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Election Laws
SUNGA vs. COMELEC (288 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 125629,
1
March 25, 1998)
On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a lettercomplaint 2 for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of
using three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, in
violation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filed
another letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidad
this time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,
intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the Omnibus
Election Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to him
in the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an Amended
Petition 4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two
(2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing more
specific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The case
was docketed as SPA No. 95-213.
1.
Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registered
candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically
enumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, filed
directly with the Commission before an election in which
respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the
Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts
complained of have in fact been committed . . . .
laws . . . .
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the
Commission may motu propio, or on motion of any of the parties,
refer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as
the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power
to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election
2.
Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who has
already been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred
for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of this
Commission.
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The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fatal
procedural lapse on the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees above
described are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take
action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or
proceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that it is
permissive only and operates to confer a discretion on the
COMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case of
non-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and did
not dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment of
fees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertaining
the same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have been
cured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and private
respondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he
submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, private
respondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee was
paid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not required
to answer.
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disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then become
the basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totally
different from the other two situations contemplated by
Resolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after the
election but before the proclamation of winners and that filed
after the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it was
specifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as a
disqualification case.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed
the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority
and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the
Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the
principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no
bar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be
availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since
private respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely
directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we
perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by
the Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim
of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity
thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
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SO ORDERED.
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2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and
substantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and
[the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with
his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can
already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and
prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election
as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for
which he/she may be disqualified."1
Election Laws
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate in
the election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120)
days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the
one which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
president and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned only
upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That,
unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, the
deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positions
of President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under the
party-list system as well as petitions for registration and/or
manifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be on
February 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
xxxx
Election Laws
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for
purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate
of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never
intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January
2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a
"candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This
legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section
80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early
deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the
"election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436
and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be
considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificate
of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period. This ground was based on the deliberations of the
legislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436,
which laid the legal framework for an automated election system.
There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 stating
that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the
filing
of
certificate
of
candidacy/petition
for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in governmentowned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the
start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
(Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
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candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for
purposes of determining ones possible violations of election
laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to public office simply because there is no
"candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period.
Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the
law does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the
questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the
start of the campaign period. x x x
The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign
period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of
the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan
political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period
are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of
the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines
a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech,
would be void for vagueness.
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting
remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. This
Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise
and express as the second sentence, and its immediately
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succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section
15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
SO ORDERED.
10
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all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the election.11
Respondents base their argument that the substitution of
candidates is not allowed in barangay elections on Section 77 of
the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. If after the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with
the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between
the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in
the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of
candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.
Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay
election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because
there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.
Such an interpretation, aside from beingnon sequitur, ignores the
purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters.12 It is a solemn duty to uphold
the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is wellsettled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed
as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed
through the ballot.13
Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific
provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay
elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into
the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more
reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political
parties are involved than when political considerations or party
affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in
petitioners favor can not be counted because she did not file any
certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only
candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the
Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the
assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that
petitioners letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay
Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated
as a certificate of candidacy.14
To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes
in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties
in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the
true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
11
Election Laws
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a
conference. Upon review, the MBOC discovered that it had,
indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes from
Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should
have been proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member
of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.
12
Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) days
following the date of the proclamation.
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true
winner elected by the voting public, to occupy the eighth position
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as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. In
Carlos v. Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:
13
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out
of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result
of frustrating the peoples will cannot be countenanced. In Benito
v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
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x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on
technicalities has been consistently observed by this Court. In
the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in
Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this
Court had the occasion to declare that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this
Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results. This bent or disposition
continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
14
"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the
principle that Comelec is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It, of course, may not be availed of
where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondents petition before the Comelec is precisely directed at
the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive
that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to Comelec.
xxx
"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a
proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly
proclaimed candidate has assumed office.
xxx
"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of
any party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an election
protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has
been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the
proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in
any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission on
Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission
on Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25
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Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes for Councilor.
SO ORDERED.
15
SO ORDERED.
