Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship.
After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding
house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she
was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that
be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao
City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown,
Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations.
He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oathtaking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could
not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married
Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical
treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael.
He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator
well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An
occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt
a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of
marriage, which he refused to fulfill, although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged
her to take pills to hasten the flow of her menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she
did not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento
vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in
the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera
vs. Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another women who had borne him
a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs.
Peralta, 101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by living on her bounty and allowing her
to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,

marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from the complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar
(Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer Armando Puno, was prevailed upon
by him to have sexual congress with him inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse
because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money upon his request. After she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy, Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case
No. 389, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was single and making a promise of
marriage, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till the end of my years in this world. I will
bring you along with me before the altar of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in
death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life." (Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a
married woman separated from her husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and
begot a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case is similar to the case of Soberano
vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano
before his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse. She wrote to him in 1950 and
1951 several letters making reference to their trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and vulgar nature as to render them
unquotable and to impart the firm conviction that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her long intimacy with the respondent. In
1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado, Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382;
Reyes vs. Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs. Duran, 114 Phil. 322;
Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September 10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint for disbarment against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313

September 7, 2006

CATHERINE JOIE P. VITUG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO M. RONGCAL, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The allegations raised in this complaint for disbarment are more sordid, if not tawdry, from the usual. As such, close
scrutiny of these claims is called for. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. 1
Under consideration is the administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Catherine Joie P. Vitug (complainant)
against Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal (respondent). A classic case of "he said, she said," the parties' conflicting
versions of the facts as culled from the records are hereinafter presented.
Complainant narrates that she and respondent met sometime in December 2000 when she was looking for a lawyer
to assist her in suing Arnulfo Aquino ("Aquino"), the biological father of her minor daughter, for support. Her former
classmate who was then a Barangay Secretary referred her to respondent. After several meetings with complainant,
respondent sent a demand letter2 in her behalf to Aquino wherein he asked for the continuance of the monthly child
support Aquino used to give, plus no less than P300,000.00 for the surgical operation their daughter would need for
her congenital heart ailment.
At around this point, by complainant's own admission, she and respondent started having a sexual relationship. She
narrates that this twist in the events began after respondent started calling on her shortly after he had sent the
demand letter in her behalf. Respondent allegedly started courting her, giving her financial aid. Soon he had
progressed to making sexual advances towards complainant, to the accompaniment of sweet inducements such as
the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for
support against Aquino. Complainant acknowledges that she succumbed to these advances, assured by
respondent's claim that the lawyer was free to marry her, as his own marriage had already been annulled.
On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer 3 ("Affidavit")
categorically stating that even as Aquino was denoted as the father in the birth certificate 4 of her daughter, he was,
in truth, not the real father. She was not allowed to read the contents of the Affidavit, she claims. Respondent
supposedly assured her that the document meant nothing, necessary as it was the only way that Aquino would
agree to give her daughter medical and educational support. Respondent purportedly assured complainant that
despite the Affidavit, she could still pursue a case against Aquino in the future because the Affidavit is not a public

document. Because she completely trusted him at this point, she signed the document "without even taking a glance
at it."5
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00 cash
andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning
them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check 6 in the amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give
her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her
that he could not give her the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for
the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part of the money
intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore, he did not file the case against
Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr. ("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as well as a civil
case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue
of a compromise agreement.7 It was only when said cases were filed that she finally understood the import of the
Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the Affidavit and
caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making false promises that all her
problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage had already been annulled, respondent
allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires. Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in
him as her counsel and paramour, her weak emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was
able to appropriate for himself money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's
aforementioned acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed the instant
complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer who would file
the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate Reinilda Bansil Morales, who
was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits sending a demand letter to her former lover,
Aquino, to ask support for the child.10 Subsequently, he and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned
that because of Aquino's infidelity, his relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the
spouses were willing to give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that
Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to study the
proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and cons of pursuing the case.
After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court settlement of no less thanP500,000.00. When
Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until the amount was lowered toP200,000.00. Aquino allegedly
offered to issue four postdated checks in equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then
proposed to rediscount the checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total ofP12,000.00. The resulting amount
was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent prepared, the
same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document and strongly refutes her
allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she signed it without even reading it, as he gave
her the draft before the actual payment was made. He notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former
bank employee who speaks and understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the
settlement proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the remainingP38,000.00,
not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he assumed that it was for his attorney's
fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He, however, denies
luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a "chemistry of (sic) two
consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies that he tricked her into believing that his
marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant
very well knew he was married when they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that,
first, they had met through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second,
they had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,

complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so disturbing to
respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the Punong Barangay from 1994 to
2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay Council ("ABC") and as such was an exofficio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua, Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board
Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his
marital status especially that she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively
helped him in his campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out, complainant
moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in the Subic Naval Base. But
months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she
received from Aquino was about to be exhausted, she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance
and urged him to file the Petition for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also
advised her "to look for the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her
that he could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit. He,
however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give her monthly
financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to meet and have communicated
only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant begged him to continue the assistance until June
when her alleged fianc from the United States would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again
asked for financial assistance for the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to
her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him that she was in
need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to relay the message to respondent.
According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared complaint against respondent that she would file with
the Supreme Court should the latter not accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent
ignored her demand. True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for investigation, report and
recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position papers and supporting documents, the
Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and Recommendation 14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting
the parties' conflicting factual versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and
concluded that respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good moral character,
putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and renders him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer, are (sic) expected those qualities of truthspeaking, high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility all of which throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant to his lascivious
hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling complainant and dropped by her house
and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It
signals the numerous visits and regular calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her
seeming financial woes and emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the impositions (sic) of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be
ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's
obviously taking advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for one (1) year with
a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was likewise ordered to
return P58,000.00 to complainant.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning 18 ("Motion")
dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning dated 22
March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of
the events that transpired between him and complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and
manipulative woman who depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she
wants. Arguing that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning in order to
determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction over
the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit
brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree"20 in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.21 As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. 24 It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is
not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not so with respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity
of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code which states
that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The next question to consider is
whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and
in dire financial need in order to satisfy his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative,
we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises of financial
security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former lover, are insufficient to
conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her. Surely, an educated woman like
herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into
sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is
suffering from any mental or physical disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her
part.29Respondent's numerous visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took
advantage of her. At best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does not induce belief
that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not badgering, him for financial
support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire belief. We find
credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage. She
herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow
barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she knew his residence phone number and that she had called
him there. She also knew that respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member
in 2001. Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on several
occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that she knew a lot of his
friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she previously had an affair with Aquino, who
was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to have just plunged into a sexual relationship with
respondent whom she had known for only a short time without verifying his background, if it were true that she

preferred "to change [her] life for the better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned
allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. 31 We are
left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship with
respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over her to force her
to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without explaining to her its
repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino especially that
her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could abandon all cares to respondent
who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the welfare of her child by signing without even
reading a document she knew was related to the support case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four
short sentences contained in a single page. It is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the Affidavit and the
consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her head as Arnulfo Aquino will not
give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if she will not sign the said Affidavit of
Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with
Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to
show that she was pondering on whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college
graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without
any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document disadvantageous to
his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining all
available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court.33 Moreover, there is no showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the
father of complainant's daughter as paternity remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently
agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart.
Besides, the record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the settlement
of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be considered evidence. 34 Suspicion, no
matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the
respondent has regularly performed his duty in accordance with his oath. 35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to her daughter.
Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal check in the amount
ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return the amount
of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of complainant's claim
for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount of P150,000.00. However,
complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two postdated checks amounting
toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent essentially agrees that the amount is in fact
more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was
for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two postdated checks issued
by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent admits that there is actually an amount
of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can
keep the same. Curiously, there is on record a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant
for P150,000.00. It was only in his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation.
He avers that he cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of either party in
this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only on the written assertions of the

parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the assertions through the question and answer
modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in
whose favor the substantial evidence level tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further
reception of evidence solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her child's DNA
test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to state that an
administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a criminal action.36 It is an
investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal profession and be allowed the privileges
as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress for private
grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the lawyer's alleged misconduct
is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court meted out the
extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the respondent contracted a bigamous
marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an
innocent woman into marriage,43 or was found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated
from the foregoing cases. We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought understanding from
the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit relationship was a product of mutual lust and
desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However,
in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no
conclusive evidence that he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a
magistrate despite his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over his indiscretion
and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs that his is not a character of
such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that
this is his first offense, we believe that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the
outcome of the aspect of this case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a
FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the
Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8391
November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez
(Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005.
Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro,
who was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became acquainted as they
frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00. Gutierrez
then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico
immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was expecting to
collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay
the medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an
Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to P60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling
toP90,000.00 "within a short time."
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message on July
12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking advantage of our friendship. You see
i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees since last week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less
more than 5m and its release is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate it wud be
collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial difficulty as everyone is.
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez claimed that his
daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board.
Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July 12,
2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick and now my
bro in law died. These events led me to struggling finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer
backed out. Now my immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her payment sa US
medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10
pls. Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from Gutierrez
the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him
to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to December 2005. Gutierrez, on the
other hand, for numerous times promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked
Yuhico's account number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter 3 to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint against him. 4

