Capitol Subdivisions vs.

Province of Negros Oriental , CONCEPCION J:

7 SCRA 60 (1963)
FACTS: Lot 378, which is the subject matter of this case, is part of Hacienda
Madalagan, registered under the name of Agustin Amenabar and Pilar Amenabar,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1776 issued in the name of the
aforementioned in 1916.
Sometime in 1920, the Amenabars sold the
aforementioned Hacienda to Jose Benares for the purchase price of P300,000,
payable in instalments. In 1924, the Original Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the Amenabars was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, Benares obtained a Transfer
Certificate of Title under his name.
Meanwhile, in 1921, Benares mortgaged the Hacienda including Lot 378 to BacolodMurcia Milling Co. And then later in 1926, he again mortgaged the Hacienda,
including said Lot 378, on the Philippine National Bank, subject to the first
mortgage held by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. These transactions were duly
recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
The mortgage in favor of the Bank was subsequently foreclosed and the Bank
acquired the Hacienda, including Lot 378, as purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Accordingly, the TCT in the name of Benares was cancelled and another TCT
was issued in the name of the Bank. In 1935, the Bank agreed to sell the
Hacienda to the son of Jose Benares, Carlos Benares, for the sum of P400,000,
payable in annual installments, subject to the condition that the title will
remain with the Bank until full payment.
Thereafter, Carlos Benares transferred his rights, under his contract with the Bank, to
plaintiff herein, which completed the payment of the installments due to the Bank in
1949. Hence, the Bank executed the corresponding deed of absolute sale to
the plaintiff and a transfer certificate of title covering Lot 378 was issued.
It should be noted that, despite the acquisition of the Hacienda in 1934 by the Bank,
the latter did not take possession of the property for Jose Benares claimed to be
entitled to retain it under an alleged right of lease.
For this reason, the deed of promise to sell, executed by the Bank in favour of Carlos
P. Benares, contained a caveat emptor stipulation. When, upon the execution of
the deed of absolute sale 1949, plaintiff took steps to take possession the
Hacienda and it was discovered that Lot 378 was the land occupied by the
Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental. Immediately thereafter, plaintiff made
representations with or on October 4, 1949, plaintiff made representations with the
proper officials to clarify the status of said occupation. Not being satisfied with the
explanations given by said officials, it brought the present action on June 10, 1950.
In its answer, defendant maintained that it had acquired the lot in question in
the year 1924-1925 through expropriation proceedings and that it took
possession of the lost and began the construction of the provincial hospital
thereon. They further claimed that for some reason beyond their
comprehension, title was never transferred in its name and it was placed in
its name only for assessment purposes.
And that defendant NEGROS OCCIDENTAL acted in bad faith in purchasing the lot
knowing that the provincial hospital was situated there and that he did not declare
such property for assessment purposes only until 1950.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant herein had acquired the lot in question in the
aforementioned expropriation proceedings.
HELD: The Court held that defendant was not able to sufficiently prove that
they have acquired the legal title over Lot 378. Several circumstances indicate
that the expropriation had not been consummated.
First, there, the entries in the docket pertaining to the expropriation case refer only to
its filing and the publication in the newspaper of the notices. Second, there was an
absence of a deed of assignment and of a TCT in favour of the Province as regards
Lot 378. Third, the property was mortgaged to Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Lot
378 could not have been expropriated without the intervention of the
Milling Co. And yet, the latter was not made a party in the expropriation
proceedings. And fourth, a second mortgage was constituted in favour of the Back,
which would not have accepted the mortgage had Lot 378 not belonged to the
mortgagor. Neither could said lot have been expropriated without the Banks
knowledge and participation.
Furthermore, in the deed executed by the Bank promising to
Mandalagan to Carlos Benares, it was explicitly stated that some
been expropriated by the Provincial Government of Negros
indicating, by necessary implication, that Lot 378
expropriated.