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P3,000.00
16
10.00
5.00
TOTAL P3,015.00
b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 --
P1,000.00
50.00
150.00
TOTAL P1,200.00
Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC to transmit
to the Comelec the entire P3,000.00 appeal fee that he paid on
January 10, 2008. Petitioner also advances another
interpretation of the Comelec Rules that the RTC is under
obligation to remit to the Comelec the P2,000.00 representing
the excess amount of the P1,000.00 appeal fee. Thus, petitioner
claims that he must be deemed to have complied, in full or at
least substantially, with the Comelec Rules on the payment of
appeal fees.
from
Regional
Trial
Election Laws
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall
pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of
the notice of appeal.
17
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
This resolution shall take effect on the seventh day following its
publication.
WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest
cases is also required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure the amended amount of which was set at
P3,200.00 in COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 made
effective on September 18, 2002.
SO ORDERED.
Election Laws
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant in an election contest shall
pay to the court that rendered the decision an appeal fee of One
Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing of
the notice of appeal.
xxx
xxx
xxx
18
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the appeal from the
trial court decision to the Comelec is perfected upon the filing of
the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal
fee to the trial court that rendered the decision. With the
promulgation of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the
appeal no longer depends solely on the full payment of the
appeal fee to the Comelec.
In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal and
paid the appeal fee of P3,015.00 to the RTC on January 10,
2008, his appeal was deemed perfected. However, Comelec
Resolution No. 8486 also provides that if the appellant had
already paid the amount of P1,000.00 before the trial court that
rendered the decision, and his appeal was given due course by
the court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal
fee of P3,200.00 to the Comelecs Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by postal
Election Laws
money order payable to the Comelec, within a period of fifteen
(15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with
the lower court. However, if no payment is made within the
prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to
Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which
provides:
(a) Failure of the appellant to pay the correct appeal fee; xxx
19
SO ORDERED.
This petition for certiorari under Rules 64 and 65, which stems
from pertinent facts and proceedings narrated below, assails the
issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EAC
(BRGY) No. 211-2008.
Election Laws
Aggrieved, Aguilar filed on April 21, 2008 his notice of appeal3
and paid to the trial court the appeal fee of P1,000.004 in
accordance with Rule 14, Sections 8 and 9 of the recently
promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal
and Barangay Officials.5
20
hereof the entire records of this case to the court of origin for its
proper disposition and return to the protestee-appellant the
Postal Money Order representing her motion fee in the amount
of one thousand one hundred pesos (P/1,100.00) pesos.
SO ORDERED.12
When the COMELEC received the records elevated by the trial
court, its First Division issued on July 31, 2008 the first assailed
Order6 which pertinently reads:
SO ORDERED.7
Acting on the "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by protesteeappellant Jerry B. Aguilar, through registered mail on 13 August
2008 and received by this Commission on 21 August 2008,
seeking reconsideration of this Commissions (First Division)
Order dated 31 July 2008, this Commission (First Division)
RESOLVES to DENY the instant motion for movants (sic) failure
to pay the complete P700.00 motion fee.
SO ORDERED.10
Election Laws
In this case, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his appeal was not resolved by the COMELEC en
banc, but by the COMELEC First Division, in obvious violation of
the provisions of the Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Stated differently, the division, after dismissing
petitioners appeal, arrogated unto itself the en bancs function of
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration. In Soriano, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections,21 we emphasized the rule that a
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
COMELEC division, except with regard to interlocutory orders,
shall be elevated to the COMELEC en banc. Here, there is no
doubt that the order dismissing the appeal is not merely an
interlocutory, but a final order.22 It was, therefore, incumbent
upon the Presiding Commissioner of the COMELEC First
Division to certify the case to the COMELEC en banc within two
days from notification of the filing of the motion.
This rule should apply whether the motion fee has been paid or
not, as what happened in Olanolan v. Commission on
Elections.23 Indeed, Rule 40, Section 1824 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure gives discretion to the COMELEC, in this
case, to the en banc and not to the division, either to refuse to
take action until the motion fee is paid, or to dismiss the action or
proceeding.25
21
Election Laws
22
SO ORDERED.39
WHEREAS, payment of appeal fees in appealed election protest
cases is also required in Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure the amended amount of which was set at
P3,200.00 in COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 made
effective on September 18, 2002.
Be that as it may, the Court still finds that the COMELEC First
Division gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court notes that the notice of
appeal and the P1,000.00 appeal fee were, respectively, filed
and paid with the MTC of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April
21, 2008. On that date, the petitioners appeal was deemed
perfected. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the
rule on the payment of appeal fees only on July 15, 2008, or
almost three months after the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July
31, 2008, or barely two weeks after the issuance of Resolution
No. 8486, the COMELEC First Division dismissed petitioners
appeal for non-payment to the COMELEC Cash Division of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
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interpreted and applied in a liberal manner so as to give effect,
not to frustrate, the will of the electorate.42
SO ORDERED.
