MEM Pre Read PDF

Major Emergency Management
Initial Response Training (Pre-Read)
Petrofac

(Initial Response)
Course
Pre-Read Notes
Training Services
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Contents
1.
Course Information .............................................................3
2.
Introduction to the Platform ..................................................5
3.
Station Bill .......................................................................6
4.
Isometric View ..................................................................7
5.
Lifeboat Stations ................................................................8
6.
Major Hazards Register ........................................................9
7.
Appraisal Process ............................................................. 15
8.
Emergency Types & Considerations ........................................ 19
9.
Time Out Guidance ........................................................... 31
10.
Time Out Pro Forma .......................................................... 33
11.
Evacuation Pro Forma ........................................................ 35
12.
Common Terms & Abbreviations............................................ 37
13.
Phonetic Alphabet ............................................................ 39
14.
Notes ........................................................................... 41
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Course Information
Course Overview
This course is designed to provide knowledge and experience in major emergency
management. For delegates who have actual or potential prospects of command,
the course provides the first stage in the process leading to formal competency
assessment. It is OPITO-approved and is based on Petrofac Training Services generic
offshore fixed platform, the Linda B.
Information concerning the Linda B platform can be found in the remainder of this
document.
Course Content
The programme focuses on:
Classroom lectures, case studies, discussions and desktop exercises on the
essential elements and underlying principles of emergency management.
An introduction to emergency management performance criteria.
Practical scenarios, performed in a custom-built simulator. As well as acting
as a member of the emergency team, or as an observer, each delegate has
the opportunity of acting as the emergency manager on at least two
occasions.
Briefing and debriefing sessions with a final appraisal of readiness for formal
assessment
Certification
OPITO-approved certification and a Petrofac Training Services appraisal
report will be issued on completion of the course.
Items to bring
Photographic ID.
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Introduction to the Platform

The Linda B Platform is the standard generic model used by Petrofac Training
Services and forms the simulation used in the Major Emergency Management Initial
Response Course. Based upon a real platform in the North Sea, the Linda B is a
fixed installation located in an operating zone about 200 miles from the Scottish
mainland.
Situated in a busy field, the Linda B is surrounded by neighbouring platforms
pumping oil and gas to shore from risers located at the north east corner of the
platform. There are 10 wells, 4 of which are subsea remote, and wells 5 & 6 are
classified as sour wells.
Drilling, Wireline services, oil & gas separation, crane operations etc. will all
feature in the emergency simulations and the installation carries a compliment of
100 persons of varying trades to help achieve realism.
Illustrations orientate the installation east and west with the Temporary Refuge
located at the west end of the installation. This refuge houses the main muster
points within the Accommodation/Living Quarters or Q Module. A blast wall with a
1 hour safety rating protects this unit from the other modules and provides for the
safety of personnel in the event of an emergency. Primary Muster Points are located
on Level 2 of the Accommodation block in an area normally used for recreational
activities. The Alternative Muster Points are located close to the Lifeboats at the
west side of the platform and can protect personnel from some of the effects of
weather but are outside the protection of the Temporary Refuge.
The helideck is located on top of the Accommodation Module with the helifuel and
chemical skid on the roof of module G. Lifeboat locations can be found later in
this document but it should be noted that 4 boats, 1,2,3 + 6, can be found at the
west side with boats 4 + 5 at the east. Sufficient capacity exists to evacuate all 100
persons on board in any 2 lifeboats should the need arise.
Of the personnel on board, 77 are categorised as non-essential and will muster at
the Primary Muster Point (or Alternative Muster Point if required). The remaining
23 individuals are regarded as Essential Personnel and muster as follows;
Manager and Emergency Control Room Team
6 personnel Emergency Control Room
Permits
2 Personnel Permit Office
Incident Commander and Fire Team
10 personnel Emergency Response Base, Level 1 Accommodation Module
Medic and Medical Team
5 personnel Sick Bay, Level 1 Accommodation Module
Only the Medic is full time employed in the role while the other emergency
personnel have other normal working roles and only form their teams when an
emergency is declared.
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The Emergency Control Room Roles are as follows;

OIM/Emergency Manager
(Has overall command of all personnel on the installation and within the 500 metre
exclusion zone around the platform)
Who leads;
Deputy OIM
Under direction
from OIM
controls ERT
and Medical
team
Training Services
Control Room
Operator
Muster
Checker
Key Events
Logger
Radio
Operator
Monitors process
& makes PA
announcements
Liaises with
Muster Points,
records missing
& casualties
Notes
significant
events and
keeps main
checklist
Communicates
with ERRV,
Coastguard and
air and sea
assets.
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Linda B Platform
Training Services
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Lifeboat Stations Cellar Deck
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Major Hazards Register
Major
Hazard
Possible Causes
-
Potential Consequences
restricted to initiating module
impairs escape ways to
muster points.
threatens integrity of TR
system.
Consult
Procedure
Number
Process Fires and Explosions

