to the time of transport of
the body or to the vigil, which could have definitely confused Pedro.

Fourth, Pedro allegedly testified on direct examination that he, together with his brothers and sister,
kept vigil beside their mother's dead body that night, while on cross-examination, he testified that
they just kept lying down and pretended to sleep. 6 There is nothing inconsistent here. The children
could have kept vigil while lying down with their deceased mother.
Appellant further cites other alleged improbabilities to discredit Pedro's testimony. Appellant
contends that it was improbable for Pedro to have seen the attack on his mother since he testified
that the room was dimly lighted, and that, while the attach was going on, he closed his eyes
pretending to sleep. 7 This contention is without merit. Even though the room was dimly lighted, Pedro
was only two (2) meters away from his parents; thus, he could easily see, as he saw, the attack on his
mother. 8 Also, although he pretended to be asleep, it was unlikely that he kept his eyes closed all the
while, as he was aware that a fight was going on. Rather, it was to be expected that he had his eyes open
and, thus, he saw the heinous crime unfold and ultimately consumated.
Appellant alleges that he does not believe that it was fear of him that caused the delay in Pedro's
divulging the real cause of his mother's death until 10 December 1974. According to appellant, such
fear could no longer have influenced Pedro from December 6, the date he started to live separately
from him. This contention is untenable. Even though Pedro started to live separately from his father
from December 6, it cannot be said that the influence of appellant's threat suddenly ceased from that
time. It must be noted that Pedro was young and was still very much under appellant's influence and
control. The thought and memory of his father's viciousness were still too fresh even after three days
from his mother's death. The fear that he too could be killed by appellant in like manner must have
deterred him from divulging the truth earlier.
Appellant also alleges that it was improbable for Pedro to have just watched the killing of his mother.
This contention is untenable. At that moment, when his mother was being assaulted and strangled,
Pedro must have been so shocked as to be rendered immobile and powerless to do anything. This is
a normal reaction in such a situation. Besides, it is a fact of life that different people react differently
to the same types of situations. 9 One cannot overlook that there is no standard form of behaviour when
one is confronted by a shocking occurrence. 10
Appellant next alleges that since the prosecution has failed without satisfactory explanation to
present Pedro's brother Alex who is alleged to be also an eyewitness to the killing of the victim, it is
presumed that Alex's testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if presented. This contention is
without merit. First, Alex, who is younger than Pedro by 3 years, may not have been competent to
testify due to his tender age. Second, even assuming that he was competent to testify, his testimony
could be merely corroborative. Corroboration is not necessary in this case because the details of the
crime have already been testified to by Pedro with sufficient clarity. The failure to present all the
eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption, especially
when the testimony of the witness sought to be presented is merely corroborative. 11Witnesses are to
be weighed, not numbered, and it is a well established rule that the testimony of a single witness, even if
uncorroborated, but positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. 12 In any event, it is not for
the appellant to say how many witnesses the prosecution should have presented. 13
The inconsistencies magnified by appellant in the testimony of Pedro Salufrania have been
satisfactorily explained. In fact, some of them are not material since they neither touch upon the
manner of death of the victim nor question the identity of the killer, both of which were unwaveringly

testified upon by Pedro. Thus, with the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities explained away,
Pedro's testimony remains unperturbed. Even if there were discrepancies, such discrepancies were
minor and may be considered as earmarks of verisimilitude. 14
The trial court's assessment of Pedro's testimony, as quoted hereunder, deserves more than passing
consideration:
... The testimony of eye-witness Pedro Salufrania, 13-year old son of the victim
Marciana Abuyo and her killer-spouse Filomeno Salufrania, appears to be very clear,
convincing and truthful. It is vivid as to the details of the horrible occurence that took
place at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of December 3, 1974 in their small house
at a far away sitio of Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, resulting in the untimely and
cruel death of her (sic) mother. He and his brother Alex were the only eyewitnesses
to the gory crime committed by their father. The credibility of this witness (Pedro
Salufrania) and his testimony was invested when, despite rigid cross-examination,
the veracity of his testimony in chief was not impeached. He remained firm and on
the verge of crying, when he pointed an accusing finger at his father during the trial.
He was unshaken notwithstanding a long and detailed cross-examination. And, there
is reason to bestow complete credence to his testimony because he had the
opportunity to closely observe how his father had deliberately and cruelly ended the
life of his mother. Despite his tender age and apparent childish innocence, this Court
believes that he can clearly perceive and perceiving, make known his perception,
precluding the possibility of coaching or tutoring by someone. His declaration as to
when, where and how the horrible incident complained of happened is the believable
version. 15
Appellant questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, since this is the first
time that the doctor conducted an autopsy on a cadaver which had been buried for about a week. It
must be noted, however, that although this was the doctor's first autopsy under circumstances
present in this case, he had, however, conducted similar post-mortem examinations on ten (10)
other occasions. This would constitute sufficient experience. Significantly, appellant did not object to
the doctor's expression of medical opinions during the trial. Being an expert in his field, the doctor is
presumed to have taken all pertinent factors into consideration with regard to the autopsy, including
embalming and the state of the cadaver's decomposition. Dr. Juan Dyquiangco Jr., was a
disinterested witness in the case, and a reputable public official in whose favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties must be applied.
Appellant further alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania
do not tally. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no inconsistencies between the findings of Dr.
Dyquiangco and Pedro Salufrania's testimony. Both are consistent on material points. Thus, the
Court sees no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the trial court insofar as their credibility
and the appellant's guilt are concerned.
Appellant's third assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in discrediting his evidence
simply because the testimonies of the defense witnesses were consistent on material points.

Moreover, there is no showing, according to the appellant, that said testimonies were rehearsed so
as to dovetail with each other.
This contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to
discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an
admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death. The trial
court's reasons for rejecting the defense version, as hereunder quoted, are tenable and sound. Thus

On the contrary, the testimonies of defense witnesses Geronimo Villan, Angeles

Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania suspiciously dove-tailed in every
detail as to when, where and how .Marciana Abuyo died at 6:00 o'clock in the
morning of 4 December 1974, in their house at sitio Kapagisahan Tigbinan Labo,
Carnarines Norte, of stomach pain. On these points, these witnesses and the
accused made statements which seemed to be very fresh and clear in their minds,
despite the lapse of four long years. Their exact and uniform declarations on these
points, their phenomenal recollections, without sufficient special or uncommon
reason to recall, rendered their testimonies unconvincing. If at all, their testimonies
appeared to this Court to be an eleventh hour concoction. And, as defense
witnesses, after observing them and their declarations on the witness stand, they
appeared to the Court to be untruthful and unreliable. For, despite the
synchronization of time when, the place where and how the incidence happened,
their testimonies on other material points revealed their tendency to exaggerate and
their propensity to falsehood, thus-Aside from the accused Filomeno Salufrania,
there are three other witnesses for the defense Geronimo Villan Angeles Liling Balce
and Juanita Bragais. There is nothing in the testimony of Juanito Bragais because he
did not witness how and when Marciana Abuyo died. Francisco Repuya, who was
also alleged by Filomeno Salufrania to be present when Marciana Abuyo died, did
not testify. Accused Filomeno Salufrania never claimed that he summoned for
Angeles Liling Balce. According to him Angeles Liling Balce was not present during
the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo, for she was fetched by him only after the
death of his wife. Logically, therefore, there is no basis for the presentation of
Angeles Liling Balce that she was present during the moment of death of Marciana
Abuyo. She was merely play-acting. Geronimo Villan who claimed he passed-by the
house of Filomeno Salufrania and saw the latter boiling water with "ikmo" and garlic,
as medicine for his wife Marciana Abuyo, who was about to give birth was discredited
by accused himself who declared he was merely boiling water for the hot drink of his
wife, who was suferring from her old stomach ailment. In like manner, witness
Geronimo Villan discredited the accused Filomeno Salufrania, about the presence of
Francisco Repuya, who allegedly alternated with Geronimo Villan in applying the
native treatments of 'hilot' and 'bantil' to Marciana Abuyo, when throughout his
testimony he (Geronimo Villan) never mentioned the presence of Francisco Repuya.
After closely observing defense witnesses Geronimo Villan and Angeles Liling Balce,
this Court is convinced that their testimonies and accounts of the incident are

fabricated, untruthful and not worth of credence. Certainly, they were not present
immediately before and during the moment of death of Marciana Abuyo. ...
Added to these, there is one scandalous circumstance, which to the mind of this
Court, betrays the guilty conscience of the accused. If there was nothing revealing in
the face of the deceased Marciana Abuyo, why was her face covered by a piece of
cloth by the accused. ...
Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of
witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their
testimony. 16 Such rule applies in the present case.
Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that
he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be
held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of
Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom. 17
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because
he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find
that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the
stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to
show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim
but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of
Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.
It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months
pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband
accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in
her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be
punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its
maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished
the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, as modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant is

