LTD Digests 2

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

International Hardwood & Veneer Co. v UP
Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Lands
Director of Forestry v. Villareal
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc. v. CA
Republic v. Vda. De Castillo
Hilario v. City of Manila
Maneclang v. IAC
Republic v. Reyes
Director of Lands v. CA
Republic v. CA
Lahora v. Dayanghirang
Laburada v. LRA
Republic v.CA
Republic v. Heirs of Abrille
Grande v. Court of Appeals
Cureg v. IAC
Fernandez v. Tanada
International Hardwood & Veneer Co. vs. UP, supra
Palawan Agri. & Industrial Co., Inc. v. Director of Lands
Director of Land Management v. CA
Kidpalos v. Baguio Mining Co.,
Divina v. CA
Fewkes v. Vasquez
Benin v. Tuason
Director of Lands v. Benitez, et al.,
1
1
2
2
3
3
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
12
13
15
16
17
19
2
20
21
21
22
24
25
27
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS,

178 SCRA 708 (1989)
Facts:
On July 20, 1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their joint application
for the registration of two parcels of land, located in the province of
Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They claimed that they inherited those
parcels of land. The Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development opposed the application on the ground that said
parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public dominion, so it
cannot be the subject of the registration proceedings.
After the hearing, the CFI ordered the registration of the title of the
lots in the names of the applicants, herein private respondents after
finding that the applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have
been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of
the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for
more than 80 years.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision, holding that the classification of
the lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the
absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest
land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron
vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10).
Issue: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or timberlands for
80 years can ripen to private ownership.
Ruling: No.
The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however long, cannot
ripen into private ownership. It emphasized that a positive act of the
government, particularly the Executive Department is needed to
declassify land, which is classified as forest, and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before
registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various cases,
stated that a parcel of forestland is within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Bureau of Forestry, an office under the Executive Department, and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System.
In the present case, the two parcels of land were not declared by the
Executive Department to be alienable and disposable, thus it cannot
be registered under private ownership.
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD & VENEER CO. v.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
200 SCRA 554 (1991)
Facts:
IHVCP is a company engaged in the manufacture, processing and
exportation of plywood. It renewed its timber license, which was
granted by the government and shall be valid for 25 years, in early
1960. Said license authorizes the company to cut, collect and remove
timber from the portion of timber land located in certain
municipalities of Laguna, including Paete.
2
to the areas covered by the timber license of IHVCP, the said Act
removed and segregated it from being a public forest.
The Court further cited Sec. 3 of R.A. 3990, which provides that, "any
incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general
fund of the University of the Philippines. The provision of the Act is
clear that UP, being the owner of the land, has the right to collect
forest charges and to supervise the operations of IHVCP insofar as the
property of the UP within it is concerned.
HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
126 SCRA 69 (1983)
Facts:
There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the
decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed
property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private
persons, Borre and Amunategui.
In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an

experiment station for UP. The said experiment station covers a
portion of the timberland in Paete, occupied by IHVCP so UP, who
claims ownership of said portion of timberland, demanded the latter
to pay the forest charges to it, instead of the BIR. IHVCP rejected the
demand and it filed a suit against UP, claiming that R.A. 3990 does
not empower UP to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by it within
the tract of land referred to in said Act, and collect the corresponding
forest charges prescribed by the BIR.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also

filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming
that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest
land and part of the public domain.
Issue: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in

Paete.
Issue: W/N the lot in question can be subject of registration and

confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
Ruling: Yes.
Held: No.
The Court ruled that R.A. 3990 ceded and transferred in full
ownership to UP the area, which means that the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain. In respect
The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the

appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to
certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a

portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and
registered in his name.

to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime
in 1950 that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a
previous warning from the District Forester that the same could not
be done because it was classified as "public forest.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or
sea water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never ceased to be classified
as forest land of public domain.
The classification is not lost even if it had been stripped off forest
cover unless in an official proclamation as disposable lands. The rules
on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY v. VILLAREAL,
200 SCRA 551 (1991)
Facts:
Respondent Ruperto Villareal applied for the registration of various
mangrove swamps located in Sapian, Capiz on January 25, 1949. He
alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of these lands for more than forty years.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the validity of such an
application. It was claimed that mangrove swamps are part of our
public forest land and are therefore inalienable under the
Constitution.
Issue: W/N the land is inalienable public forest land
Ruling: Yes
3
C.A. No. 141 delegated to the President the function of making
periodic classifications of public land. One category of such public
land is timber. The swamps, as noted in earlier cases, were sometimes
cultivated merely for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove. Since the swamps are used for timber and lands of such
purpose are considered public lands, the swamps in the instant case
must be recognized as inalienable public forest land.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS,
193 SCRA 71 (1991)
Facts:
The Fredia Mineral claim of 9 hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon,
Benguet was located sometime between December 25 and 31, 1930 by
A.I. Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of Congress Act
known as Philippine Bill of 1902 in a so-called Declaration of
Location. The said Declaration of Location of the mineral claim has
been duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime
January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big
Wedge Mining Co., which was the earlier name of Atok Big Wedge
Mining Company, Inc. in a Deed of Sale executed November 2, 1931.
Ever since, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and
possession of said claim up to present.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia
mineral claim as well as other mineral claims owned by them as
declared under Tax Declaration 9535. In view of Presidential Decree
1214, Atok filed an application for lease covering the Fredia mineral
claim.
Liwan Consi, respondent, owns a lot below the land of Mr. Acay at
Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet, where he constructed a house thereon
in 1964. Said lot is covered by Tax Declaration 9462. When he first
constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay, he was told that it
was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a
nipa hut and no one prohibited him from entering the land as well as
constructing a house thereon. In January 1984, Consi had the house
repaired and people came to take pictures and told him that the lot

belongs to Atok. However, Consi has been paying taxes on the said
land, which his father before him had occupied.
Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan
Consi on March 1, 1984.
The Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge Irving
rendered a decision on January 29, 1987 dismissing the case against
Consi.
ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio and Benguet, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson and on
December 5, 1987, the RTC rendered decision stating that the decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon is reversed and set aside.
Liwan Consi is ordered to vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral
claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, demolish the house,
and to restore possession to Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint regarding forcible
entry action.
The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or
agricultural awaits the decision of the Secretary of Natural
Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose.
There is a chance that the subject property may be classified as
alienable agricultural land. At any rate, the mining company
may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he
also has possessory rights over the property.
Such rights may mature into ownership on the basis of longterm possession under the Public Land Law, thus, both Consi
and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the subject
lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land in question the
petitioner through his long term occupancy of the same; the
respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim locator
and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which
the subject lot is found.
But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual
and beneficial possession of the subject lot since before the
Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith.
4
Issue:
Whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the
public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat
the rights of the owner of that claim?
Held:
YES. The Court enunciated that the petitioner, Atok, has the exclusive
right to the property in question. The court grants the petition. The
decision of the RTC is upheld and the decision of CA is reversed and
set aside.
Ratio:
As held in the case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation, it is of no
importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent, for all
physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure a
patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws;
his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as
good as though secured by patent.
The evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully
complied with all the requirements of the law regarding the
maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim. The perfection of the
mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the
locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become
the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
The record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a
Deed of Sale. The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is
not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to
the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a
patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions
prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the
area becomes segregated from the public and the property of the
locator.
It is evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the

property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which
they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands,
subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
On the issue of possession, Atok has been in continuous and exclusive
possession since 1931. Consi started only sometime in 1964 when he
constructed a house thereon. Atok has, indeed, superior possessory
rights than Consi. Atok has the right to sue for ejectment being in
actual possession of the land and for the deprivation of his rights.
REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLO,
163 SCRA 286 (1988)
FACTS:
Sometime in 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the
registration of two parcels of land located in Batangas with an area of
39, 755 sq.m. On August 31, 1951, Modesto Castillo married to
Amanda Lat was declared the true and absolute owner of the land
with the improvements. The OCT 0-665 was issued to him by the
Register of Deeds at Batangas on February 7, 1952. By virtue of an
instrument dated March 18, 1960, the two parcels of land covered by
OCT 0-665 together with two other lots were consolidated and subdivided into Lots 1-9. After Modestos death on August 31, 1920,
Amanda Lat Vda. De Castillo executed a deed of partition and
assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio Castillo. As a result,
Original Certificate of Title No. D-665 was cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, new transfer cerfificates of title were issued to Florencio
Castillo.
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the
lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to
defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of
Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby
(Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands
had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by
5
the waters thereof, and being of public ownership, it could not be the
subject of registration as private property. Appellants herein,
defendants below, alleged in their answer that the Government's
action was already barred by the decision of the registration court;
that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped
from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants.
The Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by Honorable
Benjamin Relova, ruled in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines. The decision orders the Register of Deeds of Batangas to
cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-665 in the name of Modesto
Castillo and the subsequent Transfer of Certificates of Title issued
over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2
are declared public lands belonging to the state.
The Court of Appeals in a decision reversed and set aside the
appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving
shore lands constitutes res adjudicate?
HELD:
Long possession of a land is not available as a defense for this case
because the Court has already ruled that mere possession of land does
not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character.
The Supreme Court held that the decision of then Intermediate
Appellate Court is set aside and reversed. The decision of the Court of
First Instance of Batangas is affirmed and reinstated.
Ratio:
One of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; that shores
are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article
420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable. It has long been
settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and
beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or
confer title upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia).