Module A
Training Services
Failure of discharge
lines from oil meter
booster pumps.
Failure of LP flare
scrubber or
associated pipework.
Release of oil/oily
water and/or gas
from production
separators or
associated pipework.
Failure of pipework
to B2 oil metering
package.
Condensate and gas
release from
pipework
downstream of P2.
Failure of T1 glycol
absorber and
associated dried gas
line.
If deluge does not operate

during a jet fire personnel in
module at risk.
Module A jet fires could
impair east lifeboats if
directed downwards.
If deluge does not operate a
sustained jet fire could
escalate to module B
resulting in further
escalation and TR
impairment.
Module A explosions have
relatively low overpressures
compared to other
hazardous modules possibly
due to the equipment
layout, however would still
cause extensive damage
both inside the module and
to adjacent modules.
An explosion may damage
the firepump room on the
northern cantilever outside
the module, however
firepumps at other locations
able to supply firewater.
An explosion could damage
flare boom and lines to the
east of module A.
Large pool fires in Module A
can result in Co
concentrations of 1000ppm
and smoke at the helideck
and accommodation module.
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6.2
6.6
6.8
6.9
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Major
Hazard
Possible Causes
Module B
Failure of a production
header.
Release of condensate
and gas from NGL
metering package and
associated lines.
Failure of gas export line
upstream of pig
receiver.
Dropped object onto
wellhead or flowline
during well services
operations.

module at risk.
If deluge does not operate a
sustained jet fire could
escalate to module C resulting
in further escalation and TR
impairment.
Module B explosions have the
highest estimated peak
overpressure of 0.74 bar for
explosions on Linda B.
Preferential venting through
module B/F hatch covers
could result in severe damage
to module F.
6.2
Release of water and

then NGLs from water
circulation line in NGL
wash system.
Failure of pipework in
gas sweetening plant
resulting in loss of gas,
condensate and DGA.
Release of condensate
and DGA from NGL
treatment plant.
Failure of DGA line
resulting in loss of DGA
followed by gas.

module at risk.
If deluge does not operate an
intense jet fire could escalate
of module D within 5 minutes.
An explosion in module C
could impair firewall to
module D leading to
immediate TR impairment.
Firepumps P27A/B, each
housed in a separate
enclosure, are vulnerable to
explosions, however
firepumps at other locations
able to supply firewater.
6.2
Loss of containment and

fire of Texatherm stored
in surge drum V28 This
could arise following a
jet fire in module C.
Although a fire in module D

would impair TR,
abandonment would not be
required as structure will not
be threatened.
As an escalated event, TR
already impaired and platform
evacuation required.
6.8
Module C
Module D
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Consult
Procedure
Number
6.3
6.6
6.8
6.9
6.3
6.8
Petrofac 2012

Major
Hazard
Module E
E
Module F
F
Module G
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Possible Causes
Release of gas from

gas compression and
condensate recovery
equipment.
Failure of pipework
resulting in release
of sour gas.
Release of fuel gas
Release of
condensate
Failure of pipework
associated with
water skimmer, V20
Release of oil/oily
water and/or gas
from sour crude
separator V74 or
associated pipework
Oil release from
pipework associated
with oil metering
package or pipeline
oil pumps.
Failure of glycol
regenerator or
associated pipework
resulting in release of
glycol and gas.
Escalation to neighbouring
modules from either an
explosion or a jet fire
could lead to TR
impairment.
Utilities and Accommodation Fires

Module H Fuel or gas or fuel oil
leak from Main
Generation sets and
water injection pump
supplies.
Lube oil release.
Low frequency of TR
impairment due to jet fires
Explosions ignited by a
source at the south end
would generate highest
overpressures.
6.2
Pool fires result in high CO

and smoke concentrations
at accomm. and helideck.
an intense jet fire could
escalate to module H
within 5 minutes.
Module H liable to sustain
serious damage from an
explosion in module G,
however relatively low
frequency.
6.2
Negligible potential for

major hazard as High
Pressure leaks can only
occur with equipment
running, these would
shutdown on detection of
supply faults. Low
Pressure leaks do not have
potential to cause a major
hazard.
6.8
Training Services
Consult
Procedure
Number
6.2
6.3
6.9
6.3
6.8
6.9
6.3
6.8
6.9
Significant lube oil releases

could only occur from the
pressurised system. No
thermal or smoke hazard with
the potential to cause
platform abandonment is
considered credible.
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Major
Hazard
Module M
Possible Causes
Fire and explosion

