Categorical Propositions Part II

Reported by: Mary Therese Gabrielle B. Estioko

5.5 The Traditional Square of Opposition

The four-standard form categorical propositions bear some relation to one another
regarding their truth-values, at least when the class terms in these propositions are common, that
is, having the same subject terms and the same predicate terms (Hall, 2012: 73). The traditional
square of opposition illustrates these logically necessary relations among the four kinds of
categorical propositions which are adopted from the Aristotelian standpoint (Hurley, 2007: 227).
There are four relations in the traditional square of opposition which may be characterized as
being contradictories, contraries, subcontraries and subalternation.
According to Hall (2012) two propositions are considered contradictories if and only
if they both cannot be true and they both cannot be false. This being true, then of course if a
given proposition is true then its corresponding contradictory proposition must be false, and if
false, its corresponding contradictory proposition must be true (pp. 73-74). These two standard
form propositions have the same subject and predicate but differ from each other in both quantity
and quality (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 194). A and O propositions are contradictories, and E and I
propositions are also contradictories. Thus, if a certain A proposition is given as true, the
corresponding O proposition is false, and vice versa, and if a certain A proposition is given as
false, the corresponding O proposition is true, and vice versa. The same relation holds between
the E and I propositions (Hurley, 2000: 226). If we know that All successful executives are
intelligent people is true, then it must be the case that the proposition Some successful
executives are not intelligent people is false. As well, if No animals with horns are carnivores
is true, then its corresponding contradictory proposition Some animals with horns are
carnivores is false. In general then, if we know that a given proposition is true then we know
that its contradictory proposition is false, and vice versa (Hall, 2012:74).
This being established, we can now draw immediate inferences or draw a conclusion
from only one premise which is not mediated by another premise (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 197).
Otherwise worded, immediate inferences involve only one premise and only one conclusion.
Propositions can also be related to each other as contraries. Two propositions are said
to be contraries if they cannot both be true that is, if the truth of one entails the falsity of the
other though they could both be false (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 194). This relation of opposition
exists only between the two universal propositions, the affirmative A proposition and the
negative E proposition (Hall, 2012: 74).
Thus, if we are given the actually true A proposition All cats are animals, the corresponding E
proposition No cats are animals is false, and if we are given the actually true E proposition No
cats are dogs, the corresponding A proposition All cats are dogs is false. Thus, the A and E
propositions cannot both be true. However, they can both be false. All animals are cats and No
animals are cats are both false (Hurley, 2000: 226).

Contraries, to repeat cannot both be true. But since they can both be false, knowing that
an A or an E proposition is false, tells us nothing about the truth value of its contrary (Hall,
2012: 74).
The corresponding particular affirmative and negative propositions, namely, the I and O
propositions are said to be subcontraries. According to Hall (2012) two propositions are
subcontraries if both propositions cannot be false, even though both can be true (p. 74). So
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if a certain I proposition is given as false, the corresponding O proposition must be true, and if
an O proposition is given as false, the corresponding I proposition is false (Hurley, 2000: 226).
If we are given this false O proposition Some cats are not pets, the corresponding I
proposition Some cats are pets is true (Hall, 2012: 74). The I and O propositions could be
both true, but they could not be both false and therefore must be regarded as subcontraries
(Copi and Cohen, 2013: 195).
According to Copi and Cohen (2013) when two propositions have the same subject and
the same predicate terms, and agree in qualitybut differ in quantity, they are called
corresponding propositions (p. 195). Said more simply, it is the relation between a universal
proposition and the corresponding particular proposition with the same quality (affirmative or
negative) (Hall: 2012: 74). This is the relation referred to as subalternation. In such pair of
corresponding propositions, we refer to the universal proposition as the superaltern and the
particular proposition as the subaltern (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 196).
In subalternation the superaltern implies the truth of the subaltern (Ibid.). Hence, if an
A proposition is true, for example, All human beings are mortal then it must follow that Some
(at least one) human being is mortal. And if No human beings are pigs is true, then Some (at
least one) human being is not a pig is also true (Hall, 2012: 74). However, Copi and Cohen
(2013) noted that this implication does not hold true from the particular to the universal or from
the subaltern to the superaltern (p. 196). Hurley (2007) further notes that if a subaltern is false it
implies that the superaltern is also false (p. 228). Hence, if an I proposition is false, it follows
that an A proposition is also false. Same is true when an O proposition is false; the
corresponding E proposition is also false.
We see the that:
(1) Contradictories cannot both be false and cannot both be true;
(2) Contraries cannot both be true, but both may be false;
(3) Subcontraries cannot both be false, but both may be true and
(4) subalternation, if the superaltern is true, the subaltern must be true; if the subaltern is
false, the superaltern must be false (Hall, 2012: 75).
The four ways in which propositions may be characterized are represented by a diagram
more commonly known as the square of opposition (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1. The Traditional Square of Opposition