23
Election Laws
24
SOVP No.
ER No.
Votes in SOVP
Votes in ER
Votes Affected
69A/69B
15327
9602679
27
27
87A/87B
10543
9602699
13
13
192A/192B
10531
9602801
20
19
-1
326A
10532
9602921
43
53
+10
TOTAL +9
B. With regard to the votes of petitioner:
Precinct No.
SOVP No.
35A/36A
10543
9602647
61A/63A
10539
264A/265A
4
5
Votes in ER
Votes Affected
40
33
-7
9602672
55
50
-5
10528
9602871
39
29
-10
324A/325A
10533
9602920
62
61
-1
328B
10527
9602924
33
32
-1
TOTAL -24
The COMELEC concluded that nine votes should be added to
the total number of votes garnered by private respondent; while
24 votes should be deducted from the total number of votes
obtained by petitioner. Thus, the total number of votes obtained
by private respondent was 10,980, while the total number of
votes received by petitioner was 10,957. As such, private
respondent was rightfully the 12th winning candidate for the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
xxxx
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later than five
(5) days following the date of proclamation and must implead all
candidates who may be adversely affected thereby.
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period, the COMELEC however has the discretion
to suspend its rules of procedure or any portion thereof. Sections
3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure state, to
wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
and proceeding brought before the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice and
in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may
be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit
of Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon
the COMELEC the power to "promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
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25
the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be
defeated by mere technical objections.15
In the instant case, records show that petitioner was declared the
12th winning candidate based on SOVPs containing
mathematical and clerical errors. The total number of votes in the
SOVPs of the identified precincts are markedly different from the
votes tabulated in their respective ERs, i.e., petitioner was given
additional votes, while private respondents votes were reduced,
BINCE, JR. vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 273, G.R. Nos. 1116248
25, March 9, 1995)
1.
That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate
Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan
is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S.
Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Election Laws
candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the municipality
of San Quintin, Pangasinan. 2
Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine
(9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private
respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the
PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs)
earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the
computation thereof.
26
(1)
To RECONVENE immediately and complete the
canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2)
To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the
provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guidelines on canvassing
and proclamation. 8
1.
To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt.
Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively, of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause
why they should not be declared in contempt of defying and
disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July
1992, directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete
the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising
the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning
candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on
the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of
Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected
Certificated of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2.
To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the
said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by Chairman
Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3.
To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for the
second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected
Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of all the municipalities in the 6th District of
Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9
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1.
Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of
office and had assumed the position of the second elected
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District. Such proclamation
enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the
majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its
interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent
COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected
COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only
corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which
was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC
cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992
Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:
(1)
To RECOVENE immediately and complete the
canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising
the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2)
To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the
Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing
and proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase
"completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to the nine 99)
COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was
completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San Quintin,
respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and
ambiguous.
27
xxx
xxx
xxx
2.
It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner,
that there are no valid corrected Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any
reference to such would be clearly unfounded. While it may be
true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous
petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San
Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to
make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their
corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the
members of actually implement the order. Such failure could
have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the
petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply
chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to the so-called
"corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass
consist of sheets of paper signed by the respective Election
Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private
respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and
San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid
corrections because the Election Registrars, as Chairmen of the
MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the
respective Board. Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the
members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to
render a decision." That majority means at least two (2) of the
three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the
"municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as
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chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the
most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a
principal of the school district or the elementary school, as
members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities
as Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the so-called
correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no showing that the
other members of the Boards were no longer available. Since
they are from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been
easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the
corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of
Canvass.
28
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand
of respondent COMELEC, private respondent COMELEC private
respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph
of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance
of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of
votes, must necessarily fail.
No costs.
SO ORDERED. 11
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file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15,
1993.
29
SO ORDERED. 13
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is,
before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The
petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992
while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992.
Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of
Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992,
respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section
6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for
correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a
winner, thus:
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certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two
copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding
or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the
statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from nonexistent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may,
motu propio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political
party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice
and hearing, correct the errors committed.