Flammable gas cloud
forming within shale
shaker room or mud
pits area emanating
from enriched mud
from wellbore
Chemical incident
Accident involving
drilling chemicals
stored within sack
store
Module Q
An explosion might result

in extensive damage to
module M mess area.
Chemical fire would result
in large volumes of toxic
smoke affecting sack store
area.
Consult
Procedure
Number
6.2
6.3
6.6
6.8
6.9
Chemical spill could result

in contamination of sack
store area.
Incident in this area may
require decontamination
procedure for
contaminated casualties.
Galley and other

accommodation fires
Smoke and fire would

affect the floor of
occurrence, but not
immediately affect the
other floors. Alternative
muster area may be
required as muster points
could be impaired.
6.1
Helicopter crash or
refuelling accident
leading to fire
involving helifuel
tanks on Module G
roof
Incident confined to
helideck and module G
roof. Unlikely to impair TR.
6.4
Incident likely to be
restricted to helideck.
6.4
Q
Helideck
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Helicopter Crash
Helideck
Crash onto helideck
Other
Crash onto other

topsides module
Blowout
Loss of well control

during drilling or
workover operations
Intersection of a
producing well during
drilling
Dropped object onto
Xmas tree during well
services operations
Potential for a major

hydrocarbon release low
as crash would be
external to modules.
Heat radiation from
potentially massive and
prolonged jet flames.
Un-ignited blowouts also
constitute a major hazard
because of the volume and
quantity of gas released
and threat of ignition.
Precautionary evacuation
of non-essential personnel
likely.
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6.2
6.3
6.6
6.8
6.9
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Possible Causes
Release from flange

or small bore fitting
Escalation event
from the process
fire or explosion in
module B
Prolonged fire will

threaten the TR system,
structural integrity,
adjacent risers and
process equipment
Explosions resulting form
a delayed ignition would
result in minimal overpressure although
ensuring fire likely to be
prolonged
6.2
Pipeline releases are

considered to have the
potential to threaten the
TR or cause fatalities.
Location of export line SSIVs
away from platform is only
potentially at risk from a
rupture upstream of SSIVs.
Inventory limited provided
SSIV operates.
No credible jet fire
scenarios which could
impair the TR are
foreseen.
Explosions less severe as
unconfined and unlikely
to cause TR impairments
6.8
6.9
These modules are highly

redundant structures and
there is only a minor risk
of serious damage,
although local facilities
are feasible
6.8
Short duration (<30 secs)

gas plume. Atmospheric
gas concentrations below
LEL.
Location of SSIVs away
from platform means
pipeline inventory down
stream of SSIVs not
exposed to dropped load
hazards.
6.8
Major
Hazard
Below
topsides
shutdown
valves (in
the air gap
or at cellar
deck level
between sea
level and the
26m level
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Consult
Procedure
Number
6.3
6.7
6.8
6.9
Pipeline Releases
Within the
500 meters
safety zone
Internal corrosion
Impact from
dropped load
Outside
modules B/F
Release from either

oil export (lines
to/from pig
launchers)
6.2
6.3
6.8
6.9
Dropped Objects
Topside
modules
Subsea
Facilities
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Dropped loads from

either National or
Ruston Bucyrus
cranes can only
impact modules F
or G or the drilling
module
Dropped crane load
on export pipelines
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Major
Hazard
Ship
Collisions
Structural
Failure
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Possible Causes
Ship collisions
includes all vessels
impacts. Vessels
include: Powered passing
vessels
Drifting passing
vessels
Dedicated vessels
(supply boats)
Fishing boats, DSV
and SBV
Fires and explosions
Ships collisions
Dropped objects
Material Failure
Foundation Failure
Loss of structural
integrity due to impact
forces.
Accidents leading to fires
and explosions (riser
ruptures).
Pre-emptive evacuations
of personnel possible in
some instances if
sufficient advance
warning
Un-ignited Gas Releases

Cellar deck
Riser release of
and air gap
Flammable gas
Outside
Modules B
& F on north
face of
platform
Within
module
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Source
concentration for
H2S approx 7000
ppm
Releases of H2S at
20000ppm from
stripping column in
modules B and F
Flame impingement on
critical structural members
particularly from risers
fires in the air gap.
Corrosion or fatigue
failure. Structure has low
reserve strength capacity.
Mud mound at jacket base
prevents scour. Low
probability of pile failure
during storm conditions
6.9
Following areas are

potentially in range of a
flammable gas from an unignited riser release: Eastern TEMPSC
Western TEMPSC (>20kg/s)
Lethal H2S concentrations are
only feasible in the following
areas for riser releases of
20kg/s and over: Eastern TEMPSC
N&S walkways outside
modules A, B & C
Releases>20kg/s threaten
north side of platform
6.7
6.9
Threat to personnel within

module but typical
hazardous diameters are
the order of 2 to 5 meters.
H2S detectable at low
concentrations hence
individuals should be able
to react and escape
6.2
Riser release with a