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded
to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent
decisions of the Court. With costs against the appellant,
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42819

April 15, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRISPIN GENOVES, defendant-appellant.
Leodegario Alba for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of
homicide with abortion.
In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934, appellant and deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in
adjoining cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke of the plow which appellant was repairing
belonged to her and tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her with his fist, causing her to fall to
the ground. She got up and returned to the fray, whereupon she received another blow with the fist
on the left cheek which caused her again to fall to the ground. Immediately after the incident
deceased proceeded to the municipal building, a distance of about four kilometers, and complained
to the chief of police about the maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with child, and as she
complained to the chief of police of pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of the
sanitary district. According to testimony deceased was in good health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage and pain which were symptoms of premature
delivery. Deceased remained in this condition until June 10, 1934. On that date the condition
culminated in the painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the twin babies that she way
carrying, but the other baby could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
The first assignment of error is the contention of appellant that the death of the offended party was
not the direct result of the assault upon her by the defendant. It is generally known that a fall is liable
to cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a complete sequel of events from the assault
to her death. The accused must be held responsible for the natural consequences of his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not strike the deceased, but this fact is clearly established
by the prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
as that inflicted and provocation, as the offended party by force induced the appellant to use force on
his part.
1vvphl.nt

The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion denounced by article 257 of the Revised Penal
Code. On the whole case, the period of confinement is fixed at twelve years and one day to fourteen
years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. The indemnity is fixed at P1,000.
The sentence, as thus modified, is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170723

March 3, 2008

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ,
PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, petitioner
Gloria Pilar S. Aguirre (Gloria Aguirre) seeks the reversal of the 21 July 2005 Decision 2 and 5
December 2005 Resolution,3 both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88370, entitled "Gloria
Pilar S. Aguirre v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz, Dr. Juvido
Agatep, Dra. Marissa B. Pascual, Pedro B. Aguirre and John and Jane Does."
The Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) when the latter issued the twin resolutions dated 11 February
20044 and 12 November 2004,5 respectively, which in turn affirmed the 8 January 2003 Resolution6 of
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City.
The Assistant City Prosecutor for the OCP of Quezon City recommended the dismissal of
the criminal complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, for violation of Articles 172 (Falsification by
Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents) and 262 (Mutilation), both of the Revised Penal
Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as "Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act," for insufficiency of evidence.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner Gloria Aguirre against respondents Pedro B.
Aguirre (Pedro Aguirre), Michelina S. Aguirre-Olondriz (Olondriz), Dr. Juvido Agatep (Dr. Agatep), Dr.
Marissa B. Pascual (Dr. Pascual) and several John/Jane Does for falsification, mutilation and child
abuse.
The antecedents of the present petition are:
Laureano "Larry" Aguirre7 used to be a charge of the Heart of Mary Villa, a child caring agency run
by the Good Shepherd Sisters and licensed by the Department of Social Work and Development
(DSWD). Sometime in 1978, respondent Pedro Aguirre; the latter's spouse, Lourdes S. Aguirre
(Lourdes Aguirre); and their four daughters, who included petitioner Gloria Aguirre and respondent
Olondriz, came to know Larry, who was then just over a year old. The Aguirres would have Larry
spend a few days at their home and then return him to the orphanage thereafter. In June 1980,
Larry, then two years and nine months of age, formally became the ward of respondent Pedro
Aguirre and his spouse Lourdes Aguirre by virtue of an Affidavit of Consent to Legal
Guardianshipexecuted in their favor by Sister Mary Concepta Bellosillo, Superior of the Heart of
Mary Villa. On 19 June 1986, the Aguirre spouses' guardianship of Larry was legalized when the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan, duly appointed them as joint co-guardians
over the person and property of Larry.
As Larry was growing up, the Aguirre spouses and their children noticed that his developmental
milestones were remarkably delayed. His cognitive and physical growth did not appear normal in
that "at age 3 to 4 years, Larry could only crawl on his TUMMY like a frog x x x;"8 he did not utter
his first word until he was three years of age; did not speak in sentences until his sixth year; and only
learned to stand up and walk after he turned five years old. At age six, the Aguirre spouses first
enrolled Larry at the Colegio de San Agustin, Dasmarias Village, but the child experienced
significant learning difficulties there. In 1989, at age eleven, Larry was taken to specialists for
neurological and psychological evaluations. The psychological evaluation 9 done on Larry revealed

the latter to be suffering from a mild mental deficiency.10 Consequent thereto, the Aguirre spouses
transferred Larry to St. John Ma. Vianney, an educational institution for special children.
In November of 2001, respondent Dr. Agatep, a urologist/surgeon, was approached concerning the
intention to have Larry, then 24 years of age, vasectomized. Prior to performing the procedure on the
intended patient, respondent Dr. Agatep required that Larry be evaluated by a psychiatrist in order to
confirm and validate whether or not the former could validly give his consent to the medical
procedure on ACCOUNT of his mental deficiency.
In view of the required psychiatric clearance, Larry was brought to respondent Dr. Pascual, a
psychiatrist, for evaluation. In a psychiatric report dated 21 January 2002, respondent Dr. Pascual
made the following recommendation:
[T]he responsibility of decision making may be given to his parent or guardian. 11
the full text of which reads
PSYCHIATRY REPORT
21 January 2002
GENERAL DATA
LAUREANO AGUIRRE, 24 years old, male, high school graduate of St. John [Marie
Vianney], was referred for psychiatric evaluation to determine competency to give consent
for vasectomy.
CLINICAL SUMMARY
Larry was adopted at age 3 from an orphanage and prenatal history is not known to the
adoptive family except that abortion was attempted. Developmental milestones were noted
to be delayed. He started to walk and speak in single word at around age 5. He was enrolled
in Colegio de San Agustin at age 6 where he showed significant learning difficulties that he
had to repeat 1st and 4th grades. A consult was done in 1989 when he was 11 years old.
Neurological findings and EEG results were not normal and he was given Tecretol and
Encephabol by his neurologist. Psychological evaluation revealed mild to moderate mental
retardation, special education training was advised and thus, he was transferred to St. John
Marie Vianney. He finished his elementary and secondary education in the said school. He
was later enrolled in a vocational course at Don Bosco which he was unable to continue.
There has been no reported behavioral problems in school and he gets along relatively well
with his teachers and some of his classmates.
Larry grew up with a very supportive adoptive family. He is the youngest in the family of four
sisters. Currently, his adoptive parents are already old and have medical problem and thus,
they could no longer monitor and take care of him like before. His adoptive mother has
Bipolar Mood Disorder and used to physically maltreat him. A year ago, he had an episode of

dizziness, vomiting and headaches after he was hit by his adoptive mother. Consult was
done in Makati Medical Center and several tests were done, results of which were consistent
with his developmental problem. There was no evidence of acute insults. The family
subsequently decided that he should stay with one of his sisters to avoid similar incident and
the possibility that he would retaliate although he has never hurt anybody. There has been
no episode of violent outburst or aggressive behavior. He would often keep to himself when
sad, angry or frustrated.
He is currently employed in the company of his sister and given assignment to do some
photocopying, usually in the mornings. He enjoys playing billiards and basketball with his
nephews and, he spends most of his leisure time watching TV and listening to music. He
could perform activities of daily living without assistance except that he still needs
supervision in taking a bath. He cannot prepare his own meal and never allowed to go out
and run errands alone. He does not have friends and it is only his adoptive family whom he
has significant relationships. He claims that he once had a girlfriend when he was in high
school who was more like a best friend to him. He never had sexual relations. He has
learned to smoke and drink alcohol few years ago through his cousins and the drivers. There
is no history of abuse of alcohol or any prohibited substances.
MEDICAL STATUS EXAMINATION
The applicant was appropriately dressed. He was cooperative and he had intermittent eye
contact. Speech was spontaneous, soft, and relevant. He responded to questions in single
words or simple sentences. He was anxious specially at the start of the interview, with full
affect appropriate to mood and thought content. There was no apparent thought or
perceptual disturbance. No suicidal/homicidal thoughts elicited. He was oriented to time,
place and person. He has intact remote and recent memory. He could do simple calculation.
He could write his name and read simple words. His human figure was comparable to a 7-8
year old. He demonstrated fair judgment and poor insight. He had fair impulse control.
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS
Psychological tests done on March 6, 1990 (Dr. Lourdes Ledesma) and on August 4, 2000
(Dr. Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villaosor) consistently revealed mild to moderate mental deficiency.
SIGNIFICANT LABORATORY EXAMS RESULTS
CT scan done 09 January 2001 showed nonspecific right deep parietal subcortical malacia.
No localized mass lesion in the brain.
MRI done on 10 January 2001 showed bilateral parietal x x x volume loss,
encephalomalacia, gliosis and ulegyria consistent with sequela of postnatal or neonatal
infarcts. Ex-vacuo dilatation of the atria of lateral ventricles associated thinned posterior half
of the corpus callosum.
ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