In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the
assistance he extended to the latter when he was under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that he
accepted the loan due to compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his
obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he
will pay his debts when his financial condition improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory conference before the IBP-CBD.
Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective position papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended. There was
no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,6 had already
disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his
issuance of worthless checks.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of
just debts and ordered him to return the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest
until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of rendering
the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to
the March 26, 2004 Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have jurisprudence on
the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple
disbarments as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety
Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00), this time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and
vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.7
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his
failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his
dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.
1avvphi1

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the purpose of
obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making
promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico
promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is
clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and
duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law
for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its recommendation
to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed,
as the IBP pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we
have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's
infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety
Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for
circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
ADM. CASE NO. 6876

March 7, 2008

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY
FALAME,petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J.
Baguio (respondent), docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991, their father, the late Lydio "Jerry"
Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil
Case No. A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia Velayo Vda. De
Sy and Belen V. Sy vs. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of
the defendants.3
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the answer to the complaint in the first
civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the first civil case were required to file their respective position papers,
respondent used and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July 1988
executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the
affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio
owned the property subject of the first civil case.4
Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the defendants
in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses
until Lydio's death on 8 September 1996.5
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case
against complainants allegedly involving the property subject of the first civil case, entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame
and Noemi F. Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and
Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons acting in their behalf" and docketed as Civil
Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint
sought the declaration of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the
said property. Alternatively, it prayed for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages
with preliminary injunction and restraining order.6
Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second civil case wherein
they were impleaded as defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they
contended that the spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio. 7
Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements of fact in the complaint in the
second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 8 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court,9 complainants asserted further.
Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated suit which respondent filed as
counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of respondent's deceased client. Specifically, they averred that

respondent filed the case for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession of the
subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants concluded that respondent violated
paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.11
In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants' allegations. He emphasizes that it
was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged his legal services for him and on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it
was Raleigh who paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's affidavit, which
was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the best of his knowledge that there is good ground to
support it. Insisting that he did not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first
civil case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired knowledge of during the
existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio
in the first place. Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or untruthful
statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did he employ any means inconsistent with
truth and honor in the hearing of the case.13
Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any case or transaction. Stressing the
long interval of twelve years separating the termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil
case, respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh but rather between the
heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on the other where physical possession of property was at
stake. Respondent further averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni Realty Holdings and
Development Corporation, as defendantsa case which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and
Jerry Jr. after Lydio's death.14
Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the trial court, the IBP had no
jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added that complainants filed this administrative case when
Raleigh could no longer testify in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.15
In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous charges against respondent,
complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule 15.03 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
represented the cause of the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio. 18
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 adopting and approving
Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report and recommendation for the dismissal of this
administrative case, thus:19
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated by the respondent and
what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have in mind the prohibition against disclosure of
secret information learned in confidence, but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or
information learned in confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed by
respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint the alleged secrets or confidential
information disclosed or will be disclosed in the professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422;
431). In the absence of such specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition against representation of conflicting interest. So,
the allegation in paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is
submitted that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility"cannot
be countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary principle of due process to which the
respondent is entitled that only those charged in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge
not specified in the complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.)
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years since the complainants
became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against the complainants, not as representatives of
Lydio Falame, but as owners of their respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v.
Gayon, 36 SCRA 104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations
and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of the improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in

Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended
and supplemental complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them.
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent committed [the] alleged
breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of secret or confidential information[,] the respondent
has shown that he did not commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for his and Lydio Falame's
defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule
139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly betrayed the trust and confidence of his former
client by denying knowledge of the fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not
disclose to the Court that at one time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally
recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba Falame over subject matter
of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated.
It is only the Honorable Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the
subject of an administrative complaint against the respondent.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this complaint be dismissed on
grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place
and for lack of merit.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court reiterating their
allegations in the complaint and their position paper.21 They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the
instant administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January 2004, or three (3) years,
four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil case was filed on 23 October 2000. 22 In addition, in their
Consolidated Comment (should be Consolidated Reply), 23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v.
Bautista-Lozada24to support their contention that administrative complaints against members of the bar do not
prescribe.25
In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to him have never been proven by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is the quantum of proof required in administrative cases against
lawyers, and that complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the presumption of
innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility only in their position paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.28
There is merit in the petition.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by prescription. As early as 1947,
the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance
that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal
proceeding is barred by limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434) 30
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-Lozada31where the Court held that Rule
VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra
vires.32

Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs with the Investigating
Commissioner's opinion that some of the charges raised by complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in
complainants' position paper filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent proffered
his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise in his comment before the Court. In his
very first pleading before the IBP, the answer with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such
absence of attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of conflict of interest, as
articulated in his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately apprised of and heard on the issue.
In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual
adversarial proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments. 33
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty
to contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such situation will
develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those
in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. 36 In addition, the rule holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.37
The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation will be
directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent
a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the
weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the
highest degree. 39
The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
in conflict with that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything
which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 40
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. His highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all hazards and costs even to himself. 41 The protection given to the client
is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to
employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the
death of the client.42
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in the first civil
case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it
was only Raleigh who paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43tells us that it is immaterial whether such employment
was paid, promised or charged for.44
As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio solely owned the property
subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his
spouse, has pursued the inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio, with
complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase respondent's rights as a co-owner.

The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or through the completion of the
specific task for which respondent was employed is not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to
that of Lydio.45 Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney may not act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. 46 And while
complainants have never been respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the property from Lydio's ownership of
it which respondent maintained in the first civil case.
For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former clientRaleigh's supposed co-ownership of
the subject property respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint
representation of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted. 47 Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look
at any representation situation from "the point of view that there are possible conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms
of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair loyalty to a client. 48Considering,
however, that this is respondent's first offense, the Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to
observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession. 49
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and meted
out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN
In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25,
1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme
Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become
"one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol

of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without
any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court
is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who
ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In
connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious
that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his
client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved
for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack
of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he
attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the
trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had
already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the
trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for

reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice
of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of
time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the
same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on
May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the
same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied
upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest
case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning
the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal,
based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was
much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was
June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme
Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in
said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably
because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in
the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter
in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution
denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to
file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8,
1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as
its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall
have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from
him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that
this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection
with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's
September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer
was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this
Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give
reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This
Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons
for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity
and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in

person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and
innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you
shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you.
But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the
beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck
from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck
from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is
the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful
and derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court,
without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble
profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with
NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various
pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from
this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he
reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is
still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable
commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the
decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the
end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and
sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and
wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional
right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's
famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare
say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices
are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct
such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be
generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or
given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been
lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then
we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between
forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there
is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this
Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed
against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state
the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls
his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions
rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a firstimpression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course
to petitions forcertiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be
unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court,
as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present

questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562,
566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons
may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying
petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases,
respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260,
1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes
review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners
counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we
held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46
of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy
docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review
are often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had
the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to
be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the
Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule
45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor.
The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by
the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and
records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the
law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no
need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have
known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only
serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and
place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs.
Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4
and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.
Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper
(Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs.
Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the
Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if
he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to
blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.
To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure
that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty
of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it
is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a
meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right
is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the
chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty,
with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict
punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who
Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous
and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of
the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the
shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and
respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of
appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal

pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill
v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of
opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the
best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on
the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called
to account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a
scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen."
(Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class
has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners
in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best
position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the
bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound
silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges
personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it
may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline
and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of
mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in

words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a
mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in
the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any
conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and
the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide
comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not
aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous
accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials.
As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that
it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the
court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The
circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the
bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to
the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations
against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W.
212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by
the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles
of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public
confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the
courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been
granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening
letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the
libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic
action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and
said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.
Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious
complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should
have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring
the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and
greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized
any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against
whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an
unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings,
deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of
civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court
an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court
said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted
and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he
considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is
his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers
for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify
an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon
him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and
the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or
the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties,
when the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert
the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and
when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations
more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have
been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism,
but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity
of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who
holds a license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the
court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which
he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a
sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30
days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good,
if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as
to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under
our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the
best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right
does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably
both with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could
ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly
asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is
necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is
the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has
reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he
lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members
of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending
action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal
confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring
lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be
allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said
Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated
litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning
to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the
state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law
School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which
shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every
right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as
follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the
Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of
insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a

communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would
be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and
could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with
due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law;
and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused
of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation,
and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a
citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which
reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced.
To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an
officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation
to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official
acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed
to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we
think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise
rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge
because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building,
to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under
such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining
of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in
Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the
accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it
was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the
state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public may feel that they
may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a
happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the
case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the
latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to
maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an
attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case,
we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.