source
concentration of
H2S up to 7000 ppm.
Consult
Procedure
Number
6.5
6.9
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6.2
6.3
6.8
6.3
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Appraisal Process
The appraisal process derives from the assessment criteria developed in the
aftermath of the Piper Alpha Inquiry, by a committee which consisted of
representatives from the regulating and advisory bodies such as OPITO, Oil & Gas
UK, the HSE, etc. and practising Emergency Managers from all areas of the industry.
The Assessment Criteria have been reviewed twice since their inception in 1992 and
now constitute a system of Major Emergency Management which is now accepted
worldwide.
OPITO Approved Major Emergencies Management Training will provide candidates
with formal training in command, control, communications and stress related
factors in the management of major emergencies.
Evaluation of delegates will be by continuous observation during a minimum of two
command centre simulations per delegate, at least one of which must be as the
Emergency Manager, each based around a major incident chosen from the following:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Type A a major emergency that is readily controllable if managed

appropriately.
Type B a major emergency which could escalate if not controlled.
Type C a major emergency that the EM is unable to control leading
to a full evacuation of the facility.
You will also find yourself dealing with scenarios which will include a number of the
following events;
Injured personnel
Multiple casualties
Missing personnel
Loss of containment
Loss of communication
Loss of evacuation, muster points or temporary refuge
Stressed personnel
Extreme weather conditions
Loss of essential facilities
Loss of key personnel
Rapidly developing situation leading to information overload
Evacuation of the facility
Environmental concerns and effects
Following the training and evaluation the delegate will receive an OPITO Approved
Major Emergency Management certificate and a written analysis of any gaps (see
Appendix H for an example Appraisal Form) that exist in the delegates current
managerial knowledge and capabilities for commanding a major emergency. These
gaps should be met by further training and workplace drills and exercises, at their
companys discretion.
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The next stage Formal Assessment

Development of the candidate should continue on return to the workplace with a
view to preparing for the next stage in the process. In order to gain formal OPITO
approved qualification in Management of Major Emergencies the Emergency Manager
must undertake a formal Assessment event. Candidates are assessed against six
Elements.
The first element relates to the concept of Maintaining a State of Readiness and is
a critical step in preparation for the assessment process. This element was
introduced during the first review of the system. Its performance criteria aim to
bring uniformity and conformity to pre and post assessment training and experience.
It is now the responsibility of the candidates company to ensure his/her compliance
with this element. The candidate should be present for assessment against Elements
2 to 6 with his/her Element 1 pro-forma completed and signed by their Asset
Manager.
The assessment process features events which will test the candidates ability to
obtain information from a variety of appropriate sources, for example Central
Control Room, Emergency Response Team Leader, Work Permits, Standby Vessel and
very importantly, the Emergency Response Plan. He or she should make valid
interpretations and take valid decisions re the Type and Location of the incident,
Containment method(s), ERT deployment, Muster status, Plant status, availability of
means of evacuation. The worst possible case and associated contingencies should
be identified and fully understood.
The Emergency Manager should plan both to mitigate the current situation and deal
with the worst possible case. Consider evacuation, minimising risk to personnel and
casualty handling. Review and update the plan regularly.
Appropriate resources include Fixed Systems, Emergency Response Teams (ERTs),
Support Teams including Medical Support, Portable Equipment and assistance
available at External Sources. Give actions due thought and initiate them as quickly
as possible.
Use a member of the management team to co-ordinate the ERT and complete a
mental risk assessment prior to deploying response teams.
Be authoritative, address personnel directly and be clear and concise. Display a
confident demeanour throughout and be prepared to support a weak team member.
Do not overload willing horses and avoid instructing personnel to act beyond their
experience and capabilities. Do not get involved in tactics as this is the job of the
team members. Only move away from the command position if it is necessary to
gather information or discuss tactics with individual team members.
The Stress Presentation will provide methods of recognising and dealing with your
own stress. The required actions to deal with others include repeating public
address messages, delegating a team member to maintain contact with a trapped
person or arranging for their replacement. Stressed individuals should be escorted
from the site and monitored by trained personnel. Effective management will
reduce the teams stress levels.
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The Emergency Manager should concentrate on;

Assessing the Situation
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Obtaining, evaluating and confirming information quickly from all

appropriate sources.
Confirming the emergency and initiating appropriate audible and
visual alarms.
Making valid interpretations and valid decisions about the type and
location of the incident and the resources available.
Reviewing the potential outcomes of the emergency and the possible
response actions against the consequences and probabilities.
Methods of maintaining an overview of the incident such as
information boards that track:
Actions taken
Personnel movements
Casualty/Missing persons
Key events
Physical resources
Taking Effective Action

The Emergency Manager should be in a position to work towards;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
Developing, reviewing and updating a clear plan that is shared with

others in the ECC; mitigating the current situation and dealing with
the worst possible case.
Taking appropriate actions as quickly as possible.
Using appropriate resources including fixed systems, medical support,
portable equipment and third party support.
Co-ordinating and directing emergency response teams taking into
account the risk of deploying personnel.
Implementing the correct level of emergency response i.e. ensuring
that the response is adequate to the emergency.
Applying procedures ensuring they are being followed.
Moving events along but under control.
Applying emergency procedures that are safe and conform to current
health and safety legislation and company procedures.
Delegate Authority
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
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Deciding which activities should be delegated in light of the

circumstances at the time.
Delegating activities to those assigned the duty as defined in the ERP;
confirming understanding.
Requesting assistance and action from others in a manner which
promotes a positive response.
Providing guidance for the team but not getting involved in the
details.
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Emergency Types & Considerations