Axis I None
Axis II Mental Retardation, mild to moderate type
Axis III None
Axis IV None at present
Axis V Current GAF = 50-60
Larry's mental deficiency could be associated with possible perinatal insults, which is
consistent with the neuroimaging findings. Mental retardation associated with neurological
problems usually has poorer prognosis. Larry is very much dependent on his family for his
needs, adaptive functioning, direction and in making major life decisions. At his capacity, he
may never understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits, and consequences of
the procedure (vasectomy) that his family wants for his protection. Thus, the responsibility of
decision making may be given to his parent or guardian.
Marissa B. Pascual, M.D.
Psychiatrist12
Considering the above recommendation, respondent Pedro Aguirre's written consent was deemed
sufficient in order to proceed with the conduct of the vasectomy. Hence, on 31 January 2002,
respondent Dr. Agatep performed a bilateral vasectomy on Larry.
On 11 June 2002, petitioner Gloria Aguirre, respondent Pedro Aguirre's eldest child, instituted a
criminal complaint for the violation of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Articles 172 and 262, both
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 against respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr.
Pascual and several John/Jane Does before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
The Complaint Affidavit,13 docketed as I.S. No. 02-12466, contained the following allegations:
2. x x x Dr. Agatep and Dra. Pascual were (sic) medical practitioners specializing in urology
and psychiatry respectively; while respondent Pedro B. Aguirre is my father; Michelina S.
Aguirre-Olondriz is my sister, and the victim Laureano "Larry" Aguirre xxx is my common law
brother. JOHN and JANE DOES were the persons who, acting upon the apparent
instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz and/or Pedro B. Aguirre, actually
scouted, prospected, facilitated, solicited and/or procured the medical services of
respondents Dra. Pascual and Dr. Agatep vis--vis the intended mutilation via bilateral
vasectomy of my common law brother Larry Aguirre subject hereof.
xxxx
4. Sometime in March 2002, however, the Heart of Mary Villa of the Good Shepherd Sisters
was furnished a copy of respondent Dra. Pascual's Psychiatry Report dated 21 January
2004 by the "DSWD," in which my common law brother "Larry" was falsely and maliciously

declared incompetent and incapable of purportedly giving his own consent to the
MUTILATION VIA BILATERAL VASECTOMY intended to be performed on him by all the
respondents.
xxxx
6. Based on the foregoing charade and false pretenses invariably committed by all of the
respondents in conspiracy with each other, on 31 January 2002, my common law brother
Larry Aguirre, although of legal age but conspiratorially caused to be declared by
respondents to be "mentally deficient" and incompetent to give consent to his BILATERAL
VASECTOMY, was then intentionally, unlawfully, maliciously, feloniously and/or criminally
placed thereafter under surgery for MUTILATION VIA "BILATERAL VASECTOMY" x x x,
EVEN WITHOUT ANY AUTHORIZATION ORDER from the GUARDIANSHIP COURT, nor
personal consent of Larry Aguirre himself.
In addition to the above, the complaint included therein an allegation that
v. x x x without a PRIOR medical examination, professional interview of nor verification and
consultation with my mother, Lourdes Sabino-Aguirre, respondent Dra. Pascual baselessly,
fraudulently and with obvious intent to defame and malign her reputation and honor, and
worse, that of our Sabido family, falsely concluded and diagnosed, via her falsified Psychiatry
Report, that my mother Lourdes Sabido-Aguirre purportedly suffers from "BIPOLAR MOOD
DISORDER" x x x.
To answer petitioner Gloria Aguirre's accusations against them, respondents Pedro Aguirre,
Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual submitted their respective Counter-Affidavits.
In her defense,14 respondent Olondriz denied that she "prospected, scouted, facilitated, solicited
and/or procured any false statement, mutilated or abused" her common-law brother, Larry Aguirre.
Further, she countered that:
3. x x x While I am aware and admit that Larry went through a vasectomy procedure, there is
nothing in the Complaint which explains how the vasectomy amounts to a mutilation.
xxxx
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete confidence that
I did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.
6. Neither did I procure or solicit the services of the physician who performed the vasectomy,
Dr. Juvido Agatep x x x. It was my father, Pedro Aguirre, Larry's guardian, who obtained his
services. I merely acted upon his instructions and accompanied my brother to the physician,
respondents Dra. Marissa B. Pascual x x x.
xxxx

10. Neither does the Complaint explain in what manner the Complainant is authorized or has
any standing to declare that Larry's consent was not obtained. Complainant is not the
guardian or relative of Larry. While she argues that Larry's consent should have been
obtained the Complaint does not dispute the psychiatrist's findings about Larry's inability to
give consent.
xxxx
13. x x x the Complaint does not even state what alleged participation was falsified or the
portion of the psychiatric report that allegedly states that someone participated when in fact
that person did not so participate.
xxxx
15. Again, I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dr. Pascual x x x.
xxxx
17. x x x the Complaint does not dispute that he (Larry) is mentally deficient or incompetent
to give consent.
xxxx
19. x x x I verified that the effect of a vasectomy operation was explained to him (Larry) by
both respondent doctors.
20. x x x I accompanied Larry and obeyed my father on the belief that my father continues to
be the legal guardian of Larry. I know of no one else who asserts to be his legal guardian x x
x.15
Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, respondent Pedro Aguirre argues against his
complicity in the crime of mutilation as charged and asserts that:
5. In any case, as I did not perform the vasectomy, I can state with complete confidence that
I did not participate in any way in the alleged mutilation.16
Nevertheless, he maintains that the vasectomy performed on Larry does not in any way amount to
mutilation, as the latter's reproductive organ is still completely intact.17 In any case, respondent Pedro
Aguirre explains that the procedure performed is reversible through another procedure called
Vasovasostomy, to wit:
8. I understand that vasectomy is reversible through a procedure called Vasovasostomy. I
can also state with confidence that the procedure enables men who have undergone a
vasectomy to sire a child. Hence, no permanent damage was caused by the procedure.
Respondent Pedro Aguirre challenges the charge of falsification in the complaint, to wit:

14. x x x I did not make it appear that any person participated in any act or proceeding when
that person did not in fact participate x x x.
xxxx
16. x x x I had no participation in the preparation of the report of Dra. Pascual. She arrived at
her report independently, using her own professional judgment x x x.
xxxx
31. What I cannot understand about Petita's Complaint is how Larry is argued to be legally a
child under the definition of one law but nonetheless and simultaneously argued to be
capacitated to give his consent as fully as an adult. 18
Respondent Pedro Aguirre further clarifies that co-guardianship over Larry had been granted to
himself and his wife, Lourdes Aguirre, way back on 19 June 1986 by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3 of Balanga, Bataan. Respondent Pedro Aguirre contends that being one of the legal
guardians, consequently, parental authority over Larry is vested in him. But assuming for the sake of
argument that Larry does have the capacity to make the decision concerning his vasectomy,
respondent Pedro Aguirre argues that petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no legal personality to institute
the subject criminal complaint, for only Larry would have the right to do so.
Just as the two preceding respondents did, respondent Dr. Agatep also disputed the allegations of
facts stated in the Complaint. Adopting the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were
material to the charges against him, he vehemently denied failing to inform Larry of the intended
procedure. In his counter-statement of facts he averred that:
(b) x x x I scheduled Larry for consultative interview x x x wherein I painstakingly explained
what vasectomy is and the consequences thereof; but finding signs of mental deficiency, x x
x I advised his relatives and his nurse who accompanied him to have Larry examined by a
psychiatrist who could properly determine whether or not Larry x x x can really give his
consent, thus I required them to secure first a psychiatric evaluation and clearance prior to
the contemplated procedure.
(c) On January 21, 2002, I was furnished a copy of a psychiatric report prepared by Dr.
Marissa Pascual x x x. In her said report, Dr. Pascual found Larry to suffer from "mental
retardation, mild to moderate type" and further stated that "at his capacity, he may never
understand the nature, the foreseeable risks and benefits and consequences of the
procedure (vasectomy) x x x, thus the responsibility of decision making may be given to his
parent or guardian x x x."
(d) x x x I was likewise furnished a copy of an affidavit executed by Pedro Aguirre stating that
he was the legal guardian of Larry x x x Pedro Aguirre gave his consent to vasectomize Larry
x x x.