149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374,
49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our
duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a
letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed
him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge,
but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general
conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the
court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect
for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral
turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an
intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable:
Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and
thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as
the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as
those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of
under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain
a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power
and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our
High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many

blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty
and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session
of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt,
despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final
decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But
the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that
the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision
was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently
to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose
their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous
"erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice
Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to
earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not
entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to
render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so
called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases

be reviewed in detail.

18

which, in the interest of brevity, need not now

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements
made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of
contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only
after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime,
this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when,
inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru
Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later
to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner
after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an
adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be
contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable
by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice
is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or
to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action
pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected
is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be
liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have
confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn
duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals
inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or nonpendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the
purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued
membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power
in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny
its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is
not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude
them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their
confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to
withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment
of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an
attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise
of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental
power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or
not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he
went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his
contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and
dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the
Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the
public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his
vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The
vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to
himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in
them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary
powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a
viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent
and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy
criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities
approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen
would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one
in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at
hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members

who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a
body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So
that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual
members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be
placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit
persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot
abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be
conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot
disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the
power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the
end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty.
Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice
under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor
offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we
are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent,
it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why
indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to
this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4017 September 29, 1999

GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PRIMO R. NALDOZA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this Court a Petition for disbarment against
Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant,
appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant
asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:
1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory
2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from
complainant, allegedly for "cash bond" in the appealed case
3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act 1
In his Answer, 2 respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it
was the complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA Decision. 3 He also
controverts complainant's allegation that he asked for a cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt. 4
In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The pertinent portions of the Complaint were summarized by the IBP in this wise:
Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to defend the interest
of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled Olano, et al. versus
Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said case was resolved in favor of the
complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the
said decision had already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent

desire to collect or to "bleed" his client of several thousand pesos of attorney's fees, convinced the
complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14, 1992, the
respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review which was docketed as G.R. No.
107984 and that two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the
complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] "Cash Bond" in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order
that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount
was given to the respondent.
1wphi1.nt

. . . [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the
Supreme Court consist[ed] only of nominal filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order
to cover up respondent's misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy
of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.
Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation revealed that
the said receipt issued by the treasurer's office of the Supreme Court . . . [was] spurious, meaning a
fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the
Supreme Court was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme
Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of
showing that the said computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent. 5 (citations
omitted)
Meanwhile, a criminal case 6 for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein respondent before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the
amount of US$ 2,555.
Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground
that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion. 7
On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution, which approved the
investigating commissioner's report 8 and recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation in this manner:
. . . [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on the receipt for
the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his position on a mere denial that it is
not his signature. Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992,
and the encircled signature of the respondent, which . . . according to him is falsified and irregular.
No evidence, however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and
irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied] that he ha[d]
anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the Petition for Review and tried to
explain that his name appear[ed] to be the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the
petitioner. But while it is true that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G.
Gatchalian, president of the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he signed the
said petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who prepared
the same and the notary public before whom the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who
"caused the preparation" of the said petition.
The legal form (Exh. "G") of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984 was denied by
the respondent because according to him he was never given a chance to cross-examine the person
who issued the [certification] . . . . However, respondent does not deny that he is the person referred
to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.
In addition to the said respondent's Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this Commission as
his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza", the copy of which Decision is appended to his
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present
administrative case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same
facts and evidence. 9 (citations omitted)
Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent's contention that his acquittal in the companion criminal case should
result in the dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal case for
estafa 10 was completely different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in

the latter. 11 He further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found
him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555. 12

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. However, the recommended
penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.
At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent's Motion to Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion,
he maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because he has been acquitted of estafa which
involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was "the very same issue litigated in this
case,"13 and that his exoneration "was a result of a full blown trial on the merits of this case." 14
In a similar case, we have said:
. . . The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of . . . criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is
acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. 15
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
independently of civil and criminal cases.