Introduction
When an incident occurs the emergency managers senses will be highly active
sending signals or cues into his or her mind. These cues, in the main, are made up of
numerous verbal communications and visual images. If the manager is to cope, stay
in control and formulate a plan of action he/she must have training to make sense
of this data. The competent emergency manager must possess the ability to make
rapid assessments of the information, discard that which is not relevant and act to
quickly define the hazard the incident presents to personnel, plant and the
environment. In some circumstances there may be missing information and the
manager may have to call on his or her experience to fill in the gaps.
With training, the Emergency Manager will start to recognise patterns within the
data that will help him or her identify what type of incident is developing. With the
incident type correctly identified, the corrective solution realised within the
emergency response plan can be implemented to bring the event under control.
With instruction on what is accepted as the correct response to an identified hazard
and by undergoing realistic simulated exercises, the manager will accumulate
knowledge and experience of the associated patterns and appropriate responses in
his/her long-term memory.
During an emergency, when a pattern is recognised, the manager will intuitively
recognise the correct response, thereby saving time by not having to concentrate on
problem solving. This is known as recognition primed decision-making or RPD. This
process should make decision making for the manager simpler, more efficient and
less demanding. With RPD in place the mind will have spare capacity; capacity that
can be used to plan ahead, resulting in a more pro-active management style.
As mentioned above each hazard should have an appropriate emergency response
plan. This plan should contain the actions that the Emergency Manager should
consider and if appropriate, implement. These action points will be discussed during
the workshop phase of the course.
Purpose
The purpose of this presentation is to indentify the types of emergency that can
occur; the potential for escalation and the resources that can be used to control and
mitigate the emergency.
The delegate shall also be shown how to take a strategic approach to emergency
management
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Outcomes
The course will encourage you to consider major emergencies that can occur and in
particular;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Major emergency types and why safety regulations put the onus on
the operators to run their facilities safely.
The factors the emergency manager must consider within the incident
people, environment, plant, resources and support.
The managers responsibility for non-essential and responding
personnel both onsite and within specific distances of the incident.
Evaluating the potential for escalation and the resources that will be
required to deal with the evolving emergency.
The possibility of a rapidly escalating situation that could deteriorate
if not properly managed.
Incident Types
The regulatory and advisory bodies have identified under broad headings the types
of incidents that an emergency manager should be competent to handle. These
are:
Well Control Incident
Explosion & Fire
Accommodation Fire
Helicopter Incident
Pipeline Incident
Collision or Wave Damage leading to structural collapse
Loss of Stability
Within each type of incident there will be many contributing and peripheral factors
that require to be addressed by the emergency manager.
Let us consider one type of incident. An explosion has occurred in a process module.
What factors should the manager consider?
To conduct an accurate assessment of the facts he must adopt systematic
methodology. One method is to group the considerations under the following key
headings. People, Plant, Resources and Support.
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People:
Muster the installation personnel in a place of safety, within the Temporary

Refuge (TR) or Alternative Muster
Establish if there are any missing personnel?
Implement Man Overboard Procedure
Is there a threat to the TR and if so how much TIME does the manager have
to implement a controlled, down manning of personnel or a full evacuation
of the installation?
Are escape routes, helideck and lifeboats compromised?
Plant:
Has the process shutdown and if appropriate blown down and have all the
systems functioned correctly?
Have Drilling and or Well Services been made safe?
Have the fire pumps and fire suppression systems activated?
If appropriate, boundary cooling of surrounding modules should be

considered
Have all ignition sources been eliminated, hot work permits withdrawn etc?
Have all isolations to the incident area been initiated?
What was the source of the explosion?
Has there been any inventory loss?
Has there been any damage to critical structural members?
Is there any potential for any further escalation, e.g development of gas
clouds, fire or further explosions?
Resources:
Has the ERRV carried out a sea search around the installation and reported
back observations on the location and severity of the incident?
Evaluate when it will be safe to deploy ERTs
Evaluate what safe systems of work ERTs will require to adopt
Have medical teams prepared to receive casualties
Support:
Evaluate the necessity for a MAYDAY transmission
Request air and sea support
Request medical support
Request environmental support
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Conclusion
Emergencies can happen at any time without warning and the emergency manager
and his team, if they are to cope competently, must be in a permanent state of
readiness.
The implementation of the appropriate Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is a core
responsibility of the installation manager. This topic is the subject of the next
chapter. Caution should be observed, however, as the emergency may have some
unique features that were not identified when the ERP was initially developed.
The competent manager will have prepared both his team and himself, by
conducting drills and exercises thereby developing confidence in their emergency
response ability and acquiring valuable knowledge and experience.
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Fire in Accommodation / TR
1.
Muster Point security (Alternative Muster).
2.
Process Security Shutdown, ESD and Blow-down.
3.
TR conditions -
4.
ERT deployment to Forward Control Position upwind.
5.
Medic to prepare hospital set up triage if required.
6.
Third parties contacted -
7.
Helideck availability for relief aircraft.
8.
Ventilate the TR to assist in search and rescue.
9.
Consider precautionary downman.
Training Services
Ventilation off
Electrical supplies off
Fire and gas system information monitored
Fuel supplies off for running generators in TR
Fixed firefighting systems status: CO2, sprinklers.
ERRV
CRO/Radio Operator call lists
Aircraft with medical support.
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Fire in Hazardous Area