sell the Hacienda

particular lots had
Occidental, thus
had not been

"Upon the other hand, the main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid
possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto giving the public the right to rely upon the face of Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry
In the case at bar plaintiff had no such actual knowledge, it being an established fact
that he was not aware until 1949 that the land on which the provincial hospital stood
was Lot 378.
Furthermore, since the year 1921, or before the expropriation case for the hospital
site had begun, said lot was mortgaged to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., and the
mortgage, duly registered, as well as annotated on the corresponding certificate of
title, was not cancelled until September 28, 1935. Prior to this date, or on December
26, 1926, Lot 378 was subjected to a second mortgage in favor of the Bank, which
acquired title thereto, thru foreclosure proceedings, in 1934.
When the Bank agreed on November 8, 1935, to sell the property to Carlos P.
Benares and the latter, subsequently conveyed his rights to plaintiff herein, as well as
when the bank executed the deed of absolute sale in plaintiff's favor on September
20, 1949, the title to the property was in the name of the Bank. Considering that
sugar centrals as well as banks are known to have an array of experienced and
competent lawyers, it cannot be said that plaintiff was not justified in assuming that
said institutions had scrutinized the background of Lot 378 and were satisfied that
the same belonged to the mortgagor when said mortgages were constituted, and to
the Bank when said deed of sale was executed. In short, we find that plaintiff
herein is a purchaser in good faith and for value..
As regards the compensation that, as such, it may collect from the defendant, we are
of the opinion, and so hold, that, since the latter's right to expropriate Lot 378 is not
contested, and is seemingly conceded, the plaintiff may demand what is due by

reason of the expropriation of said lot. In short, plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendant the fair and full equivalent to Lot 378, as of the time when possession
thereof was actually taken by the defendant, plus consequential damages
including attorney's fees from which consequential damages the consequential
benefits, if any, should be deducted, with interests, at the legal rate, on the
aggregate sum due to the plaintiff, from and after the date of said actual taking. The
case should be remanded, therefore, to the lower court for the reception of evidence
on the date of said actual taking and the amount of compensation collectible from
the defendant, and the rendition, thereafter, of the corresponding decision thereon..

REPUBLIC v. Court of Appeals

These two 1 Petitions for Review of the same decision of the defunct Court of Appeals
2 have been consolidated in this single decision, having arisen from one and the
same Land Registration Cage (LRC Case No. N-283, Laguna), and presenting as they
do issues which may be resolved jointly by this Court.
The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the trial
court and ordered the registration of the land in favor of applicant, now private
respondent, Santos del Rio. Petitioner Director of Lands in G.R. No. L-43105
claims that the land sought to be registered is part of the public domain
and therefore not registerable. Petitioners private oppositors in G.R. No. L-43190,
on the other hand, allege that they reclaimed the land by dumping duck egg shells
thereon, and that they have been in possession of the same for more than twenty
(20) years.
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with an area of 17,311 square
meters, is situated near the shore of Laguna de Bay, about twenty (20)
meters therefrom (Exh. D), 3 in Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna. It was
purchased by Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. The Deed of Sale
evidencing said purchase is duly recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna. The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year 1918, and the
realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948. When Benedicto del Rio died in
1957, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned his estate and the subject parcel
passed on to his son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the
inheritance.
Santos del Rio, herein applicant-private respondent, filed his application for
registration of said parcel on May 9, 1966. The application was opposed by the
Director of Lands and by private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission from Santos
del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in question. Although there was
no definite commitment as to rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments
to private respondent. In violation of the original agreement, private
oppositors constructed residential houses on the land which prompted
private respondent to file an ejectment suit against the former in 1966. 4
Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private oppositors had
simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with the Bureau of
Lands, and in 1966, they opposed Santos del Rios application for

registration. The Court of First Instance of Laguna dismissed the application for
registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
Petitions for Review of said decision.
The two consolidated petitions raise ISSUES:
1) whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land? NO. it is private land
2) whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the
land? YES. ABSOLUTELY
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory, is either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or those of public dominion,
have been described as those which, under existing legislation are not the
subject of private ownership, and are reserved for public purposes. 6 The
New Civil Code enumerates properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502
thereof. Article 420 provides:
The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Article 502 adds to the above enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural
beds and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands and their beds;
The Director of Lands would like Us to believe that since a portion of the land sought
to be registered is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of
the lake bed of Laguna de Bay, or is at least, a foreshore land, which brings it within
the enumeration in Art. 502 of the New Civil Code quoted above and therefore it
cannot be the subject of registration.
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Art. 74 of the Law of Waters of 1866, as follows:
The natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depth. (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" in the above definition has been interpreted in
the case of Government of P.I. vs. Colegio de San Jose 7 to be the highest depth of
the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the "regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year." The