But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands
involved in this case.
The petitioner contends that Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always
formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters
thereof. Consequently, the same were not subject to registration,
being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in
litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the
registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said
lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply.
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence
through the testimonies of witnesses. All the Governments exhibits
show the original shoreline of the disputed areas and the fact that the
properties in question were under water at the time and are still
under water especially during the rainy season proves that they are
indeed a part of the washed and inundated waters.
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question
must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land
adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the
ordinary flow of the tides. Such distinction draws importance from
the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay,
belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added
(Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose) while accretion on a sea bank still
belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private
ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer
needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is
no accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was
established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck
raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
6
HILARIO v. CITY OF MANILA,
19 SCRA 931 (1967)
Facts:
Appeal form a decision of the CFI of Rizal
A long time ago in a far away majestic land of honey and dew,
Dr. jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of
land located at Barrio Guinayang, in San Mateo, Rizal. Upon
his death this property was inherited by his son, plaintiffappellant, Jose Hilario Jr., to whom a new certificate of title
was issued.
The Hilario estate was bounded on the western side by the San
Mateo River. To prevent its entry into the land, a bamboo and
lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stone wall.
However, a great flood occurred which inundated the place,
which destroyed the dike on the northwest and meandered
into the Hilario estate. The disputed area is on the eastern side
of a lenticular strip, which stands between the old riverbed
site and the new course of the riverbed created naturally by
the flood.
In 1945, the US Army opened a sand and gravel plant within
the premises and started excavating soil, gravel, and sand. The
operations eventually extended to the disputed area. A claim
for damages was filed which was paid by the US Army. In
1947, the plant was turned over to the respondent who
continued its operations
Plaintiff filed an injunction against defendants City Engineer
of Manila, praying for the restraint of the operations of the
plant. Defendants answered that the operations were made
from the riverbed.
As joining intervenors, the Bureau of Mines and Atty.
Calalang complained that the disputed area was within the
bed of the river and that they should be enjoined from
continuing the operations. The defendants claimed that they
were authorized by plaintiff to continue its operations
Defendants filed a petition for injunction as well against
plaintiff and intervenor Atty. Calalang, alleging that the latter
have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of the

agreement had between the latter and the Director of Public
Works wherein the defendants were allowed to continue
operations but subject to the final outcome of the pending suit.
The other side filed a counter-injuction. The court issued an
order maintaining the status quo and allowing defendants to
continue.
Manila City denied ownership of the plant and claimed that
City Engineer acted merely as a deputy of the Public Works
Director
The lower court rendered a decision against defendants City
of Manila and the Director of Public Works
Not being satisfied with the decision, plaintiffs filed several
motions for reconsideration
Hence, this appeal
Issue:
When a river, leaving its old bed, changes its original course
and opens a new one through private property, would the
new riverbanks lining said course be of public ownership?
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
All riverbanks are of public ownershipincluding those formed

when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a
private estate.
Art. 339 of the Old Civil Code (Since this was decided before the
promulgation of the New Civil Code)
Property of public ownership is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar
character
Art. 73 of the Law of Waters defines banks of a river
7
By the phrase banks of a river is understood those lateral
strips or zones of its bed which are washed by the stream only during
such high floods as do not cause inundations.
The intent of the law is to consider banksfor all legal purposesas
part of the riverbed. Since all beds of rivers are of public ownership, it
follows that the banks, shich form part of them, are also of public
ownership.
Art. 70 of the Law of Waters defines beds of rivers and creeks
The natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground
covered by its waters during the highest floods
Natural is not made synonymous with Original or Prior
condition. On the contrary, even if a river should leave its original
bed so long as it is due to the force of nature, the new course would
still fall within the scope of the definition provided.
A river is but one compound concept consisting of 3 elements: 1) the
running waters, 2) the bed and 3) the banks. All these constitute a
river.
MANECLANG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
161 SCRA 469 (1985)
Facts: Adriano Maneclang, et.al., petitioners, filed before the then CFI
Pangasinan (Branch XI) a complaint for quieting of title over a certain
fishpond located within 4 parcels of land belonging to them situated
in Barrio Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of
Resolutions 38 and 95 of the Municipal Council of Bugallon,
Pangasinan. On 15 August 1975, the trial court dismissed the
complaint upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled
properties is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River
(therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation);
and held that Resolution 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the
Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and
Salomague Norte, and Resolution 95 authorizing public bidding for
the lease of all municipal ferries and fisheries were passed by the

members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the
exercise of their legislative powers. Manaclang appealed said decision
to the IAC, which affirmed the same on 29 April 1983. Hence, the
petition for review on certiorari.
Before the respondents were able to comment on the petition, the
petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of
respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the
fishpond, as the parties desire to amicably settle the case by
submitting to the Court a Compromise Agreement praying that
judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership of the petitioners
over the land the body of water found within their titled properties.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and set
aside the Compromise Agreement and declare the same null and void
for being contrary to law and public policy.
1. Stipulations null and void for being contrary to law and public
policy
The stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement partake of
the nature of an adjudication of ownership of the fishpond in dispute,
which was originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A
creek, defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to
the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription (Mercado vs. Municipal President of
Macabebe), and as a public water, it cannot be registered under the
Torrens System in the name of any individual (Diego v. CA;
Mangaldan v. Manaoag) and considering further that neither the
mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation
Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of
the subject fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or
change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. The
Compromise Agreement, thus, is null and void and of no legal effect,
the same being contrary to law and public policy.
2. Municipal council authorized to pass laws dealing with its
municipal
waters
The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted
8
municipal council is clothed with authority to pass, as it did the two
resolutions dealing with its municipal waters.
3. Publication a constructive notice to the whole world; due process
followed
Petitioners were not deprived of their right to due process as mere
publication of the notice of the public bidding suffices as a
constructive notice to the whole world.
REPUBLIC v. REYES,
155 SCRA 313 (1987)
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
seeking the annulment of the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal
Once a upon a time on April 17, 1956 respondents Urbano
Lara and Godofredo Eusebio filed with the Bureau of Lands
their Free Patent Applications for the parcels of land, situated
in Napindan, Taguig, Rizal
After the favorable recommendation of a representative of the
Bureau o Lands, said free patent applications were approved;
they were issued to respondents Eusebio and Lara, which
patents were transcribed and registered by the Register of
Deeds of Rizal
In a subsequent investigation by the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands, it was discovered
that the said lands were actually under water and form part of
the Laguna de Bay.
Eusebio and Lara executed separate affidavits, admitting that
they have not complied with certain requirements of the
Public Land Act and expressly agreed to have their patents
and certificate of title cancelled.
The Anti-Graft and Corruption Board of the Bureau of Lands
filed separate complaints against Eusebio, Lara, and the
Register of Deeds of Rizal, before the Court of First of Instance
of Rizal (Branch II)
Summons together with copies of the complaints were served
to all defendants. However, notwithstanding the receipt of the
summons, defendants (Eusebio and Lara) failed to file their

answers. The CFI of Rizal declared that the defendants were in
default; also, the CFI of Rizal rendered separate decisions
declaring the Free Patent and corresponding Certificates as
null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel said patents and titles.
The Register of Deeds addressed letters to respondents,
informing them of the said decision and adbising them to
surrender their owners duplicate copy of Original Certificates
of Titles.
Respondents sent a letter that they have long surrendered
such to Atty. Javier of the investigating section of the Ani-graft
and Corruption of the bureau of Lands
Respondents filed a case at the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) against
the Director of Lands for the annulment of the decision by the
CFI of Rizal (Branch II)
The CFI of Rizal (Branch VI) declared the judgment of the CFI
of Rizal (Branch II) null and void
A motion to admit petition to reopen proceedings was filed by
the Director of Lands in the CFI of Rizal (Branch VI); it averred
that Eusebio and Lara executed a deed of absolute sale (in
consideration for 10K) in favor of respondents Venzuela,
Cenidoza, and Orosa at the same time when Eusebio and Lara
secured the decision of the CFI of Rizal (Branch II) being final
and executory, causing the cancellation of Original Certificates
of Titles and the issuance in lieu thereof of Transfer
Certificates of Title, in the names of Venzuela, Cenidoza, and
Orosa.
In consideration of 25K, Venzuela and Cenidoza executed
separate deeds of transfer of rights in favor of Orosa, who in
turn executed a deed of mortgage in consideration of a loan in
favor PCI Bank
The motion to reopen proceedings was granted. The court
ruled that the petition is not the proper course of action
available to the Director of Lands and has consequently lost
his personality when he was declared in default, and the
Court, its jurisdiction to entertain the aforementioned petition
to reopen.
9
Issues:
W/O/N a decision which has long become final and executed
can be annulled on the grounds that the court lacks
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and that the
decision was procured through fraud
W/O/N respondent Orosa, Venzuela, and Cenidoza are
buyers in good faith.
Held:
No
No
Ratio:
There is no question that the Court acquired jurisdiction over the
respondents (Eusebio and Lara) as adduced from the evidence that
personal service was made on them.
Jurisdiction over a person of a defendant is acquired when he actually
receives the summons (Fuentes vs. Bautista)
A judgment whether correct or not becomes final when the plaintiff
did not appeal said judgment (which respondents did not avail of any
remedies until five years after) (Malia vs IAC) and courts are without
jurisdiction over the case once judgment has become final (Vda. De
Emmas vs Emmas)
Doctrine of non-interference: judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction may not be opened,modified, or vacated by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction
Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the hands of an
alleged innocent purchaser shall be cancelled. The disputed area
forms part of Laguna de Bay, neither agricultural nor disposable. Any
false statement in an application for public land shall ipso facto
produce the cancellation of the title granted.