1. Confirm type and location of fire.
2. Confirm GPA sounded Integrity of the TR.
3. Confirm ESD and blow-down.
4. Process security -
Confirm deluge operation is effective.

Confirm blow-down is effective.
Consider boundary cooling adjacent modules.
Confirm electrical isolation.
5. Initial on scene conditions Monitor using fire and gas system.

6. Inform ERRV -
Confirm no persons in water

Confirm status of fire.
7. ERT; hold deployment until safe to deploy.

8. Medic to prepare hospital; set up triage if required.
9. Later, on scene conditions Confirm topsides depressurised
Confirm fire diminished.
10. Deploy ERT when safe to upwind Forward Position.
11. Isolate deluge when advised by ERT leader.
12. Third parties contacted -
ERRV
CRO/Radio Operator call lists
13. Helideck availability for relief aircraft.

14. If fire is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.
15. Consider precautionary downman.
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Gas Loss of Containment Process Area

1. Recall PTWs in affected area.
2. Send two technicians with gas detectors to investigate if safe to do so.
3. Confirm type and origin of gas leak.
4. Muster Point security (Integrity of TR).
5. Process security
Shut down, ESD and Blow-down if safe to blow down

Shut down all prime movers
Do not operate deluge.
6. Initial on scene conditions - Confirm electrical supplies isolated

Monitor using fire and gas system.
7. Inform ERRV send up wind.
10. Later, on scene conditions - Confirm topsides depressurised
Confirm dispersal of all gas.
ERRV
CRO / Radio Operator call lists

14. If gas leak is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea Plan.
15. Consider precautionary downman.
Training Services
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Helicopter Crash on the Helideck

1. Confirm helicopter crash.
2. Sound GPA Confirm integrity of the TR.
3. Confirm ESD and blow-down.
4. Inform ERRV confirm no persons in the water.
5. Process security bund.
Consider precautionary deluge on fuel skid and chemical

Confirm fire pump operation.
Confirm foam system on helideck activated.
6. ERT and medic to be deployed early to support the helideck fire team.
7. First aiders to prepare hospital set up triage.
8. On scene conditions -
Confirm protective foam blanket is laid.

Confirm aircraft is secure on deck.
Support ERT with competent personnel to secure
aircraft
9. Third parties contacted - ERRV.

CRO / Radio Operator call lists.
Aircraft with medical support and winch facility
10. Winch down area availability for relief aircraft.
11. If fire is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.
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Chemical Dropped Load

1. Confirm dropped load and establish
Location of the load, on platform/the standby vessel.
Nature of the dropped load.
COSHH data sheets.
2. Sound GPA Confirm integrity of the TR.
3. Confirm PSD, ESD and blow-down if required.
4. Inform ERRV confirm no persons in the water.
5. Contact supply vessel Send to 500m zone.
Confirm dropped load not on vessel.
Confirm no casualties on supply vessel.
Operate deluge only when advised by the ERT

Leader
Confirm fire pump operation.
Confirm process shut down.
7. ERT to be deployed when prepared for any chemical emergency.

8. Medic to prepare hospital; set up triage.
9. Inform Musters/Medic that Crane Operator may be stressed.
10. On scene conditions - Confirm correct method of containment/treatment is
used. Support ERT with competent personnel to secure load.
ERRV and supply vessel.

CRO/Radio Operator call lists.
12. Refer to Pollution Plan if chemicals are not contained.

13. Secure crane and quarantine for investigation.
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Ship Collision
1. Confirm available data on rogue vessel.
2. Sound GPA Muster in TR.
3. Contact ERRV who will confirm - Marine data.
Plot of rogue vessel.
Provide CPA and time to CPA.
4. Consider Plant status?

Aircraft for precautionary down-man.
6. Do not deploy ERT if not required.