(e) Only then, specifically January 31, 2002, vasectomy was performed with utmost care and
diligence.19
In defense against the charge of falsification and mutilation, respondent Dr. Agatep argued that
subject complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons:
1. The complainant has no legal personality to file this case. As mentioned above, she is only
a common law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the person of Pedro Aguirre, one of
the herein respondents x x x.
2. x x x [t]he allegations in the complaint clearly centers on the condition of complainant's
mother, Lourdes Aguirre, her reputation, and miserably fails to implicate the degree of
participation of herein respondent. x x x
xxxx
(b) Falsification. x x x I strongly aver that this felony does not apply to me since it clearly
gives reference to co-respondent, Dr. Marissa Pascual's Psychiatry Report, dated January
21, 2002, in relation with her field of profession, an expert opinion. I do not have any
participation in the preparation of said report, x x x neither did I utilized (sic) the same in any
proceedings to the damage to another. x x x I also deny using a falsified document x x x.
(c) Mutilation. x x x Vasectomy does not in anyway equate to castration and what is touched
in vasectomy is not considered an organ in the context of law and medicine, it is quite
remote from the penis x x x.
(d) Child Abuse. x x x the complaint-affidavit is very vague in specifying the applicability of
said law. It merely avers that Laureano "Larry" Aguirre is a child, and alleges his father,
Pedro Aguirre, has parental authority over him x x x. 20
Similarly, respondent Dr. Pascual denied the criminal charges of falsification and mutilation imputed
to her. She stands by the contents of the assailed Psychiatric Report, justifying it thus:
x x x My opinion of Larry Aguirre's mental status was based on my own personal
observations, his responses during my interview of him, the results of the two (2)
psychological tests conducted by clinical psychologists, the results of laboratory tests,
including a CT Scan and MRI, and his personal and family history which I obtained from his
sister, Michelina Aguirre-Olondriz x x x.
5. x x x the reference in my report concerning Mrs. Lourdes Aguirre is not a statement of my
opinion of Mrs. Aguirre's mental status, x x x. Rather, it is part of the patient's personal and
family history as conveyed to me by Mrs. Aguirre-Olondriz.
6. x x x An expression of my opinion, especially of an expert opinion, cannot give rise to a
charge for falsification. A contrary opinion by another expert only means that the experts
differ, and does not necessarily reflect on the truth or falsity of either opinion x x x.

7. x x x I never stated that I examined Mrs. Aguirre, because I never did x x x.

8. I had no participation in the surgery performed on Larry Aguirre except to render an
opinion on his capacity to give informed consent to the vasectomy x x x.
9. Without admitting the merits of the complaint, I submit that complainants are not the
proper persons to subscribe to the same as they are not the offended party, peace officer or
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated x x x. 21
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to
the crime of falsification. He held that
[T]he claim of the complainant that the Psychiatric Report was falsified, because consent
was not given by Larry Aguirre to the vasectomy and/or he was not consulted on said
operation does not constitute falsification. It would have been different if it was stated in the
report that consent was obtained from Larry Aguirre or that it was written therein that he was
consulted on the vasectomy, because that would mean that it was made to appear in the
report that Larry Aguirre participated in the act or proceeding by giving his consent or was
consulted on the matter when in truth and in fact, he did not participate. Or if not, the entry
would have been an untruthful statement. But that is not the case. Precisely (sic) the report
was made to determine whether Larry Aguirre could give his consent to his intended
vasectomy. Be that as it may, the matter of Larry's consent having obtained or not may nor
be an issue after all, because complainant's (sic) herself alleged that Larry's mental condition
is that of a child, who can not give consent. Based on the foregoing consideration, no
falsification can be established under the circumstances.22
Even the statement in the Psychiatric Report of respondent Dr. Pascual that Lourdes Aguirre had
Bipolar Mood Disorder cannot be considered falsification since
The report did not state that Lourdes Aguirre was in fact personally interviewed by
respondent Dr. Pascual and that the latter concluded that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
Disorder. The report merely quoted other sources of information with respect to the condition
of Lourdes Aguirre, in the same manner that the fact that Lourdes Aguirre was physically
abusing Larry Aguirre was also not of Dra. Pascual personal knowledge. But the fact that
Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her report does not
mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be wrong and may
affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged therein that she
personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be true, she cannot
be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the author of the report is
not guilty, then with more reason the other respondents are not liable.23
Respecting the charge of mutilation, the Assistant City Prosecutor also held that the facts alleged did
not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized under Article 262 of the Revised
Penal Code, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his
reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." He ratiocinated that:

While the operation renders him the inability (sic) to procreate, the operation is reversible
and therefore, cannot be the permanent damage contemplated under Article 262 of the
Revised Penal Code.24
The Assistant City Prosecutor,25 in a Resolution26 dated 8 January 2003, found no probable cause to
hold respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual liable for the complaint of
falsification and mutilation, more specifically, the violation of Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610. Accordingly, the Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of petitioner Gloria Aguirre's complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, it is recommended that the above-entitled case be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence.27
On 18 February 2003, petitioner Gloria Aguirre appealed the foregoing resolution to the Secretary of
the DOJ by means of a Petition for Review.28
In a Resolution dated 11 February 2004, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo, for the Secretary
of the DOJ, dismissed the petition. In resolving said appeal, the Chief State Prosecutor held that:
Under Section 12, in relation to Section 7, of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000,
the Secretary of Justice may, motu proprio, dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing
of any reversible error in the questioned resolution or finds the same to be patently without
merit.
We carefully examined the petition and its attachments and found no error that would justify
a reversal of the assailed resolution which is in accord with the law and evidenced (sic) on
the matter.29
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ in
another Resolution dated 12 November 2004.
Resolute in her belief, petitioner Gloria Aguirre went to the Court of Appeals by means of a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 21 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing petitioner Gloria Aguirre's
recourse for lack of merit.
The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE
and accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated
February 11, 2004 and November 12, 2004 of the Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. 02-12466
are hereby AFFIRMED.30

Petitioner Gloria Aguirre's motion for reconsideration proved futile as it was denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution dated 5 December 2005.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, premised on the
following arguments:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS
OF LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED, BASED PURPORTEDLY ON THE INTERNET WHICH
RUNS AMUCK WITH OUR SYSTEM OF THE RULE OF LAW AND THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD, THAT BILATERAL VASECTOMY IS PURPORTEDLY 100% REVERSIBLE BY A
FUTURE MEDICAL PROCEDURE HENCE NOT AMOUNTING TO MUTILATION, X X X;
AND
xxxx
II.
WORSE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE
ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO DIRECT THE INDICTMENT OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FOR MUTILATION AND FALSIFICATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE THEREFOR X X X.31
The foregoing issues notwithstanding, the more proper issue for this Court's consideration is, given
the facts of the case, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DOJ did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed the
public prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause for respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr.
Agatep and Dr. Pascual to stand trial for the criminal complaints of falsification and mutilation in
relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
In ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals explained that:
Evidently, the controversy lies in the permanency of sterilization as a result of a vasectomy
operation, and the chances of restoring fertility with a reversal surgery x x x.
We sustain the DOJ in ruling that the bilateral vasectomy performed on Larry does not
constitute mutilation even if intentionally and purposely done to prevent him from siring a
child.
xxxx
Sterilization is to be distinguished from castration: in the latter act the reproductive capacity
is permanently removed or damaged.32

It then concluded that:

The matter of legal liability, other than criminal, which private respondents may have incurred
for the alleged absence of a valid consent to the vasectomy performed on Larry, is certainly
beyond the province of this certiorari petition. Out task is confined to the issue of whether or
not the Secretary of Justice and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City committed
grave abuse of discretion in their determining the existence or absence of probable cause for
filing criminal cases for falsification and mutilation under Articles 172 (2) and 262 of
the Revised Penal Code.33
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, contends that the Court of Appeals and the DOJ failed to
appreciate several important facts: 1) that bilateral vasectomy conducted on petitioner's brother,
Larry Aguirre, was admitted34; 2) that the procedure caused the perpetual destruction of Larry's
reproductive organs of generation or conception; 353) that the bilateral vasectomy was intentional and
deliberate to deprive Larry forever of his reproductive organ and his capacity to procreate; and 4)
that respondents, "in conspiracy with one another, made not only one but two (2) untruthful
statements, and not mere inaccuracies when they made it appear in the psychiatry report" 36that a)
Larry's consent was obtained or at the very least that the latter was informed of the intended
vasectomy; and b) that Lourdes Aguirre was likewise interviewed and evaluated. Paradoxically,
however, petitioner Gloria Aguirre does not in any way state that she, instead of respondent Pedro
Aguirre, has guardianship over the person of Larry. She only insists that respondents should have
obtained Larry's consent prior to the conduct of the bilateral vasectomy.
In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for public respondent DOJ, argues that "the
conduct of preliminary investigation to determine the existence of probable cause for the purpose of
filing (an) information is the function of the public prosecutor." 37 More importantly, "the element[s] of
castration or mutilation of an organ necessary for generation is completely absent as he was not
deprived of any organ necessary for reproduction, much less the destruction of such organ." 38
Likewise, in support of the decision of the Court of Appeals, respondents Pedro Aguirre and Olondriz
assert that, fundamentally, petitioner Gloria Aguirre has no standing to file the complaint, as she has
not shown any injury to her person or asserted any relationship with Larry other than being his
"common law sister"; further, that she cannot prosecute the present case, as she has not been
authorized by law to file said complaint, not being the offended party, a peace officer or a public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law. Accordingly, respondents Pedro Aguirre and
Olondriz posit that they, together with the other respondents Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual, may not be
charged with, prosecuted for and ultimately convicted of: 1) "mutilation x x x since the bilateral
vasectomy conducted on Larry does not involve castration or amputation of an organ necessary for
reproduction as the twin elements of the crime of mutilation x x x are absent" 39; and 2) "falsification x
x x since the acts allegedly constituting falsification involve matters of medical opinion and not
matters of fact,"40 and that petitioner Gloria Aguirre failed to prove damage to herself or to any other
person.
Respondent Dr. Agatep, in the same vein, stresses that vasectomy is not mutilation. He elucidates
that vasectomy is merely the "excision of the vas deferens, the duct in testis which transport
semen"41; that it is the penis and the testis that make up the male reproductive organ and not the vas