16

They are distinct from and they may proceed

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; 17 in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is
required. 18 Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances
are attendant in the administrative proceedings. 19
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in
the administrative case. 20 Conversely, respondent's acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the
same vein, the trial court's finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the
administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative
liability of the lawyer. 21 The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would
be well to remember the Court's ruling in In re Almacen, 22 which we quote:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . . (emphasis
ours)
We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.
First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite knowing that it had already
become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G.
Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of
Execution which led him to the conclusion that "they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court." 23 This, however,
does not substantiate the charge.
Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that
the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has
been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows
that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner's failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible
duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.

Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555,
on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian, 24 respondent
explained that the amount would "cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court
and which amount also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or
paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be garnished." 25Corroborating
Gatchalian's testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation that it "would be
paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case." 26
The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and
issued a check to complainant as his "moral obligation," he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the
actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an admission of
misconduct. 27 In his Answer submitted to this Court, he declared:
(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the allegation of the
Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all the cases and assignments
made by the Petitioner to me, I was made to report to him personally and to his Board of Directors
the progress of the cases both orally and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him
P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as
attorney's fee [to] which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37
of the above-cited rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in satisfaction
of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as Attorney's Lien, as shown in my Service
Billings and Statement of Accounts." 28 (emphasis ours)
Contrary to respondent's claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorney's lien. He demanded the money
from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted
it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice. 29 The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over
the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by a
lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. 30
Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to him, respondent gave complainant a
photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him.
Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian 31 and Deles 32 were equally clear on this point. After respondent had presented the
false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash
Collection and Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555.
In fact, the records of the said case 33 contain no indication at all that the Court has required the payment of the latter sum,
or that it has been paid at all.
Juxtaposed to the complainant's evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the IBP's findings that he
has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his client's money. We agree with the IBP
that "it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any
knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the Supreme Court, could spuriously weave such documents
which are denied by the respondent." 34
In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble profession. As we have stated
inResurrecion v. Sayson: 35
[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their
clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach.
Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus reason,
misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya, 36 the Court
ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an
execution, viz.:
[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records
abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the
herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.
In Obia v. Catimbang, 37 we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to
him:

The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his
duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal
profession.
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a
reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to
cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out
his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Adm. Case No. 4749

January 20, 2000

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at
least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and
1997: (originals available).
Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-9525253, RTC, Br. 224, QC.
Annex B "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC
Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM.
Annex C "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member
of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10
which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports
to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the
Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of
these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 (in SCRA).
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati,
MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17,
1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his
name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2dated February
14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2
of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991.
Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after
which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his commentmemorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R.
No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for
Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br.
150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set
aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he
had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but
only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he
never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if
indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and
cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432
which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is
still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per

his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of
Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP
by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBPRizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting
that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent
(10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of
the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts
that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR,
or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1370

May 9, 2005

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of
P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to,
and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law
prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not based
on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues
to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule
139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as necessary
to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption
from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in
defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention
to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could
have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the
creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's
Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they
are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of
property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive
status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where
the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was
working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the
direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code
of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by
the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This requires
membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which
power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to
levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a
revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar
program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains
regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly
observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad
before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing
the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the
meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of property
without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the

police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence,
the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of
which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 217

November 27, 1968

NIEVES RILLAS VDA. DE BARRERA, complainant,

vs.
CASIANO U. LAPUT, respondent.
CONCEPCION, C. J.:
Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon the ground
that, being her counsel, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Macario Barrera, in Special Proceedings
No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had misappropriated several sums of money held by him
in trust for said estate and tried to appropriate two (2) parcels of land belonging to the same, as well as threatened
her, in a fit of anger, with a gun, into signing several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.
In his answer, respondent admitted his former relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client and, apart from
denying the main allegations of her complaint, averred that the filing thereof was "part of a scheme to beat off" his
claim for attorney's fees in said Special Proceedings No. 2-J.
The matter was, pursuant to the Rules of Court,1 referred for investigation, report and recommendation, to the
Solicitor General, who after appropriate proceedings, recommended the dismissal of all the charges preferred
against the respondent, for insufficiency of the evidence except as regards the alleged act of coercion on his part,
for which said Officer filed the corresponding complaint alleging, inter alia:
3. That while being such counsel for the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera, and of the estate, the
respondent Casiano U. Laput on January 10, 1955 presented to the complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera at
her residence at 854-D D. Jakosalem St., Cebu City, certain pleadings for the latter's signature in the
aforementioned administration proceedings;
4. That the complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera declined to sign said pleadings but requested
respondent to leave the papers in order that she may first ask somebody to translate the same for her;
5. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of acceding to her (his) client's request became angry and told
complainant to sign the papers, at the same time drawing his revolver from its holster and placing it on his lap with
the evident purpose of intimidating the complainant, an old woman of 72 years old, into signing the papers or
pleadings presented for signature;