A certificate of title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,
and the documents of indefeasibility of torrens title does not apply to
free patent secured through fraud.
10
Void free patents and certificates of title do not divest the state of its
ownership of the land nor operate to change the public character of
the land to private
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS,
179 SCRA 522 (1989)
Facts:
Lot No. 1736 is a large tract of agricultural land situated in
Barrio Kapok, Orion, Bataan, containing 233.6883 hectares,
alleged to have been occupied since 1913 by the grandfather of
applicant Arturo Rodriguez, the late Vicente Rodriguez, who,
during his lifetime filed Lease Application with the Bureau of
Lands, but which application was rejected upon investigation
and ascertainment that the land was classified as within the
U.S. Military Reservation (Mariveles) under Executive Order
of the President of the United States of America
Upon the death of Vicente Rodriguez in 1924, possession of
the property was taken over by his sons, Victorino Rodriguez
(the father of applicant Arturo Rodriguez) and Pablo
Rodriguez.
both Victorino and Pablo Rodriguez waived their rights as
heirs of the late Vicente Rodriguez over the subject property
ceding all their participation, ownership and possession
thereon in favor of Arturo Rodriguez, who (thereafter) sold
two-thirds (2/3) undivided portion of the land to Guillermo
Reyes and Francisco S. Alcantara
In 1953, the land in question was deemed reverted to the
public domain as it was excluded from the US-Philippine
Military Bases Agreement
Arturo Rodriguez together with Guillermo Reyes and
Francisco S. Alcantara filed a verified petition for registration
of their title, alleging that they, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and adverse possession thereof in the concept of
owners for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding

the filing of their application
Arturo Rodriguez and Guillermo Reyes, filed an amended
application incorporating an allegation that the heirs of
Vicente Rodriguez, the original possessor, namely Victorino
Rodriguez and Pablo Rodriguez, had relinquished their rights
and participation in favor of Arturo Rodriguez.
Thirty-nine (39) persons headed by Rosauro Canaria filed their
Opposition to the petition for registration contending, among
others, that they have been in actual, peaceful, adverse and
continuous possession of the land for more than thirty (30)
years and have introduced improvements thereon consisting
of fruit-bearing trees; that the applicants have never been in
possession of the property; and that applicant Arturo
Rodriguez could not have inherited the land from his
grandfather, because the children of Vicente Rodriguez are
still living
The lower court ruled in favor of the applicants confirming
their title to the land, Orion Cadastre, Bataan and ordering its
registration in the names of said applicants in the following
proportion: 2/3 undivided portion to Arturo Rodriguez and
1/3 undivided portion to Guillermo Reyes
the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision reversing and
setting aside the decision of the lower court on the ground that
the land in question had been decreed in 1938 to be part of the
public domain by the cadastral court, which had become final
thereby constituting a bar to the subsequent application for
registration on the principle of res judicata
Applicants-appellees filed a motion for the reconsideration
Court of Appeals thru a division of five and by a vote of four
to one reversed its decision and ruled that the prior decision of
the cadastral court declaring the lot in question as public land
way back in 1930 does not bar the present application for
registration of title or confirmation of imperfect title under Act
496 of the same parcel of land citing the case of Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, 4 and that the applicants had registrable title
over the land subject of the application. Hence, this appeal by
certiorari
11
Issue:
W/O/N the land was declared public domain and would, thus, be
registrable
Held:
Registrable even though the cadastral court declared the land as
public domain
Ratio:
Admittedly, the land in question had been declared public land in a

decision rendered by the cadastral court
Factually, however, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak of
because, as we explained in the case of Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 7 a decision in a cadastral proceedings declaring a lot public
land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the
Land Registration Act
Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not

preclude the same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial
confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter
complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable
and disposable
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS,
73 SCRA 146 (1976)
-
Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,

applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent of a 33hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Davao City
The Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer,
accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land
The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for
the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to
participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of

the scheduled bidding
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held where Eugenio
was the lone bidder
o The Director of Lands issued to him the Order of
Award
the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the
land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of
Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for
military camp site purposes
o the excluded land The area excluded was Identified as
Lot 1176-B-2
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued
Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale
and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes
However, on Oct 9 reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for
medical center site purposes under the administration of the
Director of Hospital
Whereupon, Mindanao Medical Center applied for the
Torrens registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 and
claimed fee simple title to the land on the strength of
proclamation No. 350
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus opposed the registration
arguing that his father had acquired a vested right on the
subject property
The CFI ruled in favor of the Medical Center
Raised to the CA which granted the lot to respondents
Hence this appeal
Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole
contested area
Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center
o Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or
absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center
o Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the Philippines are
alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or

private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith
under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act,
Act 496] and shall become registered lands
Petition is GRANTED
LAHORA v. DAYANGHIRANG,
37 SCRA 346 (1971)
FACTS:
On November 26, 1965 appellant Francisco Lahora and Toribia
Moralizon petitioned the cpurt for registration of 9 parcels of land in
Davao. Registration of one of the parcels of land identified as lot no.
2228 was opposed by appellee Emilio Dayanghirang who alleged that
said lot was already registered in the name of his wife. Director of
Lands also filed opposition to the petition arguing that appellants
never had sufficient title over such land sought to be registered nor
were they been in open, continuous or notorious possession of said
lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the original registration of lot
no. 2228 is valid?
RULING:
No. the registration of lot no. 2228 is invalid as the lot has
already been registered under the name of oppositors wife. It was not
denied by the appellants that said land was a public land grant in
favor of oppositors wife, because when the Government grants land
to a private individual a patent thereof is recorded and a certificate of
title is issued to the grantee then it comes within the land registration
act that after 1 year of issuance said title becomes indefeasible,
incontrovertible and irrevocable. And as the court ruled in Pamintuan
vs. San Agustin that a cadastral court cannot decree a registration
over a land which has already been registered in an earlier case, and a
second decree for said land is null and void.
12
LABURADA v. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY,
287 SCRA 333 (1998)
Facts:
Spouses Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was
approved by the trial court. Upon motion of the petitioners, the trial
court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, the
petitioner filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on the records, Lot 3-A which sought to
be registered by spouses Laburada is part of Lot No. 3 over which
TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. On the other hand, Lot 3-B of
said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued
in the name of Vda. De Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer
from TCT No. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it
would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
and thud contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrents Title
Registration System and destroy the integrity of the same.
Issue:
W/N the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be
included in an existing Torrents Certificate of Title?
Held: No.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order
the registration of a land already decreed in the name of another in an
earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same and would
be null and void, since the principle behind original registration is to
register a parcel of land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land
which the petitioners are seeking to register has already been
registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to
Spouses Laburada will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a
s decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is
not mere ministerial act which may be compelled through
13
mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a

decree of registration.
The Petition is DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of

origin in Pasig City. The LRA is ORDERED to submit to the court a
quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in
the property described in TCT No. 6569.
REPUBLIC v. CA,
131 SCRA 532 (1984) SUPRA
Facts:
A lot with an area of 17,311 sq.m. situated in Barrio
Pinagbayanan, Pila, Laguna and 20 meters from the shore of
Laguna de Bay; was purchased by Benedicto del Rio from
Angel Pili on 19 April 1909.
The Deed of Sale evidencing said purchase is duly recorded
with the Registry of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
The land was declared for tax purposes beginning the year
1918, and the realty taxes thereon had been paid since 1948.
When Benedicto del Rio died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicially
partitioned his estate and the subject parcel passed on to his
son, Santos del Rio, as the latter's share in the inheritance.
Santos del Rio filed his application for registration of said
parcel on 9 May 1966.
The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by
private oppositors, petitioners in G.R. No. L-43190.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained permission
from Santos del Rio to construct duck houses on the land in
question. Although there was no definite commitment as to
rentals, some of them had made voluntary payments to
private respondent. In violation of the original agreement,
private oppositors constructed residential houses on the land
which prompted private respondent to file an ejectment suit
against the former in 1966.
Meanwhile, during the latter part of 1965 and in 1966, private
oppositors had simultaneously filed their respective sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands, and in 1966, they
opposed Santos del Rio's application for registration.
The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration.