Table 1.1 shows the list of immediate inferences based on the traditional square of
opposition given the truth or falsehood of anyone of the four standard-form categorical
propositions.
Table 1.1 Table of Inferences
If A is true:

E is false; I is true; O is false

If E is true:

A is false; I is false; O is true

If I is true:

E is false; A and O are undetermined

If O is true:

A is false; E and I are undetermined

If A is false:

O is true; E and I are undetermined

If E is false:

I is true; A and O are undetermined

If I is false:

A is false; E is true; O is true

If O is false:

A is true; E is false; I is true

Source: Copi and Cohen (2013)

Below are examples of the application of these immediate inferences that can be readily
drawn from the information embedded in the traditional square of opposition.
Examples:
(A)

If true:
false
true
false

A
E
I
O

All men are wicked creatures.

No men are wicked creatures.
Some men are wicked creatures.
Some men are not wicked creatures.

If false:
undetermined
undetermined
true

(B)

If true:
false
false
true

E
A
I
O

No men are wicked creatures.

All men are wicked creatures.
Some men are wicked creatures.
Some men are not wicked creatures.

If false:
undetermined
true
undetermined

(C)

If true:
undetermined
false
undetermined

I
A
E
O

Some men are wicked creatures.

All men are wicked creatures.
No men are wicked creatures.
Some men are not wicked creatures.

If false:
false
true
true

(D)

If true:
false
undetermined
undetermines

O
A
E
I

Some men are not wicked creatures.

All men are wicked creatures.
No men are wicked creatures.
Some men are wicked creatures.

If false:
true
false
true

5.6 Further Immediate Inferences

There are three other immediate inferences that are not directly associated with the square
of opposition that have to be considered. These are, namely, conversion, obversion, and
contraposition.
In general, we say that the converse of a given proposition is obtained by exchanging
the S-term and the P-term (Hall, 2012: 78). The proposition from which it is derived from is
called the obvertend.

Source: Hurley (2000)

For example, if the E proposition No men are angels is converted, the resulting
statement is No angels are men. Similarly, the I proposition Some women are writers
converted is Some writers are women (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 198). We must note that
conversion is perfectly valid for all E propositions and all I propositions. However, this does not
hold true for O propositions.
In general, the conversion of an O proposition is not valid (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 199).
Clearly if the O proposition Some animals are not dogs is true, it does not follow that Some
dogs are not animals is true.
The converse of an A proposition is valid only by limitation. In the traditional square of
opposition, we have seen that one can immediately infer from the A proposition its subaltern the
I proposition. Moreover, as seen from an earlier discussion, an I proposition may be converted
validly (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 199). Hence, seeing this relationship, by a combination of
subalternation and conversion, we can make the converse of the A proposition valid by
limitation. This pattern of inference, called conversion by limitation proceeds by interchanging
subject and predicate terms and changing the quantity of the proposition from universal to
particular, from all to some (Ibid).
So, if we are given the A proposition that All dogs are animals, we first must infer that
Some dogs are animals by subalternation, and from the subaltern, we can by conversion validly
infer that Some animals are dogs (Ibid). According to Hall (2012) we can generalize this as
follows: the inference from an A proposition to its limited converse is valid, and without this
limitation, the inference is invalid (p. 79).
Let us see how these four standard-form categorical propositions relate to their converse
in the following set of diagrams:
Source: Hurley (2000)

In Table 2.1 we can see the table of valid conversions which summarizes the immediate
inference of conversion with respect to the four standard-form categorical propositions.
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Table 2.1 Table Valid Converstions

Convertend

Converse

A: All S is P

I: Some P is S. (by limitation)

E: No S is P

E: No P is S

I: Some S is P

I: Some P is S

O: Some S is not P

Conversion not valid

Source: Copi and Cohen (2013)

Before we proceed with discussing the second kind of immediate inference, we must first
discuss the complementary class or the complement. A complement, according to Copi and
Cohen (2013), ...is the collection of all things that do not belong to the original class (p. 200).
For example, the complement of the class of dogs is the class of everything that is not a dog.
For terms consisting of a single word, the term complement is usually formed by simply
attaching the prefix non- to the term. Thus, the complement of the term dog is non-dog,
the complement of the term book is non-book (Hurley, 2000: 217).
The relationship that exists between a term and a complement can be illustrated in the
Venn diagram below. Wherein, we can see that if the circle represents the class of dogs, then
everything outside the circle represents the class of non-dogs (cats, fishes, trees, and so on)
(Hurley, 2000: 218).