deferens; and additionally argues that for the crime of mutilation to be accomplished, Article 262 of
the Revised Penal Code necessitates that there be intentional total or partial deprivation of some
essential organ for reproduction. Tubes, seminal ducts, vas deferens or prostatic urethra not being
organs, respondent Dr. Agatep concludes, therefore, that vasectomy does not correspond to
mutilation.
Anent the charge of falsification of a private document, respondent Dr. Agatep asseverates that he
never took part in disclosing any information, data or facts as contained in the contentious
Psychiatric Report.
For her part, respondent Dr. Pascual insists that the assailed Psychiatry Report was the result of her
independent exercise of professional judgment. "Rightly or wrongly, (she) diagnosed Larry Aguirre to
be incapable of giving consent, based on interviews made by the psychiatrist on Larry Aguirre and
persons who interacted with him."42And supposing that said report is flawed, it is, at most, an
erroneous medical diagnosis.
The petition has no merit.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 43 The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.44 It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief;45 that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.46
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its
principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary component of the
power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators,47 the responsibility of which is
thrust upon the DOJ. Hence, the determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant
the prosecution in court of an accused is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the nature of
his office, a public prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where
he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at
hand points to a different conclusion.
Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a wide range of discretion, the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by (public) prosecutors.48 And this Court has consistently adhered to the
policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the
investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against the
supposed offender.49
But this is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. It
is entirely possible that the investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged
in him by law. This, however, does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the

extraordinary remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.50
Prescinding from the above, the court's duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is confined to a
determination of whether the assailed executive determination of probable cause was done without
or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking the writ must be able to establish that the
investigating prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of
discretion is not enough.51 Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but
has transcended the same or acted without authority.52
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of the Assistant City
Prosecutor in dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and mutilation, as affirmed by the
DOJ, is determinative of whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant
City Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of the case. He found that there was no
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for the crimes complained of as defined and
punished under Articles 172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic
Act No. 7610, respectively. Concerning the crime of falsification of a private document, the Assistant
City Prosecutor reasoned that the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount to the crime
complained of, that is, the lack of consent by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the fact
that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the two preceding attendant facts do not in any way
amount to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to appear in the assailed report that
said consent was obtained. That would have been an untruthful statement. Neither does the fact that
the Psychiatric Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood Disorder by the same token
amount to falsification because said report does not put forward that such finding arose after an
examination of the concerned patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned that though the
vasectomy rendered Larry unable to procreate, it was not the permanent damage contemplated
under the pertinent provision of the penal code.
We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
DOJ and the Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present case.
In the present petition, respondents Pedro Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual are charged
with violating Articles 172 and 262 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.
Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, defines the crime of falsification of a private
document, viz
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage,
shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Petitioner Gloria Aguirre charges respondents with falsification of a private document for conspiring
with one another in keeping Larry "in the dark about the foregoing (vasectomy) as the same was
concealed from him by the respondents x x x,"53 as well as for falsely concluding and diagnosing
Lourdes Aguirre to be suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder.
A scrutiny, however, of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which defines the acts constitutive of
falsification, that is
Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry, or official book.
vis--vis the much criticized Psychiatric Report, shows that the acts complained of do not in any
manner, by whatever stretch of the imagination, fall under any of the eight (8) enumerated acts
constituting the offense of falsification.
In order to properly address the issue presented by petitioner Gloria Aguirre, it is necessary that we
discuss the elements of the crime of falsification of private document under the Revised Penal Code,
a crime which all the respondents have been accused of perpetrating. The elements of said crime
under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of our penal code are as follows: 1) that the offender committed any

acts of falsification, except those in par. 7, enumerated in Article 171; 2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and 3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at
least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. Under Article 171, paragraph
2, a person may commit falsification of a private document by causing it to appear in a document
that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did not
in fact so participate in the act or proceeding. On the other hand, falsification under par. 3 of the
same article is perpetrated by a person or persons who, participating in an act or proceeding, made
statements in that act or proceeding and the offender, in making a document, attributed to such
person or persons statements other than those in fact made by such person or persons. And the
crime defined under paragraph 4 thereof is committed when 1) the offender makes in a document
statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and 4) the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Applying the above-stated elements of the crime to the case at bar, in order that respondent Dr.
Pascual, and the rest acting in conspiracy with her, to have committed the crime of falsification under
par. 3 and 4 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, it is essential that that there be prima
facie evidence to show that she had caused it to appear that Larry gave his consent to be
vasectomized or at the very least, that the proposed medical procedure was explained to Larry. But
in the assailed report, no such thing was done. Lest it be forgotten, the reason for having Larry
psychiatrically evaluated was precisely to ascertain whether or not he can validly consent with
impunity to the proposed vasectomy, and not to obtain his consent to it or to oblige respondent Dr.
Pascual to explain to him what the import of the medical procedure was. Further, that Larry's consent
to be vasectomized was not obtained by the psychiatrist was of no moment, because nowhere is it
stated in said report that such assent was obtained. At any rate, petitioner Gloria Aguirre contradicts
her very own allegations when she persists in the contention that Larry has the mental age of a child;
hence, he was legally incapable of validly consenting to the procedure.
In the matter of the supposed incorrect diagnosis of Lourdes Aguirre, with regard to paragraph 2 of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, we quote with approval the succinct statements of the
Assistant City Prosecutor:
[T]he fact that Dra. Pascual cited finding, which is not of her own personal knowledge in her
report does not mean that she committed falsification in the process. Her sources may be
wrong and may affect the veracity of her report, but for as long as she has not alleged
therein that she personally diagnosed Lourdes Aguirre, which allegation would not then be
true, she cannot be charged of falsification. Therefore, it goes without saying that if the
author of the report is not guilty, then with more reason the other respondents are not liable. 54
As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime as
Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements 55 of mutilation under the
first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is,
mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and
deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction.
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as
defined and penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry
of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre,
however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of
mutilation.
This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our
penal code.
A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the
occasion to shed light on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:
The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the crime committed is that
defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article
reads: "Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging
from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses
the word "castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate." The word "capar,"
which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the
destruction of the organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to
punish any person who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for
reproduction. An applicable construction is that of Viada in the following language:
"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known by
the name of 'castration' which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for
generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which,
although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind
that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the
'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also to the
intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of
the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it
would not come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada,
Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)
Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some essential organ of
reproduction? We answer in the negative.
In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens,
through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine
with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied. 57 That part, which

is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male
reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ,i.e., a highly organized unit of structure,
having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a range of tissues. 58 Be that as
it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of
the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple
reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system.
The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision. 59
Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not
deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction." Notably, the
ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the
body),60 with the operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner, the word "castration"
is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries.61Such being the case in this present petition, the
bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and
punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability
could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much less
the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor
and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ
of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.
It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at
least a prima facie case.62 The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no
part in the initial decision to prosecute him.63 The possible exception to this rule is where there is an
unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that
will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
21 July 2005Decision and 5 December 2005 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 88370 are herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Gloria Aguirre.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127962

April 14, 2004

KINGSTON(E) LI Y NUNEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 19 April 1993, the relative early morning calm in General Luna Street, Barangay Bangkal, Makati,
was shattered when a petty argument evolved into a street brawl. After the dust had settled,
eighteen (18) -year old Christopher Arugay ("Arugay") lay dying from multiple stab wounds, while his
neighbor, twenty-four (24)-year old Kingstone1 Li ("Li"), staggered injured, with hack wounds on his
head.