Applicant appealed and obtained a favorable judgment from
the Court of Appeals, setting aside that of the trial court.
The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their
respective Petitions for Review of said decision.
Issue: W/N there is a claim of ownership by Santos del Rio

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment affirmed from, and
ordered the registration of the land described in the application in
favor of Santos del Rio, applicant private respondent; with costs
against private petitioners.
Ratio:
Classification of property as either of public dominion or of private
ownership; Public lands / public dominion
Property, which includes parcels of land found in Philippine territory,
is either of public dominion or of private ownership. Public lands, or
those of public dominion, have been described as those which, under
existing legislation are not the subject of private ownership, and are
reserved for public purposes. The New Civil Code enumerates
properties of public dominion in Articles 420 and 502 thereof. Article
402 includes those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and those which
belong to the State without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth" as
property belonging to public dominion. Article 502 adds "rivers and
their natural beds; continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
brooks running in their natural beds and the beds themselves;
waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public
dominion; and lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public
lands and their beds; to the enumeration.
Extent of a lake bed
The extent of a lake bed is defined in Artcile 74 of the Law of Waters
of 1866, as the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools, is the

ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary
depth."
Highest Ordinary Depth in a lake; Determinant is rainfall and not
gravitational pull (tides)
The phrase "highest ordinary depth" has been interpreted in the case
of Government. vs. Colegio de San Jose to be the highest depth of the
waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the
"regular, common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time
during the year; or thus rain "falling directly on or flowing into
Laguna de Bay from different sources." While the waters of a lake are
also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation
of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily
occurrence in the case of lakes. The alternation of high tides and low
tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the
rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed 4-5 months a
year during the rainy season; rather, it is the rains which bring about
the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in
the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs
during a shorter period than the level of the water at which the land is
completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest
ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. The land sought to be registered,
therefore, is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay.
Foreshore land defined; Definition does not apply to land adjacent
to lake
Foreshore land is that part of (the land) which is between high and
low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides; or the strip
of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. In the
present case, since the inundation of a portion of the land near the
lake is not due to flux and reflux of tides, it thus cannot be
considered a foreshore land within the meaning cited by the Director
of Lands.
Purpose of land registration under Torrens System
The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the
acquisition of lands but only the registration of title which applicant
14
already possesses over the land. Registration under the Torrens Law
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. Applicant in
this case asserts ownership over the parcel of land he seeks to register
and traces the roots of his title to a public instrument of sale in favor
of his father from whom he inherited said land.
Tax declaration strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription; also Open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and
adverse possession of the land
Applicant presents tax declarations covering the land since 1918 and
also tax receipts dating back to 1948. While it is true that by
themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. Further,
applicant by himself and through his father before him, has been in
open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession
of the disputed land for more than 30 years, counted from 19 April
1909, when the land was acquired from a third person by purchase.
Since applicant has possessed the subject parcel in the concept of
owner with just title and in good faith, his possession need only last
for ten years in order for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in.
Applicant has more than satisfied this legal requirement.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title
Even if the land sought to be registered is public land, applicant
would be entitled to a judicial confirmation of his imperfect title, since
he has also satisfied the requirements of the Public Land Act (CA 141
as amended by RA 1942). Section 48 of the Act enumerates as among
the persons entitled to judicial confirmation of imperfect title, such as
those who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title."

Reclamation requires proper permission; reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to party reclaiming the same
Private persons cannot, by themselves reclaim land from water bodies
belonging to the public domain without proper permission from
government authorities. And even if such reclamation had been
authorized, the reclaimed land does not automatically belong to the
party reclaiming the same as they may still be subject to the terms of
the authority earlier granted. In the present case, private oppositorspetitioners failed to show proper authority for the alleged
reclamation, therefore, their claimed title to the litigated parcel must
fall.
Tolerance of possession cannot ripen into ownership
As the private oppositors-petitioners entered into possession of the
land with the permission of, and as tenants of, the applicant del Rio;
the fact that some of them at one time or another did not pay rent.
Their use of the land and their non-payment of rents thereon were
merely tolerated by applicant and these could not have affected the
character of the latter's possession which has already ripened into
ownership at the time of the filing of this application for registration.
Only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can
serve as the root of a title acquired by prescription.
REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF ABRILLE,
71 SCRA 57
Facts:
June 28, 1916 Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered in the name of
Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa Abrille. Upon
the death of the original owner, the said property was inherited by
Luisa Villa Abrille, said lot was 525,652 sq m under the TCT. That
deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots under
subdivision plan which was approved by the Land Registration
Commissioner on March 17,1967. Lot 1 contains an area of 30,100
Square Meters while Lot 2 contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters
or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square
Meters more than the original area covered in TCT in the name of said
15
defendant Luisa Villa Abrille. March 27, 1967 or ten days after the
approval by the Land Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa
Abrille was able to secure an order from the Court of First Instance of
Davao directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and
Province of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439
and thereafter to cancel the same and issue new TCTs for the 2 lots.
The registration of Lot 2, which includes the aforementioned excess
area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack
of the required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law. The excess
or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result of the approval of
the subdivision survey was formerly a portion of the Davao River
which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said Davao
River; hence a land belonging to the public domain.
Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of
TCTs which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127
square meters.
SC = No. We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower court acted
correctly in ordering the cancellation of TCTs which admittedly
covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters. Certainly, the step
taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval
of their Subdivision Plan to include the questioned increased area of
82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted and irregular. In
order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have
been a former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and
coverage of the Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in
registrations of land title should have been filed Instead of an
ordinary approval of subdivision plan. In the instant case, part of the
tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not
yet been brought under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse
still, the approval of Subdivision Plans was without notice to all
parties in interest, more particularly the Director of Lands.
For an applicant to have his imperfect or incomplete title or claim to a
land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following requisites
should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by
the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing
together with all the documents or other evidences attached
thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land Registration
Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date
and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those
known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final
and instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a
decree of confirmation and registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration
Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration
book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate original
certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of Deeds,
upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with,
the lower court committed no error in its appealed decision dated
January 27, 1970.
16
GRANDE v. COURT OF APPEALS,
5 SCRA 524 (1962)
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance
from their deceased mother, Patricia Angui, who likewise, inherited it
from her parents. In the early 1930s, the Grandes decided to have
their land surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described
to have Cagayan River as the northeastern boundary, as stated in the
title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current
of the river, and an alluvial deposit of almost 20,000 sq.m. was added
to the registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title
against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and
continuous possession of the land created by the alluvial deposit until
1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property.
The Calalungs, however, stated that they were the rightful owners
since prior to 1933.
The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate
the premises and pay for damages. Upon appeal to the CA, however,
the decision was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to
the riparian owners?
HELD:
Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners
of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs
merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible. The
land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the
alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition
by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in
possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as
opposed to the Grandes single witness who claims that the Calalungs
only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have

acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription.
This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be
followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took
effect in 1950.
CUREG v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
177 SCRA 313 (1989)
Facts: On 5 November 1982, Domingo Apostol, Soledad Gerardo,
Rosa Gerardo, Nieves Gerardo, Flordeliza Gerardo and Lilia
Maquinad filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with
preliminary injunction against Leonida, Romeo, Pepito, Hernando,
Manuel, Antonio and Elpidio Carniyan with the RTC Isabela (Civil
Case Br. 111-373). A temporary restraining order was issued by the
trial court on 12 November 1982. The complaint alleged that the
Gerardos and Maquinad are the legal and/or the forced heirs of the
late Domingo Gerardo, who died in February 1944, the latter being
the only issue of the late Francisco Gerardo, who died before the
outbreak of WWII; that since time immemorial and/or before 26 July
1894, the late Francisco Gerardo, together with his predecessors-ininterest have been in actual, open, peaceful and continuous
possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership and adverse to all
other claimants, of a parcel of land, situated in Casibarag-Cajel,
Cabagan, Isabela, containing an area of 2.5 hectares [N: Cagayan
River; E: Domingo Guingab (formerly Rosa Cureg); S: Antonio
Carniyan; and W: Sabina Mola]. Said land was declared for taxation
purposes under TD 08-3023 in the name of Francisco Gerardo, which
cancelled TD C-9669, in the name of Francisco; that upon the death of
Francisco Gerardo, the ownership and possession of the land was
succeeded by his only issue, Domingo Gerardo who, together with 3
legal or forced heirs, namely Soledad Gerardo, Primo Gerardo(+) and
Salud Gerardo(+) have also been in actual, open, peaceful and
continuous possession of the same. Primo Gerardo was survived by
Rosa, Nieves and Flordeliza Gerardo; while Salud Gerardo was
survived by Lilia Maquinad. In 1979, Soledad, Rosa, Nieves, and
Flordeliza Gerardo along with Lilia Maquinad verbally sold the land
to Domingo Apostol. On 10 September 1982, the verbal sale and
conveyance was reduced into writing by the vendors who executed
17
an "Extra-Judicial Partition with Voluntary Reconveyance. About the
time of the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition, the land already
manifested signs of accretion of about 3 hectares on the north caused
by the northward movement of the Cagayan River; that Domingo
Apostol declared the land and its accretion for tax purposes under TD
08-13281 on 15 September 1982. Sometime about the last week of
September and or the first week of October 1982, when the Gerardos,
Maquinad and Apostol were about to cultivate their land together
with its accretion, they were prevented and threatened by the
Carniyans (Leonida Cureg and Romeo, Pepito, Hernando, Manuel,
Antonio and Elpidio: surviving spouse and children of Antonio
Carniyan) from continuing to do so.
The late Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land (acquired
from his father-in-law Marcos Cureg on 5 October 1956 as evidenced
by an Absolute Deed of Sale) situated in Casibarag-Cajel, Cabagan,
Isabela which contained an area of 2,790 sq. m.(N: Domingo Gerardo;
E: Domingo Guingab; S: Pelagio Camayo; and W: Marcos Cureg), and
which was declared for taxation purposes under TD 13131, with an
assessed value of P70.00. Carniyan revised on 28 November 1968 his
TD 13131 dated 24 July 1961 to conform with the correct area and
boundaries of his OCT P-19093 issued on 25 November 1968 pursuant
to Free Patent 399431 dated 21 May 1968; that the area under the new
TD 15663 was increased from 2,790 sq.ms. to 4,584 sq.ms. and the
boundary on the north became Cagayan River, purposely eliminating
completely the original boundary on the north which is Domingo
Gerardo. The heirs of Antonio Carniyan (Cureg, et.al.) alleged in their
answer that the land claimed by the Gerardos and Apostol is nonexistent; that Antonio Carniyan was the owner of a piece of land
bounded on the north by Cagayan River and not by the land of
Francisco Gerardo; that the "subject land" is an accretion to their
registered land and that they have been in possession and cultivation
of the "accretion" for many years.
The application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
was denied on 28 July 1983 on the ground that the Carniyans (Cureg)
were in actual possession of the land in litigation prior to September
1982. In a decision rendered on 6 July 1984, the trial court rendered

judgment declaring Domingo Apostol the absolute owner of the
parcel of land containing an area of 5.5000 hectares (N: Cagayan
River; E: Domingo Guingab; S: Antonio Carniyan; and W: by Sabina
Mola) and with an assessed value of P3,520; ordering the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against Cureg, et.al.; ordering that the
writ be made permanent; and ordering Cureg, et.al. to pay Apostol,
et.al. a reasonable attorney's fee of P5,000.00, litigation expenses of
P1,500.00 and costs.
On 17 July 1984, Cureg appealed to the then IAC Court which
affirmed the decision of the trial court on 15 October 1985 (CA-GR CV
03852). Cureg's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 8 January
1986. Hence, the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rule of
Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the
decision appealed from, and rendered judgment dismissing Civil
Case Br. III-373 for quieting of title and damages; with costs against
Apostol, et.al.
1. Tax Declaration not sufficient evidence to prove ownership; OCT
indicates true and legal ownership
Gerardos' and Maquinads (therefore Apostols) claim of ownership
of their alleged 2 & 1/2 hectare land is anchored mainly on 4 tax
declarations. The declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment
on the payment of the tax is not sufficient evidence to prove
ownership. (Evangelista v. Tabayuyong, 7 Phil. 607; Elumbaring v.
Elumbaring, 12 Phil. 384; cited in Camo v. Riosa Bayco, 29 Phil. 437,
444). On the other hand, Cureg et.al. relied on the indefeasibility and
incontrovertibility of their OCT P-19093. In the case of Ferrer-Lopez v.
Court of Appeals (GR 50420, 29 May 1987, 150 SCRA 393, 401-402), it
was ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax
declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of
ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate
of title indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners
over the disputed premises. Cureg's OCT P-19093 should be accorded
greater weight as against the tax declarations offered by Apostol, et.al.
in support of their claim, which declarations are all in the name of the
18
latters predecessor-in-interest, Francisco Gerardo, and appear to have
been subscribed by him after the last war, when it was established
during the trial that Francisco Gerardo died long before the outbreak
of the last war.
2. Decree of registration bars all claims and rights arising or existing
prior to decree
A decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may
have existed prior to the decree of registration (Ferrer-Lopez v. CA,
supra., p. 404). By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and
title thereto quieted, subject only to exceptions stated in Section 39,
Act 496 (now Section 44 of PD 1529). Since Cureg's original certificate
of title clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north by the
Cagayan River, Apostol's claim over the land allegedly existing
between Cureg's land and the Cagayan River, is deemed barred and
nullified with the issuance of the original certificate of title.
3. Tax Declaration of earlier date cannot defeat OCT of later date;
Cureg not estopped as Tax Declarations subsequent to issuance of
OCT states northern boundary is Cagayan river
A tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an original
certificate of title which is of a later date. The appellate court erred in
considering Tax Declaration 13131, in the name of Antonio Carniyan,
as an admission by him that his land is bounded on the north by the
land of Domingo Gerardo and thus is estopped from claiming
otherwise. The tax declarations of the late Antonio Carniyan
subsequent to the issuance of OCT P-19093 already states that its
northern boundary is Cagayan River. In effect, he has repudiated any
previous acknowledgment by him, granting that he caused the
accomplishment of the tax declarations in his name before the
issuance of OCT P-19093, of the existence of Francisco Gerardo's land.
4. Cureg, et.al. in actual possession; Evidence
Evidence on record proves that Cureg, et.al. are in actual possession
of the land. First, the trial court in its Decision stated the reason for
denying private respondents' petition for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, is that Cureg, et.al. were in actual possession
of the land in litigation prior to September 1982. Second, witness for

Apostol, et.al., Esteban Guingab, boundary owner on the east of the
land in question and whose own land is bounded on the north of
Cagayan River, on cross-examination, revealed that when his
property was only more than 1 hectare in 1958, (now more than 4
hectares) his boundary on the west is the land of Antonio Carniyan.
Third, witness Rogelio C. Albano, a geodetic engineer, on direct
examination stated that in 1974, the late Antonio Carniyan requested
him to survey the land covered by his title and the accretion attached
to it, but he did not pursue the same because he learned from the
Office of the Director of the Bureau of Lands that the same accretion is
the subject of an application for homestead patent of one Democrata
Aguila, contrary to the statement of the trial court and the appellate
court that Albano "made three attempts to survey the land but he did
not continue to survey because persons other than defendants were in
possession of the land," which statement appears only to be a
conclusion. Fourth, an order by the Director of Lands dated 14 August
1980 in connection with the Homestead Application of Democrata
Aguila of an accretion situated in Catabayungan, Cabagan, Isabela,
such application was disapproved because in an investigation
conducted by the Bureau of Lands of the area applied for which is an
accretion, the same was found to be occupied and cultivated by,
among others, Antonio Carniyan, who claimed it as an accretion to
his land. Apostol, et.al. nor their predecessors-in-interest appeared as
one of those found occupying and cultivating said accretion.
5. Accretion belongs to riparian owners
The land in question is an alluvial deposit left by the northward
movement of the Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the
New Civil Code, it is said that "to the owners of land adjoining the
banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current of the waters."
6. Accretion does not automatically become registered land
The area covered by OCT P-19093 is only 4,584 sq. ms. The accretion
attached to said land is approximately 5.5 hectares. The increase in the
area of Cureg's land, being an accretion left by the change of course or
the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not
automatically become registered land just because the lot which
19
receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v.
Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be
placed under the operation of the Torrens System."
FERNANDEZ v. TANADA,
39 SCRA 662 (1971)
Facts:
In an application for registration filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondent Juan Borromeo prayed that he be
declared as the real and absolute owner of the parcel of land
situated in Barrio Pook, Talisay, Cebu,
Described as follows:
N Lot No. 7191 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant);
E by a lot belonging to Claudio Baller;
S Bohol Strait or Seashore; and
W lot No. 2586 owned by Juan Borromeo (applicant).
Respondent bases his claim of ownership on Article 457 of the New
Civil Code, 1 alleging that the land sought to be registered was formed
by accretion having been deposited therein gradually by currents of a
Register bordering lot Nos. 7191 and 2586 owned by him. Respondent
further prayed that the Register of Deeds be ordered to issue an
original certificate of title in his name.
Petitioners herein opposed the above said application that (a)
Article 457 of the New Civil Code could not be invoked, the
disputed area having been fanned by action of the sea and not
by river currents, there being no river in the vicinity; (b) that it
was the oppositors who occupied the said land openly and
public and not respondent; and (c) respondent Juan Borromeo
is an alien, not qualified to own real properties in the
Philippines.
The Land Registration Court (LRC for short) ruled that the
petitioners-oppositors have no interest over the subject land
The said order was set aside after a Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by said petitioners-oppositors but
was again reversed having the original decision revived
(ordering the demolition of 11 huts over the disputed land)
Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal but the LRC denied