(b)
The order for correction must be in writing and must be
promulgated.
(c)
Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition
of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal therefrom
to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the
promulgation.
(d)
Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall
not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their votes are not
affected by the appeal.
(e)
The appeal must implead as respondents all parties
who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f)
Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy
of the appeal, to the respondents.
(g)
The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the
appeal for hearing.
(h)
The appeal shall be heard an decided by he
Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out
of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result
of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito
v. COMELEC, 14 categorically declared that:
30
their elective officials. And also settled is the rule that laws
governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may
not be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v.
Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni
v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R.
No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In an election case the court
has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate
(Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . .
(Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis
ours)
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this
Court has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of
the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free
and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results, This bent or disposition
continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
Consequently, by margin of 72
indisputably won the challenged
Panlalawigan of the sixth district
proclamation and assumption into
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flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a
faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal
proclamation.
SO ORDERED.
31
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The Tribunal did not adopt protestant's submission in his
Memorandum that the absence of thumbmark or BEI Chairman's
signature at the back of the ballot rendered the ballot spurious.
The applicable law on this issue is Sec. 24, R.A. 7166. It reads:
32
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In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, 11 the
Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not, to
paraphrase it in Co vs. HRET, 12 venture into the perilous area
of the correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of
due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring
that no less than the Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
xxx
xxx
33
There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot
which is not so authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious.
The law merely renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such
failure. The courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and embrace situations neither provided
nor intended by the lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of
a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and
intention of the legislature should be determined from the
language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the
words, there should be no room for construction. 16
xxx
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Meeting of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
read:
HON. MERCADO.
I, think, Section 22, we go to the
intent of the provision. I think the intent here is to sanction the
inspector so I would propose a compromise. The ballot should
not be deemed as spurious. However, it would rather be failure
of the inspector to, or the chairman to affix his signature would
rather be a circumstance which would aggravate the crime,
which would aggravate the election offense, on the part of the
inspector, but not to disenfranchise the voter. Because the
intention here is to punish the election inspector for not affixing
the signature. Why should we punish the voter? So I think the
compromise here. . .
34
HON. ROCO.
There is a section in the Senate version about
the ballot being signed at the back.
HON. MERCADO.
Yes, it should be a serious election
offense on the part of the chairman for not affixing the signature,
but not to make the ballot spurious.
HON. ROCO.
If it is not signed then it is being spurious
which is a very dangerous, I (think) (it) is a very dangerous
provision and so . . .
HON. RONO.
Mr. Chairman.
HON. RONO.
One thing that we have to guard against is
when we deal with the ballot and the right to suffrage, we should
not really make law that would prevent the flexibility of the
Commission on Elections, and the Supreme Court from getting
other extraneous efforts to confirm authenticity or the
spuriousness of the ballot, by making a provision that by that
single mistake or inadvertence of the chairman we make the
ballot automatically spurious is dangerous. It should be . . . what
I'm saying is that the Commission or the proper bodies by which
this matter will be taken up may consider it as one of the
evidences of spuriousness but not per se or ipso facto it
becomes; it should look for other extraneous evidence. So what I
am suggesting is let us give them this kind of flexibility before we
determine or before we say that this ballot is spurious, we give
the COMELEC some flexibility in the determination of other
extraneous evidence.
HON. GARCIA.
HON. GARCIA. That the fact that a ballot does not contain the
signature, I think, initial will not be sufficient, the signature of the
Chairman should be noted in the minutes. Noted in the minutes.
So that in case of protest, there is basis.
HON. RONO.
OO, may basis na. Iyon lang. I think that would
solve our problem.
Thus the final draft, which was later to become R.A. No. 7166,
no longer included the provision "Any ballot not so authenticated
shall be deemed spurious." The intention of the legislature even
then was quite evident.
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Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1539:
b.
Delivery of ballot. Before delivering the ballot to the
voter, the chairman shall, in the presence of the voter, the other
members of the board and the watchers present, affix his
signature at the back thereof and write the serial number of the
ballot in the space provided in the ballot, beginning with No. "1"
for the first ballot issued, and so on consecutively for the
succeeding ballots, which serial number shall be entered in the
corresponding space of the voting record. He shall the fold the
ballot once, and without removing the detachable coupon, deliver
it to the voter, together with a ball pen.
xxx
xxx
xxx
e.