Source: Hurley (2000)

Now that we have been introduced the concept of a complementary class, we can now
proceed to discuss the second of the three kinds of immediate inference called obversion. With
respect to obversion, the inference from any of the four standard-form propositions to its obverse
is valid (Hall, 2012: 80).
According to Copi and Cohen (2013), to obvert a propositionchange its qualityand
replace the predicate term with its complement (p. 201). We must note, however, that the
subject term remains the same, and so does the quantity of the proposition being obverted. So,
the obverse of an A proposition All S is P is the E proposition, No S is non-P. For example,
the A proposition All roses are flowers is logically equivalent in truth-value to No roses are
non-flowers, and vice versa. As well, the I proposition Some S is P logically implies its
obverse Some S is not non-P, and that O proposition Some S is not P logically implies its
obverse Some S is non-P (Hall, 2012: 80).

Source: Hurley (2000)

Pointing out again that every of the four standard-form categorical propositions is
logically equivalent to its obverse that is, they have the same truth-values, and hence one
can be substituted for the other without changing the truth-value of either (Hall, 2012: 80).

Below are the Venn diagrams illustrating how the four standard-form categorical propositions
relate to their obverse.

Source: Hurley (2000)

The following table gives a complete picture of all valid obversions:

Table 2.1 Table Valid Obversions
Obvertend

Obverse

A: All S is P

E: No S is non-P

E: No S is P

A: All S is non-P

I: Some S is P

O: Some S is not non-P

O: Some S is not P

I: Some S is non-P

Source: Copi and Cohen (2013)

Contraposition is the third type of immediate inference. There are two steps in order to
derive the contrapositive of a given standard-form proposition (1) switching the subject and
predicate terms and (2) replacing the subject and predicate terms with their term complements

(Hurley, 2000: 220). Hall (2012) gives an example of the contrapositive of the A proposition
All S is P which is All non-P are non-S (81)

. Source: Hurley (2000)

According to Copi and Cohen (2013), contraposition is valid for both A propositions and
O propositions (p. 202). The fact that the immediate inference from an A proposition or form an
O proposition to its contrapositive is valid, it follows that the inference from the truth of one to
the truth of the other, or from the falsity of one to the falsity of the other, is valid (Hall, 2012:
81).
Take for example, the contrapositive of the A proposition All students are wisdom
seekers is All non-wisdom seekers are non-students. Also, from the O proposition Some
pets are not cats we can infer that Some non-cats are not non-pets is its contrapositive. Notice
that in deriving the contrapositive for both A propositions and O propositions leave the quality
and the quantity unaltered (Hall, 2012: 81).
The contraposition of I propositions according to Copi and Cohen (2013)
is not, in general, a valid form of inference. The true I proposition, Some citizens are
nonlegislators, has its contrapositive the false proposition, Some legislators are noncitizens. The
reason for its invalidity becomes evident when we try to derive the contrapositive of the I
proposition by successively obverting, converting, and obverting (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 202).

The obverse of the I proposition Some S is P, is the O proposition Some S is not non-P. The
next step is to take the converse of the obverse. However, we have discussed earlier that an O
proposition and its converse are not logically equivalent. Hence, in general, the contraposition of
an I proposition is not a valid form of inference.
On the other hand, the immediate inference of an E proposition to its contrapositive is not
a valid form of inference without an appropriate qualification which is by limitation. This is
what we refer to as contrapositive by limitation. This is done so by obverting it first, followed by
converting and then obverting again. If we have the E proposition No S is P, and obvert it, we
obtain the A proposition, All S is non-P. Take note that an A proposition, as discussed earlier,
can only be validly converted by limitation. Hence, if we then do convert it by limitation, we get
the I proposition Some non-P is S. Obverting this, we attain the O proposition Some non-P is
not non-S.
To show how the four standard-form categorical propositions relate to their
contrapositive, we have the following Venn diagrams:

Source: Hurley (2000)

Hence, contraposition is valid for the A and O propositions, not valid for the I
proposition, and valid for the E proposition only by limitation (Hall, 2012: 82). An overview of
contraposition can be exhibited by the following table:
Table 2.1 Table Valid Obversions
Obvertend

Obverse

A: All S is P

A: All non-P is non-S

E: No S is P

O: Some non-P is not non-S (by limitation)

I: Some S is P

Contraposition not valid

O: Some S is not P

O: Some non-P is not non-S

Source: Copi and Cohen (2013)

5.7 Existential Import and the Interpretation of Categorical Propositions

The traditional square of opposition is based on Aristotelian logic. However, this suffers
from a dilemma. Aristotle, though brilliant, did not consider that classes can be empty. Aristotle
assumed that every class has at least one member. This assumption is referred to as the
existential assumption (Hall, 2012: 76). The source of the dilemma which undermines the
validity of many relationships in the traditional square of opposition is the problem of existential
import. A proposition is said to have existential import if it typically is uttered to assert the
existence of objects of some kind (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 208).