Li was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 148, 2 with the crime of
Homicide.3 On 5 January 1994, after trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to the penalty of eight
(8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in
a Decision4 dated 6 September 1996.
The version presented by the prosecution as to the antecedent facts leading to Arugays death
differs sharply from the version offered by Li. The accused claims that the dispute stemmed from a
spurned offer to drink, while the prosecution traces the root of the fight to an indecorous bath in
public.
The story of the prosecution was told by the witnesses Aubrey dela Camara ("dela Camara") and
Ronaldo Tan ("Tan").5
Shortly before his death, Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters Cristy and Baby
Jane, his girlfriend dela Camara and Baby Janes boyfriend, Tan. At around 1:15 in the early
morning, dela Camara and Tan suddenly heard a noise outside. Peering through the window, they
saw Li and a certain Eduardo "Eddie Boy" Sangalang taking a bath completely naked. The two were
facing the house of the Arugays.6
Enraged, Arugay yelled, "Pare bastos kayo, bat kayo nakahubad?"7
Li shouted back, "Putang Ina!" and threw something at the Arugays house. Sangalang also yelled,
"Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!"8
An incensed Arugay went out the house where he was met by Li, now wearing briefs and carrying a
baseball bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the bat, causing Arugay to fall. Li ran back to his
house. Tan and dela Camara assisted Arugay and were trying to drag him back to his house when Li
re-emerged, this time with a knife. Li then stabbed Arugay once.9
Immediately thereafter, dela Camara was confronted by Lis sister, Kristine, who proceeded to pull
her hair and slap her around. Kristine also wielded a bolo, with which she hacked dela Camara in the
arm. Although preoccupied under the circumstances, dela Camara was able to see Sangalang stab
Arugay at least once, so she claimed.10
Tan saw Arugay run towards the street after he was stabbed, with Li and Sangalang chasing him. He
saw nothing further of the incident, according to him. 11
In their respective testimonies, dela Camara and Tan are unable to ACCOUNT for the fact that
before the fight ended, Li also lay wounded with multiple hack wounds on his head and body. This
fact lies at the crux of the petitioners defense.
On the other hand, Li presents a different version.

Li encountered Arugay out on the street on the night of 18 April 1993, a few hours before the brawl.
Arugay was carrying a bayong containing various liquors. He invited Li to a drinking session which
the latter refused as he had work the following day.12
Early the next morning, around one oclock a.m., Li was watching television at his home with his
friend Ricky Amerol when they heard objects being thrown at the house. Peeping through the
window, they saw Arugay and dela Camara in front of the gate throwing stones and bottles at the
direction of Lis house. The stones broke window jalousies and also struck Amerol. At the same time,
Arugay was also hurling invectives at Li.13
Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, "Pare, ano ba problema mo? Wala naman kaming kasalanan
sa yo." Arugay and his girlfriend just kept on stoning the house and hurling invectives at petitioner.
Arugay kicked the gate but Li prevented him from opening it. Arugay then ran towards his house
across the street.14
Li tried to fix the gate, which had become misaligned and its lock destroyed as a result of the kicking.
Reacting, he saw Arugay coming out of the house armed with two kitchen knives. In response, Li
went inside his house and got a baseball bat. When he returned to the street, Arugay attacked him
with a knife. Li MANAGED to avoid Arugays thrusts and hit Arugay with the baseball bat on the
right shoulder. Arugay ran back to his house shouting, "The long one! The long one!" Li also dashed
back to his house but before he was able to enter the door, he saw Arugay carrying a two-foot long
bolo, running towards him. On Arugays heels were Ronaldo Tan and Aubrey dela Camara. 15
Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo. Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to
hit him on his right temple and right wrist. Not content, Arugay hit Li on the right shoulder. Li passed
out.16
Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald Tan hit him at the back
of his left ear with a baseball bat. Eventually, Li MANAGED to get back to the house and was
brought to the Makati Medical Center by Amerol and Barangay Tanod Eduardo Reyes.17
On cross-examination, Li admitted that Eduardo Sangalang was also in his house at the time the
incident started. Sangalang was the boyfriend of Lis half-sister, Cristy.18
Dr. Alberto Reyes of the Medico Legal Section of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the
post-mortem examination on the body of Arugay. He noted the following injuries:
Pallor, lips and nailbeds.
Contusion, arm, right, poster-lateral, 5.0 x 3.0 cm.
Wounds, incised, scalp, parieto-occipital, right, 6.0 cm.; anterior sheet, left side, suprammary
6.0 cm., inframmary 4.0 cm.
Wounds stab:

1. 3.0 cm., long, spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, oriented, horizontally, with a

sharp, medial and a blunt lateral extremeties, located at the anterior chest wall, left
side, 15.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed upwards, backwards and
medially, involving the skin and soft tissues only with an approximate depth of 4.0
cm.
2. 4.0 cm., long, spindle shaped edges irregular, with a sharp inferolateral and blunt
supero-medial extremeties, located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side, 0.5 cm.
from the anterior median line, directed upwards , backwards and medially involving
the skin and soft tissues, laceration of the diaphragm and the right lobe of the liver,
with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.
3. 1.5 cm. long, spindle shape[d] edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a
sharp lateral and blunt medial extremeties, located at the anterior abdominal wall, left
side, 9.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed backwards, upwards and
medially involving the skin and soft tissues, penetrating the transverse colon with an
approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
4. 1.5 cm. long, spindle, edges irregular oriented almost horizontally with a sharp
poster-lateral a blunt antero medial extremities located at the anterior chest wall right
side, 21.0 cm. from the anterior median line, directed backward, upwards and
medially involving the skin and soft tissues penetrating the 8th intercostals space,
into the diaphragm and right lobe of the liver, with an approximate depth of 12.0 cm.
Hemoperitoneum 1,500 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, half-full with rice and brownish fluid.
Cause of death stab wounds of the chest and abdomen. 19
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision, finding Li guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding accused KINGSTONE LI guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) years, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum with all the accessories
of the law.
The accused is further ordered to pay to the heirs of the late Christopher Arugay the sum
of P50,000.00 for and as indemnity for causing the death of said victim.
With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.20
Li appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed with modification the RTC Decision. He filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied.21
Li filed the present Petition for Review, seeking the reversal of his conviction for the crime of
homicide.
Li denies killing Arugay. He contends that the RTC erred in holding that he was the instigator of the
events leading to Arugays death; in not basing its Decision on the evidence on record; in holding
that he was guilty of homicide by reason of conspiracy; and in not ruling that the evidence of the
prosecution does not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 22
There is a difference in the factual findings of the RTC and those of the Court of Appeals. The
variance warrants the close review of the findings of the two courts. While both courts argue that Li
was guilty of homicide, their respective rationales are different.
Neither court disputes that the proximate cause of the death of Arugay was the stab wounds he
received. The RTC concluded though that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay:
From all these conflicting versions, this court after piecing out the evidence presented and
from what can be deduced in the circumstances obtaining finds that because of the
altercation between Christopher Arugay and Kingstone Li, Christopher Arugay armed himself
with a bolo and Kingstone Li armed himself with a baseball bat.
From the evidence presented, it became clear to the court that it was Kingstone Li who hit
first with a baseball bat Christopher Arugay hitting the latter not on the head but at the right
arm which is near the shoulder. 23
xxx
Now, after Kingstone Li has hit the deceased with a baseball bat, the deceased who is
armed with a bolo, retaliated by hacking Kingstone Li on the head and indeed he was hit on
the head and right wrist causing Kingstone Li to lose his hold on the baseball bat and fell
(sic) semi-unconscious or unconscious.
At this point in time, Eduardo Sangalang, who was then also present stabbed the deceased
several times at least six times.
This is explained by the findings of Dr. Alberto Reyes that Christopher Arugay sustained an
incise[d] wound on scalp, on the left chest, and four stab wounds that are fatal.
When Christopher Arugay sustained the fatal wounds, two (2) of them piercing his liver xxx 24
While the RTC concluded that Li had not stabbed Arugay, it nevertheless held him guilty, predicated
on a finding of conspiracy with Sangalang. This issue shall be explored in greater detail later.