Returning the ballot. (1) In the presence of all the
members of the Board, the voter shall affix his right hand
thumbmark on the corresponding space in the detachable
coupon, and shall give the folded ballot to the chairman. (2) The
chairman shall without unfolding the ballot or looking at its
contents, and in the presence of the voter and all the members
of the Board, verify if it bears his signature and the same serial
number recorded in the voting record. (3) If the ballot is found to
be authentic, the voter shall then be required to imprint his right
hand thumbmark on the proper space in the voting record. (4)
The chairman shall then detach the coupon and shall deposit the
folded ballot in the compartment for valid ballot and the coupon
in the compartment for spoiled ballots. (5) The voter shall then
leave the voting center.
f.
When ballot may be considered spoiled. Any ballot
returned to the chairman with its coupon already detached, or
which does not bear the signature of the chairman, or any ballot
with a serial number that does not tally with the serial number of
the ballot delivered to the voter as recorded in the voting record,
shall be considered as spoiled and shall be marked and signed
by the members of the board and shall not be
counted. 22
The difference in the rules may not be too difficult to discern. The
stringent requirements in B.P. Blg. 222 should be justifiable
considering that the official barangay ballots would be provided
by the city or municipality concerned with the COMELEC merely
prescribing their size and color. Thus, the official ballots in B.P.
Blg. 222, being supplied and furnished by the local government
themselves, the possibility of the ballots being easily
counterfeited might not have been discounted. The absence of
authenticating marks prescribed by law, i.e., the signature of the
chairman of the Board of Election Tellers at the back of the
ballot, could have well been really thought of to be fatal to the
validity of the ballot.
35
It would appear evident that the ruling in Bautista vs. Castro was
prompted because of the express declaration in Section 36(f) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 1539, implementing Section 14 of
B.P. Blg. 222, that: "Any ballot returned to the chairman . . .
which does not bear the signature of the chairman . . . shall be
considered as spoiled . . . and shall not be counted." This Court
thus stated in Bautista:
The law (Sec 14 of B.P. Blg. 222,) and the rules implementing it
(Sec. 36 of Comelec Res. No. 1539) leave no room for
interpretation. The absence of the signature of the Chairman of
the Board of Election Tellers in the ballot given to a voter as a
required by law and the rules as proof of the authenticity of said
ballot is fatal. This requirement is mandatory for the validity of
the said ballot.
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persons were negligent in performing their own duty, which in the
case at bar was purely ministerial and technical, by no means
mandatory but a mere antecedent measure intended to
authenticate the ballot. A contrary ruling would place a premium
on official ineptness
and make it possible for a small group of functionaries, by their
negligence or, worse, their deliberate inaction to frustrate
the will of the electorate. 27
1.
The absence of the signature of the BEI Chairman at
the back of the ballot shall nullify the same and all the votes
therein shall not be counted in favor of any candidate. 29
36
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1.
Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates
for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur and
voted as such in the last May 11, 1998 national and local
election (sic). Petitioner is a re-electionist and a veteran
politician;
2.
The election in Marogong functioned on May 11, 1998,
and after the voting the ballot boxes were transmitted to the
Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol of Lanao del Sur at Marawi
City where the automated counting of votes and canvass of
election returns were centralized;
3.
During the counting of votes, serious irregularities,
anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at the instance
of petitioner or his followers in that votes actually casted (sic) for
the private respondent were not counted and credited in his favor
thru (sic) the concerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of the
Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the
Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew of the petitioner;
4.
In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and 11A
about 115 official ballots were refused or rejected by the
counting machine which the private respondent's watchers or
representatives have requested and insisted to be re-fed to the
automated machine for the second and third times pursuant to
the provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 but their
requests were not heeded by the Election Officer and the
Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad, who is a close kin of the
Petitioner, and instead considered the said ballots as finally
10
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rejected, while in Precincts Nos. 12A, 23A1 and 6A, around 56
ballots were found therein which were not drawn from the official
ballots and were included in the counting of votes over the
objection of the private respondent's watchers or
representatives;
5.
Before the termination of the counting of votes and
consolidation of the results, the machine operator and
Election Officer carried away from the Kalimodan Hall
diskette and brought the same to the down town without
knowledge of the private respondent's watchers
representatives;
the
the
the
the
or
6.