7. Confirm availability of helideck for precautionary down-man.
8. Confirm Marine data CPA and time to CPA.
9. Confirm Evacuation by Air Plan if sufficient time exists.
10. Initiate Evacuation by Sea Plan if insufficient time to evacuate by air.
11. Confirm availability of TEMPSCs and coxswain.
12. Obtain Rendezvous Point (RVP) data and send Mayday signal.
13. Load and launch non-essential personnel lifeboats in sequence.
14. Level 0 shutdown, Hand over On Scene Command.
15. Load and launch essential personnel TEMPSC sail to RVP.
Training Services
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Gas Riser Loss of Containment

1. Recall PTWs in affected area.
2. Send two technicians with gas detectors to investigate if safe to do so.
3. Confirm type and origin of gas leak.
4. Muster Point security (Integrity of TR).
Shut Down, ESD and if safe to blow down.

Shut down all prime movers.
Do not operate deluge.
6. Initial on scene conditions
Confirm electrical supplies isolated

Monitor using fire and gas system.
7. Inform ERRV and send up wind.

10. Later, on scene conditions -
Confirm topsides depressurised

Confirm dispersal of all gas.

ERRV.

14. If gas leak is uncontrollable then see Evacuation by Sea plan.
15. Consider precautionary down man.
Training Services
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Well Control Incident

1. Contact Drilling Supervisor and establish the facts and what measures are
being introduced to control the situation.
2. If contact is lost with the Drill Floor and the situation warrants action,
initiate the Well Control Procedure.
3. Sound GPA and muster all non-essential personnel within the TR.
4. Hold ERT in TR.
5. Medic to prepare Sickbay.
6. Evaluate the safety of Drilling Personnel on the Drill floor based on the
current situation.
7. Stop all Hot Work.
8. Initiate electrical isolations outwith the Drill Floor.
9. Start Fire Pumps and Emergency Generator.
10. Shutdown, and if safe to do so, the Plant.
11. Notify the ERRV to start surface search and give a visual report.
12. Instruct any Supply Vessel to withdraw from 500m zone.
Contact third Parties: -
Coastguard to mobilise resources.

Inform Duty Manager on-shore.
Instruct Flight & Marine Log to mobilise resources.
Inform Installations in the vicinity that you require
assistance.
13. Consider precautionary down man of non-essential personnel.

14. Consider boundary cooling.
If conditions continue to deteriorate, recall all Drilling Personnel to the TR and
implement the Installation Evacuation Procedure.
Training Services
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Time Out Guidance Document
RULES OF TIME OUT
PRIOR TO TIME OUT COMMENCING

1.
Assess the situation and formulate your plan before calling for a Time
Out.
2.
Give adequate warning to your team before Time Out commences to

allow them to close down communication links. Give approximately 30
seconds warning.
3.
Dont trust your memory make a list of your action points.
4.
Aim for a maximum time scale of two minutes.
DURING TIME OUT

1.
Ensure full attention of all team members.
2.
Maintain the discipline of the Time Out structure:-
3.
Call Time Out.
Situation description.
Potential/escalation path.
Plan.
Delegation of task.
Confirm understanding.
End Time Out.
Emergency calls or escalation events must be given priority by the

manager if they occur during the Time Out.
Remember:
A Time Out is for you to brief your team, not for the team to brief you.
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Call Time Out Ensure Full Attention

State present
situation
State
potential
PEOPLE
PLANT
State plan
PEOPLE
PLANT
RESPONSE
SUPPORT
Delegate
Tasks
DOIM
CRO
RADIO OP
MUSTERS
KEY EVENTS
Check the understanding / Have I missed anything?

End the Time-Out.
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Evacuation Checklist
1
Call Evacuation Time-Out
Situation
Situation is no longer controllable because:
Plan
Declare plan to evacuate by lifeboat.
Delegation
Tasks
Deputy O.I.M
Withdraw all Emergency Response

Personnel to PAPA Muster Point
Radio Op
Inform E.R.R.V of our intention to evacuate, and

inform them of any casualties or missing persons
Send Mayday.
Contact ERRV and establish RVPs for lifeboats
Muster Co-ordinator
Send coxswains to check lifeboats and access routes.

Instruct all personnel to don survival suits/lifejackets.
Move all personnel down to boats, and reconcile
numbers.
Confirm understanding
OIM Make P.A Announce Evacuation Decision to all personnel
OIM Initiate PAPA (Prepare to Evacuate platform alarm)
OIM Await confirmation of numbers for all personnel at lifeboats
OIM - Instruct Coxswains to load all lifeboats
10
OIM - Instruct Coxswains to launch lifeboats in sequence of readiness
11
OIM Make final P.A for any missing persons, (if necessary)
12
OIM Final telephone call to Company House
13
OIM - Hand over command to ERRV
14
OIM Inform ERRV that the command team are now leaving the installation
15
OIM Self and team go to Lifeboat, collecting any documentation
16
OIM Initiate Level Zero (0) shutdown at lifeboat
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Common Terms & Abbreviations