6. That complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera intimidated by the threat aforementioned was
compelled to sign as in fact she did sign, said pleadings against her will;
and praying that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
In his answer, respondent denied having committed the acts imputed to him in this complaint of the Solicitor General
and alleged, in substance that the papers he caused Mrs. Barrera to sign, on the occasion referred to in said
pleading, was a "Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition of Estate"; that this "notice" was legally
unnecessary and useless; that he, however, caused it to be prepared in order to impress upon Mrs. Barrera the
necessity of filing her final accounts in the aforementioned proceedings and, closing the same, because she was
reluctant to do so; that Mrs. Barrera had, also, filed against him a criminal complaint for coercion with the office of
the City Fiscal of Cebu, based upon the same allegations made in her administrative complaint herein; and that,
after due investigation, said criminal complaint was dismissed by the City Fiscal.
From the evidence on record, we gather that, prior to January 10, 1955, Mrs. Barrera was not inclined to cause the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Macario Barrera to be closed; that, upon the other hand, respondent
wanted to put an end to said proceedings since there was nothing else to be done therein so that he could
collect his fees for services rendered to Mrs. Barrera as administratrix of said estate; that he, therefore, prepared a
petition for the declaration of Mrs. Barrera as the universal heir of her deceased husband, for the delivery to her of
the residue of his estate and the termination of the proceedings; that he, moreover, caused to be prepared a notice
"for the rendition of the final, accounting and partition" of said estate; that his purpose in preparing said petition was
to induce her to virtually agree and promise to submit her final accounts by signing this notice; that respondent
presented said petition and notice to Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955, for her signature; that she, however,
refused to do so and suggested that the papers be left with her so that she could have them read by somebody
else; that, annoyed or angered by this open manifestation of distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by
putting his revolver on his lap; and that, although he did not point the firearm at her, its display attained the intended
effect of intimidating Mrs. Barrera, who, accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and the notice
aforementioned.
Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, they become more so when we consider that they were
performed by a man dealing with a woman 72 years of age. The offense in this case is compounded by the
circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the offender should have set the example
as man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person
whom the offender was pledged to defend and protect his own client.
There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently
considered himself insulted by Mrs. Barrera and was obfuscated because she clearly indicated her lack of
confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the papers to her; and (2) he required
her to do something really harmless. Still, it cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on his lap was to
intimidate his client.
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent herein is hereby found guilty of gross
misconduct in office and accordingly suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, beginning from
the date of entry of judgment in this case. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993

VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975, complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the
disbarment of respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine Bar, on grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the convenience of the parties and their witnesses who
were residing in the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said province was authorized to
conduct the investigation and to submit a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits
submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:

. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that
when she was still a teenager and first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her sister Norma; that they also
became friends, and she knew the respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog
City; that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd.
at Del Pilar St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in
the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told respondent
to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent did, and her father consented; that for three
whole days she served as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from her
residence every morning and took her home from the convention site at the end of each day (pp.
112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and invited her for a
joy ride with the permission of her mother who was a former classmate of respondent; that
respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then they strolled along the beach, and in the course
of which respondent proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would accept him,
he would marry her within six (6) months from her acceptance; complainant told respondent that she
would think it over first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house almost every
night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to make her decision on respondent's proposal;
that on July 7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent continued his
usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp.
115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with the consent of her father, to a
party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at 7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and
went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening they left
the party at the Lopez Skyroom, but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and
took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked the jeep by the beach where
there were no houses around; that in the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her downward and his hand kept on
moving to her panty and down to her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is
this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and reminded her also
that "anyway, December is very near, the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he
pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again reiterated his promise and
assurances, at the same time pulling down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid because
they were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed to have sexual intercourse
with him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would marry her; and at
about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat outside usually at the Honeycomb
Restaurant in Dipolog City about twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had this sexual intercourse from August
to October 1973 at the frequency of two or three times a week, and she consented to all these things
because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant noticed that her menstruation which
usually occurred during the second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end of
the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test and the result was
positive; she informed respondent and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she
objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not to worry because they would get
married within one month and he would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132,
tsn,id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and talked to her parents about their
marriage; it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a
scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on
October 22, 1973 while respondent would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong,