As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and
electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegally proclaimed as winner
because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while the
private respondent garnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of
only 20 votes;
7.
After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes were kept
at the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol, Marawi City guarded
and secured by military and PNP personnel together with the
watchers/representatives of the petitioner and the private
respondent and other candidates or political parties until they
were transported and delivered to the respondent court at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13, 1998 by 1Lt.
Napisa AG together with the duly authorized representatives of
both parties.
xxx
xxx
37
5.
On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this
Honorable Commission, (First Division) granting the private
respondent's motion to withdraw petition in SPC No. 98-228 and
considered the same withdrawn.6 . . . .
6.
Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17,
1998, private respondent filed an urgent motion before the
respondent court on July 27, 1998, praying for the issuance of an
order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to bring
and produce before said court the ballot boxes subjects of the
protest and counter-protest and to set the case for hearing as
mandated by law.7 . . . .
7.
After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in the
protest and counter-protest, the public respondent issued an
order, dated August 17, 1998, setting Election Case No. 11-127
for hearing (a) for the creation of the Committee on Revision and
appointment of the Chairman and Members thereof; (b) making
of the cash deposit and payment of the revisor's compensation;
(c) partial determination of the case, etc. on September 1, 1998,
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.8
8.
When the case was called for hearing on September 2,
1998, a Revision Committee was created and its membership
were duly appointed in open court which committee was directed
by the respondent court to finish the revision of ballots, if
possible, within 20 days from the commencement of the
revision.9 . . . .
xxx
1.
On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing that he
was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed before this
Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of
petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of
Marogong, Lanao del Sur docketed as SPC No. 98-226.2
2.
As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality,
private respondent filed on May 25, 1998, an ordinary "Protest
ad Cautelam" against the petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil
D. Dimaporo vs. Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest
(Manual Judicial Recount, revision and reappreciation of ballots)
docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.3
3.
On June 1, 1998, petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed
an answer with counter-protest in Election Case No. 11-127
special and affirmative defenses and counter-protest.4 In his
answer petitioner prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings
since the protest is ad cautelam or subject to the petition filed
before this Honorable Commission.
4.
On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be set
for hearing by this Honorable Commission, the private
respondent as petitioner therein, filed a motion to withdraw his
petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeit said case was among
those cases the proceedings of which were ordered to be
continued beyond June 30, 1998, under Comelec Resolution No.
3049 promulgated on June 29, 1998.5 . . . .
9.
After the Revision Committee was directed by the
respondent to commence the revision of ballots, the petitioner
Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the
dismissal of the protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes
containing the ballots in the protested and counter-protested
precincts have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots
does not contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3)
Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warranting summary
dismissal of the petitioner of the protest.
10.
The private respondent thru (sic) undersigned counsel,
vigorously opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally
argued that the motion is clearly dilatory having been made only
after the Revision Committee has been ordered to commence
the revision of ballots on September 1, 1998 and maintained that
(1) The motion to dismiss is not allowed in an election protest;
(2) The sanctity and integrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of
the protest and counter-protest have been preserved and never
violated; (3) The automated counting of ballots does not preclude
the filing of the election protest for the judicial recount and
revision of ballots; and (4) The private respondent is not guilty of
forum shopping because his petition of protest is clearly and
explicitly a Protest Ad Cautelam in view of the pendency of his
petition before this Honorable Commission which was withdrawn
by the private respondent before it could be set for hearing or
acted upon by this Honorable Commission.
11.
After the oral arguments of both parties, the petitioner's
counsel asked that he be given ample time to file a written
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and the respondent court thru then
Acting Presiding Judge Rasad Balindong, issued an order dated
September 2, 1998, giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T.
Election Laws
Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral
motions he made, furnishing a copy thereof to the undersigned
counsel for the private respondent who was likewise given an
equal period of time to comment. 10
12.
On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motion to
dismiss 11 and on September 21, 1998, the private respondent
filed a vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss. 12
13.
During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the
opposition thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner's
counsel requested for ample time to file a rejoinder to the
vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss submitted by the private
respondent which was granted by the court and on September
28, 1998, petitioner filed his rejoinder 1 and on October 5, 1998
private respondent filed his comment 14 thereto and thereafter
all incidents were submitted for resolution of the court.
14.