BEACH
BLEVE
BOP
BOSIET
CAA
CPA
CRO
ECC
ERC
ERP
ERT
ERTL
ERRV / SBV
ESD
ESDV
FCP
FRC
FWV
GPA / GA
HDA
HLO
HSE
IC/OSC
IMS
LEL
LMGV
MAYDAY
MCA
MOB
OIM
OPITO
PA
PAPA / PEPA
PAN-PAN
PAX
POB
PPE
PTW
RO
RPE
RVP
SSSV
TANNOY
TEMPSC
TR
TRIAGE
UKDCC
UK O&G
UMGV
Training Services
HOME BASE - HEAD OFFICE ONSHORE

BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION
BLOW-OUT PREVENTER
BASIC OFFSHORE INDUCTION & EMERGENCY TRAINING
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (UNITED KINGDOM)
CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH
CONTROL ROOM OPERATOR
EMERGENCY COMMAND CENTRE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE CENTRE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM/FIRE TEAM
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM LEADER
EMERGENCY RESPONSE & RESCUE VESSEL / STAND BY VESSEL
EMERGENCY SHUT-DOWN
EMERGENCY SHUT-DOWN -VALVE
FORWARD CONTROL POINT
FAST RESCUE CRAFT / GEMINI / ZODIAC
FLOW WING VALVE
GENERAL (PLATFORM) ALARM
HELI-DECK ASSISTANT
HELICOPTER LANDING OFFICER
HEALTH & SAFETY EXECUTIVE (UNITED KINGDOM)
INCIDENT CONTROLLER/ON-SCENE COMMANDER SEE ALSO ERTL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT
LOWER MASTER GATE VALVE
INTERNATIONAL DISTRESS CALL SOS- (fr. Come help me)
MARITIME COASTGUARD AGENCY
MAN OVERBOARD
OFFSHORE INSTALLATION MANAGER
OFFSHORE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY TRAINING ORGANISATION
PUBLIC ADDRESS - TANNOY
PREPARE TO ABANDON(EVACUATE)PLATFORM
DECLARING A STATE OF URGENCY
PASSENGERS
PERSONS/PERSONNEL ON BOARD
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
PERMIT TO WORK
RADIO OPERATOR
RESPONSIBLE PERSON (ELECTRICAL)
RENDEZVOUS POINT
SUB-SURFACE/SEA SAFETY VALVE
PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM
TOTALLY ENCLOSED MOTOR PROPELLED SURVIVAL CRAFT
TEMPORARY REFUGE / ACCOMMODATION
CASUALTY CLEARING/PRIORITISING AREA
UNITED KINGDOM DISPATCHING CO-ORDINATION CENTRE
UK OIL AND GAS
UPPER MASTER GATE VALVE
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PHONETIC ALPHABET
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
X
Y
Z
Training Services
ALPHA
BRAVO
CHARLIE
DELTA
ECHO
FOXTROT
GOLF
HOTEL
INDIA
JULIET
KILO
LIMA
MIKE
NOVEMBER
OSCAR
PAPA
QUEBEC
ROMEO
SIERRA
TANGO
UNIFORM
VICTOR
WHISKY
X-RAY
YANKEE
ZULU
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Notes
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Notes
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Notes
Training Services
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Notes
Training Services
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Notes
Training Services
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Major Emergency Management

Initial Response Training (Pre-Read)

Major Emergency Management

Major Emergency Management

Course Information .............................................................3

Introduction to the Platform ..................................................5

Station Bill .......................................................................6

Isometric View ..................................................................7

Lifeboat Stations ................................................................8

Major Hazards Register ........................................................9

Appraisal Process ............................................................. 15

Emergency Types & Considerations ........................................ 19

Time Out Guidance ........................................................... 31

Time Out Pro Forma .......................................................... 33

Evacuation Pro Forma ........................................................ 35

Common Terms & Abbreviations............................................ 37

Phonetic Alphabet ............................................................ 39

Major Emergency Management

Major Emergency Management

Introduction to the Platform

Major Emergency Management

The Emergency Control Room Roles are as follows;

Major Emergency Management

Major Emergency Management

Lifeboat Stations Cellar Deck

Major Emergency Management

Major Hazards Register

Process Fires and Explosions

If deluge does not operate

Major Emergency Management

If deluge does not operate

Release of water and

If deluge does not operate

Loss of containment and

Although a fire in module D

Major Emergency Management

Release of gas from

Utilities and Accommodation Fires

Lube oil release.

Pool fires result in high CO

Negligible potential for

Significant lube oil releases

Major Emergency Management

Fire and explosion

An explosion might result

Chemical spill could result

Galley and other

Smoke and fire would

Crash onto helideck

Crash onto other

Loss of well control

Potential for a major

Major Emergency Management

Release from flange

Prolonged fire will

Pipeline releases are

These modules are highly

Short duration (<30 secs)

Release from either

Dropped loads from

Major Emergency Management

Un-ignited Gas Releases