In contrast, the Court of Appeals did not rule out the possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay, and
rendered unnecessary a finding of conspiracy to attach guilt to the accused. It held:
The deceased suffered four fatal wounds, then (sic) the accused might have inflicted at
least one fatal stab wound and so with his friend Eddie Boy, who remains at large. Since it
has not been established which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both
be held liable and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy
exists.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate courts formulation is wrong as the converse is the correct rule: with the existence of
conspiracy, it is no longer necessary to determine who among the malefactors rendered the fatal
blow;26 whereas in the absence of conspiracy, each of the accused is responsible only for the
consequences of his own acts.27 Thus, it is necessary to determine whether a conspiracy existed
between Li and Sangalang, and if there was none, to ascertain the particular acts performed by Li.
The Court of Appeals also cited the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Tan and dela Camara,
to the effect that they saw Li stab Arugay at the left portion of the body.28 These testimonies are vital
as they constitute the only evidence that Li actually stabbed Arugay. A careful examination of the
case however cautions us from giving full faith and credence to the supposed eyewitnesses for the
prosecution. The RTC itself cast doubt on the veracity of all the eyewitness testimony, whether for
the prosecution or for the accused. The RTC noted, thus:
At the outset, the court has to state that it has noted that the witnesses for the prosecution
and that of the defense either held back on material facts or have deliberately withheld some
facts or added some matters to the real facts for these are not only gaps but holes in the
versions of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. What this court can do is to
cull from the evidence presented what could be the approximate or near the truth. The
prosecution did not help this court any to have a good view of the facts and neither the
defense.29
The relationships of the witnesses dela Camara and Tan to Arugay or the latters family cannot be
easily discounted. Dela Camara was the boyfriend of Arugay, while Tan was the boyfriend of
Arugays sister, Baby Jane. As such, they are not wholly neutral or disinterested witnesses. Both of
them actually asserted in open court that they were not willing to say anything derogatory against
Arugay. Tan testified as follows:
Q: Since Jane Arugay is your girlfriend, and Christopher Arugay was your friend, you did not
like to say anything derogatory against Christopher Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Neither did you want to say anything also derogatory against the family of Christopher
Arugay, did you?
A: Yes, maam.30

Similarly, dela Camara testified as follows:

Q: As the girlfriend of Christopher Arugay, you did not say anything derogatory [about] the
said Christopher Arugay, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: You do not like to besmirch his memory, am I correct?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: So that if Christopher Arugay assaulted Kingstone Li on April 19, 1993, you did not like
this, do you know that, did you Ms. Dela Camara.
A: Yes, maam.31
The revelations serve caution against accepting the testimonies of Tan and dela Camara as gospel
truth. They cast doubt as to whether these witnesses would be capable to attest to an unbiased
narration of facts, especially if by doing so, they would be forced to impute culpability on Arugay,
thereby staining the sainted memory of their deceased friend.
Moreover, the respective testimonies of dela Camara and Tan are inconsistent with each other with
respect to material points. Dela Camara claimed that she and Tan together assisted Arugay after the
latter had been struck down with the baseball bat.32 Yet while Tan admitted that he had pulled Arugay
away from the scene of the melee, he made no mention of the assistance of dela Camara. 33 In fact,
Tan stated that dela Camara remained inside the house.34 This assertion contradicts dela Camaras
claim that she was outside the house during the whole time the incident transpired. 35 Nor did Tan
advert to the scene painted by dela Camara of Kristine Li wielding a bolo while pulling on the hair of
Arugays girlfriend. That is an unusual enough occurrence that would stick to the mind of anybody
who would witness such.
Indeed, the tale weaved by Tan arouses more curiousity upon examination of his sworn statement,
executed the night after the incident. Therein, Tan referred to some existing bad blood between
Arugay and Li over a borrowed tape, a fact which subsequently none of the parties would call
attention to.36 Curioser, Tan never mentioned any baseball bat having been used by Li during the
incident. Nor did he mention any participation of Sangalang in the actual brawl. On the other hand,
dela Camara in her own sworn statement, asserted that both Li and Sangalang had stabbed Arugay
and that she herself was hacked on the arm by Kristine Li.37
Both Tan and dela Camara testified that Li stabbed Arugay on the left side of the body as the latter
was being pulled towards his house after having been struck with the baseball bat. 38 However, Tan
testified that Li came from behind Arugay to inflict the stab wound,39 while dela Camara stated that
Arugay was facing Li when he was stabbed.40
Most importantly, the testimonies of dela Camara and Tan both contradict the physical evidence. As
consistently held:

Time and again, we have upheld the primacy of physical evidence over biased and
uncorroborated testimony of witnesses. We have held:
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in
our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. In criminal cases such as murder or rape
where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many
occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth
[W]here the physical evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical evidence should prevail. 41
It is undisputed that Li had armed himself with a baseball bat as he prepared to face Arugay. It also
appears that the baseball bat remained at the scene of the fight, as the same weapon was used to
strike Li on the head after he lay injured.42 In order to sustain the claim of Tan and dela Camara that
Li had stabbed Arugay, we would have to postulate that Li was armed with both a knife and a
baseball bat. This scenario is severely flawed.
First. Tan and dela Camara would have us believe that Li faced off Arugay with a baseball bat, then
after having struck Arugay, he ran off to his home to get a knife, returned to the melee, then stabbed
Arugay.43 This projected sequence is simply incredulous. Li was already armed with a weapon that
could incapacitate or kill. He had already struck a blow that apparently forced the victim down. There
is no logical reason for Li to suddenly run off to get a knife, considering he already had a weapon
capable of inflicting damage and was at an advantageous position vis--vis the prostrate Arugay.
There is of course the possibility that Li was already carrying the knife when he emerged with the
baseball bat, but that was not established by the prosecution. Moreover, the scenario of Li
brandishing a knife with one hand and wielding a bat with the other is highly improbable. It would
require unusual physical dexterity for a person to wield both weapons simultaneously and still utilize
them with adequate proficiency. Nor is it likely that Li concealed the knife in his clothing. According to
Tan, Li was only wearing briefs when he attacked Arugay with the baseball bat. 44
Second. The pathological findings likewise cast severe doubt on the possibility that Li had stabbed
Arugay. The trial court concluded that only one knife was used in killing Arugay, and probably only
one wielder thereof. The RTC decision said:
The court noted also with particular interest the description of the four wounds as found by
Dr. Reyes. The first wound has been described by Dr. Reyes as 3.0 cm. long,
spindle[-]shaped edges, irregular, etc; the No. 2 wound has also been described as 4.0 cm.
long, spindle[-] shaped, edges irregular, etc.; No. 3 wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle-shaped,
edges, irregular, etc.; and the fourth wound is 1.5 cm. long, spindle shaped edges irregular;
Thus there are two (2) outstanding characteristics of the four (4) stab wounds sustained by
Christopher Arugay. All of them are spindle[-]shaped and irregular in their edges. This is
significant because it would appear to the court that only one weapon was used because all
the characteristics of the four wounds were the same. Thus, to the mind of the court there is
only one person who inflicted these wounds, not two (2) or three (3). It could be possible that
there were two who inflicted the stab wound[s] if the weapon used was given to another after

using the same and the other one to whom it was transferred used it also. But in this case
there is no showing that such incident did happen. 45
It must be qualified that Dr. Reyes, the NBI Medico-Legal, refused to definitively conclude that only
one knife was used in stabbing Arugay though he conceded that such was possible. 46 Nevertheless,
the fact that Arugay sustained the same kind of stab wounds tends to support the conclusion that
only one knife was used on him.
Third. Dela Camara testified that she saw both Li and Sangalang stab Arugay. Considering that there
was only one knife used, her version would hold water only if we were to assume that the same knife
passed from the hands of Li to Sangalang or that they held identical or similar knives. As the RTC
ruled, nothing of the sort was established. The more logical assumption would be that there was only
one stabber using one knife. The question now arises, was it Li or Sangalang who stabbed Arugay?
There is the dubious claim of Tan and dela Camara that they did see Li stab Arugay once. Assuming
this were true, this blow would not have been the fatal stab wound, as it did not prevent Arugay from
further participating in the rumble and, as subsequently established, inflicting damaging blows on Li.
However, the physical evidence belies any conclusion that Li inflicted any of the several fatal wounds
on Arugay.
Dr. Pedro P. Solis, the medico-legal consultant of Makati Medical Center who also happens to be
one of the countrys leading experts in Legal Medicine47, examined Lis injuries on the same day of
the incident, and subsequently testified on his findings. He concluded that Li suffered three types of
wounds on his body. The first type consisted of abrasions, consistent with forcible contact
accompanied by a hard object. The two other types of injuries were considerably more serious:
incised wounds and a contusion. As found by the RTC:
According to (sic) Dr. Pedro Solis, who examined the accused at the Makati Medical Center on the
very night after the incident and (sic) found the following injuries on Kingstone Li, to wit:
1. xxx
2. Wound, incised, 12 cm., scalp, fronto-parietal area, right, 9 cm., right; 9 cm. posterior
aspect, shoulder, right; 1.5 cm., postero-medial aspect, distal third, forearm, right.
3. Contusion, 4 x 5 cm., scalp, parieto-occipital area (post suricular) left.
From the expert testimony and opinion of Dr. Pedro Solis, the injuries suffered by Kingstone
Li were defense wounds, and that there were two (2) weapons used in inflicting injuries on
Kingstone Li. One is a sharp edge[d] instrument such as a bolo and the other one is [a] blunt
instrument.48
The physical evidence of Lis injuries are consistent with his version that Arugay had hacked him,
and as he struggled to recover from the blow, he was struck with his own baseball bat by Tan, thus
explaining the contusion on his head. More importantly though, the injuries were serious enough to