On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thru
Honorable Presiding Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon, issued
the assailed order denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss for
lack of merit and ordering the Revision Committee to report to
the court on November 19, 1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning
for their oath taking and to receive the instruction of the court in
the revision of the ballots and other allied matters. 15
15.
On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dated November 10, 1998, 16 and
on November 23, 1998, private respondent filed a vigorous
opposition [to motion] for reconsideration. 17
16.
Finding no compelling reason to disturb its order dated
November 10, 1998, the respondent court issued the assailed
order dated December 1, 1998 which denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. In the same order, the
respondent court reiterated its previous order to the members of
the Revision Committee to take their oaths before Atty. Raqueza
T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil Laguindab and thereafter to convene
and start the revision of ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and
18, 1998, morning and afternoon. 18
17.
As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the
proceedings of the case more specifically the revision of ballots,
the petitioner filed on December 10, 1998, the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
and on December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgent motion
before the respondent court praying that further proceedings in
Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after protestee's
petition for certiorari and prohibition before this Honorable
Commission shall have been finally resolved, copy of which was
served upon the undersigned counsel only on December 12,
1998, at 10:50
A.M. 19 . . . .
18.
That before the undersigned counsel could file his
opposition to said urgent motion on December 14, 1998 and in
the absence of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
issued by (the COMELEC), the respondent judge already issued
an order granting the same motion and ordering the Revision
Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of ballots
38
on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, etc. until further order
from the court . . . . 20
1.]
holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest
case filed in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.]
holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer
is not allowed;
3.]
failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98
which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11127.
1.
Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case in the
Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.
Whether or not public respondent acted in excess of, or
with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
in holding that a motion to dismiss filed after the answer to an
election protest case in the Regional Trial court is not allowed;
and
3.
Whether or not public respondent gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in failing to resolve
the relevant material and substantial issues raised in SPR No.
52-98.
Election Laws
choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless
they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion,
should not be interfered with. 21
We disagree.
39
1.
It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation of
the Revision Committee and the appointment of its Chairman
and Members and after the said committee was ordered by the
trial court to commence the revision and to render its report
within 20 days that the petitioner orally moved for the dismissal
of the case on the flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes
subject of the protest and counter protest have been violated;
(2) the automated counting of ballots does not contemplate a
manual recount of ballots; and (3) protestant is guilty of forumshopping warranting summary dismissal of the protest;
2.
After the oral arguments on the oral motion to dismiss
the petitioner requested for ample time within which to file an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and over the vigorous opposition of
the private respondent the same was granted by the court and
the petitioner was given a period of ten (10) days to file the same
and the private respondent was likewise given a period of ten
(10) days to file his comment;
3.
On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss 26 and
during the hearing on the said motion and the opposition 27
thereto on September 21, 1998, the petitioner again asked for
ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion
to dismiss which was again granted by the court and it was only
on September 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;
4.
After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November 10,
1998, 28 the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on
November 18, 1998; 29
5.
When the motion for reconsideration was denied on
December 1, 1998, 30 petitioner filed on December 18, 1998
before the Commission on Elections a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and asked the
trial court to defer the proceedings of Election Case No. 11-27
until after his petition shall have been finally resolved which was
granted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduled revision of the
ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1998 was cancelled and
the proceedings of the case held in abeyance; 31
6.
As the Comelec En Banc did not give due course to
petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court,
upon motion of the private respondent, issued an order for the
revision of ballots on February 8, 1999. 32 On said day, neither
the petitioner's counsel nor his designated revisors appeared,
instead the petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men,
numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places, prevented
the court personnel to enter the court premises. Were it not for
the maximum tolerance exercised by the PNP personnel and the
intervention of the local datus/leaders, there would have been
bloodshed;
7.
On February 9, 1999, the petitioner's counsel filed a
withdrawal of appearance with the attached letter-request of the
petitioner asking for the deferment of the revision of ballots for at
least two (2) weeks to enable him to engage the services of
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another counsel. Considering that the incident was designed to
delay the further the early disposition of the case which would
frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in abeyance its ruling
on the withdrawal of appearance of and directed petitioner's
counsel to handle the case after the appearance of a new
counsel; 3
8.
To further delay the proceedings of the case, the
petitioner filed a petition for transfer of venue of the trial to from
RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Sur to Iligan City or in
Metro Manila which the private respondent did not oppose so as
not to delay the early resolution of this Honorable Supreme Court
on the said petition;
9.