I and O propositions are sure to have existential import, for when we say that Some
flowers are roses it asserts that there exists at least one flower which is a rose (Hall, 2012: 76).
Given an O proposition Some dogs are not companions, says that there exists at least one dog
that is not a companion. Hence, particular propositions, as a fact, make an existential assertion
or that the classes designated by their subject terms are not empty, that each at least has one
member (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 208).
The dilemma arises from the consequences of this fact. In subalternation, we have seen
that an I proposition follows from an A proposition, the same is true with O and E propositions
(Ibid: 209). Hence, if I and O propositions have existential import, and they validly follow from
A and E propositions, respectively, it must mean the A and E propositions also have existential
import. As a rule, a proposition with existential import cannot be derived validly from
another that does not have such import (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 210).
A and E propositions in the traditional square of opposition are contraries. We discussed
earlier that contraries cannot both be true, but can both be false. However, if both A and E
propositions have existential import, then both propositions can be true. Take a look at the
example given by Hall (2012):
A proposition:

All the money in my wallet is yours.

E proposition:

No money in my wallet is yours.

Now, if both the A proposition and the E proposition have existential import that is, that there is
money in my wallet then both the A and E propositions are true if there is no money in my
wallet. If I give you all the money in my (empty) wallet and if I give you none of the money in
my (empty wallet), I will have given you the same amount of money no money. Hence, we
now see that the inference of truth from the universal proposition to the falsity of its contrary is
not valid unless we assume that there is existential import (p. 77).
To solve this dilemma, in the late nineteenth century, a mathematician and logician
named George Boole proposed a resolution. Boole solved this dilemma by denying that
universal propositions have existential import. This had the following effects:
(1) I and O propositions have existential import;
(2) A and O propositions and E and I propositions with the same subject and predicate
terms retain their relationship as contradictories;
(3) Since A and E propositions have no existential import, subalternation is generally not
valid;
(4) Contraries are eliminated because A and E propositions can now both be true when
the subject class is empty. Similarly, subcontraries are eliminated because I and O
propositions can now be both false when the subject class is empty;
(5) Some immediate inferences are preserved: conversion for E and I propositions,
contraposition for A and O propositions, and obversion for any proposition.
However, conversion by limitation and contraposition by limitation are no longer
generally valid;
(6) Any argument that relies on the mistaken assumption of existence commits the
existential fallacy (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 213).
In the Boolean interpretation of categorical propositions, nothing is left of the immediate
inferences involving contraries, subcontraries, and subalterns. However, contradictories still
remain to be valid immediate inferences. For example, if All unicorns have wings is false

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because there are no unicorns, it still is the case that the corresponding contradictory O
proposition, Some unicorns do not have wings must be true. Hence,
the immediate inference from the truth of a given proposition to the falsity of its corresponding
contradictory proposition, or from the falsity of a given proposition to the falsity of its
corresponding contradictory proposition, are valid immediate inferences, even if the existential
assumption is not made (Hall, 2012: 78).

In the Boolean interpretation, the traditional square of opposition is transformed in a way

wherein the relations along the sides of the square are undone, but the diagonal, contradictory
relations remain in force (Copi and Cohen, 2013: 213). This is illustrated below and is called
the modern square of opposition.

Figure 3.1 The modern Square of Opposition

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References:
Cohen, I. M., & Cohen, C. (2013). Introduction to Logic (13th Edition ed.). Philippines: Pearson
Education South Asia PTE. LTD.
Hall, R. L. (2012). Logic: A Brief Introduction. DeLand, Florida: Stetson University.
Hurley, P. (2000). A Concise Introduction To Logic (7th Ediiton ed.). Boston: Wadsworth
Cengage Learning.
Hurley, P. (2012). A Concise Introduction to Logic (11th Edition ed.). Boston: Wadsworth
Cengage Learning.
Parsons, T. (2012, August 21). The Traditional Square of Opposition. Retrieved January 4, 2015,
from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/

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