foregoing interpretation was the focal point in the Court of Appeals decision sought to
be reviewed. We see no reason to disturb the same.
Laguna de Bay is a lake. 8 While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same
gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides 9 in seas and oceans, this
phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. 10 Thus, the
alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly
account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five
months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the
inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level
which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period
(four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the is
completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary
depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of
the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land.
The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a
foreshore land, to wit:
... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux
and reflux of the tides... 11 The strip of land that lies between the high and low water
mark and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. 12
As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in
question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from
different sources. 13 Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux
and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of
the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered
not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed
by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of
registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he
has a registerable title. This brings us to the second issue, which is whether or not
applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
already possesses over the land. 14 Registration under the Torrens Law was
never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in this case asserts
ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register and traces the roots
of his title to a public instrument of sale (Exh. G) in favor of his father from
whom he inherited said land. In addition to this muniment of title, he presents tax
declarations (Exhs. F, G, H, I) covering the land since 1918 and also tax receipts
(Exhs. J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, K, K-1, K-2, K-3) dating back to 1948. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, 15 they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession of the property. The then Court of Appeals found applicant by
himself and through his father before him, has been in open, continuous,
public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for
more than thirty (30) years, counted from April 19, 1909, when the land
was acquired from a third person by purchase. 17 The record does not show
any circumstance of note sufficient enough to overthrow said findings of facts which
is binding upon us. Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the
concept of owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only
last for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in. 18
Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement. And even if the land

sought to be registered is public land as claimed by the petitioners still, applicant

would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since he
has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (Commonwealth
Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942). Sec. 48 of said Act enumerates
as among the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, the
following:
(a) ...
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under bona fide c of ownership, for at least
tirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title ...
The claim of private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L43190, that they have
reclaimed the land from the waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed
the same for more than twenty (20) years does not improve their position. In the first
place, private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water
bodies belonging to the public domain without proper permission from
government authorities. 19 And even if such reclamation had been authorized, the
reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as
they may still be subject to the terms of the authority earlier granted. 20 Private
oppositors-petitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged
reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
In the second place, their alleged possession can never ripen into ownership. Only
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as the
root of a title acquired by prescription. 21 As correctly found by the appellate
court, the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the land with the
permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio. The fact that some of them at
one time or another did not pay rent cannot be considered in their favor. Their use of
the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were merely tolerated by applicant
and these could not have affected the character of the latter's possession 22
which has already ripened into ownership at the time of the filing of this
application for registration.
The applicant private-respondent having satisfactorily established his registerable
title over the parcel of land described in his application, he is clearly entitled to the
registration in his favor of said land.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and
the registration in favor of applicant private-respondent of the land described in his
application is hereby ordered.
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals MELO J:
GR No. 123361 March 3, 1997
FACTS: Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land
situated in Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military
Reservation No. 43 known as Camp Overton.
The application was tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge and he granted the
petitioner (Cacho) the entitlement to the two (2) parcels of land. On June 29, 1978,
Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir of the deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the
reconstitution of the two (2) original certificates of title under RA 26.

The petition was opposed to by the Republic of the Philippines, National Steel
Corporation and the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine that states
that all lands of whatever classification belong to the State. The matter was
elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA denied the petition for reconstitution of
title and ordered that the decree of registration be reopened. Thus, the instant
petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in its decision to reopen
the decrees issued by the Judge Jesse Jorge.
HELD: A land registration proceeding is in rem. The decree of registration is
binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Government and its
branches, irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of
the application, because all persons are considered as notified by the publication
required by law. A decree of registration that has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but also
upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration
proceedings. It is no doubt that the decrees of registration had been issued and such
decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. The decision
of the CA to reopen the decrees previously issued runs counter to the very purpose of
the Torrens System.
It also constitutes a derogation of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. The decrees are res
judicata and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the
nature of proceedings in rem. Such a requirement is impermissible assault upon the
integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also effectively
renders the decree inconclusive.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to
fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the
doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject decrees
presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere
ministerial act on part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon
presentation of a final judgment. It is also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho
vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions
in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from
Datto Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was
issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new
survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court
on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the
decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus,
violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must be stressed that the
judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the
whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides,
such a requirement is an impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the
Torrens System of registration because it also effectively renders the decree
inconclusive.