such. Hence, the petition
Issue:
I) W/N the lot sought to be registered was formed by accretion which
it gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters
flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586 of the
herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo)
II) W/N the oppositors had personality to oppose the registration of
respondent
III) W/N the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the demolition of the huts over the land
Held:
The jurisdictional issue raised by applicants herein is without merit If
it be true that the lot sought to be registered was formed by accretion
which it gradually received from the effects of the current of the
waters flowing on the river bordering the said Lots No. 7191 and 2586
of the herein applicant (now private respondent Juan Borromeo) then
title to the lot vested in said applicant under Article 457 of the Civil
Code of the Philippine from the time the alluvial deposit was formed.
Borromeo's petition to the Registration Court "to declare him the
owner" of the lot is in effect a request for confirmation of the title
already vested in him by the law, and the court plainly had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application.
It is true that the oppositors averred below that the deposit was not
aluvial but a result of the action of the sea. This issue, however, is
dependent on the result of the evidence to be produced at the trial on
the merits that was still to be held. The same thing can be said of the
allegation that the applicant for registration was disqualified to
acquire agricultural land. Neither of these claim can now be inquired
into at this stage of the proceedings.
The respondent court ordered the option of herein petitioners to be
dismissed as improper, for lack of personality to oppose the
registration independently of that of the national government
Oppositors were mere sales applicants to the Bureau of Land and that
they had been warned that they should not enter nor improve the
land object of their sales applications, prior to the approval thereof by
the land authorities; and in fact paragraph 6 of their sales applications
explicitly provided that the same conveyed no right to occupy the
20
land prior to approval. Under the circumstances, We can not say that
the action of the court below was in abuse of discretion
IHVC v. UP, 200 SCRA 554 (1991), SUPRA
PALAWAN AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO., INC. v.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
44 SCRA 15 (1972)
Facts:
Appellant applied for application and confirmation of title over a
parcel of land.
Application relies upon the ground that through its predecessor in
interest, it had been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and
lawful possession of the land since 1912, under a bonafide claim of
acquisition and ownership.
Director of Lands opposed said application alleging that:
- That it involves public land
- That the land was not awarded to appellant, it having refuse
to pay the value of said land
- That appellant has no valid title to be confirmed, its possession
being, not that of an owner, but, merely, that of a (sales)
applicant of a portion of the public domain.
CFI sustained opposition of Director of Lands. Hence this appeal
Antecedent Facts:
- Palawan filed sales application over a parcel of land which
was given course by the Bureau of Lands.
- Palawan requested for the area applied for to be reduced.
- Director of Lands informed Palawan of the appraisal of the
Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce of the land applied for. (P
18 per hectare)
- When Palawan failed to act on the appraisal, a Notice of
Auction Sale over the land applied for was issued by DL.
Twice it asked for its postponement, asking the Bureau of
Lands to reconsider its appraisal of the land. Bureau of Lands
stood pat.

-
Since the time the applicant had applied for the land, it took
possession thereof partially and improved portion thereof
planting coconuts and other crops.
On a later date, in reply to a subpoena issued by the DL Office
of Palawan, Palawan advised the DL office for the first time
that he will not submit to an investigation because they want
to wait for the result of their application involving the present
case (confirmation of title).
21
Issue:
W/N Palawan has valid title over land for confirmation.
Held:
No. Palawans possession of the land in question was merely that of a
sales applicant thereof, to whom it had not been awarded because of
its refusal to pay the price fixed therefor by the Bureau of Lands. As
such sales applicant, Palawan manifestly acknowledged that he does
not own the land and that the same is a public land under the
administration of the Bureau of Lands.
DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. COURT OF APPEALS,

205 SCRA 486
Facts:
Feliciano Juco and his predecessors-in-interest was adjudged
of having an open, exclusive, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the parcel of land in question in the
concept of owners for twenty years. Juco built a house in Lot 3
while his brother-in-law lived in Lot 4.
Nieves de Roldan caused the whole tract of land to be
resurveyed. Her children, then, filed an application to
purchase the property through the Bureau of Lands. Lot 4 was
place in the name of Desiderio while a sales application was
filed by Mariano for Lot 3.
Having no money, he failed to participate in the bidding hence
Lot 3 was sold.
Juco was able to obtain financial assistance from Sps Lina to
protest against Mariano Roldans acquisition of Lot 3. He
promised to sell the lot to Lina later, hence the Condiitional

Sale and Transfer of Right to Land which was executed by
Juco in favor of the Lina Sps.
The Lina sps made improvements on Lots 3 and 4.
Subsequently, an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued.
Juco lost his protest, but upon appeal, he was adjudged to
have the preferential right to buy the property.
He then filed his own application to buy said but shortly
thereafter, Juco died.
His wife and children then offered to sell the property to
Pompeyo Maliwat who was told about the proceeding over
the land but not the sale to the Lina sps.
Maliwats bought said land and subsequently filed an
application of registration of land under the Torrens system.
4 oppositors arose including the Director of Lands on the
ground that the land is public land.
RTC in favor of Maliwat. CA affirmed RTC decision.
Issue:
W/N land in question is private land
Held:
Yes. Lot 3 became private land by virtue of Jucos open, continuous
and exclusive occupation and cultivation thereof since 1939, which
when tacked to Maliwats possession far exceeds the statutory 30 yr
period for conversion of alienable public land into private property.
Being a private land, it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands.
KIDPALOS v. BAGUIO MINING CO.,
14 SCRA 913 (1965)
Facts:
On August 31, 1954, the petitioners sued Baguio Gold Mining Co. and
the Director of Mines in the CFI of Baguio City seeking judgment:
1) declaring said plaintiffs to be the owners of certain parcels of
land situated in sitio Binanga Barrio of Tuding, Municipality of
Itogon, Benguet, Mountain Province.

2) to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of
the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels
claimed by plaintiffs; and
3) to recover damages from the Company
After due trial, the Court of First Instance found that the plaintiffs
Cayapa, et al., had failed to substantiate their claims of ownership and
dismissed the suits.
Court of Appeals held that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest
Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it
formed part of the Public domain.
That from 1927 to 1933, one George Icard and his son, Joseph, had
entered and located therein certain mining claims, subsequently sold
and transferred to the Baguio Gold Mining Company;
That the latter had occupied the land, worked the claims, and
performed the acts required by the mining laws to entitle it to mineral
patents therefor until the recent World War II;
That after the war the claims were validated by Act No. 4268 of the
Philippine Legislature;
That the Mining Company had acquired beneficial title to the claims
by its locations, although the corresponding patents were still in
process at the Bureau of Mines;
That "the appellee mining company has acquired a superior title to
that of the plaintiffs-appellants over the mineral claims under
litigation"
While the cases were still pending appeal before the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio
Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the applications.
Proceedings were originally held in abeyance until the appeals in the
preceeding, cases were decided.
22
The 1960 Supreme Court resolution in L-16649-53 having become
final, the oppositor Baguio Gold Mining Company reiterated its
motions to dismiss the registration cases in the Court of First Instance.
The latter dismissed the applications, and the applicants then directly
appealed to this Supreme Court.
Held:
In consonance with the foregoing principles, we hold that the findings
in the former judgment (that the mining claims were validly located
and that the title of the mining company is superior to that of
appellants), being the basis of the sentence of dismissal, conclude the
applicants in the present case, the previous adjudication being final
and rendered on the merits, and there being identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action in all the cases. Hence, the
dismissal of these land registration proceeding, by the Court of First
Instance of Baguio was in order and conformable to law.
That at present the law permits registration applicants to proceed on
the basis of 30 years' open, adverse, and uninterrupted possession as
owner, instead of requiring, as of yore continuous adverse possession
as owner since 1894, does not help appellants at all. The vesting of
title to the lands in question in the appellee Baguio Gold Mining
Company has effectively interrupted and rendered discontinuous the
possession claimed by applicants.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal of
these proceedings on the ground of res judicata is affirmed. Appellants
shall pay the costs.
DIVINA v. COURT OF APPEALS,
GR NO. 11734, FEB. 22, 2001
Lot No. 1893 located at Gubat, Sorsogon, was originally owned by
Antonio Berosa. On July 22, 1960, he sold it to Teotimo Berosa. On
March 23, 1961, the Berosa spouses sold the same Lot 1893 to Jose P.
Gamos.