Again, the proceedings of the case was held in
abeyance in view of the pendency of the said petition for transfer
of venue;
10.
After the dismissal of the petition in Election Case No.
52-98, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari before
this Honorable Supreme Court with a prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order;
11.
As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the
proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed an urgent motion
before this Honorable Supreme Court praying for the immediate
issuance of a TRO directing the Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch
III, Iligan City to cease, desist and refrain from conducting any
further proceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until the instant
case shall have been resolved. This Honorable Supreme Court,
without granting the prayer for TRO, directed the RTC, Branch
III, Iligan City not to promulgate any decision in the said election
case until further order[s] from this most Honorable Court. 34
Sec. 258.
Preferential disposition of contests in courts.
The RTC, in their respective cases, shall give preference to
election contests over all other cases, except those of habeas
40
corpus, and shall, without delay, hear and within thirty (30) days
from the date of their submission for decision, but in every case
within six (6) months after filing, decide the same. . . . 37
(emphasis and italics supplied).
Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity
of the ballot boxes has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots or
ballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an election
protest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping,
are enough grounds to dismiss the case.
We remain unconvinced.
Election Laws
COMELEC in the conduct of our elections . . . In the case at bar,
the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only
reasonable. It was the only way to count the decisive local votes
. . . The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will
of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined. We cannot kick
away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to
R.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when
machine count does not work. Counting is part and parcel of the
conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision
of the COMELEC . . .
Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take
its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle
that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy."
4
Sec. 255.
Judicial counting of votes in election contest.
Where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant or
whenever in the opinion of the court the interests of justice so
require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot
boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents used in the
election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined
and votes recounted. (Emphasis supplied)
41
Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his argument that the
motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a prohibited
pleading under Section 1, Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure because the said provision refers to proceedings filed
before the COMELEC. The applicable provisions on the matter
are found in Part VI of the Rules of Procedure titled
"PROVISIONS GOVERNING ELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE
TRIAL COURT" and as this Court pointedly stated in Aruelo v.
Court of Appeals 46
Moreover
Election Laws
relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the
naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or
substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of social
conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voter's
obvious choice. In applying elections laws, it would be far better
to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex
but little understood legalisms. 48
42
would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office
of Member of the House of Representatives in the Second
District of Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of
the voters of the Province of Palawan.
10.
The proclamation by the members of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the protestee was
allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives for the Second District of Palawan is contrary to
law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the
Province of Palawan. 2
SO ORDERED.
PEA vs. HRET (270 SCRA 340, G.R. No. 123037, March 21,
11
1997)
On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET,
wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:
7.
The elections in the precincts of the Second District of
Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread votebuying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities
committed before, during and after the voting, and during the
counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and
certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election.
Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive votebuying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of
petitioner's known supporters through systematic deletion of
names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess
of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading
and non-reading of protestant's ballots and other irregularities.
8.
According
to
the
Statement
of
Votes
by
Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly obtained
52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023
votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of said document is
attached hereto as Annex "B".
9.
Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and
terrorism and other serious irregularities not been committed, the
result of the elections for Member of the House of
Representatives would have been different and the protestant
11
Election Laws
The specification in the motion of protest of the election precinct
or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required
in order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to
meet. . . .
43
No pronouncements as to costs.
In its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy
(GAD) vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150
SCRA 665), the Supreme Court held that the petition therein
"could have been dismissed outright as deficient in form and
substance, being couched in general terms only, without precise
indication of the time, place and manner of the commission of
the alleged irregularities."
xxx
xxx
xxx
SO ORDERED. 6
II
The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would
result in favor of the protestant after the judicial counting is not
specified, does not affect the right of the protestant, for it being
known that said omission is a defect of the protest, the same
may be cured by a specification of the votes mentioned in
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding new
grounds for those already alleged by the protestant.
Election Laws
Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in
the instant case, the defect in the petition should have been
cured by the opposition to the private respondent's Motion to
Dismiss.
Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss the
Petition Ad Cautelam, and instead, required the private
respondent Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a
prior determination that the petition is sufficient in form and
substance.
We do not agree,
RULE 22.
Summons. Upon the filing of the petition,
the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding
summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of
the petition, requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof to file his answer.
44
SO ORDERED,