incapacitate Li at the scene, calling into question his ability to inflict the fatal blows on Arugay. As Dr.
Solis testified:
A: [I] noticed in this particular case that there are incise[d] wound[s] on the right hand and
right shoulder. These are injuries brought about, as I said, brought about by [a] sharp edged
instrument. This I presumed to have been brought about by the inherent self defensive (sic)
mechanism of the victim. In so far as the injury on the head is concerned, it must be a hit,
now, I am referring to the incise wound on the head, incise[d] wound on the head will also
cause pressure on the skull thereby producing some effect on the brain, this has been
aggravated by a blunt instrument applied on the left side of his neck and joining as together
the two injuries the incise[d] wounds and that of contusion which is brought about by blunt
instrument it might have cause[d] him some degree of loss of consciousness.
Q: Would that person have been able to stab somebody one time, two times, three times or
four times after sustaining those injuries?
A: In that condition he has no complete power to perform volitional acts because he must
have lost partially or totally his consciousness primarily the hit on the left side of the head
because the brain is a vital organ and slight jarring will cause los[s] of consciousness and
what we call in ordinary parlance, you saw shooting stars as a consequence.
Q: Aside from los[s] of consciousness, would that person who sustained that injury have
been able to walk without the assistance of anybody?
A: In all [likelihood], he might have lost I said of his volitional movement, he [may be] able to
walk but as I have observe[d] it must be with assistance more particularly in this case
whereby the incise wound on the head is measured 12 cm., the head is a bloody organ in a
way that if a person is erect, blood will flow on that area and it might cause even modification
of his visual perception.49
Li was slashed on the head with a bolo, causing a twelve centimeter (12 cm.)-wound, among other
wounds. In such a condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab
wounds on Arugay. Moreover, it could not be established that Li was ever armed with a knife. Difficult
as it is already to believe that the wounded Li could have stabbed Arugay several times, the
incredulity is compounded by imagining that Li would have also groped around for a knife, dazed
and severely wounded as he was. Simply put, Li could not have stabbed Arugay. The assertions to
the contrary of Tan and dela Camara are inherently flawed.
Fourth. In all, the factual determination made by the RTC is wholly believable up to a point. There
were four participants in the brawl, namely Li, Sangalang, Arugay and Tan. The first blow was struck
by Li, who had armed himself with a baseball bat and used the same to hit Arugay on the left upper
arm. This unprovoked assault by Li establishes at least some degree of criminal culpability on his
part. Arugay then armed himself with a bolo which he used to inflict an incised wound on the head of
Li. After Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself armed with a knife, fatally stabbed Arugay at least four
times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat dropped by the wounded Li and struck Li on the head with

the bat. These findings are consistent with the physical evidence, reliance on which should be given
greater primacy over the unreliable eyewitness testimony of Tan and dela Camara.
Thus, Sangalang alone had stabbed Christopher Arugay. Yet the RTC still found Li guilty on the
tenuous determination that a conspiracy between Li and Sangalang existed. The RTC held:
From the evidence presented, the court believes and it so holds that there was conspiracy.
It must be pointed out that Kingstone Li and Eduardo Sangalang were then in the
same house at the same time. Eduardo Sangalang is the boyfriend of the half-sister of
Kingtone Li.
The act of Kingstone Li [in] getting a baseball bat and using it as a weapon and the act
of Eduardo Sangalang alias Eddie Boy in arming himself with a sharp pointed weapon
and both going out to meet Christopher Arugay whose only sin is to point to the
accused his scandalous and indecent act in bathing nude not in the bathroom but in a
place which is crowded by people who can see him especially the ladies and is
provocative to others are patent and conclusive presumption of conspiracy for their
acts were concerted and so close to each other that there is no way but to conclude a
conspiracy.50 (Emphasis not ours)
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present wherein the
criminal acts arose spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants would have the
opportunity to orchestrate a more deliberate plan. Spontaneity alone does not preclude the
establishment of conspiracy, which after all, can be consummated in a moments notice through a
single word of assent to a proposal or an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more difficult to presume
conspiracy in extemporaneous outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be established by
positive evidence. A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on
mere inferences and presumption.51
It is worth noting that while conspiracy was alleged in the Information against Li, the prosecution
devoted its efforts to prove that Li had actually inflicted the stab wounds on Sangalang, tagging him
as a direct participant in the crime. Thus, there seems to be no evidence that would directly establish
the fact that Li and Sangalang had come into an agreement to commit a common felony. Any
conclusion that there was a conspiracy will have to be drawn inferentially, as the RTC did.
It is not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the
malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the common objectives. Direct proof is not
essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature often planned in utmost secrecy and it can
seldom be proved by direct evidence.52Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design. 53 Complicity may be determined by
concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and manner in which
assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound. 54
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before concluding, as the
RTC did, that an implied conspiracy had been established. An implied conspiracy must still be based

on facts established by positive and conclusive evidence. 55 Even if conspiracy per se is not criminal,
as it rarely is in this jurisdiction,56the weight of factual evidence necessary to prove conspiracy is the
same as required to establish criminal liability proof beyond reasonable doubt. 57 Suppositions
based on mere presumptions and not on solid facts do not constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt.58
The RTCs conclusion that there was a conspiracy was drawn from these circumstances, namely:
that Li and Sangalang were in the same house at the same time; and that they both armed
themselves before going out to meet Arugay. The fact that they were in the same house at the same
time is not in itself sufficient to establish conspiracy. Conspiracy transcends companionship, 59 and
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.60
The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emerged from Lis house, both armed, to face
Arugay has to be weighed against other facts also relied upon by the RTC. As the RTC held,
Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, even as
Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any
assistance from Sangalang. Based on these circumstances, the Court is hard put to conclude that
Sangalang and Li had acted in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could
very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li
was struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a finding of conspiracy
cannot arise.61
Moreover, it appears that the fight involved two distinct phases. The first phase commenced when Li,
without sufficient provocation, assaulted Arugay with the baseball bat. Lis participation in this phase,
albeit as a solitary actor, was indubitably established. Sangalangs participation, much less his
physical presence during this phase, was not established at all. In the second phase, Sangalang
was the main actor. Li was incapacitated by then. Clearly, the existence of conspiracy should be
ruled out.
After Arugay had been struck down, it appears that there would have been a lapse of at least a few
minutes, affording him time to procure the bolo. The second phase in the brawl then commenced. No
further blows appear to have been inflicted by Li. On the other hand, Li himself became the victim of
the hack wounds on the head inflicted
by Arugay. As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had
any further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, whose previous participation was not
conclusively established, emerged into the fray. Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily, it cannot
be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in
coordination with each other.
The scenario as established by the RTC still leaves many open-ended questions and admits to a
myriad of possibilities. This very uncertainty indicates that Lis liability as a conspirator was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. The general principle in criminal law is that all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, when confronted with variant though equally
plausible versions of events, the version that is in accord with the acquittal or the least liability of the
accused should be favored.

The only injury attributable to Li is the contusion on the victims right arm that resulted from Li striking
Arugay with a baseball bat. In view of the victims supervening death from injuries which cannot be
attributed to Li beyond reasonable doubt, the effects of the contusion caused by Li are not mortal or
at least lie entirely in the realm of speculation. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the
offended party for labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical
injuries, penalized as follows:
Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries
shall be punished:
.
2. By aresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure when the offender has
caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his
habitual work nor require medical attendance;62
The duration of the penalty of arresto menor is from one day to thirty days.63 The felony of slight
physical injuries is necessarily included in the homicide charge. Since the Information against Li
states that among the means employed to commit the felonious act was the use of the baseball bat,
conviction on the lesser offense of slight physical injuries is proper. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances established, the imposition of the penalty in its medium period is
warranted.64 Li was convicted by the RTC on January 5, 1994. Having long served more than the
imposable penalty, Li is entitled to immediate release unless, of course, he is being lawfully detained
for another cause.
What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 was an artless, spontaneous street fight
devoid of any methodical plan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge
or an appreciable vindication of honor, but because the actors were too quick to offense and
impervious to reason. Yet, however senseless this lethal imbroglio is, a judicious examination of the
circumstances must be made to avoid leaps into hyperbole. Careful scrutiny of the evidence reveals
that the criminal culpability of Kingstone Li in the death of Christopher Arugay was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the person who is responsible for the death apparently
remains at large. Yet absent any clear showing of conspiracy, as in this case, Kingstone Li cannot
answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. Petitioner Kingstone Li is
ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he
is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, as defined and punished by Article
266 of the Revised Penal Code, and accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto menor in
the medium period of ten (10) to twenty (20) days. Considering that petitioner has been incarcerated
well-beyond the period of the penalty herein imposed, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons is
ordered to cause petitioners IMMEDIATE RELEASE, unless petitioner is being lawfully held for
another cause, and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, of the
compliance with such order.
SO ORDERED.