On April 26, 1960, Gamos acquired from the heirs of Felix Arimado, a
boundary owner of Lot 1893, a 20,687 sq. m. parcel of land identified
as Lot 1466, also in Gubat. It adjoins Lot 1893. On March 28, 1961,
Gamos had these two parcels of land under Tax Declaration No.
13237 and declared it had a total area of 4.0867 hectares. He also had
the property resurveyed by private land surveyor Antonio
Tiotangco. In 1967, Tax Declaration No. 13237 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 9032 in Gamos name.
The re-survey plan (AP-9021), of Lots 1466 and 1893 conducted on
June 16, 1961 for Gamos, showed that the consolidated properties
contained a total area of 100,034 sq. m. This plan was approved on
July 12, 1961 by the Acting Director of Lands.
On November 23, 1968, Tax Declaration No. 12927 which cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 9032 was secured by Gamos and declared therein
that the area of the consolidated property was 10.0034 hectares with
2500 sq. m. planted to coconut, 3.8187 irrigated for rice planting and
5.9347 were thickets.
On January 19, 1967, Teotimo Berosa conveyed to Vicente G. Divina,
herein petitioner, a portion of Lot 1893 referred to as Lot 1893-B.
On November 28, 1968, two years from the date of said sale and five
(5) days after November 23, 1968, when Gamos secured Tax
Declaration No. 12927 declaring the consolidated property as
containing 100,034 sq. m., the deed of sale was registered. An
undated Subdivision PLAN of Lot 1893, was prepared for
petitioner. The plan, without Bureau of Lands approval, showed that
Lot 1893 was divided into two, Lot 1893-A and Lot 1893-B.
On July 24, 1970 Gamos sold the consolidated property to private
respondent Vilma Gajo-Sy, for P20,000.00.
On August 28, 1972, she filed an application for registration of title to
the property at the then Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The
application was amended on March 8, 1973, on order of Branch II of
23
the said court to include therein the postal address of Inocencio Erpe,
adjoining owner of Lot No. 1893 described in Plan AP-9021.
The land registration court, by Decision of July 29, 1975, ordered the
registration of private respondents title over Lots Nos. 1466 and 1893.
On July 13, 1977, pending issuance of the final decree of registration
petitioner filed before the same court a Petition for Review. He
alleged that he is the owner of a portion of Lot 1893 consisting of
54,818 sq. m. conveyed to him by Teotimo Berosa on January 19, 1967;
that he was unaware of the registration proceedings on Lot 1893 due
to private respondents failure to give him notice and post any notice
in the subject lot; and that private respondent fraudulently
misrepresented herself as the owner of the disputed portion despite
her knowledge that another person had acquired the same.
Private respondent opposed the petition alleging that the registration
case had long become final and the court no longer had any
jurisdiction thereon; and that lack of personal notice to the petitioner
of the registration proceedings did not constitute actual fraud.
CA:
In the case at bar, petitioner-appellee did not indeed appear in the
survey plan as an adjoining owner of the subject property. Neither
was he a known claimant or possessor of the questioned portion of
Lot 1893 which was found by the court a quo to be untouched and
thickly planted with bigaho. A fortiori, there was no need to mention
in the application for registration the apprehension or claim of at
least petitioner-appellees cousin Evelyn (sic) Domalaon in
the application for registration, nor to personally notify Elena about
registration proceeding.
ISSUE: whether or not, there was deliberate misrepresentation
constituting actual fraud on private respondents part when she failed
to give or post notice to petitioner of her application for registration of
the contested land, such that it was error for the trial court to declare
private respondent owner of the disputed land.

HELD:
Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners name did
not appear in the survey plan as an adjacent owner, nor claimant nor
possessor. However, the trial and appellate courts differed in their
conclusion on whether or not there was deliberate misrepresentation
constituting fraud in private respondents part when it failed to give
notice or post notice to potential claimant and include their names in
the application for registration. The trial court said there was, but the
appellate court disagreed.
Section 15 of P.D. 1529 is explicit in requiring that in the application
for registration of land titles, the application shall also state the full
names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of the adjoining
owners if known, and if not known, it shall state the extent of the search
made to find them. As early as Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA
22 [1980] we emphasized that a mere statement of the lack of
knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining owners is not
sufficient but what search has been made to find them is necessary.
The trial court was correct when it took notice that respondents sister
Lydia Gajo-Anonuevo admitted that she had a conversation with
petitioners cousin Elena Dumalaon about the latters apprehension
that their land may have been included in respondents application
for registration of the disputed land.
Respondents omission of this material information prevented
petitioner from having his day in court. The trial court in its decision
more than amply supported its conclusion with jurisprudence to the
effect that it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact upon which
benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. Such omission
cannot but be deliberate misrepresentation constituting fraud, a basis
for allowing a petition for review of judgment under Section 38 of Act
No. 496, The Land Registration Act.
Additionally, it should be noted that petitioner acquired the bigger
portion of Lot 1893 long after the initial survey of Barrio San
Ignacio. Teotimo Berosa sold Lot 1893 to Jose P. Gamos who in turn
sold it to respondent in 1970. Clearly, going by the records,
petitioners name would not be found on the said survey plan
24
approved by the Bureau of Lands in 1961, years before his purchase of
the portion of Lot 1893. Petitioners claim is clearly meritorious.
FEWKES v. VASQUEZ,
39 SCRA 514 (1971)
Fewkes v. Vasquez (FORMS AND CONTENTS OF APPLICATION)
- March 2, 1967 - Eldred Fewkews, an American citizen,
commenced in the Court of First Instance of Albay a proceeding for
the registration of 2 lots and the improvements thereon
o Fewkes acquired by purchase from Velasco 2 parcels of
land
- Applicant was in actual possession of the lots, and that said
properties were free from any encumbrance
- Attached to the application were:
o The tracing cloth and blue print of plans Psu-61470 and
the corresponding technical descriptions of Lots 21-A
and 21-B of Psu-61470
o The certified copies of the tax declarations on said land
o The two deeds of absolute sale dated 20 June 1966 and
27 January 1967, executed by the Velascos in favor of
applicant
- March 31, 1967 - The court required the applicant to submit
the plans and technical description of the parcels of land
sought to be registered and the surveyor's certificate
o Applicant filed a motion praying the court that the
Director of Lands and/or the Land Registration
Commission be directed to approve subdivision plan Psu61470, wherein it appeared that the lots sought to be
registered are parts of a bigger lot identified in said
subdivision plan as Lot No. 21
- Court denied the motion in that the application being a
registration of land, had nothing to do with the approval of
the subdivision plan
- The court issued another order, this time for amendment of
the application in order to include the respective postal
addresses of the adjoining owners named therein
- February 23, 1968 - The court issued an order dismissing the
application for warrant of jurisdiction, based on the finding
that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of

a bigger tract, of land and that the notice of initial hearing did
not delineate accurately the portions of the land involved in
the registration proceeding
Hence this appeal
Fewkes contends that since the published description includes
the motions being registered, then the court below erred in
declaring itself without jurisdiction over the proceeding
o No need for further publication to vest jurisdiction
o Petitioners argument: the publication of the bigger
tract of land, jurisdiction over the said property, that
was part of the bigger land, was acquired by the court
below
Under Section 21 of the Land Registration Act an application
for registration of land is required to contain:
o A description of the land subject of the proceeding
o The name, status and address of the applicant, as well
as the names and addresses of all occupants of the land
and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown,
of the steps taken to locate them
o When the application is set by the court for initial
hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing),
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest
in the lot being registered and the adjoining owners,
and indicating the location, boundaries and technical
description of the land being registered, shall be
published in the Official Gazette for two consecutive
times
An essential basis for jurisdiction
It is only when there is constructive seizure of
the land, effected by the publication and notice,
that jurisdiction over the res is vested on the
court
It is the technical description of these 2 smaller lots, therefore,
that must be published in order that the persons who may be
affected by their registration may be notified thereof
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
25
BENIN v. TUASON,
53 SCRA 531 (1974)
Facts:
*** My aplologies to all. This is a long case which consolidated 3 civil
cases. The facts in the original case are very confusing as well. What is
important is to take note of the flow of the facts with regard to the
instance of application, which is the core issue of the case***
Plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of the
three parcels of agricultural lands located in the barrio of La Loma
(now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan,
province of Rizal, ; that they inherited said parcels of land from their
ancestor Sixto Benin, who in turn inherited the same from his father,
Eugenio Benin; that they and their predecessors in interest had
possessed these three parcels of land openly, adversely, and
peacefully, cultivated the same and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested therefrom.a
During the cadastral survey by the Bureau of Lands of the lands in
Barrio San Jose in 1933 Sixto Benin and herein plaintiffs claim the
ownership over said parcels of land; that they declared said lands for
taxation purposes in 1940 under Tax Declaration No. 2429; that after
the outbreak of the last World War, or sometime in 1942 and
subsequently thereafter, evacuees from Manila and other places, after
having secured the permission of the plaintiffs, constructed their
houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs.
While they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, the
defendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc.,
through their agents and representatives, with the aid of armed men,
by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing
equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and
destroying the dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as
well as the improvements consisting of rice paddies (pilapiles),
bamboos and fruit trees, and permanent improvements such as old
roads, old bridges and other permanent landmarks within and
outside the lands in question, disregarding the objections of plaintiffs,