Baranda vs. Gustilo GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988

FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of
the dispute between petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and
respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed
ownership and possession over the said land. However during the trial, it was found
that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So
the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In
compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and
issued new certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a
separate case pending in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated
in the new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo
then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking
Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deeds
stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency
of the case in the Court of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any legal standing to
file a motion for reconsideration of the Judges Order directing him to cancel the
notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the
register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
in form the presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec
117 of this decree. On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: When the
Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with
the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register
of Deeds, or by the party in interest through the Register of Deeds.
May 8, 1969 | J. Makalintal
Where several co-owners duplicate of certificates of titles are issued, a voluntary
instrument cannot be registered without surrendering all the copies to the Register of
Deeds so that every copy of thereof would contain identical entries of the
transactions affecting the land covered.
BALBIN v. Register of Deeds
FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a
duplicate copy of the registered owners certificate of title and a deed of donation

inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner
Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The
register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being legally defective or
otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously annotated in the
memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed
by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan,
who each received their co-owners duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owners
copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to
make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner
of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE: W/N the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is proper
HELD: YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their integrity
may be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is annotated on one
copy and not on the others. If different copies were permitted to carry different
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is, property of
donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, there should first be a
liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make such a
conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation bears on its
face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the fact that 2/3
portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than his share, not to
say more than what remained of such share after he had sold portions of the same
land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelios civil status, character of
land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may await the outcome
of said case and parties may protect their rights by filing the proper notices of lis
pendens.
Almirol v. Register of Deeds of Agusan CASTRO, J.:
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
FACTS: On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a parcel of
land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of Agusan, and covered by
original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of "Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa
M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962 Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds
of Agusan in Butuan City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a
transfer certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon
the following grounds:
That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the name of Arcenio
Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal presumption, is considered conjugal
property;
That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the document; but
Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was made, the
surviving husband cannot dispose of the whole property without violating the existing
law.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
petition for mandamus to compel the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale

and to issue to him the corresponding transfer certificate of title. In its resolution of
October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that the Mandamus does not lie
because the adequate remedy is that provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151
dismissed the petition, with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Register of Deeds was justified in refusing to register the
transaction appealed to by the petitioner.
HELD: No. Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent show a sincere desire
on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and transmission of rights
over real properties, these do not constitute legal grounds for his refusal to register
the deed.
Whether a document is valid or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this
function belongs properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
A register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of Republic Act 1151 from
exercising his personal judgment and discretion when confronted with the problem of
whether to register a deed or instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under
the said section, when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to
any deed or other instrument presented to him for registration all that he is supposed
to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner of Land Registration
who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order prescribing the step to be taken on
the doubtful question.
Gallardo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. L-67742 October 29, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners were nephew and niece of the late Pedro Villanueva and first
cousin of the private respondent Marta Villanueva vda. de Agana, the latter being the
daughter of Pedro Villanueva. The subject matter of this controversy involves a parcel
of land situated in Cavinti, Laguna consisting of 81,300 square meters, more or less,
initially covered by an original Certificate of Title No. 2262, issued on April 2,
1924owned and registered in the name of the late Pedro Villanueva. On August 10,
1937, petitioner claimed that the aforestated land was sold to them in a private
document, an unnotarized deed of sale written in Tagalog that was allegedly signed
by the late Pedro Villanueva conveying and transferring the property in question in
favor of the petitioners.
Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and a new certificate
of title was issued in the name of the petitioners covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT- 6293 (No. 23350) on January 4, 1944. On November 17, 1976, defendant
Marta Villanueva together with Pedro Villanueva, Jr., and Restituto R.Villanueva
executed and filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Laguna. When petitioners learned of this Affidavit of Adverse Claim, attempt
was made to settle said controversy amicably, but they failed. So, petitioners
instituted court suit against the private respondent and her husband, Dr. Marcelo S.
Agana, Sr. by filing a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages with the Court of
First Instance of Laguna on February 3, 1977.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna rendered its decision declaring the deed of sale
of August 10, 1937, as well as the reconstituted transfer certificate of title of
petitioners, void ab initio.
Thus, petitioners filed notice of appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court. However,
the Intermediate Appellate Court, on May 22, 1984, affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of

TitleNo. RT-6293 (No. 23350) issued in the names of petitioners.
HELD: No. Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the
conveyance be executed "before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of
record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify such
acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated was violated.
The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the
private deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the
defective private document of sale. With reference to the special law, Section 127 of
the Land Registration Act, Act 496 Deeds of Conveyance, affecting lands, whether
registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to
convey, encumber or bind the lands as though made in accordance with more prolix
forms heretofore in use.
It is therefore evident that Exhibit "E" in the case at bar is definitely not registerable
under the Land Registration Act. Also, the contention that ownership over registered
property may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession is absolutely without
merit. No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.