Manila, in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135,
tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant and her mother at Singalong,
Manila, respondent told them that he could not marry complainant because he was already married
(p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and
why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured
complainant not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife for 16 years and he
would work for the annulment of his marriage and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.);
respondent told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a monthly support of
P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog City and actually sent the promised
support; he came back to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked about
the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant that it would soon be approved (pp.
141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same thing
(p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila when she delivers the child, but
her mother answered her that she cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog
and instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer; complainant went to Cebu
City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she
delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City; and the child
was registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent by
phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she
got sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she came back after two
weeks but still respondent did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer and
filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; the
case was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was dismissed
and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth certificate of
the child (Exh. 1). Respondent declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6, 1932
in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a
son who is now 20 years old; that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife for
16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's father since 1952 because he was
his teacher; likewise he knew complainant's mother because they were former classmates in high
school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he used to visit her sister, Norma, in their
house; they gradually became friends and often talked with each other, and even talked about their
personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged from his wife; that with the consent
of her parents he invited her to be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab,
Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him to
fetch her from her residence and take her home from the convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each other and after the convention, he proposed his love to her
on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he used to
invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited complainant to be his partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening after
the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he decided to take her home but once
inside the jeep, she wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they started the usual kisses and they
were carried by their passion; they forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he
took her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many times whenever they went
on joy riding in the evening and ended up in the airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that complainant told him of her pregnancy;
that they agreed that the child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would take
care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents of complainant regarding the latter's
pregnancy, he told him he was married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was

already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he answered he could not marry
again, otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his
marriage as he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant consented to have
sexual intercourse with him because of her love to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit
or cajolery; and that the present case was filed against him by complainant because of his failure to
give the money to support complainant while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to
meet complainant's medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up (pp.
198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college student, and was about 20 years and
7 months old during the time (July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been
born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married, General Manager
of Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said relationship,
having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the marriage
ceremony was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said respondent had been
separated from his wife for about 16 years at the time of his relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for quite sometime, having been a
former student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at
the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with complainant's sister,
Norma in 1963 and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he
used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended complainant and who became a close
friend when he invited her, with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her home from the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her
parents' permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez
Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before
going home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the jeep at the beach,
where there were no houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they consummated the
sexual act and at about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act, respondent used to
have joy ride with complainant which usually ended at the airport where they used to make love
twice or three times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed
that complainant would deliver her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22,
1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in
Singalong, Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and
again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to deliver the child in Cebu
City in order to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took her to
the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby
girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about
the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and
later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an administrative
case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration; which complaint, however,
was dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after hearing, respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).

After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full accord with the findings and recommendation of the
Solicitor General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never informed by respondent attorney of his real
status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the
complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would
work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that respondent never
bothered to annul said marriage. More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of separation alone
is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City,
lived separately from him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as though he was never
married much less had a child in the same locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship. The Court is
therefore inclined to believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the
expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and
respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to
allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of respondent's moral values when he said that: "I
see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209, January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47)
Worse, he even suggested abortion. Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we cannot
maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still
valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery
of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into
multiple marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo, p. 15). As records indicate,
however, his claim of having embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his selfserving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could not because he was already
married and would open him to a charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why did he not marry complainant?
The answer is supplied by respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having been
married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into another civil ceremony without
committing bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a moslem convert, he cannot
marry complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant
because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent may not, therefore, escape
responsibility thru his dubious claim that he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the
grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character
is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with
upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People v. Tuanda, 181
SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or
disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181
SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such

respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the
court retains the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman
that her prior marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still legally single and free to marry
him (the lawyer), married her, was supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned her and the
child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to complainant, then
still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity. Respondent then succeeded in
having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his
promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and
moral fitness. Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is constrained to impose upon him the most
severe disciplinary action disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality. The members
are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient either moral character or education (In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1
[1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26
[1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such, should not be allowed continued membership in
the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a
member of the Bar and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys. Let
copies of this Resolution be furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent Daarol.
SO ORDERED.