and as a result plaintiffs were deprived of the rentals received from
their lessees; that plaintiffs made inquiries regarding the probable
claim of defendants, and in 1953 they discovered for the first time that
their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been
fraudulently or erroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud
The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the
registered owners mentioned in Original Certificate of Title No. 735
had applied for the registration of two parcels of land (known as the
Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate), located in the
municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of Rizal,
of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of
8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were
docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the
application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the
boundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa
Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2 (Diliman Estate) was published in the
Official Gazette; that before the decision was handed down in LRC
No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel
No. 1 were altered and amended; that the amendments and
alterations, which were made after the publication of the original
application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision
was rendered in LRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that
pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 a decree of registration was
issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing the
registration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land
(Santa Mesa Estate and Diliman Estate); that the decision dated March
7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land
Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack
of publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision
of March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the
beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a void decision and
because the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas appearing in
the decree are different and not identical with the boundaries,
technical descriptions and areas in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the area of parcel No. 1 as
mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is bigger than the area of parcel No. 1
appearing in the application for registration as published in the
Official Gazette; that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to
26
parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate), is also null and void from the beginning
because it was issued pursuant to a void decree of registration; that
the area, boundaries and technical description of Parcel No. 1
appearing in Decree of Registration No. 17431 and in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 are different from the area, boundaries and
technical description appearing in the application for registration as
published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not been
notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants
knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence,
the names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in
interest who were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed,
in possession and were cultivating the lands described in paragraph V
of their respective complaint; and that during, before, and even after
the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 the defendants had
tacitly recognized the ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective
lands because said defendants had never disturbed the possession
and cultivation of the lands by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and
that all transfer certificates of title issued subsequently, based on
Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also null and void. 3
The records show, and it is established by the evidence, that sometime
in 1911 Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y
de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y
de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, filed with the
Court of Land Registration an application for the registration of their
title over two parcels of land, designated in the survey plans
accompanying the application as Parcel 1 with an area of 8,798,617
square meters, and Parcel 2 with an area of 16,254,037 square meters.
The application was docketed as LRC No. 7681. There was another
application covering three other parcels of land, docketed as LRC No.
7680. The application in LRC No. 7681 was set for hearing on
November 20, 1911 (Exh. X). The application and the notice of
hearing, containing the technical descriptions of the two parcels of
land applied for, were published in the issue of the Official Gazette.
Court of Land Registration issued an order of general default against
the whole world except the Insular Government, the Director of
Lands and the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte
(Exh. 28). On December 23, 1911 the court issued an order authorizing
the amendment of the plan in LRC No. 7681 (Exh. 23). November 11,

1913 the applicants and the Government entered into an agreement
whereby the Government agreed to withdraw its opposition to the
application for registration of title over the portion known as
Hacienda Diliman (Parcel 2) on condition that the roads existing on
said tract of land be allowed to remain, and it was further agreed "that
the issuance, of the title to applicants shall be made subject to all the
exceptions established by Section 39 of Act 496 as amended by Section
1 of Act 2011" (Exh. 21). On December 29, 1913 the Court of Land
Registration rendered a decision (Exh. 24) in both LRC No. 7680 and
LRC No. 7681 which, among others, stated that during the
registration proceedings the plans accompanying the two applications
were amended in order to exclude certain areas that were the subject
of opposition, that the order of general default was confirmed, that
the Chief of the Surveyor's Division of the Court of Land Registration
was ordered to submit a report as to whether or not the new
(amended) plans had included lands which were not by the original
plans, and whether or not the new plans had excluded the lands that
had already been covered by the decree in LRC No. 3563. The
decision further stated that in the event that the new plans did not
include new parcels of land and that the lands that were the subject of
the proceedings in LRC No. 3563 had been excluded, an additional
decision would be made decreeing the adjudication and registration
of the lands that were the subject of the registration proceedings in
favor of the applicants, as follows: To Mariano Severo Tuason y de la
Paz, two sixths (2/6) undivided portion to Teresa Eriberta Tuason y
de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Juan Jose Tuason y de
la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion; to Demetrio Asuncion
Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6)undivided portion; and to Augusto
Huberto Tuason y de la Paz, one sixth (1/6) undivided portion
27
the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section
24 of the same act, the court may at anytime order an application to be
amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the
application. The amendment may be made in application or in the
survey plan, or in both since the application and survey plan go
together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application
for registration an area or parcel of land not previously included in
the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not
previously included in the original application, as published, a new
publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of
the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the
amended application. Without a new publication, the registration court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the
area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration
court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included
land. The reason is because without a new publication, the law is
infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration
proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to
present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of
failure of notice. But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a
portion of the area covered by the original application and the
original plan as previously published, a new publication is not
necessary. In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court is not affected
by the failure of a new application.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. BENITEZ,
ET AL., 16 SCRA 557 (1966)
Ratio:
In a cadastral proceeding, Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of

a parcel of land situated in Tacloban City.
However, 26 years after the adjudication, Benitez and Brillo filed a
petition before the same cadastral court for reopening of the cadastral
proceedings claiming that through oversight, inadvertence and
excusable neglect, a portion of the said lot containing 1,805 sq.m has
not been included in the original survey.
Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order
an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to
The proceeding was commenced pursuant to R.A. 931. The court a

quo issued an order granting to Benitez and Brillo the right to claim
Issue: W/N the amendment in the application was proper

Held:

the portion which allegedly was not included in their original title
while authorizing at the same time a licensed surveyor to make a
survey of the portion that was then being claimed and submit a report
thereon to the Director of Lands for his approval.
Accordingly, the surveyor submitted on July 20, 1960 his report, and
on April 14, 1962 the court a quo rendered judgment declaring Benitez
and his wife owners of the additional portion which they claimed to
be their own in their petition which this time was declared to contain
an area of 3,745 sq.m.
This decision having become final, the spouses moved on June 7, 1962
for a writ of execution of the judgment and of possession of the
additional portion of land that had been adjudicated to them.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Director of
Lands, filed a motion to set aside the same judgment on the ground,
that said decision was a nullity for the reason that the court a quo did
not acquire jurisdiction to act on the petition of Emilio Benitez and his
wife for the reopening of the cadastral proceedings for lack of the
requisite publication and notice as required by law.
Held:
There is no question that respondents Benitez and his wife may file a
petition for reopening of the said Cadastral Case pursuant to Republic
Act No. 931.
The petition for reopening should be filed in the same cadastral
proceedings where the original lands were surveyed and adjudicated
and in pursuance of the procedure laid down in the Cadastral Act.
Thus, besides filing the petition for reopening, it is necessary that
notice thereof be given to those persons who claim an adverse interest
in the land sought to be registered, as well as the general public, by
publishing such notice in two successive issues of the Official Gazette,
which shall likewise be posted in a conspicuous place on the new land
to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal building of the city or
municipality in which the same is situated, as required in Section 1 of
the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259).
28
Another factor that should be considered is the reservation which the
very Republic Act No. 931 makes insofar as the right of a claimant to
have an additional portion of land registered in his name is concerned
in the sense that it can only be entertained if it does not refer "to such
parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted,
or authorized provisionally or permanently disposed of by the
Government." Here it appears that the additional portion of land
claimed by respondents is actually occupied by persons who claim to
be entitled to it by virtue of lease applications or permits granted to
them by the Bureau of Lands, as may be gleaned from the following
portions of the report submitted by the surveyor appointed by the
court:
Lot 1, is an integral part of the property of Attorney Emilio
Benitez which was not included in the cadastral survey of
Tacloban, but now occupied by squatters, who claimed that
they have applied under lease applications and some under
Revocable Permits which they have been paying for many
years to the Bureau of Lands.
The survey of Lot 1 as ordered by the Honorable Court was
not finished, due to the fact that in surveying same it will
result to not less than twenty lots, whose occupants and
claimants are holders of permits to occupy their respective
areas issued by the Bureau of Lands, and paid rentals to the
government for many years. The squatters have introduced
improvements (buildings) covering the total area shown as Lot
1 in the attached sketch.
Because of these adverse claimants there is need that the matter be
threshed out in an appropriate action with due notice to said
claimants and to the Director of Lands from whom their title thereto is
said to have emanated under the Public Land Act. Such matter,
certainly, cannot be looked into in the present proceeding because of
the limited jurisdiction of the cadastral court.
Wherefore, petition is hereby granted.

LTD Digests 2

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

LTD Digests 2

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. COURT OF APPEALS,

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

In 1964, the Congress enacted R.A. 3990, an Act establishing an

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also

Issue: Whether or not UP is the owner of the portion of timberland in

Issue: W/N the lot in question can be subject of registration and

The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

It is evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

have fenced off the disputed area in contravention of the

All riverbanks are of public ownershipincluding those formed

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

summons, defendants (Eusebio and Lara) failed to file their

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

owners for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Admittedly, the land in question had been declared public land in a

Thus, a judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not

Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,

participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a

The Petition is DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of

The CFI Laguna dismissed the application for registration.

Issue: W/N there is a claim of ownership by Santos del Rio

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Petitioners-oppositors tried to appeal but the LRC denied

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT v. COURT OF APPEALS,

promised to sell the lot to Lina later, hence the Condiitional

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

that the properties sought to be registered only formed part of

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

In a cadastral proceeding, Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of

The proceeding was commenced pursuant to R.A. 931. The court a

Issue: W/N the amendment in the application was proper

Land titles and Deeds Complied Digest

You might also like